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Running head: JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Student’s Name Institutional Affiliations Course 1 JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF 2 Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Essay Summary on Conclusion and Premise Approaches have been laid to determine the conditions that are necessary for a person to know a given subject matter. This entails questioning the discretion on whether justification is essential for knowledge. The knowledge claimed can be true or false in the long run, and it is something that we should understand. Our conviction in belief according to the text may stand a chance of being disputed, and that is why one may hold a truthful justification from a wrong proposition. Contentment of all conditions for a proposition rationalizes credence by ensuring adequate evidence is provided to justify an actuality. The affiliation that exists between conditions compliments the aptitude of some truth to be acknowledged or not. When one condition entails one or more other conditions, the likelihood of accepting a certain fact is amplified. This means that a proposition needs to be validated by parties; the source and the receiver. Many cases are presented where one condition is sufficiently capable of maximizing a truth as long as other conditions are related to the success or failure of the truth-seeking procedure. In certain realities of life, certain conditions for validation of the truth in a proposition require different approaches. At times, each approach could sufficiently add up to the total realization of the need for truth for a certain proposition. For the success of a conclusion relating to different conditions, one may need to examine wider conditions for which a trustworthy conclusion can be drawn. The conclusion may depend on luck despite the satisfaction of all the conditions. This is common in politics, and you could find that the favorite and popular candidates lose the vote to the silent and reserved candidates. This gesture outlives the truth that since the candidates are popular in the polls, they have to win. In our example, popularity does not match with the vote in the long run, but it is the voters who cast their votes that count. Justified true belief may not necessarily be known but it is the conclusion that is derived from the premise proposition that in the end matters. In summary, this argument is valid, and we are only questioning its soundness. Knowledge, on the other hand, is rooted in discussions that are valid and sound. Gettier Counter example In his paper, Edmund Gettier relates the distinction between conditions that are necessary and conditions that are sufficient. He deploys an example to show this venture, whereby he illustrates that supposedly that X is true, the Y also presumes to be true. This tabulation extrapolates that the truth of X is subject to that of Y, philosophers then say that X is a sufficient condition for Y’s occurrence. Assume, on the other hand, X is false, Y too will be wrong; this shows that the truth of X is necessary for Y's reality. This is then a necessary condition perception, and in the above example, X entails Y. Getter makes it clear that justification does not entail coincidence or fluke. In short, luck and coincidence do not acknowledge the truth in what is perceived as knowledge. Additionally, Getter supports the fact that a person can believe in a false proposition. What this statement means is that one can be justified into thinking that a false hypothesis is true. This poses a challenge to JTB by limiting the sufficiency and necessity of certain conditions. In such circumstances, one may generate a factual deduction from a false proposition. Gettier     In Edmund Gettier’s essay, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge,” Gettier argues that JTB (Plato’s theory of Justified True Belief) does not necessarily guarantee knowledge. This means that the necessary but not the sufficient conditions for “S knows P” to be true have been met. What follows is a discussion of necessary and sufficient conditions, the conditions that satisfy JTB, and Gettier’s reasoning of why JTB does not necessarily guarantee knowledge. A necessary condition for some state of affairs P is a condition that must be satisfied in order for P to obtain. For example, what are the necessary conditions (P) that must be satisfied in order for some student (S) to pass a course at some college or university? Let’s say that those necessary conditions for S to pass are: (1) S must submit all of their assignments, and (2) take all of the exams and quizzes. However, submitting all of the assignments and taking all of the exams and quizzes will not guarantee that S will obtain P (pass the course). So how