OF PLACE AND TIME. space given, is divisible. ' 101 Wherefore, if it be PAR7T II. divided into 'two equal parts, the part in the -I-» middle, which is A, will be also divided into two equal parts; and therefore A was divisible. CHAPTER VIII. 0F BODY AND ACCIDENT. 1. Body defined—2. Accident defined—3. How an accident may\be understood to be in its subject—4. Magnitude, what it is.—5. Place, what it is, and that it is immovable.— 6. \Vhat is full and empty.—7. Here, there, somewhere, what they signify-8. Many bodies cannot be in one place, nor one body in many places—9. Contiguous and continual, what they are—10. The definition of motion. No motion intelli gible but with time.—11. What it is to be at rest, to have been moved, and to be moved. No motion to be conceived, without the conception of past and future—12. A point, a line, superficies and solid, what they are—13. Equal, greater, and less in bodies and magnitudes, what they are—14‘. One and the same body has always one and the same magnitude. 15. Velocity, what it is.-—16. Equal, greater, and less in times, what they are—17. Equal, greater, and less, in velocity, what. 18. Equal, greater, and less, in motion, what.-—19. That which is at rest, will always be at rest, except it be moved by some external thing; and that which is moved, will always be moved, unless it be hindered by some external thing.— 20. Accidents are generated and destroyed, but bodies not so. 21. An accident cannot depart from its subject—22. Nor be moved.—23. Essence, form, and matter, what they are. 24. First matter, what.—25. That the whole is greater than any part thereof, why demonstrated. ‘ l. HAVING understood what imaginary space is, Body defined_ in which we supposed nothing remaining without us, but all those things to be destroyed, that, by I02 PART II. PHILOSOPHY. existing heretofore, left images of themselves in our minds; let us now suppose some one of those things to be placed again in the world, or created anew. It is necessary, therefore, that this new created or replaced thing do not only fill some part of the space above mentioned, or be coinci dent and coextended with it, but also that it have no dependance upon our thought. And this is that which, for the extension of it, we commonly call body; and because it depends not upon our thought, we say is a thing subsisting of itself; as also existing, because without us; and, lastly, it is called the subject, because it is so placed in and subjected to imaginary space, that it may be understood by reason, as well as perceived by sense. The definition, therefore, of body may be this, a body is that, which having no dependance‘ upon our thought, is‘coincident or coextended with some part of space. Accident defined. 2. But what an\accident is cannot so easily be explained by any definition, as by examples. Let us imagine, therefore, that a body fills any space, or is coextended with it; that coextension is not the coextended body: and, in like manner, let us imagine that the same body is removed out of its place; that removing is not the removed body : or let us think the same not removed; that not removing or rest is not the resting body. What, then, are these things? They are accidents of that body. But the thing in question is, what is an accident ? which is an enquiry after that which we know already, and not that which we should enquire after. For who does not always and in the same manner understand him that says any OF BODY AND ACCIDENT. 103 thing is extended, or moved, or not moved? But PA}? 11most men will have it be said that an accident is Q something, namely, some part of a natural thing, 3:313?‘ when, indeed, it is no part of the same. To satisfy these men, as well as may be, they answer best that define an accident to be the manner by which any body is. conceived; which‘is all hnmf' they shou say, an ac’Eident is thatmziltygfiny/ M, by which it works in us a conception 12f‘ itself. Which definition, though it be not an answer to the question propounded, yet it is an answer to that question which should have been propounded, namely, whence does it happen that one part of any body appears here, another there .9 For this is well answered thus: it happens from the extension of that body. Or, how comes it to pass that the whole body, by succession, is seen now here, now there .9 and the answer will be, by reason of its motion. Or, lastly, whence is it that any body possesseth the same space for sometime .9 and the answer will be, because it is not moved. For if concerning the name of a body, that is, concerning a concrete name, it be asked, what is it? the answer must be made by definition; for the question is concerning the signification of the name. But if it be asked concerning an abstract name, what is it .9 the cause is demanded why a thing appears so or so. As if it be asked, what is hard? The answer will be, hard is that, whereof no part gives place, but when the whole gives place. But if it be demanded, what is hardness .9 a cause must be shewn why a part does not give place, except the , ' 104 PART II. 8. W How an acci dent may be understood to be in its subject. PHILOSOPHY. whole give place. Wherefore, I define an accident to be the manner of our conception of body. 3. When an accident is said to be in a body, it