Summary and Review for Two Books

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Question Description

1.

Book Review

Students will write a book review on Stolen Legacy. Guidelines for the review are posted on Blackboard under Information.

2.

Summaries of Textbook Chapters
Students are required to write summaries of each of the chapters of 1)Child and Adolescent Development: .
Each chapter summary should be between 150 and 250 words and include an overview of the chapter and the student’s reaction to the information.

Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James, Ph.D. University of Arkansas, Pine Bluff This work was originally published in New York by Philosophical Library in 1954. The content herein has been slightly edited to mark word corrections and in its organization to assist readability. The author, George Granville Monah James was born in Georgetown, Guyana, South America. His parents were Reverend Linch B. and Margaret E. James. George studied at Durham University in Britain and after a period at the University of London, he earned his doctorate at Columbia University in New York, NY. He then qualified to teach Mathematics, Latin, and Greek. Later he was professor of Logic and Greek at Livingstone College in Salisbury, North Carolina for two years, before teaching at the University of Arkansas, Pine Bluff. The author has also written the following pamphlets: 1. Health Week in New Castle; 2. Intermarriage (published in London, England); 3. Black People Under Germany (published in New York); 4. The Need of a New Education for the Subject Peoples of the World (published in Arkansas, U.S.A.); 5. The Probable Causes of Religious Apathy in our Institutions of Higher Learning and the Proposal of a New Naturalism (published in Arkansas, U.S.A). And second, he has also authored the following articles, titled: The Church and the New Mentality; Religion is an Inductive and Progressive Science; The Anti-Classical Wave; The First Step In Negro Reconstruction; Know Thyself (a series of 12 articles published in the New York Age and the Zion Quarterly); The Influence of Mathematics Upon the Mentality and Character of Students (published in the Georgia Herald). 1 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook Contents Introduction (A) Characteristics of Greek Philosophy; (B) The Aims of The Book Part I Chapter I Greek Philosophy Is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy 1. The teachings of the Egyptian Mysteries reached other lands centuries before it reached Athens; 2. The authorship of the individual doctrines is extremely doubtful; 3. The chronology of Greek philosophers is mere speculation; 4. The compilation of the history of Greek philosophy was the plan of Aristotle executed by his school. Chapter II So-called Greek Philosophy was Alien to the Greeks and their Conditions of Life The period of Greek philosophy (640–322 B.C.) was a period of internal and external wars and was unsuitable for producing philosophers. Chapter III Greek Philosophy was the Offspring of the Egyptian Mystery System 1. The Egyptian theory of salvation became the purpose of Greek philosophy; 2. Circumstances of identity between the Egyptian and Greek systems are shown; 3. The abolition of Greek philosophy with the Egyptian Mysteries identifies them; 4. How the African continent gave its culture to the Western World. 2 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook Chapter IV The Egyptians Educated The Greeks 1. The effects of the Persian Conquest; 2. The effects of the Conquest of Egypt by Alexander the Great; 3. The Egyptians were the first to civilize the Greeks; 4. Alexander visits the Oracle of Ammon in the Oasis of Siwah. Chapter V The Pre-Socratic Philosophers and the Teachings Ascribed to Them 1. The earlier Ionion philosophers and their doctrines; 2. Pythagoras and his doctrines; 3. The Eleatic philosophers and their doctrines. 4. The later Ionion philosophers and their doctrines; 5. Summary of conclusions concerning the Pre-Socratic philosophers and the history of the Four Qualities and Four Elements. (a) The doctrines of the early Ionic, the Eleatic and the later Ionic philosophers and Pythagoras are traced to their Egyptian origin; (b) The doctrine of the Four Qualities and Four Elements is traced to its Egyptian origin; (c) Plagiarism shown to be a common practice among the Greek philosophers who borrowed from one another but chiefly from Pythagoras who obtained his ideas from the Egyptians; (d) The doctrine of the Atom by Democritus is traced to its Egyptian origin, as well as his large number of books. He taught nothing new. Chapter VI The Athenian Philosophers 1. SOCRATES 1. His Life: (a) Date and place of birth; (b) His economic status and personality; (c) His trial and death; (d) Crito's attempt to smuggle him out of prison; (e) Phaedo describes the final scene before his death. 2. Doctrines: The doctrines of (a) The Nous; (b) The Supreme Good; (c) Opposites and harmony; (d) The immortality of the soul and (e) Self knowledge. 3. Summary of Conclusions: (a) The doctrines of Socrates are traced to their Egyptian origin, as he taught nothing new; (b) The importance of the farewell conversation of Socrates with his pupils and friends is set forth. 3 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook 2. PLATO (I) His early life; (II) His travels and academy; (III) His disputed writings; (IV) His doctrines. 1. The theory of ideas and its application to natural phenomena including (a) the real and unreal; (b) the Nous and (c) creation. 2. The ethical doctrines concerning (a) the highest good; (b) definition of virtue and; (c) the cardinal virtues. 3. The doctrine of the Ideal state whose attributes are compared with the attributes of the soul and justice. (V) Summary of Conclusions: (a) The doctrines of Plato are traced to their Egyptian origin, as he taught nothing new; (b) Magic is shown to be the key to the interpretation of ancient religion and philosophy; (c) The authorship of his books is disputed by modern scholars, and ancient historians deny his authorship of the Republic and Timeas; (d) The allegory of the charioteer and winged steeds is traced to its Egyptian origin. 3. ARISTOTLE (I) (a) His early life and training; (b) His own list of books; (c) Other list of books; (II) Doctrines; (III) Summary of Conclusions. A The doctrines are traced to their Egyptian origin, as he taught nothing new; B (1) The library of Alexandria was the true source of Aristotle's large numbers of books; (2) The lack of uniformity between the list of books points to doubtful authorship; C The discrepancies and doubts in this life. 4 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook Chapter VII The Curriculum of The Egyptian Mystery System 1. The education of Egyptian Priests according to their Orders; 2. The education of the Egyptian Priests in: (a) The Seven Liberal Arts; (b) Secret systems of languages and mathematical symbolism; (c) Magic. 3. A comparison of the curriculum of the Egyptian Mystery System with the list of books said to be drawn up by Aristotle himself. Chapter VIII: The Memphite Theology is the Basis of all Important Doctrines of Greek Philosophy 1. (a) The history, description and complete text of the Memphite Theology are given and the subject matter is divided into three parts; (b) The text of the first part is followed by the philosophy which the first part teaches; (c) The text of the second part is followed by the philosophy which the second part teaches; (d) The text of the third part is followed by the philosophy which the third part teaches. 2. The Memphite Theology is shown to be the source of modern scientific knowledge; (a) The identity of the creation of the Ennead with the Nebular Hypothesis and; (b) The identity of the Sun God Atom with the atom of Science. 5 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook 3. The Memphite Theology opens great possibilities for modern scientific research: (a) The Greek concept of the atom is shown to be erroneous; (b) With the new interpretation of the atom the Memphite Theology provides a vast field of scientific secrets yet to be discovered. Part II Chapter IX Social Reformation through the New Philosophy of African Redemption 1. Social Reformation The knowledge that the African continent gave civilization the Arts and Sciences, Religion and Philosophy is des- tined to produce a change in the mentality both of the White and Black people. 2. There are three persons in the drama of Greek philosophy: (a) Alexander the Great; (b) Aristotle's School and; (c) The Ancient Roman Government who are responsible for a false tradition about Africa and the social plight of its peoples; (3) Both the White and Black people are common victims of a false tradition about Africa and this fact makes both races partners in the solution of the problem of racial reformation. (4) The methods suggested for racial reformation: (a) Reeducation of both groups by worldwide dissemination of Africa's contribution to civilization; (b) The abandonment of the false worship of Greek intellect; (c) Special attention must be given to the re-education of missionaries and a constant demand made for a change in missionary policy. 2. The New Philosophy of African Redemption 1. A statement and explanation of the new philosophy of African Redemption are made; 2. Black people must cultivate methods of counteraction against: (a) The false worship of Greek intellect; (b) Missionary literature and exhibition and; (c) must demand a change in missionary policy. Appendix Notes 6 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook Introduction Characteristics of Greek Philosophy The term Greek philosophy, to begin with is a misnomer, for there is no such philosophy in existence. The ancient Egyptians had developed a very complex religious system, called the Mysteries, which was also the first system of salvation. As such, it regarded the human body as a prison house of the soul, which could be liberated from its bodily impediments, through the disciplines of the Arts and Sciences, and advanced from the level of a mortal to that of a God. This was the notion of the summum bonum or greatest good, to which all men must aspire, and it also became the basis of all ethical concepts. The Egyptian Mystery System was also a Secret Order, and membership was gained by initiation and a pledge to secrecy. The teaching was graded and delivered orally to the Neophyte; and under these circumstances of secrecy, the Egyptians developed secret systems of writing and teaching, and forbade their Initiates from writing what they had learnt. After nearly five thousand years of prohibition against the Greeks, they were permitted to enter Egypt for the purpose of their education. First through the Persian invasion and secondly through the invasion of Alexander the Great. From the sixth century B.C. therefore to the death of Aristotle (322 B.C.) the Greeks made the best of their chance to learn all they could about Egyptian culture; most students received instructions directly from the Egyptian Priests, but after the invasion by Alexander the Great, the Royal temples and libraries were plundered and pillaged, and Aristotle's school converted the library at Alexandria into a research centre. There is no wonder then, that the production of the unusually large number of books ascribed to Aristotle has proved a physical impossibility, for any single man within a life time. The history of Aristotle's life, has done him far more harm than good, since it carefully avoids any statement relating to his visit to Egypt, either on his own account or in company with Alexander the Great, when he invaded Egypt. This silence of history at once throws doubt upon the life and achievements of Aristotle. He is said to have spent twenty years under the tutorship of Plato, who is regarded as a Philosopher, yet he graduated as the greatest of Scientists of Antiquity. Two questions might be asked: (a) how could Plato teach Aristotle what he himself did not know?; and (b) why should Aristotle spend twenty years under a teacher from whom he could learn nothing? This bit of history sounds incredible. Again, in order to avoid suspicion over the extraordinary number of books ascribed to Aristotle, history tells us that Alexander the Great, gave him a large sum of money to get the books. Here again the history sounds incredible, and three statements must here be made. 7 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook (a) In order to purchase books on science, they must have been in circulation so as to enable Aristotle to secure them. (b) If the books were in circulation before Aristotle purchased them, and since he is not supposed to have visited Egypt at all, then the books in question must have been circulated among Greek philosophers. (c) If circulated among Greek philosophers, then we would expect the subject matter of such books to have been known before Aristotle's time, and consequently he could not be credited either with producing them or introducing new ideas of science. Another point of considerable interest to be accounted for was the attitude of the Athenian government towards this so-called Greek philosophy, which it regarded as foreign in origin and treated it accordingly. Only a brief study of history is necessary to show that Greek philosophers were undesirable citizens, who throughout the period of their investigations were victims of relentless persecution, at the hands of the Athenian government. Anaxagoras was imprisoned and exiled; Socrates was executed; Plato was sold into slavery and Aristotle was indicted and exiled; while the earliest of them all, Pythagoras, was expelled from Croton in Italy. Can we imagine the Greeks making such an about turn, as to claim the very teachings which they had at first persecuted and openly rejected? Certainly, they knew they were usurping what they had never produced, and as we enter step by step into our study the greater do we discover evidence which leads us to the conclusion that Greek philosophers were not the authors of Greek philosophy, but the Egyptian Priests and Hierophants. Aristotle died in 322 B.C. not many years after he had been aided by Alexander the Great to secure the largest quantity of scientific books from the Royal Libraries and Temples of Egypt. In spite however of such great intellectual treasure, the death of Aristotle marked the death of philosophy among the Greeks, who did not seem to possess the natural ability to advance these sciences. Consequently history informs us that the Greeks were forced to make a study of Ethics, which they also borrowed from the Egyptian "summum bonum" or greatest good. The two other Athenian Philosophers must be mentioned here, I mean Socrates and Plato; who also became famous in history as philosophers and great thinkers. Every school boy believes that when he hears or reads the command "know thyself", he is hearing or reading words which were uttered by Socrates. But the truth is that the Egyptian temples carried inscriptions on the outside addressed to Neophytes and among them was the injunction "know thyself". Socrates copied these words from the Egyptian Temples, and was not the author. All mystery temples, inside and outside of Egypt carried such inscriptions, just like the weekly bulletins of our modern Churches. Similarly, every school boy believes that when he hears or reads the names of the four cardinal virtues, he is hearing or reading names of virtues determined by Plato. Nothing has been more misleading, for the Egyptian Mystery System contained ten virtues, and from this source Plato copied what have been called the four cardinal virtues, justice, wisdom, temperance, and courage. It is indeed surprising how, for centuries, the Greeks have been praised by the Western World for intellectual accomplishments which belong without a doubt to the Egyptians or the peoples of North Africa. 8 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook Another noticeable characteristic of Greek philosophy is the fact that most of the Greek philosophers used the teachings of Pythagoras as their model; and consequently they have introduced nothing new in the field of philosophy. Included in the Pythagorean system we find the doctrines of (a) opposites (b) Harmony (c) Fire (d) Mind, since it is composed of fire atoms, (e) Immortality, expressed as transmigration of Souls, (f) The summum bonum or the purpose of philosophy. And these of course are reflected in the systems of Heraclitus, Parmenides, Democritus, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. The next thing that is peculiar about Greek philosophy is its use in literature. The Egyptian Mystery System was the first secret Order of History and the publication of its teachings was strictly prohibited. This explains why Initiates like Socrates did not commit to writing their philosophy, and why the Babylonians and Chaldaeans who were very closely associated with them also refrained from publishing those teachings. We can at once see how easy it was for an ambitious and even envious nation to claim a body of unwritten knowledge which would make them great in the eyes of the primitive world. The absurdity however, is easily recognized when we remember that the Greek language was used to translate several systems of teachings which the Greeks could not succeed in claiming. Such were the translation of Hebrew Scriptures into Greek, called the Septuagint; and the translation of the Christian Gospels, Acts and the Epistles in Greek, still called the Greek New Testament. It is only the unwritten philosophy of the Egyptians translated into Greek that has met with such an unhappy fate: a legacy stolen by the Greeks. On account of reasons already given, I have been compelled to handle the subject matter of this book, in the way it has been handled: namely (a) with a frequency of repetition, because it is the method of Greek philosophy, to use a common principle to explain several different doctrines, and (b) the quotation and analysis of doctrines, because it is the object of this book to establish the Egyptian Origin and this cannot be so satisfactorily done if the doctrines are not presented. Greek philosophy is somewhat of a drama, whose chief actors were Alexander the Great, Aristotle and his successors in the peripatetic school, and the Roman Emperor Justinian. Alexander invaded Egypt and captured the Royal Library at Alexandria and plundered it. Aristotle made a library of his own with plundered books, while his school occupied the building and used it as a research centre. Finally, Justinian the Roman Emperor abolished the Temples and schools of philosophy i.e. another name for the Egyptian Mysteries which the Greeks claimed as their product, and on account of which, they have been falsely praised and honoured for centuries by the world, as its greatest philosophers and thinkers. 9 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook This contribution to civilization was really and truly made by the Egyptians and the African continent, but not by the Greeks or the European continent. We sometimes wonder why the people of African descent find themselves in such a social plight as they do, but the answer is plain enough. Had it not been for this drama of Greek philosophy and its actors, the African continent would have had a different reputation, and would have enjoyed a status of respect among the nations of the world. This unfortunate position of the African continent and its peoples appears to be the result of misrepresentation upon which the structure of race prejudice has been built, i.e. the historical world opinion that the African continent is backward, that its people are backward, and that their civilization is also backward. Finally, the dishonesty in the movement of the publication of a Greek philosophy, becomes very glaring, when we refer to the fact, purposely that by calling the theorem of the Square on the Hypotenuse, the Pythagorean theorem, it has concealed the truth for centuries from the world, who ought to know that the Egyptians taught Pythagoras and the Greeks, what mathematics they knew. I want to mention here that among the many books which I found helpful in my present work are "The Intellectual Adventure of Man" and "The Egyptian Religion" by Professor Henri Frankfort and "The Mediterranean World in Ancient Times" by Professor Eva Sandford. George G. M. James 10 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook The Aim of the Book The aim of the book is to establish better race relations in the world, by revealing a fundamental truth concerning the contribution of the African continent to civilization. It must be borne in mind that the first lesson in the humanities is to make a people aware of their contribution to civilization; and the second lesson is to teach them about other civilizations. By this dissemination of the truth about the civilization of individual peoples, a better understanding among them, and a proper appraisal of each other should follow. This notion is based upon the notion of the Great Master Mind: Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free. Consequently, the book is an attempt to show that the true authors of Greek philosophy were not the Greeks; but the people of North Africa, commonly called the Egyptians; and the praise and honor falsely given to the Greeks for centuries belong to the people of North Africa, and therefore to the African continent . Consequently this theft of the African legacy by the Greeks led to the erroneous world opinion that the African continent has made no contribution to civilization, and that its people are naturally backward. This is the misrepresentation that has become the basis of race prejudice, which has affected all people of color. For centuries the world has been misled about the original source of the Arts and Sciences; for centuries Socrates, Plato and Aristotle have been falsely idolized as models of intellectual greatness; and for centuries the African continent has been called the Dark Continent, because Europe coveted the honor of transmitting to the world, the Arts and Sciences. I am happy to be able to bring this information to the attention of the world, so that on the one hand, all races and creeds might know the truth and free themselves from those prejudices which have corrupted human relations; and on the other hand, that the people of African origin might be emancipated from their serfdom of inferiority complex, and enter upon a new era of freedom, in which they would feel like free men, with full human rights and privileges. 11 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook Part I Chapter I: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy 1. The Teachings of the Egyptian Mysteries Reached Other Lands Many Centuries Before it Reached Athens According to history, Pythagoras after receiving his training in Egypt, returned to his native island, Samos, where he established his order for a short time, after which he migrated to Croton (540 B.C.) in Southern Italy, where his order grew to enormous proportions, until his final expulsion from that country. We are also told that Thales (640 B.C.) who had also received his education in Egypt, and his associates: Anaximander, and Anaximenes, were natives of Ionia in Asia Minor, which was a stronghold of the Egyptian Mystery schools, which they carried on. (Sandford's The Mediterranean World, p. 195–205). Similarly, we are told that Xenophanes (576 B.C.), Parmenides, Zeno and Melissus were also natives of Ionia and that they migrated to Elea in Italy and established themselves and spread the teachings of the Mysteries. In like manner we are informed that Heraclitus (530 B.C.), Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Democritus were also natives of Ionia who were interested in physics. Hence in tracing the course of the so-called Greek philosophy, we find that Ionian students after obtaining their education from the Egyptian priests returned to their native land, while some of them migrated to different parts of Italy, where they established themselves. Consequently, history makes it clear that the surrounding neighbors of Egypt had all become familiar with the teachings of Egyptian Mysteries many centuries before the Athenians, who in 399 B.C. sentenced Socrates to death (Zeller's Hist. of Phil., p. 112; 127; 170–172) and subsequently caused Plato and Aristotle to flee for their lives from Athens, because philosophy was something foreign and unknown to them. For this same reason, we would expect either the Ionians or the Italians to exert their prior claim to philosophy, since it made contact with them long before it did with the Athenians, who were always its greatest enemies, until Alexander's conquest of Egypt, which provided for Aristotle free access to the Library of Alexandria. The Ionians and Italians made no attempt to claim the authorship of philosophy, because they were well aware that the Egyptians were the true authors. On the other hand, after the death of Aristotle, his Athenian pupils, without the authority of the state, undertook to compile a history of philosophy, recognized at that time as the Sophia or Wisdom of the Egyptians, which had become current and traditional in the ancient world, which compilation, because it was produced by pupils who had belonged to Aristotle's school, later history has erroneously called Greek philosophy, in spite of the fact that the Greeks were its greatest enemies and persecutors, and had persistently treated it as a foreign innovation. 12 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook For this reason, the so-called Greek philosophy is stolen Egyptian philosophy, which first spread to Ionia, thence to Italy and thence to Athens. And it must be remembered that at this remote period of Greek history, i.e., Thales to Aristotle 640 B.C.–322 B.C., the Ionians were not Greek citizens, but at first Egyptian subjects and later Persian subjects. Zeller's Hist. of Phil.: p. 37; 46; 58; 66–83; 112; 127; 170172. William Turner's Hist. of Phil.: p 34; 39; 45; 53. Roger's Student Hist. of Phil.: p. 15. B. D. Alexander's Hist. of Phil.: p. 13; 21. Sandford's The Mediterranean World p. 157; 195–205. A brief sketch of the ancient Egyptian Empire would also make it clear that Asia Minor or Ionia was the ancient land of the Hittites, who were not known by any other name in ancient days. According to Diodorus and Manetho, High Priest in Egypt, two columns were found at Nysa Arabia; one of the Goddess Isis and the other of the God Osiris, on the latter of which the God declared that he had led an army into India, to the sources of the Danube, and as far as the ocean. This means of course, that the Egyptian Empire, at a very early date, included not only the islands of the Aegean sea and Ionia, but also extended to the extremities of the East. We are also informed that Senusert I, during the 12th Dynasty (i.e., about 1900 B.C.) conquered the whole sea coast of India, beyond the Ganges to the Eastern ocean. He is also said to have included the Cyclades and a great part of Europe in his conquests. Secondly, the "Amarna Letters" found in the government offices of the Egyptian King, Iknaton, testify to the fact, that the Egyptian Empire had extended to western Asia, Syria and Palestine, and that for centuries Egyptian power had been supreme in the ancient world. This was in the 18th Dynasty i.e., about 1500 B.C. We are also told that during the reign of Tuthmosis III, the dominion of Egypt extended not only along the coast of Palestine: but also from Nubia to Northern Asia. (Breadsted's Conquest of Civilization p. 84; Diodorus 128; Manetho; Strabo; Dicaearchus; John Kendrick's Ancient Egypt vol. I). 13 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook 2. The Authorship of the Individual Doctrines is Extremely Doubtful As one attempts to read the history of Greek philosophy, one discovers a complete absence of essential information concerning the early life and training of the so-called Greek philosophers, from Thales to Aristotle. No writer or historian professes to know anything about their early education. All they tell us about them consists of (a) a doubtful date and place of birth and (b) their doctrines; but the world is left to wonder who they were and from what source they got their early education, and would naturally expect that men who rose to the position of a Teacher among relatives, friends and associates, would be well-known, not only by them, but by the whole community. On the contrary, men who might well be placed among the earliest Teachers in history, who had grown up from childhood to manhood, and had taught pupils, are represented as unknown, being without any domestic, social or early educational traces. This is unbelievable, and yet it is a fact that the history of Greek philosophy has presented to the world a number of men whose lives it knows little or nothing about; but expects the world to accept them as the true authors of the doctrines which are alleged to be theirs. In the absence of essential evidence, the world hesitates to recognize them as such, because the truth of this whole matter of Greek philosophy points to a very different direction. The Book on nature entitled peri physeos was the common name under which Greek students interested in nature-study wrote. The earliest copy is said to date back to the sixth century B.C. and it is customary to refer to the remnants of peri physeos as the Fragments. (William Turner's History of Philosophy p. 62). We do not believe that genuine Initiates produced the Book on nature, since this was contrary to the rules of the Egyptian Mysteries, in connexion with which the Philosophical Schools conducted their work. Egypt was the centre of the body of ancient wisdom, and knowledge, religious, philosophical and scientific spread to other lands through student Initiates. Such teachings remained for generations and centuries in the form of tradition, until the conquest of Egypt by Alexander the Great, and the movement of Aristotle and his school to compile Egyptian teaching and claim it as Greek philosophy. (Ancient Mysteries by C. H. Vail p. 16.) Consequently, as a source of authority of authorships, peri physeos, is of little value, if any, since history mentions only four names as authors of it, namely, Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras; and asks the world to accept their authorship of philosophy, because Theophrastus, Sextus, Proclus and Simplicius, of the school at Alexandria are said to have preserved small remnants of it (the Fragments). If peri physeos is the criterion to the authorship of Greek philosophy, then it falls short in its purpose by a long way, since only four philosophers are alleged to have written this book, and to have remnants of their work. 14 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook According to this idea all the other philosophers, who failed to write peri physeos and to have remnants of it, also failed to write Greek philosophy. This is the reductio ad absurdum to which peri physeos leads us. The schools of philosophy, Chaldean, Greek and Persian, were part of the Ancient Mystery System of Egypt. They were conducted in secrecy according to the demands of the Osiriaca, whose teachings became common to all the schools. In keeping with the demands for secrecy, the writing and publication of teachings were strictly forbidden and consequently, Initiates who had developed satisfactorily in their training, and had been advanced to the rank of Master or Teacher, refrained from publishing the teachings of the Mysteries or philosophy. Consequently any publication of philosophy could not have come from the pen of the original philosophers themselves, but either from their close friends who knew their views, as in the case of Pythagoras and Socrates, or from interested persons who made a record of those philosophical teachings that had become popular opinion and tradition. There is no wonder then, that in the absence of original authorship, history has had to resort to the strategy of accepting Aristotle's opinion as the sole authority in determining the authorship of Greek philosophy (Introduction to Alfred Weber's History of Philosophy). It is for these reasons that great doubt surrounds the socalled Greek authorship of philosophy. (William Turner's History of Philosophy p. 35; 39; 47; 53; 62; 79; 210–211; 627. Ancient Mysteries by C. H. Vail p. 16. Theophrastus: Fragment 2 apud Diels. Introduction to Alfred Weber's History of Philosophy). 3. The Chronology of Greek Philosophers is Mere Speculation History knows nothing about the early life and training of the Greek philosophers and this is true not only of the pre-Socratic philosophers: but also of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, who appear in history about the age of eighteen and begin to teach at forty. As a body of men they were undesirable to the state, (personae non gratae) and were consequently persecuted and driven into hiding and secrecy. Under such circumstances they kept no records of their activities and this was done in order to conceal their identity. After the conquest of Egypt by Alexander the Great, and the seizure and looting of the Royal Library at Alexandria, Aristotle's plan to usurp Egyptian philosophy, was subsequently carried out by members of his school: Theophrastus, Andronicus of Rhodes and Eudemus, who soon found themselves confronted with the problem of a chronology for a history of philosophy. (Introduction of Zeller's Hist. of Phil. p. 13). Throughout this effort there has been much speculation concerning the date of birth of philosophers, whom the public knew very little about. As early as the third century B.C. (274– 194 B.C.) Eratosthenes, a Stoic drew up a chronology of Greek philosophers and in the second century B.C. (140) Apollodorus also drew up another. The effort continued, and in the first century B.C. (60–70 B.C.) Andronicus, the eleventh Head of the Peripatetic school, also drew up another. 15 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook This difficulty continued throughout the early centuries, and has come down to the present time for it appears that all modern writers on Greek Philosophy are unable to agree on the dates that should be assigned to the nativity of the philosophers. The only exception appears to occur with reference to the three Athenian philosophers, i.e., Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, the date of whose nativity is believed to be certain, and concerning which there is general agreement among historians. However, when we come to deal with the pre-Socratic philosophers, we are confronted with confusion and uncertainty, and a few examples would serve to illustrate the untrustworthy nature of the chronology of Greek Philosophers. (1) Diogenes Laertius places the birth of Thales at 640 B.C., while William Turner's History of Philosophy places it as 620 B.C.; that of Frank Thilly at 624 B.C.; that of A. K. Rogers at early in the sixth century B.C.; and that of W. G. Tennemann at 600 B.C. (2) Diogenes Laertius places the birth of Anaximenes at 546 B.C.; while W. Windelbrand places it at the sixth century B.C.; that of Frank Thilly at 588 B.C.; that of B. D. Alexander at 560 B.C.; while that of A. K. Rogers at the sixth century B.C. (3) Parmenides is credited by Diogenes as being born at 500 B.C.; while Fuller, Thilly and Rogers omit a date of birth, because they say it is unknown. (4) Zeller places the birth of Xenophanes at 576 B.C.; while Diogenes gives 570 B C.; and the majority of the other historians declare that the date of birth is unknown. (5) With reference to Xeno, Diogenes who does not know the date of his birth, says that he flourished between B.C. 464–460; while William Turner places it at 490 B.C.; like Frank Thilly and B. D. Alexander; while Fuller, A. K. Rogers and W. G. Tennemann declare it is unknown. (6) With references to Heraclitus, Zeller makes the following suppositions: if he died in 475 B.C. and if he was sixty years old when he died, then he must have been born in 535 B.C.; similarly Diogenes supposes that he flourished between B.C. 504–500; and while William Turner places his birth at 530 B.C.; Windelbrand places it at 536 B.C.; and Fuller and Tennemann declare that he flourished in 500 B.C. (7) With reference to Pythagoras, Zeller who does not know the date of his birth supposes that it occurred between the years 580–570 B.C.; and while Diogenes also supposes that it occurred between the years 582–500 B.C.; William Turner, Fuller, Rogers, and Tennemann declare that it is unknown. 16 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook (8) With reference to Empedocles, while Diogenes places his birth at 484 B.C.; Turner, Windelbrand, Fuller, B. D. Alexander and Tennemann place it at 490 B.C.; while A. K. Rogers and others declare it is unknown. (9) With reference to Anaxagoras, while Zeller and Diogenes place his birth at 500 B.C.; William Turner, A. G. Fuller, and Frank Thilly agree with them, while Alexander places it at 450 B.C. and A. K. Rogers and others declare it is unknown. (10) With reference to Leucippus, all historians seem to be of the opinion that he has never existed. (11) Socrates (469–399 B.C.), Plato (427–347 B.C.), and Aristotle (384–322 B.C.) are the only three philosophers the dates of whose nativity and death do not seem to have led to speculation among historians; but the reason for this uniformity is probably clue to the fact that they were Athenians and had been indicted by the Athenian Government who would naturally have investigated them and kept a record of their cases. (A. K. Roger's Hist. of Phil. p. 104). It must be noted from the preceding comparative study of the chronology of Greek philosophers that (a) the variation in dates points to speculation (b) the pre-Socratic philosophers were unknown because they were foreigners to the Athenian Government and probably never existed (c) it follows that both the pre-Socratic philosophers together with Socrates, Plato and Aristotle were persecuted by the Athenian Government tor introducing foreign doctrines into Athens. (d) In consequence of these facts, any subsequent claim by the Greeks to the ownership or authorship of the same doctrines which they had rejected and persecuted, must be regarded as a usurpation. 4. The Compilation of the History of Greek Philosophy was the plan of Aristotle executed by his School When Aristotle decided to compile a history of Greek Philosophy he must have made known his wishes to his pupils Theophrastus and Eudemus: for no sooner did he produce his metaphysics, than Theophrastus followed him by publishing eighteen books on the doctrines of the physicists. Similarly, after Theophrastus had published his doctrines of the physicists, Eudemus produced separate histories of Arithmetic, Geometry, Astronomy and also theology. This was an amazing start, because of the large number of scientific books, and the wide range of subjects treated. This situation has rightly aroused the suspicion of the world, as it questions the source of these scientific works. 17 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook Since Theophrastus and Eudemus were students under Aristotle at the same time, and since the conquest of Egypt by Alexander the Great, made the Egyptian Library at Alexandria available to the Greeks for research, then it must be expected that the three men, Aristotle who was a close friend of Alexander, Theophrastus and Eudemus not only did research at the Alexandrine Library at the sane time, but must also have helped themselves to books, which enabled them to follow each other so closely in the production of scientific works (William Turner's Hist. of Phil. p. 158–159), which were either a portion of the war booty taken from the Library or compilations from them. (Note that Aristotle's works reveal the signs of note taking and that Theophrastus and Eudemus were pupils attending Aristotle's school at the same time). William Turner's Hist. of Phil. p. 127. Just here it might be as well to mention the names of Aristotle's pupils who took an active part in promoting the movement towards the compilation of a history of Greek philosophy: (a) Theophrastus of Lesbos 371–286 B.C., who succeeded Aristotle as head of the peripatetic school. As elsewhere mentioned, he is said to have produced eighteen books on the doctrines of physicists. Who were these physicists? Greek or Egyptians? Just think of it. (b) Eudemus of Rhodes a contemporary of Theophrastus with whom he also attended Aristotle's school. He is said to have produced histories of Arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and theology, as elsewhere mentioned. What was the source of the data of the histories of these sciences, which must have taken any nation thousands of years to develop? Greece or Egypt? Just think of it. (c) Andronicus of Rhodes, an Eclectic of Aristotle's school and editor of his works (B.C. 70). These men's works together with Aristotle's metaphysics, which contained a critical summary of the doctrines of all preceding philosophers, seem to form the nucleus of a compilation of what has been called, the history of Greek philosophy (Zeller's Hist. of Greek Phil.: Introduction p. 7– 14). The next movement was the organization of an association called "The learned study of Aristotle's Writings", whose members were Theophrastus and Andronicus, who were both closely connected with the school of Aristotle. The function of this association was to identify the literature and doctrines of philosophy with their so-called respective authors, and in order to accomplish this, the alumni of Aristotle's school and its friends were encouraged to enter upon a research for Aristotle's works and to write commentaries on them. In addition to this, the Learned Association also encouraged research for the recovery of what has been named Fragments or remnants of a book, which is supposed to have once existed, and to have borne the common title "Peri Physeos", i.e., concerning nature. 18 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook Here again those who went out in search of "peri physeos" or its remnants were the alumni of Aristotle's school and its friends: but their efforts to establish authorship was a failure. (a) Theophrastus found only two lines of peri physeos, supposed to have been written by Anaximander. (b) Sextus and Proclus of the fifth century A.D., and Simplicius of the sixth century A.D. are said to have found a copy of "peri physeos" supposed to have been produced by Parmenides. (c) In addition, the name of Simplicius is also associated with a copy of "peri physeos", which is supposed to have been produced by Anaxagoras. So much for "peri physeos and the Fragments," and so much for the attempt of "The Learned Association" for the study of Aristotle's works; which has failed because of lack of evidence, as has elsewhere been pointed out. The recovery of two copies and two lines of "peri physeos" is not proof that all Greek Philosophers wrote "peri physeos", or even that the names assigned to them were their bona fide authors. It certainly would appear that the object of the Learned Association was to beat Aristotle's own drum and dance. It was Aristotle's idea to compile a history of philosophy, and it was Aristotle's school and its alumni that carried out the idea, we are told. Chapter II: So-called Greek Philosophy was Alien to the Greeks and their Conditions of Life 1. The Period of Greek Philosophy (640–322 B.C.) was a Period of Internal and External Wars, and was therefore Unsuitable for Producing Philosophers History supports the fact that from the time of Thales. to the time of Aristotle, the Greeks were victims of internal disunion, on the one hand, while on the other, they lived in constant fear of invasion from the Persians who were a common enemy to the city states. Consequently when they were not fighting with one another they found themselves busy fighting the Persians, who soon dominated them and became their masters. From the 6th century B.C. the territory from the coast of Asia Minor to the Indus Valley became united under the single power of Persia, whose central territory Iran has survived as a national unit to the present day. Persian expansion was like a nightmare to the Greeks who dreaded the Persians on account of their invulnerable navy, and organized themselves into leagues and confederacies in order to resist their enemy. (C. 12 p. 195; Sandford's Mediterranean World). There are three sources which throw light on the chaotic and troublesome conditions of this period in Greek history. 19 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook A. The Persian Conquests After the Persians had conquered the Ionians (possibly ancient Hittites), and made them their subjects, Polycrates (539–524 B.C.) seized the Island of Samos and made it a famous city. (Sandford's Mediterranean World c. 9). Between 499 and 494 B.C. the Ionians revolted against the Persians, who defeated them at Lade, while Cyprus and Miletus were also captured. (Sandford's Mediterranean World c. 12). In the summer of 490 B.C. Greek and Persian forces met at Marathon, but after a hand to hand fight, both belligerents withdrew, only to prepare stronger forces in order to renew the conflict. Accordingly, after ten years had elapsed a Hellenic League was organized against the Persians, and the Spartan King Leonides was sent with an army to hold the pass at Thermopylae, until the fleet should win a decisive victory. (C. 12, p. 202; Sandford's Mediterranean World). Accordingly, during the month of August 481 B.C. Persian ships under the command of Xerxes anchored in the gulf of Pagasae, while the Greeks anchored off Cape Artemisium. Both sides awaited a favorable opportunity to attack. The Persians began to force the pass while simultaneously one of their detachments was secretly aided by a Greek traitor, along a steep mountain pass to the rear of the Greek position. Having been taken by surprise, the Greek guards immediately withdrew without resistance. The Spartans who were guarding Thermopylae were all slain and the pass captured by the Persians. (Sandford's Mediterranean World C. 12 p. 202). Having been defeated at Thermopylae, the Greeks withdrew to Salamis, where again they encountered a naval engagement with the Persians. It was late in September 481 B.C., and the result was a wanton destruction of ships on both sides, without any decision. Both belligerents withdrew: The Persians to Thessaly, and the Greeks to Attica. (Sandford's Mediterranean World C. 12 p. 203). With the persistent aim of freedom from Persian domination, Athens, together with the island and coast cities (of the Aegean and Ionia) renewed their resistance of Persian rule. This was the confederacy of Delos, which undertook several naval engagements, but with little or no success. In 467 B.C. the battle of Eurymedon River was fought and lost with a great number of ships. Eighteen years later (449 B.C.) another naval engagement took place off the island of Cyprus, but again without decision, and consequently Persian sovereignty over the Greeks remained. (Sandford's Mediterranean World C. 12 p. 205). In the meantime Sparta, under the terms of the Treaty of Miletus (413 B.C.) obtained subsidies from Persia, for naval construction, on condition that she recognize Persian sovereignty over the Ionians and their allies. This was done by Sparta as a threat to Athenian ambitions. However, it was not long after the Treaty of Miletus, that the Greeks themselves submitted to the authority and dominance of the Persians. During the winter 387–386 B.C., the individual Ionian cities, signed the peace terms of the Persian King, and finally accepted Persian rule. This Treaty was negotiated by a Spartan envoy who was authorized by the Persian King to enforce its provisions. (Sandford's Mediterranean World C. 13 and 15, p. 225 and 255). 20 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook B. The Leagues Apart from the resistance of a common foe, the Persians, a study of the function of the Leagues, reveals the enmity and spirit of aggression which were characteristic of the relationship which existed between the Greek city states themselves. Accordingly in 505 B.C., the Peloponnesian states signed treaties among themselves, pledging warfare against Sparta who had absorbed them under her influence. Meanwhile, Aristogoras revived the Ionian League (499–494 B.C.) to resist Persian aggression, and friendship between Athens and Aegina was restored by the Hellenic League (481 B.C.) which was afterward converted into the Confederacy of Delos (478 B.C.) as mentioned elsewhere. In like manner, Thebes also fell in line with the general temper of the age and organized the Boeotian League, a federation of city states, for self-protection and aggression. (Sandford's Mediterranean World C. 9, P. 150; C. 12, P. 201). In 377 B.C. a second Athenian Confederacy was organized, but this was to frustrate the aims of the Lacedaemonians and to compel them to respect the right of the Athenians and their allies (Sandford's Mediterranean World C. 15, P. 260). Likewise in 290 B C., the Aetolian League, made up of the States of central Greece, gained control of Delphi, and frequently violated Achaean rights in the Peloponnesus, while in 225 B.C. Antigonus Doson organized another Hellenic League, with the purpose of obstructing the ambitions of Sparta and her Aetolian allies. (Sandford's Mediterranean World C. 18, p. 317 and 319). (W. H. Couch's Hist. of Greece, p. 206–209, c. 11. Botsford & Robinson's Hellenic Hist., p. 115–121; 127–142. T. B. Bury's Hist. of Greece, p. 216–229; 240–241; 259–269; 471472. The Tutorial Hist. of Greece by W. J. Woodhouse, c. 18, 20 and 21). C. The Peloponnesian Wars 460–445 B.C. and 431–421 B.C. Owing to the ambitions of Athens to dominate the Ionians and other neighboring peoples, Pericles launched a campaign of alliances and conquests extending from Thessaly to Argos, and from Euboea to Naupactus, Achaea and the chief islands of the Ionian Sea. The net results were as follows: (a) Athens established alliances with Boeotia, Phocis and Locris, in spite of Sparta's opposition. (b) In 456 B.C. Aegina was captured and made tributary. (c) In 450 B.C. Athens failed in her attempt to invade Corinth. (d) In 451 friendship between Athens and Sparta was restored through the instrumentality of Cimon, on the condition that Athenian alliance with Argos was dissolved. (e) In 447 B.C. the exiled Oligarchs of Thebes defeated the Athenians at Coronea, and reestablished the Boeotian League under Theban leadership. (f) In 445 B.C. the 30 years peace was signed and after the revolt of Euboea and Megara, Sparta invaded Attica and Pericles sued for peace. Athens lost all her continent all her continental holdings. (Sandford's Mediterranean World C. 13, P. 220). 21 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook The second Peloponnesian war (431–421 B.C.) like that of the first arose through a general spirit of rebellion among the Greek city states against Athenian imperialism, Sparta being the chief enemy. The net results were as follows: (a) In 435 B.C. war between Corcyra and Corinth, Corcyra being aided by Athens. (b) In 432 B.C. (1) Athens blockaded Potidaea, because she refused to dismantle her Southern walls, and dismiss her Corinthian Magistrates. (2) Megara was excluded from Greek Markets, in order to reduce her to subjection. (3) The Peloponnesian League planned war against Athens and Boeotia. Phocis and Locris were to fight against Athens, Corcyra and a few Northern states. (c) In 431 B.C. (1) Thebes attacked Plataea, and while a Peloponnesian army occupied Attica, the Athenian fleet raided Peloponnesus. (2) Pericles being unable to defend Attica adequately transferred the civil population every Spring to the area between the walls of Athens and the Peiraeus. In the meantime the Athenian fleet operated against Potidaea, the Peloponnesian coast and Corinthian commerce. (d) In 428 B.C. (1) Mitylene and all the cities of Lesbos revolted. (2) A brutal massacre of Oligarchs took place at Corcyra. (e) In 425 B.C. (1) A Laconian force at Pylos was captured and a fort was established through Demosthenes and Cleon. (2) Cythera and other stations were fortified against the Peloponnesians. (3) Amphipolis was captured by Brasidas a Spartan, who had instigated rebellion among the Athenian allies, and after Brasdias and Cleon had been killed in battle (422 B.C.), Athens authorized Nicias to sue for peace. (Sandford's Mediterranean World C. 13, P. 220–221). It is obvious from a study of the causes and effects of the Peloponnesian wars that: (a) The Greek states were envious of each other and (b) The desire for power and expansion led to constant aggression and warfare among themselves. 22 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook (c) The condition of constant warfare between the city states was unfavorable for the production of philosophers. Before passing on to consider my next proposition I would like to say that it is an accepted truth that the development of philosophical thought requires an environment which is free from disturbance and worries. The period commonly assigned to Greek philosophy (i.e. Thales to Aristotle) was exactly the opposite to one of peace and tranquility, and therefore it could not be expected to produce philosophy. The obstacles against the origin and development of Greek philosophy, were not only the frequency of civil wars; and the constant defense against Persian aggression; but also the threat of extermination from the Athenian government, its worst enemy. (d) Philosophy Requires a Suitable Environment I must now add the following quotation which depicts this period. "For although the natural ills that beset mankind are many, we ourselves have added to them by wars and civil strife against one another, so that some have been unjustly put to death in their own cities, others driven into exile with their wives and children, and many have been compelled, for the sake of their daily bread, to die fighting against their own people, for the sake of the enemy". (Isocrates) (Botsford & Robinson's Hellenic Hist., c. XIII. Couch's Hist. of Greece, c. XXII. Bury's Hist. of Greece, c. X. The Tutorial Hist. of Greece by W. J. Woodhouse, c. 27, 28 and 29). Chapter III: Greek Philosophy was the Offspring of the Egyptian Mystery System 1. The Egyptian Theory of Salvation Became the Purpose of Greek Philosophy The earliest theory of salvation is the Egyptian theory. The Egyptian Mystery System had as its most important object, the deification of man, and taught that the soul of man if liberated from its bodily fetters, could enable him to become godlike and see the Gods in this life and attain the beatific vision and hold communion with the Immortals (Ancient Mysteries, C. H. Vail, P. 25). Plotinus defines this experience as the liberation of the mind from its finite consciousness, when it becomes one and is identified with the Infinite. This liberation was not only freedom of the soul from bodily impediments, but also from the wheel of reincarnation or rebirth. It involved a process of disciplines or purification both for the body and the soul. Since the Mystery System offered the salvation of the soul it also placed great emphasis upon its immortality. The Egyptian Mystery System, like the modern University, was the centre of organized culture, and candidates entered it as the leading source of ancient culture. 23 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook According to Pietschmann, the Egyptian Mysteries had three grades of students (1) The Mortals i.e., probationary students who were being instructed, but who had not yet experienced the inner vision. (2) The Intelligences, i.e., those who had attained the inner vision, and had received mind or nous and (3) The Creators or Sons of Light, who had become identified with or united with the Light (i.e., true spiritual consciousness). W. Marsham Adams, in the "Book of the Master", has described those grades as the equivalents of Initiation, Illumination and Perfection. For years they underwent disciplinary intellectual exercises, and bodily asceticism with intervals of tests and ordeals to determine their fitness to proceed to the more serious, solemn and awful process of actual Initiation. Their education consisted not only in the cultivation of the ten virtues, which were made a condition to eternal happiness, but also of the seven Liberal Arts which were intended to liberate the soul. There was also admission to the Greater Mysteries, where an esoteric philosophy was taught to those who had demonstrated their proficiency. (Ancient Mysteries C. H. Vail p. 24–25). Grammar, Rhetoric, and Logic were disciplines of moral nature by means of which the irrational tendencies of a human being were purged away, and he was trained to become a living witness of the Divine Logos. Geometry and Arithmetic were sciences of transcendental space and numeration, the comprehension of which provided the key not only to the problems of one's being; but also to those physical ones, which are so baffling today, owing to our use of the inductive methods. Astronomy dealt with the knowledge and distribution of latent forces in man, and the destiny of individuals, laces and nations. Music (or Harmony) meant the living practice of philosophy i.e., the adjustment of human life into harmony with God, until the personal soul became identified with God, when it would hear and participate in the music of the spheres. It was therapeutic, and was used by the Egyptian Priests in the cure of diseases. Such was the Egyptian theory of salvation, through which the individual was trained to become godlike while on earth, and at the same time qualified for everlasting happiness. This was accomplished through the efforts of the individual, through the cultivation of the Arts and Sciences on the one hand, and a life of virtue on the other. There was no mediator between man and his salvation, as we find in the Christian theory. Reference will again be made to these subjects, as part of the Curriculum of the Egyptian Mystery System. Now that we have outlined the Egyptian theory of salvation and its purpose, let us examine Greek philosophy and its purpose in order to discover whether there is an agreement between the two systems, or not. 24 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook 2. Circumstances of Identity between the Egyptian and Greek Systems A. The Indictment and Prosecution of Greek Philosophers The indictment and prosecution of Greek philosophers is a circumstance which is familiar to us all. Several philosophers, one after another, were indicted by the Athenian Government, on the common charge of introducing strange divinities. Anaxagoras, Socrates, and Aristotle received similar indictments for a similar offence. The most famous of these was that against Socrates which reads as follows. "Socrates commits a crime by not believing in the Gods of the city, and by introducing other new divinities. He also commits a crime by corrupting the youth". Now, in order to find out what these new divinities were, we must go back to the popular opinion which Aristophanes (423 B.C.) in the Clouds, aroused against him. It runs as follows: "Socrates is an evildoer, who busies himself with investigating things beneath the earth and in the sky, and who makes the worse appear the better reason, and who teaches others these same things (Plato's Apology C. 1–10; Aristophanes' Frogs, 1071; Apology 18 B.C., 19 C. Apology 24 B). It is clear then that Socrates offended the Athenian government simply because he pursued the study of astronomy and probably that of geology; and that the other philosophers were persecuted for the same reason. But the study of science was a required condition to membership in the Egyptian Mystery System, and its purpose was the liberation of the Soul from the ten bodily fetters, and if the Greek philosophers studied the sciences, then they were fulfilling a required condition to membership in the Egyptian Mystery System and its purpose; either through direct contact with Egypt or its schools or lodges outside its territory. B. A Life of Virtue was a Condition required by the Egyptian Mysteries as Elsewhere Mentioned The virtues were not mere abstractions or ethical sentiments, but were positive valours and virility of the soul. Temperance meant complete control of the passional nature. Fortitude meant such courage as would not allow adversity to turn us away from our goal. Prudence meant the deep insight that befits the faculty of Seership. Justice meant the unswerving righteousness of thought and action. Furthermore, when we compare the two ethical systems, we discover that the greater includes the less, and that it also suggests the origin of the latter. In the Egyptian Mysteries the Neophyte was required to manifest the following soul attributes: (1) Control of thought and (2) Control of action, the combination of which, Plato called Justice (i.e., the unswerving righteousness of thought and action). (3) Steadfastness of purpose, which was equivalent to Fortitude. (4) Identity with spiritual life or the higher ideals, which was equivalent to Temperance an attribute attained when the individual had gained conquest over the passional nature. 