can S guarantee that they will pass the course? The conditions that will guarantee that’s S will pass the course are referred to as sufficient conditions. A sufficient condition for some state of affairs P is a condition that, if satisfied guarantees that P obtains. For example, the sufficient conditions for P are: (1) S must get a passing grade on all assignments, and (2) pass all of exams and quizzes. If these conditions are satisfied, this guarantees that S will pass the course. Gettier claims that “JTB” does not necessarily guarantee knowledge even if the following conditions are satisfied. What are these conditions? One is said to have Justified True Belief (knowledge) if the following conditions are satisfied: (a) the proposition must be true (for example, the proposition, “If a student obtains a passing grade on all assignments and passes all exams and quizzes, then that student will pass the course) (b) one must believe that the proposition is true, and (c) one must be justified in believing that the proposition is true. Similarly, S knows P if and only if: (a) P is true (b) S believes that P is true, and (c) S is justified in believing that P is true. It is important to note that justification does not entail luck or coincidence. One must be justified rightly. This means that coincidence and luck are not considered as justificatory evidence in the establishment of what we consider as knowledge. Gettier provides two counterexamples that supports his claim that JTB does not necessarily result in knowledge. In the first counterexample, two men, Jones and Smith, have applied for a certain job. Let’s suppose that Smith is ‘justified’ in believing that the following proposition is true: Jones will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket. We don’t know why Smith is so confident that Joes will get the job. Perhaps, someone in human resources or Jones, himself, has advised Smith of these state of affairs. Secondly, Smith knows that Jones has ten coins in his pocket. Therefore, Smith is justified in deducing the following proposition: Whoever gets the job has ten coins in his pocket.   1   But Jones does not get the job. Smith gets the job. But amazingly, Smith, unknown to him, has ten coins in his pocket. Therefore, the proposition, ‘Whoever gets the job has ten coins in his pocket’ is true. Let’s look at Gettier’s reasons for asserting that in an instance where JTB does not guarantee knowledge. Gettier claims that a person can believe in a proposition that is indeed false. The conjunctive proposition, ‘Jones will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket’ is false because Jones did not get the job. We know that a conjunction is false if even one of its constituent sentences is false. Smith knew that Jones has ten coins in his pocket. He is also justified in believing that Jones was going to get the job. But, Jones did not get the job. Therefore, Smith is justified in believing in a proposition that is false. This  is  important  because  critical  to  the  truth  of  proposition  S  knows  P  is  the  truth  of  proposition  S  is   justified  in  believing  that  P.  Therefore,  ‘S  is  justified  in  believing  that  P’  is  a  necessary  condition  of  S   knows  P.  Reiterating,  the  proposition  ‘Jones will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket’ is false even though S (Smith) is justified in believing that this proposition is true.   Gettier’s second claim is that if one deduces proposition B (that is true) from proposition A (that is false), one is still justified in believing that B is true. Smith deduced that ‘Whoever gets the job has ten coins in his pocket’ from the conjunctive proposition, ‘Jones will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket’. We know that this proposition is false. Therefore, one can see that this deduction was made from a proposition that is false. All of the conditions for JTB were satisfied: (1) the proposition ‘Whoever gets the job has ten coins in his pocket’ is true; (2) Smith believed that ‘Whoever gets the job has ten coins in his pocket’; and (3) Smith was justified in believing that ‘Whoever gets the job has ten coins in his pocket’. However, one cannot claim that S knows P because Jones did not get the job; Smith got the job; and Smith did not know he had ten coins in his pocket. He was only right via luck or coincidence. Similarly, in the second counterexample, Gettier provides the following scenario. Smith knows that Jones owns a Ford. The justification for this belief is that Jones has owned a Ford for as long as Smith has known him. From this proposition, Smith constructs the following disjunctive propositions that speculate on the whereabouts of a friend Brown even though he has no idea where Brown is: (a) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston; (b) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona; (c) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Brest-Litosvk. But let’s suppose that Jones does not own a Ford and is driving a rental. Additionally, Brown, unbeknownst to Smith, is in Barcelona. This means that disjunctive proposition (b) is true. It is not true based the proposition that “Jones owns a Ford’. We know that a disjunction is true if just one of its constituent sentences is true. It is true because of the proposition ‘Brown is in Barcelona’. This means that all of the conditions for JTB are satisfied: (1) the proposition, ‘Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona’ is true; (2) Smith believed that the proposition ‘Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona’ is true; and (3) Smith is justified in believing that ‘Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona’ is true. But it does not result in knowledge because it is not true that S knows P. Smith did not know of Brown’s whereabouts and, apparently, he did not know that Jones no longer owned a Ford. He does not know P. He is right only via luck or coincidence. In conclusion, Gettier claims that JTB does not necessarily guarantee knowledge because (1) one can be justified in believing in a proposition that is false. This is problematic for JTB because S believing that P is a necessary and sufficient condition for S knows P. And, (2) one can be justified in deducing true conclusion from a false proposition.         2   “Is  Jus'fied  True  Belief  Knowledge?”     Edmund  Ge;er   Before  we  can  ‘unpack’  the  argument  posed  by  Ge;er  in  “Is   Jus'fied  True  Belief  Knowledge,”  we  must  understand  the   following:     What  is  epistemology?   Who  is  Plato,  Chisholm,  and  Ayer?   What  is  JTB  (Jus'fied  True  Belief)?   What  is  meant  by  necessary  condi'ons?   What  is  meant  by  sufficient  condi'ons?   What  is  jus'fica'on?   What  is  meant  by  entailment?   What  is  epistemology?   Epistemology  is  the  study  of  knowledge.  Epistemologists   concern  themselves  with  a  number  of  tasks,  which  we  might  sort   into  two  categories.        First,  we  must  determine  the  nature  of  knowledge;  that  is,    what  does  it  mean  to  say  that  someone  knows,  or  fails  to    know,  something?        Second,  we  must  determine  the  extent  of  human    knowledge;  that  is,  how  much  do  we,  or  can  we,  know?      (h?p://www.iep.utm.edu/epistemo/)     Who  is  Plato,  Chisholm,  and  Ayer?   Plato  is  one  of  the  world's  best  known  and  most  widely  read  and  studied   philosophers.  He  was  the  student  of  Socrates  and  the  teacher  of  Aristotle,  and  he   wrote  in  the  middle  of  the  fourth  century  B.C.E.  in  ancient  Greece.  Though  influenced   primarily  by  Socrates,  to  the  extent  that  Socrates  is  usually  the  main  character  in  many   of  Plato's  wriMngs,  he  was  also  influenced  by  Heraclitus,  Parmenides,  and  the   Pythagoreans.    h?p://www.iep.utm.edu/plato/     Roderick  Milton  Chisholm  (1916  –  1999)  is  widely  regarded  as  one  of  the  most   creaMve,  producMve,  and  influenMal  American  philosophers  of  the  20th  Century.   Chisholm  worked  in  epistemology,  metaphysics,  ethics,  philosophy  of  language,   philosophy  of  mind,  and  other  areas.  h?p://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chisholm/     Sir  A.  J.  Ayer,  in  full  Sir  Alfred  Jules  Ayer  (1910  –  1989)  was  BriMsh  philosopher  and   educator  and  a  leading  representaMve  of  logical  posi'vism  through  his  widely  read   work  Language,  Truth,  and  Logic  (1936).  Although  Ayer’s  views  changed  considerably   aWer  the  1930s,  becoming  more  moderate  and  increasingly  subtle,  he  remained  loyal   to  empiricism,  convinced  that  all  knowledge  of  the  world  derives  from  sense   experience  and  that  nothing  in  experience  jusMfies  a  belief  in  God  or  in  any  other   extravagant  metaphysical  enMty.   h?p://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/46462/Sir-­‐AJ-­‐Ayer       What  are  necessary  and  sufficient  condi'ons?     A  necessary  condiMon  for  some  state  of  affairs  P  is  a  condiMon  that  must  be   saMsfied  in  order  for  P  to  obtain.  For  example,  what  are  the  necessary   condiMons  P  that  must  be  saMsfied  in  order  for  some  student  S  to  pass  a   course  at  some  college  or  university?  The  student  must:        (1)  submit  assignments  in  a  'mely  manner      (2)  take  all  of  the  exams  and  quizzes       This  means  that  if  the  student  S  does  not  submit  the  assignments  in  a  Mmely   manner  and  take  all  of  the  exams  and  quizzes,  student  S  will  not  pass  the   class.       