is not so to be understood, as if any thing were contained in that body ; as if, for example, redness were in blood, in the same manner, as blood is in ‘a bloody cloth, that is, as a part in the whole; for so, an accident would be a body also. But, as magnitude, or rest, or motion, is in that which is great, or which resteth, or which is moved, (which, how it is to be understood, every man understands) so also, it is to be understood, that every other accident is in its subject. And‘ this, also, is explicated by Aristotle no otherwise than nega tively, namely, that an accident is in its subject, not as any part thereof, but so as that it may be away, the subject still remaining ; which is right, saving that there are certain accidents which can never perish except the body perish also; for no body can be conceived to be without extension, or without figure. other but acci peculiar nts, which are not common toiallAllbodies, to some only, as towb‘umbilnoved, colour, hardness, and the like, do perish continually, and are succeeded by others; yet so, as that the body never perisheth. And as for the opinion that some . may have, that all other accidents are not in their bodies in the same manner that extension, motion, rest, or figure, are in the same; for example, that colour, heat, odour, virtue, vice, and the like, are \ otherwise in them, and, as they say, inherent; I desire they would suspend their judgment for i the present, and expect a little, till itbe found out or BODY AND ACCIDENT. 105 by ratiocination, whether these very accidents are PART II not also certain motions either of the mind of the ~SJ—e ‘perceiver, or of the bodies themselves which are perceived; for in the search of this, a great part of natural philosophy consists. 4. The extension of a body, is the same‘thing Magnitqdc, . . . what It Is. with the magnitude of It, or that which some call - real space. But this magnitude does not depend upon our cogitation, as imaginary space doth; for this is an effect of our imagination, but magnitude is the cause of it; this is an accident of the mind, that of a body existing out of the mind. 5. That space, by which word I here understand Place, What?‘ . im Ina . s a I , and that It ' ' t-with the i: immovable. 1 magnitude offlanyhody, iscalledIhe_placeof that j ; and the body itself is that which we call the thing placed. Now place, and the magnitude of the thing placed, differ. First in this, that a body keeps always the same magnitude, both when it is at rest, and when it is moved; but when it is moved, it does not keep the same place. Secondly in this, that place is a phantasm of any body of such and such quantity and figure; but magnitude is the peculiar accident of every body; for one body may at several times have several places, but has always one and the same magnitude. 7f>\ Thirdly in this, that plac_e_nothiIlg__pptpf/the “KW lastly, mindz placeuidswfeigned nor magnilmwany ‘gx‘teEs/ion, thingi'iwithin but magnitude it. And Q’K \& ‘ ‘8 C true ext'én/sion; and a placed body is not extension, but a thing extended. Besides,place/i5immdvable; for, seeing that which is movedj'is understood to be carried from place to place, if place were moved, it would also be carried from place to 106 PHILOSOPHY. PM?‘ "‘ place, so that one place must have another place, W and that place another place, and so on infinitely, fiffighwfgjiwhieh is ridiculous. And as for those, that, by “imm‘mble- making place to be of the same nature with real space, would from thence maintain it to be immovable, they also make place, though they do not perceive they make it so, to be a mere phan tasm. For whilst one aflirmsthat place is therefore said to be immovable, because space in general is considered there; if he had remembered that nothing is general or universal besides names or ' signs, he would easily have seen that that space, which he says is considered in general, is nothing but a phantasm, in the mind or the memory, of a body of such magnitude and such figure. And whilst another says: real space is made immovable by the understanding; as when, under the super ficies of running water, we imagine other and other water to come by continual succession, that superficies fixed there by the understanding, is the immovable place of the river: what else does he make it to be but a phantasm, though he do it obscurely and in perplexed words? Lastly, the nature of place does not consist in the superficies qf the ambient, but in solid space ; for the whole placed body is coextended with its whole place, and every part of it with every answering part of the same place ; but seeing every placed body is a solid thing, .it cannot be understood to be coex tended with superficies. Besides, how can any whole body be moved, unless all its parts be moved together with it? Or how can the internal parts of it be moved, but by leaving their place P But the internal parts of a body cannot leave the or BODY AND ACCIDENT. 107 superficies of an external part contiguous to it; PART II and, therefore, it follows, that if place be the “4-4 superficies of the ambient, then the parts of a body moved, that is, bodies moved, are not moved. 6. Space, or place, that is possessed by a body, awngaterislgfll is called full, and that which is not so possessed, is called empty. 