The Philosophy of the Mind
Deng and Lee offer a lot of informative information about Posser’s view towards the concept
of time and space. Experiencing time by Posser entails various concepts of the philosophy of the
mind and its intersection with metaphysics. The information provides connections that
previously remained neglected in the sector by other philosophers. The huge comments made by
Deng and Lee focus on the A-theory and B-theory and their relevance and logic or lack of in
philosophy. Geoffrey Lee tries to explain time-lapse through “Explaining away temporal flow
thoughts on Prosser’s ‘Experiencing Time’. The author explains that Posser possesses a general
knowledge in expressing his argument. Posser explains that perception remains insensitive and
may not give evidence about the specific truth. Lee explains that the general explanation refers to
similar notions like the existence in a spatial world.
On the other hand, Deng suggests that the book’s main arguments begin in the second
chapter. The author explains that the B-theorists help to account for the difference existent
between temporal reality and temporal appearances. Deng explains that he does not comprehend
the concept of time’s passing explained by the author. Deng argues that he does not understand
the way that perceiving various aspects to express time passage (p, 5). Deng explains that time
passage ought to explain and derive more information and not focus on the extra generalization
of the process and concept.
Deng’s Critique from Prosser’s Reply to Her
Deng provides a claim named 2 that explains that the A-theory might contain limited
intelligence (p, 4). Deng supports that the theory does not necessarily equate to any false
accusations. Deng explains that the constructed claim 1 might own or bring about tension about
the other projects in the book, explaining the purpose of experience in explaining time passage.
In general, Deng explains that humans live in the A-theory instead of B-theory. However,
Prosser explains that no tension exists between the two theories. The author explains that, even
though an individual might argue about the A-theory, there exist different features that remain
incompatible with the B-theory.
Deng also suggests that the detector argument does not have or fully set up the failure of
experience that can collaborate with the A-theory. The author of Experiencing Time gives
specific information about the multi-detector and detector arguments. Both arguments, according
to the author can help to express that experience may lack a certain form of sensitivity that can
support the dynamic features around the world. The detector argument represents a general
direction leading and explaining the main problem realized by the non-detector argument.
Another purpose of the detector argument represents that of explaining that the A and B theories
represented truths. Therefore, in such a case, experience represents the exact aspect and meaning
adopted by philosophy in many aspects. However, as Deng supports, the A-theory helps with a
better explanation leading to the understanding of the proper nature of experience.
Deng also raises a few issues about chapter 2. She explains that the goal world does not exist.
The only way that the objective world exists through the continuous change of time while
incorporating a group of fleeting images over a long time. The author suggests that Deng uses a
form of substance dualism. The author understands that the conscious movement of time passes
simultaneously with the physical and static timeline. The author concludes that Deng’s argument
possesses logic as the definition would equate to the realization of various consciousness in
various positions about the life timeline. Deng continues to explain that the main issue presented
by the case results in the realization of different realities that continue to contradict each other (p,
11). The author also argues that the standard McTaggart paradox explains the controversy by
explaining that reality as a whole keeps changing, contributing to no controversy about the
inconsistencies in realities brought upon by the case.
The reply to the imagined quasi-Kantian position suggested by the author also raises some
issue on Deng of the non-dynamic phenomenology. Deng feels that the author does not
offer relevant and adequate information about the concept discussed. On the other hand, the
author explains that the punitive dynamic phenomenology, P, does not offer an
accurate assessment of the real passing of time or any other existent dynamic phenomena.
Deng also initiates the issue and claim that the author makes about the dynamic experience.
The author argues that dynamic experience represents a falsehood containing necessity in the
context (p, 17). Deng suggests the necessary falsehood preached by the author represent an odd
statement without the effective basis or background. The author, however, suggests that the Atheory explains that reality has various changes and definitions through its incompatible states.
Time passage cannot include the incorporation of the shift from one form of affairs to another
state in the presence of inconsistencies. The only passage of time, according to Posser’s analysis,
can occur through the use of similar mediums. The author goes on to explain that mo
contradiction can exist through the use of the A-theory since one reality can o...