25 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook (5) Evidence of having a mission in life and (6) Evidence of a call to spiritual Orders or the Priesthood in the Mysteries: the combination of which was equivalent to Prudence or a deep insight and graveness that befitted the faculty of Seership. Other requirements in the ethical system of the Egyptian Mysteries were: (7) Freedom from resentment, when under the experience of persecution and wrong. This was known as courage. (8) Confidence in the power of the master (as Teacher), and (9) Confidence in one's own ability to learn; both attributes being known as Fidelity. (10) Readiness or preparedness for initiation. There has always been this principle of the ancient mysteries of Egypt: "When the pupil is ready, then the master will appear". This was equivalent to a condition of efficiency at all times for less than this pointed to a weakness. It is now quite clear that Plato drew the four Cardinal virtues from the Egyptian ten; also that Greek philosophy is the offspring of the Egyptian Mystery System. C. (i) There was a Grand Lodge in Egypt which had associated Schools and Lodges in the Ancient world There were mystery schools, or what we would commonly call lodges in Greece and other lands, outside of Egypt, whose work was carried on according to the Osiriaca, the Grand Lodge of Egypt. Such schools have frequently been referred to as private or philosophic mysteries, and their founders were Initiates of the Egyptian Mysteries; the Ionian temple at Didyma; the lodge of Euclid at Megara; the lodge of Pythagoras at Crotona; and the Orphic temple at Delphi, with the schools of Plato and Aristotle. Consequently we make a mistake when we suppose that the so-called Greek philosophers formulated new doctrines of their own; for their philosophy had been handed down by the great Egyptian Hierophants through the Mysteries. (Ancient Mysteries C. H. Vail p. 59). In addition to the control of the mysteries, the Grand Lodge permitted an exchange of visits between the various lodges, in order to ensure the progress of the brethren in the secret science. We are told in the Timaeus of Plato, that aspirants for mystical wisdom visited Egypt for initiation and were told by the priests of Sais, "that you Greeks are but children" in the Secret Doctrine, but were admitted to information enabling them to promote their spiritual advancement. Likewise, we are told by Jamblichus of a correspondence between Anebo and Porphyry, dealing with the fraternal relations, existing between the various schools or lodges of instructions in different lands, how their members visited, greeted and assisted one another in the secret science, the more advanced being obliged to afford assistance and instruction to their brethren in the inferior Orders. (Jamblichus: correspondence between Anebo and Porphyry) (Plato's Timaeus) (W. L. Wilmshurst on meaning of Masonry). 26 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook Having stated that the Grand Lodge of ancient mysteries was situated in Egypt, with jurisdiction over all lodges and schools of the ancient world, it now remains to show that such a Grand Lodge, did actually and physically exist. In doing so, two things are necessary: first, a description of the Egyptian temple, of which our modern mystery lodges (called by different names) are copies, and second, a description of the actual remains of the Grand and Sublime Lodge of Ancient Egypt. C. (ii) A Description of the Egyptian Temple Here I quote two authorities on the Egyptian temple, the first, C. H. Vail, on ancient mysteries p. 159 who says "that the Egyptian temples were surrounded with pillars recording the number of the constellations and the signs of the Zodiac or the cycles of the planets. And each temple was supposed to be a microcosm or a symbol of the temple of the Universe or of the starry vault called temple". The next authority is Max Muller, who in his Egyptian Mythology P. 187–193, has described Egyptian temples as follows: "Egyptian temples were made of stone, the outer courts of mud bricks. Wide roads led to the temples for the convenience of processions, while the immediate entrance was lined with statues, consisting of sphinxes and other animals. The front wall formed two high tower like buildings, called pylons, before which stood two granite obelisks. Immediately behind the pylons came a large court where the congregation assembled and watched the sacrifices. Immediately next to the hall of the congregation, came the hall of priests, and immediately following the hall of the priests came the final chamber, called the Adytum, i.e., the Holy of Holies, which was entered only by the high Priest. This was the place of the shrine and the abode of the God. Each temple was a reproduction of the world. The ceilings were painted to represent the sky and the stars, while the floor was green and blue like the meadows. Ceremonial cleanliness was at all times imperative, and the people before entering the temple must carefully purify themselves in a nearby stream. In later times, this became a ceremony of sprinkling with holy water before entrance into the temple". It is clear from the foregoing description that not only the modern masonic lodges, are copies of the Egyptian temple, but also the ancient ones, for there is complete identity in their internal decoration. But the minor or lower lodges including those outside of Egypt, must have had a governing body, and so now, I proceed to quote C. H. Vail, who in his Ancient Mysteries, pages 182 and 183, describes fully the location and remains of the famous Grand Lodge of Luxor, as follows: 27 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook C. (iii) The location of the Masonic Grand Lodge of Antiquity "At a short distance from Danderah, now called Upper Egypt, is the most extraordinary group of architectural ruins presented in any part of the world, known as the Temples of the ancient city of Thebes. Thebes in its prime occupied a large area on both sides of the Nile. This city was the centre of a great commercial nation of Upper Egypt ages before Memphis was the capital of the second nation in Lower Egypt; and however grand the architectural monuments of the latter may have been those of the former surpassed them. The portrayal by pencil or brush can convey but a faint idea of the perfected city. As the city stands today, it is like a city of giants, who after a long conflict have been destroyed, leaving the ruins of their various temples, as the only proof of their existence "The Temple of Luxor (it was in this temple that the Grand Lodge of Initiates always met), stands on a raised platform of brickwork covering more than two thousand feet in length and one thousand feet in breadth (note the oblong shape, which became the pattern for all lodges and churches in the ancient world). It is the one that interests the members of all Ancient Orders, especially so, all the members of those Orders that worshipped at the Shrine of the Secret Fire, more than perhaps any other, and stands on the eastern bank of the Nile. It is in a very ruined state; but records say the stupendous scale of its proportions almost takes away the sense of its incompleteness. Up to about a quarter of a century ago, the greater part of its columns in the interior and outer walls had been removed, after falling, for use elsewhere. This temple was founded by the Pharaoh Amenothis III, who constructed the southern part, including the heavy colonnade overlooking the river; but destruction unfortunately conceals this fact. The chief entrance to the Temple looked to the east; while the Holy Chambers at the upper end of the plain approached the Nile. As mighty as the Temple of Luxor was, it was exceeded in magnitude and grandeur by that of Carnak. The distance between these two great structures was a mile and a half. Along this avenue was a double row of Sphinxes, placed twelve feet apart, and the width of the avenue was sixty feet. When in perfect state this avenue presented the most extraordinary entrance that the world has ever seen. If we had the power to picture from the field of imagination the grand processions of Neophytes constantly passing through and taking part in the ceremonies of Initiation, we would be powerless to produce the grandeur of the surroundings, and the imposing sight of colour and magnificent trappings of those who took part. Neither can we produce the music that kept the vast number of people in steady marching order. Crude it might have been to the cultivated ear of the 20th century. But could not the palpitating strain sung by massed voices on the lapse of time, whose history launches the profoundest aspirations of the human heart, like the trend of a mighty river, because the grand currents of Universal Law, imparting the desire to that Shadowy Past, as it steps forth from the pages of history, dim with age? Egypt must have been, when these Temples were built, a martial nation for records of her warlike deeds are perpetuated in deeply engraved tablets which even now, excite the admiration of the best Judges of archaeological remains. She was also a highly civilized nation, and of a nature that could bear the expenditure which always attends the culture of the Arts. She surpassed in her astonishing architecture, all other nations that have existed upon the earth." 28 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook I am fully convinced by these references and quotations that an Egyptian Grand Lodge of ancient mysteries actually existed some five thousand years ago or more, on the banks of the Nile in the city of Thebes, and that it was the only Grand Lodge of the Ancient World whose ruins have been found in Egypt, and that it was the governing body which necessarily controlled the ancient mysteries together with the philosophical Schools and minor Lodges wherever they happened to have been organized. C. (iv) The Rebuilding of the Temple of Delphi The temple of Delphi was burnt down in 548 B.C. and it was King Amasis of Egypt, who rebuilt it for the brethren, by donating three times as much as was needed, in the sum of one thousand talents, and 50,000 lbs. of alum. According to information at hand, the temple had organized its members into an amphictyonic league for protection against political and other forms of violence; but they were too poor to raise sufficient funds from the membership, and they decided upon a public contribution from the citizens of Greece. Accordingly they wandered throughout the land soliciting aid, but failed in their efforts. Having decided to visit the brethren in Egypt, they approached King Amasis, who as Grand Master, unhesitatingly offered to rebuild the Temple, and donated more than three times as much as was needed for the purpose. Here it would be well to note that: (1) the Greeks regarded the Temple of Delphi as a foreign institution, hence (2) they were unsympathetic towards it and for the same reason destroyed it by fire. (3) Clearly, the Temple of Delphi was a branch of the Egyptian Mystery System, projected in Greece. Sandford's Mediterranean World p. 135; 139. John Kendrick's Ancient Egypt Bk. II. P. 363. 3. The Abolition of Greek Philosophy together with the Egyptian Mysteries From the conquest of Egypt by Alexander the Great, the Greeks, who were always attracted by the mysterious worship of the Nile-land, began to imitate the Egyptian religion in its entirety; and during the Roman occupation, the Egyptian religion spread not only to Italy: but throughout the Roman Empire, including Brittany. This assimilation of the Egyptian religion was confined to the Gods of the Osirian cycle and the Graeco-Egyptian Serapis, and aimed at a close imitation of the ancient traditions of the Nileland. Owing to the splendor of architecture, the hieroglyphs of the temples, the obelisks and sphinxes before the shrines, the linen vestments and the shaven heads and faces of the priests, the endless and obscure ritual, filled the Greeks with awe, and wonderful mysteries were consequently believed to have underlain these incomprehensible, and the Egyptian religion stood in the way of the rising Christianity. 29 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook The success of the Egyptian religion was due no doubt, on the one hand to its conservatism; while on the other to the shadowy philosophical abstractions which constituted Graeco-Roman religion, so that the staunch faith of the Egyptians, together with their mysterious forms of worship, led to the universal conviction among the Ancients, that Egypt was not only the Holy Land but the Holiest of lands or countries, and that indeed, the Gods dwelt there. The Nile became a centre for pilgrimages in the ancient world, and the pilgrims who went there and experienced the marvelous revelations and spiritual blessings which it afforded them, returned home with the conviction that the Nile was the home of the most profound religious knowledge. The Greeks failed to imitate Egyptian conservatism and not only in Egyptian cities, with large Greek population, but in Europe, Egyptian divinities were corrupted with Greek and Asiatic names and mythologies and reduced to vague pantheistic personalities, so that Isis and Osiris had retained very little of their Egyptian origin. (Max Muller p. 241–43; Egyptian Mythology). Consequently, as they failed to advance Egyptian Philosophy, so they also failed to advance Egyptian religion. During the first four centuries of the Christian era, the religion of Egypt continued unabated and uninterrupted, but after the Edict of Theodosius at the end of the fourth century A.D., ordering the close of Egyptian temples, Christianity began to spread more rapidly and both the religion of Egypt and that of Greece began to die. In the island of Philae, in the first cataract of the Nile, however, the Egyptian religion was continued by its inhabitants, the Blemmyans and Nobadians, who refused to accept Christianity and the Roman government fearing a rebellion, paid tribute to them as an appeasement. During the sixth century A.D., however, Justinian issued a second edict which suppressed this remnant of Egyptian worshippers and propagated Christianity among the Nubians. With the death of the last priest, who could read and interpret "the writings of the words of the Gods" (the hieroglyphics) the Egyptian faith sank into oblivion. It was only in popular magic that some practices lingered on as traces of a faith that became a universal religion, or the survival of a statue of Isis and Horus, which were regarded as the Madonna and Child. A sentiment of admiration and awe for this strangest of all religions still survived, but the information from classical writers concerning this faith has been incomplete. Napoleon's invasion of Egypt brought a revival of interest from the West to decipher her inscriptions and papyri with a view to an understanding and appreciation of this most ancient of civilizations. (Mythology of Egypt by Max Muller C. XIII p. 241–245; The Mediterranean World by Sandford, p. 508, 548, 552–558, 568). 30 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook We learn the following facts from the above quotations: (i) The Egyptian Mysteries had become the Ancient World Religion, spreading throughout the Roman Empire and including Italy, Greece, Asia Minor, and various parts of Europe including Brittany. This continued under different names, long after Justinian's Edict of toleration granted to the Christians. (ii) Egypt was the Holy Land of the ancient world, that pilgrimages were made to that land because of the marvellous revelations and spiritual blessings which it afforded the ancient peoples, and because of the universal conviction among the Ancients that Egypt was the land of the Gods. (iii) The Edicts of Theodosius in the fourth century A. D, and that of Justinian in the sixth century A.D. abolished alike not only the Mystery system of Egypt, but also its philosophical schools, located in Greece and elsewhere, outside Egypt. (iv) The abolition of the Egyptian Mysteries was to create an opportunity for the adoption of Christianity. This was the problem: the Roman government felt that Egypt was now conquered in arms and reduced to her knees, but in order to make the conquest complete, it would be necessary to abolish the Mysteries which still controlled the religious mind of the ancient world. (v) There must be a New World Religion to take the place of the Egyptian religion. This New Religion, which should take the place of the Mysteries, must be equally powerful and universal, and consequently everything possible must be done in order to promote its interests. This explains the rapid growth of Christianity following Justinian's Edict of toleration. Since the Edicts of Theodosius and Justinian abolished both the Mysteries of Egypt and the schools of Greek philosophy alike, it shows that the nature of the Egyptian Mysteries and Greek philosophy was identical and that Greek philosophy grew out of the Egyptian Mysteries. 4. How the African Continent gave its culture to the Western World As mentioned elsewhere, the Egyptian Mysteries and the philosophical schools of Greece were closed by the edicts of Theodosius in the 4th century A.D. and that of Justinian in the 6th century A.D. (i.e., 529); and as a consequence, intellectual darkness spread over Christian Europe and the Graeco-Roman world for ten centuries; during which time, knowledge had disappeared. As stated elsewhere, the Greeks showed no creative powers, and were unable to improve upon the knowledge which they had received from the Egyptians (Hist. of Science by Sedgwick and Tyler p. 141; 153; Zeller's Hist. of Phil. Introduction p. 31). 31 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook During the Persian, Greek and Roman invasions, large numbers of Egyptians fled not only to the desert and mountain regions, but also to adjacent lands in Africa, Arabia and Asia Minor, where they lived, and secretly developed the teachings which belonged to their mystery system. In the 8th century A.D. the Moors, i.e., natives of Mauritania in North Africa, invaded Spain and took with them, the Egyptian culture which they had preserved. Knowledge in the ancient days was centralized i.e., it belonged to a common parent and system, i.e., the Wisdom Teaching or Mysteries of Egypt, which the Greeks used to call Sophia. As such, the people of North Africa were the neighbors of the Egyptians, and became the custodians of Egyptian culture, which they spread through considerable portions of Africa, Asia Minor and Europe. During their occupation of Spain, the Moors displayed with considerable credit, the grandeur of African culture and civilization. The schools and libraries which they established became famous throughout the Mediaeval world; Science and learning were cultivated and taught; the schools of Cordova, Toledo, Seville and Saragossa attained such celebrity, that they, like their parent Egypt, attracted students from all parts of the Western world; and from them arose the most famous African professors that the world has ever known, in medicine, surgery, astronomy and mathematics. But these people from North Africa did more than merely distinguish themselves in Spain. They were really the recognized custodians of African culture, to whom the world looked for enlightenment. Consequently, through the medium of the ancient Arabic language, philosophy and the various branches of science were disseminated: (a) all the so-called works of Aristotle in metaphysics, moral philosophy and natural science (b) translations by Leonardo Pisano in Arabic mathematical science (c) translation by Gideo a Monk of Arezzo in musical notation. (Sedgwick and Tyler's Hist. of Science C. IX.) In addition, the Moors kept up constant contact with mother Egypt: for they had established Caliphates not only at Baghdad and Cordova, but also at Cairo in Egypt. (Europe in the Middle Ages by Ault p. 216–219). Just here it would be well to mention that all the great leaders of the great religions of antiquity were Initiates of the Egyptian Mystery System: from Moses, who was an Egyptian Hierogrammat, down to Christ. It should also be of interest to know that European scientists like Roger Bacon, Johann Kepler, Copernicus and others obtained their science through Arab or Berber sources. It is also noteworthy that throughout the Middle Ages, European knowledge of medicine came from these same sources. (History of The Arabs, by Hitti pages 370, 629, 665 and 572). (Philo; Esoteric Christianity by Annie Besant p. 107; 128–129; Ancient Mysteries by C. H. Vail p. 59; 61; 74–75; 109). 32 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook CHAPTER IV The Egyptians Educated the Greeks 1. The Effects of the Persian Conquest A. Immigration restrictions against the Greeks are removed and Egypt is thrown open to Greek research. Owing to the practice of piracy, in which the Ionians and Carians were active, the Egyptians were forced to make immigration laws restricting the immigration of the Greeks and punishing their infringement by capital punishment, i.e., the sacrifice of the victim. Before the time of Psammitichus, the Greeks were not allowed to go beyond the coast of Lower Egypt, but during his reign and that of Amasis, those conditions were modified. For the first time in Egyptian history Ionians and Carians were employed as Mercenaries in the Egyptian Army (670 B.C.), interpretation was organized through a body of interpreters, and the Greeks began to gain useful information concerning the culture of the Egyptians. In addition to these changes, King Amasis removed the restrictions against the Greeks and permitted them to enter Egypt and settle in Naucratis. About this same time, i.e., the reign of Amasis, the Persians, through Cambyses invaded Egypt, and the whole country was thrown open to the researches of the Greeks. B. The Genesis of Greek Enlightenment. The Persian invasion, did not only provide the Greeks with ample research, but stimulated the creation of prose history in Ionia. Heretofore, the Greeks had little or no accurate knowledge of Egyptian culture: but their contact with Egypt resulted in the genesis of their enlightenment. (Ovid Fasti III 338; Herodotus Bk. II p. 113; Plutarch p. 380; Eratosthenes ap Strabo 801–802; Diogenes Bk. IX 49). C. Students from Ionia and the Islands of the Aegean visit Egypt for their Education. Just as in our modern times, countries like the United States, England, and France are attracting students from all parts of the world, on account of their leadership in culture; so was it in ancient times, Egypt was supreme in the leadership of civilization, and students from all parts, flocked to that land, seeking admission into her mysteries or wisdom system. 33 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook The immigration of Greeks to Egypt for the purpose of their education, began as a result of the Persian invasion (525 B.C.), and continued until the Greeks gained possession of that land and access to the Royal Library, through the conquest of Alexander the Great. Alexandria was converted into a Greek city, a centre of research and the capital of the newly created Greek empire, under the rule of Ptolemies. Egyptian culture survived and flourished, under the name and control of the Greeks, until the edicts of Theodosius in the 4th century A.D., and that of Justinian in the 6th century A.D., which closed the Mystery Temples and Schools, as elsewhere mentioned. (Ancient Egypt by John Kendrick Bk. II p. 55; Sandford's Mediterranean World p. 562; 570). Concerning the fact that Egypt was the greatest education centre of the ancient world which was also visited by the Greeks, reference must again be made to Plato in the Timaeus who tells us that Greek aspirants to wisdom visited Egypt for initiation, and that the priests of Sais used to refer to them as children in the Mysteries. As regards the visit of Greek students to Egypt for the purpose of their education, the following are mentioned simply to establish the fact that Egypt was regarded as the educational centre of the ancient world and that like the Jews, the Greeks also visited Egypt and received their education. (1) It is said that during the reign of Amasis, Thales who is said to have been born about 585 B.C., visited Egypt and was initiated by the Egyptian Priests into the Mystery System and science of the Egyptians. We are also told that during his residence in Egypt, he learnt astronomy, land surveying, mensuration, engineering and Egyptian Theology. (See Thales in Blackwell's source book of Philosophy; Zeller's Hist. of Phil.; Diogenes Laertius and Kendrick's Ancient Egypt). (2) It is said that Pythagoras, a native of Samos, travelled frequently to Egypt for the purpose of his education. Like every aspirant, he had to secure the consent and favour of the Priests, and we are informed by Diogenes that a friendship existed between Polycrates of Samos and Amasis King of Egypt, that Polycrates gave Pythagoras letters of introduction to the King, who secured for him an introduction to the Priests; first to the Priest of Heliopolis, then to the Priest of Memphis, and lastly to the Priests of Thebes, to each of whom Pythagoras gave a silver goblet. (Herodotus Bk. III 124; Diogenes VIII 3; Pliny N. H., 36, 9; Antipho recorded by Porphyry). We are also further informed through Herodotus, Jablonsk and Pliny, that after severe trials, including circumcision, had been imposed upon him by the Egyptian Priests, he was finally initiated into all their secrets. That he learnt the doctrine of metempsychosis; of which there was no trace before in the Greek religion; that his knowledge of medicine and strict system of dietetic rules, distinguished him as a product of Egypt, where medicine had attained its highest perfection; and that his attainments in geometry corresponded with the ascertained fact that Egypt was the birth place of that Science. 34 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook In addition we have the statements of Plutarch, Demetrius and Antisthenes that Pythagoras founded the Science of Mathematics among the Greeks, and that he sacrificed to the Muses, when the Priests explained to him the properties of the right angled triangle. (Philarch de Repugn. Stoic 2 p. 1089; Demetrius; Antisthenes; Cicero de Natura Deorum III, 36). Pythagoras was also trained in music by the Egyptian priests. (Kendrick's Hist. of Ancient Egypt vol. I. p. 234). (3) According to Diogenes Laertius and Herodotus, Democritus is said to have been born about 400 B.C. and to have been a native of Abdera in Miletus. We are also told by Demetrius in his treatise on "People of the Same Name", and by Antisthenes in his treatise on "Succession", that Democritus travelled to Egypt for the purpose of his education and received the instruction of the Priests. We also learn from Diogenes and Herodotus that he spent five years under the instruction of the Egyptian Priests and that after the completion of his education, he wrote a treatise on the sacred characters of Meroe. In this respect we further learn from Origen, that circumcision was compulsory, and one of the necessary conditions of initiation to a knowledge of the hieroglyphics and sciences of the Egyptians, and it is obvious that Democritus, in order to obtain such knowledge, must have submitted also to that rite. Origen, who was a native of Egypt wrote as follows: "Apud Aegyptios nullus aut geometrica studebat, aut astronomiae secreta remabatur, nisi circumcisione suscepta." (No one among the Egyptians, either studied geometry, or investigated the secrets of Astronomy, unless circumcision had been undertaken). (4) Concerning Plato's travels we are told by Hermodorus that at the age of 28 Plato visited Euclid at Megara in company with other pupils of Socrates; and that for the next ten years he visited Cyrene, Italy and finally Egypt, where he received instruction from the Egyptian Priests. (5) With regards to Socrates and Aristotle and the majority of pre-Socratic philosophers, history seems to be silent on the question of their travelling to Egypt like the few other students here mentioned, for the purpose of their education. It is enough to say, that in this case the exceptions have proved the rule, that ail students, who had the means, went to Egypt to complete their education. The fact that history fails to supply a fuller account of this type of immigration, might be due to some or all of the following reasons: (a) The immigration laws against the Greeks up to the time of King Amasis and the Persian Invasion, (b) Prose history was undeveloped among the Greeks during the period of their educational immigration to Egypt. (c) The Greek authorities persecuted and drove students of philosophy into hiding and consequently, (d) Students of the Mystery System concealed their movements. 35 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook Let us remember that Anaxagoras was indicted and imprisoned; that he escaped and fled to his home in Ionia, that Socrates was indicted, imprisoned and condemned to death; and that both Plato and Aristotle fled from Athens under great suspicion (William Turner's Hist. of Phil. p. 62; Plato's Phaedo; Zeller's Hist. of Phil. p. 84; 127; Roger's Hist. of Phil. p. 76; William Turner's Hist. of Phil. p. 126). 2. The Effects of the Conquest of Egypt by Alexander the Great A. The Royal Library and Museum together with Temples and other Libraries are Looted. As elsewhere mentioned, it was an ancient custom of invading armies to loot libraries and temples in order to capture books and manuscripts, which were regarded as great treasures. A few instances would be enough to verify this custom: (a) we are informed that during the Persian Invasion beginning with Cambyses, the temples of Egypt were not only stripped of their gold and silver, but rifled for their ancient records. Every Egyptian Temple carried a secret library with secret manuscripts and books. (b) We are also informed that when Athens was captured by the Romans in 84 B.C. the library of books said to have belonged to Aristotle was also captured and taken to Rome. (William Turner's Hist. of Phil. p. 128; John Kendrick's Ancient Egypt vol. II p. 432). Just as in the invasion of Egypt by the Persians, the invading armies stripped the temples of their gold, silver and sacred books; and just as in the capture of Athens by the Romans Sulla carried off the only library of books which he found; so it is to be expected of Alexander the Great, in his invasion of Egypt. One of the first things that he and his companions and armies would do, would be to search for the treasures of the land and capture them. These were kept in temples and libraries and consisted of gold and silver out of which the gods and ceremonial vessels were made, and sacred books and, manuscripts kept both in libraries and in the "Holy of Holies" of Temples. It is my firm belief that this indeed was the great opportunity which Alexander gave Aristotle and enabled him and his pupils to carry off as many books as they wanted from the Royal Library and to convert it into a research centre. Apart from the Royal Library at Alexandria, there was also another famous library nearby: The "Royal Library of Thebes"; "The Menephtheion", which was founded by Pharaoh, Setei. The Menephtheion was completed by Rameses II; but little occurs in history about this greatest of Egyptian Royal Libraries. 36 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook However, any invading army would first loot the Royal Library of Alexandria and then would turn their attention to the Menephtheion at Thebes. They would also visit the cities of Memphis and Heliopolis and likewise loot their libraries and temples. This was the ancient custom and certainly one of the ways in which the Greeks received their education from Egyptians. (Egyptian Mythology by Max Muller p. 187–189; 205; Diodorus 16, 51; Bunsen I p. 27; Ancient Egypt by John Kendrick vol. II 56; 432–433). It is therefore an erroneous belief that the Greeks, on Egyptian soil, and through their own native ability, set up a great university at Alexandria and turned out great scholars. On the other hand, since it is a well known fact that Egypt was the land of temples and libraries, we can see how comparatively easy it was for the Greeks to strip other Egyptian libraries of their books in order to maintain the new Library at Alexandria, after it had been already looted by Aristotle and his pupils. The Greeks (i.e., Alexander the Great, Aristotle's school and the succeeding Ptolemies) converted the Royal Library of Alexandria into a research centre, by transferring Aristotle's school and pupils from Athens to this great Egyptian Library, and therefore the students who studied there received instructions from Egyptian priests and teachers, until they died out. The difficulty of language and interpretation made it imperative for the Greeks to use Egyptian teachers. The Greeks did not carry culture and learning to Egypt, but found it already there, and wisely settled in that country, in order to absorb as much as possible of its culture. B. The Royal Library of Thebes: The Menephtheion is described. It was also looted by invading armies. But when we read a brief sketch of the magnificence of the Theban Royal Library; The Menephtheion, we even see a better picture and are bound to admit that Egypt was the store house of ancient culture and that that culture was preserved in the form of literature stored away in her great libraries and temples. Great as the Royal Library of Alexandria might have been, we see in the Theban Royal Library something far more magnificent and far more representative of the true greatness of our Ancient Egypt. On the left of the steps leading to the second court, there is still seen the pedestal of the enormous granite statue of Rameses; the largest, that ever existed in Egypt, according to Diodorus. Its height has been calculated at fifty-four feet, and its weight, at 887¼ tons; a marvel to the modern mind. The interior face of the wall of the pylon represents the wars of Rameses III. The Osiride pillars of the second court are the monolithal figures, sixteen cubits in height, supplying the place of columns, and at the foot of the steps leading from the court to the next hall beyond, there were two sitting statues of the King. The head of one of these was of red granite, known by the name of "Young Memon", was taken away by Belzoni, and is now a principal ornament of the British Museum. 37 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook Beyond this are the remains of a hall 133 feet broad by 100 feet long, supported by 48 columns, twelve of which are thirty-two feet in height and 21 feet in circumference. On different parts of the columns, and the walls are represented acts of homage by the king to the principal Deities of the Theban Pantheon, and the gracious promises which they make him in return. In another sculpture the two chief Divinities of Egypt invest him with the emblems of military and civil dominion, i.e., the Scimitar, the Scourge and the Pedum. Beneath, the twenty-three sons of Rameses appear in procession, bearing the emblems of their respective high offices in the state, their names being inscribed above them. Nine smaller apartments, two of them still preserved, and supported by columns, lay behind the hall. On the jambs of the first of these apartments are sculptured Thoth: the Inventor of Letters, and the Goddess Saf, with the title of 'Lady of Letters'; and 'President of the Hall of Books', accompanied the former with an emblem of the sense of sight, and the latter of hearing. There is no doubt that this is the "Sacred Library" which Diodorus describes as the inscribed "Dispensary of the Mind". It had an astronomical ceiling, in which the twelve Egyptian months are represented, with an inscription from which important inferences have been drawn respecting the chronology of the reign of Rameses III. On the walls is a procession of priests, carrying the Sacred Arts, and in the next apartment, the last that now remains, the king is presenting offerings to the various Divinities. (Ancient Egypt by J. Kendrick Bk. I p. 128–131. Report of French Commission). C. Museum and the Library of Alexander were used as a University. The Museum and Library of Alexandria were so famous in ancient times, that we wonder why more information concerning this centre of learning, has not come down to us. A few references to authoritative sources might no doubt help to enlighten us on this matter. From Sedgwick's and Tyler's History of Science, chapter 5 pages 87–119, we learn that the subjugation of Egypt by Alexander the Great in 330 B.C. had checked the further development of Greek civilization on its native soil. That after the death of Alexander the Great in 323 B.C., his vast empire was divided among his generals, and that Alexandria, the new Egyptian capital fell to Ptolemy. That the city, barely ten years old, soon became the centre of the learned world, and that by 300 B.C., the Museum (i.e., the seat of the Muses), was founded, and became a veritable university of Greek learning. That to the Museum was attached a great library, with a dining hall and lecture rooms for professors, and this became a school of philosophers, mathematicians and astronomers. Here for the next 700 years, science had its chief abiding place. 38 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook Here however, it should be remembered that the above statement of Sedgwick and Tyler is misleading, since the Greeks did not carry a civilization of their own to Egypt, but on the contrary found a very highly developed Egyptian culture, the survival of which was maintained by the use of Egyptian Priests and Scholars as teachers. D. A Military Policy of the Greeks to Commandeer Information from the Egyptians was put in operation. One of the military policies adopted by the Greek military authorities at Alexandria was the issue of commands to the leading Egyptian Priests for information concerning the Egyptian history, philosophy and religion. As a custom this is no less ancient than modern, since it is also a custom in modern times for victorious armies to confer with the men of science of an invaded country, in order to discover whether or not, there is anything new in the field of science, which they might possess. We would recall how at the end of World War II, the American scientists conferred with the Japanese scientists at Tokio. Accordingly, we are told that Ptolemy I Soter, in order to elicit the secrets of Egyptian wisdom or mystery system, ordered Manetho, the High Priest of the temple of Isis at Sebennytus in Lower Egypt, to write the philosophy, and the history of the religion of the Egyptians. Accordingly, Manetho published several volumes concerning these respective fields, and Ptolemy issued an order prohibiting the translation of these books which had to be kept on reserve in the Library, for instruction of the Greeks by the Egyptian Priests. Here it becomes quite clear that the first professors of the Alexandrine School were the Egyptian Priests, and that the Scholarchs and pupils of Aristotle's transferred school, received their training directly from the Egyptian Priests. It is also well to note that the chief text books of the Alexandrine School were Manetho's books. We are told by Apollodorus from whom Syncellus drew his information, that Ptolemy II ordered Eratosthenes, the Cyrenean (i.e., a black man and native of Cyrene) and librarian of the Alexandrine Library, to write a chronology of the Theban Kings, and that Eratosthenes did so with the aid of the Egyptian Hierophants at Thebes (Ancient Egypt by John Kendrick vol. II p. 81; Apollodorus; Syncellus; Clinton, Fasti Hellenici, sub anno). Furthermore, it became the custom during the Greek and Roman occupation to use the services of Egyptian Priests and Scholars, as professors at the Alexandrine School. We are told that during the reign of Theodosius (378–395 A.D.), the Egyptian Professor Horapollo wrote a system of the Egyptian hieroglyphics: The Hieroglyphica of Horapollo, which has been regarded as the best that has come down to modern times. We are also told that this professor taught not only at the Alexandrine School, but also at that of Constantinople. (John Kendrick's Ancient Egypt Bk. I p. 242; Leeman's Amstelod, 1935 translated by Cory). 39 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook 3. The Egyptians Were the First to Civilize the Greeks Greece was first civilized by colonies from Egypt, then from Phoenicia and Thrace. These were under the government of wise men, who not only subdued the ferocity of an ignorant populace by civil institutions, but also cast about them the strong chain of religion and the fear of the gods. Whatever dogmas they had been taught in their respective countries, concerning things divine and human, they delivered to these newly formed societies, with the object of bringing them under the restraint of virtuous discipline. Phoroneus and Cecrops were Egyptians, Cadmus a Phoenician and Orpheus a Thracian, and each of them, through their colonies carried into Greece the religious and philosophical tenets of his respective country. The practice of teaching the doctrines of religion to people under the guise of myths originated from the Egyptians and was adopted by the Phoenicians and Thracians, and subsequently introduced to the Greeks. According to Strabo, it was not possible in ancient times to lead a promiscuous multitude to religion and virtue by philosophical harangues. This could be effected only by the aid of superstition, by prodigies and fables. The thunder bolt, the aegis, the trident, the spear, torches and snakes were the instruments made use of by the founders of States, to terrify the ignorant and vulgar into subjection. These references must speak for themselves. Cheops and Cecrops were the names which the Greeks used for the Egyptian Khufu, who belonged to the 4th Dynasty of the Egyptians or the pyramid age, i.e., 2800 B.C. (Strabo Bk. I; Brucker's Historia Critica Philosophiae with translation by Wm. Enfield: Bk. II p. 62). 4. Alexander Visits the Oracle of Ammon in the Oasis of Siwah No discussion on Alexander's invasion of Egypt would be complete without reference to his famous visit to the Oracle of Ammon, situated in the Oasis of Siwah. Alexander had placed a garrison in Pelusium, whence he marched through the desert along the eastern bank of the Nile to Heliopolis where he crossed the river to Memphis, where his fleet had been awaiting him, and where he was welcomed by the Egyptians and crowned as Pharaoh. Having sacrificed to Apis and other Gods, Alexander descended the Nile by the Canopic branch and set out on his journey to the Oracle of Ammon in the Oasis of Siwah. His route was along the coast of Libya, as far as Paraetonium, whence he marched through the desert to the Oasis of Siwah. What do we suppose was Alexander's motive for visiting the Temple of Ammon? Perhaps a brief description of the religious and economic importance of Heliopolis, Memphis, Thebes and Ammonium might help us to determine what it was. 40 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook In the first place these cities were strongholds of the Egyptian religion, where there were many rich temples, schools and Priests, and therefore were representative of the Egyptian religious life. In the second place these cities were centers of education, and after the Persian invasion, Greek students who travelled to Egypt for the purpose of their education received their training from the Priests of one or all of these cities, as elsewhere mentioned. When Pythagoras went to Egypt, he carried a letter of introduction from Polycrates of Samos to King Amasis, who in turn gave him letters of introduction to the Priests of Heliopolis, Memphis, and Thebes. As centres of education, the temples and libraries of these cities contained very valuable books; and in the third place, these regions had previously been captured by the Persians for the very fact of their wealth. This should explain why they included these districts in their Satrapy which paid them an enormous annual tribute amounting to 700 talents of gold, together with the produce of the fisheries of Lake Moeris which amounted to a talent a day, during the six months that the water flowed in from the Nile; and a third part of that sum, during the afflux. In addition Egypt furnished 120 thousand medicini of corn as rations for the Persian troops who were stationed in the White Fort of Memphis. The equivalent of this tribute was 170 thousand pounds sterling, and shows the underlying motive not only of the Persian invading armies, but also of all invading armies of antiquity. In the case of Alexander there is no exception. According to history, the Persians were in occupation of Egypt, and Alexander having mustered superior forces, went there and drove them out and took possession himself. May I ask this question: was this a joke, or was there a motive? And if there was a motive, what else could it have been but that Alexander wanted the wealth in books, gold, silver, ivory, slaves, and tribute which the Persians were extorting from the unfortunate Egyptians? In ancient times, the Oracle of Ammon at Siwah was the most celebrated, and Heliopolis, Memphis and Thebes were representatives of the best of Egyptian culture. (John Kendrick's Ancient Egypt Book II P. 433–435; Diodorus 15, 16. Herodotus Book III P. 124; Diogenes Laertius Book VIII; Timaeus of Plato; Pliny N. H. XXXVI 9; Antiphon recorded by Porphyry). 41 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook CHAPTER V The Pre-Socratic Philosophers and the Teachings Ascribed to Them It is absolutely necessary here in chapters V and VI to mention the doctrines of the so called Greek philosophers in order to convince my readers of their Egyptian origin which is shown in the summaries of conclusions which follow these teachings. It is also necessary to mention them so as to serve the purpose of reference and to meet the convenience of readers. I. The Earlier Ionian School This Group consisted of (i) Thales (ii) Anaximander and (iii) Anaximenes. (i) Thales, supposed to have lived 620–546 B.C. and a native of Miletus, is credited by Aristotle, with teaching that (a) water is the source of all living things, and (b) all things are full of God. Both history and tradition are silent as to how Thales arrived at his conclusions, except that Aristotle attempts to offer his opinion as a reason: that is that Thales must have been influenced by the consideration of the moisture of nutriment, and based his conclusion on a rationalistic interpretation of the myth of Oceanus. This however is regarded as mere conjecture on the part of Aristotle. (Turner's History of Philosophy, p. 34). (ii) Anaximander, supposed to have been born 610 B.C. at Miletus, is credited with the teaching that, the origin of all things is "the Infinite", or the Unlimited (i.e., apeiron), or the Boundless. The Apeiron is regarded as equivalent to the modern notion of space, and the mythological notion of chaos. Both history and tradition are silent as to how Anaximander arrived at his conclusion: but here again we find Aristotle offering his opinion as a reason, i.e., that Anaximander must have supposed that change destroys matter, and that unless the substratum of change is limitless, change must at sometime cease. This opinion is of course, mere conjecture, on the part of Aristotle. (Turners History of Philosophy, p. 3536). (iii) Anaximenes, also a native of Miletus, and supposed to have died in 528 B.C., is credited with the teaching that all things originated from air. Both history and tradition are silent as to how Anaximenes arrived at his conclusion; and all attempts to furnish a reason are regarded as mere conjecture. (Turner's History of Philosophy, p. 37–38). 42 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook 2. Pythagoras Born in the Aegean Island of Samos, supposedly in 530 B.C.; the following doctrines have been attributed to Pythagoras: (i) Transmigration, the immortality of the soul and salvation. This salvation is based upon certain beliefs concerning the soul. True life is not to be found here on earth, and what men call life is really death, and the body is the tomb of the soul. Owing to the contamination caused by the soul's imprisonment in the body, it is forced to pass through an indefinite series of re-incarnations: from the body of one animal, to that of another, until it is purged from such contamination. Salvation, in this sense, consists of the freedom of the soul from the "cycle of birth, death and rebirth", which is common to every soul, and which condition must remain until purification or purgation is completed. Being liberated from the ten chains of the flesh, and also from successive re-incarnations, the soul now acquires her pristine perfection, and the eligibility to join the company of the Gods, with whom she dwells forever. This was the reward which the Pythagorean System offered its initiates. (ii) The doctrines of (a) Opposites, (b) the Summum Bonum, or Supreme Good, and (c) the process of purification. (a) The Union of opposites creates harmony in the universe. This is true in the case of musical sounds, such as we find in the lyre: where the harmony produced is the result of the mean proportional relation between the lengths of the two middle strings to that of the two extremes. This is also true in natural phenomena, which are identified with number, whose elements consist of the odd and the even. Thus, the even is unlimited, because of its quality of unlimited divisibility, and the odd indicates limitation; while the product of both is the unit or harmony. Similarly, do we obtain harmony in the union of positive and negative; male and female; material and immaterial; body and soul? (b) The Summum Bonum or Supreme Good in man is to become godlike. This is an attainment, or transformation which is the harmony resulting from a life of virtue. It consists in a harmonious relationship between the faculties of man, by means of which his lower nature becomes subordinated to his higher nature. 43 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook (c) The Process of Purification: the harmony and purification of the soul is attained, not only by virtue, but also by other means, the most important among them being the cultivation of the intellect through the pursuit of scientific knowledge and strict bodily discipline. In this process, music also held an important place. The Pythagoreans believed and taught that just as medicine is used to cure the body, so music must be used to cure the soul. Here it might be appropriate to insert the doctrine of the "Three Lives", since it is also a method and means of purification: "Mankind is divided into three classes: Lovers of wealth; lovers of honour, and lovers of wisdom (i.e. philosophers); this last, being highest." According to Pythagoras, philosophy determined the purification, which led to the final salvation of the soul. (iii) The Cosmological Doctrine All things are numbers, that is to say not only every object, but the entire universe is an arrangement of numbers. This means that the characteristic of any object is the number by which it is represented. (a) Since the universe consists of ten bodies, namely, the five stars, the earth and the counter earth, then the universe must be represented by the perfect number ten. (b) Applied to the space around us, but called by Pythagoreans the Boundless or Unlimited, it must be taken to mean, the measuring out of this Boundless, into a balanced and harmonious universe, so that everything might receive its proper proportion of it. No more, no less. (c) This arrangement seems to suggest the notion of forms capable of receiving a mathematical expression, i.e., a doctrine which later appeared in Plato, as the theory of Ideas. (d) In the centre of the universe there is a central fire around which the heavenly bodies fixed in their spheres, revolve from West to East, while around all there is the peripheral fire. This motion of the heavenly bodies is regulated in the velocity, and produces the harmony of the spheres. (Roger's Students' History of Philosophy p. 14–22). (Bakewell's Source Book of Philosophy) (Life and Tenets of Pythagoras). (Ruddick's History of Philosophy) (Life and Tenets of Pythagoras). (Fuller's History of Philosophy) (Life and Tenets of Pythagoras). (Turner's History of Philosophy: p. 40–43). (History of Ancient Egypt by John Kendrick vol. I p. 401-402) (Plato's Phaedo, 85E). (Aristotle's Metaphysics I 5; 985b, 24; and I 5; 986a, 23). 44 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook 3. The Eleatic Philosophers The Eleatic Philosophers include (a) Xenophanes, (b) Parmenides, (c) Zeno and (d) Melissus. They deal with the problem of change, and are credited with introducing the notions of Being and Becoming. The term Eleatic is derived from Elea, a city in Southern Italy, where these men are said only to have visited. (a) Xenophanes Born at Colophon, in Asia Minor, about 370 B.C., Xenophanes is credited with the following doctrines: (i) The Unity of God Men err when they ascribe their own characteristics to the gods: for God is all eye, all ear, and all intellect. Again, since there is no Becoming, and since Plurality depends upon Becoming, therefore there is no Plurality. Consequently all is one and one is all. (ii) Temperance Against the artificial culture of Greece, its luxuries, excess and fops; Xenophanes is credited with advocating Temperance i.e., plain living, simplicity, moderation, and pure thinking. Roger's Students' History of Philosophy: p. 27–28. Wm. Turner's History of Philosophy: p. 45–46. Zeller's History of Philosophy: p. 58–60. (b) Parmenides Is said to have been born at Elea 540 B.C. and to have composed a poem concerning nature: peri physeos, which contains his doctrines. A. The Poem consists of three parts: (i) In part one, the Goddess of truth points out that there are two paths of knowledge: one leading to a knowledge of truth, and the other to a knowledge of the opinions of men. (ii) In part two, the journey to truth is described and contains a metaphysical doctrine, and in part three, a cosmology of the apparent. B. The Doctrines are as follows: (i) The Physical Doctrine Though right reason (logos) holds that Being is one and immutable, the senses and common opinion are convinced that plurality and change exist around us. 45 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook (ii) The Doctrine of Truth Truth consists of the knowledge that Being is, and that not-Being is not: and since not-Being is not, then Being is one and alone. Consequently, Being is unproduced and unchangeable. It is impossible for Being to produce Being; for under such circumstances Being must exist before it begins to exist. (iii) The doctrine of the Cosmology of the Apparent. 1 Here Parmenides simply repeats the Pythagorean doctrine of opposites:— All things are composed of light or warmth, and of darkness or cold, and according to Aristotle, the former of these opposites corresponds to Being, while the latter to not-Being. These opposites are equivalent to the male and female principles in the cosmos. (iv) The Doctrine of the Anthropology of the Apparent The life of the soul, i.e., perception and reflexion, depends upon the blending of opposites, i.e., of the light-warm and the dark-cold principles, each of which stands in a physical relation to a corresponding principle in the cosmos. (Zeller's History of Philosophy p. 60–62). (Roger's Students' History of Philosophy p. 29–30). (William Turner's History of Philosophy p. 47–48). (B. D. Alexander's History of Philosophy p. 22–24). (c) Zeno Supposed to be born 490 B.C. at Elea was a pupil of Parmenides, according to Plato. (Parmenides 127B). His doctrines were intended to be a contradiction of (i) Motion and (ii) Plurality and space. (i) Arguments against motion: (a) A body, in order to move from one point to another, must move through an infinite number of spaces since magnitude is divisible ad infinitum. (b) A body which is in one place is at rest. An arrow in its flight is at each successive moment in one place therefore it is at rest. (c) The race between Achilles and the tortoise is intended to contradict the concept of motion. In such a race Achilles can never overtake the tortoise, because he must first reach the point at which the tortoise started; but in the meantime the tortoise will have gained more ground. Since Achilles must always reach first the position previously occupied by the tortoise, the tortoise must always keep ahead, at every point. 46 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook (ii) Arguments against Plurality and Space: (a) If a measure of corn produces a sound, then each grain ought to produce a sound. (This argument is taken from Simplicus: but ascribed to Zeno.) (b) If Being exists in space, then space itself must exist in space, and the process will have to go on ad infinitum. (This argument is also taken from Simplicus.) (c) If magnitude exists, it must be infinitely great and infinitely small, at one and the same time, since it has an infinitude of parts which are indivisible. Therefore the idea of the manifold is contradictory. (William Turner's History of Philosophy p. 49–50). (Roger's Students' History of Philosophy p. 31–32). (Zeller's History of Philosophy p. 63–64). 4. The Later Ionian School: (a) Heraclitus, (b) Anaxagoras, (c) Democritus (a) Heraclitus Believed to have been born B.C. 530, and to have died in 470 B.C. Heraclitus, a native of Ephesus, in Asia Minor, has been credited with the following doctrines: (i) The Doctrine of Universal Flux There is no static Being, and no Unchanging element. Change is Lord of the Universe. The underlying element of the universe is Fire, and all things are changed for Fire, and Fire for all things. (a) The change is not at random; but uniform, orderly and cyclic. Thus the heavenly Fires are transmuted successively, into vapour, water and earth; only to go through a similar process as they ascend again into Fire. (b) It contains the elements both of the old and new, at any given moment in the process. Consequently, where night ends, there day begins; where summer begins, there spring ends; and where mortal life ends, there spiritual life begins. (c) It also consists in the generation which results from the union of opposites (a doctrine, later to be found in Plato and Socrates). Hence we observe that the union of male and female produces organic life; and that sharp and flat notes produce harmony. 47 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook (ii) The Theory of Knowledge Since sense-knowledge, or knowledge derived from the senses is illusion, it must be avoided, and true knowledge sought for in the perception of the underlying unity of the various opposites. This is possible for man, who is part of the all comprehending Fire, which underlies the Universe. But in the doctrine of the upward and downward paths, true knowledge comes from the upward path which leads to the eternal Fire; whereas folly and death are the result of following the downward path. (iii) The Doctrine of the Logos That the hidden harmony of nature ever reproduces concord from oppositions, that the divine law (dikē) or universal reason (logos) rules all things; and that the primitive essence recomposes itself anew in all things according to fixed laws, and is again restored by them. (Zeller's History of Philosophy p. 68). (A. B. Turner's History of Philosophy p. 66–77). (Zeller's History of Philosophy p. 66–71). (William Turner's History of Philosophy p. 53–58). (b) The Life and Teachings of Anaxagoras Anaxagoras, a native of Clazomenae, in Ionia, is supposed to have been born in 500 B.C. Like all the other philosophers, nothing is known about his early life and education. He comes into history through a visit to Athens, where he met and made the friendship of Pericles, and where he was charged with impiety. He however escaped from prison and fled back to his home in Ionia where he died in 430 B.C. His doctrines included the following: (i) Nous i.e., mind alone is self-moved, and is the cause of motion in everything in the universe, and has supreme power over all things. (William Turner's History of Philosophy, p. 63); (Zeller's Hist. of Phil. p. 85; 86). (ii) Sensation is produced by the stimulation of opposites. We experience the sensation of cold, because of the heat in us, and we experience a sweet taste because of the sour in us. (Wm. Turner's Hist. of Phil. p. 64; Theophrastus: de Sensu, Fragment 27: Zeller's Hist. of Phil. p. 86). N.B. 48 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook These doctrines will be treated elsewhere, as regards their source and authorship. (C) The Life and Teachings of Democritus (1) His Life Democritus (420–316 B.C.) is said to have been the son of Hegesistratus, and also a native of Abdera, a city at Miletus, an island in the Aegean. Both Aristotle and Theophrastus have regarded Leucippus as the founder of atomism, in spite of the fact that his existence is doubted. Like all the other Greek philosophers, nothing seems to be known about his early life and training. However he enters history as a magician and sorcerer. (Burnet, op. cit. p. 350; Wm. Turner's Hist. of Phil. p. 65). (2) His Doctrines The name of Democritus has been associated with the following doctrines, summarized as atomism in his explanation of (i) the nature of the atoms, and their behavior in relation to the phenomena of (ii) creation (iii) life and death and; (iv) sensation and knowledge. (i) The Description of the Atom (a) The world-stuff. The atom is explained as a colorless, transparent and homogeneous powder, consisting of an infinite number of particles. (b) Their Qualities: The atom is described as full or solid, invisible, indestructible, un-created and capable self-motion. The atoms differ in shape, order, position, quantity and weight. (c) The Identity of the Atom with Reality: Every atom is equivalent to "that which is (i.e. To on); and the void is equivalent to "that which is not" (i.e., To mē on). Reality is the movement of "that which is," within that-which is not. (ii) The Atom in Creation. Owing to the difference in size, weight and mobility, and in particular to necessity, there is a resultant motion, by means of which the atoms combine themselves for the formation of the organic and inorganic worlds. (iii) The Atoms in the Phenomena of Life and Death. What we commonly call life and death, are due to a change in the arrangement of the atoms. When they are arranged in a certain way, life emerges; but when that arrangement is changed to another way, then death is the result. 