Daily Intelligencer O R A L H I S T O R I E S MAY 29, 2014 7 New Yorkers Remember the Early Days of the AIDS Epidemic By Tim Murphy On Sunday HBO premiered The Normal Heart, Ryan Murphy’s long-awaited film adaptation of Larry Kramer’s landmark 1985 play about gay men in New York fighting back against government indifference to the AIDSepidemic. The film captured an era unfamiliar to young gay people, who came of age amid lifesaving HIV medications, but full of emotional memories for its middle-aged survivors. We reached out to dozens of them — living both with and without HIV — to ask what moments they remember most vividly from those years, which were terrifying and grief-filled but also sometimes exhilarating and empowering as AIDS street activism flourished in the latter half of the ’80s. Harold Levine, 57, marketing consultant, HIV-negative I remember the spring of 1981, standing in Cahoots, the gay bar on Columbus and 80th Street. It was the middle of the day; we had probably just had brunch. There was a restaurant in back with big rattan peacock chairs, and the sun was streaming in the windows. I was talking with a group of guys from Boston, and one of them said that a friend of his had just died from “that new gay cancer.” None of us had heard of it, and we asked for more details. “He got sick, went to the hospital, and was dead in a few weeks,” we were told. At that time we were always hearing of gay men’s diseases, but they were almost always STDs. We just didn’t know how to get our heads around “gay cancer.” It was a few months before I heard about a second case, then the floodgates opened and it was all we could talk about. ADVERTISEMENT John Blair, age withheld, club promoter, HIV-negative I owned a gay gym, The Body Center, on Sixth Avenue from 1978 to 1985. In early 1981, one of our young trainers, very good-looking with a beautiful body, got sick and went back to Pennsylvania to his family. Four months later, we got a call from his sister saying he was very sick and the doctors did not think he would last the week. We jumped into our car and raced to his bedside. I cannot tell you the horror I felt as I walked into his hospital room and saw this old man in bed with tubes in his arms and nose. He was skin and bones and could barely talk. To see this once-young, healthy boy deteriorate so fast was devastating. Unfortunately, it was a picture and a situation that would play out over and over for the next decade. The Normal Heart is our legacy to this generation. What you see on that screen is true and very painful to watch, but it’s also important to remember all the beautiful people that were taken from us in such a horrible fashion. Tim Miller, 55, performance artist, HIV-negative It was the summer of 1981 — that summer of the first New York Times storyon the yetunnamed AIDS — and I was 22 and had just broken up with my boyfriend, John Bernd, with whom I had done a bunch of performances in the East Village. A couple of months after we broke up, John was at the dentist and under the hygienist’s vigorous scraping, his gums started to bleed and wouldn’t stop. The hygienist applied gauze, but nothing seemed to stanch the flow. The dentist became quite perplexed and admitted John to Bellevue for tests. “It seems my blood has lost the ability to clot,” John told me over the phone from the hospital. “They want to check me for all kinds of things. They’re testing my blood for platelets, whatever they are.” “Well, I’m sure it’s no big deal,” I lied, vaguely aware of some disturbing rumors that had been afoot about some gay men who were sick. “I’ll come by later today and visit.” Surely this “gay cancer” could only affect older West Village mustached disco queens who went to the baths every day, not youthful smooth-faced East Village anarchist performance artists in skinny neckties. I was wrong about that. Stephen Pevner, 54, film and theater producer, HIV-negative I distinctly remember reading a New York Times article about a rapidly spreading cancer affecting gay men in New York, San Francisco, and Los Angeles on a train ride up to New York from Baltimore, my hometown. It was July 5, 1981, and I was moving to New York to live with my college roommate who had graduated a year earlier. I remember the date because I had secured a job interview to gopher at a talent agency and they were only available to meet after the July 4th weekend. At the time, there was a huge herpes scare, so my friends and I would hang on to any news about STDs. The 350-square-foot efficiency apartment I was going to share was located on far West 71st Street, where three of the six studio apartments were occupied by AfricanAmericans. One gentleman, James Johnson, worked in the publicity department at Paramount Pictures and would invite me to movie screenings. By the end of the summer, he and the other two black guys in the building were dead. I would run into each of them frequently enough, but I never saw any of them deteriorate. It was that fast. So fast that the landlord was having trouble turning over the rent-stabilized apartments, so I was able to secure one for another college buddy. A couple of years later, the Times obits section was commonly referred to as the Gay Sports Page, because we would count the number of apparent AIDS-related deaths before checking the other news. John T., 55, accountant, HIV-positive On July 4, 1981, a beautiful summer day, we gathered at my friend Carol’s studio apartment in Kips Bay — Carol, Alfred, and myself — before we all went to one of the beaches reachable via public transportation. This was our first summer in New York after college. We had gone to Coney Island on Memorial Day, and vowed to go to the next beach eastward every weekend