What  are  necessary  and  sufficient  condi'ons?  (Contd.)   A  sufficient  condiMon  for  some  state  of  affairs  P  is  a  condiMon  that,  if   saMsfied,  guarantees  that  P  obtains.  For  example,  what  are  the  sufficient   condiMons  P  that  must  be  saMsfied  to  guarantee  some  student  S  will  pass  a   course  at  some  college  or  university?  The  student  must:        (1)  get  a  passing  grade  on  all  assignments      (2)  pass  all  exams  and  quizzes     This  means  that  if  the  student  S  gets  a  passing  grade  on  all  assignments  and   passes  all  exams  and  quizzes,  this  will  guarantee  that  student  S  will  pass  the   class.           What  is  jus'fica'on?     Loosely  speaking,  jus'fica'on  is  the  reason  why  someone  (properly)  holds  the  belief,   the  explanaMon  as  to  why  the  belief  is  a  true  one,  or  an  account  of  how  one  knows   what  one  know.   h?ps://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/ Theory_of_jusMficaMon.html     Accidental  truth,  accidental  jusMficaMon,  or  “luck”  are  considered  as  jusMficaMon.       What  is  entailment?     Entailment  means  that  if  P  entails  Q,  then  where  P  is  true,  Q  is  true;  and  Q  is  the   logical  consequence  of  P.  For  example,  the  proposiMon  ‘Joe  has  a  car  and  John  has  a   new  job’  entails  the  proposiMon  ‘Joe  has  a  car’.  This  means  that  ‘Joe  has  a  car’  is  the   logical  consequence  of  ‘Joe  has  a  car  and  John  has  a  new  job’.  Similarly,  the   proposiMon  ‘Mary  is  a  student’  entails  the  proposiMon  ‘Mary  is  a  student  or  Molly  is  a   teacher’…       Ge;er’s  Argument     Premise  1:  ‘S  being  jus'fied  in  believing  that  P’  is  a  necessary  condiMon  for  ‘S                knows  P’  though  it  is  possible  for  S  to  jusMfied  in  believing  a                                proposiMon  that  is  false.     Premise  2:  S  is  jusMfied  in  believing  in  proposiMon  Q  that  is  entailed  in                                                  (or  a  logical  consequence  consequence  of)    proposiMon  P,  which  S              believes  to  be  true.     Conclusion:  JTB  (JusMfied  True  Belief)  does  not  necessarily  fulfill  the  sufficient                  condiMons  that  guarantee  the  truth  of  the  proposiMon  that  S                          knows  P.         Ge;er  Counterexample  I   Proposi'on  :  Jones  is  the  man  who  will  get  the  job,  and  Jones  has  ten  coins                                      in  his  pocket.                           Conclusion:  The  man  who  will  get  the  job  has  ten  coins  in  his  pocket.     Analysis:                        1.  Smith  gets  the  job.                      2.  Smith,  unknown  to  him,  also  has  ten  coins  in  his  pocket.                                      3.  The  conclusion  is  true  but  it  was  derived  from  a  false  premise.                                      4.  The  proposi'on  is  a  conjunc'on  and  the  first  conjunct                                                  (Jones  is  the  man  who  will  get  the  job)  is  false.  Therefore,                                                  the  conjunc'on/premise  is  false.                                        5.  All  of  the  condi'ons  of  JTB  were  sa'sfied,  but  it  didn’t  guarantee                                                that  ‘S  knows  P’.                                          6.  Smith  does  not  know  that  the  conclusion  because  he  did  not  know                                                  how  many  coins  were  in  his  pocket.  He  based  his  belief  on  how                          many  coins  Jones  had  in  his  pocket,  “whom  he  falsely  believes  to  be  the                                                  man  will  get  the  job.”                                   Counterexample  1   d:  Jones  is  the  man  who  will  get  the  job,  and  Jones  (the  man  who  will  get              the  job)  has  ten  coins  in  his  pocket.                   e:  The  man  who  will  get  the  job  has  ten  coins  in  his  pocket.     a:    Jones  is  the  man  who  will  get  the  job.     b:    Jones  has  ten  coins  in  his  pocket.                  a  &  b        False   ∴b        True           Ge;er  Counterexample  II   Premise:  Jones  owns  a  Ford.     (Each  of  the  following  proposi'ons  is  entailed  by  the  proposi'on:  Jones  owns  a  Ford.   Therefore,  Smith  is  jus'fied  in  believing  that  all  of  the  following  proposi'ons  are  true     based  on  his  belief  that  ‘Jones  owns  a  Ford’.     