Proofreading a political science essay 30 pages

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Hello , I need Good writer to edit/ proofread/ and make the essay perfect.

I will upload the essay instructions and materials/notes so you can work on the citations as well.

Please be good at political science

I will need the final essay and One comparing the two and shows the fixed errors

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE EDITORIAL STYLE GUIDELINES 1. The Manuscript: • If the paper is accepted for publication, the author will also be asked to provide a French version of the abstract. • Manuscripts should not be longer than 8,000 words, all material included. • The Journal employs “in-text” citation style, with a list of references cited following the text. See items 5 and 6 below. • Our style in English generally follows the current edition of The Canadian Style: A Guide to Writing and Editing (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada); our dictionary is the current edition of Gage Canadian Dictionary (Toronto: Gage). Authors should also consult the most recent volume of the Journal for style. 2. Tables and Figures: • Because of cost and space limitations, tables should be used parsimoniously, to illustrate findings which are crucial to the hypothesis. Otherwise, a sentence can be inserted to advise the reader that the author is willing to elaborate or provide other test results through correspondence. • Rules for in-text citations apply to the citation of sources at the foot of tables and figures. See section 5 below. • Tables and figures should be submitted on separately numbered sheets. See Appendix for an example of format for tables. Figures should be drawn carefully, with any text precisely located. If accepted for publication, camera-ready copy of tables and figures might be required. • The positioning of a table or figure should be indicated in the text following the paragraph that first mentions it, with the instruction, “Insert Table 1 (or Figure) about here.” 3. Be Mindful of These Rules • Unlike a paper delivered to a specialist audience at a particular conference and at a particular time, a journal article will be read by a diverse audience of specialists and generalists over an extended period of time. Therefore, remarks concerning recent or topical events and individuals should be fully elaborated for the broader journal readership. • The Journal employs gender-neutral or inclusive language except where the references to “man” or “mankind” and so forth are attributable not to the author of the manuscript but to a person who is a subject of the manuscript or whose work is being cited in it. Accordingly, the Journal prefers “humans” and “humanity” or perhaps even “people” to “man” or “mankind.” The use of “he/she” or “him/her” or “he and she,” and other variations are awkward replacements. Suitable editing of the text can usually avoid such problems, often by making use of “individual”or “person” or by changing from the singular “he”and “his” to the plural “they” and “their.” • Verbs ending in “ise/ize” and their derived forms: use “ize” as in organize or nationalize or nationalization. • Verbs with single “l”/double “l” and their derivatives: use the single “l” as in fulfil and fulfilment or enrol and enrolment. • Double “l”/single “l” in the past tense of verbs: use, for example, travelled, modelled and labelled rather than traveled, modeled and labeled. • Examples of particular spellings: use “our” as in behaviour, and labour; also benefited, judgment, programme, sizeable, worldview; also, grass roots (noun), but grassroots (adjective). • Hyphenation: Generally avoid hyphens (as in “neoliberal”), but use a hyphen when the word following the prefix begins with the same vowel as the one with which the prefix ends, or when the appearance of the compound would be confusing without the hyphen, as in co-editor, co-author, co-operation, co-ordination, pre-empt and neoinstitutional. Hyphenation can cause particular problems in addition to the above where hyphenated words, because of their widespread use in the social sciences, are increasingly dropping their hyphens. In general, however, the Journal continues to employ hyphens in macro-economic, micro-economic and socio-economic. We also hyphenate geo-political, neo-Marxist, inter-election, inter-nation, inter-state, inter-regional, left-wing (adjective), right-wing (adjective), policy-making (adjective), cross-national, post-secondary, non-existent, non-voter and following the prefix “anti.” The Journal does not hyphenate intergovernmental, nongovernmental, multinational, subsystem, subgroup, subsample, prewar, postwar, turnout, postindustrial, semiskilled, crosstablulation. The Journal does not hyphenate policy maker, policy making, decision maker and decision making when used as nouns. 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For example: According to Alan Cairns, “the electoral system has been an important factor in the evolution of the Canadian party system” (1968: 78). Alan C. Cairns’s study of the impact of the electoral system on political parties (1968) concludes.... Electoral systems are not neutral (Cairns, 1968). • If a reference involves two authors, both names should be included. For example, “...one cannot deny that Canada’s political parties are facing serious challenges to their presumed monopoly on the linkage function” (Tanguay and Gagnon, 1996: 3). • If a reference has more than two authors, the first author’s last name should be followed by “et al.” For example, The effect of identification with governing parties on feelings of efficacy and trust has received attention (Lambert et al., 1986). • If there is more than one reference in the manuscript to the same author(s) and the same year of publication, insert a, b, c, and so forth following the year. For example, ... (Lambert et al., 1986a). ...(Lambert et al., 1986b). • When more than one source is to be included in a single citation, they are listed preferably in alphabetical order, separated by semi-colons. If the list is not exhaustive, but representative of the literature, the list of names and dates should be preceded by the phrase “for example.” Though the number of scholars who have addressed the question is small, the evidence is compelling (for example, Irvine, 1974; Irvine and Gold, 1980; Johnston, 1985; Meisel, 1967, 1975). • Also, a brief phrase might be inserted within the parentheses, such as ... (but see Lambert et al., 1986a). • The citation of an institution should precede the information itself. Also, references that lack an author’s name require the name of the institution that sponsored the reference. For an example of each, Municipal data (City of St. Catharines, 1982: 2) indicate that property tax rates.... • References to court cases should contain sufficient information within the text to connect the reader with the item in the list of references at the end of the manuscript. For example, The Supreme Court of Canada has also rejected the limitations of a “political question” doctrine that would put executive decisions in foreign policy and defence matters largely beyond judicial review (Operation Dismantle v. The Queen, 1985). Of particular note is Justice Thurgood Marshall’s argument against capital punishment (U.S. Supreme Court, Gregg v. Georgia, 1976). • References to sources on the Internet should approximate as much as possible conventional formats regarding printed sources, indicating when the site was last revised or when you last accessed the site. For example, The survey employed by the election study team of 2000 (Blais, André et al. ces.html, July 20, 2001) included these questions. 5. Reference List at the End of the Manuscript Only references cited in the text are to be included in the list titled “References” at the end of the manuscript. • The list should be in alphabetical order (Treat Mc as Mac. Surnames containing, for example, De, de la, or Von, should be listed under D or V.) • Names should be in upper and lower case. • When several references have the same author(s), the name should be repeated each time and the list should be in chronological order. If the list includes several references by the same author in the same year, distinguishing between or among them by adding a letter to the date of publication (for example, 2002a, 2002b, and so forth). • In co-authored references, all authors’ full names must be included as they appear in the work being referenced. • Generational references in names, such as Jr or II, should be listed following the given name and a comma. For example, Rockefeller, John D., III, [the rest of the reference]. Here are some examples of how to cite different types of material. Titles of publications should be italicized rather than underlined. Books Archer, Keith, Roger Gibbins, Rainer Knopff and Leslie Pal. 1995. Parameters of Power: Canada’s Political Institutions. Scarborough: Nelson. Atkinson, Michael M., ed. Governing Canada : Institutions and Public Policy.1993. Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Canada. Locke, John. 1965. The Reasonableness of Christianity, ed. George W. Ewing. Chicago: Regnery. Macpherson C. B.. 1962. The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chapter in an edited book Bennett, Colin J. and Robin Bayley. 1999. “The New Public administration of Information: Canadian Approaches to Access and Privacy.” In Public Administration and Policy: Governing in Challenging Times, ed. Martin W. Westmacott and Hugh P. Mellon. Scarborough: PrenticeHall. Journal article Salazar, Debra J. and Donald K. Alper. 2002. “Reconciling Environmentalism and the Left: Perspectives on Democracy and Social Justice in British Columbia’s Environmental Movement.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 35: 527-66. Conference paper Nesbitt-Larking, Paul. 1994. “The 1992 Referendum and the 1993 Federal Election in Canada: Patterns of Protest.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Calgary. Occasional paper series Panayiotis, C. Afxentiou. 