49 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook In death, the personality disappears, the senses also disappear; but the atoms live on for ever. The heavier atoms descend to the earth: but the soul atoms, which are composed of fire, ascend to the celestial regions, whence they came. (iv) The Atom in Sensation and Knowledge (a) The Mind or Soul is composed of fire atoms, which are the finest, the smoothest, and the most mobile. These fire atoms are distributed throughout the whole universe; and in all animate things, and especially in the human body, where they are found in the largest numbers. (b) External objects constantly give off emanations or minute images of themselves. These in turn impress themselves upon our senses, which set in motion our Soul atoms, and thereby create Sensation and Knowledge. (Diogenes Laertius Book IX p. 443–455). (Wm. Turner's History of Philosophy p. 65–70). (Roger's Students History of Philosophy p. 40–42). (Zeller's History of Philosophy p. 76–83). (B. D. Alexander's History of Philosophy p. 37–41). 5. Summary of Conclusions Concerning the Pre-Socratic Philosophers and the History of the Four Qualities and Four Elements. I. The early Ionic philosophers have been given the credit of teaching the following doctrines (a) Thales, that all things originated from water, (b) Anaximander, that all things originated from Primitive matter, i.e., the boundless (to apeiron), and (c) Anaximenes, that all things get their life from air. But these ideas were not new at the time when these men are supposed to have lived, i.e., between the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. The creation story, found in the book of Genesis, speaks of the elements of water, air and earth as the cosmic ingredients of the chaos out of which creation gradually developed. The date of the Pentateuch is placed at the eighth century B.C.; but the view of the Mosaic authorship of Genesis takes us still further back into antiquity, and many centuries before the time of the Ionian philosophers. We are told not only by the bible, but also by the historian Philo, that Moses was an Initiate of the Egyptian Mysteries and became a Hierogrammat; learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptian people. This was only possible by proper initiation and gradual advancement, when evidence of fitness was demonstrated by the Neophyte. The Egyptian name of Moses was given to all candidates at their baptism, and meant "saved by water". The Exodus of the Israelites appears to have occurred in the 21st Egyptian Dynasty, i.e., 1100 B.C. in the reign of Bocchoris under the leadership of Moses, whose creation story of Genesis is clearly of Egyptian origin. It is clear that the early Ionic Philosophers drew their teachings from Egyptian sources. (Chaeremon: Jos. C. Apion I, 32; Philo; Ancient Mysteries C. H. Vail p. 61; John Kendrick's Ancient Egypt vol. 2 p. 268–270; 303; See also Dr. Hasting's Bible Dictionary, on authorship and date of Pentateuch). 50 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook II. In the case of the Eleatic philosophers, history regards Zenophanes as a Satirist, not a philosopher, and Zeno as paradoxical concerning his treatment of the problems of plurality, space and motion, which ultimately leads to a reduction ad absurdum. Parmenides introduced no new teaching when he spoke of Being (To on) as that which exists; and Non-Being (To mē on) as that which does not exist. He only reemphasized the doctrine of opposites as a principle of nature: a doctrine taught not only by the Pythagoreans, but also the Athenian philosophers, chiefly Socrates. But the doctrine of opposites owes its origin to the Egyptian Mysteries which take us back to 4000 B.C. when it was demonstrated not only by double pillars in front of temples, but also by the pairs of Gods in the Mystery System, representing male and female, positive and negative principles of nature. It is also clear that the electric Philosophers drew their teachings from Egyptian sources. (Plato Phaedo; Memphite Theology: Intellectual Adventure of Primitive Man by Frankfort p. 55; 66–67; 51–60. Plutarch: Isis et Osiris, p. 364C; 355A; 371B; 868, Ancient Egypt: John Kendrick vol. I p. 339). III. The later Ionic philosophers have been given credit for the following doctrines: (1) Heraclitus, (a) that the world was produced by fire through a process of transmutation, and (b) since all things originate from fire, then Fire is the Logos: The Creator. (2) Anaxagoras (a) the Nous or mind is the source of motion or life in the universe and that sensation is produced by the stimulation of opposites. (3) Democritus (a) that atoms under-lie all material things, and (b) that the phenomena of life and death are merely changes in the mixture of the atoms, so that the atoms never die, because they are immortal. These doctrines were by no means produced by the late Ionic philosophers, but could be shown to have originated from the Egyptian Mystery System. The Egyptians were fire worshippers, because they believed that fire was the creator of the universe, and built their great pyramids (pyr = fire) in order to worship the God of Fire, and the pyramid age goes back to something like 3300 B.C., several thousands of years before the Greeks were said to have come into the Mediterranean area. According to Jamblichus the Egyptian God Ptah was the God of order and form in creation, an Intellectual Principle. This God was also recognized as the Divine Artificer who fashioned the universe out of fire. (Rosellini: mon del sults; John Kendrick's Ancient Egypt vol. I p. 318.). Furthermore, Swinburne Clymer in his Philosophy of Fire p. 18 has made the following statement "The study of the Mysteries of Isis and Osiris (Egyptian Goddess and God) quickly proves to the student that it was a pure Fire Philosophy. Zoroaster carried those mysteries into Greece, while Orpheus carried them into Thrace. 51 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook In each of these places, these Egyptian mysteries assumed the names of different Gods in order to be adapted to local conditions. Hence in Asia they took the form of Mithra: in Samothrace, the form of the Mother of the Gods; in Boeotia, the form of Bacchus; in Crete, the form of Jupiter; in Athens, the forms of Ceres and Proserpine. The most noted of these Egyptian imitations were the Orphic, Bacchic, Eleusinian, Samothracian, and Mithraic. All of these Fire Worshippers, believed that the universe originated from Fire, and they lived at a time which antedated the time of the late Ionic philosophers by thousands of years. The other doctrines of the later Ionic philosophers together with those of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle will be treated under Summaries of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle and in Chapter VIII, and will include (1) Opposites (2) The nous or mind (3) The Logos, (4) The Atom, (5) The Theory of Ideas, (6) The Unmoved Mover, (7) Immortality. IV. The Greek Philosophers practised plagiarism. The teachings of Pythagoras seem to have been so comprehensive that nearly all his successors embraced and taught a portion of his doctrine, which we are told he obtained by frequent visits which he made to Egypt for the purpose of his education. Two things are at once obvious, (1) that the Greek philosophers practiced plagiarism and did not teach anything new and (2) the source of their teachings was the Egyptian Mystery System, either directly through contact with Egypt, or indirectly through Pythagoras or tradition. These facts can now be further demonstrated by an outline of the doctrines of Pythagoras, with the names of philosophers who repeated his doctrines: 1. The Doctrine of Opposites: the unit of number is composed both of odd and even elements; of the finite and infinite; and of the positive and negative. In this connection, we find (a) Heraclitus suggesting fire to be the source of creation, by means of the principle of strife which separates phenomena; and harmony which restores them to their original source. (William Turner's History of Philosophy p. 55; Zeller's Hist. of Phil. p. 67–68). (b) Parmenides, suggesting Being as existent and Non-Being as non-existent (Zeller's Hist. of Phil. p. 61; Turner's Hist. of Phil. p. 48). (c) Socrates, attempting to prove the immortality of the Soul by the doctrine of opposites (Plato Phaedo). (d) Plato, attempting to explain nature, used the Theory of Ideas which he based upon the principle of opposites. Consequently the Idea is true reality, i.e., Being (To on); hence the concept is real; but the thing which is known by the concept is unreal. The noumen is real and perfect; but the phenomenon is unreal and imperfect (Parmenides 132D; Aristotle Meta 16, 987b9). (e) Aristotle in attempting to establish the existence of God, describes the divine attributes in terms of opposites. God is the First Mover that is unmoved (proton kinoûn akineton). Hence, we have a combination of motion and rest, as the attributes of Deity and Nature. (Aristotle's physics VIII 5, 256a; II 1; 192b 14; II 8, 199; de caelo I 4, 271a; Wm. Turner's Hist. of Phil. p. 141). 52 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook 2. The Doctrine of Harmony, as a union of opposites, after being expounded by Pythagoras, appears also in the systems of (a) Heraclitus, who explains the phenomena of nature as passing successively through their opposites; (b) Socrates, who also defines harmony as the union of opposites; (c) Plato, who defines the harmony of the soul as the proper subordination of its parts, i.e., the higher and lower natures. (Turner's Hist. of Phil. p. 41; 56; Zeller's Hist. of Phil. p. 51; 69; Plato Phaedo C 15; Plato Republic); also (d) Aristotle, who defines the soul as a harmony in his de animo I. 2. 3. The Central and Peripheral Fires. Here Pythagoras attempts to show that fire under-lies creation, and this same notion is expressed by (a) Heraclitus, who speaks of the origin of the universe through the transformation of fire. Then we have (b) Anaxagoras (c) Democritus (d) Socrates and (e) Plato, each using the term mind (nous) as responsible for creation. Anaxagoras and Socrates who speak directly of mind (nous) as an Intelligence and purpose behind nature; while Democritus and Plato speak of mind (nous) indirectly as the World Soul, but further describe it as being composed of fire atoms floating throughout space. Clearly then, Mind (nous), no matter what other name or function we give it, is fire, since it is composed of fire atoms; and fire according to Pythagoras underlies creation. (Wm. Turner's Hist. of Phil. p. 42, 55, 63, 82; Zeller's Hist. of Phil. p. 53, 67, 76–83; Aristotle: Metaphysics I, 3, 984b, 17; Diogenes Laertius: Bk. X. p. 443–453; Xenophon Memorabilia I, 4, 2; Plato Timaeus: 30, 35; Roger's Student Hist. of Phil. p. 40–42; B. D. Alexander's Hist. of Phil. p. 43). 4. Immortality of the Soul. According to Pythagoras, the doctrine of the immortality of the Soul is implied in the doctrine of the Transmigration of the Soul: A. Socrates: The purpose of philosophy is the salvation of the Soul, whereby it feeds upon the truth congenial to its divine nature and thus escapes from the wheel of rebirth, and finally attains the consummation of unity with God. (Zeller's Hist. of Phil. p. 50–56; Roger's Hist. of Phil. p. 29 and 60; William Turner's Hist. of Phil. p. 41 and 48). B. Plato's doctrines (1) Transmigration and (2) Recollection: (1) Transmigration: the souls of men go to the place of reward or punishment, and after one thousand years they are permitted to choose a new lot of life. He who has thrice chosen the higher life, gains after three thousand years, the home of the Gods in the kingdom of thought. Others wander about for thousands of years in various bodies; and many are destined to pursue their earthly life in lower animal forms. It is necessary to point out that in this doctrine of Transmigration; Plato describes the judgment scene in the Egyptian Book of the Dead. (2) Recollection: although the sense perceived world cannot lead us to a knowledge of Ideas, yet it reminds us of the Ideas which we saw in a previous existence. (The allegory of the Subterranean Cavern; Plato's Republic C. X; The Allegory of the slave boy; Plato's Meno; Timaeus of Plato: 31B, 33B; 38E; The Phaedo of Plato: C 15; 29; 57; Wm. Turner's Hist. of Phil. P. 105–112; B. D. Alexander's Hist. of Phil. p. 55; 152–153). 53 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook 5. Summum Bonum According to Pythagoras, the supreme good in man is to become godlike. This transformation is to be accomplished by virtue which is a union of opposites in man's faculties, i.e., the subordination of man's lower nature to his higher nature. (Zeller's Hist. of Phil. p. 43). But the precise purpose of the Egyptian Mysteries was to make a man godlike by the purificatory agencies of education and virtue. Consequently it is clear that Pythagoras obtained this doctrine directly from the Egyptian Mysteries. Hence it also follows that philosophers who have taught this doctrine, must have obtained it, either directly from the Egyptian Mysteries, or indirectly, through the teachings of Pythagoras. (According to Sallust, Deification or becoming godlike was the purpose of the Egyptian Mysteries, and according to C. H. Vail in his Ancient Mysteries, the Egyptian Summum Bonum consisted of five stages, during which the Neophyte developed from a good man into a triumphant Master, attaining the highest spiritual consciousness by means of casting off the ten bodily fetters and becoming an adept like Horus or Buddha or Christ). The philosophers, besides Pythagoras, who are given credit with having taught the doctrine of the Supreme Good, are (a) Socrates, who defined it as an attainment in which man becomes godlike, through self-denial and the cultivation of the mind. (Xenophon Memorabilia I, 5, 4,) (b) Plato who defined it as happiness which is the attainment of the Idea of the Good, which is God. (Plato: Symposium 204E; Plato: Republic IV, 441, 443; Plato: Phaedo 64 sqq; Plato: Theaetetus 176 A). (c) Aristotle; who defined it as happiness which is based upon reason and which includes all the gifts of fortune. It should be noted however that Aristotle's definition of the Supreme Good marks the first departure from the concept of the Summum Bonum of the Egyptian Mysteries; and the same thing is true of the Hedonists, who defined it as pleasure. (Wm. Turner's Hist. of Phil. p. 153. Aristotle Ethics, Nic I, 6, 1097; Aristotle Ethics, Nic I, 9, 1099a, 31) The conception of a Supreme Good is Egyptian, from which source Pythagoras and other philosophers obtained the doctrine. V. Summary of Conclusions Concerning Democritus Because of the importance of the doctrine of the atom, and the great suspicion of his great number of books like that of Aristotle, Democritus is treated separately, like each of the Athenian philosophers. 1. His Life: The same thing might be said of Democritus as might be said of any of the men who were called Greek philosophers: nothing appears to be known about his early life and training. However he comes into history attracting public attention, as a sorcerer and magician. (Turner's Hist. of Phil. p. 65). 54 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook 2. His Doctrines and Authorship: (i) Authorship: The authorship of the doctrine of the atom is doubtful, from the standpoint or view of certain modern writers. The names of the Ionians Leucippus and Democritus have been associated with this doctrine, which according to the opinion of Aristotle and Theophrastus, originated through Leucippus, but was developed by Democritus. As a matter of fact, the Ionians doubted the existence of Leucippus because he was unknown to them; and it seems proper that the opinion of the Ionians should receive credence rather than that of Aristotle and Theophrastus, who were Athenians, and who were compiling philosophy in the interest of their movement. (Burnet op. cit. p. 350; Turner's Hist. of Phil. p. 65). (ii) The doctrine concerning the Atom is eclectic. The doctrine of the atom as explained by Democritus, is eclectic, and represents one of the many forms in which the ancient doctrine of opposites has been expressed. The Pythagoreans expressed it by the elements of number: odd and even. Parmenides being unfamiliar with the law of generation, denied the existence of one opposite (not-Being), in order to affirm the existence of the other (being). Socrates, being more acquainted with the law of generation than Parmenides, expressed it in several pairs of opposites, in an effort to prove the immortality of the soul: hence he spoke of unity and duality; of division and composition; of life and death. In like manner Democritus expressed the doctrine of opposites, when he described Reality by the life of the atom, i.e., a movement of "that which is" (To on) within "that which is not" (To mē on). The original source of this doctrine however, is the philosophy of the Mystery System of Egypt where we find the male and female principles of nature symbolized by (a) Osiris and Isis: the Egyptian God and Goddess, and (b) the Gods Homs and Seth, symbolizing a world in static equilibrium of conflicting forces, as they contend for dominion over Egypt. (Memphite Theology; Kingship and the Gods by Frankfort C. 3, p. 25–26; 35; Herodotus I, 6–26; Ancient Egypt by John Kendrick Bk. I p. 339; Egyptian Religion by Frankfort, p. 64, 73 and 88; Zeller's Hist. of Phil. p. 61; Wm. Turner's Hist. of Phil. p. 41; Plato Phaedo C. 15, 16, 49). The doctrine and philosophy of opposites is further demonstrated by the Egyptian Creation story, in which Order came out of Chaos and which was represented by four pairs of opposites i.e., male and female gods. (a) Nun and Naunet i.e., primeval Matter and Space. (b) Huk and Hauket i.e., Illimitable and the Boundless. (c) Huh and Hauhet, i.e., Darkness and Obscurity. (d) Amon and Amaunet, i.e., the hidden and concealed ones (the Air, Wind). 55 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook Clearly the doctrine of opposites was a basic philosophy of the Egyptians, being connected with not only the Gods of their Mystery dramas, but with their Cosmology, and since this connection makes the doctrine one of the earliest in the development of Egyptian thought, it antedates the reign of Menes, and means that the Egyptians were familiar with it before 3000 B.C. Under these circumstances and in consequence of these facts, the Egyptian Mystery System was the source of the doctrines (a) of the atom and (b) of opposites. Leucippus and Democritus taught nothing new and must have obtained their knowledge of the doctrines from the Egyptians, directly or indirectly. (iii) The Doctrines of the universal distribution of fire atoms, and their emanation from external objects are derived from Magic These doctrines are magical and express the magical principle "that the qualities of animals or things are distributed throughout all their parts." (Dr. Frazer's Golden Bough). Consequently within the universe contact is established between objects through emanations, and in the case of human beings, the result might be sensation or cognition; healing or contagion. This principle is demonstrated not only by the cures such as were affected by the garment of Christ, and the handkerchiefs of St. Paul: but also by the modern scientific and medical practice of the preventive measure of quarantine. It must be remembered that magic was part of the education of the Egyptian priests: for the religious rites and ceremonies of the Egyptians were magical; and the priests were the custodians of the knowledge. (iv) A fourth point is the fact that in the history and compilation of Greek philosophy by Aristotle and his followers, there are only two men whose names are associated with the authorship of an extraordinary number of scientific books; and the names of these men are Democritus himself and Aristotle. (Diogenes Laertius Bk. 9 p. 445–461; Bk. 5 p. 465–467). (v) A fifth point which deserves important mention is the fact that in the history and compilation of Greek philosophy by Aristotle and his followers, it has been discovered that wherever there has been the possession of a large collection of scientific books, there has also been direct or indirect association with Alexander the Great. (vi) The association between Democritus and Alexander the Great is seen through the Democritean Circle; a succession of Teachers and students, from a common original Teacher:— Democritus (420–316 B.C.) is said to have taught Metrodorus of Chios, who in turn is said to have taught Anaxarchus, who is said to have flourished at the time of the 110th Olympiad (340– 337 B.C.), and to have accompanied Alexander the Great on his campaign against Egypt 333 B.C. 56 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook Here, it is easy to see the tie between Democritus and Anaxarchus for these men were all Ionians, and members of the same school and were alive at the time of Alexander's Conquest of Egypt. (Zeller's Hist. of Phil. p. 83; Diogenes Laertius Bk. 2, p. 471). On the other hand, Aristotle's contact with Alexander the Great is well known, since he was a tutor of the young prince, at the Macedonian palace. Roger's Student Hist. of Phil. p. 104). (vii) Circumstantial evidence points to the fact that the books of Democritus were not written by him, nor did they contain his teachings. This is so, for the following reasons: (a) Leucippus, whom the Ionians did not know, and whose existence has been questioned, has been given credit by Aristotle for the origin of the doctrine of the atom. (Zeller's Hist. of Phil. p. 77; Burnet, op. cit. p. 350) (Wm. Turner's Hist. of Phil. P. 65; Diogenes Bk. X, 13). (b) Apart from what was written on the Atom, the name of Democritus is, associated with a large list of books, dealing with over sixty different subjects, and covering all the branches of science known to the ancient world. In addition to this vast field of knowledge, the list also contains books on Military Science, Law and Magic. Clearly, the accumulation of such a vast range of knowledge, by a single individual, written in a single lifetime is impossible both physically and mentally. The method among the ancients of imparting knowledge was by gradual stages, followed by evidence of proficiency, which in turn was also followed by initiations, which marked every step in the progress of the Neophyte. The progress of training was slow and no Neophyte could accomplish such knowledge in his life time as took the Egyptians over five thousand years to accumulate. These human limitations are as true today as they were among the ancients; for our great scientists of the Modern World are specialists only in single subjects. (c) The question now remains: how did Democritus accumulate those books if he did not write them? We believe we have the answer because it has been noticed in the history of Greek philosophy that (a) wherever a Greek philosopher has had association, direct or indirect, with Alexander the Great, there was also the possession of a large collection of scientific books, and (b) this is true in the cases of Democritus and Aristotle. (c) Anaxarchus and Democritus were Ionians, who belonged to the same school and (d) Anaxarchus accompanied Alexander the Great on his campaign against Egypt. (the indirect association between Democritus and Alexander the Great now becomes obvious.) (e) It follows that since Alexander's conquest of Egypt had brought the Greeks their long hoped for opportunity, i.e., access to the Egyptian Library and Museum, we would naturally expect Alexander and his friends, and the invading armies to have helped themselves with the Egyptian books. 57 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook We would also expect Anaxarchus upon his return to Ionia, to have sold, at least a portion of his loot, to Democritus, (nor do we expect Aristotle and Theophrastus to relate these facts to us), since under the rules of the Mysteries, knowledge (spoken or written,) could be diffused only by brethren among brethren. This we believe is the way Democritus came to possess such a large number of scientific books. Again it must be stated that Democritus taught nothing new, but simply what he had learnt from the Egyptians, directly or indirectly. His doctrine on the universal distribution of fire atoms is based upon a magical principle: if the atom is an ingredient of the world, then it would be universally distributed. Furthermore, Democritus enters history as a magician, and since there is historical evidence that he visited the Egyptian priests, it is evident that magic was part of the training which he must have received from them. (Antisthenes: Treatise on Succession; Herodotus; Origen; Diogenes Laertius: Bk. 9 p. 443; Zeller's Hist. of Phil. p. 77). 3. His Books are doubtful in authorship Several important facts must be noted in connection with the books which are said to have been written by Democritus: (a) A large number of books which appears in a list in the 9th Book of Diogenes, Laertius, does not appear elsewhere in the usual textbooks on the history of Greek Philosophy; while Zeller asserts that the genuineness of these books cannot be determined upon the evidence of the fragments. (Zeller's Hist. of Phil. p. 77). It seems that his list of publications remains doubtful in authorship. (b) More than 60 different subjects are treated and they include Ethics, Physics, Astronomy, Botany, Zoology, Poetry, Medicine, Dialectics, Military Science, and Law; also books on Magic, including divination. (c) We are informed by Diogenes Laertius that this large list of books was compiled by Thrasyllus (about 20 A.D.) who was a student of the school of Plato, and also a member of Aristotle's movement, which had for its purpose, the compilation of Greek philosophy. (Zeller's Hist. of Phil. p. 13–14) (Diogenes Laertius Bk. 9 p. 455–461). 58 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook VI. The Four Qualities and Four Elements The history of the following ancient theory of "The Four Qualities and Four Elements", provides the world with the evidence of the Egyptian origin of the doctrines of (a) Opposites or Contraries, (b) Change or Transmutation and (c) the life and function of the universe is due to either of four elements: fire, or water, or earth or air. 1. This ancient theory was expressed by a diagram formed by outer and inner squares. 2. The corners of the outer square carried the names of the elements: fire, water, earth and air. 3. The corners of the inner square, being at the mid points of the sides of the outer square, carried the four fundamental qualities, the hot, the dry, the cold and the wet. 4. The diagram explains that fire is hot and dry; earth is dry and cold; water is cold and wet; and air is wet and hot. 5. Accordingly water is an embodiment of cold and wet qualities, and when the cold quality is replaced by the hot quality, the element water is changed into the element air, with the wet and hot qualities. 6. Consequently, transmutation is definitely implied in the teaching of this symbol. 7. It is the oldest teaching of physical science and has been traced to the Egyptians, as far back as 5000 B.C. 59 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook 8. It shows that Plato and Aristotle (who had been credited with the authorship of this teaching) derived their doctrines or portions of them from the Egyptians. (Rosicrucian Digest, May 1952, p. 175). CHAPTER VI: The Athenian Philosophers 1. Socrates: (i) His Life (ii) Doctrines (iii) Summary of Conclusions (I) Life of Socrates (a) Date and place of birth Socrates was born in Athens, in the year 469 B.C. He was the son of Sophroniscus, a sculptor, and Phaenarete, a midwife. Very little is known about his early years; but we are told that he was brought up in the profession of his father, and that he called himself not only a pupil of Prodicus and Aspasia, (which statement suggests that he might have learnt from them, music, geometry and gymnastics): but also a self taught philosopher, according to Xenophon in the Symposium. Up to the age of 40, his life appears to be a complete blank: the first mention being made of him, when he served as an ordinary soldier in the sieges of Potidaea and Delium between (432–429) B.C. (Trial and Death of Socrates: F. J. Church: p. 15 of Introduction). (b) His economic status and personality Socrates did not accept fees for what he taught, and he became so poor, that his wife Xanthippe became very dissatisfied with domestic conditions. He believed that he possessed (Daimonion Ti) a divine something, i.e., a divine voice which advised and guided him in the great crises of his life. (Turner's Hist. of Phil. p. 78–79; and Plato's Apology). (c) His Condemnation and death in 399 B.C. After the accustomed speeches of the accusers: (Miletus, Anytus and Lycon); Socrates followed with his defense, at the conclusion of which, the judges voted 281 to 220, and Socrates was condemned to death. As a parting word, he addressed himself both to those who voted against him and those who voted in his favor. In the case of the former, he rebuked them by predicting that evil would befall them, in consequence of their crime in condemning him. 60 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook In the case of the latter, he not only consoled them with the assurance that no evil could come to a good man either in life or in death; but also expressed to them his idea about immortality. "Death is either an eternal and dreamless sleep, wherein there is no sensation at all; or it is a journey to another, and a better world, where are the famous men of old". Whichever alternative be true, death is not an evil, but a good. His death is willed by the gods, and he is content. (Plato's Apology Chapters 25–28). His death was delayed through a state religious ceremonial, and he remained in prison for 30 days. We are told that during this time, he was visited by his friends, who consisted of the inner circle, and also his wife Xanthippe; that this was the occasion of his discourse concerning the immortality of the soul; that he could have escaped from death if he wished; because his friends visited him before day-break and offered to set him free; but that he refused the offer. Accordingly Socrates drank the hemlock and died. (Plato Phaedo;) (Xenophon Memorabilia IV, 8, 2). (d) Crito's account: Crito, on the night before the death of Socrates, while he was in prison, on behalf of the company of visitors, made a final appeal to him to permit them to secure his escape, and spoke as follows: "O, my Socrates, I beseech you for the last time to listen to me and save yourself. For to me your death will be more than a single disaster: not only shall I lose a friend the like of whom I shall never find again, but many persons, who do not know you and me well, will think that I might have saved you, if I had been willing to spend money, but that I neglected to do so. And what character could be more disgraceful than the character of caring more for money than for one's friends? The world will never believe that we were anxious to save you, but that you yourself refused to escape. "Tell me this Socrates. Surely you are not anxious about me and your other friends, and afraid, lest, if you escape, the informers should say that we stole you away, and get us into trouble, and involve us in a great deal of expense, or perhaps in the loss of all our property, and it may be, bring some other punishment upon us besides? If you have any fear of that kind, dismiss it. "For of course we are bound to run those risks, and still greater risks than those if necessary, in saving you. So do not, I beseech you, refuse to listen to me." Then Socrates replied: "I am anxious about that, Crito, and about much besides," and Crito continued the appeal: "Then have no fear on that score. There are men who, for no very large sum, are ready to bring you out of prison into safety, and then, you know, these informers are cheaply bought, and there will be no need to spend much on them. 61 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook "My fortune is at your disposal, and I think that it is sufficient, and if you have any feeling about making use of my money, there are strangers in Athens, whom you know, ready to use theirs, and one of them, Simmias of Thebes, who actually brought enough for the purpose. And Cebes and many others, are ready too. "And therefore, I repeat, do not shrink from saving yourself, on that ground. And do not let what. you said in court (that if you went into exile, you would not know what to do with yourself), stand in your way: for there are many places for you to go to, where you will be welcomed. "If you choose to go to Thessaly, I have friends there who will make much of you, and shelter you from any annoyance from the people of Thessaly. "Consider then, Socrates; or rather the time for consideration is past; we must resolve, and there is only one plan possible. Everything must be done tonight. If we delay any longer, we are lost. "O, Socrates, I implore you not to refuse to listen to me." (Plato's Crito C. 3–5). (e) Phaedo's account of the final scene just before the death of Socrates. In answer to another question from Echecrates, Phaedo replied: I will try to tell you the whole story: "On the previous days, I and the others had always met in the morning at the court, where the trial was held, which was close to the prison; and then we would go in to Socrates. "We used to wait each morning until the prison was opened, conversing; for it was not opened early. When it was opened we used to go in to Socrates, and we generally spent the whole day with him. But on that morning we met earlier than usual, for the evening before we had learnt, on leaving the prison, that the ship had arrived from Delos. So we arranged to be at the usual place as early as possible. When we reached the prison, the porter, who generally let us in came out to us and bade us wait a little, and not to go in until he himself summoned us; for the 'Eleven' were releasing Socrates from his fetters and giving him directions for his death. "In no great while he returned and bade us enter. So we went in and found Socrates just released. When Xanthippe saw us, she wailed aloud, and cried in her woman's way: 'This is the last time: Socrates, that you will talk with your friends, or they with you.' And Socrates glanced at Crito and said, 'Crito, let her be taken home'. So some of Crito's servants led her away; weeping bitterly and beating her breasts. And it was about sunset, and the servant of the Eleven after bidding Socrates farewell, gave him the instructions as to how to take the poison, and then handed it to him. Socrates took the cup, and drank the poison cheerfully, and then walked about until his legs felt heavy. 62 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook And when he had lain down, he made his last request to Crito in the following words: I owe a cock to Asclepius, do not forget to pay it. By this time the poison took effect and he passed away." (Plato Phaedo C. 3 and 65). (ii) The Doctrines of Socrates i. The doctrine of Nous, i.e., mind or an Intelligent Cause, in order to account for God and Creation. He is credited with the teleological premise: whatever exists for a useful purpose is the work of an Intelligence. (Xenophon Memorabilia I, 4, 2; Wm. Turner's Hist. of Phil. p. 82). ii. The Doctrine of the Supreme Good: The Supreme good i.e., the summum bonum is equated both with happiness and with knowledge. This however is not merely eutuchia which depends upon external conditions and accidents of fortune; but is (eupraxia), a well-being, which is conditioned by good action. This is an attainment in which man becomes godlike through self denial of external needs and the cultivation of the mind: for happiness comes not through the perishable things of the external world, but through the things that endure, which are within us. (Xenophon Memorabilia I, 5, 4.) Wm. Turner's Hist. of Phil. p. 83). iii. The Doctrines of Opposites and Harmony: (a) Odd and even are the elements of numbers. One is definite but the other is unlimited, and the unit is the product both of odd and even. Hence the universe consists of opposites: the finite and the infinite, the male and the female; the odd and the even; the left and right. (b) Harmony is the Union of Opposites (Plato's Phaedo C. 15; Wm. Turner's Hist. of Phil. p. 41; 47). (Zeller's Hist. of Phil. p. 61). iv. The Doctrines Concerning the Soul: (a) The Immortality of the Soul (b) The Transmigration of the Soul (c) The Salvation of the Soul: 63 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook The purpose of philosophy is the salvation of the Soul, whereby it feeds upon the truth congenial to its divine nature, and thus escapes from the wheel of re-birth, and finally attains the consummation of unity with God. (Zeller's Hist. of Phil. p. 50–56; Roger's Hist. of Phil. p. 29 and 60; Wm. Turner's Hist. of Phil. p. 41 and 48). (d) The body is the tomb of the Soul (e) The aspirations of the Soul: There is a realm of true reality, which is above the world of sense. To this the Soul aspires. v. The Doctrine of Self-Knowledge: Know Thyself (seauton gnothi). Self-knowledge is the basis of true knowledge. The Mysteries required as a first step, the mastery of the passions, which made room for the occupation of unlimited powers. Hence, as a second step, the Neophyte was required to search within himself for the new powers which had taken possession of him. The Egyptians consequently wrote on their temples: "Man, know thyself". (Zeller's Hist. of Phil. p. 105; S. Clymer's Fire Philosophy p. 203). vi. Astrology and Geology: There was a suspicion that Socrates was also engaged in the study of Astrology and Geology, and that he taught these subjects, for in his defense before the Athenian judges, he stated that the more formidable of his accusers tried to persuade them with lies, that one Socrates, a wise man, was speculating about the heavens and about things beneath the earth, and that he was capable of making the worse appear the better reason. (Plato's Apology C. 2). This suspicion is further supported by the indictment brought against Socrates, and which reads as follows:—"Miletus, the son of Miletus, of the deme Pitthis, on his oath, brings the following accusation against Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus, of the deme Alopece. "Socrates commits a crime by not believing in the gods of the city, and by introducing new divinities. He also commits a crime by corrupting the youth. Penalty, death."(Plato's Apology C. 24; C. 18 and 19). 64 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook There is still a third source from which the suspicion arose that Socrates was engaged also in Astrology and Geology. This was the caricature of Socrates, published by Aristophanes in his comedy: the Clouds, as follows: "Socrates is a miserable recluse, who speaks a great deal of absurd and amusing nonsense about Physics, and declares that Zeus is dethroned, that Rotation reigns in his stead, and that the new divinities are Air, which holds the earth suspended, Ether, the Clouds and Tongue. "He professes to possess the power of Belial, which enables him to make the worse appear the better reason, and his teachings cause children to beat their parents." (Aristophanes Clouds, 828 and 380; Life and Trial of Socrates; F. J. Church: Introduction p. 18). (iii) Summary of Conclusions 1. Life and Personality of Socrates There are two circumstances in the life of Socrates which demand our attention: (a) he is said to have been completely unknown up to the age of 40 and (b) to have lived a life of poverty. These circumstances point to secrecy in training, and poverty as conditions of his life; and as such, they coincide with the requirements of the Mystery System of Egypt, and her secret schools, whether in the land of Egypt or abroad, which exacted the vows of secrecy and poverty from all Neophytes and Initiates. All aspirants of the Mysteries had to receive secret training and preparation, and Socrates was no exception. He alone of the three Athenian philosophers deserves the appellation of a true Master Mason. Plato was a great coward and Aristotle was greater still. At the execution of Socrates, Plato fled to Megara to the lodge of Euclid, and Aristotle when indicted fled in exile to Calchis. (Clement of Alexandria: Stromata Bk. 5. C. 7 and 9; Plutarch on "Isis and Osiris" Sec. 9–11; Plato's Apology C. 8; 17; Phaedo C. 10; 13; 32; 63). 2. The Doctrines: (i) The Doctrine of the Nous or an Intelligent Cause With reference to this doctrine, we find that it is also credited to Anaxagoras, who is said to have lived between 500 and 430 B.C. and who therefore antedated Socrates (469–399 B.C.) in expounding it (Wm. Turner's Hist. of Phil. p. 63; p. 82). Secondly, further examination shows that the doctrine of the Nous is also a direct inference from the doctrine of Cognition, as credited to Democritus (460–360 B.C.), who is credited with stating that fire atoms are distributed through the universe, and that mind is composed of fire atoms. Therefore it can be inferred (a) that mind fills or is distributed through the universe and (b) since only like can produce like, then the mind of the Universe must have been produced by a mind which is its source. (Wm. Turner's Hist. of Phil. p. 68; Zeller's Hist. of Phil. p. 80). 65 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook Thirdly, this doctrine of the Nous, is a doctrine that originated from the ancient mysteries of Egypt, where the God Osiris was represented in all Egyptian temples by the symbol of an Open Eye. This symbol indicated not only sight that transcends time and space, but also the omniscience of God, as the great mind which created and which directs the Universe. This symbol is carried as a decoration in all modern Masonic lodges and has the same meaning. (Ancient Mysteries: C. H. Vail p. 189). (ii) The Doctrine of the Supreme Good This doctrine of the supreme good or summum bonum is likewise a very ancient doctrine which takes us back to the Egyptian mysteries. As stated in the books on Greek philosophy and by Socrates, it is only in part, and consequently a mistaken notion of the original doctrine has resulted. To say that the supreme good is happiness, that happiness is well-being, that well-being is knowledge, and that knowledge is virtue, is the same thing as saying that the Supreme Good is virtue. (Xenophon Memorabilia I 4, 5; Wm. Turner's Hist. of Phil. p. 81–83). In the Egyptian mysteries, however, the concept of the supreme good is expressed as the purpose of virtue, and that is the salvation of the soul, by liberating it from the ten bodily fetters. This process of liberation is a process of purification both of mind and of body: the former by the study of philosophy and science, and the latter by bodily ascetic disciplines. This training was continued from the baptism of water, and was subsequently followed by the baptism of fire, when the candidate had made the necessary progress. This process transformed man and made him godlike, and fitted him for union with God. The concept of the Supreme Good, which originally came from the Egyptian Mysteries is the earliest theory of salvation: and Socrates must have derived this doctrine from that source, or indirectly from the Pythagoreans. (Plato's Phaedo C. 31; 33–34; Ancient Mysteries, C. H. Vail p. 24–25; Fire Philosophy, R. S. Clymer p. 19; 74; 80). (iii) The Following Doctrines are Generally admitted as having been derived from The Pythagoreans: (a) Transmigration of the Soul (b) The immortality of the Soul (c) The tomb of the Soul is the body. (d) The doctrines of opposites and harmony. 66 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook Since doctrines (a), (b), (c) and (d) originated from the Pythagoreans, and since the Pythagoreans derived them from the Egyptians, then their Egyptian origin, directly or indirectly becomes evident. (Roger's Hist. of Phil. p. 29 and 60; Turner's Hist. of Phil. p. 41 and 48; Plato's Phaedo). (iv) Astrology and Geology: From (a) the indictment (b) his defense before the Athenian Judges and (c) the caricature by Aristophanes in the Clouds, we discover that Socrates was suspected of being a student of Nature, and of introducing new divinities into Athens. Again it must be stated, that under the Mystery System of Egypt, the study of Nature was a requirement, and since the Athenians prosecuted and condemned Socrates to death, for engaging in this study and spreading the knowledge, they must have regarded the new ideas as foreign or of Egyptian origin. (Plato's Apology C. 24–28; Ancient Mysteries, C. H. Vail p. 24–25). (v) The Doctrine of Self-knowledge: The doctrine of self-knowledge, for centuries attributed to Socrates is now definitely known to have originated from the Egyptian Temples, on the outside of which the words "Man, know thyself" were written. It is evident that Socrates taught nothing new, because his doctrines are eclectic containing elements from Anaxagoras, Democritus, Heraclitus, Parmenides and Pythagoras, and finally have been traced to the teachings of the Egyptian Mystery System. (Fire Philosophy, S. R. Clymer p. 203). (vi) The Importance of the Farewell Conversations of Socrates with his pupils and friends at the prison: In examining what took place during the farewell conversations of Socrates with his pupils and friends, at least five points should be noted: (a) The subject of the Conversations (b) The determination of his friends to smuggle him away (c) His refusal to accept liberation (d) His dying request, which was addressed to Crito, whom he asked to pay an important debt for him (e) The value of those conversations, in their present form in literature. Now the question arises, what is the meaning and significance of these five points? The answers and conclusions are as follows:— (a) As the subject of the conversations dealt with the immortality and salvation of the Soul, we at once recognize the fact that this was the central theme of the Ancient Mysteries, and consequently that Socrates was acquainted with the doctrines. 67 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook Moreover, when we read the Phaedo and the doctrines, both of Opposites and Recollection which he had advanced in proof of immortality, we are convinced that he must have received his training from the Mystery System of Egypt, in connection with which there were Hierophants and qualified teachers. (b) Secondly, in dealing with the behavior of his friends, in their determination to smuggle him away, we are dealing with their attempt to render help to a brother in distress. This was the life that Initiates were expected to live, for brotherhood was another great principle upon which, the Egyptian Mysteries laid emphasis. Evidently, Socrates was a "Brother Initiate" of the Egyptian Mysteries, since it comprised one universal brotherhood. (c) Thirdly, in dealing with the refusal of Socrates to accept liberation, again we are dealing with a type of behaviour, which singles him out as an advanced Initiate of the ancient mysteries of Egypt. In the paths to mastery and victory, the Mystery System regarded unselfishness or sacrifice as an advanced stage of attainment, which must be accomplished before unlimited power could be bestowed upon the candidate. It is true that Anaxagoras escaped for his life and in like manner Plato and Aristotle; but this only serves to show that Socrates had reached a higher degree in the Mysteries than all of them. This necessitated training and the training centre was Egypt. (d) Fourthly, with reference to the dying request of Socrates, addressed to Crito, in which he asked him to pay a certain debt, we again encounter another of the great ideals essential to the life of an Initiate. This in the teaching of the Mysteries embraces the exercise of a cardinal virtue i.e., justice; a practice which the Candidate must adopt, in order that his sense of value might also develop. Here again the action of Socrates reveals that he was a Brother Initiate, with a high sense of justice and honesty, since he did not wish to die without discharging all his obligations. Certainly, the dying request of Socrates reveals him as a loyal member of the Mystery System of Egypt. (e) Fifthly and finally, what value may we attach to the literature which deals with the farewell conversations of Socrates with his friends and pupils? Since this literature embraces a man whose beliefs and practices coincide with those of the Initiates of the ancient mysteries of Egypt, then we may regard the study of Xenophon's Memorabilia, Plato's Apology, the Phaedo, Euthyphro, Crito and Timaeus as valuable specimens of literature of the Mysteries, or Masonic World. (Ancient Mysteries; C. H. Vail C. 24–25; also C. 32). (The Phaedo of Plato; The Timaeus of Plato). (R. S. Clymer; Fire Philosophy C. 44; 49; 67; 75). 68 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook 2. Plato: (i) Early Life (ii) Travels (iii) Disputed Writings (iv) His Doctrines (v) Summary of Conclusions. (i) His Early Life: Plato is said to have been born at Athens in 427 B.C., and that his father's name was Aristo, and his mother's name was Perictione, who was a relative of Solon. Little information is known about his early life and training: but there is a supposition that because his parents were wealthy, he must have had such educational opportunities as were available to a wealthy youth. He is said to have studied the doctrines of Heraclitus under Cratylus, and to have been a pupil of Socrates for eight years. It is also said that he was a soldier. (Roger's Student Hist. of Philosophy p. 76) (Wm. Turner's Hist. of Philosophy p. 93) (Will. Durant's Story of Phil.) (ii) (a) His Travels: He was 28 years old, when Socrates died (i.e., 399 B.C.), and together with the other pupils of Socrates, he fled from Athens to Euclid at Megara for Safety. He kept away from Athens for 12 years, during which time, it is also said that apart from visiting Euclid, he travelled (a) to Southern Italy where he met the remnant of Pythagoreans, (b) to Syracuse in Sicily, where, through Dion, he met Dionysius to whom he became a Tutor: who subsequently caused him to be sold as a slave, and (c) to Egypt. (Fuller's Hist. of Philosophy) (Roger's Student's Hist. of Philosophy) (Wm. Turner's Hist. of Phil. p. 94) (Diogenes Laertius Bk. III, p. 277). (ii) (b) His Academy Plato is said to have returned to Athens in 387 B.C. when a middle aged man of 40 years and to have opened an Academy in a gymnasium on the western suburbs of Athens over which he presided for 20 years. He is said to have taught the following subjects (a) Political Science (b) Statesmanship (c) Mathematics (d) Dialectics, and it is said that the curriculum was based upon the educational principles advocated in the Republic. (Fuller's Hist. of Philosophy: Plato's Life) (B. D. Alexander's Hist. of Philosophy p. 68) (Roger's Students Hist. of Philosophy p. 72) (Wm. Turner's Hist. of Philosophy p. 122123). (iii) His Writings are disputed and doubted by modern scholarship. There are 36 dialogues and a number of letters, which Plato is supposed to have written: but which are disputed and doubted by modern scholarship. 69 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook (a) Grote states that Plato has written only those dialogues that bear his name. (b) Schaarsmidt states that only nine of the 36 dialogues are genuine while (c) Aristotle considered the Platonic dialogues as nine in number, namely The Laws, Timaeus, Phaedo, Symposium, Phaedrus, Georgias, Theaetus, Philebus and the Republic, which he thought are genuine. (d) Of the remaining 27 dialogues some scholars contend that the youthful dialogues should be included with the genuine ones, and these are the Apology, Crito, Enthydemus, Laches, Lysis and Protagoras, and (e) Of the remaining 21 dialogues scholars suggest that those which were not written by Plato must have been written by his pupils (B. D. Alexander's Hist. of Phil. p. 68). (iv) The doctrines of Plato: The doctrines attributed to Plato are scattered over a wide area of literature: being found in piecemeal throughout what are called dialogues; but particularly in connection with: (I) the theory of ideas and its application to natural phenomena which includes the doctrines of (a) the real and unreal (b) the Nous (mind) and (c) Creation. (II) the ethical doctrines concerning (A) the highest good (B) definition of virtue and (C) the cardinal virtues. (III) the doctrine of the Ideal State whose attributes are compared with the attributes of the soul and justice. Following this order, they are as follows: (I) The Theory of Ideas A. Definition of Ideas. This may be expressed in the following syllogism: The idea (retaining its unity, unchangeableness and perfection) is the element of reality in a thing. The idea is the concept by which a thing is known. Therefore the concept by which a thing is known is the element of reality in a thing (To on). It follows also, that since the concept or idea of a thing is real, then the concrete thing itself is unreal. (Timaeus 51) (Phaedrus 247). 70 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook B. The application of the theory of Ideas to natural Phenomena. In view of the definition of the Idea, three doctrines have resulted: (a) The doctrine of the real and unreal. The things which we see around us are the phenomena of nature, they belong to the earthly realm, they are only copies (Eidola) of their prototypes (paradeigmata), the Ideas and noumena, which dwell in the heavenly realm. The Ideas are real and perfect, but the phenomena are unreal and imperfect; and it is the function of philosophy to enable the mind to rise above the contemplation of the visible copies of Ideas, and advance to a knowledge of the Ideas themselves. (The Phaedrus 250). There is however, something common between them, because the phenomena partake of the Idea (metechei). This participation is an imitation (mimesis), but it is so imperfect that natural phenomena fall far short of Ideas. (Parmenides 132 D) (Aristotle's Metaphysics I, 6; 987b, 9). (b) The doctrine of the Nous or World Soul. This teaches that the universe are living animals and that they are endowed with the most perfect and intelligent souls; that if God had made the world as perfect as the nature of matter allowed, that He must have endowed it with a perfect soul. This soul acts as mediator between the Ideas and natural phenomena, and is the cause of life, motion, order, and knowledge in the universe. (Timaeus, 30, 35). (c) The doctrine of a Demiurgos in Creation (Cosmology) In the myth of creation found in the Timaeus, we find the doctrine on Creation, as it is ascribed to Plato's authorship, as follows: Out of chaos, which was ruled by necessity, God the Demiurgos or Creator, made order, by fashioning the phenomena of matter according to the eternal prototypes (i.e., the Ideas) in as perfect a manner, as the imperfection of matter would allow. He next created the Gods, and ordered them to fashion the body of man, while He himself, made the soul of man, from the same material as that of the world soul. The soul of man is a self-moving principle and is responsible for life, motion and consciousness in the body. (Myth of creation in Timaeus; Wm. Turner's Hist. of Philosophy, p. 109–110). 71 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook (II) The Ethical Doctrines The ethical doctrines that have been attributed to Plato are (A) that of the highest good, i.e., the Summum Bonum (B) the connotation of virtue and (C) the reduction of the virtues to four and the place of wisdom among them (A) as something subjective, and as an earthly experience, the highest good is happiness: but as an objective attainment, it is the Idea of good, and consequently identified with God. Therefore the purpose of man's life is freedom from the fetters of the body, in which the soul is confined, and the practice of virtue and wisdom, makes him like a God, even while on earth. (B) and (C) Virtue is the order, the health and the harmony of the soul. There are many virtues, but the greatest is wisdom. All virtues may be reduced to the four cardinal virtues: wisdom, fortitude, temperance and justice. (Symposium 204E); (Theaetetus 176A); (Phaedo 64 sqq.) (The Republic IV, 441, 443). (III) The Ideal State (The Republic) The doctrine attributed to Plato in the field of civics is the doctrine of the Ideal state whose attributes are compared with the attributes of the soul and justice. In a state, virtue should be the chief aim, and unless philosophers become rulers, or rulers become thorough students of philosophy, there will be unceasing troubles for states and humanity at large. The Ideal state is modeled upon the individual soul, and just as the soul has three parts, so also should the state have three parts: the rulers, the warriors, and the workers. (Republic VI, 490 sq.; V, 478; III, 415). Similarly, just as the harmony of the soul depends upon the proper subordination of its parts, so also does the state depend upon the proper subordination of its parts, in order to enjoy peace. Here Plato introduces the allegory of the charioteer and the winged steeds, in order to show that virtue is to the soul as justice is to the state:—One horse is of noble origin: while the other is ignoble; and consequently they cannot agree. As the noble horse strives to mount up to the heavenly regions which are suitable to its nature: so the other tries to drag him down. Likewise in dealing with the soul, it is the proper subordination of its parts, that enables the noble in man to attain its excellence; so also in dealing with the state, it is justice, or the proper subordination of the different classes, that makes it an Ideal State. (Roger's Students Hist. of. Phil. p. 83); (Plato's Republic). 72 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook (v) Summary of conclusions. The doctrines of Plato are eclectic and point to Egyptian origin. 1. The doctrine of the real and unreal to represent doctrine found in the comparison between natural phenomena and the Ideas, is only an instance of the application of the doctrine of opposites. Here the things of this world have their corresponding types in the heavenly realm; here the Ideas correspond to Being, while the natural phenomena correspond to not-Being. But the doctrine of opposites may be traced back not only to Socrates, Democritus, Parmenides and the Pythagoreans, but further back to its original source, i.e., the Egyptian Mystery System, where the principle of opposites was represented not only by pairs of male and female Gods, such as Osiris and Isis, but also by pairs of pillars in the front of all the Egyptian temples. (Memphite Theology in Kingship and the Gods, by Frankfort, C. 3, p. 25–26 and 35). (Herodotus I, 6–26) (Ancient Egypt by John Kendrick, Bk. I, p. 339). (Egyptian Religion by Frankfort, p. 64, 73, 88). (Zeller's Hist. of Phil. p. 61). (The Phaedo C. 15, 16, 49). II. The doctrine of the Nous or World Soul is a principle of Egyptian magic: Plato is credited with expressing this doctrine in the form of a simile, in which he compares the world to a living animal, which is composed of Souls. One being made perfect and responsible for the life, motion and knowledge of the animal or universe. This doctrine may be traced not only to (a) Democritus who based his teaching about the fire atoms of the soul, and cognition upon the magical principle of the Egyptians: "that the qualities of an animal are distributed throughout its parts." (Golden Bough by Frazer) (Hist. of Phil., B. D. Alexander, p. 40). (Wm. Turner, Hist. of Phil., p. 68), but also to (b) Anaxagoras, who is said to have advanced the Nous (mind) as responsible for creating order out of chaos, and which is omnipotent and omniscient. (History of Philosophy, Wm. Turner, p. 63). The doctrine of the Nous as a matter of fact, originated from (c) the Mystery System of Egypt, in connection with which, the God Osiris was represented in all Egyptian temples, by the symbol of an Open Eye, referred to elsewhere. This symbol indicated not only sight that transcended space and time: but also omniscience, as the Great Mind which created and which still directs the universe. This symbol also forms a part of the decoration of all Masonic lodges of the modern world and dates back to the Osirian or Sun worship of the Egyptians more than 5000 B.C. This same notion was also represented by the Egyptians by a God with eyes all over Him and was known as the "All seeing Eye." (Zeller's Hist. of Phil., p. 809). (The Ancient Mysteries, C. H. Vail, p. 189). (Max Muller: Egyptian Mythology). 73 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook III. The doctrine of the Demiurge in Creation. This doctrine which is ascribed to the authorship of Plato, did not by any means originate from Plato. It was not only a current doctrine at the time of Plato, but was well known among the Eastern Ancient nations and taught by them many centuries before his time (427–347 B.C.). History tells us that the Persians taught this doctrine more than six centuries B.C. through their leader Zoroaster. History also tells us that Pythagoras (500 B.C.), taught the same doctrine expressed in terms of Monads. The universe consisted of two unities, i.e., (a) the Unity from which the series of numbers or beings is derived, being absolute Unity, which is the source of all, i.e., the Monad of Monads or the God of Gods and (b) the One, i.e., the first in the series of derived numbers or beings. It is opposed to and limited by plurality, and therefore it is relative unity, i.e., a created Monad or God (a Demiurge), consequently the opposition between the One and the many is the source of all the rest. Furthermore, history likewise tells us that the original source of the doctrine of a Demiurge in creation was Egypt, and it dates back to the creation story of Egypt 4000 B.C. which is to be found in the account given by the Memphite Theology: an inscription on a stone, now kept in the British Museum. It contains the theological and cosmological views of the Egyptians which date back to the very beginning of Egyptian history, when the first dynasties had made their new capital at Memphis, the city of the God Ptah, i.e., about 4000 B.C., or even earlier. The Egyptian cosmology must be presented in three parts; each part being supplementary to the other, and presenting a complete philosophy by their combination. Part (I) deals with the Gods of chaos, part (II) deals with the Gods of order and arrangement in creation, and part (III) deals with the Primate of the Gods, through whose Logos creation was accomplished. In part (I) precreation or chaos is represented by (i) Ptah, the Primate of the Gods, emerging from the primeval waters Nun in the form of a Hill, Ta-tjenen, i.e., The Risen Land (ii) Atum, i.e., Atom, the sun God, immediately joining Ptah, by emerging also from the chaotic waters Nun, and sitting upon him (the Hill). (iii) A description of the other qualities within the chaos follows:—There are four pairs of male and female Gods in the form of frogs and serpents. Their names are (a) Nun and Naunet, the primeval ocean and primeval matter; (b) Huh and Hauhet, the Illimitable and the Boundless, (c) Kuk and Kauket, Darkness and Obscurity; and (d) Amon and Amaunet, the Hidden and concealed ones. (Memphite Theology in Ancient Egyptian Religion by Frankfort, p. 10, p. 21; Frankfort's Intellectual Adventure of Man, p. 10, 21, 52). In part (II) the Gods of order and arrangement are represented as follows: The same first pair of pre-creation Gods are together present, i.e., Ptah, the primeval Hill, who is the thought and word of all the Gods, together with Atum, who rests upon Ptah. Atum, i.e., Atom, having absorbed the thought and creative power of Ptah, then proceeds with the work of Creation. He names four pairs of parts of his own body, which become Gods, and in this way, eight Gods are created, who together with himself become nine Gods in one family or Godhead, called the Ennead. 