that summer, hoping to make it to Montauk by Labor Day. I think we were going to Brighton or Jones Beach that weekend. There was a day-old copy of the New York Times at Carol’s. One of us noticed a small article inside the front section with the headline “Rare Cancer Seen in 41 Homosexuals.” We discussed this story as we headed for sun and sand. The news felt simultaneously distant and ominous. We were just starting to venture into the gay scene; Alfred and I, who were best friends, frequented Julius, The Ninth Circle, and Uncle Charlie’s South, but were only beginning to meet other gay men. The article said that the victims had “multiple and frequent sexual encounters with different partners, as many as ten sexual encounters each night up to four times a week.” That wasn’t us. Alfred died in 1989, the same year I tested positive myself. I got a call about him from our friend Andrew while I was in a department store, with Tiananmen Square tanks on TV. We were all a few years younger than the generation that was mowed down by the initial wave of infections, so I lost relatively few people compared to men older than I. Sean Strub, 56, diagnosed with HIV in 1985, founder POZ magazineand The Sero Project One Saturday in May of 1983 I was having breakfast at a diner in New Hope, Pennsylvania, where I had a weekend place, with Rupert Smith and his boyfriend, Patrick McAllister. Rupert was an artist who worked for Andy Warhol as a screen printer. Over scrambled eggs, Rupert casually said, “I guess you’ve heard about Robert,” referring to someone I was fond of and had dated. I felt a chill. “No, what about Robert?” I asked. “I heard he’s got it,” was all Rupert needed to say. That led us to talk about Joe McDonald, a prominent model who had died a few weeks before. Patrick said that he was worried about a ménage à trois he and Rupert had had with someone who had dated Joe. My mind was stuck on the news about Robert, worrying about him and myself, thinking back to all the times he and I had had condomless sex. Then my attention fixed on a small oblong purple spot near Patrick’s left earlobe. It was about as wide as the tip of a pencil eraser and about the same color. I had seen guys on the street and at AIDS benefits, but their lesions were bigger and darker than Patrick’s. Did he know it was there? Should I say something? There was no etiquette in the situation. Just then Rupert said, “But Patrick and I got checked out by our doctor, and we’re okay.” I was flustered for a moment, then heard myself blurt out, “Did the doctor see that spot?” I pointed at Patrick’s ear. Rupert took a peek, and his face changed. “I don’t think that was there a couple of days ago,” he said. Patrick, who could be prickly, said belligerently, “What? Now you think I have AIDS? Thanks a lot!” He left the table to look in the bathroom mirror and returned with an ashen face. I felt guilty, like it was my fault for having noticed the spot. (This has been adapted from Strub’s memoir, Body Counts.) Perry Halkitis, 51, researcher, author of The AIDS Generation I grew up in NYC but all through high school I was in the closet. I was kid from Queens with a mullet, a dress shirt unbuttoned to my abs, and Jordache jeans. At 18, after my first semester at Columbia, I ventured into my first gay bar — The Eagle. I loved what I saw but no one seemed to notice me. A week later I returned there with Levi’s and a tight white tee, a crew cut, and three days of razor stubble. My fortunes quickly changed. Flash forward to 1988. My blood was drawn by my physician, labeled in collection tubes, and placed in a brown paper bag. It was then my responsibility to deliver the specimens to the Health Department lab on First Avenue. I placed the bag though a metal collection chute and waited two weeks for the results. I was at work when the doctor called to tell me, over the phone, that I’d tested positive. Time stood still. I felt myself outside my body, and yet the world was spinning. I didn’t think the end was near, just soon to come. That anxiety and sense of being outside myself exists to this day every time I see my doctor. I’m always expecting to hear something bad and that my time is up. I called my partner at the time, Robert Massa. It had been his love that had encouraged me to test. When I got home, we went about our business. I had suspected that I was positive. One of the first men I had sex with had died in 1985. So while it was shocking, it was not unexpected. The next day I made a doctor’s appointment. I remember thinking how futile it was to even go see a doctor, but I guess deep down inside I knew that I should be connected to care. I’ve had a doctor’s appointment every three months since 1988. Editor’s Note: AIDS deaths in New York City peaked in 1994, by which point almost 50,000 had died. Late the following year, new drugs called protease inhibitors emerged, becoming part of a drug cocktail that sent AIDSmortalities plunging. According to the New York State Health department, 3,400 New Yorkers were diagnosed with HIV in 2012, compared to 15,000 in 1993. Arguments Supporting the Bomb I Argument #1: The Bomb Saved American Lives The main argument in support of the decision to use the atomic bomb is that it saved American lives which would otherwise have been lost in two D-Day-style land invasions of the main islands of the Japanese homeland. The first, against the Southern island of Kyushu, had been scheduled for November 1 (Operation Torch). The second, against the main island of Honshu would take place in the spring of 1946 (Operation Coronet). The two operations combined were codenamed Operation Downfall. There is no doubt that a land invasion would have incurred extremely high casualties, for a variety