1999. “Convergence across Canadian Provinces.” Discussion paper series. No. 99-03. Department of Economics. University of Calgary. Thesis or dissertation Barr, C. W. 2000. “Evaluations of Political Leaders in Canada, Britain and the United States.” Doctoral dissertation. York University, Toronto, Ontario. Government documents Canada. Parliament. 1992. Report of the Special Joint Committee on a Renewed Canada [Beaudoin-Dobbie Committee]. Ottawa: Supply and Services. Canada. Privy Council Office. 1996. Discussion Paper on Values and Ethics in the Public Service. Ottawa: Privy Council Office. Alcock, Reg. 2001. Canada. House of Commons Debates. November 27, 7576. Court reports Supreme Court of Canada. Morgentaler v. The Queen, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 616. Dickson, C.J. Morgentaler v. The Queen, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 616, at 672. Supreme Court of Canada. Simmons v. The Queen, (1988) 55 D.L.R. (4th) 673. U.S. Supreme Court. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Magazine or newspaper articles Johnson, A. D. 1998. “Measuring Excellence.” Maclean’s, November 23, 30-33. “Spending Limits Irk Cabinet.” 1997. The Globe and Mail (Toronto), December 3, A1. Sources on the Internet Cite sources on the Internet as closely as possible to conventional formats noted above. For example, consult the printed version, that would be referenced as: Walker, Janice R. and Todd Taylor. 1988. The Columbia Guide to Online Style. New York: Columbia University Press. Or consult the electronic version, that would be referenced as: Walker, Janice R. and Todd Taylor. 1988. The Columbia Guide to Online Style. http://www.columbia.edu/cu/cup/cgos/idx_basic.html (April 23, 2001). Note that in the reference to the electronic document, the date of the print version of the source and the date of an author’s access to the electronic source are both listed in reference to the electronic version. If an Internet-based source lacks an author (institutional or human), a publisher or a date of printed publication, use the file name, the date the site was last revised or the date you accessed the site. For the latter case, Canada Election Study. 2001. http://www.fas.umontreal.ca/pol/ces-eec/ces.html (July 20, 2001). 6. Endnotes If any at all, manuscripts should contain only brief and necessary explanatory endnotes listed as “Endnotes” following the text and preceding the list of references. Appendix: Format of Tables Format of Tables Here is an example (Black, Jerome H. 1987) of a format for tables. Use brief but clear titles, including statistical techniques used to produce the data. Data sources should appear in full in all tables. Levels of statistical significant are designated by a, b, c and so forth, denoting greater levels of significance. These alphabetical superscripts may also be used to explain other useful information such as treatment of missing data and coding techniques. TABLE 2 INCIDENCE OF PAST POLITICIZATION AND INVOLVEMENT IN CANADIAN POLITICS, FOR ETHNICITY CATEGORIES (means) South East West British Euro Euro Indian pean pean Incidence of past politicization Political interest 1.87 1.01 2.03 1.58 Participation 2.50 1.15 1.11 1.84 (N) (38) (68) (96) (75/77) Involvement in Canadian politics Federal partisanship 1.26 Interest in Canadian 1.48 politics Communal activity 0.25 Contacting 0.16 politicians/officials Political knowledge 2.40 (N) (38/39) a p<.05 b p<.01 F 9.43b 6.94b 0.66 1.19 0.97 1.75 0.97 1.66 3.43b 4.72b 0.14 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.13 0.12 3.75a 1.51 0.93 1.87 1.78 11.17b (69) (95/96) (83) Source: Black, Jerome H. 1987. “The Practice of Politics in Two Settings: Political Transferability Among Recent Immigrants to Canada.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 20: 746.
Introduction The Calls to Action within the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) carry a potential to be a historic turning point that could formulate an improved relationship among indigenous peoples in Canada and all Canadians, including governments. The TRC could facilitate longed reconciliation between indigenous peoples and the Canadian government, as well as restore the rights that were continuously violated under colonialist settler occupation and the successor state, Canada. However, if the Canadian government does not adhere to the calls with significant devotion, TRC would just be marked as another failed commitment amongst many (Russell, 1). For TRC to be implemented successfully, the reconciliation process must not satisfy with the recognition and petty apologies for the wrongdoing in the past but navigate toward the systematic scrutinization that would prevent further violations of indigenous rights. To assert more formal significance in the TRC, Calls to Action #43 and #44 demand implementation of the UNDRIP. The calls demand all jurisdiction, including the federal government of Canada to adopt and implement the UNDRIP as the framework for achieving reconciliation (TRC, 191). Moreover, the calls request the government of Canada to produce a national action plan, strategies, and other concrete measures to achieve the goals of the UNDRIP. One of the significances of UNDRIP regarding the rights of the indigenous people is Article 11, section 1) and 2). Article 11, section 1) notes that “Indigenous peoples have the right to practise and revitalize their cultural traditions and customs. This includes the right to maintain, protect and develop the past, present and future manifestations of their cultures,…historical site,… and ceremonies...” (UNDRIP article 11, pg.6). Section 2) of the Article specifically focuses on the States’ obligations to compensate any “cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken” without indigenous peoples’ free, prior, and informed consent or “in violation of their laws, traditions and customs.” (Article 11, section 2. Pg.6) With the intention to monitor the process of reconciliation, this paper will specifically focus on the Canadian governments' responsiveness to Calls #43 and #44. The paper will answer the question; does the federal government of Canada and the provincial government of British Columbia in conjunction with BC Hydro successfully accommodate FPIC and UNDRIP to answer the reconciliation calls? Based on the Article 11, the question will be examined by analyzing if governments obtained free, prior, and informed consent from the indigenous peoples before the Site C Dam approval which diminished indigenous right to practice and revitalize the cultural traditions and customs in the territories. The first section of this paper will lay out the definitions of free, prior and informed consent that should be specified to foster better examination of governments’ progress observed from the Site C Dam case. What constitutes the meaning of free consent? How soon is prior? How much information is considered as informed? What is the standard of consent that Canada ought to meet if it is to accommodate the goal of reconciliation with indigenous peoples? These questions will be answered in the first section of the paper. The second section of the paper will examine the history and the impact of the Site C Dam development project. The third section will examine the consultation process of Site C Dam construction, debated between the Treaty 8 First Nations and BC Hydro. The fourth section of the paper will elaborate on the governments and BC Hydro's positions of the duty to consult. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution Act, 1982, section 35, will be explained to understand what ‘duty to consult’ represents. The fifth section of the paper will assess if FPIC was upheld in the consultation process, which was formulated using legal mechanisms such as an environmental impact assessment (EIA) and Impact and Benefits Agreements (IBA). The paper will conclude that BC Hydro, the provincial government, and the federal government of Canada did not meet the requirements of FPIC and UNDRIP; therefore, they were unsuccessful in responding to TRC calls #43 and #44. Free, Prior, and Informed Consent Foremost, the specific meaning of free, prior, and informed consent must be declared to create a robust framework that can analyze the Canadian government’s commitment to the UNDRIP article 43 and 44, which is called by the TRC to achieve reconciliation. Although UNDRIP, and FPIC within it, is not legally binding, they are recognized as the international norm in relations between states and indigenous people. The UNDRIP and FPIC are “frequently framed as a principle and more recently, as a safeguard and a standard.” (Doyle 134). What are the requirements of FPIC? What constitutes the meaning of free, prior, and informed consent in practice? The requirement of free, prior, and informed consent is a thorough consultation between the government and indigenous people, aimed to achieve a mutually beneficial agreement. The consultation and indigenous consent are significant requirements for the land development projects in indigenous territories. In such cases, Doyle suggests that obtaining the consent based on self-determination is necessary to respect the indigenous right to “own, develop, control, and use their communal lands, territories and resources.” (Doyle, 126) Such rights are fundamental self-determination rights of the indigenous people that have been discriminated against for decades. Any government actions that imposes development projects without consultation or consent “deny the indigenous peoples’ possibility of determining their own development priorities” (Doyle 131). In this sense, self-determination is vital to achieving FPIC of indigenous people to avoid unwanted land developments and “to ensure that indigenous peoples shape developments by and for themselves” (Doyle, 131). Therefore, “the relationship between FPIC and self-determination is a mutually reinforcing one” (Doyle, 131). A fair consent and the rights to self-determination are interdependent, as