7. Here, there, in the country, in the city, and other the like names, by which answer is made to what they’ the question where is it .9 are not properly names slgmfy' of place, nor do they of themselves bring into the mind the place that is sought ; for here and there signify nothing, unless the thing be shewn at the ’ same time with the finger or something else ; but when the eye of him that seeks, is, by pointing or some other sign, directed to the thing sought, the place of it is not hereby defined by him that answers, but found out by him that asks the ques tion. Now suchshewings as are made by words only, as when we say, in the country, or in the city, are some of greater latitude than others, as when we say, in the country, in the city, in such a street, in a house, in the chamber, in bed, &c. For these do, by little and little, direct the seeker nearer to the proper place; and yet they do not determine the same, but only restrain it to a lesser space, and signify no more, than that the place of the thing is within a certain space designed by those words, as a part is in the whole. And all such names, by which answer is made to the ques tion where .9 have, for their highest genus, the name somewhere. From whence it may be under stood, that whatsoever is somewhere, is in some place properly so called, which place is part of / '108 PHILOSOPHY. PAR; 11- that greater space that is signified by some of these w—' names, in the country, in the city, or the like. Many bodies 8. A body, and the magnitude, and the place cannot be in . . . one place, nor thereof, are divided by one and the same act of Zilfnybogflcels the mind; for, to divide an extended body, and the extension thereof, and the idea of that extension, which is place, is the same with dividing any one of them ; because they are coincident, and it cannot be done but by the mind, that is by the division of space. From whence it is manifest, that neither two bodies can be together in the same place, nor one body be in two places at the same time. Not two bodies in the same place; because when a body that fills its whole place is divided into two, the place itself is divided into two also, so that there will be two places. Not one body in two places ; for the place that a body fills being divided into two, the placed body will be also divided into two; for, as I said, aplace and the body that fills that place, are divided both together; and so there will be two bodies. Contiguqus and continual, 9. Two bodies are said to be contiguous to one . . what they are. another, and eontznuul, 1n the same manner as spaces are ; namely, those are contiguous, between which there is no space. Now, by space I under stand, here as formerly, an idea or phantasm of a body. Wherefore, though between two bodies there be put no other body, and consequently no magnitude, or, as they call it, real space, yet if another body may be put between them, that is, if there intercede any imagined space which may receive another body, then those bodies are not contiguous. And this is so easy to be understood, that I should wonder at some men, who being or BODY AND ACCIDENT. 109 otherwise skilful enough in philosophy, are of a PA RT II. 8. different opinion, but that I find that most of those that affect metaphysical subtleties wander from ~W truth, as if they were led out of their Way by an ignis fatuus. natural senses, For can any man that has his think that two bodies must therefore necessarily touch one another, because no other body is between them? Or that there can be no oacuum, because vacuum is nothing, or as they call it, non ens .9 Which is as childish, as if one should reason thus; no man can fast, because to fast is to eat nothing; but nothing cannot be eaten. Continual, are any two bodies that have a common part ; and more than two are continual, when every two, that are next to one another, are continual. 10. MOTION is a continual relinquishing of Thedefinirion one place, and acquiring of another ; and that place which is relinquished is commonly called the terminus a quo, asthat which is acquired is called the terminus ad quem ; I say a continual relin quishing, because no body, how little soever, can totally and at once go out of its former place into another, so, but that some part of it will be in a of motion. No motion intelli gible but with time. part of. a place which is common to both, namely, to the relinquished and the acquired places. For example, let any body be in the place A C B D; the same body can not come into the place B D E F, I I I I but it must first be in GH I K, E—IT—D—F whose part G H B D is common to both the places A C B D, and G H I K, and whose part B D I K, is common to both the places G H I K, and B D E F. Now it cannot be con- ‘ 110 PART .II. PHILOSOPHY. ceived that any thing can be moved without time; for time is, by the definition of it, aphantasm, that is, a conception of motion; and, therefore, to con ceive that any thing may be moved without time, were.to conceive motion without motion, which is What it is to he at rest, to have been moved, and to be moved. No motion to be conceived without the impossible. I]. That is said to be at rest, which, during any time, is in one place ; and that to be moved, or to have been moved, which, whether