of reasons. For one, Field Marshall Hisaichi Terauchi had ordered that all 100,000 Allied prisoners of war be executed if the Americans invaded. Second, it was apparent to the Japanese as much as to the Americans that there were few good landing sites, and that Japanese forces would be concentrated there. Third, there was real concern in Washington that the Japanese had decided to fight, literally, to the death. Many Japanese saw suicide as an honorable alternative to surrender. For American military commanders, determining the strength of Japanese forces and anticipating the level of civilian resistance were the keys to preparing casualty projections. Numerous studies were conducted, with widely varying results. Some of the studies estimated American casualties for just the first 30 days of Operation Torch. Such a study done by General MacArthur’s staff in June estimated 23,000 US casualties. U.S. Army Chief of Staff George Marshall thought the Americans would suffer 31,000 casualties in the first 30 days, while Admiral Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations, put them between 31,000 and 41,000. Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral Chester Nimitz, whose staff conducted their own study, estimated 49,000 U.S casualties in the first 30 days, including 5,000 at sea from Kamikaze attacks. Studies estimating total U.S. casualties were equally varied and no less grim. One by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in April 1945 resulted in an estimate of 1,200,000 casualties, with 267,000 fatalities. Admiral Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, estimated 268,000 casualties (35%). Former President Herbert Hoover sent a memorandum to President Truman and Secretary of War Stimson, with “conservative” estimates of 500,000 to 1,000,000 fatalities. A study done for Secretary of War Henry Stimson's staff by William Shockley estimated the costs at 1.7 to 4 million American casualties, including 400,000-800,000 fatalities. General Douglas MacArthur had been chosen to command US invasion forces for Operation Downfall, and his staff conducted their own study. In June their prediction was American casualties of 105,000 after 120 days of combat. Mid-July intelligence estimates placed the number of Japanese soldiers in the main islands at under 2,000,000, but that number increased sharply in the weeks that followed as more units were repatriated from Asia for the final homeland defense. By late July, MacArthur’s Chief of Intelligence, General Charles Willoughby, revised the estimate and predicted American casualties on Kyushu alone (Operation Torch) would be 500,000, or ten times what they had been on Okinawa. Argument 2: It Was Necessary to Shorten the War Another concurrent argument supporting the use of the bomb is that it achieved its primary objective of shortening the war. The bombs were dropped on August 6 and 9. The next day, the Japanese requested a halting of the war. On August 14 Emperor Hirohito announced to the Japanese people that they would surrender, and the United States celebrated V-J Day (Victory over Japan). Military planners had wanted the Pacific war finished no later than a year after the fall of Nazi Germany. The rationale was the belief that in a democracy, there is only so much that can be asked of its citizen soldiers (and of the voting public). As Army Chief of Staff George Marshall later put it, “a democracy cannot fight a Seven Years’ war.” By the summer of 1945 the American military was exhausted, and the sheer number of troops needed for Operation Downfall meant that not only would the troops in the Pacific have to make one more landing, but even many of those troops whose valor and sacrifice had brought an end to the Nazi Third Reich were to be sent Pacific. Supporters of the bomb wonder if it was reasonable to ask even more sacrifice of these men. Argument 3: Only the Bomb Convinced the Emperor to Intervene A third concurrent argument defending the bomb is the observation that even after the first two bombs were dropped, and the Russians had declared war, the Japanese still almost did not surrender. The Japanese cabinet convened in emergency session on August 7. Military authorities refused to concede that the Hiroshima bomb was atomic in nature and refused to consider surrender. The following day, Emperor Hirohito privately expressed to Prime Minister Togo his determination that the war should end, and the cabinet was convened again on August 9. At this point Prime Minister Suzuki agreed, but a unanimous decision was required and three of the military chiefs still refused to admit defeat. Some in the leadership argued that there was no way the Americans could have refined enough fissionable material to produce more than one bomb. But then the bombing of Nagasaki had demonstrated otherwise. Even so, hours of meetings and debates lasting well into the early morning hours of the 10th still resulted in a 3-3 deadlock. Prime Minister Suzuki then took the unprecedented step of asking Emperor Hirohito, who never spoke at cabinet meetings, to break the deadlock. Hirohito responded: “I have given serious thought to the situation prevailing at home and abroad and have concluded that continuing the war can only mean destruction for the nation and prolongation of bloodshed and cruelty in the world. I cannot bear to see my innocent people suffer any longer.” Arguments Supporting the Bomb II Argument 4: The Decision was made by a Committee of Shared Responsibility Supporters of President Truman's decision to use atomic weapons point out that the President did not act unilaterally, but was supported by a committee of shared responsibility. The Interim Committee, created in May 1945, was