indigenous people should be able to participate in the governments’ decision-making process that would impact indigenous peoples’ right to maintain their culture and way of life (Doyle, 127). The consent must occur based on the decision made by indigenous people who have thoroughly considered any possibilities that would impact their ability to pursue their traditional way of life, including economic, social, and cultural rights. (Doyle, 127) Before the UNDRIP adaptation, the Human Rights Treaty bodies limited their recommendations only to “seek consent,” without elaborating on what the outcome should entail. (Doyle, 131) These recommendations only aimed to resolve “institutional deficiencies” regarding consultations, not specifying what the consultation should achieve. (Doyle, 131) Following the adoption of the UNDRIP, all three treaty bodies that maintained the ambiguous requirement to ‘seek’ consent, also specified that the consent should be obtained or secured. Combined with UNDRIP, the bodies now recommend states to facilitate consultation and to obtain consent, as the necessary FPIC process to respect indigenous peoples’ rights. The Special Rapporteur also suggested in his 2012 report on indigenous peoples and the extractive sector that "consultation and free, prior, and informed consent are best conceptualized as safeguards against measures that may affect indigenous peoples’ rights." (Doyle,135) It is evident that the right to self-determination is a necessary component for achieving FPIC. In the context of development projects "in or near indigenous peoples’ territories,” the indigenous people must be guaranteed their right to assert control over the traditional land and legitimately to request governments to obtain indigenous’ free, prior, and informed consent. (Doyle, 130) So, what constitutes the meaning of free, prior, and informed consent in practice? Any indigenous peoples’ consent given based on governments' actions that denied, coerced, or manipulated indigenous peoples’ rights and choices to fit development needs cannot be considered free (Doyle, 140). In short, the decisions of indigenous people regarding any government plans that could have an impact on indigenous territories must be autonomous and expressed without pressure (Papillon 217). The indigenous people must be free collectively to govern their own “social, economic, and political future and empowered to make decisions over their traditional lands" (Papillon 217). Although it does not mean that the consultation with government is pointless, a free consent specifies the need to empower the indigenous community-based deliberative process that allows for the free and transparent expression of a community's diverse perspectives, worries, and interests (Papillon, 217). Therefore, the free consent must also imply the right to reject after the indigenous people rightfully examine the possible impact of the development project on indigenous peoples’ capacity to carry out the rights of self-determination. Such notion is supported by The Experts Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (EMRIP) in 2011, as it notes, “the State’s duty to obtain free, prior, and informed consent affirms the prerogative of indigenous peoples to withhold consent and to establish terms and conditions for their consent” (Doyle, 133). The Special Rapporteur on the fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples had also set the tone in the 2003 report, which asserted that the “right to free prior and informed consent by indigenous peoples’ includes the ‘right to say no’ in the context of large-scale development projects” (Doyle, 132). What does the prior consent mean in practice? Within the contexts of “rights to lands, territories, and resources,” Doyle identifies prior consent as the consent given before any “relocation of indigenous peoples from their lands or territories” (Doyle, 139). However, such a definition of prior consent confines the necessity of FPIC only to the case where indigenous people have to move out of the territory. Such definition does not refer to the situations where indigenous people who do not live in the territories directly under the plans of development, but are affected by the outcome of the development projects. The impact of the Site C dam construction was one of such situations, which will be explained later in this paper. The better understanding of prior consent comes from Article 32 of UNDRIP. The article states that consultation and cooperation with the indigenous peoples in concern based on representative institutions should be prior to the “approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization, or exploitation of mineral, water, or other resources” (UNDERIP, 32). Such a requirement of FPIC suggests that consultation and consent must be obtained in the decision-making process of the development project. Papillon also argues in favor of the UNDRIP’s definition, as he notes, “FPIC requires both negotiations and deliberation at the community level in order to clearly establish the legitimacy of the project prior to its approval” (Papillon, 220). Both definitions of prior consent indicate the need for a community-based deliberative process from indigenous peoples, in the form of consultation, prior to the execution of the project that should be based on reliable information. So, how much information should be available in the decision-making process prior to approval of development projects to satisfy the meaning of FPIC? The conditions of granting informed consent are met when indigenous peoples have been “afforded the possibility of considering developmental alternatives and determining priorities in advance of making such a choice” through consultations (Doyle, 131). This means that if it is evident that the plan will directly affect the livelihood of the indigenous people, the government should provide substitutional or alternative options that the people can consider to avoid or minimize the impact. The necessity to provide adequate information as “the procedural dimension” of the consent (not as the evidence after approving the project) has been explained by U.N. human rights bodies and ILO supervisory bodies. They assert states must provide a full release of information “regarding all aspects of a potential project in a manner that is accessible and understandable to the impacted indigenous peoples” (Doyle, 140). If consent is not obtained through these free, prior, and informed procedures of consultation, the development project that hinders the indigenous selfdetermination should not continue without the states’ showing that indigenous concerns “were heard and accommodated” (Anaya, 17). Now that this paper has structured the requirements of FPIC, it will examine Site C Dam history, impact, consultation process, and the duty to consult to specify the Canadian governments' commitment to FPIC. The Site C Dam case History Historically, Site C was first proposed in 1830, but after the hearings between 1981 and 1983, the British Columbia Utility Commission turned down the Site C project. The commission was critical of BC Hydro's methods of predicting the impact of the Site C dam and concluded that it did not take energy prices into account nor assess “statistically significant past patterns of behavior.” Following the rejection, BC Hydro chose to purchase electricity from independent power producers up to this date (https://www.ordersdecisions.bcuc.com/bcuc/decisions/en/112107/1/document.do). However, in April 2010, the implementation of the Clean Energy Act excused the Site C Dam project from the Utilities Commission review (http://www.bclaws.ca/civix/document/id/complete/statreg/10022_01). Immediately after the exemption, the provincial government announced that it would move further with the project, and place it under the regulatory review phase (https://www.bchydro.com/news/press_centre/news_releases/2010/province_announces_site_c_c lean_energy_project.html). The initial review was conducted under both the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA 2012) and the British Columbia Environmental Assessment Act (BCEAA). Later, the federal government of Canada and the provincial government of British Columbia merged the assessment acts into a cooperative federalprovincial environmental assessment with a joint review panel process (https://www.ceaaacee.gc.ca/050/documents/p63919/99173E.pdf). Four years later, in October 2014, Site C received approvals from the cooperative environmental assessment, which conducted a three-year environmental review. Following the approval, the provincial government approved the construction of the Site C Dam at the cost of $8.335 billion. After such processes were formulated, conducted, and approved by the provincial and the federal government, a notice of Site C Dam construction was issued in July 2015 (https://www.sitecproject.com/sites/default/files/Notice%20of%20Construction%20Activities%2 0-%20July%202015.pdf), and by March 2016, the construction was underway. Impact The Site C dam is planned to submerge a 83 km-long stretch of the Peace River Valley into a reservoir, also flooding 20 km of its small branching rivers that have significant cultural and traditional value to the Dane-zaa, Cree, Metis, and other indigenous peoples (source). The construction of the dam would destroy the place to carry out cultural practices, such as hunting and fishing. There is no doubt that the dam would significantly undermine the ability of indigenous people to “own, develop, control, and use their communal lands, territories, and resources," as the indigenous peoples in the area rely on the valley for hunting, fishing, trapping, and gathering berries (source). The people conduct ceremonies and harvest wild foods, providing basic needs for their communities that revitalize their traditions and cultures that have been constrained for decades (source). The Peace River Valley is also a habitat for the animals that are included in the indigenous peoples’ traditional