it be now at rest or moved, was formerly in another place than that which it is now in. From which defini conception of past and future. tions it may be inferred, first, that whatsoever is moved, has been moved; for if it be still in the same place in‘ which it was formerly, it is at rest, that is, it is not moved, by the definition of rest ; but if it be in another place, it has been moved, by the definition of moved. Secondly, that what is moved, will yet be moved; for that which is moved, leaveth the place where it is, and therefore will be in another place, and consequently will be moved still. Thirdly, that whatsoever is moved, is not in one place during any time, how little soever that time be ; for by the definition of rest, that which is in one place during any time, is at rest. There is a certain sophism against motion, which seems to spring from the not understanding of this last proposition. For they say, that, any body be moved, it is moved either in the place where it is, or in the place where it is not ; both which arefalse ; and therefore nothing is moved. But the falsity lies in the major proposition; for that which is moved, is neither moved in the place where it is, nor in the place where is not; but 0F BODY AND ACCIDENT. 111 from the place where it is, to the place where it is PART II not. Indeed it cannot be denied but that what- W soever is moved, is moved somewhere, that is, within some space; but then the place of that body is not that whole space, but a part of it, as is said above in the seventh article. From what is above demonstrated, namely, that whatsoever is moved, has also been moved, and will be moved, this also may be collected, that there can be no conception of motion, without conceiving past and future time. 12. Though there be'no body which has not Apointzaliue, some magnitude, yet if, when any body is moved, :‘lgefii‘igf’ the magnitude of it be not at all considered, the "hatthey “6' way it makes is called a line, or one single dimension; and the space, through which it passeth, is called length; and the body itself, a point ; in which sense the earth is called a point, and the way of its yearly revolution, the ecliptic line. But if a body, which is moved, be considered as long, and be supposed to be so moved, as that all the several parts of it be understood to make several lines, then the way of every part of that body is called breadth, and the space which is made is called superficies, consisting of two dimensions, one whereof to every several part of the other is applied whole. Again, if a body be considered as having superficies, and be under stood to be so moved, that all the several parts of it describe several lines, then the way of every part of that body is called thickness or depth, and the space which is made is called solid, consisting of three dimensions, any two whereof are applied whole to every several part of the third. ll2 PHILOSOPHY. PARST 11. But if a body be considered as solid, then it is “4/ not possible that all the several parts of it should describe several lines; for what way soever it be moved, the way of the following part will fall [into the way of the part before it, so that the same solid will still be made which the foremost super ficies would have made by itself. And therefore there can be no other dimension in any body, as it is a body, than the three which I have now described ;' though, as it shall be shewed hereafter, velocity, which is motion according to length, may, by being applied to‘ all the parts of a solid, make a magnitude of motion, consisting of four dimensions; as the goodness of gold, computed in all the parts of it, makes the price and value thereof. Equal. great, 13. Bodies, how many soever they be, 'that greater and - less, in,hodies can fill every one the place of every one, are said $33,351:; to be equal every one to every other. Now, one ‘he? ‘"6body may fill the same place which another body filleth, though it be not of the same figure with that other body, if so be that it may be understood to be reducible to the same figure, either by flexion or transposition of the parts. And one body is greater than another body, when a part of that is equal to all this; and less, when all 1 that is equal to a part of this. Also, magnitudes are equal, or greater, or lesser, than one another, for the same consideration, namely, when the bodies, of which they are the magnitudes, are either equal, or greater, or less, &c.r One and the ‘ 14. One and the same body is always of one same body . .I has always one and the same magnitude. For seeing a body “dthe sam“ and the magnitude and place thereof cannot be magnitude. comprehended in the mind otherwise than as they OF BODY AND ACCIDENT. 113 are coincident, if any body be understood to be at PM?‘ IT rest, that is, to remain in the same place during s—Q—e some time, and the magnitude thereof be in one part of that time greater, and in another part less, that body’s place, which is one and the same, will be coincident sometimes with greater, sometimes with less magnitude, that is, the same place will be greater and less than itself, which is impossible. But there would be no need at all of demonstrating a thing that is in itself so manifest, if there were not some, whose opinion concerning bodies and their magnitudes is, that a body may exist separated from its magnitude, and have greater or less mag nitude bestowed upon it, making use of this principle for the explication of the nature of rarum and densum. 