20 Can Terrorism Ever Be Justified? It is always important to have clear definitions that do not prejudge important ethical issues, but it is particularly important when dealing with terrorism. Suppose that a government directed its armed forces to make a missile attack against an office building in another country; would that count as a terrorist attack? There is no reason to believe that the Saudi government had any knowledge of or involvement in the attack on the Twin Towers; but if the Saudi citizens who hijacked the airliners and attacked the Twin Towers had been military personnel acting under orders of the Saudi government, would that still have been a terrorist attack? The answers to those questions will depend, obviously, on how terrorism is defined. And definitions are not always neutral: under the preferred U.S. State Department definition of terrorism, official acts by states can never count as terrorist acts. Terrorism often involves the killing of innocent people. Is terrorism, then, always an unjustified wrong? That conclusion is not quite so obvious. After all, we know that making war on a country will involve the killing of innocents; but most people believe that war is sometimes justified. If it is sometimes acceptable to kill innocents for the political purposes of war, why would it never be acceptable to kill innocents for the political purposes of a terrorist group (for example, if the terrorist group is seeking recognition of what it regards as its legitimate claim for territorial independence as a sovereign country)? Or suppose a country is under foreign occupation, perhaps a very brutal occupation. Those who want to throw off the occupation typically cannot declare war against their occupiers: they have no resources for raising or equipping armies. If it is wrong for them to plant a bomb in a city of the occupying country in a terrorist strike aimed at forcing the occupier to leave, how could it be right for a nation to bomb the city of an enemy that is attempting to forcibly conquer and occupy that nation? - TERRORISM IS ALWAYS WRONG C. A. J. (Tony) Coady C. A. J. (Tony) Coady is Australian Research Council Senior Research Fellow in Philosophy at the University of Melbourne; this essay is excerpted from "Terrorism, Just War and Supreme Emergency," in C. A. J. (Tony) Coady and Michael O'Keefe, editors, Terrorism and Justice: Moral Argument in a Threatened World (Melbourne University Press, 2002). Coady | Terrorism Is Always Wrong 331 definitions condemnation of terrorism when he said: 'no degree of the term is used of terrorism in the scholarly literature. This so that the act of defining can become a WHAT IS TERRORISM? Defining terrorism is a hazardous task. It has been esti- mated that there are well over one hundred different disarray reflects the highly polemical contexts in which move in a campaign rather than an aid to thought. Consider some influential definitions picked out by the Terrorism Research Center in the United States. 1. Terrorism is the use or threatened use of force designed to bring about political change.' 2. Terrorism constitutes the illegitimate use of force to achieve a political objective when innocent people 3. 'Terrorism is the premeditated, deliberate, system- atic murder, mayhem, and threatening of the innocent to create fear and intimidation in order are targeted. influence an audience.' oppression and no level of desperation can ever justify the killing of innocent civilians. I condemn terrorism, I condemn the killing of innocent civilians, whether they are Israeli, American or Palestinian.' It also use- fully provides a point of connection with the moral apparatus of just war theory, specifically the principle of discrimination and its requirement of non-combatant immunity. Of course, terrorism does not always take place in the context of all-out international war, but it usually has a warlike dimension. I will define it as follows: 'the organised use of violence to target non- combatants (“innocents” in a special sense) for political purposes. This definition has several contentious conse- quences. One is that states can themselves use terror- ism, another is that much political violence by non-state agents will not be terrorist. As to the former, to gain a political or tactical advantage, usually to there is a tendency, especially among the representa- tives of states, to restrict the possibility of terrorist acts 4. "Terrorism is the unlawful use or threat of violence to non-state agents. But if we think of terrorism, in the against persons or property to further political or light of the definition above, as a tactic rather than an social objectives. It is usually intended to intimidate ideology, this tendency should be resisted, since states or coerce a government, individuals or groups, or to can and do use the tactic of attacking the innocent. modify their behaviour or politics.' This is why allegations of terrorism against Israeli 5. "Terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence government forces in parts of Palestine during the anti- against persons or property to intimidate or coerce terrorist campaign in 2002 made perfect sense, even if the truth of the claims was contentious. a government, the civilian population, or any Some theorists who think terrorism cannot be segment thereof, in furtherance of political or perpetrated by governments are not so much confused social objectives.' as operating with a different definition. They define terrorism, somewhat in the spirit of the FBI definition, We might note that .. [the first] definition has the consequence that all forms of war are terrorist. as the use of political violence by non-state agents against the state. Some would restrict it to violence Whatever verdict we give on war, it is surely just against a democratic state. This is the way many politi- cal scientists view terrorism. Call this