primarily tasked with providing advice to the President on all matters pertaining to nuclear energy. Most of its work focused on the role of the bomb after the war. But the committee did consider the question of its use against Japan. Secretary of War Henry Stimson chaired the committee. Truman's personal representative was James F. Byrnes, former U.S. Senator and Truman's pick to be Secretary of State. The committee sought the advice of four physicists from the Manhattan Project, including Enrico Fermi and J. Robert Oppenheimer. The scientific panel wrote, "We see no acceptable alternative to direct military use." The final recommendation to the President was arrived at on June 1. Supporters of Truman's decision thus argue that the President, in dropping the bomb, was simply following the recommendation of the most experienced military, political, and scientific minds in the nation, and to do otherwise would have been grossly negligent. Argument #5: The Japanese Were Given Fair Warning (Potsdam Declaration) Supporters of Truman’s decision to use the atomic bomb point out that Japan had been given ample opportunity to surrender. On July 26, with the knowledge that the Los Alamos test had been successful, President Truman and the Allies issued a final ultimatum to Japan, known as the Potsdam Declaration (Truman was in Potsdam, Germany at the time). Although it had been decided by Prime Minster Churchill and President Roosevelt back at the Casablanca Conference that the Allies would accept only unconditional surrender from the Axis, the Potsdam Declaration does lay out some terms of surrender. The government responsible for the war would be dismantled, there would be a military occupation of Japan, and the nation would be reduced in size to pre-war borders. The military, after being disarmed, would be permitted to return home to lead peaceful lives. Assurance was given that the allies had no desire to enslave or destroy the Japanese people, but there would be war crimes trials. Peaceful industries would be allowed to produce goods, and basic freedoms of speech, religion, and thought would be introduced. The document concluded with an ultimatum: "We call upon the Government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all the Japanese armed forces...the alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction. To bomb supporters, the Potsdam Declaration was more than fair in its surrender terms and in its warning of what would happen should those terms be rejected. The Japanese did not respond to the declaration. Argument 6: The atom bomb was in retaliation for Japanese barbarism Although it is perhaps not the most civilized of arguments, Americans with an “eye for an eye” philosophy of justice argue that the atomic bomb was payback for the undeniably brutal, barbaric, criminal conduct of the Japanese Army. Pumped up with their own version of master race theories, the Japanese military committed atrocities throughout Asia and the Pacific. They raped women, forced others to become sexual slaves, murdered civilians, and tortured and executed prisoners. Most famously, in a six-week period following the Japanese capture of the Chinese city of Nanjing, Japanese soldiers (and some civilians) went on a rampage. They murdered several hundred thousand unarmed civilians, and raped between 20,000-80,000 men, women and children. With regards to Japanese conduct specific to Americans, there is the obvious “back-stabbing” aspect of the “surprise” attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. That the Japanese government was still engaged in good faith diplomatic negotiations with the State Department at the very moment the attack was underway is a singular instance of barbaric behavior that bomb supporters point to as just cause for using the atom bomb. President Truman said as much when he made his August 6 radio broadcast to the nation about Hiroshima: “The Japanese began the war from the air at Pearl Harbor. They have been repaid many fold.” Argument 7: The Manhattan Project Expense Required Use of the Bomb The Manhattan Project had been initiated by Roosevelt back in 1939, five years before Truman was asked to be on the Democratic ticket. By the time Roosevelt died in April 1945, almost 2 billion dollars of taxpayer money had been spent on the project. The Manhattan Project was the most expensive government project in history at that time. The President's Chief of Staff, Admiral Leahy, said, "I know FDR would have used it in a minute to prove that he had not wasted $2 billion.” Bomb supporters argue that the pressure to honor the legacy of FDR, who had been in office for so long that many Americans could hardly remember anyone else ever being president, was surely enormous. The political consequences of such a waste of expenditures, once the public found out, would have been disastrous for the Democrats for decades to come. (The counter-argument, of course, is that fear of losing an election is no justification for using such a weapon). Arguments Against the Bomb I Argument 1: The Bomb Was Made for Defense Only The origins of the Manhattan Project go back to 1939, when Hungarian-born physicist Leo Szilard, who had moved to the U.S. in 1938 to conduct research at Columbia University, became convinced of the feasibility of using nuclear chain reactions to create new, powerful bombs. German scientists had just conducted a successful nuclear fission experiment, and based on those results, Szilard was able to demonstrate that uranium was capable of producing a nuclear chain reaction. Szilard noted that Germany had stopped the exportation of uranium from Czechoslovakian mines which they had taken over in 1938. He feared that Germany was trying to build