15. Motion, in as much as a certain length may in a certain time be transmitted by it, is called VELOCITY or swiftness : &c. For though swift be very often understood with relation to slower or less swift, as great is in respect of less, yet nevertheless, as magnitude is by philosophers taken absolutely for extension, so also velocity or swift ness may be put absolutely for motion according to length. 16. Many motions are said to be made in equal 322%, and times, when every one of them begins and ends less,in times, together with some other motion, or if it had what ‘hey m' begun together, would also have ended together . with die same. For time, which is a phantasm of: motion, cannot be reckoned but by some exposed : motion; as_in dials by the motion of the sun or of the hand; and if two or more motions begin and end with this motion, they are said to be made in voL. I. I 114 PHILOSOPHY. equal times; from whence also it is easy to under stand what it is to be moved in greater or longer time, and in less time or not so long; namely, that that is longer moved, which beginning with another, ends later; or ending together, began sooner. Equal, greater, l7. Motions are said to be equally swift, when and less, in ve locity, what. equal lengths are transmitted in equal times; and greater swiftness is that, wherein greater length is PART II. 8. ¥_‘__/ passed in equal time, or equal length in less time. Also that swiftness by which equal lengths are passed in equal parts of time, is called ‘uni orm swiftness or motion ; and of motions not uniform, such as become swifter or slower by equal in— creasings or decreasings in equal parts of time, are said to be accelerated or retarded uniformly. ' Equal, greater, and less, in motion, what. 18. But motion is said to be greater, less, and equal, not only in regard of the length which is transmitted in a certain time, that is, in regard of swiftness only, but of swiftness applied to every smallest particle of magnitude; for when any body is moved, every part of it is also moved ; and supposing the parts to be halves, the motions of those halves have their swiftness equal to one ‘another, and severally equal to that of the whole ; but the motion of the 'whole is equal to those two motions, either of which is of equal swiftness with it; and therefore it is one thing for two motions to be equal to one another, and another thing for them to be equally swift. And this is manifest in two horses that draw abreast, where the motion of both the horses together is of equal swiftness with the motion of either of them singly; but the motion of both is greater than the motion of one OF BODY AND ACCIDENT. 115 of them, namely, double. Wherefore motions are PM?‘ II said to be simply equal to one another, when the ~---—.'-_/ swiftness of one, computed in every part of its magnitude, is equal to the swiftness of the other computed also in every part of its magnitude: and greater than one another, when the swiftness of one computed as above, is greater than the swiftness of the other so computed; and less, when less. Besides, the magnitude of motion computed in this manner is that which is commonly called FORCE. 19. Whatsoever is at rest, will always be at Thatwhich‘ rest, unless there be some other body besides it, ihfatyrseiiemli ‘ which, by endeavouring to get into its place by {festl'xfoffefiptbfi motion, sufi'ers it no longer to remain at rest. :gi‘ggfxtemal For suppose that some finite body exist and be at rest, and that all space besides be empty; if now this body begin to be moved, it will certainly be moved some way; seeing therefore there was nothing in that body which did not dispose it to rest, the reason Why it is moved this way is in something out of it ; and in like manner, if it had been moved any other way, the reason of motion that way had also been in something out of it ; but seeing it was supposed that nothing is out of it, the reason of its motion one way would be the same with the reason of its motion every other way, wherefore it would be moved alike all ways at once; which is impossible. In like manner, whatsoever is moved, will dw‘giilclhaif always be moved, except there be some other body ways he moved, besides it, which causeth it to rest. For if we Hzisisifybesm; suppose nothing to be without it, there will be no “final ‘hing’ reason why it should rest now, rather than at 12 116 PART II. 8. we Accidents are generated and destroyed, but bodies not so. PHILOSOPHY. another time; wherefore its motion would cease in every particle of time alike; which is not intelligible. 