74 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook N.B. Magic is the key to the interpretation of ancient religions and philosophy. (a) Part (III) tells of the specific powers of Ptah, which Atum absorbs, but does not tell us how He absorbs them. (b) Part (I) tells us how, for it describes the movement of Atum, as emerging from the primeval waters, and sitting upon Ptah (the risen land or hill). It however does not give us the reason for Atum's movement: a behavior which can be understood, only when we apply to its interpretation, the key of magical principles. (c) The Magical Principle Now, what is the magical principle involved in Atum's behavior? It is this: "The qualities or attributes of entities, human or divine, are distributed throughout their various parts, and contact with such entities, releases those qualities." (d) It is now clear that by making contact with Ptah, Atum immediately received the attributes of Ptah's creative thought and speech and omnipotence and became the instrument and the Logos and the Demiurge, through whom the task of creation was undertaken and completed. (Dr. Frazer's Golden Bough). (e) It is also clear that according to the Memphite Theology, the doctrines of a Demiurge and created Gods originated from the Egyptian religion and Mystery System, and not from Plato who lived from 427 to 347 B.C. (Ancient Egyptian Religion: Memphite Theology by Frankfort, p. 20 and 23). (Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man, by Frankfort, p. 21, and 51–60). (The Egyptian Book of the Dead, c. 17). (The Golden Bough, by Dr. Frazer—on Magic). (The Mediterranean World, by Sandford, p. 182). (History of Philosophy, by Weber, p. 21–22). (The Cure of the woman who touched the hem of Christ's garment: Mark, chapter 5, verses 25–34). (The cure of several people who held the kerchiefs of St. Paul: Acts, chapter 19, verse 12). N.B. The Memphite Theology will be dealt with in a separate chapter to show the origin of Greek Philosophy. IV. The doctrines of (A) the highest good (B) virtue and (C) the cardinal virtues. 75 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook N.B. This is really the earliest theory of salvation and it originated from the Egyptian Mysteries but not from Plato. (A) The main purpose of the Egyptian Mysteries was the salvation of the human soul. The Egyptians believed the human body to be a prison house, where the soul is chained by ten fetters. This condition not only kept man separated from God, but made him subject to the wheel of rebirth or re-incarnation. In order to escape from the effects of his condition, two requirements had to be fulfilled by the Neophyte: (i) He must keep the Ten Commandments taught by the Mysteries, for by such a discipline, he would gain conquest over the fetters of the soul, and liberate it, so as to make its development possible, and (ii) he now being well qualified and duly prepared, must undergo a series of initiations, in order to develop his soul from the human stage to that of a God. Such a transformation was known as salvation. It placed the Neophyte in harmony with nature, man and God. It deified him, i.e., made him become godlike; and this attainment was known as the highest good. According to this theory of salvation, man is expected to work out his own salvation, without a mediator between himself and his God. (B) Plato defines virtue as the order or discipline of the soul. This meaning we accept, since it agrees with the purpose of the ten commandments of the Mysteries. The doctrines of the ten virtues and the ten fetters are as old as the Egyptian history itself. Each commandment or discipline represented a principle of virtue, and the function of each virtue was to remove a fetter. Hence a life of virtue was antecedent and preparatory to those further experiences, i.e., the initiations which led to gradual perfection and the divinity of the Neophyte. (C) Plato is also credited with having reduced all virtues to four cardinal virtues, and with assigning the highest place among them to wisdom, as follows:—wisdom, fortitude, temperance and justice. We are also informed through the history of philosophy, that Socrates, the alleged teacher of Plato, taught that wisdom was the equivalent of all virtue. This divergence of opinion between pupil and teacher is significant, since it points to the fact that both of them simply speculated about a system of Ethics which was current in the ancient world, and which neither of them had produced. 76 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook This system of Ethics as has already been mentioned belonged to the Mystery System of Egypt, which required Neophytes in preparation for initiation, to keep the following ten commandments, underlying which were ten principles of virtue: The Neophyte must (I) control his thoughts (II) control his actions (III) have devotion of purpose (IV) have faith in the ability of his master to teach him the truth (V) have faith in himself to assimilate the truth (VI) have faith in himself to wield the truth (VII) be free from resentment under the experience of persecution (VIII) be free from resentment under experience of wrong, (IX) cultivate the ability to distinguish between right and wrong and (X) cultivate the ability to distinguish between the real and the unreal (he must have a sense of values). If we now compare the order in the above outline with the order in which the cardinal virtues are said to be arranged, we shall immediately see that the first place which wisdom occupies among the virtues was given to it by the Egyptian Mysteries, and not by Plato. Consequently in (I) and (II) from the control of thoughts and actions, we derive the virtue of wisdom; in (VI) from freedom of resentment under persecution, we derive the virtue of fortitude; in (IX) and (X) from an ability to distinguish between right and wrong, and between the real and unreal, we derive the virtues of justice and temperance. (Plato's Republic, c. IV, 44, and 443). (Ancient Mysteries by C. H. Vail, p. 25 also 109–112). (Wm. Turner's History of Philosophy, p. 115). (Zeller's History of Philosophy, p. 155–157). V. (A) The doctrine of the Ideal State. Concerning the authorship and source of this doctrine, there are two conclusions: First, Plato was not the author of the Republic and second, the allegory of the charioteer and winged steeds, is not a product of Plato, but is derived from the Egyptian Book of the Dead, in the Judgment Drama. Concerning the first conclusion it is only necessary to reaffirm what has already been stated in connection with the writings of Plato, and that is that they are disputed not only by such modern scholars as Grote and Schaarsmidt, but also by ancient historians: Diogenes Laertius, Aristoxenus and Favorinus (80–150 A.D.), who declare that the subject matter of the Republic was found in the controversies written by Protagoras (481–411 B.C.) at the time of whose death Plato was but a boy. Furthermore, the authorship of Plato rests only upon the opinions of Aristotle and Theophrastus, both of whose aims were the compilation of a Greek philosophy with Egyptian material. (Diogenes Laertius, p. 311 and 327; Aristotle Metaphysics Bk. I). (Zeller's History of Philosophy; Introduction, p. 8 and 13; Wm. Turner's History of Philosophy, p. 95). 77 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook Concerning the second conclusion, it must be pointed out that the allegory of the "Charioteer and the winged steeds" is a description of the quality and destiny of the soul as it appears at the bar of justice, in the Judgment Drama of the Egyptian Book of the Dead. In this Drama, the Great Chief Justice and President of the Unseen World, Pethempamenthes, i.e., Osiris is seated on a throne, and is attended by the Goddesses Isis and Nephthys, while 42 assistant judges are seated around. Near Osiris there are four genii of Amenthe, the Unseen World, represented as short vases, called canopi, in which the different viscera, symbolizing the moral qualities of the individual, are kept embalmed. The intestines hive a very important connection with the moral qualities of the individual since they are blamed for any sin which the individual commits. At the opposite end the deceased is introduced by Horus, while in the centre stands the Scale of Justice which has been erected by Anubis. On one side of it, there appears a heart-shaped vase containing the moral qualities of the deceased, while on the other side, there is a figure of the Goddess of Truth. Toth, the scribe, holding a roll of papyrus, stands by and makes a record of the weighing. After this is completed, Horus receives the record from Toth and advances to Osiris to make known the results. Osiris listens and at the end of the report, pronountes sentence of reward or punishment. In the meantime, fearful monsters lurk around the scene to destroy the soul, if the verdict is against it. Let us observe that: (1) the motion of the scale in the Judgment Drama corresponds with the up and down motion of the winged steeds of the allegory (2) the opposite qualities weighed on the scale correspond with the opposite qualities possessed by the noble and ignoble steeds of the allegory (3) the idea of justice symbolized by the scale of Judgment Drama, corresponds with the idea of justice expressed in the allegory. (4) The winged steeds corresponds with the monsters of the judgment drama. (B) The Authorship of the Republic. According to Diogenes Laertius book III and pages 311 and 327, it is stated both by Aristoxenus and Favorinus, that nearly the whole of the subject matter of Plato's Republic was found in the Controversies, written by Protagoras. 78 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook Furthermore, according to Roger's Students History of Philosophy p. 78, it is stated that although Plato might have drawn heavily upon the reminiscences of Socrates, whose lectures he attended: yet the subject matter of the Republic is a more carefully reasoned system of philosophy, than can be easily attributed to Socrates. 'That the whole volume is a cumulative argument into which there are subtly interwoven opinions on almost every subject of philosophical importance. It is obvious that modern scholarship doubts that Plato drew the subject matter of the Republic from Socrates, and is inclined to attribute authorship to Plato himself. If however, we take into consideration the fact that the subject matter of the Republic was in circulation long before the time of Plato: for Protagoras is supposed to have lived from 481–411 B.C. and Plato, from 427– 347 B.C., reason forbids the assignment of the authorship to Plato. But the important question remains: From what source did Protagoras draw the ideas of the Republic which were circulated in the Controversies? Textbooks on Greek philosophy tell us that Protagoras was a pupil of Democritus; but when we turn to the writings of Democritus we are unable to discover any connection between them and the (a) educational system and the (b) paternal government which are advocated in the Republic. This fact forces us to the conclusion that the subject matter of Plato's Republic was neither produced by Plato, nor any Greek philosopher. (C) The Authorship of Timaeus. According also to Diogenes Laertius Book VIII p. 399–401, when Plato visited Dionysius at Sicily, he paid Philolaus, a Pythagorean, 40 Alexandrian Minae of silver, for a book, from which he copied the whole contents of the Timaeus. Under these circumstances it is clear that Plato wrote neither the Republic nor the Timaeus, whose subject matter identifies them with the purpose of the Mysteries of Egypt. (Roger's Students Hist. of Philosophy p. 76; 78; and 104). (Zeller's Hist. of Philosophy: Introduction p. 13 and 103). (Wm. Turner's Hist. of Philosophy p. 79 and 95). (Plato; Apology, Crito, and Phaedo). (Xenophon: Memorabilia; Strabo; Ancient Mysteries by C. H. Vail). (Clement: Stromata Bk. V. C. 7 and 9). VI. The Chariot was not a culture pattern of the Greeks, at the time of Plato, nor was it used by them in warfare: Greek culture and traditions did not furnish Plato with the idea of the chariot and winged steeds, for nowhere in their brief military history, (i.e., up to the time of Plato) do we find the use of such a war machine by the Greeks. 79 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook The only nearby nation who specialized in the manufacture of chariots and the breeding of horses was the Egyptians. When Joseph was Governor in Egypt, the horse and war chariot were in use; and when the Israelites fled from the country, Pharaoh pursued them to the Red Sea in chariots. Even Homer and Diodorus who visited Egypt, testify that they saw a great multitude of war chariots and numerous stables along the banks of the Nile, from Memphis to Thebes. And since the Judgment Drama in the Egyptian Book of the Dead reveals the entire philosophy contained in the allegory, Plato cannot be credited as its author. The following sketch of the military history of the Greeks shows that the chariot was not used by them, nor was it their culture pattern: A. External wars or wars with the Persians. (a) The Ionian revolt against Persian rule, 499–494 B.C. This climaxed in a naval engagement at Lade, where the Ionian fleet was defeated. (b) The battle of Marathon, 490 B.C. During the summer of 490 B.C., the Greeks met the Persians at the bay of Marathon, and after a brief fight with bows and arrows, both belligerents withdrew to prepare for more decisive engagements. (c) The battle of Thermopylae, 480 B.C. Ten years after Marathon, the Persians and Greeks met again to settle their grievances. The Persians anchored in the Gulf of Pagasae, while the Greeks anchored off Cape Artimesium. A battle followed and Thermopylae was captured by the Persians. (d) The battle of Salamis, 479 B.C. Both Persians and Greeks met again at Salamis in 479 B.C., and a naval engagement followed, with considerable loss of ships on both sides. Both belligerents withdrew without any decision. (e) The confederacy of Delos and their wars with the Persians, 478–448 B.C. The purpose of the confederacy was defense against Persian aggression, and two naval battles were fought: one at the river Eurymedon in 467 B.C., when the Greeks gained a minor victory, and the other at Cyprus in 449 B.C., when the island was captured by the Persians. N.B. Chariots were not used in any of these engagements. 80 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook B. Internal wars, i.e., the Peloponnesian wars, 460–445 B.C., and 431–421 B.C. respectively. These wars were fought between the different Greek states, and their major engagements were maritime. In 432 B.C. Athens blockaded Potidaea and Megara was excluded from Greek markets. In 431 B.C. Thebes attacked Plataea, and while a Peloponnesian army occupied Attica, an Athenian fleet raided Peloponnesus. Pericles conducted the evacuation of Attica, the oligarchs at Corcyra were massacred, and after the seizure of Amphipolis; Nicias sued for peace 422 B.C. N.B. It is evident that Greek culture and tradition did not furnish Plato with the idea of the charioteer and winged steeds, for nowhere in their brief military history, (i.e., up to the time of Plato) do we find the use of such a war machine by the Greeks as a chariot. The only nearby nation who specialized in the manufacture of chariots and horse breeding was the Egyptians, as already mentioned. And since the Judgment Drama in the Egyptian Book of the Dead depicts the allegory of the charioteer and winged steeds, credit for its authorship cannot be given to Plato, but to the Egyptians. (Sandford: Mediterranean World, c. 12, p. 197; 202; 203; 205; c. 13, p. 220–221). (Genesis, c. 45, 27; c. 47, 17; Deut. c. 17, 16). (I Kings, c. 10, 28). (Homer II. i, 381; Diodorus; Roger's Hist. of Phil., p. 8384). (John Kendrick: Ancient Egypt, Vol. I, p. 166). (The Egyptian Book of the Dead). 3. Aristotle: (i) (a) Early Life and Training and (b) His Own List of Books (c) Other Lists of Books (ii) Doctrines (iii) Summary of Conclusions: A. His Doctrines B. (i) The Library of Alexandria B. (ii) True Source of his Unusual Number of Books C. The Discrepancies and Doubts in His Life. (i) (a) Birth and early life and training. According to the textbooks on the history of Greek philosophy, Aristotle was born in 384 B.C. at Stagira, a town in Thrace. His father, Neomachus is said to have been a physician to Amyntas, King of Macedonia. Nothing is mentioned in books about his early education, only that he became an orphan and at the age of 19 he went to Athens, where he spent twenty years as a pupil of Plato. 81 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook We are also informed that after the death of Plato, his nephew, became the master of his school, and that Aristotle left immediately for Mysia, where he met and married the niece of Hermeias. Likewise, that after the death of Amyntas of Macedon, his son Phillip having become king, appointed Aristotle as Tutor of his son Alexander a boy of 13 years (later to be called the Great in consequence of his conquest of Egypt). After Phillip's assassination in 336 B.C. Alexander became king, and we are informed that he immediately planned an Asiatic campaign and included Egypt, during which time Aristotle is said to have returned to Athens and founded a school in a gymnasium called the Lyceum. We are further informed that Aristotle conducted this school for only twelve years, that Alexander the Great advanced him the funds to purchase a large number of books, that his pupils were called Peripatetics, and that owing to an indictment for impiety, brought against him by a priest named Eurymedon, he fled from Athens to Chalcis in Euboea, where he remained in exile until his death in 322 B.C. (Roger's Student's History of Phil. p. 104). (Zeller's History of Philosophy, p. 171– 172). (Fuller's History of Philosophy, Aristotle's Life). (B. D. Alexander's Hist. of Phil. p. 91– 92). (Diogenes Laertius Bk. V. p. 449). (b) His own list of books. Aristotle is credited with classifying his own writings as follows: (i) The Theoretic, whose object is truth, and which included (a) Mathematics (b) Physics and (c) Theology. (ii) The Practical, whose object is the useful, and which included (a) Ethics (b) Economics and (c) Politics. (iii) The Productive or Poetic whose object is the beautiful, and which included (a) Poetry (b) Art and (c) Rhetoric. N.B. Neither Logic nor Metaphysics was in this list. (History of Philosophy, B. D. Alexander, p. 92). (c) Other lists of books. There are two lists of books which have come down to modern times from Alexandrine and Arabian sources. (i) The older list, derived from the Alexandrine Hermippus (200 B.C.), who estimated the books of Aristotle at 400, which, according to Zeller's suggestion, must have been in the Alexandrine Library, at the time of the compilation of the list, since works which are now considered to be Aristotle's are not found in the list. 82 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook (ii) The later, derived from Arabian sources, was compiled by Ptolemus, of the First or Second Century A.D. This list mentions most of the works in the modern collection, and has a total of one thousand books. (Zeller's History of Philosophy, p. 172–173; B. D. Alexander's History of Philosophy, p. 92–93). (ii) Doctrines of Aristotle I. Metaphysics: or The Principles of Being, in the Metaphysical realm. 1. Aristotle defines Metaphysics as the science of Being as Being. 2. He names the Attributes of Being as (a) actuality (entelecheia) i.e., perfection and (b) potentiality i.e., the capacity for perfection. (dynamis). 3. He states that all created beings are composed of actuality and potentiality. These two principles are present and are mixed in all created beings except one, whose being is actuality, and includes the composition of (a) matter and form (b) substance and accident (c) soul and its faculties (d) active and passive intellect. II. Principles of being in the physical realm. There are four principles of being in the physical realm which are called Causes: (1) Matter (hyle) the material cause, is the potentiality or capacity of existence (hyle prole). It is that out of which being is made. (2) Form or Essence (morphe) i.e., the formal cause is that which gives actuality to existence. It is that into which a thing is made. When matter is united with form the result is organized or realized being that has come to existence in the processes of nature (synolon, ousia prote). (3) Final Cause, is that for which everything exists. Everything has a purpose and that purpose is the final cause. A final cause always implies intelligence: but this is not always true in the case of the efficient Cause. Consequently in the realm of nature, every being or living organism is the complex effect of four causes: (1) The substance out of which it is made (i.e., material cause). (2) The type or idea, according to which the embryo tends to develop (i.e., formal cause). (3) The act of creation or generation (i.e., efficient cause). 83 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook (4) The purpose or end for which the organism is created (i.e., final cause). In other words, matter, type, creation and purpose are the four principles which underlie all existing things. (B. D. Alexander's History of Philosophy, p. 97–100; Aristotle, Meta. I, 3; Wm. Turner's History of Philosophy, p. 136140. Alfred Weber's Hist. of Phil., p. 80–84). III. Doctrines concerning the existence of God. (1) Although motion is eternal, there cannot be an indefinite series of movers and the moved, therefore there must be One, the first in the series which is unmoved (proton kinoun akineton) i.e., The Unmoved Mover. (2) The actual is antecedent to the potential for although last in appearance, is really first in nature. Therefore before all matter and the composition of actual and potential, pure actuality must have existed. Therefore actuality is the cause of all things that exist and since it is pure actuality, its life is essentially free from all material conditions. It is the thought of thought, the absolute spirit, who dwells in eternal peace and self enjoyment, who knows himself and the absolute truth, and is in need of neither action nor virtue. (3) God is one, for matter is the principle of plurality, and the First Intelligence is free from material conditions. His life is contemplative thought: neither providence nor will is comparable with the eternal repose in which He dwells. God is not concerned with the world. IV. The doctrine of the origin of the world. The world is eternal, because matter, motion and time are eternal. V. The doctrine concerning Nature. Nature is everything which has the principle of motion and rest. It is spontaneous and self determining from within. Nature does nothing in vain, but according to definite law. It is always striving for the best according to a plan of development, which is obstructed only by matter. The striving of nature is through the less perfect to the more perfect. VI. The doctrine concerning the Universe. The world is globe shaped, circular and most perfect in form. The heaven, which is composed of ether, stands in immediate contact with the First Cause. The stars, which are eternal come next in order, the earth-ball is in the middle, and is the furthest from the prime mover, and least participant of divinity. 84 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook (Eth. Wic 10, 8; 1178b, 20) (Op. cit. 10: 8, 9; 1179). (Wm. Turner's History of Philosophy, p. 141–143; B D. Alexander, History of Phil. p. 102–103; Zeller's History of Philosophy, p. 221; Roger's History of Philosophy, p. 109). (Aristotle's Physics II, I, 192b 14) (De Caelo, I, 4, 271a, 33). (De Part. An. IV, 2, 677a 15). (Aristotle's Physics II, 8, 199). (B. D. Alexander's Hist. of Phil. p. 104). (De Generatione Animalium, IV, 4, 7706, 9). VII. The doctrine of the soul. The soul is not merely a harmony of the body or the blending of opposites. It is neither the four elements nor their compound, for it transcends all material conditions. The soul and body are not two distinct things: but one in two different aspects, i.e., just as form is related to matter. The soul is the power which a living body possesses, and it is the end for which the body exists, i.e., the final cause of its existence. While the soul which is the radical principle of life, is one, yet it has several faculties. Those faculties are: (1) Sensitive (2) Rational (3) Nutritive (4) Appetitive (5) Locomotive. Of these, the sensitive and the rational are the most important: sensation being the faculty by means of which the forms of sen'sible things are received, just as impression is made as by a seal; and intelligent knowledge being the faculty by means of which intellectual knowledge is acquired. It is the seat of ideas only, it does not create them, since knowledge comes through the senses. (B. D. Alexander's History of Philosophy, p. 105–106). (Wm. Turner's History of Philosophy, p. 147–153). (Zeller's History of Philosophy, p 201–204). (iii) Summary of Conclusions A. His Doctrines. 1. The doctrine of Being (To on). By declaring the attributes of Being as (a) actuality or the determining principle, and (b) potentiality or the indeterminate principle: Aristotle attempted to explain Reality in terms of the principle of opposites. But this principle was used not only by the Pythagoreans, Parmenides, and Democritus in a similar manner but also by Socrates in his attempt to prove the immortality of the soul, and by Plato who saw reality as the concept of things as distinguished from the things themselves: as the noumena as distinct from phenomena, and as the real, distinct from the unreal. 85 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook But the principle of opposites originated from the Egyptian Mystery System, whose Gods were male and female, and whose temples carried in front of them two pillars as symbols of the principle of opposites. It is obvious that Aristotle was not the author of this doctrine, but the Egyptians. (Aristotle's Metaphysics I, 5, 985b, 24; Aristotle's Metaphysics I, 5, 98b, 31). (Aristotle's Metaphysics I, 6, 987b, 9; Wm. Turner's Hist. of Phil., p. 41; 47; 48). (Plato's Phaedo, c. 15; c. 16 and c. 49; Parmenides 132D). (Memphite Theology, King-ship and the Gods, by Frankfort, c. 3, p. 25, 26, 35). (Egyptian Religion by Frankfort, p. 64, 73, 88). 2. The existence of God (a) The teleological concept has not only been embraced by Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, but also by the peoples of the remotest antiquity. In the accounts found in the first chapter of Genesis and in the Memphite Theology, found in chapters 20 and 23 of Frankfort's Ancient Egyptian Religion, creation proceeds from chaos to order, by definite and gradual steps, showing design and purpose in nature, and suggesting that it must be the work of a divine Intelligence. The dates of these sources carry us far back into antiquity, many centuries before the time of Aristotle, between 2000 and 5000 B.C. We are also told that in addition to the teleological concept, Aristotle introduced the concept of the "Unmoved Mover" in order to prove the existence of God. But the "Unmoved Mover" is none other than the Atum of the Memphite Theology of the Egyptians, the Demiurge, through whose command (logos) four pairs of Gods were created out of different parts of his body and who accordingly moved out of him. This act of creation took place while Atum remained unmoved; as he embraced Ptah. Thus the family of Nine Gods was created, and has been named the Ennead. It is quite clear that the concept of the "Unmoved Mover" is derived from the Egyptian theological or mystery system, and not from Aristotle, as the modern world has been made to believe. N.B. Incidentally, but no less important, it might be mentioned here that in this story of the created Gods by Atum the Sun God into a family of nine, i.e., the Ennead, we have the original source of two important scientific hypotheses of modern times: (1) There are nine major planets and (2) The Sun is the parent of the other planets (This latter being supported by the Nebular Hypothesis). Let us remember also that (a) the worship of the planets began in Egypt and (b) the Egyptian temples were the first observatories of history. 86 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook (c) In attempting to prove the existence of God or a First Cause by reference to actuality and potentiality, Aristotle simply followed the traditional custom of the Ancients, who used the principle of Opposites in order to explain the functions of nature. (d) Plato used it, through the theory of Ideas, to explain the real and unreal in the phenomena of nature. (e) Socrates used it in order to establish the fact of immortality by showing that the death of one form of life of existing things, is but the beginning of another form of life of these things. In other words life is perpetual, it only changes its form in its course of progress. Democritus applied the principle of opposites in their interpretation of a particular phase of reality. We cannot therefore consider Aristotle's use of the terms, actuality and potentiality in the problem of the existence of God as a new method of interpretation. Furthermore, Aristotle's review of the doctrines of all previous philosophers including Plato, together with his exposure of their errors, and inconsistencies, shows that he had become confident not only of the fact that he was in possession of a new and correct knowledge one that had not before been made available to the Greeks, but also that he could then speak with great authority. Right here I must say that I am convinced that Aristotle represents a culture gap of 5000 years or more between his innovation and the Greek level of civilization; because it is impossible to escape the conviction that he obtained his education and books from a nation outside of Greece, the Egyptians who were far in advance of the culture of Greeks of his day. (Memphite Theology in Kingship & The Gods by Frankfort c. 3. p. 25, 26, 35). (Herodotus I, 6– 26) (Egyptian Religion by Frankfort p. 64, 73, 88). (Plato's Phaedo c. 15, 16, 49) (Zeller's History of Philosophy p. 61). (Aristotle's Eth., Nic. 10, 8; 1178b, 20) (Op. cit. 10: 8, 9; 1179). (Zeller's History of Philosophy p. 221) (Roger's History of Philosophy p. 109). (William Turner's History of Philosophy p. 141–143). (B. D. Alexander's History of Philosophy, p. 102, 103). (B D. Alexander's History of Philosophy p. 92, 93; Roger's Student History of Philosophy p. 104). (William Turner's History of Philosophy p. 126–127, 135). (Zeller's History of Philosophy p. 171–173) (Plutarch's Alexander) (Aristotle's Metaphysics) (William Turner's History of Philosophy, p. 128 footnote also Noct. Mt. 20: 5).(Strabo). 3. The doctrine of the origin of the world. According to the doctrine that has been ascribed to Aristotle: "because matter, motion and time are eternal, therefore the world is also eternal", he plainly accepts and repeats a doctrine which has also been ascribed to Democritus (400 B.C.), whose dictum we are all quite familiar with: ex nihillo nihil fit (nothing comes out of nothing), and consequently matter or the world must always have existed. 87 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook But the antiquity of the doctrine of the eternal nature of matter, takes us back to the creation story of the Memphite Theology of the Egyptians, in which Chaos is represented by the Primeval Ocean Nun, out of which there arose the Primeval Hill Ta-tjenen. Under these circumstances we cannot give Aristotle credit for the authorship of this doctrine. In addition to the false authorship that has been attributed to Aristotle, he contradicts himself in his physics VIII 1. 25; when he also speaks of the world as caused. A thing cannot be eternal and infinite, and at the same time finite. (Memphite Theology in Egyptian Religion by Frankfort p. 20). (Intellectual Adventure of Man by Frankfort p. 10, 21, 52). 4. The doctrine of the attributes of nature. Aristotle defines nature as that which possesses the principle of motion and rest and also adds that the motion is an effort to move from the less perfect to the more perfect by a definite law: supposedly what we would today call evolution. As we examine this definition, we find that Aristotle has only applied the principle of opposites to explain one of the modes by which nature has revealed herself just as he has done in his attempt to explain Being in the dual terms of actuality and potentiality. But change and motion, permanence and rest, were by no means new problems at the time of Aristotle; since they appear to have been investigated not only by Parmenides, Zeno and Melissus, but also by Democritus, who stressed the notion of permanence in his famous dictum: ex nihillo nihil fit (out of nothing, nothing comes) implying thereby that nature is permanent and eternal. Similarly, his reference to nature's movement from the less perfect to the more perfect, was by no means a new discovery of a principle of nature. The creation account found in the first chapter of Genesis speaks of the gradual development of life, in which the Demiurge or Logos was engaged at work during six stages and rested on the seventh. Similarly, the creation account of the Egyptians pound in the Memphite Theology, also speaks of nature's movement from Chaos to order. These accounts by many thousand years antedate Aristotle's time for the former is about 2000 B.C. while the latter 4000 B.C., and since the principle of opposites has already been shown to originate from the Egyptians, as well as that of the gradual development of life, it is clear that this doctrine on the attributes of nature did not originate from Aristotle. (Zeller's History of Philosophy, p. 60–65;) (William Turner's History of Philosophy p. 44–52). (Genesis c. 1). (Roger's History of Philosophy p. 28–32). (Intellectual Adventure of Man by Frankfort, p. 21, 51–60). (Ancient Egyptian Religion by Frankfort, p. 20, 23). 88 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook 5. The Soul. According to Aristotle the soul possesses the following attributes (1) Identity with body, as form with matter (2) The power which a living body possesses, i.e., the radical principle of life, manifesting itself in the following attributes: (a) sensitive (b) rational (c) nutritive (d) appetitive (e) locomotive. This description of the soul by Aristotle, seems to vary somewhat from the more familiar and current ideas held by the Atomists, on the one hand and Socrates, Plato and the Pythagoreans on the other; for while the former believed that the soul is material and is composed of fire atoms; the latter regarded it as a harmony of the body and a blending of opposites. (William Turner's History of Philosophy, p. 42, 67–68). (Plato Phaedo, c. 15) (Zeller's History of Philosophy, p. 61). (De Respiratione, 4, 30, 47a). Naturally we are now forced to ask the question: Did this doctrine of the soul originate from Aristotle? It is clear that he did not get it from his teacher Plato, nor from the Pythagoreans and Atomists; but from some other source outside of Greece. As we turn our attention to ancient history, we happily discover that there are two such sources outside of Greece (1) The Creation story in Genesis first chapter and (2) The Egyptian Book of the Dead, which does not only contain attributes of the soul, identical with those mentioned by Aristotle, but far more in an elaborate system of philosophy in which human nature is explained as a unity of nine inseparable parts consisting of different bodies and souls interdependent one upon another, the physical body being one of them. (The Egyptian Book of the Dead by Sir E. A. Budge. Introduction, p. 29–64). In the Genesis story, it is asserted that God made man out of matter (i.e., the dust of the earth), and breathed into his nostrils, the breath of life, and "man became a living soul". Here we have a clear statement of the identity of "body and soul", taken from a document (Genesis) which antedates Aristotle by many centuries. 89 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook In the Egyptian Book of the Dead, we also find that the human soul is composed of the following nine inseparable parts: (1) The Ka, which is an abstract personality of the man to whom it belongs possessing the form and attributes of a man with power of locomotion, omnipresence and ability to receive nourishment like a man. It is equivalent to (Eidolon), i.e., image. (2) The Khat, i.e., the concrete personality, the physical body, which is mortal. (3) The Ba, i.e., the heart-soul, which dwells in the Ka and sometimes alongside it, in order to supply it with air and food. It has the power of metamorphosis and changes its form at will. (4) The Ab, i.e., the Heart, the animal life in man, and is rational, spiritual and ethical. It is associated with the Ba (heart-soul) and in the Egyptian Judgment Drama it undergoes examination in the presence of Osiris, the great Judge of the Unseen World. (5) The Kaibit, i.e., shadow. It is associated with Ba (heart-soul) from whom like the Ka, it receives its nourishment. It has the power of locomotion and omnipresence. (6) The Khu, i.e., spiritual soul, which is immortal. It is also closely associated with the Ba (heart-soul), and is an Ethereal Being. (7) The Sahu, i.e., spiritual body, in which the Khu or spiritual soul dwells. In it all the mental and spiritual attributes of the natural body are united to the new powers of its own nature. (8) The Sekhem, i.e., power or the spiritual personification of the vital force in a man. Its dwelling place is in the heavens with spirits or Khus. (9) The Ren, i.e., the name, or the essential attribute for the preservation of a Being. The Egyptians believed that in the. absence of a name, an individual ceased to exist. N.B. It must be noted that according to the Egyptian concept (1) The soul has nine parts, whose unity is so complete, that even the Ren, i.e., the name, is an essential attribute, since without it, it cannot exist. (2) The Ba (or heart-soul), is connected with the Ka, Kaibit and Ab (Abstract personality or Shadow and Animal life) on the one hand, and also with Khu and Sekhem (spiritual Soul and spiritual personification of vital force) on the other hand, as the power of Nourishment. 90 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook (3) The Sahu is a spiritual body which is used both by Khu and Sekhem. (4) The Khat, i.e., the physical body, is essential to the soul while manifesting itself upon the physical plane. (5) The soul has the additional following attributes:— (a) omnipresence (b) metamorphosis (c) locomotion (d) nutritive (e) mortality (in case of one khat) (f) immortality (g) rationality (h) spirituality (i) morality (j) ethereal (k) shadowy (6) It is clear therefore from such a comparison as this, that the Aristotelian doctrine of the soul is identical and coincides with only a very small portion of the Egyptian philosophy of the soul, which therefore stands in relation to it as a whole to its part. Consequently we must conclude that Aristotle obtained his doctrine of the soul from the Egyptian Book of the Dead, directly or indirectly. B (i) The Library of Alexandria was the true source of Aristotle's large numbers of books: It is to be expected that the library of Alexandria was immediately ransacked and looted by Alexander and his party, no doubt made up of Aristotle and others, who did not only carry off large quantities of scientific books: but also frequently returned to Alexandria for the purpose of research. 91 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook Just as these books were captured in Egypt by the army of Alexander and fell into the hands of Aristotle, so after Aristotle's death, these very books were destined to be captured by a Roman army and conveyed to Rome according to the following story taken from the histories of Strabo and Plutarch: The books of Aristotle fell into the hands of Theophrastus who succeeded him as Head of his School. At the death of Theophrastus, they were bequeathed to Neleus of Scepsis. After the death of Neleus, the books were hidden in a cellar, where they remained for almost two centuries. When Athens was captured by the Romans in 84 B.C., the books were captured by Sulla and carried to Rome, where Tyrannio a grammarian secured copies and enabled Andronicus of Rhodes to publish them. (Strabo; Plutarch; Wm. Turner's Hist. of Phil., p. 128 footnote). (Noct., Mt, 20; 5). The fragmentary character of Aristotle's writings and their lack of unity, reveal the fact that he himself made notes hurriedly from books while doing his research at the great Egyptian Library. The ancient teaching method was oral; not by lecture and note taking. Right here I must repeat that I am convinced that Aristotle represents a culture gap of 5000 years between his innovation and the Greek level of civilization; because it is impossible to escape the conviction that he obtained his education and books from a nation outside of Greece, who was far ahead of the culture of the Greeks of his day, and that was the Egyptians. (B. D. Alexander's History of Philosophy, p. 92 and 93). (Roger's Student History of Philosophy, p. 104). (Alfred Weber's History of Philosophy, p. 77 and 78). (Wm. Turner's History of Philosophy, p. 126, 127, 135). (Zeller's History of Philosophy, p. 171–173). (Plutarch's Alexander, c. 8). (Aristotle's Metaphysics) (Wm. Turner's History of Phil., p. 128 footnote also Noct., Mt., 20; 5). (Strabo). The so-called books of Aristotle deal with scientific knowledge which was not in circulation among the Greeks, and consequently, it was impossible, as has already been stated, for him to have purchased them from other so-called Greek philosophers. It is for the purpose of concealing the true source of his books and of his education, that history tells the very strange stories about Aristotle (a) that he spent 20 years, as a pupil under Plato, whom we know was incompetent to teach him; and (b) that Alexander the Great also gave him money to buy the large number of books to which his name has been attached; but at the same time, fails to tell us when, where and from whom Aristotle bought the books. Furthermore, as already pointed out, Aristotle's review of the doctrines of all previous philosophers including Plato, together with his exposure of their errors and inconsistencies, shows that he had become confident not only of the fact that he was in possession of correct knowledge, one that had not before been made available to the Greeks; but also that he could then speak with great authority. 92 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook B (ii) The lack of uniformity between the lists of books points to doubtful authorship. 1. There are at least three lists of books. One list is said to be Aristotle's own classification of his writings, and naturally it must be dated within the period of his own life time 384–322 B.C. In this list Aristotle has told the world that he wrote texts on (a) Mathematics, Physics and Theology, (b) Ethics, Economics and Politics and (c) Poetry, Art and Rhetoric. Now, in order to write these texts one must have received his education and training in the subjects on which they are written. We are told in the history of Greek philosophy, that Socrates taught Plato and that Plato taught Aristotle. But there is no evidence that Socrates ever taught mathematics or economics or politics. Consequently, it was impossible for him to teach Plato these subjects, and also impossible for Plato to teach Aristotle these subjects, under the Egyptian Mystery System which was graded, and which required proof of efficiency before promotion. We are therefore unable to accept the claim of Aristotle to have been the author of those books. 2. Two lists are derived from different sources and the two together differ widely in (a) number (b) subject matter and (c) date. The list of Hermippus the Alexandrine (200 B.C.) contains 400 books. The list compiled by Ptolemus, between First and Second Centuries A.D. contains 1000 books. The very fact that there is no uniformity in the lists points to a doubtful authorship. Also, if Aristotle in 200 B.C. had only 400 books, by what miracle did they increase to 1000 in the Second Century A.D.? Or was it forgery? C. The discrepancies and doubts in his life. (i) He wastes 20 years as a pupil under Plato: It is said that he went to Plato at the age of 19 and spent 20 years with him as a pupil. But this is doubtful and unreasonable. Doubtful because Plato is regarded as a philosopher, while Aristotle as a scientist, who has been credited with all the scientific knowledge of the ancient world, and it is impossible for a master to teach a pupil what he himself does not know. It is also unreasonable to expect a man who has been credited with Aristotle's knowledge, to waste 20 of the best years of his life, under a master who was incompetent to teach him. (B. D. Alexander, Hist. of Phil., p. 92; Roger's Student History of Philosophy, p. 104). 93 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook (ii) The truth of how he got such a large number of books is misrepresented: He is said to have received financial aid from Alexander the Great, and was able to purchase a large number of books in order to advance his studies. (Zeller's Hist. of Phil., p. 171; Wm. Turner's History of Phil. p. 127). But this sounds more like a fable than the truth, for up to the time of Aristotle, Greek education was represented by the Sophists who taught Rhetoric and dialectics; while the study of elementary science was confined to a few unknown philosophers. This was the standard of Greek education, for the Sophists were the only authorized teachers. Yet Aristotle is credited with producing a thousand different books dealing with all branches of the scientific knowledge of antiquity. Certainly he could not have obtained them from the Greeks, for that vast body of knowledge, which bears his name and which was presented as new, would really have been the traditional common possession of all who were members of the Greek schools of philosophy for they would have been the only persons inside Greece permitted to own such books; for knowledge was protected as secret. Under these circumstances it is evident that the vast body of scientific knowledge ascribed to Aristotle, was neither in the possession of the Greeks of his time, nor was there any one in Greece competent to teach him Science and, least of all, on so vast a scale. (iii) He got the books by looting the Library of Alexandria: The question must now be asked: how did Aristotle, a single individual, come to possess such a vast number of scientific works, a body of knowledge which took the ancient world five thousand years or more to accumulate? It is evident that Aristotle's fame as a scholar has been grossly exaggerated: for such an accomplishment would have been both a physical and mental impossibility. Throughout the intellectual advancement of man, the world has witnessed many a genius; but those have always been specialists in particular fields, not specialists in every branch of science. And the modern world is no exception, for our great men of science are not specialists in every branch of science, but only in a particular one. That appears to be nature's way. As a matter of fact, the many discrepancies and doubts in the life and activities of Aristotle lead us to the only reasonable solution of the problem that instead of the tales (a) that Alexander the Great gave him money to buy books (b) that he spent 20 years of his life as a pupil with Plato and (c) that he left the palace of Alexander for Athens, when Alexander started on his Egyptian invasion, he, on the contrary, must have spent a large part of those 20 years under the tutorship of the Egyptian priests, and also must have accompanied Alexander on the Egyptian invasion, 94 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook which gave him the opportunity, not only to carry away from the Alexandrian Library, the vast number of books which are now said to be his, but also to copy notes from a large number of volumes. Indeed modern scholarship has shown that the writings of Aristotle bear all the marks of hurriedly copied notes which of course suggests that Aristotle himself copied these notes from the books of the Alexandrian Library. The historical account of Aristotle's life is incredible. (iv) It was the custom of ancient armies to capture books as valuable war booty: When a victorious army takes possession of a country, it is customary for special companies to search for and seize war booty, i.e., to help themselves to everything that is considered valuable. The Greeks, among all the surrounding nations, were the most anxious to obtain the valuable secrets of the Egyptians, in the Ancient Sciences, and it would appear that the greatest opportunity came to them to accomplish the desire when Alexander the Great invaded Egypt. As stated elsewhere, ancient invading armies looted libraries, because of the great value attached to books; and temples were also looted, not only for books, but also for the gold and silver, out of which the gods and ceremonial vessels were made. CHAPTER VII: The Curriculum of the Egyptian Mystery System 1. The Education of the Egyptian Priests According to Their Orders From Diodorus, Herodotus and Clement of Alexandria, we learn that there were six Orders of Egyptian Priests, and that each Order had to master a certain number of the books of Hermes. Clement has described a procession of the Priests, calling them by their Order, and stating their qualifications, as follows: First comes the Singer Odus, bearing an instrument of music. He has to know by heart two of the books of Hermes; one containing the hymns of the Gods, and the other, the allotment of the king's life. Next comes the Horoscopus, carrying in his hand a horologium or sun-dial, and a palm branch; the symbols of Astronomy. He has to know four of the books of Hermes, which deal with Astronomy. Next comes the Hierogrammat, with feathers on his head, and a book in his hand, and a rectangular case with writing materials, i.e., the writing ink and the reed. He has to know the hieroglyphics, cosmography, geography, astronomy, the topography of Egypt, the sacred utensils and measures, the temple furniture and the lands. Next comes the Stolistes, carrying the cubit of justice, and the libation vessels. He has to know the books of Hermes that deal with the slaughter of animals. 95 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook Next comes the Prophetes carrying the vessel of water, followed by those who carry the loaves. The Prophetes is the President of the temple and has to know the ten books which are called hieratic, and contain the laws and doctrines concerning the Gods (secret-theology) and the whole education of the Priests. The books of Hermes are 42 in number and are absolutely necessary. 36 of them have to be known by the Orders which precede, and contain the whole philosophy of the Egyptians. The remaining six books must be known by the Order of Pastophori. These are medical books and deal with physiology, male and female diseases, anatomy, drugs and instruments. The books of Hermes were well known to the ancient world and were known to Clement of Alexandria, who lived at the beginning of the third century A.D. In addition to the education contained in the 42 Books of Hermes, the Priests gained considerable knowledge from the selection and examination of sacrificial victims, and the strict bodily purity which their priestly office imposed. In addition to the Hierogrammat and Horoscopus, who were skilled in theology and hieroglyphics, a Priest was also a Judge and an interpreter of the law. This led to a select tribunal, which made the Egyptian Priest the custodian of every kind of literature. We are also told that the Science of Statistics was cultivated to the greatest perfection among the Egyptian Priests. (Diodorus I, 80; Clement of Alexandria; Stromata 6, 4, p. 756; John Kendrick's Ancient Egypt Bk. I, p. 378–379; Bk. II, 85–87; Aelian, Var. Hist. 14, 34; Clement of Alexandria: Stromata 6, 4, p 758: John Kendrick's Ancient Egypt Bk. II p. 31–33). 2. The Education of the Egyptian Priests in: A. The Seven Liberal Arts. B. Secret Systems of Languages and Mathematical Symbolism. C. Magic A. The education of the Egyptian Priests in the Seven Liberal Arts. As has already been pointed out, in connection with Plato and the Cardinal Virtues, the Egyptian Mysteries were the centre of organized culture, and the recognized source of education in the ancient world. Neophytes were graded according to their moral efficiency and intellectual competence, and had to submit to many years of tests and ordeals, in order that their eligibility for advancement might be determined. Their education included the Seven Liberal Arts, and the virtues. The virtues were not mere abstractions or ethical sentiments; but positive valours and the virility of the soul. Beyond these, the Priests entered upon a course of specialization. B. The education of the Egyptian Priests consisted also in the specialization in secret systems of language and mathematical symbolism. 96 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook (i) It would appear that there were two forms of writing in use among the Egyptians: (a) The demotic, believed to have been introduced by Pharaoh Psammitichus, for trade and commercial purposes; and (b) The hieroglyphics of which there were two forms, i.e., the hieroglyphics proper, and the hieratic a linear form, both of which were used only by the Priests, in order to conceal the secret and mystical meaning of their doctrines. (Clement of Alexandria: Stromata Bk. V. c. 4 p. 657; Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride Bk. II, p. 374; John Kendrick; Ancient Egypt, Bk. II, p. 84; 119, 336, and 245). (ii) We are also informed that the mystery system of Egypt employed modes of spoken language which could be understood, only by the initiated. These consisted not only of myths and parables; but also of a secret language called Senzar. (Ancient Mysteries: C. H. Vail, p. 23). (iii) We also understand that the Egyptians attached numerical values both to letters of words and to geometrical figures, with the same intention as with their use of hieroglyphics, i.e., to conceal their teachings. It is further understood that the Egyptian numerical and geometrical symbolism were contained in the 42 Books of Hermes, whose system was the oldest and most elaborate repository of mathematical symbolism. Here again we are reminded of the source of the number philosophy of Pythagoras. (Ancient Mysteries: C. H. Vail, p. 22–23; Clement of Alexandria: Stromata Book V, c. 7 and 9). C. The Education of the Egyptian priests consisted also in the specialization in magic According to Herodotus, the Egyptian Priests possessed super-natural powers, for they had been trained in the esoteric philosophy of the Greater Mysteries, and were experts in Magic. They had the power of controlling the minds of men (hypnosis), the power of predicting the future (prophecy) and the power over nature, (i.e., the power of Gods) by giving commands in the name of the Divinity and accomplishing great deeds. Herodotus also tells us that the most celebrated Oracles of the ancient world were located in Egypt: Hercules at Canopis; Apollo at Apollinopolis Magna; Minerva at Sais; Diana at Bubastis; Mars at Papremis; and Jupiter at Thebes and Ammonium; and that the Greek Oracles were Egyptian imitations. Here it might be well to mention that the Egyptian Priests were the first genuine Priests of history, who exercised control over the laws of nature. Here it might also be well to mention that the Egyptian Book of the Dead is a book of magical formulae and instructions, intended to direct the fate of the departed soul. It was the Prayer Book of the Mystery System of Egypt, and the Egyptian Priest received training in post mortem conditions and the methods of their verification. It must also be noted that Magic was applied religion, or primitive scientific method. (The Egyptian Book of the Dead; Herodotus Bk. II 109, 177; Sandford's Mediterranean World, p. 27; 507; Definition of Magic, Frazier's Golden Bough). 97 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook 3. A Comparison of the Curriculum of the Egyptian Mystery System with the Lists of Books Attributed to Aristotle A. The Curriculum The Curriculum of the Egyptian Mystery System consisted of the following subjects: (i) The Seven Liberal Arts, which formed the foundation training for all Neophytes and included: grammar, Arithmetic, Rhetoric and Dialectic (i.e., the Quadrivium) and Geometry, Astronomy and Music (i.e., the Trivium). (ii) The Sciences of the 42 Books of Hermes In addition to the foundation training prescribed for all Neophytes, those who sought Holy Orders, had to be versed in the books of Hermes and according to Clement of Alexandria, their orders and subjects were as follows:— (a) The Singer or Odus, who must know two books of Hermes dealing with Music i.e., the hymns of the Gods. (b) The Horoscopus, who must know four books of Hermes dealing with Astronomy. (c) The Hierogrammat, who must know the hieroglyphics, cosmography, geography, astronomy and the topography of Egypt and Land Surveying. (d) The Stolistes, who must know the books of Hermes that deal with slaughter of animals and the process of embalming. (e) The Prophetes, who is the President of the temple, and must know ten books of Hermes dealing with higher esoteric theology and the whole education of priests. (f) The Pastophori, who must know six books of Hermes, which are medical books, dealing with physiology, the diseases of male and female, anatomy, drugs and instruments. (iii) The Sciences of the Monuments (Pyramids, Temples, Libraries, Obelisks, Phinxes, Idols);— Architecture, masonry, carpentry, engineering, sculpture, metallurgy, agriculture, mining and forestry. Art (drawing and painting). (iv) The Secret Sciences Numerical symbolism, geometrical symbolism, magic, the book of the Dead, myths and parables. 98 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook (v) The Social Order and Its Protection The Priests of Egypt were also Lawyers, Judges, officials of government, Business Men and Sailors and Captains. Hence, they must have been trained in Economics, Civics, Law, Government, Statistics, census taking, navigation, ship building, military science, the manufacture of chariots and horse breeding. If we compare 3A with 3B which immediately follows, we would discover that the curriculum of the Egyptian Mystery System covered a much wider range of scientific subjects than those of Aristotle's list, which it includes. N.B. Note also that The Seven Liberal Arts: The Quadrivium and Trivium originated from the Egyptian Mysteries. (The Mechanical Triumphs of the Ancient Egyptians by F. M. Barber). (The Book of the Foundation of Temples by Moret). (A short history of Mathematics by W. W. R. Ball). (The Problem of Obelisks by R. Engelbach). (The Great Pyramid Its Divine Message by D. Davidson). (History of Mathematics by Florian Cajori). B. Aristotle's list of books, prepared by himself. (1) Aristotle is said to have prepared a list of books in the following order (B. D. Alexander's Hist. of Phil. p. 97; Wm. Turner's Hist. of Phil. p. 129). (i) Theoretic whose purpose was truth, and which included (a) Mathematics (b) Physics and (c) Theology. (ii) Practical, whose purpose was usefulness, and which included (a) Ethics (b) Economics (c) Politics and (iii) Poetic or Productive, whose purpose was beauty, and which included (a) Poetry (b) Art and (c ) Rhetoric. An examination and comparison of 3 A. with 3 B. show that (a) The Curriculum of the Egyptian Mystery System included all the scientific and philosophic subjects credited to the authorship of Aristotle. (b) The books attributed to Aristotle's authorship cannot be dissociated from Egyptian origin, as elsewhere referred to, both through the plunder of the Royal Library of Alexandria and through research carried on at the centre by Aristotle himself. As has been mentioned elsewhere, the writings of Aristotle are disputed by modern scholarship (Wm. Turner's Hist. of Phil. p. 127) and I feel more justified in making the comparison between the curriculum of the Mystery System and the list said to be drawn up by Aristotle himself; rather than with the notorious list of one thousand books, whose subjects are nevertheless included under the curriculum of the Egyptian Mystery System. (Zeller's Hist. of Phil. p. 173). 