an atomic bomb, while the United States was sitting idle. Although WWII had not yet started, Germany was clearly a threat, and if the Germans had a monopoly on the atomic bomb, it could be deployed against anyone, including the United States, without warning. Szilard worked with Albert Einstein, whose celebrity gave him access to the president, to produce a letter informing Roosevelt of the situation. Their warning eventually resulted in the Manhattan Project. Bomb opponents argue that the atomic bomb was built as a defensive weapon, not an offensive one. It was intended to be a deterrent, to make Germany or any other enemy think twice before using such a weapon against the United States. Argument 2: Use of the Bomb was Illegal On September 39, 1938, the League of Nations, "under the recognized principles of international law," issued a unanimous resolution outlawing the intentional bombing of civilian populations, with special emphasis against bombing military objectives from the air. The League warned, "Any attack on legitimate military objectives must be carried out in such a way that civilian populations in the neighborhood are not bombed through negligence." Significantly, the resolution also reaffirmed that "the use of chemical or bacterial methods in the conduct of war is contrary to international law." In other words, a special category of illegal weapons had been recognized, a category today called Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Moreover, America presented itself to the world as a model for human rights, the U.S. should aspire to at least meet the basic code of conduct agreed to by the rest of the civilized world. Finally, nuclear weapons were not specifically outlawed because they did not exist, but as a weapon of mass destruction, they most certainly would have been. Argument 3: The Atomic Bomb Was Inhumane The logical conclusion to the list of arguments against the bomb is that use of such a weapon was simply inhumane. Hundreds of thousands of civilians with no democratic rights to oppose their militarist government, including women and children, were vaporized, turned into charred blobs of carbon, horrifically burned, buried in rubble, speared by flying debris, and saturated with radiation. Entire families, whole neighborhoods were simply wiped out. The survivors faced radiation sickness, starvation, and crippling mutilations. Then there were the “hidden cracks,” the spiritual, emotional, and psychological damage. Japanese outside of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, scared and ignorant about radiation sickness, treated bomb victims as if they had a communicable disease. They were shunned and ostracized from Japanese society. Some blamed themselves for various reasons—like a woman who convinced her parents to move to Hiroshima before the bomb was dropped, or those who were the only survivor of a family, or of an entire school. Others, unable to cope with trauma left untreated, committed suicide. Radiation continued to haunt the survivors, bringing a lifetime of sickness, not the least of which was an increase in the rates of various cancers. Birth defects for those pregnant at the time jumped significantly, and although the data on birth defects passed down through generations is inconclusive (Hiroshima and Nagasaki are ongoing laboratories of the long-term effects of radiation exposure), bomb survivors and their offspring continue to suffer anxiety about the possibilities. It is impossible to do justice to this argument in a simple summary of the arguments. A few specific first-hand accounts could be repeated here, but they would be insufficient. To truly grasp the magnitude of the suffering caused by the use of atomic weaponry on human beings, one has to be immersed in the personal. The cold statistics must give way to the human story. For some Americans that process began with the publication of John Hersey’s Hiroshima in 1946. Even some of those who participated in the mission had regrets. Captain Robert A. Lewis, co-pilot on the Enola Gay’s mission over Hiroshima, wrote in his log as the bomb exploded, “My god, what have we done?” In 1955, he participated in an episode of the television show This is Your Life that featured a Hiroshima survivor. Lewis donated money on behalf of his employer for operations to help remove the scar tissue of young Japanese women horribly disfigured by the bomb ten years earlier. Argument 4: Use of the Atomic Bombs Was Racially Motivated Opponents of President Truman’s decision to use the atomic bomb argue that racism played an important role in the decision; that had the bomb been ready in time it never would have been used against Germany. All of America’s enemies were magazine advertisements, and in a wide array of novelty items ranging from ash trays to “Jap Hunting License” buttons. Even Tarzan, in one of the last novels written by his creator Edgar Rice Burroughs, spent time in the Pacific hunting and killing Japs. Numerous songs advocated killing all Japanese. The popular novelty hit, “Remember Pearl Harbor” by Carson Robison, for example, urges Americans to “wipe the Jap from the map.” It continues: Remember how we used to call them our "little brown brothers?" What a laugh that turned out to be Well, we can all thank God that we're not related To that yellow scum of the sea They talked of peace, and of friendship We found out just what all that talk was worth All right, they've asked for it, and now they're going to get it We'll blow every one of them right off of the face of the Earth Although stereotyped and caricatured in home front propaganda was common for all foes, there was a clear difference in the nature of that propaganda. Although there were crude