20. When we say a living creature, a tree, or any other specified body is generated or destroyed, it is not to be so understood as if there were made a body of that which is not-body, or not a body of a body, but of a living creature not a living crea ture, of a tree not a tree, &c. that is, that those accidents for which we call one thing a living creature, another thing a tree, and another by some other name, are generated and destroyed; and that therefore the same names are not to be given to them now, which were given them before. But that magnitude for which we give to any thing the nameof body is neither generated nor destroyed. For though we may feign in our mind that a point may swell to a huge bulk, and that this may again contract itself to a point; that is, though we may imagine something to arise where before was nothing, and nothing to be there where before was something, yet We cannot comprehend in‘ our mind how this may possibly be done in nature. And therefore philosophers, who tie themselves to natural reason, suppose that a body can neither be generated nor destroyed, but only that it may appear otherwise than it did to us, that is, under different species, and consequently be called by other and other names; so that that which is now called man, may at another time have the name of not-man ; but that which is once called body, can never be called not-body. But it is manifest, that all other accidents besides magni tude or extension may be generated and destroyed; d‘ or BODY AND ACCIDENT. 117 as when a white thing is made black, the whiteness PARST II that was in it perisheth, and the blackness that Q was not in it is now generated; and therefore ‘ bodies, and the accidents under which they appear diversely, have this difference, that bodies are things, and not generated ; accidents are generated, and not things. 21. And therefore, when any thing appears 22:31?“ otherwise than it did by reason of other and other fromirswbject accidents, it is not to be thought that an accident goes out of one subject into another, (for they are not, as I said above, in their subjects as a part in the whole, or as a contained thing in that which contains it, or as a master of a family in his house,) but that one accident perisheth, 'and another is generated. For example, when the hand, being moved, moves the pen, motion does not go out of the hand into the pen; for so the writing might be continued though the hand stood still; but a new motion is generated in the pen, and is the pen’s motion. ' 22. And therefore also it is improper to say, an N°r be moved accident is moved; as when, instead of saying, figure is an accident of a body carried away, we say, a body carries away itsfigure. 23. Now that accident for which we give a Essence, form, certain name to any body, or the accident which 3.113132%, denominates its subject, is commonly called the ESSENCE thereof; as rationality is the essence of a man ; whiteness, of any white thing, and exten— sion the essence of a body. And the same essence, in as much as it is generated, is called the FORM. Again, a body, in respect of any accident, is called the SUBJECT, and in respect of the form it is called the MATTER. 118 PART II. 8. PHILOSOPHY. ; Also, the production or perishing of any accident‘ makes its subject be said _to be changed; only the production or perishing of form makes it be said it is generated or‘destroyed ; but in all generation and mutation, the name of matter still remains. For a. table made of wood is not only wooden, but wood; and a statue of brass is brass as well as brazen; though Aristotle, in his Metaphysics, says, that whatsoever is made of any thing ought not to be called 5mm), but éxéwwov; as that which is made of wood, not Eékov, but Eékwov, that is, not wood, First mat ter, what. but wooden. ' 24. And as for that matter which is common to all things, and which philosophers, following‘ Aris totle, usually call materia prima, that is, first matter, it is not any body distinct from all other bodies, nor is it one of them. What then is it? A mere name; yet a name which ‘is not of vain use; for it signifies a conception of body without the consideration of any form or other accident except only magnitude or extension, and aptness to receive form and other accident. So that when soever we have use of the name body in general, if we use that of materia prima, we do well. ' For as when a man not knowing which was first, ' water or ice, would find out which of the two were the matter of both, he would be fain to suppose some third matter which were neither of these two ; so he that would find out what is the matter of all things, ought to suppose such as is not the matter of anything that exists. Wherefore materia . prima is nothing ; and therefore they ‘do not attribute to it either form or any other accident besides quantity ; whereas all singular things have their forms and accidents certain. ’ or BODY AND ACCIDENT. 119 Materia prima, therefore, is body in general, PM?‘ II that is, body considered universally, not as having W neither form nor any accident, but in which no form nor any other accident but quantity are at all considered, that is, they are not drawn into argu mentation. ' be 25. demonstrated, From whatwhich has been are said, assumed thosebyaxioms Euclid may in zlflywglayrfi3:55: the beginning of his first element, about the equa- aims‘ lity and inequality of magnitudes ; of which, omitting the rest, I will here demonstrate only this one, the whole is greater than any part thereof; to the end that the reader may know that those axioms are not indemonstrable, and therefore not principles of demonstration; and from hence learn to be wary how he admits any thing for a principle, which is not at least as evident as these are. Greater is defined to be that, whose part is equal to the whole of another. Now if we suppose any whole to be A, and a part of it to be B ; seeing the whole B is equal to itself, and the same B is a part of A ; therefore apart of A will be equal to the whole B. Wherefore, by the definition above, A is greater than B; which was to be proved. Deborah Brown_PreviewUser [PHIL2010] Representation & Reality - The Philosophy of Language (St Lucia). Semester 1, 2018 Exemplar Annotated text Exemplar Annotated text 1. God, having designed man to be a sociable creature, not only made him with an inclination and a need to have fellowship with other men, but also equipped him with language, 1s which was to be the great instrument and common tie of society. 