99 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook CHAPTER VIII: Memphite Theology is the Basis of all Important Doctrines in Greek Philosophy History and Description: The Memphite Theology is an inscription on a stone, now kept in the British Museum. It contains the theological, cosmological and philosophical views of the Egyptians. It has already been referred to in my treatment of Plato's doctrines; but it must be repeated here to show its full importance as the basis of the entire field of Greek philosophy. It is dated 700 B.C., and bears the name of an Egyptian Pharaoh who stated that he had copied an inscription of his ancestors. This statement is verified by language and typical arrangement of the text, and therefore assigns the original date of the Memphite Theology to a very early period of Egyptian history, i.e., the time when the first Dynasties had made their new capital at Memphis: the city of the God Ptah, i.e., between 4000 and 3500 B.C. (Intellectual Adventure of Man by Frankfort, p. 55). The Text: This consists of three supplementary parts, each of which will be treated separately: both as regards its teachings and the identity in Greek philosophy. Part I presents the Gods of Chaos. Part II presents the Gods of Order and arrangement in creation; and Part III presents the Primate of the Gods, or the God of Gods, through whose (Logos) creation was accomplished. In Part I pre-creation or chaos is represented as follows:— A. Text of Part I: The Primate of the Gods Ptah, conceived in his heart, everything that exists and by His utterance created them all. He is first to emerge from the primeval waters of Nun in the form of a Primeval Hill. Closely following the Hill, the God Atom also emerges from the waters and sits upon Ptah (the Hill). There remain in the waters four pairs of male and female gods (the Ogdoad, or unity of Eight-Gods), bearing the following names: (1) Nun and Naunet, i.e., the Primeval waters and the counter heaven. (2) Huh and Hauhet, i.e., the boundless and its opposite: (3) Kuk and Kauket, i.e., darkness and its opposite; and (4) Amun, i.e., (Amon) and Amaunet, i.e., the hidden and its opposite. (Egyptian Religion by Frankfort, p. 20; 23. Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man by Frankfort, p. 21). 100 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook B. The Philosophy of Part I: (1) Ptah has the following attributes: (a) The Primate of the Gods, i.e., The God of Gods (b) The Logos. Thought and creative utterance and power (Egyptian Religion by Frankfort, p. 23). (c) The God of Order and form (d) The Divine Artificer and Potter (Fire Philosophy by Swinburne Clymer; Jamblichus; Ancient Egypt by John Kendrick, Bk. I, p. 318; 339). It must be noted that while the Sun God Atom sits upon Ptah the Primeval Hill He accomplishes the work of creation. But the Memphite Theology dates back to 4000 B.C., when it is believed the Greeks were unknown (Frankfort's Intellectual Adventure of Man, p. 5; 53; 55. The Book of the Dead, p. 17). This arrangement in the Memphite Theology could only mean that the ingredients of the Primeval Chaos contained ten principles: four pairs of opposite principles, together with two other gods: Ptah representing Mind, Thought, and creative Utterance; while Atom joins himself to Ptah and acts as Demiurge and executes the work of creation. From such an arrangement in the cosmos we are in position to infer the following philosophies: (a) Water is the source of all things. (b) Creation was accomplished by the unity of two creative principles: Ptah and Atom, i.e., the unity of Mind (nous) with Logos (creative Utterance). (c) Atom was the Demiurge or Intermediate God in creation. He was also Sun God or Fire God. (d) Opposite Principles control the life of the universe. (e) The elements in creation were Fire (Atom), Water (Nun), Earth (Ptah or Ta-tjenen) and Air. Part I of the Memphite Theology is the correct Source of these philosophies: but strangely the Greeks have claimed them as their production, although without any right whatever. C. Individual Greek Philosophers to whom portions of the philosophy of the Memphite Theology has been assigned: Of these doctrines, "water as the source of all things" has been assigned to Thales (Zeller: Hist. of Phil. p. 38); that of the "Boundless or Unlimited", has been assigned to Anaximander (Zeller: Hist. of Phil. p. 40); while that of "Air as the basis of life" has been assigned to Anaximenes (Zeller: Hist. of Phil. p. 42). Furthermore, the doctrine "that Fire underlies the life of the universe", has been assigned not only to Pythagoras, who spoke of the functions of the central and peripheral Fires; but also to Heraclitus who spoke of the transmutation of Fire into the other elements, and their transmutation back into Fire. 101 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook Also Democritus who spoke of Fire Atoms, as filling space as the Mind or Soul of the World; and Plato who spoke of a World-Soul, which is composed of Fire Atoms. (Wm. Turner's Hist. of Phil. p. 42; 5; Zeller's Hist. of Phil. p. 53; 149; Plato's Timaeus, 30A; B. D. Alexander's Hist. of Phil., p. 40). Likewise the doctrine of opposites has been assigned not only to Pythagoras, who spoke of the elements of the unit as odd and even; but also to (a) Heraclitus who spoke of "the unity of warring opposites"; (b) Parmenides who spoke of the distinction between Being and Not-Being; (c) Socrates, who spoke of things as being generated from their opposites; and (d) Plato who spoke of Ideas and Noumena as real and perfect; but phenomena as unreal and imperfect. (The Phaedrus of Plato 250; Parmenides 132D; Aristotle Metaphysics I, 6; 987b, 9; Plato Phaedo 70E; Zeller's Hist. of Phil. p. 51; 61, 68; The Timaeus, p. 28). Furthermore, the doctrines of the Nous (or Mind) or an Intelligent Agency as responsible for creation, has been assigned not only to Anaxagoras, but also to Socrates who spoke of the existence of useful things as the work of an Intelligence: To Plato who spoke of a World-Soul or Mind, as the cause of life and knowledge in the universe and to Democritus, who attached a similar meaning. (Zeller's Hist. of Phil. p. 80; p. 85; Wm. Turner's Hist. of Phil. p. 82; p. 109). The doctrine of the Logos has been assigned to Heraclitus who spoke of Fire as the Logos or creative principle in nature; while the doctrine of the Demiurge, or an Intermediate God who created the world, has been assigned to Plato (Wm. Turner's Hist. of Phil. p. 55, p. 108). A. Text of Part II The Gods of Order and arrangement in the cosmos are represented by nine gods, in one Godhead, called the Ennead. Here Atum (Atom), the source of the Ogdoad, is also retained as the source of the Gods of Order and arrangement. Atum (Atom) names four pairs of parts of his own body, and thus creates eight Gods, who together with himself become nine. These Eight Gods are the created Gods, the first creatures of this world; and Atum (Atom), the Creator God, the Demiurge, of whom Plato spoke. The Gods whom Atum (Atom) projected from his body were: (i) Shu (Air) (ii) Tefnut (Moisture) (iii) Geb (Earth) and (iv) Nut (Sky); 102 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook who are said to have given birth to four other Gods: (v) Osiris (the God of omnipotence and omniscience) (vi) Isis (wife of Osiris, Female Principle) (vii) Seth (the opposite of good) (viii) Nephthys (Female Principle in the Unseen World). (Plutarch: Isis et Osiris, 355A; 364C; 371B; Frankfurt; Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man, p. 66–67). B. The Philosophy of Part II As we read the text of Part II, we find that the Sun God Atum (Atom) who was present in the Chaos was also present at the development of orderly arrangement in the cosmos. At this stage Atum (Atom) assumes the role of creator of all Gods except Ptah, the God of Gods. He next proceeds to accomplish this special type of creation in the following manner: He commands Eight Gods to proceed from His own body according to the names of those eight parts. The result of this creation presents us with what has been called (a) the "Ennead" or the unity of "nine Gods in one Godhead" (b) the doctrine of the Demiurge as in Part I, (c) the doctrine of the created Gods and (d) the doctrine of the Unmoved Mover; also (e) the doctrine of opposites and (f) Omnipotence and Omniscience. Of these doctrines, that of the "Ennead" will be dealt with elsewhere, and since the doctrine of the Demiurge has already been treated, together with (c) the created Gods, I shall now discuss the doctrine of the Unmoved Mover, as based upon the same act of creation. According to the Memphite Theology of the Egyptians, Atum created Eight Gods who proceeded from eight parts of His own body. He was seated upon Ptah the Hill and was unmoved. In this act of creation Atum (Atom) became the Unmoved Mover. In spite of the Memphite Theology being the direct source of these doctrines, yet Plato has been given credit for the doctrine of the created Gods; while Aristotle has received credit for that of the "Unmoved Mover". Certainly the world has never been more misled. Here it must be made quite clear, that the doctrine of a Demiurge in creation includes two other doctrines: that of the created Gods and that of the Unmoved Mover. It was the function of the Demiurge to create the universe; and in doing so, his first act was the creation of the Gods, who accordingly became the first creatures. But the manner in which the Demiurge created the Gods was the process of projecting them from His own body. This method of creation clearly makes the Demiurge the Unmoved Mover. However the history of Greek philosophy has assigned the authorship of the doctrines of the Demiurge and the created Gods to Plato, and the authorship of the doctrine of the Unmoved Mover to Aristotle. But this so-called Platonic doctrine is one, made up of three inseparable parts (a) the Demiurge (b) the function of the Demiurge and (c) the method of the function: a unity which contradicts Aristotle's authorship of what is really only an inference from the supposed original doctrine of Plato. 103 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook (The Myth of Creation in Plato Timaeus; Wm. Turner; Hist. of Phil., p. 109–110; Zeller's Hist. of Phil. p. 192; Wm. Turner's Hist. of Phil. p. 142). The doctrine of opposites has already been discussed, however, in Part I of the Memphite Theology. One of the pairs of created Gods, Osiris and Isis was used to represent the male and female principles of nature. In addition to this, Osiris had other qualities attached to Him, which might be understood from the following derivatives (a) osh meaning many, and (b) iri meaning to do and also (c) meaning an Eye. Consequently Osiris came to mean not only many eyed or omniscient, but also omnipotent or all powerful. Here again, as in all instances already mentioned, in spite of the fact that the Memphite Theology is the source of Greek philosophy, yet the doctrines of "an Intelligent Cause", a Nous as responsible for the life and conduct of the world, has been assigned to Anaxagoras, Socrates and also Plato, whose World Soul, consisted of fire atoms, like the World Soul of Democritus. (Plato Timaeus 30, 35. Xenophon Memorabilia I, 4, 2; Wm. Turner's Hist. of Phil. 63). A. Text of Part III In this third part of the Memphite Theology, the Primate of the Gods is represented as Ptah: Thought, Logos and Creative Power, which are exercised over all creatures. He transmits power and spirit to all Gods, and controls the lives of all things, animals and men through His thought and commands. In other words it is in Him that all things live move and have their eternal being. B. The Philosophy of Part III From Part III we infer the following doctrines:—(a) all things were created by the thought and command of Ptah, the God of Gods. (b) Through the thought and command of Ptah, we all live, move and have our eternal Being. (c) Ptah is Creator and Preserver as has already been pointed out elsewhere; Ptah's powers were transmitted by magical means to Atum who performed the work of creation. (Intellectual Adventures of Man by Frankfort, p. 52–60). II. Memphite Theology is the Source of Modern Scientific Knowledge A. The Ennead and the Nebular Hypothesis. B. The identity between the Sun God Atom, and the atom of science. A. The Ennead and the Nebular Hypothesis coincide 104 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook Just as the Memphite Theology is the source of Greek philosophy or primitive science, so it is also the basis of modern scientific belief. The Gods of Order and arrangement in the cosmos are represented by nine Gods in the Godhead, called the Ennead. Atum, (Atom), the Sun God, i.e., Fire God, creates eight other Gods, by naming four pairs of parts of his own body, from which they came forth. Here the names of the created Gods were given as Shu and Tefnut (Air and Moisture), Geb and Nut (Earth and Sky); and two other pairs of opposites: Osiris and Isis; and Seth and Nephthys, who are supposed to be the first creatures of this world (Frankfort's Intellectual Adventures of Man, p. 54). Now if we compare this Egyptian cosmology with the Nebular hypothesis of Laplace, we would find very striking similarities in the two contexts. According to the Nebular hypothesis our present solar system was once a molten gaseous nebula. This nebula rotated at an enormous speed, and as the mass cooled down it also contracted and developed greater speed. The result was a bulging at the equator and a gradual breaking off of gaseous rings, which formed themselves into planets. These planets in turn threw off gaseous rings, which formed themselves into smaller bodies, until at last, the sun was left as the remnant of the original parent Nebula. From this context it is clear that the original parent nebula was fire or the Sun, and that by throwing off parts of itself, it created some planets, which in turn threw off parts of themselves and created others. According to the context of the Memphite Theology, the creator God was the Sun God or fire God Atum (Atom), who named four pairs of parts of his own body, from which Gods came forth. But Atum (Atom) together with the Eight Created Gods composed the Ennead or Godhead of nine: a very striking similarity with modern science which teaches that there are nine major planets. We may now summarise these similarities: (a) The creator God in both the Egyptian and Modern Cosmologies is the Sun or Fire. (b) The creator God in both cosmologies creates Gods from parts of Himself. (c) The number of Gods are nine and correspond with the nine major planets. These similarities make it evident that Laplace obtained his hypothesis from the Memphite Theology or other Egyptian sources. Of course the Memphite Theology, according to Frankfort in his Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man, p. 54 does not mention the creation of planets. Nevertheless, since it was the method of the Egyptian to conceal the truth by the use of myths, parables magical principles (primitive scientific method), number philosophy and hieroglyphics, we can easily see what methods might be involved before we could arrive at a better translation of the Memphite Theology. At any rate, the entire setting of the Memphite Theology is astronomical, and what could be more natural, than to expect an astronomical interpretation? It seems well within reason, to regard the Ennead as the heliocentric system of history. Atom the sun God, creating eight other Gods or planets from his own body, as the Unmoved Mover a teaching which has been falsely attributed to Aristotle. 105 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook B. The identity between the Egyptian Sun God Atum (Atom) and the atom of Modern Science: There are two things which I desire to point out in connexion with the relationship between Atum (Atom) the Egyptian Sun God and the atom of modern science. These things are (i) the similarity of attributes and (ii) the similarity of names. (i) The Egyptian God Atum (Atom) means self-created; everything and nothing; a combination of positive and negative principles: all-inclusiveness and emptiness; a Demiurge, possessing creative powers; the Creator Sun. (p. 53, Frankfort's Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man; p. 182, Frankfort's Kingship and the Gods). Atum (Atom) also means "the all and the not yet Being"; (p. 168 Frankfort's Kingship of the Gods). As a God Atum (Atom) represents the principles of opposites. The atom, as the substratum of matter, according to Greek philosophy, is defined by Democritus as "movement of that which is" (To on) within "that which is not" (To mē on). It therefore represents the principle of opposites, and shows the identity between the Egyptian Sun God and the substratum of matter. Furthermore, the atom is defined as "the full and void; being and not-being (Zeller's Hist. of Phil., p. 38) and these definitions coincide with the everything and nothing, and the "allinclusiveness" and emptiness of the Egyptian Sun God. (ii) The similarity of names shared by the Egyptian Sun God and the atom of science: Now, with reference to the similarity of these two names, the first thing we should bear in mind is the fact that they both possess identical attributes, as has been already pointed out in section i; and consequently we are compelled to conclude that the atom of science is the identical name of the Egyptian Sun God: the most ancient of Gods except Ptah, who was present with Atom at creation. The second thing we should bear in mind is the fact that the name of the God Atom (sometimes spelt Atum) belongs to the cosmology of the Memphite Theology, whose date goes back to 4000 B.C. when the Greeks were not even known. Consequently we are compelled to conclude that the Greeks obtained both the original name and the attributes of the Sun God Atom from the Egyptians. Furthermore, the Greeks were unacquainted with the Egyptian language, during the period of the so-called Greek philosophy, dating from the sixth century B.C. and as a consequence transliterated Egyptian words into Greek without regard to their Coptic derivatives. The following Homeric stories verify the practice of the Greeks in the transliteration of Egyptian words and the plagiarism of their legends. (a) According to Homer, Proteus was a Maritime Divinity feeding his phocae on the coast of Egypt. He was endowed with the gift of prophecy which was exercised only upon compulsion. Proteus, however was an Egyptian Pharaoh who succeeded to the throne on the death of Pheron, the son of Sesostris. Proteus was also worshipped at Memphis. The Greeks did not only transliterate the name of this Egyptian King, but also plagiarized on the legend. (Herodotus II, 112). 106 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook (b) Likewise the story of Io the Argive Princess, who was changed into a heifer, and after long wanderings, reached Egypt, where she gave birth to a God, and where she herself was worshipped as the Goddess Isis, points clearly to the introduction of the worship of Isis or Athor, under the symbol of the heifer, at an early period into Argos. Here it must be pointed out that Io is the Coptic name for Moon, and the same word was preserved as the dialect of Argos, without any affinity with any Greek root. It was a habit of the Greeks to Hellenize Egyptian words by transliterating them and adding them to the Greek vocabulary. (c) This practice of borrowing words from nearby nations continued until New Testament times. In Acts of Apostles of the Greek Testament, Chapter 13th and verse 1, the word Niger (i.e., black man) in the name Simeon the Negro is a Roman or Latin word (niger, nigra, nigrum) meaning black. Simeon, of course, was an Egyptian Professor attached to the Church at Rome. The atom of science is really the name of the Egyptian Sun God that has come down to modern times, through the so-called Greek philosophy, and carries identical attributes, with the Sun God. (Diodorus I, 29; John Kendrick's Ancient Egypt, vol. II 5–52; Eust. ad Dionys: Perieg: V). It must be remembered that what we erroneously call Greek philosophy, was the beginning of science or the investigation of nature; and consequently we cannot separate modern science from Greek philosophy. III. Memphite Theology Opens Great Possibilities for Modern Scientific Research A. Greek Concept of the Atom; erroneous. The Greeks derived the meaning of the atom from (i) (alpha) i.e. a negative prefix meaning not; and (ii) (temnein) i.e. the present infinitive active of (temno) to cut. The two derivatives together meaning "that which cannot be cut". For centuries the world has been misled by this misconception of the Greeks: a fact which no doubt, had impeded the progress of atomic research by Western scholars, who had believed in the so-called Greek origin of philosophy or primitive science. Today, however, the Greek conception of the atom is no longer tenable, since modern science has successfully split the atom. B. Great Scientific Secrets in the Memphite Theology, Yet to be Discovered I believe that the time has come, within which man will be able to unlock most of the secrets of nature hitherto hidden and unknown. I have shown that the Nebular Hypothesis of modern times coincides with the teachings of the Memphite Theology, in which the Sun God Atom is said to have created eight other Gods, which together with himself constitute the Ennead of the Egyptians, which correspond to the nine major planets of modern scientific teaching. 107 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook We also know that out of Cosmic Chaos there arose from the primeval waters a pair of Gods i.e. the Primeval Hill and Atom the Sun God, and that through the contact of Atom with the Hill, He received power to create the other eight major planets. This seems to imply that: (i) Atomic energy originates from water and earth, since water H2O, and uranium, an indispensable ingredient in atomic energy, is found in the bowels of the earth. Note that both Atom and the Hill came out of the primeval Waters. (ii) Four pairs of Gods, representing positive and negative principles still remain in water, in the form of male and female frogs and snakes, and constitute four fifths of the secrets of creation, which man has yet to fathom. (iii) Successful scientific research in the principles and secrets of nature lies in the study of the Memphite Theology, whose symbology requires the key of magical principles for its interpretation. With this approach our men of science should be able to unlock the doors of the secrets of nature and become the custodians of unlimited knowledge. This is the legacy of the African continent to the nations of the world. She has laid the cultural foundations of modern progress and therefore she and her people deserve the honour and praise which for centuries have been falsely given to the Greeks. And likewise, it is the purpose of this book to make this revelation the beginning of a universal reformation in race relations, which I believe would be the beginning of the solution of the problem of universal unrest. Part II Chapter IX: Social Reformation through the New Philosophy of African Redemption . Now that it has been shown that philosophy, and the arts and sciences were bequeathed to civilization by the people of North Africa and not by the people of Greece; the pendulum of praise and honour is due to shift from the people of Greece to the people of the African continent who are the rightful heirs of such praise and honour. This is going to mean a tremendous change in world opinion, and attitude, for all people and races who accept the new philosophy of African redemption, i.e. the truth that the Greeks were not the authors of Greek philosophy; but the people of North Africa; would change their opinion from one of disrespect to one of respect for the Black people throughout the world and treat them accordingly. 108 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook It is also going to mean a most important change in the mentality of the Black people: a change from an inferiority complex, to the realization and consciousness of their equality with all the other great peoples of the world, who have built great civilizations. With this change in the mentality of the Black and White people, great changes are also expected in their respective attitudes towards each other, and in society as a whole. In the drama of Greek philosophy there are three actors, who have played distinct parts, namely Alexander the Great, who by an act of aggression invaded Egypt in 333 B.C., and ransacked and looted the Royal Library at Alexandria and together with his companions carried off a booty of scientific, philosophic and religious books. Egypt was then stolen and annexed as a portion of Alexander's empire; but the invasion plan included far more than mere territorial expansion; for it prepared the way and made it possible for the capture of the culture of the African continent. This brings us to the second actor, that is the School of Aristotle whose students moved from Athens to Egypt and converted the royal library, first into a research centre, and secondly into a University and thirdly compiled that vast body of scientific knowledge which they had gained from research, together with the oral instructions which Greek students had received from the Egyptian priests, into what they have called the history of Greek philosophy. In this way, the Greeks stole the Legacy of the African continent and called it their own. And as has already been pointed out, the result of this dishonesty has been the creation of an erroneous world opinion; that the African continent has made no contribution to civilization, because her people are backward and low in intelligence and culture. This erroneous opinion about the Black people has seriously injured them through the centuries up to modern times in which it appears to have reached a climax in the history of human relations. And now we come to the third actor, and that is Ancient Rome, who through the edicts of her Emperors Theodosius in the 4th century A.D. and Justinian in the 6th century A.D. abolished the Mysteries of the African continent; that is the ancient culture system of the world. The higher metaphysical doctrines of those Mysteries could not be comprehended; the spiritual powers of the priests were unsurpassed; the magic of the rites and ceremonies filled the people with awe; Egypt was the holy land of the ancient world and the Mysteries were the one, ancient and holy Catholic religion, whose power was supreme. This lofty culture system of the Black people filled Rome with envy, and consequently she legalized Christianity which she had persecuted for five long centuries, and set it up as a state religion and as a rival of Mysteries, its own mother. This is why the Mysteries have been despised; this is why other ancient religions of the Black people are despised; because they are all offspring of the African Mysteries, which have never been clearly understood by Europeans, and consequently have provoked their prejudice and condemnation. In keeping with the plan of Emperors Theodosius and Justinian to exterminate and forever suppress the culture system of the African continent the Christian church established its missionary enterprise to fight against what it has called paganism. 109 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook Consequently missionaries and educators have gone to the mission field with a superiority complex, born of miseducation and disrespect: a prejudice which has made it impossible for them to accomplish the blessings which missionary enterprise might otherwise have accomplished. For this reason Missionary enterprise has been responsible for a positive injury against the African people, which consists of the perpetual caricature of African culture in literature and exhibitions which provoke laughter and disrespect. This then is only a brief summary of the parts played by the persons of the drama of Greek philosophy and the resultant effects upon the Black people. This drama might be called the Causa Causarum of the social plight of the peoples of African descent, because it has made the White and Black races not only common victims of a false racial tradition about the African continent but also partners in the solution of the problem of racial reformation. I believe that a reformation of this kind is possible, if the best minds of both racial groups cooperate in its accomplishment. Both groups have been the common victims of miseducation arising from a false tradition about the African continent and it has caused them to develop attitudes according to their common belief: The White people, a superiority complex; and the Black people, the corresponding inferiority complex; and if we are to accomplish a reformation in race relations it is obvious that both racial groups must combine their efforts in the abandonment and destruction of that mentality which has plunged the Black people into their social plight. This I suggest should be done by a worldwide dissemination of the truth, through a system of reeducation, in order to stimulate and encourage a change in the attitude of races toward each other In combining their efforts, both races must not only preach and teach the truth that the Mystery system of the African continent gave the world philosophy and religion, and the arts and sciences, but they must see to it that all false praise of the Greeks be removed from the textbooks of our schools and colleges: for this is the practice that has blind-folded the world, and has laid the foundations for the deplorable race relations of the modern world. (a) The name of Pythagoras, for instance, should be deleted from our mathematical textbooks: in Geometry, where the theorem of the square on the hypotenuse of a right angled triangle is called the Pythagorean theorem, because this is not true. (b) we must point out to the world the deception in attaching the authorship of Socrates to the precept 'man know thyself'; and in attaching the authorship of Plato to the four cardinal virtues; since Socrates obtained the self-knowledge precept from the Egyptian temples where it was used as an inscription; and Plato reduced the ten virtues of the North African Mystery system to four (c) we must also prove to the world that the doctrines of the so-called Greek philosophers originated from the ancient Mystery System of North Africa. 110 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook This proof has been set forth in chapters five to eight of 'Stolen Legacy,' and in order to carry out our world-wide crusade we must recommend 'Stolen Legacy,' for adoption and study in the schools and colleges of both racial groups and in our fraternities, sororities and inter-racial groups, in order that young and old of our present generation might all get to know the truth and be able to pass it on to future generations. This I believe would be a very helpful method by which this process of re-education would become universal and effective in the creation of a much needed racial reformation. The White people of 'our modern age cannot be regarded as wholly responsible for social conditions which are the result of false racial tradition. It is this that makes race relations a challenge to the best minds of both racial groups to combine their efforts in its solution. But our disturbed race relations have also another cause. This I would say is both supplementary and intensive; for the false tradition about the backwardness of the African continent , created by Alexander the Great and Aristotle's School has been dramatized by missionary literature and exhibitions, as the will of Roman Emperors and as a source of laughter and disrespect. There is no doubt that this policy has created bitterness and dissatisfaction in the minds of natives, who have been compelled to question the sincerity of the missionary. In the meantime missionary enterprise gains the sympathy and support of a miseducated world, in order to carry on its programme. What can we do to eradicate this second and more subtle evil: the dramatization of a false tradition so as to make it appear as true? I suggest that since the missionary dramatizes false tradition because he himself also believes it, we should combine our efforts, first of all in reeducating him so that he might know the truth and change his superiority complex which is responsible for his mistaken policy. His re-education should not only consist of a thorough study of the ideas and arguments contained in my book 'Stolen Legacy'; but he must also be given special training in the language, customs and ideals of Africans, in order to make him cultivate an attitude of respect for the culture of the African continent, seemingly the oldest specimen to have been developed by mankind; because that continent is the birth place and the cradle of the Ancient Mysteries. With a world enlightened as to the real truth about the place of the African continent in the history of civilization, false tradition and belief should cease to be effective, disrespect and prejudice should tend to disappear, and race relations should tend to be normal and peaceful. This brings us to the final problem, the problem of African redemption. The aims of 'Stolen Legacy' are not only to stimulate a reformation in race relations and scientific research; but also to cultivate race pride in the Black people themselves and to offer them a New Philosophy of African Redemption as the Modus Operandi of achieving racial reformation. 111 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook This New Philosophy of Redemption consists of a simple proposition as follows: 'The Greeks were not the authors of Greek philosophy, but the Black people of North Africa, The Egyptians.' Now, in order to explain the value of this proposition, three questions must be asked and answered. (a) As a simple proposition, what is its significance? Its significance lies in the fact that it is a statement of an important truth, which is the exposure of Greek dishonesty. (b) Why is this proposition called a philosophy? A philosophy is an accepted belief, and this proposition is a philosophy because it is offered as a belief, worthy of acceptance. (c) What is a philosophy of redemption? A philosophy of redemption is not merely an accepted belief; but a belief that is also lived in order to enjoy the benefits of its teaching. This proposition will become a philosophy of redemption to all Black people, when they accept it as a belief and live up to it. This brings us to our final question and that is, how to live up to this philosophy of redemption? In other words, how shall the Black people work out their own salvation? From the outset my readers and co-workers in the solution of a common problem, must be reminded that our philosophy of redemption is a psychological process, involving a change in belief or mentality to be followed by a corresponding change in behaviour. It really signifies a mental emancipation, in which the Black people will be liberated from the chain of traditional falsehood, which for centuries has incarcerated them in the prison of inferiority complex and world humiliation and insult. This mental emancipation or redemption, it must be remembered, has two functions. It is general, when, on the one hand, the phenomenon of our unwholesome race relations is regarded as a general problem needing a general emancipation of both races in order to affect a solution. In this general sense emancipation transcends the limitations and boundaries of race, and therefore includes the whole world, White and Black people, since we are all victims of the same chain of the traditional falsehood, that has incarcerated the modern world. On the other hand, emancipation or redemption is specific, when we refer to the effects of the phenomenon of unwholesome race relations upon the Black people. It is freedom from such conditions that constitutes the specific function of emancipation or redemption. We digressed somewhat in order to explain the terms philosophy and philosophy of redemption, believing it to be necessary before proceeding to answer the next question: how to live up to this New Philosophy of Redemption? How must it be worked out? 112 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook Being liberated from inferiority complex by their New Philosophy of Redemption, which is destined to destroy the chain of false tradition which has incarcerated them, the Black people must face and interpret the world according to their new vision and philosophy. Throughout the centuries up to our modern times, world conditions have been influenced by two phenomena which have affected human relations. (i) The giving of false praise to the Greeks: a custom which appears to be an educational policy conducted by educational institutions. This has led to the false worship of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, as intellectual gods in all the leading universities of the world, and in support of this intellectual worship, these institutions have also organized what are known as Greek lettered fraternities and sororities, as the symbols of the superiority of Greek intellect and culture. (ii) The second phenomenon is Missionary enterprise whereby the Black people's culture has been caricatured in literature and exhibitions, in such specimens as provoke disrespect and laughter. Never let us forget that the Roman Emperors Theodosius and Justinian were responsible for the abolition of the Egyptian Mysteries that is the culture system of the Black people, and also for the establishment of Christianity for its perpetual suppression. Likewise, never let us forget when we are reviewing this bit of history that the Greeks called the Egyptians Hoi Aiguptoi which meant Black people. In living up to their New Philosophy of Redemption, the life of the Black people will have to be one of counteraction against these two sets of conditions. In the first place the Black people must adopt a negative attitude towards this type of phenomena, because they have become fully aware that these phenomena are the result of a false tradition, and therefore also partake of the nature of falsehood and insincerity. In this negative attitude the Black people of the world must shun the false tradition and must teach the truth, which is their New Philosophy of Redemption. This must be done in the home to young children; in the colleges and schools to students; from the pulpits and platforms to audiences; and in the fraternities and sororities to young men and women. This New Philosophy of Redemption, being a revelation of truth in the history of Black people's civilization must become a necessary portion of their education, and must be taught for generations and centuries to come; in order to fill them with inspiration and pride and liberate them from mental servitude. In the second place, in this negative attitude the Black people must demonstrate their disbelief in the false worship of Greek intellect. This should be done in the following three ways: (i) They must discontinue the practice of quoting Socrates, Plato and Aristotle in their speeches as intellectual models; because we know that their philosophy was stolen (ii) They must relinquish membership from all Greek lettered fraternities and sororities and (iii) They must abolish all Greek lettered fraternities and sororities from all colored colleges because they have been a source of the promotion of inferiority complex and of educating the Black people against themselves. 113 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook We come now to the counteraction of the second set of phenomena, the missionary activities in defamatory literature and exhibitions which provoke disrespect for and laughter at the Black people. Just as in the first set of phenomena, so is it in the second, the Black people must adopt a negative attitude in their attempt to live up to their philosophy of redemption. Of course, they are perfectly well aware that the activities of missionaries are the result of their own miseducation through the medium of a false tradition about Black people; but since their problem is also one of emancipation from certain social evils, the Black people feel that they are entitled to a change in Missionary policy. For these reasons I suggest that the negative attitude of the Black people should consist first of a boycott of missionary literature and exhibitions, and secondly, of a perpetual protest against these forms of missionary policy, until a change is brought about. For as long as Missionary enterprise maintains its policy of militancy against African culture, the Black people will be disrespected. This is the least that the Black people are entitled to: respectful treatment, because they are the representatives of the oldest civilization in the world, from which all other cultures have borrowed. I have frequently seen in the parish magazines of some European churches, pictures of the following description: An African Chief, dressed in a new silk hat, a long shirt, but no trousers, a frock coat and barefeet; probably to provide amusement for the parishioners and to excite their pity. This is what the Black people must protest against and this is how they must live up to their philosophy of redemption and work it out. In conclusion, let us remember that the unfortunate position of the modern church in being associated with the drama of Greek philosophy is excusable; because her missionary function has been due to the erroneous mandates and edicts of secular Princes and Emperors, who ruled the church, when it was only a department of state. This bit of ecclesiastical history should be well known to the early branches of the Christian church and consequently, they are the ones whom our enlightened age expects to initiate a change in missionary policy, which would free themselves from the error and superstition of human relations. This lead of the various branches of Catholicism should be followed by Protestantism, so that the entire church of Christ on earth should be united in this racial reformation, and carry to the mission field a practical gospel of happiness; that is happiness that must begin while we are here on earth; a gospel that is interested in the total welfare of the people. A gospel which ignores the social and economic rights of natives and emphasizes only happiness in an unknown world is one-sided, misleading, and contrary to Christian tenets and practice. It was early Christianity that established a diaconate for the express purpose of solving the economic problems of its adherents; so that they might begin in their earthly life to experience what happiness really meant. 114 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook It is evident that the benefits of religion are intended to be coextensive with human needs and unless the Christian religion changes its missionary policy with respect to the Culture of the Black people, it would be difficult for them to obtain complete emancipation from the social injuries created by Ancient Rome. Appendix The purpose of this appendix is to present a brief analysis and summary of the arguments, conclusions and inferences which relate to the subject matter which has already been treated. It is also hoped that it will serve the secondary purpose of simplification. ARGUMENT I: Greek philosophy was stolen Egyptian philosophy Because history tells us that (i) The teachings of the Egyptian Mystery System travelled from Egypt to the island Samos, and from Samos to Croton and Elea in Italy, and lastly from Italy to Athens in Greece through the medium of Pythagoras and the Eleatic and late Ionic philosophers. Accordingly, Egypt was the true source of the Mystery teachings and therefore any claim to such origin by the ancient Greeks is not only erroneous but must have been based upon dishonest motives. (ii) History also represents the early life and education of Greek philosophers as a blank and their chronology as a matter of speculation. Consequently it has given the world the opinion that the Greek philosophers, with the exception of the three Athenians, might never have existed and might never have taught the doctrines alleged to them. In other words History represents the PreSocratic philosophers as questionable in existence and under those circumstances they could neither produce philosophy nor claim its authorship, except by questionable and dishonest methods. (iii) The compilation of Greek philosophy appears to have been the idea of Aristotle, but the work of the alumni of his school. The movement was unauthorized by the Greek Government which always hated and persecuted philosophy, because it was Egyptian and foreign. The organization, control and operation of the Mysteries gave the Egyptians the right of ownership to philosophy, and therefore any claims by the ancient Greeks to philosophy must be considered as illegal and dishonest. 115 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook ARGUMENT II: So-called Greek philosophy was alien to the Greeks Because (i) the period of Greek philosophy (Thales to Aristotle) was a period of internal wars among the city states themselves and external wars with their common enemy, the Persians. The Greeks were victims of perpetual internal strife and perpetual fear of annihilation by their common enemy. They had no time which they could devote to the study of nature, for this required the riches and wealth of the leisure classes: but they were too poor to engage in such a pursuit. This is one of the reasons why the Greek philosophers were so few and why the Greeks were unacquainted with philosophy. (ii) The Greeks did not possess the native ability essential to the development of philosophy. The death of Aristotle, who had inherited a vast quantity of books from the library of Alexandria through his friendship with Alexander the Great, was also followed by the death of Greek philosophy which soon degenerated into a system of borrowed ideas known as eclecticism. This system contained nothing new in spite of the great treasure of knowledge which they had obtained through Alexander's friendship with Aristotle and his conquest of Egypt. (iii) The Greeks rejected and persecuted philosophy owing to the fact that it came from an outside and foreign source and contained strange ideas with which they were unacquainted. This prejudice led to the policy of persecution. Hence Anaxagoras was indicted and escaped from prison and fled to Ionia in exile. Socrates was executed; Plato fled to Megara to the rescue of Euclid; and Aristotle was indicted and escaped into exile. This policy of the Greeks would be meaningless, if it did not indicate that philosophy was alien to Greek mentality. ARGUMENT III: Greek philosophy was the offspring of the Egyptian Mystery System Because complete identity had been found to exist between the Egyptian Mystery System and Greek philosophy with the only exception of age in relation of parent to child. The Egyptian Mystery System antedated that of Greece by many thousands of years. The following are the circumstances and conditions of identity: (i) Complete agreement between the Egyptian, theory of salvation and the purpose of Greek philosophy, i.e., to make man become Godlike by virtue and educational disciplines. (ii) Complete agreement of the conditions of initiation into both systems, i.e., preparation (in gradual stages of virtue) before every initiation. (iii) Complete agreement in tenets and practice. 116 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook (iv) History tells us that the remains of the Ancient Grand Temple of Luxor have been traced to the banks of the Nile in the ancient city of Thebes, a short distance from Danderah, now called upper Egypt. It also tells us that this Grand Temple was constructed by Pharaoh Amenothis III who began it, and Rameses II who completed it. At the time of Greek philosophy, the Mystery System of Egypt was the only such system in the ancient world, and therefore its Grand Lodge was the only such Grand Lodge in existence. It was the seat of government, having organized the ancient world into a universal or catholic brotherhood with jurisdiction over all minor lodges and schools wherever they were. And whether we call it the Mysteries or Greek philosophy or Free Masonry, the system was one and all branches came out of that one and were subordinate to it. (v) The identity between the Egyptian Mysteries and Greek philosophy is also established by the fact that when the Roman Emperors Theodosius and Justinian issued their edicts closing down the Egyptian Mysteries, the effect was the same upon the philosophical schools in Greece, for they had to be closed. Things which are affected equally by the same cause are themselves equal. ARGUMENT IV: The Egyptians educated the Greeks Because history supports the following facts: (i) The effects of the Persian conquest upon Egypt (a) Removed immigration restrictions against the Greeks. (b) Opened up Egypt to Greek research and (c) encouraged students from Ionia and elsewhere to visit Egypt for the purpose of their education. (ii) The effects of the conquest of Alexander the Great upon Egypt (a) It was the custom of ancient armies when invading countries to search for treasures in libraries and temples. Accordingly it is believed that Alexander and his friends who accompanied him ransacked the Library of Alexandria and other libraries and helped themselves with books. It is also believed that this was how Aristotle got the vast quantity of books alleged to his authorship and how he acquired exaggerated fame. (b) The Library of Alexandria was taken over by the Alumni of Aristotle's school and converted into a research centre and University, for the education of the Greeks who were compelled to use Egyptian Professors, on account of linguistic difficulties and other reasons. (c) Apart from the looting of libraries and the conversion of the Library of Alexandria into a University for their education, the Greeks had another way of adopting the culture of the Egyptians. The Ptolemies used to commandeer useful information from the Egyptian High Priests, and we are told that Ptolemy I Soter commanded the High Priest Manetho to write a history of religion and philosophy of the Egyptians and this was done and the volumes became the chief text books in the University of Alexandria. 117 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook (iii) The Egyptians were the first to civilize the Greeks History tells us that the Greeks received the influence of civilization from three sources: colonizers first from Egypt, colonizers secondly from Phoenicia and colonizers thirdly from Thrace. It also tells us that these colonies were under the government of wise men who subdued the ferocity of the ignorant populace, not only by means of civil institutions, but also by the strong chain of religion and the fear of the Gods. Those colonizers were Cecrops from Egypt, Cadmus from Phoenicia and Orpheus from Thrace. ARGUMENT V: The doctrines of Greek philosophers are the doctrines of the Egyptian Mystery System The proof of this proposition is really one of the main purposes of this book and hence chapters five and six have been devoted to this purpose. The Egyptian teachings were expressed in symbols of various types and therefore their origin can be established by reference to the particular symbol in question. In these chapters therefore mention has been made not only of the names of Greek philosophers and the doctrines which have been ascribed to them; but also the necessary references to the particular types of symbology, in proof of their Egyptian origin. These have been given in the Summary of Conclusions as follow: 1. The early Ionic philosophers have been credited with the doctrines that (a) all things originated from water (b) all things originated from the boundless or primitive chaos and (c) all things originated from air. But these doctrines could not have been those of the Ionic philosophers; since we find the same ideas expressed in the first chapter of Genesis, where we are told that at the beginning the world was in a state of chaos, without form and void (boundless); and how the spirit of God (air) moved upon the waters and separated them from dry land and earth from sky; and how step by step, living things came out of the waters and how finally, through the breath of life (air) man came into existence. Genesis is the first book of the Pentateuch whose date has been placed to the Eighth Century B.C.: a time when the early Ionic philosophers did not even exist and who therefore could not have been the authors of these doctrines. Similarly, the authorship of Genesis has been ascribed to Moses, who Philo tells us was an Egyptian Priest, a Hierogrammat, and learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians. But the age in which Moses lived must be associated with the Exodus of the Israelites which he conducted in the 21st Egyptian Dynasty: 1100 B.C. in the reign of Bocchoris. But the creation story of Genesis coincides with the creation story of the Memphite Theology of the Egyptians, which takes us back to between 4 and 5 thousand B.C. This means that the doctrines of the early Ionians arose neither at their time (the fifth century B.C.), nor at the time of Pentateuch (the eighth century B.C.), nor yet at the time of Moses (the eleventh century B.C.), but at the time of the Memphite Theology (between 4 and 5 thousand B.C.) and therefore definitely point to Egyptian origin. 118 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook 2. The Eleatic philosophers have been named as (i) Zenophanes who was a satirist (ii) Zeno whose treatment of space and time led to a reductio ad absurdum and (iii) Parmenides who alone deserves notice. He has been credited with the definitions of Being and non-Being, which he expressed as 'that which is' and 'that which is not'. In other words, nature or reality consists of two properties, i.e., a positive and a negative. But Parmenides introduced no new doctrine, when he defined the principle of opposites. This principle was used by Pythagoras in his theory of numbers; by Socrates in his proof of the immortality of the Soul; by Plato in his Theory of Ideas and the distinction between phenomena and noumena; and by Aristotle in his definition of the attributes of Being. In all these instances it has been shown that the doctrine of opposites originated from the Egyptian Mystery System, in connection with which Gods were represented as male and female, and temples carried double pillars in front of them to indicate positive and negative principles of nature. 3. The late Ionic philosophers have been named as (i) Heracleitus who taught that the world was produced by fire, through a process of transmutation; and that since all things originate from Fire, then Fire is the Logos. (ii) Anaxagoras, who taught that Mind or Nous is the source of life in the Universe and (iii) Democritus, who taught that atoms underlie all material things; that life and death are merely changes brought about by variation in the mixture of atoms, which do not die because they are immortal. Now, taking these doctrines in the order in which they come, their Egyptian origin has been fully established. (a) The doctrine of Fire has been traced to the Egyptians, whose Mystery System was a Fire Philosophy and who worshipped the God of Fire in their pyramids. The word pyramid is a Greek word, whose derivative pyr means fire. This doctrine takes us back to the pyramid age in Egypt 33 hundred B.C. when, of course, the Greeks were unknown. (b) It must be noted that the doctrine of the Logos has been identified by Heracleitus with the doctrine of Fire. This is as it should be, because (c) in the doctrine of the created Gods which has been ascribed to Plato, Atom the Sun God or Fire performs the function of Demiurge in creating the Gods. (d) Similarly in the doctrine of the Unmoved Mover ascribed to Aristotle, the Fire God Atom while unmoved and sitting upon the Primeval Hill, creates the Gods by commanding them to proceed from various parts of His own body. In this way Atom also became the Unmoved Mover. This makes it clear that the Logos of Heracleitus is identical with the Demiurge of Plato and the Unmoved Mover of Aristotle. The function of Atom as Demiurge and the method of His creation are found in the Memphite Theology of the Egyptians. Here 119 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook I would like to suggest that students who are interested in tracing the influence of Egyptian philosophy upon Christian thought, should read this portion of my book together with the first chapter of St. John's gospel. The problem of permanence and change is also traced in the Creation story of the Memphite Theology in which eternal matter is represented by chaos, and change by the gradual formation of order. (e) The doctrine of Mind or Nous, has been ascribed not only to Anaxagoras, but also to Democritus who spoke of it as being composed of fire atoms distributed throughout the universe and Socrates who has been credited with the teleological premise: that whatsoever exists for a useful purpose is the work of an Intelligence. This doctrine has been traced to the Egyptian Mystery System, in which the God Osiris was represented by an Open Eye; signifying not only omniscience, but also omnipotence. All Masonic lodges carry this symbol with the same meaning today. (f) The doctrine of the atom has been ascribed to Democritus, who does not define but describes its properties. It is the basis of life; it is immortal and does not die; and when many of them are mixed in certain ways the result is a radical change. These properties coincide with the properties of Atom the Sun God and the Demiurge in creation, who created other Gods from various parts of himself. He was the basis of life and giver of life. But Atom the Sun God occurs in the creation story of the Memphite Theology and shows the Egyptian origin of the atom. 4. The system of Pythagoras seems to have been so comprehensive that nearly all subsequent philosophers have copied ideas from his teachings. Interpreting nature in the form of mathematics, Pythagoras is credited with teaching the following doctrines: (a) The properties of Number include opposite elements: odd and even, finite and infinite, and positive and negative. This principle of opposites was copied by and used in the teachings of Heracleitus, Parmenides, Democritus, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. (b) The doctrine of Harmony, defined as the union of opposites. This idea was copied by and used in the teachings of Heracleitus, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. (c) Fire (central and peripheral) was taught to be the basis of creation. This doctrine was also used by and in the teachings of Heracleitus, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Socrates and Plato. (d) The immortality of the soul and The Summum Bonum. This was taught by Pythagoras in the form of a transmigration of the soul. It was also taught by Socrates as the purpose of philosophy through which, the soul feeding upon the truth congenial to its divine nature, was enabled to escape the wheel of rebirth and to attain the final consummation of unity with God. All the doctrines of Pythagoras have been shown to originate from the Egyptian Mystery System. 120 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook Number possesses opposite elements and the principle of opposites belongs to the Egyptian Mystery System in which it was represented by male and female Gods. Harmony being a blending of opposites, needs no further reference, and Fire likewise takes us back to the Egyptian Mystery System which was a Fire Philosophy and its Initiates Fire worshippers. Finally, the purpose of philosophy was the salvation of the soul. This was accomplished by methods of purification offered by the Egyptian Mysteries, which lifted man from the mortal to the immortal level. This was the Summum Bonum, The Greatest Good. 5. Socrates (A) His life and (B) His doctrines (C) His indictment, condemnation and death (D) His farewell conversations. A. In his life he voluntarily adopted secrecy and poverty, in order that he might avoid the temptation of riches and be enabled to cultivate the virtues required by the Mysteries. B. All his doctrines likewise associate him with the Egyptian Mysteries. (i) His doctrine of the Mind or Nous as Intelligence which underlies creation, was represented in Egyptian temples, just as in modern Masonic temples, by the "Open Eye of Osiris", indicating omniscience and omnipotence. (ii) His doctrine of self knowledge: "Man know thyself" was copied directly or indirectly from among the inscriptions which appeared on the outside of the Mystery temples in Egypt. (iii) His doctrines of Opposites and Harmony were a testimony of the custom of the Mysteries to demonstrate the principle of opposites in nature by pairs of male and female Gods and also by double pillars in front of temples. (iv) His doctrines of Immortality, Salvation of the Soul and The Summum Bonum were a summary of the theory of salvation as was taught by the Mysteries. Socrates himself explained it. The purpose of philosophy was the salvation of the soul by a process of purification which lifted man from the mortal level and raised him to the immortal. This was an attainment, this was the Summum Bonum or Greatest Good. C. His indictment, condemnation and death are circumstances which also show his association with the Mysteries. He was indicted for the introduction of foreign Gods and the corruption of Athenian Youth and was condemned and put to death. The foreign Gods were the Gods of the Mysteries and his submission to martyrdom was due on the one hand to the prejudice of the Athenian authorities, while on the other hand, to his virtue of courage, required by the Mysteries. 