diet, and the animals that are considered sacred in their culture. The flooding caused by the dam would also disrupt migration of fish species and release mercury that could make the fish from the area unsafe to eat for at least 20 to 30 years, affecting not only the current generation of indigenous people but the following generations of communities (source). Debated consultation process Regarding the consultation done between the Treaty 8 First Nations and the BC Hydro, only two documents exist on the BC Hydro website. One of the two documents available under the “aboriginal consultation” topic is the Treaty 8 First Nations’ Report on Stage 2 Consultation, and the other is the response from the BC Hydro answering the concerns of the Treaty 8 First Nations. The first document was drafted to inform the Board of the British Columbia Hydro and the BC Hydro about indigenous communities' concerns on the forming process of Stage 2 Consultation agreement. In June 2009, the Treaty 8 First Nations (T8FN) requested an opportunity to make a presentation to “the Board” and BC Hydro on the status of Stage 2 Consultation when the Board called BC Hydro for a Stage 2 Report in the fall of 2009 (200900). BC Hydro and the Board rejected the request but did agree to a report in the form of an Appendix to be included in the BC Hydro First Nation Consultation Report (200900). Such indirect presentation was the only opportunity for the T8FN to assert its concerns on the delayed consultation process, although it was the stakeholder that are “most directly affected by the proposed Site C Project” (200900). The decisions to commence stage 3 was solely dependent on the Board and BC Hydro decision, which was minimally supported by the BC Hydro’s general report of the Stage 2 Consultation relative to the process. BC Hydro initially established a five-stage approach to consult with the indigenous people that will be affected by the Site C Dam project, which is the T8FN, including Doig River First Nation, Fort Nelson First Nation, Halfway River First Nation, Prophet River First Nation, Saulteau First Nations, and West Moberly First Nations (200900). The T8FN is a group of indigenous peoples who practice their tradition within the bounds of Treaty 8. T8FN should have been the major stakeholders in the planning phase, as the Treaty 8 was a “historic treaty between First Nations and the Canadian state that recognizes the right of First Nations to pursue their usual vocations of hunting, trapping, and fishing throughout the tract” (source). However, the Treaty 8 Nations in the Peace River Valley were excluded from stage 1 of the consultation, which was the review of project feasibility. The T8FN has questioned BC Hydro’s choice to conduct Stage 1 without any involvement of T8FN and to make significant progress on Stage 2 before engaging with them. After forming the five-stage consultation process, the BC Hydro did not inform, notify, nor approach the Treaty 8 Nations about the Site C Project until stage-2 preconsultation was concluded. Moreover, the Stage 2, Project Definition and Consultation, “had been underway for several months” after the pre-consultation phase, when T8FN was finally notified about the project (200900). During these several months, BC Hydro was already forming the Stage 2 Consultation Agreement in the absence of First Nations, and it was ratified at the “same time as the conclusion of Round 2 of Project Definition Consultation with the public,” which indigenous groups were not included for half of the process (200900, Table 1). Table 1. The T8FN has continuously asserted that it was notified too late about the negotiation taking place on the forming of stage 2 consultation agreement. The First Nations claim that they did not have enough time before the agreement was ratified, to provide adequate information such as “community feedback related to the proposed Site C without Project disclosure of BC Hydro’s reports and studies” (200900). Therefore, T8FN argued that it was only a minimal part in the formation of stage 2 consultation agreement and was violated of its FPIC rights. Although it was delayed, BC Hydro and the T8FNs engaged in the Stage 2 Consultation Agreement to identify the impacts of the Site C Dam project on the Treaty 8 and selfdetermination rights of the T8FN. They consulted to identify “potential moderation and accommodation measures” (200900). The two parties agreed on a three-pillared approach (Stage 2 Consultation Agreement) to the Stage 2 Consultation. The phase 1 of the Stage 2 Consultation required BC Hydro to provide the following: “All scientifically credible information about the potential effects or impacts of the proposed project on the environment; the socioeconomic effects or impacts of the proposed project; the potential scope, baseline information, study design and methodology pertaining to the proposed project; the potential effects or impacts of infrastructure pertaining to the proposed project; the appropriate methods or means for meaningful mitigation and accommodation of potential effects or impacts on section 35(1) rights; and compensation for the anticipated impacts on section 35(1) rights” (200900). Also, it included the responsibility of the T8FN Technical Advisory Representatives to analyze the information provided by BC Hydro and explain them to the remainder of the T8FN communities (200900). The information was to be distributed to each T8FN member by the community outreach team and gather back responses to identify “potential effects or impacts of the proposed project on section 35(1) rights and other community concerns” (200900). The Phase 2 of the Stage 2 Consultation required T8FN to provide BC Hydro with relevant information concerning potential effects or impacts of the project on section 35(1) rights based on community response and discuss with BC Hydro to form a draft "term of reference for the environmental assessment process” (200900). Phase 3 required the parties to formulate strategies to avoid and accommodate the identified concerns for adverse effect on section 35(1) rights and, if needed, prepare for the “negotiation of applicable impact benefit agreements in Stage 3” (200900). The stage 2 Consultation Report to the Board and BC Hydro protested inadequate commitment from BC Hydro on the 3-phase Stage 2 Consultation Agreement. Regarding Phase 1, T8FN noted that although it has made repeated requests for all studies conducted by BC Hydro, T8FNonly began to receive them in July 2009. Also, T8FN claimed that it had not received any “raw earth engineering data, the Archaeological Predictive Model, and the Social Economic report.” Therefore, T8FN did not have adequate time or information to deliver and form full indigenous community feedback based on the BC Hydro data and provide it to the BC Hydro in time for its Stage 2 Consultation Report meeting (which excluded the T8FN representatives). Moreover, the assessment information from BC Hydro excluded “cumulative socio-economicecological effects or impacts of the proposed project, the potential effects or impacts of infrastructure relating to the proposed project,” and ways to moderate project by accommodating concerns (200900). Given the delay in acquiring the insufficient information from BC Hydro to form communitybased responses and concerns, T8FN was not able to engage meaningfully in Phase 2, providing concerns of the project on its section 35(1) rights to the BC Hydro. Even without such delayed and lacking information from BC Hydro, in June 2009, T8FN provided BC Hydro with 97 concerns and questions on the project and its “potential effects or impacts on their section 35(1) rights” (200900). BC Hydro started to respond to these questions in October 2009, with many responses left unanswered at the time of Stage 2 Consultation Report between the Board and BC Hydro (200900). After T8FN received the Consultation Stage 1 and some of the Consultation Stage 2 studies and reports from BC Hydro (review of feasibility which T8FN was excluded and Project Definition and Consultation which T8FN joined in half way), T8FN was left with more questions. T8FN continued to protest that the timing of BC Hydro’s Five-Stage approach was unfair to T8FN and strongly believed that such delayed information and engagement had hindered its capacity to “participate in the process and to express their concerns and issues regarding the potential effects or impacts on their section 35(1) rights” (200900). Also, BC Hydro “took over a month to respond to the draft Traditional Land Use Study Agreement (TLUS),” which is the main mechanism for T8FN that can assess the impact of the Site C Project on indigenous selfdetermination and treaty rights. Such information was crucial in defining the project that stage 2 pursued. T8FN pointed out that BC Hydro’s slow negotiations caused a delay in agreeing and executing the Traditional Land Use Study, which should have acted as a “key tool” for discussing mitigation and accommodation (200900). At Phase 3 of Stage 2 Consultation, the TLUS still had not begun. T8FN argued that BC Hydro did not acknowledge the TLUS’s critical role in “understanding the feasibility of the proposed dam project.” T8FN asserted that the Technical Advisory Representative of T8FN should have had an opportunity to analyze and utilize the TLUS reports in surveying indigenous community, to receive adequate responses from community members about the potential impacts. In T8FN’s perspective, the absence of TLUS also diminished its capacity to engage in the consultation effectively, which led to premature “identification and implementation of mitigation factors to accommodate interests, concerns, and potential impacts” (200900). The BC Hydro’s response to T8FN’s Report on Stage 2 Consultation is available in the BC Hydro website under “aboriginal consultation.” In this document, BC Hydro answers the argument and concerns raised by T8FN based on its own assessment of the Stage 2 Consultation. The following is the summary of the response. BC Hydro