1e So nature shaped man’s organs so that he could make articulate sounds, which we call ‘words’. But this wasn’t enough to produce language, for parrots and some other birds can learn to make distinct enough articulate sounds, yet they are far from being capable of language. 2. Besides articulate sounds, therefore, 2s man had also to be able to use these sounds as signs of internal conceptions, making them stand as marks of ideas in his own mind. 2e This was so that he could make those ideas known to others, thus conveying thoughts from one mind to another. 3. But this still didn’t suffice to make words as useful as they ought to be. If every particular thing had to be given a separate name, there would be so many words that the language would be too complicated to use; so a fully satisfactory language needs sounds that, as well as being signs of ideas, can be used in such a way that one word covers a number of particular things. So language was improved in yet another way by coming to include general terms, so that one word can mark a multitude of particular things. Sounds could be used in this helpful manner only by signifying ideas of a special kind: 3s names become general if they are made to stand for general ideas, and names remain particular if the ideas they signify are particular. 3e [Locke regularly uses ‘name’ to cover not only proper names but also general words such as ‘woman’, ‘island’, ‘atom’ and so on.] 4. 4s Besides these names standing for ideas, there are other words that men use to signify not any idea but rather the lack or absence of certain ideas or of all ideas whatsoever. 4e Examples are nihil [= ‘nothing’] in Latin, and in English ‘ignorance’ and ‘barrenness’. These negative or privative words can’t be said properly to have no ideas associated with them, for then they would be perfectly meaningless sounds. Rather, they relate to positive ideas, and Page 1 signify their absence. [In section 5 Locke discusses the words referring to items far removed from anything of which we have sense-experience . The meanings of many such words, he says, are borrowed from ideas of sense-perception.] For example, ‘imagine’, ‘apprehend’, ‘comprehend’, ‘adhere’, ‘conceive‘, etc. are all words taken from the operations of perceptible things and applied to certain modes of thinking. . . . 6. But to understand better the use and force of language as a means for instruction and knowledge, we should tackle two questions. 1 In the use of language, what are names immediately applied to? Also, given that all words (except proper names) are general, and so stand not for particular things but for sorts and kinds of things, 2 what are these sorts and kinds (or, if you prefer Latin, these species and genera)? what do they consist in? how do they come to be made? When we have explored these thoroughly, we’ll have a better chance of finding the right use of words, the natural advantages and defects of language, and the remedies that ought to be used to avoid obscurity or uncertainty in the signification of words. 5s Without that, we can’t talk in a clear and orderly way about knowledge; and knowledge, which has to do with propositions (most of them universal ones), has a greater connection with words than perhaps is suspected. 5e So these matters will be the topic of the following chapters. 1. Deborah Brown_PreviewUser Purpose of language —to bind society. Mon, 19 Feb, 2018: 14:41 2. Deborah Brown_PreviewUser That words stand as signs of ideas is necessary to distinguish meaningful use from mimcry (e.g. parroting speech). But are words signs of ideas? Does 'horse' signify an idea of horses or horses? Mon, 19 Feb, 2018: 14:50 3. Deborah Brown_PreviewUser This shifts the problem: What makes an idea general or particular? Mon, 19 Feb, 2018: 14:53 4. Deborah Brown_PreviewUser Is this consistent with the above? How can a word only be meaningful if it signifies an idea but some words (e.g. nihil) be meaningful by signifying the absence of an idea? Mon, 19 Feb, 2018: 14:54 Page 2 5. Deborah Brown_PreviewUser The study of words and their meaning is important for explaining knowledge; hence philosophy of language is an important part of epistemology, the theory of knowledge. Sun, 25 Feb, 2018: 12:26 This document has been generated by AustLit (www.austlit.edu.au) https://cirrus.austlit.edu.au/austlit/page/12914558?mainTabTemplate=groupGroupAnnotatableText&anno tating=y&textid=12910575&formatfootnote&ausartsy (Sun, 25 Feb, 2018: 12:27) Page 3
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