121 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook D. His farewell conversations also show his membership with the great Egyptian Order. There are two accounts of these conversations: one by Crito and the other by Phaedo. Crito describes the brotherly behaviour of a band of faithful friends and Neophytes who visited him daily while he was in prison awaiting his execution. The purpose of these visits was to secure the escape of a brother; but their efforts were in vain, for he refused to yield to their entreaties. Phaedo mentions that the theme of the other conversation was the immortality of the soul in which Socrates endeavoured to give them some proofs by his application of the principles of opposites. We are also told that towards the end of the conversations, and just before he drank the poison, Socrates requested Crito to pay for him a certain debt which he owed. These conversations reveal the following facts: (a) The brotherly love of the visiting Neophytes in their attempt to secure the escape of their brother Socrates. (b) A final class was conducted by Socrates on the doctrine of immortality: the central doctrine of the Egyptian Mysteries and (c) A final request of Socrates to have a debt paid for him and (d) These conversations constitute the earliest specimen of Masonic literature. All four of which facts point to membership in the Egyptian Mystery System. It was a Universal Brotherhood and required the cultivation of brotherly love. Its central teaching was the immortality of the soul, and it also required all Initiates to practice the virtues of justice and honesty and therefore to pay their debts. E. It is believed that Socrates did not commit his teachings to writings. This was also in obedience to the secrecy of the Mysteries. 6. Plato (A) His early life and education as in the case of all other philosophers are unknown to history, which represents him as fleeing from Athens after the death of Socrates and after twelve years during which time he visited Euclid at Megara, the Pythagoreans in Italy, Dionysius in Sicily and the Mystery System in Egypt, he returned to Athens and opened an Academy, where he taught for 20 years. (B) His doctrines which are scattered over a wide area of literature consisting of 36 dialogues are disputed by modern scholarship. The pupils of Socrates especially Plato are supposed to have published his teachings, and it is not known how much of this vast literature belongs to Plato and how much to Socrates. The doctrines of Plato have all been traced to Egyptian origin. 122 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook (i) The Theory of Ideas, which he illustrated by reference to the phenomena of nature, is a distinction between the Ideas or noumena and their copies the phenomena; and between the real and unreal, by the application of the principle of opposites, which was manifested by the Egyptian Mystery System by male and female Gods and pairs of pillars carried in front of Egyptian temples. (ii) The doctrine of the Mind or Nous has also been traced to the "Open Eye" used in Egyptian temples and modern Masonic lodges to symbolize the omniscience and omnipotence of the Egyptian God Osiris. (iii) The doctrine of the Demiurge and created Gods have also been traced to Atom the Sun God in the creation story of the Memphite Theology of the Egyptians. (iv) The doctrine of the Summum Bonum or Greatest Good has been shown to be identical with the theory of salvation of the Egyptian Mystery System. The salvation of the soul was the purpose of philosophy, whose methods of purification lifted the individual from the level of a mortal and advanced him to the level of a God. This goal was the Summum Bonum or Greatest Good. (v) The doctrine of the Ideal State whose attributes have been compared with the attributes of the soul and justice which are contained in the allegory of the charioteer and winged steeds, points to Egyptian origin because the allegory has been traced to the Judgment Drama of the Egyptian Book of the Dead. (vi) The doctrines of virtue and wisdom have been shown to have originated from the Egyptian Mystery System which required ten virtues in order to subjugate the ten bodily impediments. 7. Aristotle 1. The life of Aristotle is one of discrepancies and doubts. (i) While like other philosophers, history does not know anything about his early life and education, yet it tells the strange story that he spent 20 years as a pupil under Plato, that he never went to Egypt and that Alexander the Great gave him the money to secure the vast number of books which are attached to his name. But history also tells us that Plato was a philosopher and that Aristotle was a scientist and consequently we are forced to ask the question: why should a man like Aristotle waste 20 years of his life under a Teacher who was incompetent to teach him? These circumstances have led to the suspicion that Aristotle must have spent the greater part of those 20 years in advancing his education in Egypt and in accompanying Alexander the Great on his invasion of Egypt, when he got the opportunity to ransack the library at Alexandria and carry off all the books which he wanted. 123 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook The story of history does not make much sense; but unfortunately throws a cloud of darkness over the life of Aristotle. (ii) Another discrepancy is to be found in connection with three lists of books said to belong to him, but which differ in source, in date and in quantity, (a) His own list which must receive the date in which he lived: the 4th century B.C. This contains the smallest number of books. (b) A list from Hermippus of Alexandria two centuries later, i.e., 200 B.C. containing 400 books and (c) A list from Arabian sources, compiled at Alexandria, three centuries later, i.e., 1st century A.D. containing a thousand books. One is forced to ask the questions: Did Aristotle write a thousand books in his life time? How has his small list increased after his death to 400 after the lapse of two centuries, and to one thousand after the lapse of five centuries? These circumstances make the authorship of Aristotle very doubtful, for it is incredible that a single individual could write a thousand books on the various fields of science in a single life time. 2. The doctrines of Aristotle have all been shown to originate from the Egyptian Mystery System (i) The doctrine of Being in the metaphysical realm has been explained as the relation between potentiality and actuality, which acts according to the principle of opposites. The Egyptians were the first scientists to discover the principle of duality in nature and therefore represented it by male and female Gods and by pairs of pillars in front of their temples. This is the source of this doctrine. (ii) In the proof of the existence of God, Aristotle used two doctrines, (a) Teleology, showing purpose and design in nature as the work of an Intelligence and (b) the Unmoved Mover. Both doctrines have been traced to the creation story of the Memphite Theology of the Egyptians where it is shown that creation moved from chaos to order and indicated the work of an Intelligence; and also where Atom the Demiurge and Logos while sitting unmoved upon the Primeval Hill projected eight Gods from various parts of His body and thus became the Unmoved Mover. (iii) The doctrine of the origin of the world, according to Aristotle, states that the world is eternal because matter, motion and time are eternal. This same view was expressed by Democritus in 400 B.C. in the dictum ex nihillo nihil fit (out of nothing, nothing comes), indicating that matter is permanent and eternal. The same view has been traced to the creation story of the Memphite Theology of the Egyptians in which chaos or primitive matter is represented by the Primeval Ocean Nun out of which arose the Primeval Hill. These are supposed to have always been in existence. 124 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook (iv) The doctrines of the attributes of nature, according to Aristotle, states that nature consists of motion and rest and that the motion moves from the less perfect to the more perfect by a definite law. I suppose the law of evolution. This teaching however did not originate from Aristotle for the problem of motion and rest permanence and change were not only investigated by the Eleatic and later Ionic philosophers, but by the Egyptians in whose creation story, the Memphite Theology, nature is shown to move from chaos by gradual steps to order. Certainly the doctrine of the attributes of nature came from the Egyptians. (v) The doctrine of the soul, according to Aristotle, states that the soul is a radical principle of life which is identical with the body, and possesses five attributes, being sensitive, rational, nutritive, appetitive and locomotive. Other philosophers have defined the soul (a) as material and composed of fire atoms (b) as a harmony of the body through the blending of opposites, and (c) as the breath of life in the creation story of Genesis. The true source of Aristotle's doctrine of the soul has however been traced to the philosophy of the soul found in the Egyptian Book of the Dead. There we find the soul explained as a unity of nine inseparable souls in one just like the Ennead a God Head of Nine in One, with necessary bodies. In this Egyptian philosophy, the attributes of the soul of the physical body have been found to coincide with those described by Aristotle, and it therefore shows the Egyptian source of Aristotle's doctrine, which relates to a small fragment of the Egyptian philosophy of the soul. ARGUMENT VI: The Education of the Egyptian Priests and the Curriculum of the Mystery System show that Egypt was the source of Higher Education in the ancient world, not Greece. The first idea that we get from chapter seven is the fact that the Institution of Holy Orders originated from the Egyptian Mystery System, where African priests were organized into various Orders and trained according to their rank. This made the priesthood the custodians of learning until the dawn of the modern age and pointed to Africans as the first professors in Higher Education. The second idea that we get is that the Seven Liberal Arts also originated from the Egyptian Mystery System, because these subjects formed the basis of the education of the Priests, who in addition, had to be versed in the 42 Books of Hermes and to specialize in Magic, Hieroglyphics, secret language and mathematical symbolism. The third idea that we get is that the Curriculum of the Egyptian Mystery System was coextensive with the needs of the highest civilization of the ancient world. Its text books consisted of: (i) The 42 Books of Hermes. (ii) The therapeutic use of the Seven Liberal Arts, for the cure of man's soul. (iii) The applied Sciences and Arts as revealed by the monuments such as sculpture, painting, drawing, architecture, engineering. 125 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook (iv) The social Sciences appropriate for trade and commerce, such as geography, economics and ship-building. ARGUMENT VII: The Memphite Theology contains the theology, philosophy and cosmology of the Egyptians and is therefore an authoritative source of doctrinal origin. Chapter VIII attempts to show that the Memphite Theology of the Egyptians is the source of (i) Greek philosophy by showing that the separate doctrines of philosophers are portions of the teachings contained in it and also the source of (ii) modern scientific hypotheses by showing that (a) the Nebular Hypothesis and (b) the assumption that there are nine major planets of the solar system have originated from Atom the Egyptian Sun God or Fire God who has been shown to be identical with the atom of modern science. It is because of this great revelation, i.e., the identity of Atom the Sun God of the Egyptians with the atom of modern science that I have recommended the Memphite Theology as a new field of scientific research, and magic the scientific method of the Mysteries as the key to its interpretation. My second reason is the fact that the Memphite Theology is the first Heliocentric theory of the universe, and my third reason is the fact that the history of philosophy is the history of science. IX. The New Philosophy of African Redemption Chapter IX deals with the New Philosophy of African Redemption, the aim of which is mental and social redemption, by converting the world to the New Philosophy that the Black people of North Africa gave philosophy to the world, but not the Greeks; and by refusing not only to worship Greek intellect, because it is a process of miseducation, but also refusing to submit any longer to missionary policy. The New Philosophy of African Redemption is a necessary escape of the Black people from their social plight caused by a false tradition concerning them which has been set in motion by (a) Alexander the Great (b) Aristotle and his school and (c) Emperors Theodosius and Justinian whose edicts abolished the Egyptian Mysteries: the Greatest Educational and Ecclesiastical System that the world has ever known and established Christianity as its perpetual rival. 126 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook Notes Chapter I (1) The Teachings of the Egyptians. This was called Sophia by the Greeks and meant Wisdom Teaching. It included (a) Philosophy and the Arts and Sciences (b) religion and magic and (c) secret methods of communication both linguistic and mathematical. Read The Stromata of Clement of Alexandria, Bk. 6, p. 756 and 758; also Diodorus I, 80; also Ancient Mysteries by C. H. Vail, p. 22–23; The Stromata of Clement of Alexandria, Bk. 5, c. 7 and 9. (2) The Peri Physeos. This was the name given to one of the earliest books on science apart from the manuscripts of the Egyptians. The name means "Concerning nature". Read Ancient Mysteries by C. H. Vail, p. 16. Chapter II The period of Greek philosophy was unsuitable for the production of Greek philosophers. Because (a) Persian domination did not only enslave the Greeks but kept them in a constant state of fear (b) It also kept them busy organizing Leagues in constant self-defense against aggression and (c) The city states could not agree, and the Peloponnesian wars kept them in constant warfare with each other. Read Sandford's Mediterranean World, c. 12, p. 203, 205; c. 13 and 15, p. 225, 255; also c. 18, p. 317, 319; also The Tutorial History of Greece, c. 27, 28 and 29. Chapter III (1) The Summum Bonum. This means (a) The Greatest Good (b) the lifting of man from the level of a mortal and advancing him to the level of a God (c) the salvation of the soul (d) the purpose of philosophy (e) the goal of the Egyptian theory of salvation. Read C. H. Vail's Ancient Mysteries, p. 25. (2) The Grand Lodge of Luxor. The ruins of the ancient Grand Lodge of Luxor are found today on the banks of the Nile in Upper Egypt in the ancient city of Thebes. It was built by Pharaoh Amenothis III. It was the only Grand Lodge of the ancient world. It had branches or minor lodges throughout the ancient world; in Europe, Asia, Africa, North America, South America and probably in Australia. These were some of the places:—(a) Palestine at Mt. Carmel (b) Syria at Mt. Herman in Lebanon (c) Babylon (d) Media, near the Red Sea (e) India, on the banks of the Ganges (f) Burma (g) Athens (h) Rome (i) Croton (j) Rhodes (k) Delphi (l) Miletus (m) Cyprus (n) Corinth (o) Crete (p) Central and South America, especially Peru (q) Among the American Indians and among the Mayas, Aztecs and Incas of Mexico. 127 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook Read Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics by Jas. Hastings; Lives of Eminent Philosophers by Diogenes Laertius; and History of Philosophy by Thomas Stanley. The discovery of the ruins of Luxor on the banks of the Nile and the organization of the Egyptian Mysteries into a Grand Lodge with minor lodges throughout the ancient world are evidence that Egypt was the cradle of the Mysteries and of the Masonic Brotherhood. (3) The rebuilding of the temple of Delphi. This temple was burnt down in 548 B.C. by the Greeks who were always hostile towards the Egyptian Mysteries. The Brethren tried at first to raise funds from the native Greeks but failed in their attempt. They then decided to approach the Grand Master Amasis King of Egypt, who unhesitatingly donated three times as much as was needed for the purpose. This act of King Amasis shows the universality of the brotherhood of the Egyptian Mysteries and of Free Masonry. Read Sandford's Mediterranean World, p. 135 and 139; also John Kendrick's Ancient Egypt, Bk. II, p. 363. 4) The abolition of Greek philosophy together with the Egyptian Mysteries. Identical effects proceed from identical causes. Therefore the edicts of Theodosius in the 4th century A.D. and of Justinian in the 6th century A.D., which closed down the Egyptian Mysteries, simultaneously had the same effect upon Greek philosophy, and proved the identity between them. Read The Ecclesiastical edicts of the Theodosian Code by W. K. Boyd; also Mythology of Egypt by Max Muller, c. 13, p. 241–245; also Sandford's Mediterranean World, p. 508, 548, 552–568. (5) The Statue of the Egyptian Goddess Isis with Her Child Horns in Her arms. This was the first Madonna and Child of human history. It was a Black Madonna and Child. Read Max Muller's Mythology of Egypt, c. 13, p. 241–245; also Sandford's Mediterranean World, p. 552–568. Remember that the name Egyptian is a Greek word Aiguptos which means Black, and that primitive man visualized God in terms of his own attributes and this included colour. (6) All the great religious leaders from Moses to Christ were Initiates of the Egyptian Mysteries This is an inference from the nature of the Egyptian Mysteries and prevailing custom. (a) The Egyptian Mystery System was the One Holy Catholic Religion of the remotest antiquity. (b) It was the one and only Masonic Order of Antiquity, and as such, (c) It built the Grand Lodge of Luxor in Egypt and encompassed the ancient world with its branch lodges. (d) It was the first University of history and it made knowledge a secret, so that all who desired to become Priests and Teachers had to obtain their training from the Mystery System, either locally at a branch lodge or by travelling to Egypt. 128 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook We know that Moses became an Egyptian Priest, a Hierogrammat, and that Christ after attending the lodge at Mt. Cannel went to Egypt for Final Initiation, which took place in the Great Pyramid of Cheops. Other religious leaders obtained their preparation from lodges most convenient to them. (e) This explains why all religions, seemingly different, have a common nucleus of similarity; belief in a God; belief in immortality and a code of ethics. Read Ancient Mysteries by C. H. Vail, p. 61; Mystical Life of Jesus by H. Spencer Lewis; Esoteric Christianity by Annie Besant, p. 107, 128–129; Philo; also read note (2) Chapter III for branch lodges of the ancient world. Chapter IV (1) The Genesis of Greek Enlightenment In the reign of King Amasis, the Persians through Cambyses invaded Egypt 525 B.C. and as a result (a) Immigration regulations against the Greeks were removed (b) They were allowed to settle at Naucratis and do their research (c) This contact enabled the Greeks to begin to borrow Egyptian Culture and to become enlightened. Read Herodotus, Bk. II, p. 113; Plutarch, p. 380; Diogenes, Bk. IX 49; Ovid Fasti III 338. (2) Cheops and Cecrops Those were Greek names for the Egyptian Khufu who belonged to the 4th Dynasty of the Egyptians. It was during the Pyramid Age, and Cheops was also the name of the Great Pyramid where Christ received His Final Initiation into the Egyptian Mysteries. Read Brucker's Critical History of Philosophy; also Mystical Life of Jesus by H. Spencer Lewis. Chapter V (1) The Diagram of the Four Qualities and Four Elements This is important evidence that the teachings of the supposed early Ionic philosophers and of Heracleitus originated from the Egyptian Mysteries. Read the Diagram and also Ancient Mysteries by C. H. Vail, p. 61; and the Creation Story of the Memphite Theology by Frankfort; also Rosicrucian Digest, May 1952, p. 175. 129 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook (2) The Pythagorean Theorem Pythagoras travelled to Egypt and was taught geometry by the Egyptian Priests and made to sacrifice to the Gods, before they showed him the proof of the theorem of the square on the hypotenuse of a right angled triangle. Pythagoras did not discover this proof, and it is misleading to name the theorem after him. Read Herodotus, Bk. III, p. 124; Diogenes, Bk. VIII, p. 3; Pliny, N. H., 36, 9; also Plutarch and Demetrius. Chapter VI (1) The doctrine of self-knowledge: Man know thyself (Seauton gnothi) This doctrine has been falsely ascribed to Socrates. It was an inscription that was placed on the Egyptian temples, and Socrates copied it directly or indirectly. Read Zeller's History of Philosophy, p. 105; S. Clymer's Fire Philosophy and Max Muller's Egyptian Mythology. (2) The Farewell Conversation of Socrates with his pupils and friends These conversations are significant in the following respects: (a) Socrates is identified as a member of the Egyptian Mysteries or Masonic Order. (b) Masonic behavior is manifested through these conversations. (c) The books containing these conversations; Plato's Crito, Phaedo, Euthyphro, Apology and Timaeus, are the earliest specimen of Masonic literature apart from the secret writings of the Egyptians. (d) Of the three Athenian philosophers Socrates stood highest in the rank of a Free Mason. He was not afraid of death, he did not publish the knowledge imparted to him and he was an honest man. Read Crito and Phaedo of Plato. (3) Plato's Theory of Ideas After the Egyptian Priests discovered the fundamental principle of opposites as underlying life in the universe, they applied it in their interpretation of natural phenomena. Consequently this mode of interpretation has been reflected in the teachings of the so-called Greek philosophers who had obtained their education from the Egyptian Mystery System. Read the doctrines of Parmenides who in the problem of existence distinguishes between Being and non-Being; also of Heracleitus in the problem of flux and change through the process of transmutation; also of Socrates in the proof of immortality, and Plato in his supposed Theory of Ideas, in which he distinguished between (a) the real and unreal (b) the idea of a thing and the thing itself (c) the noumena and phenomena. In all these instances the principle of opposites has been used as a method of interpretation. This method is Egyptian not Platonic. 130 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook (4) The Republic of Plato: The Ideal State Plato's authorship of the Republic is disputed for the following reasons: (a) The attributes of an Ideal State are expressed in the allegory of the charioteer and winged steeds which is dramatized in the Judgment Drama of the Egyptian Book of the Dead and therefore proves its Egyptian origin. (b) The chariot was neither a culture pattern nor war machine of the Greeks at the time of Plato. The wars of the Greeks with the Persians and the Peloponnesian wars were all maritime. (c) At this time the Egyptians were specialists in the manufacture of chariots and horse breeding Gen., c. 45, v. 27; c. 47, v. 17; Deut., c. 17, v. 16; I Kings, c. 10, v. 28. (d) The historians Diogenes Laertius, Aristoxenus and Favorinus have declared that the subject matter of the Republic was found in the controversies written by Protagoris (481–411) when Plato was but a boy. Read Diogenes Laertius, p. 311 and 327; also The Egyptian Book of the Dead, c. 17; also Republic III 415; V 478; and VI 490 sqq. (5) The Timaeus of Plato Plato's authorship of the Timaeus is also disputed for the following reasons:— (a) The historian Diogenes Laertius in Bk. VIII, p. 399–401 has declared that when Plato visited Dionysius in Sicily, he paid Philolaus a Pythagorean forty Alexandrian Minae of silver for a book, from which he copied the whole contents of the Timaeus. (b) The subject matter of the Timaeus is eclectic. Read the Timaeus. (6) Magic is the Key to the interpretation of ancient religion and natural philosophy Through the application of the principle: that the qualities of entities, human or divine, are distributed throughout their various parts; and that contact with such entities releases those qualities, many religious phenomena and those of primitive science could be interpreted and understood. (a) The cure of the woman who touched the hem of Christ's garment, Mark, c. 5, verses 25–34. (b) The cure of several people, who held the handkerchiefs of St. Paul. Acts, c. 19, verse 12. 131 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook (c) In order to accomplish creation, Atom the Sun God sat upon Ptah, the God of Gods, in order to absorb His qualities of creative thought, speech and omnipotence. This act qualified Him as the Logos and Demiurge and He first created the Gods and finally mortals. Read Memphite Theology in Frankfort's Ancient Egyptian Religion and Dr. Frazer's Golden Bough. (7) The doubts and discrepancies in the life and activities of Aristotle It is somewhat unfortunate that history has represented the life and activities of Aristotle in a way so repugnant to reason, that the world has been compelled to doubt his accomplishments and fame. It tells us that (a) he spent twenty years as a pupil under Plato whom we know was incompetent to teach him. (b) It tells us that Alexander gave him money to buy his large number of books, but the Greeks had no libraries at the time, nor was it easy to purchase books which were not in circulation. (c) It also tells us that three lists of books which bear his name differ froth one another, in source, date and quantity. (d) The third list contains one thousand books: a quantity which is a mental and physical impossibility as the production of a single individual in a single lifetime. (e) It is silent about Aristotle's visits to Egypt, although it was the custom in his days for Greek students to go to Egypt for the purpose of their education. Read Zeller's History of Philosophy, p. 172–173; Diogenes, Bk. V, p. 449; B. D. Alexander's History of Philosophy, p. 92–93. (8) The Unmoved Mover: Proton Kinoun Akineton A doctrine ascribed to Aristotle in his attempt to prove the existence of God. The God in this doctrine was Atom the Egyptian Sun God, who in the creation story of the Memphite Theology, sat upon the God of Gods Ptah and having absorbed His creative qualities, speech and omnipotence, became the Logos and accomplished the work of creation by projecting Gods from various parts of His own body. This doctrine did not originate from Aristotle, but has been traced to the creation story of the Memphite Theology of the Egyptians. Read Memphite Theology in Frankfort's Ancient Egyptian Religion, c. 20 and 23; also p. 25, 26 and 35; William Turner's History of Philosophy, p. 141–143; B. D. Alexander, p. 102–103. 132 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook (9) Aristotle's doctrine of the Soul This doctrine has been found to be only a very small part of the elaborate philosophy of the soul found in the Egyptian Book of the Dead, which is the original source of Aristotle's supposed doctrine. Read the Egyptian Book of the Dead by Sir E. A. Budge, p. 29–64. Chapter VII The Curriculum of the Egyptian Mysteries Through the curriculum of the Egyptian Mysteries it is now known that the African continent has given the following Legacy to the civilization of the world. It consists of the following culture patterns: (1) Holy Catholic Orders, together with a priesthood divided into ranks according to training. (2) Holy Catholic Worship, consisting of rituals, ceremonies including processions and appropriate vestments of priests. (3) Greek Philosophy and the Arts and Sciences, including the Seven Liberal Arts, that is, the Quadrivium and Trivium which were the foundation training of Neophytes. These were included in the forty-two Books of Hermes. (4) The applied Sciences which produced the pyramids, tombs, libraries, obelisks, and Sphinxes, war chariots and ships, etc. (5) The social sciences, appropriate for the highest civilization in ancient times. Read The Stromata of Clement of Alexandria, c. 6, p. 756, 758; also Diodorus I, 80. Read also The Mechanical Triumphs of the Ancient Egyptians by F. M. Barber; History of Mathematics by Florian Cajeri; History of Mathematics by W. W. R. Ball. Chapter VIII The Memphite Theology (1) Definition The Memphite Theology is an inscription on a stone containing the cosmology, theology and philosophy of the Egyptians. Read Frankfort's Ancient Egyptian Religion, c. 20 and 23; also Frankfort's Intellectual Adventure of Man. It is located in the British Museum. 133 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook (2) Importance Its importance lies in the fact that (a) it is an authoritative source of Egyptian Philosophy, Cosmology and Religion (b) it is proof of the Egyptian origin of Greek philosophy. (3) The Source of Modern Scientific Knowledge (a) Atom the Egyptian Sun God who is the Logos of Heracleitus, the Demiurge of Plato and the Unmoved Mover of Aristotle creates eight other Gods by projecting them from His own body, thus producing nine Gods or the Ennead. This is identical with the Nebular Hypothesis of Laplace, in which the original Sun creates eight other planets, by throwing off rings from itself, thus producing the nine major planets of modern scientific belief. (b) It has been shown on pages 146 and 147 of this book, that the name of Atom the Egyptian Sun God is the same name used for the atom of science and also that the attributes of both are the same. Read Frankfort's Intellectual Adventure of Man, p. 53; Frankfort's Kingship and the Gods, p. 182; also Herodotus II, 112; Diodorus I, 29. (4) It offers great possibilities for modern scientific research What science knows about (a) the number of major planets (b) how these major planets were created by the Sun and (c) the attributes of the atom has been traced to the Cosmology of the Memphite Theology, which suggests that (d) science knows only 1/5 of the secrets of creation and therefore 4/5 of such secrets yet remains to be discovered (e) consequently The Memphite Theology offers great possibilities for modern scientific research. Chapter IX The Drama of Greek Philosophy (1) This consists of three actors (a) Alexander the Great who invaded Egypt and plundered the Royal Library at Alexandria (b) Aristotle and the alumni of his school, who took possession of the Royal Library and having first carried off large quantities of scientific books, subsequently converted it into a research Centre and University. (c) The Roman government, which through the edicts of Emperors Theodosius and Justinian closed down the Egyptian Mysteries together with its schools, the University of the Ancient World and System of the African Culture. (2) The result of this was (a) the misrepresentation and erroneous opinion that the African continent and people are backward in culture and have made no contribution to civilization and (b) the establishment of Christianity as a rival against the Mysteries or African System of Culture, in order to perpetuate this erroneous opinion. 134 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook (3) A further result has been (a) the false worship of Greek intellect and (b) the activities of Missionary enterprise through which the culture of Black people is caricatured both in literature and in exhibitions. (4) A further result has been (a) the general feeling among Black people throughout the world that they are in great need of freedom from their social plight, and (b) The offer by "Stolen Legacy" of a "New Philosophy of African Redemption" in order to meet this universal need of "Social Reformation". (5) The nature and methods of this New Philosophy and Social Reformation (a) The New Philosophy of African Redemption is simply the proposition that the "Greeks were not the authors of Greek philosophy: but the people of North Africa, the Egyptians". This must be preached and circulated for centuries to come. (b) The effects of this New Philosophy should be as follows (1) To change the mentality both of White and Black people and their attitude towards each other and bring about a Social Reformation. (2) To stimulate the Black people to abandon their false worship of Greek intellect, and to reject the caricature of their culture by Missionary enterprise and to demand a change in Missionary policy. 135 Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy by George G. M. James The Journal of Pan African Studies 2009 eBook
Child and Adolescent Development An Advanced Course Edited by WILLIAM DAMON RICHARD M. LERNER JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC. Child and Adolescent Development Child and Adolescent Development An Advanced Course Edited by WILLIAM DAMON RICHARD M. LERNER JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC. ➇ This book is printed on acid-free paper. Copyright © 2008 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. All rights reserved. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, New Jersey. Published simultaneously in Canada. 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ISBN 978-0-470-17657-3 Printed in the United States of America. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Contents Preface xi Contributors xiii PART I: INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 1 THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF CHILD AND ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT: IMPORTANT ISSUES IN THE FIELD TODAY 3 William Damon and Richard M. Lerner Developmental Systems Theory Context of Human Development Diversity Multidisciplinarity Focus on Biological Development and Neuroscience Diverse and Innovative Methodologies Application Positive Child and Adolescent Development Conclusions References 5 6 8 8 9 10 11 11 12 13 PART II: BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS CHAPTER 2 NEURAL BASES OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 19 Charles A. Nelson III, Kathleen M. Thomas, and Michelle de Haan Why Developmental Psychologists Should Be Interested in Neuroscience Brain Development Neural Bases of Cognitive Development Object Recognition Executive Functions Conclusions References CHAPTER 3 TEMPERAMENT 19 21 26 33 38 43 44 54 Mary K. Rothbart and John E. Bates Definition of Temperament History of Temperament Research Structure of Temperament Neural Models of Temperament Measurement of Temperament Psychobiological Research Approaches Temperament and Development v 54 55 56 58 59 62 64 vi CONTENTS Temperament and the Development of Personality Temperament and Adjustment Conclusions References 69 71 81 83 PART III: PARENTAL AND PEER RELATIONS CHAPTER 4 SOCIALIZATION IN THE FAMILY: ETHNIC AND ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 95 Ross D. Parke and Raymond Buriel Contemporary Theoretical Approaches to Socialization in the Family Family Systems Approach to Socialization Determinants of Family Socialization Strategies Social Change and Family Socialization Children and Families of Color in the United States: Issues of Race, Ethnicity, and Culture Remaining Issues and Future Trends Conclusion References 96 98 111 113 115 126 128 128 PART IV: PERSONALITY, SELF, AND SELF-CONCEPT CHAPTER 5 PEER INTERACTIONS, RELATIONSHIPS, AND GROUPS 141 Kenneth H. Rubin, William M. Bukowski, Jeffrey G. Parker, and Julie C. Bowker Orders of Complexity in Children’s Peer Experiences Culture Peer Interactions, Relationships, and Groups: A Developmental Perspective Proximal Correlates and Distal Predictors of Children’s Peer Relationships Social Cognitive Correlates of Peer Acceptance and Rejection Childhood Peer Experiences and Later Adjustment Conclusions References CHAPTER 6 PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT 141 144 145 156 159 167 169 171 181 Rebecca L. Shiner and Avshalom Caspi Developing Structure of Personality Temperament and Personality Traits in Childhood and Adolescence: A Process-Focused, Developmental Taxonomy Developmental Elaboration of Personality Traits The Origins of Individual Differences in Personality 182 186 195 198 CONTENTS Personality Continuity and Change Personality and the Life Course: How Early-Emerging Personality Differences Shape Developmental Pathways Conclusions References CHAPTER 7 THE DEVELOPING SELF vii 200 204 208 209 216 Susan Harter Antecedents of the Self as a Cognitive and Social Construction Developmental Differences in Self-Representations during Childhood Stability versus Change in Self-Representations Gender Differences in Global and Domain-Specific Self-Evaluations Cross-Cultural Comparisons Ethnic Differences in Our Own Culture Conclusions References 217 221 250 251 252 253 254 255 PART V: LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT CHAPTER 8 ACQUIRING LINGUISTIC CONSTRUCTIONS 263 Michael Tomasello Theory Early Ontogeny Later Ontogeny Processes of Language Acquisition Conclusions References CHAPTER 9 CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 264 266 279 288 292 292 298 Susan A. Gelman and Charles W. Kalish Background and Overview Conceptual Diversity Concepts Embedded in Theories Conclusions References CHAPTER 10 DEVELOPMENT IN THE ARTS: DRAWING AND MUSIC 298 301 307 313 315 322 Ellen Winner Drawing Music Conclusions References 323 339 350 351 viii CONTENTS PART VI: EMOTION AND MOTIVATION CHAPTER 11 PRINCIPLES OF EMOTION AND EMOTIONAL COMPETENCE 361 Carolyn Saarni, Joseph J. Campos, Linda A. Camras, and David Witherington Conceptual Framework for Emotion Development of Emotional Communication in Early Life Emotional Development in Childhood and Adolescence: Social Effectiveness and Positive Adaptation Emotional Competence What Develops in Emotional Development? References CHAPTER 12 DEVELOPMENT OF ACHIEVEMENT MOTIVATION 361 369 374 376 397 397 406 Allan Wigfield, Jacquelynne S. Eccles, Robert W. Roeser, and Ulrich Schiefele Current Theoretical Perspectives on Motivation Motivation Development: Within-Person Change and Group Differences Gender Differences in Motivation Development of Group Differences in Motivation Conclusions References 406 413 420 421 424 425 PART VII: PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR, ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR, AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT CHAPTER 13 AGGRESSION AND ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN YOUTH 437 Kenneth A. Dodge, John D. Coie, and Donald Lynam Dimensions of Aggression and Other Antisocial Behavior Aggressive and Antisocial Development in the Human Species Determinants of Individual Differences in Antisocial Behavior Cognitive-Emotional Processes as Mediators Treatment and Prevention of Antisocial Behavior Conclusions References CHAPTER 14 THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORALITY 437 438 440 452 456 459 461 473 Elliot Turiel Setting the Stage Issues, Emphases, and Theories Emphasizing Emotions 473 476 477 CONTENTS Gender, Emotions, and Moral Judgments Emphasizing Culture Emphasizing Judgment and Reciprocal Social Interactions Domain Specificity: Emphasizing Distinctions in Judgments Culture and Context Revisited Conclusions References ix 481 484 488 491 499 507 508 PART VIII: ADOLESCENCE CHAPTER 15 THE SECOND DECADE: WHAT DEVELOPS (AND HOW)? 517 Deanna Kuhn and Sam Franklin What Develops? Abandoning the Simple Answer Brain and Processing Growth Deductive Inference Inductive and Causal Inference Learning and Knowledge Acquisition Inquiry and Scientific Thinking Argument Understanding and Valuing Knowing Conclusions References CHAPTER 16 ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT IN INTERPERSONAL CONTEXT 517 519 523 527 531 533 536 539 541 545 551 W. Andrew Collins and Laurence Steinberg Significant Interpersonal Relationships during Adolescence Interpersonal Contexts and the Psychosocial Tasks of Adolescence Conclusions References 552 561 577 578 PART IX: DIVERSITY IN DEVELOPMENT CHAPTER 17 CULTURAL AND COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT IN PHYLOGENETIC, HISTORICAL, AND ONTOGENETIC PERSPECTIVE 593 Michael Cole Definitional Issues: Culture, Cognitive Development, and Allied Concepts Culture and Cognition: A Synthetic Framework Ontogeny 594 597 617 x CONTENTS Conclusions References 635 639 CHAPTER 18 GENDER DEVELOPMENT 647 Sheri A. Berenbaum, Carol Lynn Martin, and Diane N. Ruble Development of Gender-Related Constructs and Content Theoretical Analysis of Gender Development Conclusions References CHAPTER 19 PHENOMENOLOGY AND ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS THEORY: DEVELOPMENT OF DIVERSE GROUPS 648 662 680 681 696 Margaret Beale Spencer Introduction of Theory and Foundational Assumptions Framework Overview PVEST Rationale and Need for New Theory PVEST: An Identity-Focused Cultural-Ecological Perspective Contemporary Experiences of Contemporary African American Males and Contributions of Critical Race Theory Testing of the Phenomenological Variant of Ecological Systems Theory as a Dual Axis Coping Formulation Conclusions References 696 700 720 726 Author Index 741 Subject Index 769 729 730 734 735 Preface Whatever else we—the two editors of this text—have done in our working lives, one thing is beyond doubt: We are veteran teachers of child and adolescent development. Combined, our years of teaching in this field total well over 70 years, or about the average life span of humans in most parts of the world today. What’s more, each of us has taught child development in every corner of the university, from large lecture halls to intimate seminar rooms. We have taught (and learned from) student audiences ranging from first-semester freshmen to advanced postdocs in over a dozen colleges and universities in the United States and abroad. Experience does not always improve performance—the aging literature is humbling on that matter—but it does allow us to make some observations from the perspectives of insiders. Our first and surest observation is that this is a delightful field to teach. The material is immediately fascinating and meaningful to students. It does not take much theatrical ability to get students to thrill to the first displays of attachment between caregiver and infant, or to the toddler’s early mastery of symbolic speech, or the child’s budding interests in close friendships, or the adolescent’s discovery of new-found intellectual and personal powers. The field itself is built around a narrative of learning and growth, which students naturally find compelling, if not inspiring. Motivating students to read the material is not an instructor’s primary problem in this particular field. Yet that does not mean that teaching child development is a trivial exercise. To do justice to the dynamic interplay between nature and nurture, biology and culture, or the vast array of social and historical influences that shape a human life, demands a degree of conceptual complexity that requires students at any level to stretch and deepen their thinking. The primary task of any instructor in this field is to help students appreciate, and ultimately master, the complexity of how a child’s life develops over time. Without working through the full complexity of this process, there can be little true understanding. For example, glance at a typical popular media account of child development, where extreme and untested explanations that often contradict one another are presented without any apparent awareness of the confusion. It is not that the writers of such accounts lack intelligence (far from it); instead, the case is that they have not studied this field in sufficient depth to unravel its many intricate laws and principles. We always like to point out that the study of human development in all its richness, dynamism, and contextual variation is not rocket science—it is actually far more challenging. And the field of child development itself, in addition to the subjects it encompasses, is incredibly dynamic. In the 31⁄2 decades since we began teaching in this field, child development has become more interdisciplinary, contextual, and sophisticated, both methodologically and theoretically. Studies of the brain and studies of culture, each in their own way, have moved from the margins to the center of our field, informing us about the most fundamental questions of intellectual and social development. The purview of the field has expanded to diverse populations in the United States and to other parts of the world that were too long neglected in developmental study. New theoretical models that are better equipped to deal with the dynamic and systemic nature of human development have arisen and become strengthened. From the point of view of two veteran (but still-aspiring) teachers, conveying this complex and dynamic field requires instructional materials that meet certain requirements. xi xii PREFACE For one thing, readings that we use must be up-to-date. The field has changed too rapidly to permit us to reuse old syllabuses. For another thing, readings must tackle, in ways that students can comprehend, the intricate interplay of all the biological and social forces that count in human development. To do this, the theoretical frameworks that are guiding current work in the field must inform the readings. Which brings us to why we put together the present advanced text. In our view, there are a number of worthwhile basic textbooks for courses in child development. But to appreciate the field of child development in all its depth, students need more than a basic textbook. They need exposure to firsthand accounts of leading scientists who themselves are grappling with the most difficult, important, and exciting topics. Students need to hear the voices of these scientists as they discuss recent findings, explore new problems, use cutting-edge methods, and build new conceptual models. To really understand the field, students need access to the writings of those who are working at the boundaries of the field and inventing its future. With the publication of the most recent edition of the Handbook of Child Psychology, we saw an opportunity to offer such access to students. In the present volume, we have brought together core readings from the Handbook, abridged and rewritten for advanced students. We believe our selections represent the range of major topics that define the field today, as understood by scholars who are creating much of the most influential work on those topics at the present time. In the pages of this volume, students encounter the full story of what is known and not known about child and adolescent development from many of the world’s leading scholars. We are convinced that students will respond eagerly to these in-depth treatments of principal issues in child and adolescent development, and they deserve no less. We believe also that students will share in the gratitude we have for the creativity and knowledge of the superb scientists who have contributed chapters to this book. We want to thank all the colleagues who have worked so hard to craft such useful and engaging chapters. It is their expertise that has made this book possible. We are grateful as well to Jennifer Davison, managing editor at the Institute for Applied Research in Youth Development, and Lauren White, assistant editor at the Institute, for their expertise and impressive productivity in guiding the development of this work through all phases of the manuscript development and production processes. We appreciate as well the support of and the commitment to quality scholarship by our publisher, John Wiley & Sons, and, in particular, our editor, Patricia Rossi. Her enthusiasm for and expertise in publishing high-quality work in developmental science have been invaluable resources for us. William Damon is grateful to the Thrive Foundation for Youth for its support of his scholarship during the period in which he worked on this book. Richard M. Lerner thanks both the National 4-H Council and the John Templeton Foundation for supporting his work during this period. Finally, our work on the Handbook of Child Psychology and, in turn, on the present book was framed and inspired by our mentor, colleague, and friend—Paul H. Mussen. We dedicate this book to his memory. WILLIAM DAMON Stanford, California RICHARD M. LERNER Medford, Massachusetts Contributors John E. Bates Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences Bloomington, Indiana John D. Coie Department of Sociology and Health Science Duke University Durham, North Carolina Sheri A. Berenbaum Department of Psychology Pennsylvania State University University Park, Pennsylvania Michael Cole Departments of Communication and Psychology University of California La Jolla, California Julie C. Bowker Department of Psychology University at Buffalo Buffalo, New York William M. Bukowski Department of Psychology Concordia University Montreal, Quebec Raymond Buriel Department of Psychology and Department of Chicano/a Latino/a Studies Pomona College Claremont, California Joseph J. Campos University of California, Berkeley Berkeley, California Linda A. Camras Department of Psychology DePaul University Chicago, Illinois Avshalom Caspi Institute of Psychiatry Kings College London, England, and Institute of Psychiatry Duke University Durham, North Carolina W. Andrew Collins Institute of Child Development University of Minnesota Minneapolis, Minnesota William Damon Center on Adolescence Stanford University Stanford, California Michelle de Haan University of London London, England Kenneth A. Dodge Duke University Durham, North Carolina Jacquelynne S. Eccles Institute for Research on Women and Gender University of Michigan Ann Arbor, Michigan Sam Franklin Department of Human Development Columbia University Teachers College New York, New York Susan A. Gelman Department of Social Sciences University of Michigan Ann Arbor, Michigan xiii xiv Susan Harter Department of Psychology University of Denver Denver, Colorado Charles W. Kalish Waisman Center University of Wisconsin-Madison Madison, Wisconsin Deanna Kuhn Department of Human Development Columbia University Teachers College New York, New York CONTRIBUTORS Robert W. Roeser Institute for Applied Research in Youth Development Tufts University Medford, Massachusetts Mary K. Rothbart University of Oregon Eugene, Oregon Kenneth H. Rubin Center for Children, Relationships, and Culture University of Maryland College Park, Maryland Richard M. Lerner Institute for Applied Research in Youth Development Tufts University Medford, Massachusetts Diane N. Ruble Department of Psychology New York University New York, New York Donald Lynam Department of Psychological Sciences Purdue University West Lafayette, Indiana Carolyn Saarni Department of Counseling Sonoma State University Rohnert Park, California Carol Lynn Martin School of Social and Family Dynamics Arizona State University Tempe, Arizona Ulrich Schiefele Department of Psychology Universität Bielefeld Bielefeld, Germany Charles A. Nelson III Developmental Medicine Center Harvard Medical School and Children’s Hospital Boston, Massachusetts Rebecca L. Shiner Department of Psychology Colgate University Hamilton, New York Ross D. Parke Department of Psychology University of California Riverside, California Margaret Beale Spencer Department of Applied Psychology and Human Development University of Pennsylvania Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Jeffrey G. Parker Department of Psychology Pennsylvania State University University Park, Pennsylvania Laurence Steinberg Department of Psychology Temple University Philadelphia, Pennsylvania CONTRIBUTORS Kathleen M. Thomas Institute of Child Development University of Minnesota Minneapolis, Minnesota Ellen Winner Department of Psychology Boston College Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts Michael Tomasello Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology Leipzig, Germany Allan Wigfield Department of Human Development University of Maryland College Park, Maryland Elliot Turiel Graduate School of Education University of California Berkeley, California David Witherington Department of Psychology University of New Mexico Albuquerque, New Mexico xv PA R T I I N T RO D U C T I O N Chapter 1 The Scientific Study of Child and Adolescent Development: Important Issues in the Field Today WILLIAM DAMON and RICHARD M. LERNER The purpose of this book is to offer students an advanced textbook that explores forefront issues in the study of child and adolescent development. The book’s chapters are written as state-of-the-science reviews by leading scholars who themselves have been making groundbreaking contributions to the topics that they discuss. For this reason, the book is unique, both in the depth of its coverage and in the timeliness of the research that it presents. As a comprehensive collection of authored reviews, it conveys the field of child and adolescent development through the “primary source” of scientists who themselves are now shaping that field. The voices of the scientists add a lively energy to the important topics that they discuss. The chapters in this book began as contributions to the most recent edition of the Handbook of Child Psychology (Damon & Lerner, 2006). For the purposes of the present text, we edited and abridged the chapters to make them maximally accessible to students wishing to master the current state of knowledge in this intricate and expanding field. To create a text that would present a balanced representation of the field as a whole, we selected contributions that focused on the key processes and outcomes of child and adolescent development. Taken together, the book’s 19 chapters cover development in the biological, cognitive, linguistic, social, cultural, moral, personality, emotional, and aesthetic domains. In addition, the chapters explore an extensive The preparation of this chapter was supported in part by grants to Richard M. Lerner from the National 4-H Council and the John Templeton Foundation. 3 4 INTRODUCTION range of contemporary research topics, including the significance of diversity in development and the results of various social-policy and educational initiatives that attempt to foster gains in critical dimensions of youth development. The core discipline represented by this text is psychology, but it would be inaccurate to claim that the text, or the field itself, stems purely from psychological science. Vital contributions have been made by other social and life-science disciplines such as anthropology, sociology, and biology, and by humanities disciplines such as history and philosophy. From its start, the study of child and adolescent development has been a multidisciplinary enterprise. The original 1933 edition of the Handbook of Child Psychology, despite the term “psychology” in its title, highlighted the work of biologists, physiologists, and educators, as well as a long chapter by the then-young anthropologist Margaret Mead. Today the boundaries of child study are expanding even further, pushed by recent advances in the cognitive and neurosciences as well as in social and cultural theory. The present text reflects the interplay of several disciplines that have taken an interest in the development of the child. It is a dynamic and productive interplay, yielding rich knowledge that no “bounded” discipline in isolation could achieve. Psychology, with its special focus on mind and self, is certainly at the center of this interplay, but virtually all the analytic frameworks in child and adolescent development have been enhanced by insights from other disciplines. There are deep theoretical reasons why the study of children and adolescents—or for that matter, the investigation of individuals at any point across the life span—requires the integration of knowledge from multiple disciplines. Factors from all levels of human organization—biological factors; psychological and behavioral factors; social, cultural, ecological, and historical factors—all combine to influence the developmental course of every human life. As a consequence, understanding child and adolescent development requires more than a focus on psychological functioning. Such a focus is a necessary but not sufficient frame for describing, explaining, or optimizing the development of children and adolescents. Scholars today approach the study of individuals across the life span within a framework that has been labeled “developmental science” (e.g., Magnusson & Stattin, 2006) because it involves the integrative use of the theoretical and methodological skills of scholars from the several disciplines that enable changes in all these levels to be understood. These disciplines include biology, neuroscience, psychology, sociology, anthropology, medicine, nursing, education, law, social work, engineering and computer science, economics, geography, ecology, the arts, and history. Scholars from these different fields focus on phenomena associated with the different levels of organizations noted previously—ranging from genes and neurons to social policy and culture. They work to understand the contributions to the development of people that are made by evolution; by the brain; by emotions, personality, cognition, motivation, and morality; by relations within the family or in peer groups and in the community; by the physical ecology; and by institutions of society, such as education, health care, business, and faith institutions. These scholars do not see their contributions to the understanding of human development as isolated knowledge. To the contrary, in contemporary developmental science, the stress in both theory and research is on relations among variables within and across levels of organization (Overton, 2006). For instance, genes contribute to the development of mind and behavior but, at the same time, behavior and the broader ecology of human development influence the function and role in development of genes (Garcia Coll, Bearer, & Lerner, 2004; Gottlieb, Wahlsten, & Lickliter, 2006; Lewontin, 2000). Suomi (2004), for example, has found that variations in infant-mother and in peer group THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF CHILD AND ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT 5 relations in rhesus monkeys accounts for whether specific genes are associated with aggression and poor social skills or with socially skilled and peaceful behaviors. Shiner and Caspi (Chapter 6, this volume) report that analogous interactions between genes and the social context have comparable outcomes in human development. Accordingly, whether studying infancy, childhood, adolescence, or the adult and aging portions of the life span, the cutting edge of contemporary scholarship in human development is work attempting to integrate information from the several levels of organization involved in the ecology of human development (Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 2006). Such work aims to explain how mutually influential relations between individuals and their contexts provide the basis for behavior and development. A primary goal of this book is to extract from the field of child and adolescent development the best scholarship currently available about how this individual-context relational process works. Each chapter addresses this relational process in its own way, with respect to the particular developmental phenomena that it examines. Out of this dynamic relation between individual and context comes developmental change in all its glorious profusion: learning about the world and the self; acquiring skills, values, and knowledge; building biologic and neuronal capacities; gaining new powers of attention and memory; forming a unique personality; developing character; establishing emotional and behavioral regulation; learning how to communicate and collaborate with others; and a host of other achievements that lead to a fulfilled life. Parents, teachers, and other adults in all parts of the world value such developmental achievements in children, although they do not always know how to understand them, or how to foster them. The story of change and progressive growth during the childhood and adolescent years is richly documented by the chapters in this text. The chapters in this text provide not only empirically driven descriptions of such change but also insightful explanations of the general course of change across the first 2 decades of life. In addition, many of the authors suggest ways in which theory and research may be applied to optimize the chances for positive, healthy development among children and adolescents. Not only is application of great interest scientifically, it is also of great interest personally to the families and communities that seek to nurture young people. This text covers a diverse array of particular topics in childhood and adolescence. Within this diversity of topics, there are common themes that cut across the chapters and the field itself. Students seeking to understand the field may find it helpful to attend to, and master, each of the following key concepts as they appear in this text. Developmental Systems Theory The fundamental theme within contemporary developmental science involves a focus on developmental systems theories. These theories help scientists understand mutually influential (i.e., bidirectional, reciprocal, or fused; e.g., Thelen & Smith, 2006; Tobach & Greenberg, 1984) relations among variables from the multiple levels of organization involved in human development. To appreciate the use of developmental systems theories, it is useful to pose two questions that such models help address: 1. Why should developmental science focus on variables associated with, for instance, biology, psychology, culture, and history, to study children and adolescents? 2. Why should developmental science study the mutually influential relations among variables across these levels? 