the political defi- resistance to Hitler, with terrorism. More interestingly, confusing to equate all forms of it, including the armed several of the definitions make use of the idea of unlawful or illegitimate violence, but this seems to with fudge too many questions about what is wrong terrorism. The idea of the illegal simply raises the issue of what and whose laws are being broken-armed internal resistance to Hitler by German citizens would arguably have been justified, yet it would certainly have been against German law. And the adjective ille- gitimate needs unpacking in terms of what makes this Or that use of force illegitimate. Rather than further reviewing the varieties of defi- nition, I propose to concentrate on one key element in common responses to and fears about terrorism, This element features in several of the quoted defini- namely the idea that it involves 'innocent' victims. s recently overtly invoked by Yasser Arafat's nition to contrast with the tactical definition. A further consequence of the tactical definition is that it implies a degree of purposiveness that terrorism is thought to lack. Some theorists have claimed that terrorism is essentially 'random,' others that it is essen- tially 'expressive.' In both cases, the claim is that a reference to political purposes is inappropriate. In reply, it can be argued that talk of terrorism as random is gen- erated by the genuine perception that it does not restrict its targets to the obvious military ones, but this does not mean that it is wild and purposeless. Indeed, most terrorists think that the best way to get certain political effects is to aim at 'soft ' non-combatant targets. Similarly, there can be no doubt that many terrorist attacks are expressive and symbolic, involving the affir- mation of the attitude: 'We are still here; take notice of tions. It was 332 Chapter 20 / Can Terrorism Ever Be Justified? atrocity, for instance, has a deep place in our thinking us.' Yet the expressive need not exclude the purposive. So terrorist acts can be, and usually are, both expressive and politically purposive. It is a further question whether these purposes are particularly realistic. The idea that terrorist acts are merely expressive is partly sustained by the belief that when viewed as purposive the acts are basically futile. The futility is often real enough, but purposive acts abound that are in fact futile. Note that I am not defining terrorism as immoral: it needs discussion and some background moral theory to show that it is immoral. Chuck Yeager writes in his memoirs that he suffered genuine moral revulsion at orders to commit atrocities' that he was given and complied with in World War II. He was especially ‘not proud of his part in the indis- criminate strafing of a 50 square mile area of Germany that included mainly non-combatants. A major part of the discrimination principle concerns the immunity of non-combatants from direct attack. Various questions have been raised about the making of the combatant/non-combatant distinction in THE JUST WAR TRADITION It is time to say a few words about the just war tradition that provides much of that background. In the just war tradition, this account has two key divisions—the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. The former tells us the conditions under which it can be right to resort to war, the latter is concerned to guide us in the permissible methods by which we should wage a legitimate war. Under the jus ad bellum it is common to list the following conditions: 1. War must be declared and waged by legitimate authority. 2. There must be a just cause for going to war. 3. War must be a last resort. 4. There must be reasonable prospect of success. 5. The violence used must be proportional to the wrong being resisted. Under the jus in bello there are basically two govern- ing principles: 1. The Principle of Discrimination—this limits the kind of violence that can be used, principally by placing restrictions on what count as legitimate targets. 2. The Principle of Proportionality—this limits the degree of response by requiring that the violent methods used do not inflict more damage than the original offence could require. There are clearly many difficulties with these con- ditions, but equally clearly they make initial intuitive sense. In this brief discussion, I shall concentrate on the Principle of Discrimination since it is the principle most relevant to my approach to terrorism. Moral restrictions on how one conducts oneself in war are apt to be met with incredulity. 'You do what needs to be done to win' is a common response. There is a certain appeal in this pragmatic outlook, but it flies in the face not only of just war thinking but of many common human responses to war. The concept of an the context of modern war. The first point of clarifica tion is that when we classify people as non-combatants or innocents we do not mean that they have no evil in their hearts, nor do we mean that combatants are necessarily full of evil thoughts. The classification is concerned with the role the individual plays in the chain of agency directing the aggression or wrongdoing. And it is agency, not mere cause, that is important since the soldier's aged parents may be part of the causal chain that results in his being available to fight without their having any agent responsibility for what the soldier is doing. The combatant may be coerced to fight, but is still prosecuting the war, even if the greater blame lies with those who coerce. On the other hand, young school children may be enthusiastic about their country's war, but are not prosecuting it. Neither are the farmers whose products feed the troops, for they would feed them (if they'd buy) whatever their role. It should be added that the combatant/non-combatant distinc- tion is not equivalent to the soldier/civilian distinction even though they overlap