Conclusion:  (a)  Either  Jones  owns  a  Ford,  or  Brown  is  in  Boston;                                                  (b)  Either  Jones  owns  a  Ford,  or  Brown  is  in  Barcelona;                                                (c)    Either  Jones  owns  a  Ford,  or  Brown  is  in  Brest-­‐Litovsk.     Analysis:              1.  Jones  does  not  own  a  Ford.                                              2.  Smith  does  not  know  where  Brown  is  and  unknown  to  him,  Brown  is  in                                                    Barcelona.                                              3.  Smith  derived  ‘b’  from  a  false  premise  because  Jones  no  longer  owns  a  Ford.                                              4.  The  proposi'on  ‘b’  is  true  because  if  at  least  one  disjunct  is  true,  the                                  disjunc'on  is  true.                                              5.  All  of  the  condi'ons  of  JTB  were  sa'sfied,  but  it  didn’t  guarantee                                                    that  ‘S  knows  P’.                                                  6.  Smith  didn’t  know  that  the  proposi'on  ‘b’  is  true  even  though  ‘b’  is  true,  he                                                      believed  it  to  be  true,  and  he  was  jus'fied  in  believing  ‘b’  is  true.         Counterexample  2   a:  Jones  owns  a  Ford.   b:  Brown  is  in  Boston   c:    Brown  is  in  Barcelona.   d:    Brown  is  in  Brest-­‐Litosvk.            a               ∴[(a  v  b)  v  (a  v  c)  v  (a  v  d)]                        F                              T                        F            False    True   Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Author(s): Edmund L. Gettier Reviewed work(s): Source: Analysis, Vol. 23, No. 6 (Jun., 1963), pp. 121-123 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Committee Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3326922 . Accessed: 14/08/2012 02:37 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. . Oxford University Press and The Analysis Committee are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Analysis. http://www.jstor.org ANALYSIS 23.6 JUNE 1963 IS JUSTIFIEDTRUE BELIEFKNOWLEDGE? By EDMUND L. GETTIER ARIOUS attemptshave been madein recentyearsto statenecessary and sufficientconditionsfor someone'sknowing a given proposition. The attempts have often been such that they can be stated in a form similarto the following:' IFF (a) S knows that P (i) P is true, (ii) S believes that P, and (iii) S is justifiedin believing that P. For example, Chisholm has held that the following gives the necessary and sufficientconditions for knowledge:2 IFF (i) S acceptsP, (b) S knows that P (ii) S has adequateevidence for P, and P is true. (iii) Ayer has statedthe necessaryand sufficientconditionsfor knowledge as follows : V (c) S knows that P IFF (i) P is true, (ii) S is sure that P is true, and (iii) S has the right to be sure that P is true. I shall argue that (a) is false in that the conditions stated thereindo not constitute a siftcient condition for the truth of the proposition that S knows that P. The same argument will show that (b) and (c) fail if 'has adequateevidence for' or 'has the right to be sure that' is substituted for 'is justifiedin believing that' throughout. I shall begin by noting two points. First, in that sense of' justified' in which S's being justifiedin believing P is a necessarycondition of S's knowing that P, it is possible for a person to be justifiedin believing a proposition that is in fact false. Secondly, for any proposition P, if S is justifiedin believing P, and P entails Q, and S deduces Qfrom P and acceptsQ as a resultof this deduction,then S is justifiedin believing Q. Keeping these two points in mind, I shall now present two cases 1 Plato seems to be considering some such definition at Theaetetus201, and perhaps accepting one at Meno98. 2 Roderick M. Chisholm, Perceiving:a PhilosophicalStudy,Cornell University Press (Ithaca, New York, 1957), p. 16. Macmillan (London, 1956), p. 34. 3 A. J. Ayer, The Problemof Knowledge, 121 122 ANALYSIS in which the conditions stated in (a) are true for some proposition, though it is at the same time false that the person in question knows that proposition. CaseI: Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certainjob. And suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following conjunctive proposition: (d) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket. Smith's evidence for (d) might be that the president of the company assured him that Jones would in the end be selected, and that he, Smith, had counted the coins in Jones's pocket ten minutes ago. Proposition(d) entails: (e) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. Let us supposethat Smith sees the entailmentfrom (d) to (e), and accepts (e) on the grounds of (d), for which he has strong evidence. In