firmly asserts that it believes the consultations with Treaty 8 have been honorable (as of December 2009). In BC Hydro’s perspective, the consultation with T8FN covered a broad spectrum of issues and was started in early stages of the development phase, before any significant decisions to build the potential Site C Project was made. BC Hydro felt it significantly engaged with T8FN, providing funds to participate fully in the consultation process. The document also provided quantitative information to prove its commitment to the consultation, mentioning 31 meetings, 100 letters, and 800 emails about the Site C Project. BC Hydro claimed that it was fully engaged on the Stage 2 Consultation Agreement and noted it would continue to do so if the province approved BC Hydro to Stage 3. The document also answers the most noted problem by T8FN, which is the delay in involving indigenous groups in the consultation process, Stage 1 and Stage 2. BC Hydro notes that prior to the release of the Stage 1 report, the senior project advisor and the former President and CEO had contacted T8FN in November 2007, “advising of BC Hydro’s desire to begin consultations with T8FN on the potential Site C Project" (BC Hydro). However, it notes, on December 14, 2007, T8FN “responded in writing with concerns about the appropriateness of BC Hydro, rather than the Crown, undertaking consultations with First Nations,” and once such issue was solved, the consultation began right away (BC Hydro). Therefore, BC Hydro argued that consultation began at a very early development stage with the terms and scopes agreed by both parties and asserted such process was “deemed best practices and, in part, ensured the “Crown’s consultation obligations are met or exceeded.” The document constantly mentioned that consultations were conducted in the early stages as possible and how often the meetings were held, noting “7 main table consultation meetings, 6 technical meetings, and 10 other meetings in smaller groups” (BC Hydro). BC Hydro has also stated it provided T8FN with “over 400 historical reports related to Site C and studies from Stage 1 and Stage 2 without delay, focused on fish and aquatic habitat, vegetation and wildlife, water quality, local climate and greenhouse gas, heritage, community services and infrastructure, economic, and land use and resources” (BC Hydro). Moreover, it claimed BC Hydro technical advisors provided a substantial amount of information “in the form of presentations, outlines of proposed studies, proposed archaeological modeling, and GIS data” (BC Hydro.) Duty to Consult over FPIC As observed, the perspectives of each party on the consultation process show a stark difference. The perspectives of the two parties show the gap between FPIC and the duty to consult. T8FN argued for the BC Hydro's lack of commitment to UNDRIP and FPIC when BC Hydro argued for its full commitment on duty to consult. The one phrase that sums up the BC Hydro and provincials position on such matter is indicated in the response document provided by BC Hydro, as it asserted “process was deemed best practices and, in part, ensured the Crown’s consultation obligations are met or exceeded.” Such a statement shows BC Hydro and provincial/federal government conducted consultation under the “duty to consult” rather than free, prior, informed consent frame within UNDRIP. This paper does not intend to distinguish which claim is the right frame within which to observe the consultation process. Based on agreeable facts, this paper intends to assess if FPIC was present in the consultation process regarding the resource development project on the territories where indigenous rights would be affected. To do so, this paper must clarify why the gap exists between FPIC and duty to consult by noting the difference. The vague proposals to “seek consent” and more detailed elaboration to obtain consent from UNDRIP have caused two contrasting views between the Canadian government and the indigenous people. The Principles document from the government of Canada formulated in 2018 states that the government of Canada recognizes that “meaningful engagement with Indigenous peoples aims to secure their free, prior, and informed consent when Canada proposes to take actions which impact them and their rights, including their lands, territories and resources” (Principles). It may seem that the government has successfully recognized the terms of UNDRIP and therefore plans to answer TRC Calls. However, the vague notion of “seeking consent” is implied in the document, which limits the necessary action by the government only to the reasonable consultation defined under the state constitution. Such wording is present throughout the Principles document showing the Canadian government’s resistance to the FPIC’s notion to “obtain” consent. Canada has strongly objected to the implied “veto” power in FPIC because it constrains the government authority to execute decisions made based on the sovereignty of the state. Therefore, even though the government of Canada has shown a commitment to upholding UNDRIP and FPIC, the document does not specify in detail what FPIC should entail, as this paper has noted based on the interpretation of various scholars. Furthermore, the Principles document does not elaborate what “meaningful engagement” constitutes, and to what degree the government will “aim” to secure consent, or whether it will continue to secure consent if not obtained. Through the phrases such as “meaningful engagement,” “aims to secure,” and “look for opportunities to build processes and approaches aimed at securing consent,” the government of Canada only signifies its procedural responsibility on “good faith” and “duty to consult,” avoiding the responsibility to guarantee the obtainment of collective consent. Such lax wording and proposals on the consultation and consent act as a smokescreen to cover further minimal actions of the Canadian government. Not only the Principles document is paradoxical by stating the government intends to go “beyond the legal duty to consult” without guaranteeing consent, it also does not endorse UNDRIP properly as it manifests to be. It only reaffirms the government’s intention to engage in the minimum requirement to seek consent under the constitution, which requires the Canadian government to consult with the indigenous group but can override the result at the convenience of the government without any obligation to implement the result. This view focuses on the phrase such as “consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples” but neglects the responsibility to obtain consent (Principles). What the Principles document should have been is a confirmation of an actual inclusion of the indigenous people in the decision-making process and endorsing the government responsibility firmly to obtain “free, prior, and informed consent for the approval of a project affecting indigenous lands or territories and other resources,” implying the right to reject (Russell). As the description of a proper consent in UNDRIP suggests straightforwardly, the formation of policymaking regarding indigenous people must be a careful implementation of the decisions made by the indigenous group, derived from a thorough consultation. The whole process of consultation should be “asking for the permission of the traditional territory owners and the people who will be directly affected by government policies on the reserves, instead of asking for unaccounted opinions for the sake of formality” (Russell). From the beginning of the Site C process, the principal actors of the Site C project were provincial government, the federal government, and BC Hydro. The three parties had two choices to approach the Site C Dam project. One way was to uphold FPIC under UNDRIP and obtain indigenous consent. Such path would require the governments and BC Hydro to engage in consultations until the indigenous groups give consent for the approval (not consent for the already approved decisions) of the development project, and, if not granted, work to modify plans until it accommodates indigenous needs. The other way was to respect Treaty 8 rights under the Constitution Act, 1982, section 35, and engage in consultations based on Supreme Court interpretations of section 35. By choice, the Canadian governments (provincial and federal) engaged in the consultations through legal mechanisms involving BC Hydro under their “duty to consult.” What exactly is the “duty to consult”? The duty to consult is not elaborated under section 35 but derives from the multiple Supreme Court interpretations on section 35. Section 35 asserts that “the existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are recognized and affirmed.” However, its implication before the Haida Nation v. British Columbia case, was limited to the cases that can justify infringements of aboriginal or treaty rights under the Sparrow. To be included in the consultation and accommodation regarding the negative impacts on indigenous rights, the responsibility was on the First Nation to “prove both the existence of the right and its infringement” (sterling), Later, Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin of the Supreme Court ruled in the Haida Nation v. British Columbia case that “the Crown has a ‘duty to consult’ aboriginal peoples when it acts in a manner that may adversely affect aboriginal or treaty rights guaranteed by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982” (sterling). Moreover, The First Nation did not need to prove the existence of rights but only needed the rights to be plausibly asserted in order to invoke the duty to consult (sterling). Also, the decision ruled that when negative effects on the rights of the First Nations are recognized, the consultation by the crown must accommodate valid aboriginal concerns. Often in a case where the indigenous land rights and the resource development plan is conflicted, the vague notion of “duty to consult” was used as a “smokescreen” to legitimize the minimum commitment