considerably. Some civilians, such as political leaders and senior public servants, be legitimate targets if they are actively directing of promoting unjust violence whether or not they wear uniforms or bear arms. But even when these distinctions are made there seems room not only for doubt about the application of the distinction to various difficult categories of person such as slave labourers coerced to work in munitions factories but also its applicability at all to the highly will integrated citizenry of modern states. Some people say that it is surely anachronistic to think of contemporary construc war as waged between armies; it is really nation against nation, economy against economy, peoples against peoples. But although modern war has many unusual tion than a necessary reflection of changed reality. Even in World War Il not every enemy citizen was a combat features, its 'total' nature is more an imposed ant. In any war, there remain millions of people who are plausibly 1101 seen as involved in the enemy's lethal Coady / Terrorism Is Always Wrong - 333 a shooting down a Soldier who is shooting at you and gunning chain of agency. There are, for instance, infants, young children, the elderly and infirm, lots of tradespeople and workers, not to mention dissidents and conscien- requires there to be no serious moral difference between objectors. This challenge to the distinction defenceless child who is a member of the same nation as the soldier. The conclusion is perhaps In fact, there has been a remarkable change on this sufficiently absurd or obscene to discredit the argument. issue in the strategic doctrine and military outlook of many major powers since the end of the Cold War. It is now common to pay at least lip service to the principle, s evidenced by certain restraint shown or announced during the Gulf War, and the bombing of Serbia, and by the widespread condemnation of Russian brutality in Chechnya. The rhetoric, at least, of the recent US-led war in Afghanistan is also respectful of the distinction. The real question is not so much whether it is immoral to target non-combatants (it is), but how 'collateral damage and death to non-combatants can be defended. The conduct of war in contemporary circumstances is or traffic police, whose roles are usually tangentially related to the causes of the conflict. It is true that some ideologies purport to have enemies so comprehensive as to make even small children and helpless adults 'combatants.' Western advocates of strategic bombing of cities in the name of total war' share with the Islamic fanatics who incorporate American air travellers and sundry citizens of Manhattan into their holy targets a simplistic and Manichaean vision of the world. This vision is at odds with the just war tradition's attempt to bring some moral sanity to bear upon the use of political violence. as morally impossible unless the activities of warriors are allowed to put non-combatants at risk in certain circumstances. Some modification to the immunity principle to allow indirect harming seems to be in line with commonsense morality in other areas of life, and to be necessitated by the circumstances of war. If it is not available, then pacifism, as Holmes has argued, seems the only moral option. The tactical definition of terrorism faces the prob- lems already discussed concerning the meaning of the term 'non-combatant, but even more acutely. In guerilla war, for instance, insurgents may not be easily identifiable as combatants, and will seek to enlist or involve the villagers and local inhabitants in the cam- paign, thereby blurring their status as non-combatants. On the other hand, many state officials who are not EMERGENCY WAR, TERRORISM AND 'SUPREME Is terrorism wrong? Given just war theory and the tacti- the cal definition, the answer is clearly yes. And if one takes principle of non-combatant immunity to invoke an absolute moral prohibition, as just war thinkers have commonly done, then it is always wrong. Yet many contemporary moral philosophers, sympathetic to just war thinking, are wary of moral absolutes. They would treat the prohibition as expressing a very strong moral presumption against terrorism and the targeting of non-combatants, but allow for exceptions in extreme circumstances. So, Michael Walzer thinks that in conditions of 'supreme emergency' the violation of the normal immunity is permissible in warfare, though only with a heavy burden of remorse. He thinks the Allied terror bombing of German cities in World War II (in the early stages) was legitimated by the enormity of the Nazi threat. John Rawls has recently endorsed this view while condemning the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. If this concession is allowed to states, it seems mere consistency to allow it to non-state agents on the same terms. The general reluctance to do so suggests that such categories as 'supreme emergency' may mask contestable political judgements. directly prosecuting the campaign against the insur- sents may be plausibly viewed as implicated in the grievances the revolutionaries are seeking to redress. There are certainly problems here, but they do not seem may be difficult and dangerous to treat even children as insurmountable. In the heat and confusion of battle, it non-combatants, especially where children are coerced contemporary conflicts). Nonetheless, a premeditated or seduced into combatant roles (as is common in many campaign of bombing regional hospitals to induce civil- ian lack of cooperation with rebels is in palpable viola- of state officials, such as water authorities tion of the jus in bello. So are the murder of infants, and The basic idea, we may here take from the tradition, plausibly traceable to Machiavelli, is that certain neces- sities of life may require the overriding of profound and otherwise 'absolute' moral prohibitions in extreme situa- tions. Walzer's