6 INTRODUCTION Quite specific answers to these questions, ones that are pertinent to numerous areas of development—emotions, personality, cognition, motivation, morality, or social relations within the family or with peers, to name a few instances—are found across this book. As a general way of answering these questions, however, we may note that over the course of its evolution as a field of scholarship, developmental science has found that approaches to development that pertain to one discipline or level of analysis, be it biology, psychology, or culture, are not adequate to explain the diverse ways in which human development occurs (Cairns & Cairns, 2006). Accordingly, across the past 30 years, approaches to development that seek to account for development by studying how variables from any one level of organization affect and are affected by variables from other levels have become of increasing interest and relevance to developmental science (Brandtstädter, 2006; Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 2006; Gottlieb et al., 2006; Magnusson & Stattin, 2006). Such approaches have been termed developmental systems models (Ford & Lerner, 1992; Gottlieb et al., 2006; Lerner, 2006). These models, and the several concepts defining or derived from them, constitute a superordinate framework for all the work presented in this book. Table 1.1 presents the defining features of developmental systems theories. Inspection of this table will prepare the reader to appreciate how developmental systems theories frame all the other key themes of contemporary developmental science. For instance, we may note that among the interrelated features of contemporary developmental systems theories are concepts such as relationism, the integration of levels of organization, historical embeddedness and temporality, relative plasticity, and diversity. These concepts are associated with additional concepts, such as reciprocal interaction, bidirectionality, plasticity, and biobehavioral organization. As explained in Table 1.1, these concepts lead to themes ranging from the importance of context for understanding human development through the ability to be optimistic that the application of developmental science may result in the promotion of positive development for diverse children and adolescents. To appreciate the import of development systems models for these other defining themes of contemporary developmental science, it is useful to discuss each of the other themes found in the chapters of this book. Context of Human Development Developmental science, when framed by developmental systems theories, does not just focus on the individual alone as a target of analysis to explain his or her development. Instead, developmental systems theories point to the fact that it is essential to consider the physical and social ecology within which human development occurs (Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 2006; Elder & Shanahan, 2006). As a consequence, interest in developmental systems ideas has made the role of context in human development a pervasive concern in the contemporary study of child and adolescent development. All chapters in this book reflect this concern. For instance, variables at both the inner-biological and the social-cultural levels of organization provide proximal and distal contexts, respectively, of cognitive development (see Chapter 2 by Nelson, Thomas, & de Haan) and of personality development (see Chapter 3 by Rothbart & Bates and Chapter 6 by Shiner & Caspi). Similarly, characteristics of the psychological functioning of the child or adolescent is moderated by the family (see Chapter 4 by Parke & Buriel), by the peer group (see Chapter 5 by Rubin, Bukowski, Parker, & TABLE 1.1 Defining Features of Developmental Systems Theories A Relational Metamodel Predicated on a postmodern philosophical perspective that transcends Cartesian dualism, developmental systems theories are framed by a relational metamodel for human development. There is, then, a rejection of all splits between components of the ecology of human development (e.g., between nature- and nurture-based variables, between continuity and discontinuity, or between stability and instability). Systemic syntheses or integrations replace dichotomizations or other reductionist partitions of the developmental system. The Integration of Levels of Organization Relational thinking and the rejection of Cartesian splits are associated with the idea that all levels of organization within the ecology of human development are integrated or fused. These levels range from the biological and physiological through the cultural and historical. Developmental Regulation across Ontogeny Involves Mutually Influential Individual ← → Context Relations As a consequence of the integration of levels, the regulation of development occurs through mutually influential connections among all levels of the developmental system, ranging from genes and cell physiology through individual mental and behavioral functioning to society, culture, the designed and natural ecology, and ultimately, history. These mutually influential relations may be represented generically as Level 1 ← → Level 2 (e.g., Family ← → Community) and, in the case of ontogeny, may be represented as individual ← → context. Integrated Actions, Individual ← → Context Relations, Are the Basic Unit of Analysis within Human Development The character of developmental regulation means that the integration of actions—of the individual on the context and of the multiple levels of the context on the individual (individual ← → context)—constitute the fundamental unit of analysis in the study of the basic process of human development. Temporality and Plasticity in Human Development As a consequence of the fusion of the historical level of analysis—and therefore temporality—within the levels of organization comprising the ecology of human development, the developmental system is characterized by the potential for systematic change, by plasticity. Observed trajectories of intra-individual change may vary across time and place as a consequence of such plasticity. Plasticity Is Relative Developmental regulation may both facilitate and constrain opportunities for change. Thus, change in individual ← → context relations is not limitless, and the magnitude of plasticity (the probability of change in a developmental trajectory occurring in relation to variation in contextual conditions) may vary across the life span and history. Nevertheless, the potential for plasticity at both individual and contextual levels constitutes a fundamental strength of all humans’ development. Intra-Individual Change, Interindividual Differences in Intra-Individual Change, and the Fundamental Substantive Significance of Diversity The combinations of variables across the integrated levels of organization within the developmental system that provide the basis of the developmental process will vary at least in part across individuals and groups. This diversity is systematic and lawfully produced by idiographic, group differential, and generic (nomothetic) phenomena. The range of interindividual differences in intra-individual change observed at any point in time is evidence of the plasticity of the developmental system and makes the study of diversity of fundamental substantive significance for the description, explanation, and optimization of human development. (continued) 7 8 INTRODUCTION TABLE 1.1 (Continued) Optimism, the Application of Developmental Science, and the Promotion of Positive Human Development The potential for and instantiations of plasticity legitimate an optimistic and proactive search for characteristics of individuals and of their ecologies that, together, can be arrayed to promote positive human development across life. Through the application of developmental science in planned attempts (i.e., interventions) to enhance (e.g., through social policies or community-based programs) the character of humans’ developmental trajectories, the promotion of positive human development may be achieved by aligning the strengths (operationized as the potentials for positive change) of individuals and contexts. Multidisciplinarity and the Need for Change-Sensitive Methodologies The integrated levels of organization comprising the developmental system require collaborative analyses by scholars from multiple disciplines. Multidisciplinary knowledge and, ideally, interdisciplinary knowledge is sought. The temporal embeddedness and resulting plasticity of the developmental system requires that research designs, methods of observation, and measurement, and procedures for data analysis be change sensitive and able to integrate trajectories of change at multiple levels of analysis. Bowker; and Chapter 16 by Collins & Steinberg), by the school (see Chapter 12 by Wigfield, Eccles, Roeser, & Schiefele), and by culture (see the Chapter 17 by Cole and Chapter 19 by Spencer). Diversity Because of the inevitable complexity of the combinations of individual and contextual variables that provide a basis of human development, the authors of the chapters in this book make clear that individual differences—diversity—constitute a fundamental, substantive feature of all human development. Indeed, estimates are that there are over 70 trillion potential human genotypes, and each of them may be coupled across life with an even larger number of physical and social contexts and interpersonal relationships and experiences (Hirsch, 2004). Therefore, the diversity of development is assured because of each person’s singular history of individual-context relations. This history makes each person’s trajectory of change across the life course unique and, indeed, as people age they become more different from each other (i.e., there is an increase in interindividual differences in intra-individual change; Baltes, Lindenberger, & Staudinger, 2006). Therefore, diversity becomes a fundamental substantive focus for developmental science. Although, as noted, all chapters in this book focus on diversity—on both intraindividual change (which is the within-person instance of diversity) and on interindividual differences in intra-individual change (which is the between-person instance of diversity), several chapters in this book (Chapter 17 by Cole; Chapter 18 by Berenbaum, Martin, & Ruble; and Chapter 19 by Spencer) are focused specifically on the substantive importance of diversity in elucidating what is normative in regard to the structure and/or function of developmental change in children and adolescents. Multidisciplinarity Clearly, then, the approach to development found across the chapters in this volume involves an appraisal of how relations between diverse individuals and similarly diverse and changing proximal and distal contexts of the ecology of human development THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF CHILD AND ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT 9 (Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 2006) interrelate across life to constitute the basic process of development. What is also clear from this approach is that in order to either describe or explain the course of these changes, knowledge of the contributions made by variables from different levels of organization need to be integrated. For example, the structure and function of genes, hormones, and neurons at the physiological level of organization need to be understood in relation to the structure and function of both the psychological level of organization (and, for instance, of cognitive, emotional, and motivational) and the social level of organization (involving, for example, family and peer relationships, and interactions with community organizations and cultural institutions). Chapter 2 in this book by Nelson, Thomas, and de Haan; Chapter 6 by Shiner and Caspi; Chapter 8 by Tomasello; and Chapter 17 by Cole illustrate this multidisciplinarity (see, too, Baltes et al., 2006; Elder & Shanahan, 2006; Gottlieb et al., 2006; Overton, 2006). In short, the theoretical and empirical scholarship in this book documents the importance of a multidisciplinary approach to studying children and adolescents. Focus on Biological Development and Neuroscience Across this book, there exist several specific substantive illustrations of the integration of multiple disciplines. A key case in point captures recently emerging interests within developmental science on brain-behavior relations and, as well, on a more general, dynamic approach to biology and physiological function. These emphases are illustrated by the chapters in the “Biological Foundations” section of the book (see Chapter 3 by Rothbart and Bates and Chapter 2 by Nelson, Thomas, & de Haan) and, as well, in other chapters (e.g., Chapter 6 by Shiner & Caspi). Stress is placed on understanding either cognitive development or behavioral individuality (temperament, personality) by understanding changes across childhood and adolescence in biological development (as compared to attempting to explain development by reference to the static possession of genes) and by a systems approach within the study of developmental neuroscience. The importance of a developmental approach to biology and neuroscience cannot be overestimated. In prior historical eras within the study of human development, many scientists seeking to incorporate the contributions of biological level variables (e.g., genes, neurons) into the explanation of child and adolescent development sought to reduce the complexity of such development to what were regarded as either nonchanging features of genetic inheritance (i.e., genotypes; see for instance Plomin, 1986, 2000; Rowe, 1994) or to characteristics of physiological functioning (neural structure) that were construed as “hard wired” (e.g., see Edelman, 1987, 1988 for reviews). These approaches were actually antithetical to a developmental approach to the study of development (e.g., see Gottlieb, 1998, 2004; T. C. Schneirla, 1956, 1957; Tobach & Schneirla, 1968): They reduced development to characteristics of the individual that were seen to be fixed and unchanging. Simply, they sought to explain development by reference to characteristics that did not develop. However, as illustrated by chapters in this book, such nondevelopmental approaches have been superseded by theory and research that sees biological variables as products and producers of changes in variables at all other levels of the developmental system (e.g., see Gottlieb et al., 2006; Overton, 2006). Accordingly, as illustrated by the chapters throughout this book, multidisciplinarity does not mean the addition of a biogenic view of the child with a psychogenic or a sociogenic view (Elder & Shanahan, 2006). Instead, developmental scientists work 10 INTRODUCTION across levels to understand how both individual and contextual variables may combine to promote the development of, for instance, specific features of development, such as emotions (see Chapter 10 by Saarni, Campos, Camras, & Witherington), motivation (see Chapter 12 by Wigfield, Eccles, Roeser, & Schiefele), language (see Chapter 8 by Tomasello), concept development (see Chapter 9 by Gelman & Kalish), artistic development (see Chapter 10 by Winner), morality or problem behaviors (see Chapter 13 by Dodge, Coie, & Lynam and Chapter 14 by Turiel), or the self, personality, or gender characteristics (see Chapter 7 by Harter; Chapter 6 by Shiner & Caspi; and Chapter 18 by Berenbaum, Martin, & Ruble). In addition, reliance on the contributions of variables from multiple levels of organization (and hence on the province of different disciplines) occurs when developmental scientists seek to elucidate development within a specific portion of the life span. This approach is illustrated in this book by the chapters on adolescent cognitive development (Chapter 15 by Kuhn & Franklin) and adolescent social development (Chapter 16 by Collins & Steinberg). Diverse and Innovative Methodologies How does such integrative developmental analysis happen? Certainly, theory must provide a frame for any useful empirical work undertaken to understand child and adolescent development. However, theory must be coupled with empirically useful methods. Given that developmental scientists are drawing from ideas across levels of organization, we see illustrated in this book the need for and the use of diverse methodologies across these different fields. These tools often represent innovations in design, sampling, measurement, and data analysis. For instance, designs within contemporary developmental science are increasingly multimethod in character, seeking to triangulate information across time by combining both quantitative and qualitative methods of assessment. Neuroscience measurement, for instance, using brain functional magnetic imaging (fMRI) techniques may be combined with written or verbal assessment of cognitive or emotional functioning (see Chapter 2 by Nelson, Thomas, & de Haan). Similarly, qualitative, ethnographic understanding of the cultural values of diverse youth may be linked to quantitative measure of individual cognitive development (see Chapter 17 by Cole) or of identity and adjustment (see Chapter 19 by Spencer). Moreover, while the study of change always requires longitudinal assessments, such designs have become increasing complex in developmental science. They may involve sequential strategies or time series analyses (e.g., Baltes, Reese, & Nesselroade, 1977) or, borrowing from multiple disciplines, cohort analyses, panel studies, program evaluation, or dynamic systems analysis (e.g., Teti, 2005; Thelen & Smith, 2006). In addition, the data analysis techniques used to appraise dynamic, individual-context relations across time have also grown more complex. Quantitative techniques, such as structural equation modeling, hierarchical linear modeling, and pattern-centered analyses (that combine person-centered and variable-centered approaches) have been forwarded (e.g., see Card & Little, 2007; Duncan, Magnuson, & Ludwig, 2004; Laub & Sampson, 2004; Lerner, 2004; Little, Bovaird, & Card, 2007; McArdle & Nesselroade, 2003; Nesselroade & Ram, 2004; von Eye, 1990b; von Eye & Schuster, 2000; Willett, 2004). In turn, approaches that capitalize on new computer-based programs for under- THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF CHILD AND ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT 11 standing the substance and categorical characteristics or configurations of qualitative data (e.g., Atlas-ti or configural frequency analysis) have emerged in recent years to become effective tools for developmental scientists (e.g., Mishler, 2004; von Eye, 1990a). This qualitative research is especially useful as a means to identify the nature of an understudied phenomenon (e.g., as a sample case, see Damon, Menon, & Bronk, 2003, and Mariano & Damon, in press, in regard to the study of “noble purpose” in adolescents) and/or in triangulating quantitative appraisals of human development. Application Across the breadth of the chapters in this book it is clear that developmental science has come to value work that moves beyond description and explanation and toward attempts to optimize the course of life of diverse children and adolescents. As illustrated richly throughout this book, in the contemporary instantiation of developmental science, application is as important a goal of scholarship as is elucidation of basic features of developmental change. Developmental science is aimed often then on proving its worth not only in the halls of academe but, as well, in the arena of public policy and in neighborhoods and communities nationally and internationally. Schools, youth-serving organizations, faith institutions, mental health clinics, foundations, industry, or government offices are places where developmental scientists are, today, likely to be found in large numbers. Positive Child and Adolescent Development In fact, whether working in laboratories on their campus, or in community-based organizations, educational settings, after-school programs, business, or government, there is considerable and growing commonality among developmental scientists in directing their work to enhancing the opportunities for health and successful development among diverse children and adolescents. Indeed, as illustrated in several chapters in this book (e.g., see Chapter 19 by Spencer, Chapter 14 by Turiel, and Chapter 10 by Winner), the promotion of positive child and adolescent development is of fundamental concern (Benson, Scales, Hamilton, & Sesma, 2006; Damon, 2004; Lerner, 2005). Indeed, interest in the promotion of positive development may arise when work is focused on the study of basic issues in the description or explanation of a particular feature of development (e.g., the acquisition of linguistic constructions, as in Chapter 8 by Tomasello; the neural centers for specific cognitive functions, as in Chapter 2 by Nelson, Thomas, & de Haan, or the fundamental facets of musical understanding, as in Chapter 10 by Winner). In turn, interest in promoting positive development may obviously also occur in relation to highly applied concerns, such as bringing the “voice” of the community to bear on the planning of programs to enhance literacy among children and parents from immigrant families. Nevertheless, across the settings within which they work, developmental scientists are increasingly oriented to using their scholarship to inform policymakers, funders, and practitioners about ways to apply developmental science to enhance the probability that all youth will develop in positive ways. In sum, reflecting the breadth and richness of contemporary developmental science, the chapters in this book elucidate eight key themes. Table 1.2 lists these themes. We 12 INTRODUCTION TABLE 1.2 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Key Substantive Themes in Contemporary Developmental Science Focus on developmental systems theories Role of context in human development Individual differences—diversity Importance of a multidisciplinary approach Study of biological development and of developmental neuroscience Diverse methodologies Application of developmental science Promotion of positive child and adolescent development believe that these themes all derive from and reflect the integrative ideas of the developmental systems models that, today, constitute the cutting edge of theory, research, and application in developmental science (e.g., see Cairns & Cairns, 2006; Damon, 2006; Lerner, 2006; Overton, 2006; Valsiner, 2006). In addition, together, these themes reflect the idea that all facets of the “job description” of developmental scientists—the description, explanation, and optimization of behavior and development—are today valued and essential components of the study of children and adolescents. Conclusions Contemporary developmental science—predicated on a relational model and focused on the use of developmental systems theories to frame research and application on dynamic relations between diverse individuals and contexts—constitutes an approach to understanding and promoting positive human development that is both complex and exciting. The approach, at the heart of the chapters in this book, also offers a productive means to do good science. Such work is informed by philosophically, conceptually, and methodologically useful information from the multiple disciplines having knowledge bases pertinent to the integrated, individual-context relations comprising the ecology of human development. Indeed, and as illustrated eloquently by the work discussed across the chapters in this volume, the value of the science and the applications that constitute the contemporary study of children and adolescents are reasons for the growing interest in developmental science. The scholarship presented in this book shows the many ways in which children and adolescents, in dynamic exchanges with both natural and designed ecologies, can learn to thrive. In addition, the work discussed in this book documents how children and adolescents may themselves create opportunities for their own positive development. As Bronfenbrenner (2005) eloquently put it, it is these kinds of mutually beneficial relations among people and the world that make human beings fully human. Scientific findings such as those presented in this text are needed to provide an understanding of how young people can learn to thrive in this world. The importance of sound scientific understanding has become especially clear in recent years, when news media broadcast story after story based on simplistic and biased popular speculations about the causes of human development. The careful and responsible discourse found in the chapters of this text contrasts sharply with most popular news stories about the role of parents, genes, or schools in children’s growth and behavior. Students who read this text will have a sounder source of information about these vi- THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF CHILD AND ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT 13 tally important issues. They will find in the chapters of this book the most solid, insightful and current set of scientific theories and findings available today in the field of child and adolescent development. References Baltes, P. B., Lindenberger, U., & Staudinger, U. M. (2006). Lifespan theory in developmental psychology. In W. Damon & R. M. Lerner (Series Eds.) & R. M. Lerner (Vol. Ed.), Handbook of child psychology: Vol. 1. Theoretical models of human development (6th ed., pp. 569–664). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. Baltes, P. B., Reese, H. W., & Nesselroade, J. R. (1977). Life-span developmental psychology: Introduction to research methods. 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Lerner (Series Eds.) & R. M. Lerner (Vol. Ed.), Handbook of child psychology: Vol. 1. Theoretical models of human development (6th ed., pp. 258–312). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. Tobach, E., & Greenberg, G. (1984). The significance of T. C. Schneirla’s contribution to the concept of levels of integration. In G. Greenberg & E. Tobach (Eds.), Behavioral evolution and integrative levels (pp. 1–7). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Tobach, E., & Schneirla, T. C. (1968). The biopsychology of social behavior of animals. In R. E. Cooke & S. Levin (Eds.), Biologic basis of pediatric practice (pp. 68–82). New York: McGraw-Hill. Valsiner, J. (2006). Developmental epistemology and implications for methodology. In W. Damon & R. M. Lerner (Series Eds.) & R. M. Lerner (Vol. Ed.), Handbook of child psychology: Vol. 1. Theoretical models of human development (6th ed., pp. 166–209). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. von Eye, A. (1990a). Introduction to configural frequency analysis: The search for types and anitypes in cross-classifications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. von Eye, A. (1990b). Statistical methods in longitudinal research: Principles and structuring change. New York: Academic Press. von Eye, A., & Schuster, C. (2000). The road to freedom: Quantitative developmental methodology in the third millennium. International Journal of Behavioral Development, 24, 35–43. Willett, J. B. (2004). Investigating individual change and development: The multilevel model for change and the method of latent growth modeling. Research in Human Development, 1(1/2), 31–57. PA R T I I BIOLOGICAL F O U N DAT I O N S Chapter 2 Neural Bases of Cognitive Development CHARLES A. NELSON III, KATHLEEN M. THOMAS, and MICHELLE DE HAAN This chapter reviews what is known about the neural bases of cognitive development. We begin by discussing why developmental psychologists might be interested in the neural bases of behavior (with particular reference to cognitive development). Having established the value of viewing child development through the lens of the developmental neurosciences, we provide an overview of brain development. We then turn our attention to specific content areas, limiting ourselves to domains in which there is a corpus of knowledge about the neural underpinnings of cognitive development. We discuss learning and memory, face/object recognition, attention/executive functions, and spatial cognition, including illustrative examples from both typical and atypical development. We conclude the chapter with a discussion of the future of developmental cognitive neuroscience. Why Developmental Psychologists Should Be Interested in Neuroscience Prior to the ascendancy of Piagetian theory, the field of cognitive development was dominated by behaviorism (for discussion, see Goldman-Rakic, 1987; Nelson & Bloom, 1997). As students of the history of psychology are well aware, behaviorism eschewed the nonobservable; therefore, the study of the neural bases of behavior was not pursued for the simple reason that neural processes could not be observed. Through the 1950s and 1960s, Piagetian theory gradually came to replace behaviorism as the dominant theory of cognitive development. Despite being a biologist by training, Piaget, 19 20 BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS and subsequently his followers, primarily concerned themselves with developing a richly detailed cognitive architecture of the mind—albeit a brainless mind. We do not mean this in a pejorative sense, but rather, to imply that the zeitgeist of the time was to develop elegant models of cognitive structures, with little regard for (a) whether such structures were biologically plausible or (b) the neurobiological underpinnings of such structures. (At that time, there was no way to observe the living brain directly.) Throughout the late 1970s and into the last decade of the twentieth century, neo- and non-Piagetian approaches came into favor. Curiously, a prominent theme of a number of investigators writing during this time was that of nativism; we say curiously because inherent in nativism is the notion of biological determinism, yet those touting a nativist perspective rarely if ever grounded their models and data in biological reality. It was not until the mid-1990s that neurobiology began to be inserted into a discussion of cognitive development, as reflected in Mark Johnson’s eloquent contribution to the Handbook of Child Psychology’s fifth edition (Johnson, 1998). This perspective has become more commonplace, although the field of developmental cognitive neuroscience is still in its infancy. (For overviews of this field generally, see de Haan & Johnson, 2003a; Nelson & Luciana, 2001.) Moreover, we have observed that it is still not clear to many developmental psychologists why they should be interested in the brain. This is the topic to which we next direct our attention. Our major argument in this regard is that our understanding of cognitive development will improve as the mechanisms that underlie development are elucidated. This, in turn, should permit us to move beyond the descriptive, black-box level to the level at which the actual cellular, physiologic, and eventually, genetic machinery will be understood—the mechanisms that underlie development. A number of distinguished cognitive developmentalists and cognitive theorists have proposed or at least implied that elements of number concept (Wynn, 1992; Wynn, Bloom, & Chiang, 2002), object permanence (Baillargeon, 1987; Baillargeon, Spelke, & Wasserman, 1985; Spelke, 2000), and perhaps face recognition (Farah, Rabinowitz, Quinn, & Liu, 2000) reflect what we refer to as experience-independent functions; that is, they reflect inborn traits (presumably coded in the genome) that do not require experience to emerge. We see several problems with this perspective. First, these arguments seem biologically implausible because they represent sophisticated cognitive abilities; if they were coded in the genome, they would surely be polygenic traits and would not reflect the action of a single gene. Given that we now know the human genome consists of approximately 30,000 to 40,000 genes, it seems highly unlikely that we could spare the genes to separately code for number concept, object permanence, or face recognition. After all, those 40,000 genes must be involved in myriad other events (e.g., the general operation of the body as a whole) far more important than subserving these aspects of cognitive development. A second concern about this nativist perspective is that it is not developmental. To say something is innate essentially closes the door to any discussion of mechanism. More problematic is that genes do not cause behaviors; rather, genes express proteins that in turn work their magic through the brain. It seems unlikely that behaviors that are not absolutely essential to survival (of the species, not the individual) have been directly coded in the genome, given the limited number of genes that are known to exist. Far more likely is that these behaviors are subserved by discrete or distributed neural circuits in the brain. And, these circuits, in turn, most likely vary in the extent to which they depend on experience or activity for their subsequent elaboration. NEURAL BASES OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 21 We make three general points: 1. The “value added” of thinking about behavior in the context of neurobiology is that doing so provides biological plausibility to our models of behavior (to be discussed further later). 2. Viewing behavioral development through the lens of neuroscience may shed light on the mechanism(s) underlying behavior and behavioral development, thereby moving us beyond the descriptive level to the process level. 3. When we insert the molecular biology of brain development into the equation, a more holistic view of the child becomes possible—genes, brain, and behavior. This, in turn, permits us to move beyond simplistic notions of gene-environment interactions to talk about the influence of specific experiences on specific neural circuits, which in turn influence the expression of particular genes, which influence how the brain functions and how the child behaves. Brain Development The construction and development of the human brain occurs over a very protracted period beginning shortly after conception and, depending on how we view the end of development, continuing through at least the end of adolescence. Shortly after conception, embryonic tissue forms from the two-celled zygote (specifically, from the blastocyst, the ball of cells created through multiplying cells). The outer layer of the embryo gives rise to, among other things, the central (brain and spinal cord) and peripheral nervous systems. It is this outermost layer we will be concerned with in this chapter. NEURAL INDUCTION AND NEURULATION The process of transforming the undifferentiated tissue lining the dorsal side of the ectoderm into nervous system tissue is referred to as neural induction. In contrast, the dual processes called primary and secondary neurulation refer to the further differentiation of this neural tissue into, respectively, the brain and the spinal cord (for a review of neural induction and neurulation, see Lumsden & Kintner, 2003). The thin layer of undifferentiated tissue that lines the ectoderm is gradually transformed into an increasingly thick layer of tissue that will become the neural plate. A class of chemical agents referred to as transforming growth factors is responsible for the subsequent transformation of this undifferentiated tissue into nervous system tissue (Murloz-Sanjuan & Brivanfou, 2002). What one observes morphologically is the shift from neural plate to neural tube. Specifically, the neural plate buckles, forming a crease down its longitudinal axis. The tissue then folds inward, the edges rise up, and a tube is formed. This process begins on approximately day 22 of gestation (Keith, 1948), fusing first at the midsection and progressing outward in either direction until approximately day 26 (Sidman & Rakic, 1982). The rostral portion of the tube eventually forms the brain, and the caudal portion develops into the spinal cord. Cells trapped inside the tube typically go on to comprise the central nervous system (CNS); however, there is a cluster of cells trapped between the outside of the neural tube and the dorsal portion of the ectodermal wall that is referred to as the neural crest. Neural crest cells typically develop into the autonomic nervous system (ANS). 22 BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS A fair amount is now known about the genes that regulate many aspects of brain development, including neurulation. Much of this knowledge is based on studies of invertebrates and vertebrates, in which alterations in morphogenesis are observed after genes are selectively deleted (“knock-out”) or in a more recently developed method, added (“knock-in”). Although at first glance, one might be suspicious about the generalizability of such work to humans, reassurance can be found in the observation that humans share more than 61% of their genes with fruit flies and 81% with mice. Not everything we know is based on animal models: Increasingly our knowledge of the molecular biology of brain development is based on careful genetic analysis of nervous system tissue that has failed to develop correctly. The patterning of the neuroaxis (i.e., head to tail) is for the most part completed by about the fifth prenatal week. Based on mouse studies, many of the transcription factors responsible for this process are well known. As reviewed by Levitt (2003), some of the genes involved in dorsal patterning include members of the emx, Pax, and ihx families of genes, whereas nkx and dlx gene families may play a role in ventral patterning. PROLIFERATION Once the neural tube has closed, cell division leads to a massive proliferation of new neurons (neurogenesis), generally beginning in the fifth prenatal week, and peaking between the third and fourth prenatal months (Volpe, 2000; for review, see BronnerFraser & Hatten, 2003). The term massive barely captures this process. It has been estimated, for example, that at its peak, several hundred thousand new nerve cells are generated each minute (Brown, Keynes, & Lumsden, 2001). Proliferation begins in the innermost portion of the neural tube, referred to as the ventricular zone (Chenn & McConnell, 1995), a region that is derived from the subependeymal location that lines the neural tube. In a process called interkinetic nuclear migration, new neural cells travel back and forth between the inner and outer portions of the ventricular zone. The new cell first travels toward the outer portion of the ventricular zone—the so-called S phase of mitosis—where DNA is synthesized, creating a duplicate copy of the cell. Once the S phase has been completed, the cell migrates downward toward the innermost portion of the ventricular zone where it divides into two cells (for a generally accessible description of these phases, see Takahashi, Nowakowski, & Caviness, 2001). Each of these new cells then begins the process again. As cells divide, a new zone is created, the marginal zone, which contains processes (axons and dendrites) from the cells of the ventricular zone. During the second phase of proliferation, neurons actually begin to form. However, for each dividing cell, only one daughter cell will continue to divide; the nondividing cell goes on to migrate to its final destination (Rakic, 1988). Before turning to disorders of proliferation, three points should be noted. First, with the exception of cells that comprise the olfactory bulb, the dentate region of the hippocampus, and possibly regions of the neocortex, virtually every one of the estimated 100 billion neurons we possess (Naegele & Lombroso, 2001) are of prenatal origin (see section on postnatal neurogenesis); glia follow this same general pattern, although the development of glia (with the exception of radial glial cells; see section on migration that follows) lags somewhat behind neuronal development. What needs to be underscored about this observation is its importance in the context of plasticity: Unlike all other cells, the brain generally does not make new neurons after birth, which means that the brain does not repair itself in response to injury or disease by making new neurons. NEURAL BASES OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 23 Second, as cells continue to proliferate, the general shape of the neural tube undergoes a dramatic transformation—specifically, three distinct vesicles are formed: the proencephalon (forebrain), mesencephalon (midbrain), and rhombencephalon (hindbrain). Further proliferation leads to the proencephalon splitting into the telencephalon, which will give rise to the cerebral hemispheres, and the diencephalon, which gives rise to the thalamus and hypothalamus. The rhombencephalon will in turn give rise to the metencephalon (from which the pons and cerebellum are derived) and the myelencephalon (which will give rise to the medulla). The mesencephalon gives rise to the midbrain. Finally, our knowledge of the molecular biology of cell proliferation is gradually advancing. The Foxg1 gene has been implicated in the process of cell proliferation (Hanashima, Li, Shen, Lai, & Fishell, 2004), but undoubtedly many other genes are involved as well. CELL MIGRATION The cortex proper (arguably the seat of cognition) is formed by a process whereby newly formed cells migrate out beyond their birthplace to ultimately give rise to a sixlayered cortex. As discussed by Brown et al. (2001), the ventricular zone (the epithelium that lines the lateral ventricular cavities) gives rise to cells that undergo cell division, with the postmitotic cell migrating through the intermediate zone to its final point of destination. The cells born earliest take up residence in the preplate (the first layer of cortical neurons), which subsequently divides into the subplate and the marginal zone, both of which are derived from the cortical plate. The postmitotic cells move in an inside-out (ventricular-to-pial) direction, such that the earliest migrating cells occupy the deepest layer of the cortex (and play an important role in the establishment of cortical connections), with subsequent migrations passing through the previously formed layer(s). (Note that this rule applies only to the cortex; the dentate gyrus and the cerebellum are formed in an outside-in pattern.) At approximately 20 weeks gestation, the cortical plate consists of three layers and by the seventh prenatal month the final contingent of six layers can be seen (Marin-Padilla, 1978). There are two types of migratory patterns—radial and nonradial (generally tangential). Radial migration generally refers to the propagation of cells from the ventricular zone outward, or from the deepest to most superficial layers of the cortex. Approximately 70% to 80% of migrating neurons use this radial pathway. In contrast, cells adopting a tangential migratory pattern (generally interneurons for the cortex and nuclei of the brain stem) move along a tangential (“across”) path. Pyramidal neurons, the major projection neurons in the brain, along with oligodendrocytes and astrocytes, enlist radial glial cells to migrate through the layers of cortex (Kriegstein & Götz, 2003), whereas cortical interneurons (for local connections) migrate via tangential migration within a cortical layer (Nadarajah & Parnavelas, 2002). Radial migration is particularly noteworthy for several reasons. First, there are different types of radial migration. Locomotion is characterized by migration along a radial glial fiber. In somal translocation, the cell body (soma) of a cell advances toward the pial surface by way of a leading process. Finally, cells that move from the intermediate zone (IZ) to the subventricular zone (SVZ) appear to migrate using multipolar migration (Tabata & Nakajima, 2003). A number of genes are involved in the regulation of migratory movement (see Hatten, 2002, and Ridley et al., 2003 for reviews). 24 BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS SYNAPTOGENESIS Synapses generally refer to the point of contact between two neurons. Depending on the receiving neuron, the resulting action can be excitatory (promoting an action potential) or inhibitory (reducing the likelihood of an action potential). Development The first synapses are generally observed by about the 23rd week of gestation (Molliver, Kostovic, & Van der Loos, 1973), although the peak of production does not occur until sometime in the first year of life (for review, see Webb, Monk, & Nelson, 2001). It is now well known that there is a massive overproduction of synapses distributed across broad regions of the brain, followed by a gradual reduction in synapses; it has been estimated that 40% more synapses are produced than exist in the final (adult) complement of synapses (see Levitt, 2003). The peak of the overproduction varies by brain area. For example, in the visual cortex, a synaptic peak is reached between roughly the fourth and eighth postnatal months (Huttenlocher & de Courten, 1987), whereas in the middle frontal gyrus (in the prefrontal cortex) the peak synaptic density is not obtained until after 15 postnatal months (Huttenlocher & Dabholkar, 1997). There is evidence that the overproduction of synapses is largely under genetic control, although little is known about the genes that regulate synaptogenesis. For example, Bourgeois and colleagues (Bourgeois, Reboff, & Rakic, 1989) have reported that being born prematurely or even removing the eyes of monkeys prior to birth has little effect on the overproduction of synapses in the monkey visual cortex. Thus, in both cases the absolute number of synapses is the same as if the monkey experienced a typical, full-term birth. This suggests a highly regularized process with little influence by experience. As we demonstrate, however, the same cannot be said for synaptic pruning and the cultivating of synaptic circuits, both of which are strongly influenced by the environment. Synaptic Pruning The process of retracting synapses until some final (and presumably optimal) number has been reached is dependent in part on the communication among neurons. Pruning appears to follow the Hebbian principle of use/disuse: Thus, more active synapses tend to be strengthened and less active synapses tend to be weakened or even eliminated (Chechik, Meilijson, & Ruppin, 1999). Neurons organize and support synaptic contact through neurotransmitter receptors (both excitatory and inhibitory) on the presynaptic cell (the cell attempting to make contact) and through neurotrophins expressed by the postsynaptic cell (the cell on which contact is made). Synapses are modulated and stabilized by the distribution of excitatory and inhibitory inputs (Kostovic, 1990). The adjustments that are made in the pruning of synapses can either be quantitative (reducing the overall number of synapses) or qualitative (refining connections such that incorrect or abnormal connections are eliminated; for review, see Wong & Lichtman, 2003). As has been thoroughly reported in both the lay and scientific press, the pruning of synapses appears to vary by area. Synapse numbers in the human occipital cortex peak between 4 and 8 months of age and are reduced to adult numbers by 4 to 6 years of age. In contrast, synapses in the middle frontal gyrus of the human prefrontal cortex reach their peak closer to 1 to 1.5 years of age, but are not reduced to adult numbers until mid- to late adolescence. Unfortunately, these data are based on relatively few brains NEURAL BASES OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 25 (thus leaving open the question of the range of individual differences) and relatively old methods (i.e., density of synapses per unit area, which increases the risk that nonsynaptic and even nonneuronal elements may be counted, such as glial cells). We should expect improved figures in the years to come with advances in new methods, a point that applies to much of the literature reviewed thus far. MYELINATION Myelin is a lipid/protein substance that wraps itself around an axon as a form of insulation and, as a result, increases conduction velocity. Oligodendroglia produce myelin in the CNS, whereas schwann cells produce myelin in the ANS. Myelination occurs in waves beginning prenatally and ending in young adulthood (and in some regions, as late as middle age; see Benes, Turtle, Khan, & Farol, 1994). Historically, myelin was examined in postmortem tissue using staining methods. From such work, it was revealed that myelination begins prenatally with the peripheral nervous system, motor roots, sensory roots, somesthetic cortex, and the primary visual and auditory cortices (in this chronological order). During the first postnatal year, regions of the brain stem myelinate, as does the cerebellum and splenium of corpus callosum; by 1 year, myelination of all regions of the corpus callosum is underway. Although staining for myelin is undoubtedly the most sensitive metric for examining the course of myelination, an obvious disadvantage to this procedure is that it can only be done on a relatively small number of postmortem brains; in addition, as is the case with human synaptogenesis, it is also of concern how representative these brains are of the general population. Fortunately, advances in magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) have now made it possible to acquire detailed information about myelination in living children; importantly, several longitudinal studies have examined the course of myelination from early childhood through early adulthood (Giedd, Snell, et al., 1996; Giedd, Vatuzis, et al., 1996; Jernigan, Trauner, Hesselink, & Tallal, 1991; Paus et al., 1999; Sowell et al., 1999; Sowell, Thompson, Holmes, Jernigan, & Toga, 2000). The results of this work paint the following picture: The pre- through postadolescent period witnesses an increase in gray matter volume, followed by a decrease, whereas white matter shows first a decrease and then an increase. During this same age period (prepost adolescence), particular changes of note occur in the dorsal, medial, and lateral regions of the frontal lobes, whereas relatively smaller changes are observed in the parietal, temporal, and occipital lobes. This suggests, not surprisingly, that the most dramatic changes in myelination occur in the frontal lobes through the adolescent period (for a general overview, see Durston et al., 2001). SUMMARY Overall, brain development begins within weeks of conception and continues through the adolescent period. This general statement does not do justice to the age-specific changes that occur during the first 2 decades of life. Thus, the assembly of the basic architecture of the brain occurs during the first two trimesters of fetal life, with the last trimester and the first few postnatal years reserved for changes in connectivity and function. The most prolonged changes occur in the wiring of the brain (synaptogenesis) and in making the brain work more efficiently (myelination), both of which show dramatic, nonlinear changes from the preschool period through the end of adolescence. 26 BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS Neural Bases of Cognitive Development Having laid the foundation for how the human brain develops, we now turn our attention to the neural bases of specific cognitive functions. As is the case with many of the topics targeted for review in this chapter, the reader is encouraged to consult more comprehensive treatises (e.g., de Haan & Johnson, 2003b; Johnson, 2001; Nelson & Luciana, 2001). Also note that because the focus of our discussion is on the neural bases of cognitive development, we restrict our discussion to the literature that directly relates a specific cognitive ability to brain development; the basic cognitive developmental behavioral literature is thoroughly reviewed in other chapters contained in this and previous volumes. MEMORY Development of Memory Systems Drawing on data from both juvenile and mature nonhuman primates, neuropsychological and neuroimaging data with adult humans, and the limited neuroimaging literature with developing humans, Nelson (1995) proposed that explicit qua explicit memory begins to develop some time after the first half year of life, as inferred from tasks such as deferred imitation, cross-modal recognition memory, delayed nonmatch-to-sample (DNMS), modified “oddball” designs in which event-related potentials (ERPs) are recorded, and preferential looking and habituation procedures that impose delays between familiarization (or habituation) and test. As is the case with the adult, this system depends on a distributed circuit that includes neocortical areas (such as the inferior temporal cortical area TE), the tissue surrounding the hippocampus (particularly the entorhinal cortex), and the hippocampus proper. However, Nelson also proposed that the development of explicit memory is preceded by an earlier form of memory referred to as preexplicit memory. What most distinguishes preexplicit from explicit memory is that the former (a) appears at or shortly after birth, (b) is most evident in simple novelty preferences (often reflected in the visual paired comparison procedure), and (c) is largely dependent on the hippocampus proper. These proposals (subsequently updated and elaborated by Nelson & Webb, 2003) were built less on direct visualization of brain-behavior relations than on the integration of data from many sources. This renders the model a useful heuristic, albeit one that would benefit from more data and less speculation. The challenge is that relatively little is known about the development of the circuitry purported to be involved in different memory systems and different types of memory; similarly, there are relatively few investigators using neuroimaging tools of any sort to examine brain-memory relations. Nevertheless, advances over the past decade in the testing of developing nonhuman and human primates have provided much needed additional information. Current Findings—Explicit Memory in the Developing Brain It is critical to consider the task being used to evaluate memory in deriving an understanding of what structure or circuit is involved. As discussed by Nelson (1995), Nelson and Webb (2003), and most recently, Hayne (2004), the very same task, used in different ways, could impose different task demands on the subject and recruit different underlying circuitry (see discussion of the DNMS task later in this chapter). NEURAL BASES OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 27 There is now very good evidence from the monkey literature that lesions of the hippocampus lead to disruptions in visual recognition memory, at least under certain circumstances, and at least as inferred from novelty preferences. Pascalis and Bachevalier (1999) have reported that in monkeys, neonatal lesions of the hippocampus (but not amygdala; see Alvarado, Wright, & Bachevalier, 2002) impair visual recognition memory as tested in the Visual Paired Comparison (VPC) procedure, at least when the delay between familiarization and test is more than 10 seconds. Nemanic, Alvarado, and Bachevalier (2004) have reported similar effects in adult monkeys. Specifically, lesions of the hippocampus, perirhinal cortex, and the parahippocampal cortex all impair performance on the VPC, although differentially so. Thus, lesions of the perirhinal cortex, parahippocampal cortex, and hippocampus proper lead to impairments when the delay between familiarization and test exceeds 20 seconds, 30 seconds, and 60 seconds, respectively. These findings are consistent with those from the human adult, where, for example, individuals with known damage to the hippocampus also show deficits in novelty preferences under short delay conditions (McKee & Squire, 1993). Importantly, in the human adult work, the same individuals who hours later fail to show novelty preferences do show intact recognition memory (Manns, Stark, & Squire, 2000). Moreover, a patient with selective hippocampal damage shows impairments on the VPC task but relatively intact recognition memory (Pascalis, Hunkin, Holdstock, Isaac, & Mayes, 2004). Together, these results suggest that recognition memory per se may be mediated by extra-hippocampal tissue (a point to which we will return), whereas novelty preferences are likely mediated by the hippocampus proper. The monkey data are only partially consistent with this view, as they suggest that the hippocampus and surrounding cortex all play a role in novelty preferences, although differentially so, at least in the adult. Further evidence for the role of the hippocampus in encoding the relations among stimuli (versus encoding individual stimuli, which may be the domain of the parahippocampal region) can be found in a paper by Robinson and Pascalis (2004). These authors tested groups of 6-, 12-, 18-, and 24-month-old infants using the VPC. Rather than evaluate memory for individually represented stimuli, the authors required infants to encode the properties of stimuli in context. During familiarization, stimuli were presented against one background, and during testing the same stimulus, paired with a novel stimulus, was presented against the same or a different background. The authors report that although all age groups showed strong novelty preferences when the background was the same, only the 18- and 24-month-olds showed novelty preferences when the backgrounds were changed. This would suggest that this particular function of the hippocampus—studying the relations among stimuli or encoding stimuli in context—is somewhat slower to develop than recognizing stimuli in which the context is the same. Support for this claim can be found in the developmental neuroanatomy literature. Specifically, although the hippocampus proper, the entorhinal cortex, and the connections between them are known to mature early in life (e.g., Serres, 2001), it is also known that the development of dentate gyrus of the hippocampus matures more slowly (see Serres, 2001), as does the perirhinal cortex (see Alvarado & Bachevalier, 2000). Thus, if Pascalis and colleagues are correct that their context-dependent task is dependent on the hippocampus, then in theory the delayed maturation observed on this task reflects the delayed maturation of some specific region of the hippocampus, such as the dentate gyrus. This last observation underscores an important point, which is that although explicit memory emerges sometime between 6 and 12 months of life, it is far from fully developed 28 BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS by this age. The fact that even very young infants (i.e., a few months of age) do quite well on standard preferential looking paradigms suggests that there is either enough hippocampal function to subserve task performance (as would be inferred from the monkey work performed by Bachevalier and colleagues) or that perhaps the parahippocampal region (about which virtually nothing is known developmentally) is mediating task performance. Thus, consistent with the neuroscience literature, the full, adultlike expression of explicit memory awaits the subsequent development of subregions of the hippocampus along with the connections to and from associated neocortical areas. NOVELTY PREFERENCES Because of the prominent role novelty preferences have played in evaluating memory in infants and young children, it is worth discussing at some length the putative neural bases of such preferences. As stated, we have concluded from monkey data that the hippocampus plays a prominent role in novelty preferences, primarily based on the perturbations observed in such preferences when the hippocampus is lesioned. However, we need not restrict ourselves to data from monkeys. Neuroimaging studies with human adults have also reported that the hippocampus is involved in novelty preferences (see Dolan & Fletcher, 1997; Strange, Fletcher, Hennson, Friston, & Dolan, 1999; Tulving, Markowitsch, Craik, Habib, & Houle, 1996). In contrast, Zola et al. (2000) reported that hippocampal lesions in mature monkeys did not affect novelty preferences at 1-second delays, and thus, that impairment (i.e., decline in performance) at subsequent delays was due to problems in memory, not novelty detection. Similarly, Manns et al. (2000) have shown that among intact human adults, novelty preferences and recognition memory are both intact shortly after familiarization, although with increasing delay novelty preferences disappear, and recognition memory remains intact. This work, coupled with that from Zola et al. (2000), argues for a dissociation between novelty preferences and recognition memory and raises two questions. First, are novelty preferences truly mediated by the hippocampus or perhaps by extra-hippocampal tissue, and second, what does this dissociation say about the infancy literature in which recognition memory is typically inferred from novelty preferences? First, it may be unwise to assume that all tasks that tap novelty preferences by default place the same demands on memory. For example, our view is that in tasks that require the subject to generalize discrimination across multiple exemplars of the same category of stimuli (e.g., to distinguish male faces from female faces), novelty preferences may depend on the ability to examine the relations among stimuli, and thus, depend disproportionately on the hippocampus. In contrast, if the task simply requires one to discriminate two individual exemplars (e.g., one female face from another), then perhaps the parahippocampal region is involved. Second, novelty preferences and recognition memory may not represent the same or different processes as much as related ones. Thus, in the VPC procedure, perceptual support is provided by presenting the familiar and novel stimuli simultaneously. In so doing, recognition may be facilitated at very short delays, perhaps due to some iconic store rather than the need to compare the novel stimulus to one stored in memory. This may occur in short-term memory and be supported by the parahippocampal region. Whereas it is easy to dissociate novelty preferences from recognition memory in children or adults (in whom instructions can be given), the same is not true for infants, particularly when behavioral measures are employed. However, using ERPs, Nelson NEURAL BASES OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 29 and Collins (1991, 1992) appeared to dissociate these processes to some degree. Fourthrough 8-month-old infants were initially familiarized to two stimuli; during the test trials, one of these stimuli was presented on a random 60% of the trials (frequentfamiliar), the other on