of the government, avoiding free, prior and informed consent. Assessment of FPIC in EIA and IBA from Site C How was BC Hydro able to conduct consultation with the indigenous people, instead of the Canadian government, when Haida interpretation asserts the Crown’s duty to consult? Although courts’ interpretation of section 35 in the Haida case suggests that the Crown should be responsible for performing the duty to consult, the court further approves the government to “delegate procedural aspects to third parties, including project proponents.” In the case of Site C Dam, the two levels of governments delegated the duty to consult to the BC Hydro as the Impact and Benefits Agreements IBA, and to the cooperative environmental assessment as the environmental impact assessment EIA. The Supreme Court of Canada recognizes EIAs as the significant consultation mechanisms because they provide indigenous people with assessments on the impact and adequacy of the development project. The court finds that such function fulfills the duty to consult. The Site C environmental assessments did support priorities of the indigenous people and proved the inadequacy of the project’s initial review, as it noted that the project had come forward without “a comprehensive planning vision” for the region. Moreover, the assessment stated that “it is doubtful that the full extent of the impacts of a project like Site C can be fully understood, much less addressed without evaluating the effects of multiple projects in a rapidly developing region.” However, as the legal mechanism upholding the delegated “duty to consult,” EIAs are very limited for inhibiting “free and informed consent to a given project” (Papillon, 219). First, the political position of indigenous groups in consultations is often considered equal to other nonindigenous stakeholders who are included in the decision-making process. EIA’s assess general environmental impact on the overall stakeholders, which does not adhere to the specific impact on conditions of indigenous cultures, traditions, or livelihood. According to Papillon, “even in cases where their unique status and rights are considered, consultations as part of EIAs remain relatively passive participatory exercises” (Papillon, 219), Furthermore, when EIAs include special assessment for indigenous peoples, the decisions to implement the significance still relies on the regulatory authorities. Therefore, no matter how much information EIA produces in favor of the First Nations’ position, the governments always hold the final decision-making power. Such FPIC limitations can be observed from the noted Consultation Reports. BC Hydro conducted baseline studies to characterize conditions before including T8FN in the Stage 2 Consultation stage and prior to forming an agreement on Stage 2 Consultation. However, BC Hydro argued the data was not enough to be provided to the T8FN and the scope of effects assessment studies were not yet decided by regulators when Stage 2 was proceeding without T8FN (BC Hydro answer). Moreover, BC Hydro persistently delayed completing the agreement on Traditional Land Use Studies suggested by the indigenous people, which was a critical environmental, cultural, and traditional assessment to define the concerns of T8FN fully (T8FN). Considering these aspects of the consultation process, the project consultation should not have continued in the absence of T8FN, TLUS, and BC Hydro environmental assessment data if FPIC was to be achieved. The EIA process and consultation were not prior nor informed. After ignoring the need of EIA in the early stages, BC province and federal government have “followed and established their own distinctive EIA processes for the project,” such as Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA 2012) and the British Columbia Environmental Assessment Act (BCEAA), which merged into the cooperative federal-provincial environmental assessment with a joint review panel process under their “duty to consult” (https://www.ceaaacee.gc.ca/050/documents/p63919/99173E.pdf). Duty to consult was also delegated to BC Hydro through the Impact and Benefits Agreement. Papillon notes that IBAs are an effective consultation mechanism because they are private, and often confidential agreements negotiated between corporations and indigenous representative organizations without direct government intervention. He argues that the negotiation of an IBA demonstrates concrete engagement with indigenous peoples, shows a willingness to accommodate their rights and interests, and, more importantly, confirms indigenous support for the project by focusing on the discussions of tangible cost and benefits. However, IBAs are commenced through bargaining that can convince indigenous peoples to set aside their right to FPIC and the implied right to “say no” to the project by offering benefits or compensations. Not only do IBAs prompt abandonment of FPIC rights to reject, but they are also often negotiated between elites without any significant input from the indigenous communities until an agreement is reached. Once an agreement is reached, various communities are either destined to choose to support or oppose, rather than having a chance to discuss. Papillon notes such closed environment and limit to proper discussions are “not consistent with the spirit and intent of FPIC, which, as argued, requires both negotiations and deliberation at the community level in order to clearly establish the legitimacy of the project prior to its approval” (Papillon, 220), IBAs and EIAs could complement each other in this respect. It is safe to argue that IBAs are political methods under the “duty to consult,” which aims to facilitate negotiations for consent based on economic terms, away from the rights of FPIC. Also, although EIAs hold the potential to be a “deliberative space” that can foster agreements and consent based on studies, how those data are considered and taken into the final decision is determined by authorities who conduct the EIAs; in the Site C dam case, BC Hydro, provincial government, and the federal government of Canada. Within a context where the project proponent’s ultimate interest is to secure “quick, stable, and binding indigenous support for the project,” both EIAs and IBAs are limited to being legal instruments that are used to satisfy the court’s interpretation of section 35 and duty to consult, which is much below the standards of the FPIC (Papillon, 221). The effectiveness of IBA and EIA as the legal mechanism to build consultation upon duty to consult is prominent in the Site C Dam case. The IBA and EIA were committed to pursuing the court’s interpretation of section 35 and sustaining delegated duty to consult from the Crown, constructing legitimate frames to avoid court challenges. Although the Tribal Chief of T8FN strongly objected to any IBAs replacing FPIC for the construction of Site C Dam, multiple indigenous groups have agreed to compensation and benefits offered by BC Hydro IBA. In 2009, when the appropriateness of Stage 2 Consultation was under debate, the Tsay Keh Dene agreed to IBA and received $20.9 million and annual funds of $2 million to accommodate indigenous social, cultural, and governance programs. Other benefits included infrastructure assistance, such as road maintenance and capacity funding for further discussions of impacts under IBA. Also, the Kwadacha First Nation received $15 million and annual payments of $1.6 million (news https://vancouversun.com/opinion/columnists/vaughn-palmer-site-c-passes-all-legalloopholes-but-project-still-threatened). The successful IBAs between the proponents of the project and indigenous groups secured the intentions of proponents to rely on duty to consult. Based on the degree of efforts made by project proponents through EIAs and IBAs, courts continuously dismissed all challenges made on the inadequate government actions towards FPIC. The project proponents won 14 cases with no losses. Moreover, “nine judicial reviews of the environmental approvals and/or permits for Site C have been dismissed or discontinued,” and five court appeals were dismissed (news). The federal court of appeal gave Hydro the upper hand as it noted that consultations were “extensive and conducted in good faith.” (news) Also courts found BC Hydro’s consultation with the T8FN was lengthy, in good faith and was “extensive both qualitatively and quantitatively” (news). Courts bluntly critiqued indigenous groups by noting that if consultations were insufficient in any way, the fault was on T8FN by refusing to participate, as they decided that the project not proceeding was the only viable solution for them. Overall, courts found Hydro’s efforts were satisfactory under the legal standard of “deep consultations” (news). Further decisions by the court dismissed the requirements of FPIC in which government must obtain free, prior, and informed consent before proceeding with the development project. Courts asserted that indigenous positions on FPIC and not accepting the proposed terms does not mean the consultation provided by BC Hydro were not fully engaging and inadequate (news), Moreover, the court found the First Nations refused to give the process a chance even though BC Hydro provided thorough consultation in both in a qualitative and quantitative manner. Overall, the courts’ interpretations of Site C Dam challenges were entirely based preceding notion of duty to consult, not on FPIC and the norms of UNDRIP. Conclusion This paper has noted what constitutes free, prior, and informed consent. BC Hydro, the provincial government, and the federal government of Canada did not meet the requirements of FPIC and UNDRIP, and, therefore, were unsuccessful in responding to TRC calls #43 and #44. The requirements of free consent were not met in the Site C Dam development project. The indigenous peoples in T8FN were not free collectively to govern their own social, economic, and political future and were not empowered to make decisions over their traditional lands. The right