defence of the terror bombing of German cities in World War II in terms of 'supreme emergency' is clearly in the tradition, and provides a useful focus for discussing its relevance to terrorism. Walzer does not defend the bombing unequivocally. He thinks that, though it was morally wrong as a violation of the princi- ple of discrimination, it was justified by the plea of supreme emergency in the early stages of the war. In the later stages, however, it was just plain morally criminal, 334 Chapter 20 / Can Terrorism Ever Be Justified? and moral thinking as a sort of touchstone of moral intentionally killing innocent people functions in our intellectual health. To suspend this, because of neces- sity or supreme emergency is to bring about an upheaval in the moral perspective. since an Allied victory could be reasonably foreseen on the basis of morally legitimate targeting and fighting. The bombing of Dresden was therefore an outright atrocity, though the bombing of other German cities up to 1942 was not. He is clear that the bombing in this earlier phase was a violation of the principle of discrimi- nation, and at one point calls it 'terrorism.' It was morally wrong, and implies guilt, but had to be done. Walzer's use of the category 'supreme emergency' here is based on the idea that the need to defeat Nazi Germany was no ordinary necessity. Hitler's victory would have been a dire blow to civilisation. The enor- mity of his regime and its practices was such that his extended empire would have been a disaster for most of the people living under its sway. In addition, the threat of Hitler's victory was present and urgent, and the bomb- ing of German cities aimed directly at the civilian popu- lations was the only offensive weapon the British had. that they can never attack innocent people to aid their My second point is that the primacy of the political community that lies behind much of the dirty hands debate is highly suspect. Walzer admits of individuals self-defence. He then adds: “But communities, in emer- gencies, seem to have different and larger prerogatives. I out ascribing to communal life a land of transcendence that I don't believe it to have.' Walzer goes on to try to am not sure that I can account for the difference, with A CRITIQUE OF THE SUPREME EMERGENCY DEFENCE any such power bent upon subordi- curiosity of Walzer's argument is that it is A presented primarily as an argument available to states and their representatives. But, if we think only of the connotations of 'supreme emergency,' it is not at all obvious that the issue can be so restricted. Palestinian resistance groups, for example, can mount a powerful case that they face a hostile nation and dispossession to a degree that threatens not only their lives but their way of life. Even the various groups around Osama bin Laden may well see them- selves as qualifying for this exemption. No doubt it can be argued that there are various delusions and mistakes in their outlooks, but the history of warfare is replete with similar delusions and mistakes. My own view is that the supreme emergency story suffers from grave defects whether it is offered as an exemption on behalf of a state, or some less established political community, or a group claiming to represent either. The first problem is that it undervalues the depth and centrality of the prohibition on killing the innocent. In spite of Walzer's agonising about the need to acknowledge that we have violated an important moral restraint by our bombing or other terror tactic, he locates the prohibition on attacking non-combatants within what he calls 'the war convention. Although, there is some unclarity about what he means by this, the terminology suggests that the prohibition is itself somehow merely conventional. On the contrary, it is, as I have argued, basic to what makes it legitimate to wage a just war at all. More generally, the prohibition on locate the difference in the supposed fact that the sur- vival and freedom of political communities ... are the highest values of international society. Maybe they are the highest values of international society, but this is hardly surprising if one construes international society as a society of political communities, namely recognised states. What is needed, at the very least, is an argument that locates the survival and freedom of political communities as the highest human value, and one that is capable of justifying the overriding that 'supreme emergency' requires. I doubt that argument exists. Certainly, it is not enough to point to the undoubted value of political life for there are many other values that are equally, if not more, significant. A third consideration against the dirty hands story in its 'supreme emergency' form is that admission of this exemption is likely to generate widespread misuse of it. On Walzer's own account the 'legitimate resort to terror in the early stages of World War II led rapidly to its illegitimate use thereafter. It is surely plain enough that the widespread resort to state terror in various contexts has been justified in ways that parallel Walzer's apologetic, and non-state agents are not slow to follow suit. We surely do better to condemn the resort to terrorism outright with no leeway for exemptions, be they for states, revolutionaries or religious zealots. MORAL RESPONSE Finally what sorts of violent responses to terrorism can be morally legitimate? The first thing to say of this is that the use of terrorism to combat terrorism should be ruled out. Attacking the innocent is illicit when used by non-state groups and it is wrong when used by states in response. Two wrongs do not make a right. Second, the use of violence to capture or even kill terrorists is ad legitimate if it accords with the conditions of the jus bellum that govern the morality of resort to war. One
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