references to Germans as “krauts,” and Italians as “Tonies” or “spaghettis,” the vast majority of ridicule was directed at their political leadership. Hitler, Nazis, and Italy’s Mussolini were routinely caricatured, but the German and Italian people weren’t. By Japanese as threats not because of their political education, but because of their genetics. As further evidence, bomb opponents point to US policy toward the Japanese-Americans living in California at the time. They were rounded up, denied their basic liberties under the Constitution (even though many of them were American citizens), and sent to isolated camps in the deserts, surrounded by barbed wire, until the war’s end. Nothing on this scale was done to the Germans during WWII, or even during the First World War, when there were millions of German and Austrian immigrants and their children living in the United States. In May 1944 Life magazine reported on the hardships of George Yamamoto, a Japanese-American who had immigrated to the US in 1920 at the age of 17 to work on his family’s farm. In 1942 Mr. Yamamoto worked at a fish market, ran a sporting goods store, and was a solid member of his community, along with his wife and children. They were interned, but Mr. Yamamoto applied for a relocation program, was cleared by the US government as loyal and trustworthy and was packed off to Delaware to find work. He was run out of town before he could even start, and was relocated to New Jersey, where he was to work on a farm owned by Eddie Kowalick. But the citizens of New Jersey were no more accommodating. They feared an influx of Jap workers and didn't want their kids sitting next to "yellow" children in school. A petition to evict Yamamoto was circulated, there were multiple threats of violence against him, and one of Mr. Kowalick's barns was burned to the ground. After threats were made against the life of Mr. Kowalick's baby, he felt he had no choice but to ask Mr. Yamamoto to move on. Three weeks after Life printed this story, they printed letters written in response. contrast, anti-Japanese racism in American society targeted the Japanese as a race of people, and demonstrated a level of hatred comparable with Nazi antiJewish propaganda. The Japanese were universally caricatured as having huge buck teeth, massive fangs dripping with saliva, and monstrous thick glasses through which they leered with squinty eyes. They were further dehumanized as being snakes, cockroaches, and rats, and their entire culture was mocked, including language, customs, and religious beliefs. Anti-Japanese imagery was everywhere—in Bugs Bunny cartoons, popular music, post cards, and children’s toys. Americans didn’t like Mussolini, Hitler, and Nazis, but many hated the Japanese race. Arguments Against the Bomb II Argument 5: There Were Alternatives Supporters of President Truman’s decision to use atomic weapons against Japan tend to paint the decision as a difficult choice between two stark options—it was either American boys, or the bomb. Opponents of the bomb are adamant that there were other options available to the President, which at the very least should have been tried before resorting to the bomb. One alternative might have been to arrange a demonstration of the bomb. Although the U.S. and Japan had no diplomatic relations after Pearl Harbor, a demonstration might have been arranged discretely through some back channel, perhaps through the Russians. It was already known in Washington that the Japanese had reached out to the Russians earlier to try to arrange some form of mediation with the U.S. Another alternative was to wait for the Russians to intervein. Military analysts working for the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in 1945 believed that two things must happen for the Japanese leadership to surrender. There had to be acceptance of the inevitability of defeat; and a clarification from the Americans that "unconditional surrender" did not mean national annihilation. The JIC believed as early as April 11, 1945, that a Soviet declaration of war on Japan would satisfy the first necessity: By the autumn of 1945, we believe that the vast majority of Japanese will realize the inevitability of absolute defeat regardless of whether the U.S.S.R. has actually entered the war against Japan. If at any time the U.S.S.R. should enter the war, all Japanese will realize that absolute defeat is inevitable. Many also argued that the United State should allow the Japanese to keep their emperor. The American government clearly understood that if they harmed the emperor, whom the Japanese revered as a god, the Japanese would resist forever. And the key to this argument lies in the fact that the American government already planned on letting the emperor stay. All they had to do was find a way to hint their intentions loud enough for the Japanese to hear. Although there was certainly no guarantee that taking this action would bring about a Japanese surrender, bomb opponents argue that it was at least worth a try (although bomb supporters counter-argue that doing so could have been interpreted as a weakness by the Japanese military leadership and could actually have emboldened the Japanese to fight on). Instead, the Japanese ignored the Potsdam Declaration, the atomic bombs were dropped, the Japanese surrendered, and the Americans, as planned, allowed the emperor to stay on the throne (where he remained until his death in 1989). Argument #6: Use of the bomb was more to scare Russia than to defeat Japan. As discussed above, bomb opponents question why the United States used atomic bombs on August 6 and 9, when they knew the Russians were going to declare war on Japan a week later, and when Operation Torch wasn’t scheduled