to reject implied in free consent was not available to T8FN because proponents of the project relied on the duty to consult via legal mechanisms of IBA and EIA, which satisfied the courts’ interpretation of Section 35. Moreover, the indigenous people did not have a chance rightfully to examine the possible impact of the development project on indigenous peoples’ capacity to carry out the rights of self-determination, as BC Hydro stalled its agreements on Traditional Land Use Studies of T8FN and relied on its own scientific studies or EIAs. Although BC Hydro claimed T8FN was included in the consultation process as early as possible, it can be observed from the consultation reports and scheduling that T8FN was excluded for a significant amount of time. Such delayed and uninformed consultation process progressed without the significant stakeholders’ suggestions, input, or priorities not only goes against the meaning of consultation, but violates the principles of FPIC. Papillon asserts that, under the notion of FPIC, an “exchange or negotiation should take place between the concerned community, the project proponent, and relevant decision-making authorities” (Papillon). Furthermore, the communities involved in the development project who will be directly affected should be “empowered to define its priorities freely and prior to the decision-making process” (Papillon). It is important to note that FPIC requires authorities to acquire indigenous concerns prior to decision-making process beginning, not prior to the approval. Therefore, BC Hydro’s argument that it has provided a consultation prior to approval of the project does not hold any significance in terms of FPIC. The requirements of informed consent were not met either. Even though it was, and still is, evident that the plan will directly affect the livelihood and the rights of self-determination of the indigenous people, the government did not go to the extent until suggested alternatives were agreeable by indigenous groups. From the beginning of the project when the T8FN was notified, the position of the indigenous group was on the FPIC and how the project consultation did not satisfy the requirements of FPIC. However, there was a substantial gap between indigenous peoples and the three project proponents because the proponents approached to accommodate indigenous rights solely based on duty to consult. Therefore, from the position of the project proponents, the consultation did not need to obtain any freely and thoroughly achieved consent based on informed alternatives, prior to the decision-making process. The supreme court’s interpretation of Section 35 from the Haida case, implementing the duty to consult as the satisfactory way of accommodating indigenous rights, empowered levels of governments and corporation only to follow their ways of understanding of how the process should be, not acknowledging the indigenous’ perspective on how indigenous’ life should be treated. Such egotistical way of interpreting the culture, tradition, and the history of indigenous people resembles the very colonialist view of the settlers that Canada has inherited. Report (fragmented paragraphs) The UNDRIP principle that this study focuses on is the Free, Prior, and Informed Consent. The study specifically focuses on the need for FPIC under UNDRIP when States, often in conjunction with corporations, pursue resource extraction or development projects on the territories that are directly connected to the self-determination rights of the indigenous peoples. The principles of FPIC is based on the notion that various actors must not only seek, but obtain from the indigenous peoples that are under the potential impact of the projects. The ultimate goal of this study was to examine if the governments of Canada successfully uphold the FPIC within UNDRIP, and thereby answering the reconciliation calls to action #43 and #44. The study specifically examined if FPIC was present in the Site C Dam construction project. The government actors involved in Site C Dam project were the Provincial Government of British Columbia and the Federal Government of Canada. However, both government actors heavily relied on the Supreme Courts’ interpretation of the Constitution Act, 1982, Section 35, which is the ‘duty to consult’ indigenous people that the development project might affect. They Key indigenous actors who were consulted under the duty to consult rather than the principles of FPIC, were the indigenous peoples under the Treaty 8. The Treaty 8 is a historical treaty which secures the rights of the indigenous people within the bounds that is mentioned. The self-determination rights elaborated under such treaty is the right to hunting, trapping and fishing which are still practiced to this date. Such activities are directly related to the preservation and vitalization of the indigenous traditions and culture. The Treaty 8 First Nations organization includes six indigenous groups; Doig River First Nation, Fort Nelson First Nation, Halfway River First Nation, Prophet River First Nation, Saulteau First Nations and West Moberly First Nations. There are other indigenous groups who are not included Treaty 8 First Nations organization but who are still under the influence of Treaty 8 rights such as the Kwadacha First Nation, the Tsay Keh Dene, Dane-zaa, Cree, and Metis. The territorial space under the development plan of Site C Dam coincides with the Treaty 8 territories. The main territory that the Site C dam plans to submerge into reservoir is the 83 km long stretch of the Peace River Valley, which is located in the Northeastern British Columbia. The Site C dam would also affect nearby territories by flooding 20 km of the Peace River Valley’s small branching rivers that have significant cultural and traditional value to the Danezaa, Cree, Metis and other indigenous peoples. (source) The construction of the dam would destroy the place to carry out cultural practices such as hunting and fishing. There is no doubt that the dam would significantly undermine the ability of indigenous people to “own, develop, control and use their communal lands, territories and resources," as the Indigenous peoples in the area rely on the valley for hunting, fishing, trapping, and gathering berries. (Source) The Site C Dam construction plan is adopted as the economic development plan and environmental commitment plan. The governments of Canada argue that the dam would provide significantly increase the energy capacity by providing powers to 450,000 homes. By creating its own source of energy, the provincial government no longer has to purchase electricity from independent power producers. The government also argues that the construction of the Site C Dam will contribute to the 93 percent clean energy generation goal set by the climate change policy adapted in 2008. (source) The Canadian government is trying to accommodate the greater social needs and fulfill the environmental obligation at the cost of indigenous peoples’ rights. This study is devoted to Site C Dam case to examine if the provincial government of British Columbia and the federal government Canada upholds the principle of FPIC with indigenous people, and therefore, answer the TRC calls #43 and #44. To assess FPIC in Site C Dam case, six necessary components are assessed on a scale from -1 to +1, 0 being the midpoint. The components of interest are, actors’ commitment to the FPIC, the definition of the free, prior and informed consent, Impact Benefits Agreement, and Environmental Assessment Agreement. To measure the principles of FPIC on a scale, the definition of the free, prior and informed consent will be divided into three parts based on the theoretical perspectives of Doyle, Anaya and Papillon, as noted in the paper. The weakest definition of the free consent would be Indigenous peoples not being able to govern their own social, economic, and political future, which equals to pressured consent rather than free. Also, when a chance to freely examine the potential impact on the rights of self-determination is constrained, free consent is defined the weakest. The weakest definition of the prior consent would be a delayed engagement, from the project proponents, with the indigenous representatives and communities. The indigenous communities under the potential impact of the project must be notified prior to the decisionmaking process and have sufficient time for thorough discussions. Furthermore, a weakest definition of informed consent would be indigenous peoples’ lack of access to the adverse effects of the project that can hinder indigenous peoples’ self-determination. Based on the weakest definition and the strongest definition of free, prior and informed consent, the government actions towards indigenous peoples in the Site C Dam project will be assessed on a scale. The governments (the provincial and the federal governments) and BC Hydro will be assessed as one actor in the measurement as the governments have delegated their duty to consult to the BC Hydro and only showed commitments through such delegation. The expressed commitment and actual behavior of the actors would be positioned on the numeric scale from -1 to +1. The expressed commitment and actual commitment will be defined under the definition provided, and both measurement will be used to judge if actors have been compliant, under-compliant or over compliant. First, the actors’ expressed commitment would score 0 for the free consent and actual behavior would also fall under -1, resulting under-compliance. The actor’s expressed commitment on the prior consent would also score 0, and the actual behavior would score 0, resulting compliance. Lastly, the actor’s expressed commitment on the informed consent would score +1 but the actual commitment falls under 0, which shows the under-compliance. All scores indicate that the governments and corporations that engage in project that hinders the rights of indigenous groups are trending away from the principles of FPIC and more to the duty to consult.