this case, Smith is clearlyjustifiedin believing that (e) is true. But imagine, further,that unknown to Smith, he himself, not Jones, will get the job. And, also, unknown to Smith, he himself has ten coins in his pocket. Proposition (e) is then true, though proposition (d), from which Smith inferred(e), is false. In our example,then, all of the following are true: (i) (e) is true, (ii) Smith believes that (e) is true, and (iii) Smith is justifiedin believing that (e) is true. But it is equallyclear that Smith does not knowthat (e) is true; for (e) is true in virtue of the number of coins in Smith's pocket, while Smith does not know how many coins are in Smith'spocket, and bases his belief in (e) on a count of the coins in Jones's pocket, whom he falsely believes to be the man who will get the job. CaseII: Let us suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following proposition: (f) Jones owns a Ford. Smith'sevidence might be that Jones has at all times in the past within Smith's memory owned a car, and always a Ford, and that Jones has just offered Smith a ride while driving a Ford. Let us imagine, now, that Smith has another friend, Brown, of whose whereabouts he is totally ignorant. Smith selects three place-namesquite at random, and constructs the following three propositions: (g) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston; CIRCULARITY AND INDUCTION 123 (h) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona; (i) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk. Each of these propositionsis entailedby (f). Imaginethat Smithrealizes the entailmentof each of these propositions he has constructedby (f), and proceeds to accept (g), (h), and (i) on the basis of (f). Smith has correctlyinferred(g), (h), and (i) from a proposition for which he has strong evidence. Smith is therefore completely justified in believing each of these three propositions. Smith, of course, has no idea where Brown is. But imagine now that two further conditions hold. First, Jones does notown a Ford, but is at presentdrivinga rentedcar.And secondly, by the sheerest coincidence,and entirely unknown to Smith, the place mentionedin proposition(h) happensreallyto be the placewhereBrown is. If these two conditions hold then Smith does not know that (h) is true, even though (i) (h) is true, (ii) Smith does believe that (h) is true, and (iii) Smith is justifiedin believing that (h) is true. These two examplesshow that definition(a) does not state a suffiient condition for someone's knowing a given proposition. The same cases, with appropriatechanges, will suffice to show that neither definition (b) nor definition(c) do so either. WayneState University CIRCULARITYAND INDUCTION By PETER ACHINSTEIN 1. DECENTLY' I suggested why an argument proposed by Max Black, which attempts to support an inductive rule by citing its past success,suffersfrom circularity.The inductiverule under discussionis this: R: To argue from Mostinstances of As examinedundera widevarietyof havebeenB to (probably)ThenextA to beencountered conditions willbe B. The argumentin favour of the rule is as follows: (a): In most instancesof the use of R in argumentswith truepremisses examinedin a wide variety of conditions, R has been successful. Hence(probably): In the next instanceto be encounteredof use of R in an argument with a true premiss,R will be successful. I" The Circularityof a Self-Supporting Inductive Argument ", ANALYSIS,22.6 (June 1962). Essays (150 points.) Criteria Ratings Pts Introduction: 30.0 to >23.9 pts Proficient 23.9 to >20.9 pts Average 20.9 to >17.9 pts Below Average 17.9 to >0 pts Unsatisfactory Writer introduces the author and the title of their essay, states the author's thesis (conclusion), and advises audience how they will proceed. 30.0 pts Argument pt. 1: Writer provides clear and concise summary of author's argument. 30.0 to >23.9 pts Proficient 23.9 to >20.9 pts Average 20.9 to >17.9 pts Below Average 17.9 to >0 pts Unsatisfactory 30.0 pts 30.0 to >23.9 pts Proficient 23.9 to >20.9 pts Average 20.9 to >17.9 pts Below Average 17.9 to >0 pts Unsatisfactory Argument pt. 2 Writer constructs an argument with clearly delineated premises and conclusion; additionally, writer substantiates their claims. 30.0 pts 30.0 to >23.9 pts Proficient 23.9 to >20.9 pts Average 20.9 to >17.9 pts Below Average 17.9 to >0 pts Unsatisfactory Argument pt. 3 Writer anticipates objections to their claims, and writes a conclusion summarizing the main points of their argument. 30.0 pts 30.0 to >23.9 pts Proficient 23.9 to >20.9 pts Average Organization This essay is grammatically sound and free from spelling and punctuation errors, and is 550 to 650 words. 20.9 to >17.9 pts Below Average 17.9 to >0 pts Unsatisfactory 30.0 pts Total Points: 150.0
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