for months. Why not wait? Bomb opponents believe that the American government did not wait for the Russians because they were already thinking about the post-war world and how they could best limit Soviet gains when they redrew the map of Europe. They believed the shock-and-awe effect of using the atomic bomb against Japan would make the Soviet Union more manageable in post-war negotiations. (This argument had been made most consistently by historian Gar Alperovitz). There was certainly reason to be concerned about the Soviet Union. When Germany collapsed, the Russians had made huge advances. Russian troops moved into Hungary and Rumania and showed no inclination to leave there or the Balkans. But was it an acceptable trade-off to annihilate several hundred thousand civilians just so the Russians wouldn’t be able to get in on the kill of Japan, and so the U.S. might have the upper-hand in the post-war world? Bomb opponents are abhorred by the moral implications. In the spring of 1945, as Germany surrendered, some of the scientists who had developed the new weapon as a Nazi deterrent started to have reservations about their invention. One was Leo Szilard, who had written the letter along with Einstein back in 1939 that had convinced Roosevelt to start the Manhattan Project. In April 1945 Einstein wrote a letter of introduction for Szilard, who was able to get a meeting with Mrs. Roosevelt on May 8. But then the President died. When Szilard tried to get a meeting with Truman, he was intercepted by James Byrnes, who received him in his South Carolina home. Szilard’s biggest concern was that the Soviet Union should be informed about the bomb ahead of time. He was afraid that the shock of America using the bomb on Japan would NOT make the Soviets more manageable, but would instead spur them to develop their own atomic bomb as quickly as possible, possibly igniting an arms race that could eventually lead to a nuclear war. But Szilard was talking to exactly the wrong person. Byrnes told Szilard, "Russia might be more manageable if impressed by American military might, and that a demonstration of the bomb [on Japan] might impress Russia." Years later, Szilard wrote of the encounter, "I shared Byrnes' concerns about Russia's throwing her weight around in the post-war period, but I was completely flabbergasted by the assumption that rattling the bomb might make Russia more manageable." He later mused, "How much better off the world might be had I been born in America and become influential in American politics, and had Byrnes been born in Hungary and studied physics." Having met with Szilard, Byrnes was even more firmly convinced of the rightness of his own views. At the Interim Committee meetings, he cut off any debate about warning the Soviets, and Secretary of War Stimson gave in. When Stimson briefed Truman on June 6, he informed the President that the Interim Committee recommended he not tell their Soviet ally about the bomb, “Until the first bomb had been successfully laid on Japan.” But Stimson wasn’t sure how they should handle the meeting with Stalin at Potsdam. Truman replied that he had purposefully delayed the meeting for as long as possible to give the Manhattan scientists more time. Having been counseled by Byrnes, Truman was already thinking about how to handle the Russians. According to historian Gar Alperovitz in the 1985 edition of his work, Atomic Diplomacy, when Truman was on his way to Potsdam, he was overheard by a White House Aide to have said during a discussion about the test bomb and what it meant to America's relationship with the Soviet Union, "If it explodes, as I think it will, I'll certainly have a hammer on those boys." For decades now bomb opponents have cited this story as evidence of Truman’s true intentions. However, a close look at the sources raises questions about Alperovitz’s methods. That story was first told by the White House Aide himself, Jonathan Daniels, in a book published in 1950. Daniels says he had heard the story second-hand and he stated specifically that Truman had been referring to Japan. He only speculated that the President might also have had the Russians in mind. While at Potsdam, Truman received a coded message confirming the success of the test bomb. According to Winston Churchill, it completely changed Truman’s demeanor toward Stalin; made him more confident and bossy. Just before leaving Potsdam, Truman did feel obliged to say something to the Soviet leader. Argument #7: Truman Was Unprepared for Presidential Responsibility Another criticism directed toward President Truman is that he simply wasn’t ready for the responsibility of being president; he didn’t understand the ramifications of his decisions, he delegated too much authority, and he was unduly influenced by Secretary of State James Byrnes. A second criticism of Truman is that he did not keep enough personal control over this terrifying new weapon. The military order to use the bomb, delivered before the Potsdam Declaration had been issued, is an open-ended order in which the Air Force had too much control. The aircraft group that included the Enola Gay was directed to deliver the first atomic bomb, weatherpermitting, on any of the four target cities: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata, or Nagasaki, on or after August 3. GAY LIBERATION FRONT: Program Platform Statement Adopted by Seattle Cay Liberation Front on Tuesday, December 2, 1970 The basic purpose of CLF is the liberation of homosexuel men and women in this society suffer under three principal types of op- pression: 1) Societal oppression: Much of society's oppression of homosexuals stems from ignorance which produces fear, and the consequent alienation of heterosexual society from the recognition of homosexuals as individual men and women. Basically, American society has reacted violently out of fear of the unknown, out of an inability to accept differences from the norms by which they function. Unexposed to a climate in which they can learn about homosexuality, heterosexual society accepts, reinforces, and perpetuates the myths and ignorances regarding homosexuality. This programming becomes increasingly less susceptible to change the more it is reinforced by the rest of the heterosexual society. We are encouraged by an apparent beginning toward change of this atmosphere among young people, who seem increasingly to desire to learn about various life styles and accept individuals as individuels. 