Tutor Answer

Joelda
School: UCLA

Attached.

Running Head: CANADIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Canadian Journal of Political Science
Student Name
Institutional Affiliation

1

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

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Abstract
This paper talks on The Calls to Action within the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(TRC) carry a potential to be a historic turning point that could formulate an improved
relationship among indigenous peoples in Canada and all Canadians, including governments.
The study specifically focuses on the need for FPIC under UNDRIP when States, often in
conjunction with corporations, pursue resource extraction or development projects on the
territories that are directly connected to the self-determination rights of the indigenous peoples.
In addition, the requirements of free consent in the Site C Dam development project as the case
study, how the project affected the indigenous peoples in T8FN collectively to govern their own
social, economic, and political future and if they are able to make decisions over their traditional
lands. The principles of FPIC are based on the notion that various actors must not only seek but
obtained from the indigenous peoples that are under the potential impact of the projects. The
ultimate goal of this study was to examine if the governments of Canada successfully uphold the
FPIC within UNDRIP, and thereby answering the reconciliation calls to action 43 and 44.

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Contents
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... 2
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 4
Free, Prior, and Informed Consent .............................................................................................. 6
The Site C Dam case ..................................................................................................................... 10
History....................................................................................................................................... 10
Debated consultation process .................................................................................................... 12
Table 1 ...................................................................................................................................... 14
Duty to Consult over FPIC ....................................................................................................... 19
Assessment of FPIC in EIA and IBA from Site C .................................................................... 23
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 27
Report (fragmented paragraphs) ................................................................................................... 29
References ..................................................................................................................................... 33

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Introduction
The Calls to Action within the Truth and Reconciliation Commission has the power to
intervene on various issues affected by the changes that have occurred due to projects that have
been implemented in Canada. The TRC could facilitate much-anticipated reconciliation between
indigenous peoples and the Canadian government, as well as restore the rights that were
continuously violated under colonialist settler occupation and the successor state, Canada.
However, if the Canadian government does not adhere to the calls with significant devotion,
TRC would just be marked as another failed commitment amongst many (Russell, 1). For TRC
to be implemented successfully the reconciliation process must not be satisfied with the
recognition and petty apologies for the wrongdoing in the past but navigate toward the
systematic scrutiny that would prevent further violations of indigenous rights. To assert more
formal significance in the TRC, Calls to Action 43 and 44 demand implementation of the
UNDRIP. The calls demand all jurisdiction, including the federal government of Canada to adopt
and implement the UNDRIP as the framework for achieving reconciliation (TRC, 191).
Moreover, the calls request the government of Canada to produce a national action plan,
strategies, and other concrete measures to achieve the goals of the UNDRIP. One of the
significances of UNDRIP regarding the rights of the indigenous people is Article 11, section 1
and 2. Article 11, section 1 notes that “Native peoples have the right to practice and revitalize
their cultural traditions and customs. This involves the right to preserve, protect and develop the
past, current and upcoming manifestations of their cultures, historical site, and ceremonies”
(UNDRIP article 11, pg.6). Section 2 of the Article specifically focuses on the States’ obligations
to compensate any “cultural, intelligent, religious and mystical possessions taken” without native

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5

people permitted, prior, and conversant with the consent or “in violation of their laws, traditions,
and customs” (Article 11, section 2. Pg.6)
With the intention to monitor the process of reconciliation, this paper will specifically
focus on the Canadian governments' responsiveness to Calls 43 and 44. The paper will answer
the question; does the federal government of Canada and the provincial government of British
Columbia in conjunction with BC Hydro successfully accommodate FPIC and UNDRIP to
answer the reconciliation calls? Based on the Article 11, the question will be examined by
analyzing if governments obtained free, prior, and informed consent from the indigenous peoples
before the Site C Dam approval which diminished indigenous right to practice and revitalize the
cultural traditions and customs in the territories.
The first section of this paper will lay out the definitions of free, prior and informed
consent that should be specified to foster better examination of governments’ progress observed
from the Site C Dam case. What constitutes the meaning of free consent? How soon is prior?
How much information is considered as informed? What is the standard of consent that Canada
ought to meet if it is to accommodate the goal of reconciliation with indigenous peoples? These
questions will be answered in the first section of the paper.
The second section of the paper will examine the history and the impact of the Site C
Dam development project.
The third section will examine the consultation process of Site C Dam construction,
debated between the Treaty 8 First Nations and BC Hydro.
The fourth section of the paper will elaborate on the governments and BC Hydro's
positions of the duty to consult. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution Act,
1982, section 35, will be explained to understand what ‘duty to consult’ represents.

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6

The fifth section of the paper will assess if FPIC was upheld in the consultation process,
which was formulated using legal mechanisms such as an environmental impact assessment
(EIA) and Impact and Benefits Agreements (IBA). The paper will conclude that BC Hydro, the
provincial government, and the federal government of Canada did not meet the requirements of
FPIC and UNDRIP; therefore, they were unsuccessful in responding to TRC calls 43 and 44.
Free, Prior, and Informed Consent
Foremost, the specific connotation of free, prior, and enlightened on agreement must be
declared to create a robust framework that can analyze the Canadian government’s commitment
to the UNDRIP article 43 and 44, which is called by the TRC to achieve reconciliation. Although
UNDRIP, and FPIC within it, is not legally binding, they are recognized as the international
norm in relations between states and indigenous people. The UNDRIP and FPIC are “frequently
framed as a principle and more recently, as a safeguard and a standard” (Doyle, 134).
What are the requirements of FPIC? What constitutes the meaning of free, prior, and
informed consent in practice? The requirement of free, prior and informed consent is a thorough
discussion amongst the administration and native people, aimed to achieve a mutually beneficial
agreement. The consultation and indigenous consent are significant requirements for the land
development projects in indigenous territories. In such cases, Doyle suggests that obtaining the
consent based on self-determination is necessary to respect the indigenous right to “own, develop,
control, and use their communal lands, territories, and resources.” (Doyle, 126) Such rights are
fundamental self-determination rights of the indigenous people that have been discriminated
against for decades. Any government actions that impose development projects without
consultation “deny the native peoples’ possibility of defining their own development
significances” (Doyle 131). In this sense, self-determination is vital to achieving FPIC of

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7

indigenous people to avoid unwanted land developments and “to ensure that indigenous peoples
shape developments by and for themselves” (Doyle, 131).
Therefore, “the relationship between FPIC and self-determination is a mutually
reinforcing one” (Doyle, 131). A fair consent and the rights to self-determination are
interdependent, as indigenous people ought to contribute in the governments’ decision-making
process that would impact indigenous peoples’ right to maintain their culture and way of life
(Doyle, 127). The consent must occur based on the decision made by indigenous people who
have thoroughly considered any possibilities that would impact their ability to pursue their
traditional way of life, including economic, social, and cultural rights. (Doyle, 127)
Before the UNDRIP adaptation, the Human Rights Treaty bodies limited their
recommendations only to “seek consent,” without elaborating on what the outcome should entail.
(Doyle, 131) These recommendations only aimed to resolve “institutional deficiencies”
regarding consultations, not specifying what the consultation should achieve. (Doyle, 131)
Following the adoption of the UNDRIP, all three treaty bodies that maintained the ambiguous
requirement to ‘seek’ consent, also specified that the consent should be obtained or secured.
Combined with UNDRIP, the bodies now recommend states to facilitate consultation and to
obtain consent, as the necessary FPIC process to respect indigenous peoples’ rights. The Special
Rapporteur also suggested in his 2012 report on indigenous peoples and the extractive sector that
"consultation and free, prior, and informed consent are best conceptualized as safeguards against
measures that may affect indigenous peoples’ rights." (Doyle, 135)
It is evident that the right to self-determination is a necessary component for achieving
FPIC. In the context of development projects "in or near indigenous peoples’ territories,” the
indigenous people must be guaranteed their right to assert control over the traditional land and

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8

legitimately to request governments to obtain indigenous’ free, prior, and informed consent
(Doyle, 130). So, what constitutes the meaning of free, prior, and informed consent in practice?
Any indigenous peoples’ consent given based on governments' actions that denied,
coerced, or manipulated indigenous peoples’ rights and choices to fit development needs cannot
be considered free (Doyle, 140). In short, the decisions of indigenous people regarding any
government plans that could have an impact on indigenous territories must be autonomous and
expressed without pressure (Papillon and Rodon 217). The indigenous people must be free
collectively to govern their own “social, economic, and political future and empowered to make
decisions over their traditional lands" (Papillon and Rodon 217). Although it does not mean that
the consultation with government is pointless, a free consent specifies the need to empower the
indigenous community-based considered process that allows for the free and crystal clear
expression of a community's varied viewpoints, worries, and interests (Papillon and Rodon 217).
Therefore, the free consent must also imply the right to reject after the indigenous people
rightfully examine the possible impact of the development project on indigenous peo...

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Anonymous
Good stuff. Would use again.

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