2) Psychological appression: The psychological oppression of homosexuals takes two forms. One is an internalized oppression of the homosexuel by himself. This reflects thet programming perpetuated in the society that creates the feeling within many homosexuals that they are somehow "sick" or."perverted." The ramifications of such a feeling for the individual are extremely damaging, since he or she is unable to accept him/herself fully and feel free and healthy in his/her sexuality. The second form of the psychological oppression is homo- sexual's oppression of other homosexuals. Again this reflects entrenched societal programming which causes the homosexual to reflect the sexist views of heterosexuel society onto other homosexuals. Hence, rather than dealing equally with individuals we find homosexuals practicing sexism toward other homosexuals. 3) Legal/Quasi-political oppression: Reinforcing and embodying societal ignoranceis the "legal" oppression of homosexuals. This facet of oppression encompasses a wide range of lawa, discriminatory practices, and more insidious harrassment. This includes laws which prohibit sexual activities between consenting individuals, laws for- bidding bodily contact between two members of the same sex, discrimi- natory hiring practices, to mention only a few. Often even more oppres- sive than the letter of the law and more difficult to deal with is the misuse of legal avenues to harrass homosexuals, particularly as they frequent gay establishments. PROGRAM ACTIONS Taking the above three points in turn, the following are some programmatic actions this group would like to see CLF undertake as part of the struggle against oppression: Homosexuals as they relate to heterosexual society: GLF should undertake whatever avenues are open to them to educate straight society about homosexuality with the aim to alleviate fear by eliminating ignorance. CLF should make tape recordings discussing various facets of homosexuality which would be available for use of interested groups. CLF should have a central Speakers Bureau which would arrange for gays to speak at institutions or organizations requesting a speaker and to pursue and arrange for CLF speakers to par- ticipate in appropriate public porums. GLF should continue and expand its participation in seminar series or classes in experimental colleges and free universities or schools. Although this is probably a ways off, GLF should consider at some future time providing a counseling service for parents of homosexual men and women. Homosexuals as they relate to institutions: GLF should undertake to draw up and disseminate all laws, local ordinances, or semi-legal practicies oppressive to homosexuals. GLF should selectively violate these laws openly, then obtain legal aid in fighting them in the courts. GLF should form a political caucus for those members who wish to struggle against the oppression of homosexuals and other minority groups in a cooperative effort with all oppressed people. Homosexuals dealing with other homosexuals: consciousness raising sessions in which small groups of homo- sexual men, women or both relate on a personal basis to each other in order to collectively build for each other a healty freedom and dignity in coming to terms with their sexuality. small rap groups of male and female homosexuals relating to each other the differences and similarities between male and female homosexual lives. A better understanding between the sexes will help to break down the sexism sometimes prac- ticed by gay men against gay women and vice versa. a GLF library of gey writings should be started and centrally located so that it is available to anyone --gay or straight - - who is interested. Reviews of such articles or books by gay people should also be collected. Additionally, CLF should compile a reading list of publications or periodicals which deal with homosexuality. GLF should undertake to publish a newsletter to inform the gay community of available classes, small rap sessions, current news relating to gay, new books, etc. In this same line, it would be advantageous to have a CLF switchboard so that persons can find out the latest of what's going on. POLITICAL STATEMENT The goals of GLF revolve around social change. In order to accom- plish this social change, political action is necessary. The Gay Liberation Front is interested in homosexuel freedom, but we must realize and support the cause of freedom for all people. We will thus take political action when and where necessary in a manner deemed appropriate by the GLF membership. We too, will support those actions of other groups concerned with the freedom of people to determine their own life petten and recognize all forms of human relatioships as valid. Our goal is to establish a society in whcih all people enjoy freedom of existence and freedom to relate to each other in whatever manner they see fit, without fear of oppression or condemnation.
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