a random 20% of the trials (infrequent-familiar), and on each of the remaining 20% of the trials, a different novel stimulus (infrequent-novel) was presented. In theory, if recognition memory is independent of how often a stimulus is seen (i.e., its probability of occurrence), then all infants should treat the two familiar stimuli as equivalent, regardless of how often they are presented during the test trials. The authors reported that it was not until 8 months that infants responded equivalently to the two classes of familiar events and differently to the novel events. In contrast, at 6 months infants responded differently to the two classes of familiar events and differently yet again to the novel events. These findings were interpreted to reflect an improvement in memory from 6 to 8 months, specifically, the ability to ignore how often a stimulus is seen (inherent in novelty responses) from whether the stimulus is familiar (inherent in recognition memory). At this point, it is difficult to say with certainty whether, in human children, it is the hippocampus or parahippocampal region that subserves novelty preferences and whether novelty preferences reflect a subroutine involved in recognition memory or reflect a proxy for recognition memory per se. These are questions that await further study. DELAYED NON-MATCH-TO-SAMPLE What about other tasks that have been thought to reflect explicit memory, such as the DNMS task? Here a subject is presented with a sample stimulus, and following some delay (during which the stimulus cannot be observed), the sample and a novel stimulus are presented side by side. In the case of monkeys, the animal is rewarded for retrieving the novel stimulus; in the case of humans, some investigators implement a similar reward system and essentially adopt the animal-testing model (e.g., see Overman, Bachevalier, Sewell, & Drew, 1993), whereas others have modified the task such that no reward is administered and looking at the novel stimulus rather than reaching for it serves as the dependent measure (see A. Diamond, 1995). In the classic DNMS task, it is generally reported that monkeys do not perform at adult levels until they approach 1 year of age, and performance among children does not begin to resemble adults until they are approximately 4 years of age (assuming the standard 14 ratio of monkey to human years, these data are remarkably consistent). Pascalis and Bachevalier (1999) have reported that neonatal lesions of the hippocampus do not impair performance on the DNMS task, suggesting that the DNMS likely depends on extra-hippocampal structures and does not depend on just novelty preferences (i.e., unlike the VPC task, the DNMS task requires the subject to coordinate action schemes with what is represented in memory, and as well, inhibit a response to the familiar stimulus). Support for this can be found in studies reported by Málková, Bachevalier, Mishkin, and Saunders (2001) and Nemanic et al. (2004), in which lesions of the perirhinal cortex in adult monkeys led to impairments in visual recognition memory as inferred from the DNMS; importantly, data from the Nemanic et al. (2004) study suggests that lesions of the hippocampus and parahippocampal regions have little effect on DNMS performance. Of note is the observation that these data contradict those reported by other groups (e.g., Zola et al., 2000), where hippocampal lesions in adult monkeys do lead to impairments on DNMS performance. Our group has reported hippocampal activation in human adults tested with the DNMS task (Monk et al., 2002). What is to account for 30 BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS these differences? First, it could be that there is a fundamental difference in structure function relations in young versus mature subjects thus, the same function could be subserved by a different structure in the developing versus the developed individual. Second, it could mean that the demands of the DNMS task differ (or are interpreted differently) depending on developmental age (e.g., the reward value of reinforcing stimuli could differ; how the child/juvenile monkey interprets the task demands could be different from how the adult/mature monkey interprets the task demands). Third, earlier studies of hippocampal lesions in adult monkeys could have included lesions of the surrounding cortex, thus making it difficult to distinguish between impairments due to the hippocampus or perirhinal cortex. Finally, in the Monk et al. (2002) neuroimaging work, it was difficult to distinguish the hippocampus from adjacent cortex, and therefore, it is possible that the surrounding cortex was most involved in performance on the DNMS task. SUMMARY Piecing together heterogeneous sources of information, it appears that an early form of explicit memory emerges shortly after birth (assuming a full-term delivery). This preexplicit memory is dependent predominantly on the hippocampus. As infants enter the second half of their first year of life, hippocampal maturation, coupled with development of the surrounding cortex, makes possible the emergence of explicit memory. A variety of tasks have been used to evaluate explicit memory, some unique to the human infant, others adopted from the monkey. Based on such tasks, one observes a gradual improvement in memory across the first few years of life, most likely due to changes in the hippocampus proper (e.g., dentate gyrus), to the surrounding cortex (e.g., parahippocampal cortex), and to increased connectivity between these areas. The changes one observes in memory from the preschool through elementary school years are likely due to changes in prefrontal cortex, and connections between the prefrontal cortex and the medial temporal lobe. Such changes make possible the ability to perform mental operations on the contents of memory, such as the ability to use strategies to encode and retrieve information. Finally, changes in long-term memory are likely due to the development of the neocortical areas that are thought to store such memories, and the improved communication between the neocortex and the medial temporal lobe (MTL). It is most likely these changes that usher in the end of infantile amnesia (for elaboration, see Nelson, 1998; Nelson & Carver, 1998). NONDECLARATIVE MEMORY Nondeclarative or implicit forms of learning and memory functions represent an essential aspect of human cognition by which information and skills can be learned through mere exposure or practice, without requiring conscious intention or attention and eventually becoming automatic. Although controversy exists regarding the definition of nondeclarative memory or learning, performance on most nondeclarative tasks does not appear to depend on medial temporal lobe structures. Patients like H. M., mentioned earlier, demonstrate severe deficits in explicit memory consistent with known insults to or disruption of medial temporal lobe memory systems. However, these patients are not impaired on classic tests of implicit memory and learning, such as perceptual priming or serial reaction time (SRT) learning (Milner, Corkin, & Teuber, NEURAL BASES OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 31 1968; Shimamura, 1986; Squire, 1986; Squire & Frambach, 1990; Squire, Knowlton, & Musen, 1993; Squire & McKee, 1993). A multitude of tasks have emerged in the cognitive literature to assess nondeclarative cognitive functions (see Seger, 1994; Reber, 1993). Reber (1993) proposes making a distinction between two broad categories of nondeclarative function: implicit memory (the end-state representation of knowledge available to an individual, of which he or she is unaware) and implicit learning (the unintentional and unconscious acquisition of knowledge). Implicit learning involves learning of underlying rules and structure in the absence of any conscious awareness of those regularities. Such learning is slow and requires repeated exposure to the information to be retained. In contrast, implicit memory may occur with a single exposure to a stimulus and results in an increased processing efficiency for subsequent presentations of that stimulus or closely related stimuli. Not only do these categories differ in their basic cognitive nature (representation versus acquisition of knowledge), but they seem to differ in their underlying neural substrates as well. In a now well-known classification of memory systems, Squire (1994) identified three primary forms of implicit learning and memory: priming, procedural learning (skills and habits), and classical conditioning (associative learning), each relying on separable neural systems. IMPLICIT SEQUENCE LEARNING In contrast to priming, implicit learning—also termed habit learning, skill learning, or procedural learning—involves the slow acquisition of a knowledge base or behavioral skill set over time. In everyday life, learning to ride a bicycle involves the gradual acquisition of a skill that is very difficult or impossible to describe verbally. Although intentionally trying to learn the skill, the learner is typically unaware of what exactly is being learned. Implicit learning has most frequently been tested using sequence learning (e.g., Nissen & Bullemer, 1987) or artificial grammar learning paradigms (Reber, 1993). In the SRT task, individuals are asked to map a set of spatial or object stimuli onto an equal number of response buttons. Reaction times to match the stimulus and the button are recorded. Unknown to the participant, whereas stimuli often appear in random order, at other times, the order of stimulus presentation follows a predictable and repeating sequence. Implicit learning is assumed when participants show reaction time improvements during the sequential trials compared with random trials, despite no conscious awareness of the underlying regularity. Patients with temporal lobe amnesia perform normally on sequence learning tasks. However, patients with basal ganglia damage, such as those with Parkinson’s or Huntington’s diseases, have been shown to be impaired on the serial reaction time task (Ferraro, Balota, & Connor, 1993; Heindel, Salmon, Shults, Walicke, & Butters, 1989; Knopman & Nissen, 1991; Pascual-Leone et al., 1993). Importantly, these patients perform normally on measures of explicit memory as well as on measures of perceptual and conceptual priming (Schwartz & Hastroudi, 1991), providing support for the separability of implicit learning and implicit memory at the neural systems level. Neuroimaging data provide supporting evidence for the role of subcortical structures in serial reaction time learning. Common findings across a number of laboratories (Bischoff-Grethe, Martin, Mao, & Berns, 2001; Grafton, Hazeltine, & Ivry, 1995; Hazeltine, Grafton, & Ivry, 1997; Schendan, Searl, Melrose, & Ce, 2003) demonstrate differential activity in frontal—basal ganglia—thalamic circuits for sequential trials 32 BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS compared with random trials. Further evidence suggests that connections among these fronto-striatal loops and fronto-cerebellar loops may be an important aspect of implicit learning. Pascual-Leone et al. (1993) observed that, although adults with basal ganglia insults demonstrated significant reductions in implicit sequence learning, adults with cerebellar degeneration showed no evidence of learning on the SRT task. Significant controversy exists regarding the developmental trajectory of implicit learning. In a study of SRT learning in 6- to 10-year-old children and adults, Meulemans, van der Linden, and Perruchet (1998) observed equivalent learning of a 10-step spatial sequence across age groups, despite overall reaction time differences with age. These data support the notion that implicit cognition may mature very early in infancy and show little variation or improvement with age (Reber, 1992). However, other measures of implicit pattern learning or contingency learning, as well as SRT data from an alternate group, are less clear. Maybery, Taylor, and O’Brien-Malone (1995) report age-related improvements in covariation learning, with older children showing larger learning effects than younger children. However, Lewicki (1986) found no evidence of age-related learning effects on the original version of the same task. Similarly, Thomas and Nelson (2001) found that, although the size of the implicit learning effect was similar between 4-, 7-, and 10-year-olds who showed evidence of sequence learning on an SRT task, older children were more likely to show learning. In fact, the probability of significant learning was inversely related to age, with fully one-third of the youngest age group showing no evidence of learning (whereas all 10-year-olds showed a learning effect). Evidence for age-related improvements in implicit sequence learning comes from an infant analogue of the SRT task: visual expectancy formation. In this task, infants are shown a repeating pattern of visual stimuli, and eye movements are recorded to determine whether the infant learns to anticipate the location of the upcoming stimuli over time. Although we cannot rule out the possibility that this behavior is explicitly learned, the task has many similarities to the adult SRT paradigm. Although infants as young as 2 and 3 months of age can show reliable visual expectancy formation (Canfield, Smith, Brezsnyak, & Snow, 1997; Haith, Hazan, & Goodman, 1988), older infants are able to learn more complicated sequential relationships than younger children (Clohessy, Posner, & Rothbart, 2002; Smith, Loboschefski, Davidson, & Dixon, 1997). In a recent pediatric imaging study of the SRT task, Thomas et al. (in press) compared the neural systems subserving implicit sequence learning in 7- to 11-year-old children and adults. Overall, results from adults were consistent with previous neuroimaging studies implicating fronto-striatal circuitry in visuomotor sequence learning. In particular, activity in the basal ganglia was positively correlated with the size of the implicit learning effect (greater learning was associated with increased activity in the caudate nucleus). Although children and adults showed many of the same regions of activity, relative group differences were observed overall, with children showing greater subcortical activity and adults showing greater cortical activity. Consistent with findings from adult SRT studies (Schendan et al., 2003), both adults and children showed activity in the hippocampus despite no explicit awareness of the sequence. This activity is unlikely to be either necessary or sufficient for implicit sequence learning given the adult literature indicating spared performance following lesions to the hippocampus. Instead, this activity may reflect a sensitivity to stimulus novelty, a function of the hippocampus discussed earlier in this chapter. Children showed an inverse pattern of hippocampal activity as compared to adults (random trials elicited greater hip- NEURAL BASES OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 33 pocampal activity than sequence trials for child participants). The SRT task used here produced significant developmental differences in the magnitude of the learning effect, with children demonstrating significantly less learning than adults. Unlike prior behavioral studies, this effect was not driven by a difference in the percentage of nonlearners in the two age groups. Rather, despite significant individual learning in both groups, adults learned to a greater extent with the same degree of exposure. Finally, some evidence exists to address the effects of basal ganglia insults early in development. Although early insults may lead to lasting impairments in functions subserved by the affected systems, the plastic nature of the developing brain may also allow for redistribution of function to other regions that are unaffected. Structural neuroimaging studies have identified childhood attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), as well as perinatal complications such as intraventricular hemorrhage as risk factors for disrupted basal ganglia circuitry. Castellanos et al. (2001, 2002) have reported decreases in caudate volume in children with ADHD compared with nonaffected controls. Similarly, functional imaging studies of attentional control (see Executive Functions, later in this chapter) suggest a lack of typical basal ganglia activity in children with ADHD (Vaidya et al., 1998). A paper addressing reading disabilities suggests a possible link between reduced motor sequence learning and symptoms of ADHD (Waber et al., 2003). Thomas and colleagues reported evidence of significant decrements in sequence learning for 6- to 9-year-old children diagnosed with ADHD (Thomas, Vizueta, Teylan, Eccard, & Casey, 2003). These authors also examined implicit sequence learning in children with perinatal histories of intraventricular hemorrhage (IVH), or bleeding into the lateral ventricles at birth. Children whose IVH was moderate (bilateral grade II or more severe) evidenced significant decrements in the magnitude of the implicit learning effect. In contrast, children whose perinatal IVH had been relatively mild (unilateral grade II or less severe) showed no difference in learning from a full-term, age- and gender-matched control group. Together, these studies suggest a potential long-term deficit in implicit learning resulting from early insults to basal ganglia circuitry. Object Recognition FACE/OBJECT RECOGNITION Among the numerous visual inputs that we receive each moment, the human face is perhaps one of the most salient. The importance of the many signals it conveys (e.g., emotion, identity, direction of eye gaze), together with the speed and ease with which adults typically process this information, are compelling reasons to suppose that there may exist brain circuits specialized for processing faces. Neuropsychological studies provided the first evidence to support this view, with reports of double dissociation of face and object processing. That is, there are patients who show impaired face processing but relatively intact general vision and object processing (with the occasional exception of color vision; reviewed in Barton, 2003), and other patients who show the opposite pattern of deficit (e.g., Moscovitch, Winocur, & Behrmann, 1997). These studies also hinted that damage to the right hemisphere might be necessary for the face-processing impairments to be observed. More recently, ERP, MEG, and fMRI methods have been used to identify the pathways involved in face processing in the 34 BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS intact brain. These studies have confirmed and extended findings from brain-injured patients, indicating that a distributed network of regions in the brain mediate face processing: occipito-temporal regions are important for the early perceptual stages of face processing, with more anterior regions, including areas of the temporal and frontal cortices and the amygdala, involved in processing aspects such as identity and emotional expression (Adolphs, 2002; Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2002). In this section, we focus mainly on the involvement of occipito-temporal cortex and the amygdala, as these are the areas for which the most developmental data are available. OCCIPITO-TEMPORAL CORTEX In adults, a network including the inferior occipital gyrus, the fusiform gyrus, and the superior temporal sulcus is important for the early stages of face processing (Haxby et al., 2002). In this view, the inferior occipital gyrus is primarily responsible for early perception of facial features, while the fusiform gyrus and the superior temporal sulcus are involved in more specialized processing (Haxby et al., 2002). In particular, the fusiform gyrus is thought to be involved in the processing of invariant aspects of faces (such as the perception of unique identity), whereas the superior temporal sulcus is involved in the processing of changeable aspects (such as perception of eye gaze, expression, and lip movement; Haxby et al., 2002; Hoffman & Haxby, 2000). Perhaps the most intensively studied of these regions is an area of fusiform gyrus labeled the fusiform face area (Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997; Puce, Allison, Asgari, Gore, & McCarthy, 1996). This region is more activated to faces compared with other objects or body parts (Kanwisher et al., 1997; Puce et al., 1996). Although some investigators have argued against the view of face-specific patches of cortex and have instead emphasized the distributed nature of the representation of object feature information over the ventral posterior cortex (Haxby et al., 2001), even these authors acknowledge that the response to faces appears unique in certain ways (e.g., extent of activation, modulation by attention; Ishai, Ungerleider, Martin, & Haxby, 2000). Although these studies appear to suggest that particular regions of cortex are devoted specifically to face processing, this interpretation has been questioned. In particular, it has been argued that the supposed face-specific cortical areas are not specific to faces per se, but instead are recruited for expert-level discrimination of complex visual patterns, whether faces or other classes of objects (R. Diamond & Carey, 1986; Gauthier, Skudlarski, Gore, & Anderson, 1999). In this view, the mechanisms active during development of face processing could be the same as those observed in adults learning an equally challenging visual perceptual task. In support of this view, studies have shown that the fusiform face area is also activated by nonface objects (e.g., cars) if the subjects are experts with that category (Gauthier et al., 2000), and activation in the fusiform face areas increases following training of expertise with a category of visual forms (Gauthier, Tarr, Anderson, Skudlarski, & Gore, 1999). Developmental studies can provide important information to constrain the claims of the different sides of this debate. For example, by studying when and how facespecific brain responses emerge, developmental studies can provide some hints as to whether and how much experience might be needed for these responses to emerge. Behavioral studies provide a suggestion that face-processing pathways may be functional from very early in life: newborn babies move their eyes, and sometimes their heads, longer to keep a moving facelike pattern in view than several other comparison NEURAL BASES OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 35 patterns (Johnson, Dziurawiec, Ellis, & Morton, 1991). While there is a debate as to whether this reflects a specific response to facelike configurations or a lower-level visual preference (e.g., for patterns with higher density of elements in the upper visual field, see Turati, Simion, Milani, & Umilta, 2002; see also Banks & Ginsburg, 1985; Banks & Salapatek, 1981), there is some agreement among the divergent views that the ultimate result is that facelike patterns are preferred to other arrangements from the first hours to days of life. While this might seem to support the notion that face-specific cortical areas are active from birth, the prevailing view is that this early preferential orienting to faces is likely mediated by subcortical mechanisms (e.g., superior colliculus; for a review of the evidence, see Johnson & Morton, 1991), and that cortical mechanisms do not begin to emerge until 2 to 3 months of age. At this early age, cortical areas are thought to be relatively unspecialized (Johnson & Morton, 1991; Nelson, 2001). One possible role of the earlier-developing subcortical system is to provide a “facebiased” input to the slower-developing occipito-temporal cortical system, and to provide one mechanism whereby an initially more broadly tuned processing system becomes increasingly specialized to respond to faces during development (Johnson & Morton, 1991; Nelson, 2001). The only functional neuroimaging study to investigate face processing in human infants confirms that occipito-temporal cortical pathways are involved by 2 to 3 months of age. In this study, 2-month-olds’ positron emission tomography (PET) activation in the inferior occipital gyrus and the fusiform gyrus, but not the superior temporal sulcus, was greater in response to a human face than to a set of three light diodes (TzourioMazoyer et al., 2002). These results demonstrate that areas involved in face processing in adults can also be activated in infants by 2 months of age, although they do not address the question of whether these areas are specifically activated by faces rather than by other visual stimuli. The superior temporal sulcus, suggested to be involved in the processing of information relevant to social communication, was not activated in this study. One possible explanation is that the stimuli (static and neutral) were not optimal for activating processing in the superior temporal sulcus. However, the observation that activation in the superior temporal sulcus has been found in adults even in response to static, neutral faces (e.g., Kesler-West et al., 2001) argues against this interpretation. It is possible that the superior temporal sulcus plays a different role in the face-processing network in infants than in adults, since in primates its connectivity with other visual areas is known to differ in infants compared with adult monkeys (Kennedy, Bullier, & Dehay, 1989). Event-related potential studies support the idea that cortical mechanisms are involved in face processing from at least 3 months of age. However, these studies also suggest that when cortical mechanisms become involved in infants’ processing of faces, they are less “tuned in” to faces than is the mature system. Two studies have shown that face-responsive ERP components are more specific to human faces in adults than in infants (de Haan, Pascalis, & Johnson, 2002; Halit, de Haan & Johnson, 2003). In adults, the N170, a negative deflection over occipito-temporal electrodes that peaks approximately 170 ms after stimulus onset, is thought to reflect the initial stage of the structural encoding of the face. Although the location in the brain of the generator(s) of the N170 remains a matter of debate, it is generally believed that regions of the fusiform gyrus (Shibata et al., 2002), the posterior inferior temporal gyrus (Shibata et al., 2002), lateral occipito-temporal cortex (Schweinberger, Pickering, Jentzsch, 36 BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS Burton, & Kaufmann, 2002), and the superior temporal sulcus (Henson et al., 2003) are involved. The N170 is typically of larger amplitude and/or has a longer latency for inverted than upright faces (de Haan et al., 2002; Eimer, 2000; Itier & Taylor, 2002; Rossion et al., 2000), a pattern that parallels behavioral studies showing that adults are slower at recognizing inverted than upright faces (Carey & Diamond, 1994). In adults, the effect of inversion on the N170 is specific for human faces and does not occur for inverted compared with upright exemplars of nonface object categories (Rebai, Poiroux, Bernard, & Lalonde, 2001; Rossion et al., 2000), even animal (monkey) faces (de Haan et al., 2002). Developmental studies have identified two components, the N290 and the P400, believed to be precursors of the N170. Both components are maximal over posterior cortex, with the N290 peaking at about 290 ms after stimulus onset and the P400 about 100 ms later. The N290 shows an adultlike modulation of amplitude by stimulus inversion by 12 months of age: inversion increases the amplitude of the N290 for human but not monkey faces (Halit et al., 2003). The P400 has a quicker latency for faces compared with objects by 6 months of age (de Haan & Nelson, 1999) and shows an adultlike effect of stimulus inversion on peak latency by 12 months of age: It is of longer latency for inverted than upright human faces but does not differ for inverted compared with upright monkey faces (Halit et al., 2003). At 3 and 6 months, the N290 is unaffected by inversion; and the P400, while modulated by inversion, does not show effects specific to human faces (de Haan et al., 2002; Halit et al., 2003). Overall, these findings suggest that there is a gradual emergence of face-selective response over the first year of life (and beyond). This finding is consistent with results of a behavioral study showing a decrease in discrimination abilities for nonhuman faces with age; 6-montholds can discriminate between individual humans and monkeys, whereas 9-month-olds and adults tested with the same procedure discriminate only between individual human faces (Pascalis, de Haan, & Nelson, 2002). The results also suggest that the structural encoding of faces may be dispersed over a longer time in infants than in adults. It is possible that, as the processes become more automated, they are carried out more quickly and/or in parallel rather than in serial fashion. The spatial distribution of the N170 and P400 both change from 3 to 12 months, with maxima shifting laterally for both components (de Haan et al., 2002; Halit et al., 2003). In addition, the maxima of these components appear more superior than in adults, a result consistent with studies in children finding a shift from superior to inferior maximum of the N170 with age (Taylor, Edmonds, McCarthy, & Allison, 2001). This might reflect a change in the configuration of generators underlying these components with age. Investigations with older children also support the view of a gradual specialization of face processing. ERP studies suggest that there are gradual, quantitative improvements in face processing from 4 to 15 years of age rather than stage like shifts (Taylor, McCarthy, Saliba, & Degiovanni, 1999). The ERP studies also provide evidence that there is a slower maturation of configural than featural processing: Responses to eyes presented alone matured more slowly than responses to eyes presented in the configuration of the face (Taylor et al., 2001). There have not been many functional imaging studies of face processing during childhood, but one study examining facial identity processing suggests that changes in the network are activated in 10- to 12-year-olds compared with adults (Passarotti et al., 2003). Children showed a more distributed pattern of activation compared with adults. Within the fusiform gyrus, children tended to show more activation in lateral areas of the right hemisphere than did adults: In the left NEURAL BASES OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 37 hemisphere, children showed greater lateral than medial activation, whereas adults showed no difference for the two areas. In addition, children showed twice as much activation of the middle temporal gyrus as adults. The authors interpret these results as suggesting that increased skill is associated with a more focal pattern of activation. Studies of children with autistic spectrum disorders support the view that atypical activation of occipito-temporal cortex is related to impairments in face processing. Autistic spectrum disorders are characterized by impairments in processing of social information, including faces. Functional imaging studies indicate that when individuals with autism or Asperger syndrome view faces, they show a diminished response in the fusiform gyrus compared with controls (Hubl et al., 2003; Pierce, Muller, Ambrose, Allen, & Courchesne, 2001; Schultz et al., 2000) and show an increased activation of object-processing areas in the inferior temporal cortex (Hubl et al., 2003; Schultz et al., 2000). It is possible that this reflects a different processing strategy in which individuals with autism focus more on featural rather than configural information in the face. In other words, individuals with autism may rely more on general purpose object-processing pathways rather than specialized face-processing pathways when viewing faces. AMYGDALA The amygdala is a heterogeneous collection of nuclei located in the anterior temporal lobe. Several studies in adults have shown that lesions to the amygdala impair emotion recognition, even when they leave other aspects of face processing intact (e.g., identity recognition; Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1994). Lesion studies also indicate that recognition of fearful expressions is particularly vulnerable to such damage (Adolphs et al., 1994, 1999; Broks et al., 1998; Calder et al., 1996). Functional imaging studies in healthy adults and school-age children complement these findings, with some studies showing that the amygdala responds to a variety of positive, negative, or neutral expressions (Thomas et al., 2001; Yang et al., 2002), and other studies suggesting that the amygdala is particularly responsive to fearful expressions (Morris et al., 1996; Whalen et al., 2001). There is indirect evidence that the amygdala plays a role in processing facial expressions in infants. Balaban (1995) used the eye-blink startle response (a reflex blink initiated involuntarily by sudden bursts of loud noise) to examine the psychophysiology of infants’ responses to facial expressions. In adults, these reflex blinks are augmented by viewing slides of unpleasant pictures and scenes, and they are inhibited by viewing slides of pleasant or arousing pictures and scenes (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990, 1992). Consistent with the adult findings, Balaban found that 5-month-old infants’ blinks were augmented when they viewed angry expressions and were reduced when they viewed happy expressions, relative to when they viewed neutral expressions. Animal studies indicate that the fear potentiation of the startle response is mediated by the amygdala (Davis, 1989; Holstege, van Ham, & Tan, 1986), therefore, these results suggest that by 5 months of age, portions of the amygdala circuitry underlying the response to facial expressions may be functional. There is evidence that early damage to the amygdala may have a more pronounced effect on recognition of facial expression than damage sustained later in life. For example, in one study of emotion recognition in patients who had undergone temporal lobectomy as treatment for intractable epilepsy, emotion recognition in patients with early, right mesial temporal sclerosis, but not those with left-sided damage or extratemporal 38 BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS damage, showed impairments on tests of recognition of facial expressions of emotion but not on comparison tasks of face processing (Meletti et al., 2003). This deficit was most pronounced for fearful expressions, and the degree of deficit was related to the age of first seizure and epilepsy onset. ROLE OF EXPERIENCE The preceding studies suggest that the cortical system involved in face processing becomes increasingly specialized for faces throughout the course of development. Several developmental theories propose that experience is necessary for this process of specialization to occur (e.g., Nelson, 2001). Only a few studies have directly examined the role of experience in development of face processing. In one series of studies, the face-processing abilities of patients with congenital cataracts who were deprived of patterned visual input for the first months of life were tested years after this period of deprivation. These patients show normal processing of featural information (e.g., subtle differences in the shape of the eyes and mouth), but show impairments in processing configural information (i.e., the spacing of features within the face; Le Grand, Mondloch, Maurer, & Brent, 2001a, 2001b; Geldart, Mondloch, Maurer, de Schonen, & Brent, 2002). This pattern was specific to faces in that both featural and configural aspects of geometric patterns were processed normally (Le Grand et al., 2001a, 2001b). Moreover, when patients whose visual input had been restricted mainly to one hemisphere during infancy were examined, it was found that visual input to the right hemisphere, but not the left hemisphere, was critical for an expert level of face processing to develop (Le Grand, Mondloch, Maurer, & Brent, 2003). These studies suggest that visual input during early infancy is necessary for the normal development of at least some aspects of face processing. Another way in which the role of experience has been investigated is by studying children who experience atypical early emotional environments. For example, Pollak and colleagues have found that perception of the facial expression of anger, but not other expressions, is altered in children who are abused by their parents. Specifically, they report that, compared with nonabused children, abused children show a response bias for anger (Pollak, Cicchetti, Hornung, & Reed, 2000), identify anger based on less perceptual input (Pollak & Sinha, 2002), and show altered category boundaries for anger (Pollak & Kistler, 2002). These results suggest that atypical frequency and content of their emotional interactions with their caregivers result in a change in the basic perception of emotional expressions in abused children. Executive Functions Most high-level cognitive functions involve executive processes, or cognitive control functions, such as attention, planning, problem solving, and decision making. These processes are largely voluntary (as opposed to automatic) and are highly effortful. Such functions, including selective and executive attention, inhibition, and working memory, are hypothesized to improve with age and practice, and to vary with individual differences in motivation or intelligence. These cognitive control processes have been described as providing a “supervisory attention system” (Shallice, 1988)—a system for inhibiting or overriding routine or reflexive behaviors in favor of more con- NEURAL BASES OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 39 trolled or situationally appropriate or adaptive behaviors. Desimone and Duncan (1995) describe this system as an attentional bias that provides a mechanism for attending to relevant information by simultaneously inhibiting irrelevant information (Casey, Durston, & Fossella, 2001). The ability to override a dominant response or ignore irrelevant information is critical in everyday life, as evidenced by the functional impairments associated with chronic inattention, behavioral impulsivity, or poor planning and decision making. Classic lesion cases, such as the famous case of Phineas Gage, indicate that injury to the prefrontal cortex can result in difficulties in behavioral regulation, such as impulsivity and socially inappropriate behavior (Fuster, 1997), as well as disruptions in planning, working memory, and focused attention. Cognitive developmentalists will recognize these same functions as showing relatively protracted behavioral maturation, often not reaching adult levels of performance until late adolescence (Anderson, Anderson, Northam, Jacobs, & Catroppa, 2001). It is therefore not surprising that the prefrontal cortex shows one of the longest periods of development of any brain region (A. Diamond, 2002; Luciana, 2003, for reviews). In fact, the relations between prefrontal cortex development and the development of executive functions is probably one of the clearest relations in the developmental cognitive neuroscience literature. However, this does not imply that we fully understand the instantiation of attention, working memory, or inhibition in the brain. Instead, we have significant evidence from lesion and neuroimaging methods to relate subregions of prefrontal cortex to specific aspects of cognitive control in adulthood, as well as a growing body of literature addressing the normative and atypical function of these regions, and their connected networks of structures, in the development of cognitive control. For reasons of space, only illustrative examples from normative behavioral development, animal models, adult and pediatric neuroimaging studies, and atypical developmental populations are provided here (Casey, Durston, et al., 2001; A. Diamond, 2002; Luciana, 2003). DOMAINS OF EXECUTIVE FUNCTION Many researchers have identified working memory and behavioral inhibition as the primary functions of prefrontal cortex, and by extension, the basic components of executive function (e.g., A. Diamond, 2001). Working memory has typically been associated with dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC; J. Cohen et al., 1994; Fuster, 1997; Levy & Goldman-Rakic, 2000), while more ventral regions have been implicated in inhibition of a prepotent behavioral response (Casey et al., 1997; Kawashima et al., 1996; Konishi et al., 1999). Other investigators have parsed their definition of executive functions somewhat differently in an effort to include the voluntary and effortful aspects of attentional control as well as response inhibition. Whatever scheme is used, it is apparent that the classic executive function tasks involve more than one of the preceding aspects of voluntary control or regulation. In the following sections, we provide examples of behavioral tasks thought to tap various aspects of executive function across development, as well as provide select examples that evidence the role of specific regions of prefrontal cortex in supporting cognitive control. Of course, prefrontal cortex does not act in isolation. Other brain regions are assumed to be integral to the executive function system, providing input and feedback, as well as receiving inputs from prefrontal cortex. Developmental improvements in executive function may arise as much from the development of such functional integration as from the architectural 40 BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS and physiological development of prefrontal cortex (Anderson et al., 2001; Anderson, Levin, & Jacobs, 2002). WORKING MEMORY Perhaps the task most clearly associated with both child development and prefrontal cortex is the classic A-not-B task. In this paradigm (or its close cousin, the delayed response task), an infant or animal watches an object being hidden at one of two identical locations, and after some delay is rewarded for retrieving the object. This task requires both holding information in mind across a delay and, on subsequent trials when the hiding location changes, inhibiting a prepotent tendency to return to a previously correct response location (A. Diamond, 1985). Animal lesion studies support the importance of DLPFC in successful performance on the A-not-B and delayed response tasks (A. Diamond & Goldman-Rakic, 1989; Fuster & Alexander, 1970; Goldman & Rosvold, 1970). In addition, electrophysiological studies indicate that cells in this region actively respond during the delay interval, suggesting that DLPFC is involved in the maintenance of information in working memory (Funahashi, Bruce, & GoldmanRakic, 1989; Fuster & Alexander, 1971). Further investigation demonstrates that lesions to this region impair performance only under delay conditions and not during immediate object retrieval (A. Diamond & Goldman-Rakic, 1989). Functional imaging studies suggest that developmental differences in working memory function, at least in middle childhood, may be reflected in less efficient or less focal activation of DLPFC. That is, pediatric fMRI studies have demonstrated that children activate similar regions of DLPFC compared with adults during both verbal and spatial working memory tasks, but also may activate additional areas of prefrontal cortex, including ventral lateral regions (VLPFC; Casey et al., 1995; Nelson et al., 2000; Thomas et al., 1999). INHIBITORY CONTROL Although working memory has been associated with dorsolateral regions of the prefrontal cortex, the ability to inhibit inappropriate behaviors has typically been associated with ventral medial or orbital frontal cortex (Casey et al., 1997; Konishi et al., 1999). In adults, lesions to ventral prefrontal cortex lead to impulsive and socially inappropriate behavior (Barrash, Tranel, & Anderson, 1994; Damasio, Grabowski, Frank, Galaburda, & Damasio, 1994). One common developmental measure of response inhibition is the go/no-go paradigm. In this task, children are asked to respond to every stimulus except one (e.g., all letters except X). The task is designed such that the majority of trials are “go” trials, building up a compelling behavioral response tendency. The child’s ability to refrain from making the response at the occurrence of the “no-go” stimulus is used as an index of inhibitory control. Performance on such tasks has been shown to improve across the preschool and school-age years (Casey, Durston, et al., 2001; Ridderinkhof, van der Molen, Band, & Bashore, 1997). Neuroimaging studies using the go/no-go paradigm have demonstrated signal increases in ventral PFC during periods high in inhibitory demand (Casey, Forman, et al., 2001; Casey et al., 1997), with correspondingly lower levels of activity during periods of low inhibitory demand. Konishi et al. (1999) observed increased ventral PFC activation during no-go trials in an event-related fMRI paradigm. Pediatric neuroimaging studies have demonstrated both developmental differences in activation of ventral prefrontal NEURAL BASES OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 41 cortex (Bunge, Dudukovic, Thomason, Vaidya, & Gabrieli, 2002), with children showing reduced signal compared with adults, and increasing activation of ventral lateral PFC with increasing inhibitory load (Durston, Thomas, & Yang, 2002). Durston and colleagues (2002) showed that behavioral performance on the go/no-go task was significantly correlated with activity in inferior frontal cortex, as well as other prefrontal regions, including the anterior cingulate gyrus (ACC). Importantly, these same studies highlight the importance of regions beyond the prefrontal cortex. In particular, basal ganglia structures have also been shown to be involved in response inhibition (e.g., Luna et al., 2001), perhaps particularly so for children (Bunge et al., 2002; Casey et al., 1997; Durston et al., 2002). Children with ADHD show significantly lower activity in basal ganglia regions during performance of a go/no-go task than typically developing children (Durston et al., 2003; Vaidya et al., 1998) and show high rates of false alarms on the task. Children with ADHD showed additional recruitment of dorsolateral PFC not observed for the control group who performed at a high rate of accuracy (Durston et al., 2003). When taking medication to treat their inattention and impulsivity, children with ADHD show basal ganglia activity equivalent to the typically developing group along with parallel improvements in behavioral performance (Vaidya et al., 1998). Other developmental disorders, such as Tourette syndrome, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and childhood-onset schizophrenia also have been associated with disruption of frontal-striatal circuitry (connections between basal ganglia and frontal cortex) and impaired performance on tasks involving attentional control. ATTENTIONAL CONTROL Beyond the general processes of working memory or inhibition, many real-world and experimental tasks require selectively focusing attention on relevant task information while simultaneously suppressing interference from salient but irrelevant or misleading information (Casey, Durston, et al., 2001). Perhaps the most studied adult task of this type is the color-word Stroop paradigm, in which participants are asked to identity the color of ink in which a word is written but, in the case of a color word, have to inhibit a natural tendency to read the word instead (e.g., the word “BLUE” presented in red ink). Neuroimaging data from the Stroop paradigm identify medial prefrontal cortex, specifically the anterior cingulate cortex, as particularly important in detecting (e.g., Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Bush et al., 1999; Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000; Duncan & Owen, 2000; Fan, Flombaum, McCandliss, Thomas, & Posner, 2003; MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000; Posner & Petersen, 1990) and perhaps even resolving this type of attentional conflict. DLPFC and other regions of prefrontal cortex may also be activated during cognitive conflict depending on demands of the specific task. In the Simon task, a spatial conflict is created between the location of a stimulus (left or right side of the screen) and the required response (left or right button; Gerardi-Caulton, 2000). In a study by Fan et al. (2003), this conflict was associated with activation of superior frontal gyrus as well as anterior cingulate cortex, while conflict in the Stroop task was associated with activity in ventral lateral prefrontal cortex. When the same adult participants performed the Eriksen flanker task, which requires focusing attention on a central stimulus and actively ignoring competing flanking stimuli, these authors observed attention-related activity in premotor cortex. Despite these task-related differences in 42 BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS MR signal, further analyses demonstrated overlapping regions of activity in the anterior cingulate gyrus and the left prefrontal cortex across all three tasks, suggesting some common activity related to cognitive control or management of cognitive conflict (Fan et al., 2003). Other neuroimaging studies of the Eriksen flanker task have indicated that prefrontal cortex is differentially activated based on the degree of cognitive conflict within the same task (Casey et al., 2000; Durston et al., 2003). Durston and colleagues (2003) found that parametric manipulations of conflict on the flanker task were associated with monotonic increases in both DLPFC and ACC. Of course, additional brain regions are activated beyond the prefrontal cortex, such as the superior parietal cortex, perhaps related to the spatial nature of the task. Applying the concept of a “spotlight of attention” (Posner & Raichle, 1997), the flanker task requires narrowing the spatial distribution of attentional focus to reduce interference or conflict from the irrelevant flanking stimuli. Activation of superior parietal cortex may be related to this spatial feature of the task (also see Orienting, later in this chapter). Behaviorally, the cognitive control tasks previously described show significant developmental changes across early and middle childhood, and in some cases, even into adolescence. Casey et al. (2001) provide developmental data demonstrating that, for tasks such as the Eriksen flanker and Stroop, adult like performance is not achieved until early adolescence. A. Diamond (2002) has shown similar trajectories for Stroop-like tasks including the Simon task, with evidence of protracted development. Rueda and colleagues (2004) showed evidence of increased cognitive conflict in 6- and 7-year-olds compared with 8- to 10-year-olds and adults. Despite a significant literature demonstrating developmental improvements in cognitive control across early and middle childhood, fewer studies have addressed the brain bases of this development. A. Diamond (2001) has shown that children with presumed functional disruptions of prefrontal cortex (children treated for phenylketonuria or PKU) are impaired on their performance of Stroop-like and inhibitory control tasks like the go/no-go task, suggesting that typical developmental function is relying on this brain region that is continuing to develop across childhood. Similar effects on other executive function tasks have also been observed in this population (Luciana, Sullivan, & Nelson, 2001). Likewise Casey, Tottenham, and Fossella (2002) have demonstrated that children with psychiatric disorders associated with frontal-striatal circuitry show specific impairments on tests of cognitive conflict. Children with obsessive-compulsive symptomatology showed deficits when required to inhibit a well-learned response set, but no impairment in a Stroop-like task. In contrast, children with diagnoses of childhood onset schizophrenia were impaired on the Stroop-like task but not on the response selection task or on a go/no-go inhibition task, suggesting potential differences within prefrontal cortex. A related aspect of cognitive control arises when the individual is required not only to ignore irrelevant information, but also to shift among multiple rules for responding. The classic adult task of this type is the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST), in which participants must discover the sorting rule simply on the basis of binary feedback received during card-sorting performance. Healthy adults show rapid acquisition of the initial sorting rule and quickly alter their behavior if and when the rule is changed. Lesions to the left DLPFC but not other regions of prefrontal cortex impair performance on switching tasks, resulting in perseverative errors (Keele & Rafal, 2000; Owen et al., 1993; Shallice & Burgess, 1991). Neuroimaging studies provide convergent evidence for the role of DLPFC and basal ganglia circuits in task switching and reversal learning (Cools, Clark, Owen, & Robbins, 2002; Cools, Clark, & Robbins, 2004). NEURAL BASES OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 43 Perhaps not surprisingly, typically developing 3-year-old children perform very similarly to adults with frontal lobe lesions. Zelazo, Frye, and Rapus (1996) have described a dramatic developmental shift in set-switching performance in the preschool years using the dimensional card sorting task. This task requires the child to first sort cards by one criterion (e.g., shape), and then to shift and sort the cards by another criterion (e.g., color). While 3-year-olds have no trouble sorting by the first criterion, whether it is shape or color, they frequently fail to shift their sorting behavior when the criterion changes despite being able to verbalize the rule, reminiscent of some patients with prefrontal cortex damage (REF). However, 5-year-olds generally have no difficulty with this task. Kirkham and colleagues have suggested that this developmental shift is predominantly the result of improved inhibitory control (A. Diamond, Kirkham, & Amso, 2002). The developmental neuroimaging data in this domain are still sparse, although a number of groups are working in this direction. Additional work will be needed to assess developmental changes in the recruitment and efficiency of prefrontal cortex in such cognitive conflict or cognitive control tasks. It remains to be seen whether the normal developmental pattern of functional brain activity engages the same circuits known to be disrupted in adult lesion populations with executive dysfunctions. Conclusions Based on our extensive review of the literature, the field of developmental cognitive neuroscience has clearly advanced over the past decade. We know a considerable amount about the neural bases of a variety of cognitive abilities, although our knowledge base is uneven both between and within developmental periods. We know more about the neural bases of memory in infancy than we do in childhood, and we know more about some executive functions than others (e.g., working memory versus planning). What does the future hold for those interested in this area? For starters, as our knowledge of brain development improves, our ability to ground behavior in the brain should similarly improve. This, in turn, should permit establishing more biologically plausible models of behavioral development (connectionist models, in particular, should benefit from this advance). Second, as our knowledge of neural plasticity and molecular biology increases, we will do a better job of designing studies that shed light on which behaviors are derived from experience-dependent versus experienceindependent processes. This, in turn, should lead us away from strongly held nativist beliefs, at least in the context of higher-level cognitive functions. Third, we anticipate a judicious increase in the study of clinical populations; as such study has the potential to provide converging information on typical development. Fourth, given increased interest in using neuroimaging tools to study affective development, we anticipate increased interest in linking cognitive and emotional development in the context of brain development. Fifth, increased attention will be paid to the coregistration of imaging modalities, particularly ERPs with fMRI and optical imaging. Sixth, as investigators gain more experience in conducting fMRI studies with children, and as physicists and engineers improve MR scanning parameters, the field should experience a downward shift in the age at which such studies can be performed. Scanning infants will always prove difficult, but scanning preschool-age children may prove less challenging. 44 BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS These are just a few of the areas of growth we anticipate in the coming decade—others will surface as the field evolves. But, we remain optimistic that interest in linking brain with behavior in the context of development is now firmly entrenched in developmental psychology. References Adolphs, R. (2002). Recognizing emotion from facial expressions: Psychological and neurological mechanisms. Behavioural and Cognitive Neuroscience Reviews, 1, 21–61. 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Impaired recognition memory in monkeys after damage limited to the hippocampal region. Journal of Neuroscience, 20, 451–463. Chapter 3 Temperament MARY K. ROTHBART and JOHN E. BATES In this chapter, we describe recent advances in concepts of temperament. Early views on temperament as unchanging and stable have been replaced by more dynamic views of how temperament changes with development. An early focus on the period of infancy has been extended to childhood and adolescence, and research on temperament has burgeoned (Rothbart & Derryberry, 2002). Definition of Temperament We have defined temperament as constitutionally based individual differences in reactivity and self-regulation, in the areas of affect, activity, and attention (Rothbart & Bates, 1998; Rothbart & Derryberry, 1981). The term constitutional refers to the biological bases of temperament, influenced over time by heredity, maturation, and experience. Reactivity and self-regulation are umbrella terms that broadly organize the temperament domain. By reactivity, we mean responsiveness to change in the external and internal environment. Reactivity includes a broad range of reactions (e.g., the emotions of fear, cardiac reactivity) and more general tendencies (e.g., negative emotionality), and is not limited to general reactivity. Reactivity is measured by the latency, duration, frequency, and intensity of reactions (e.g., fear, anger, positive affect, or orienting; Rothbart & Derryberry, 1981). Emotional reactivity also includes action tendencies. Fear, for example, disposes freezing, attack, and/or inhibition, and positive affectivity disposes approach. Consequences of these behaviors can feed back to influence the ongoing emotional reaction. By self-regulation, we refer to processes such as effortful control and orienting that modulate reactivity. Temperament dispositions require appropriate eliciting conditions for their expression. Fearful children, for example, are not continually distressed and inhibited. When they experience novelty, sudden change in stimulation, or signals of punishment, they are particularly prone to a fearful reaction. 54 TEMPERAMENT 55 Temperament represents the core of personality, whereas personality involves much more, including the content of thought, skills, habits, values, defenses, morals, beliefs, and social cognition. Social cognition, which includes the perception of the self, events, and others, and the relation of self to objects, events, and others, becomes increasingly important with development, eliciting and moderating temperamental processes. For example, anger comes to be elicited by judgments that others have broken the rules when we have been following them. Rutter (1987) has described personality as elaborations of temperament into the cognitive and social models we make of the world. Thus, temperament and experience, jointly, “grow” a personality (Rothbart, 2007). In this chapter, we consider the recent history of temperament concepts and research, the structure of temperament as it has emerged from research on child development, neuroscience, and personality research, and methods and measures for the study of temperament. We consider the development of temperament, addressing issues of continuity and change. We discuss relations between temperament and behavioral adjustment. And finally, we indicate future directions for the study of temperament. History of Temperament Research The normative child psychologists of the 1920s and 1930s wished to establish the normal sequences of motor and mental development, and thereby noticed striking temperamental variability among the children (Gesell, 1928, as cited in Kessen, 1965; Shirley, 1933). Shirley described the infant’s “core of personality” (p. 56), and devoted a full volume to it. Fifteen years later, Neilon (1948) had clinicians describe 15 of Shirley’s 25 babies as adolescents, and found that judges matched Shirley’s descriptions of infants with their descriptions as adolescents at a better-than-chance level of accuracy. The early normative psychologists brought us three important concepts: First, temperament traits provide the core of personality and influence pathways of development. Second, although stability of temperament is expected across age, developmental outcomes also depend on the child’s experiences in the social world. And third, different outcomes may occur for children with similar temperaments, and children who differ temperamentally may come to similar developmental outcomes via different pathways (see Kochanska, 1995). CLINICAL RESEARCH A second major line of research on temperament in childhood came from biologically oriented clinicians. Escalona’s (1968) groundbreaking book, The Roots of Individuality proposed the concept of “effective experience,” the idea that events in children’s lives are experienced only as they are filtered through the individual child’s nervous system. An adult’s vigorous play, for example, may lead to pleasure in one child and distress in another. Clinical investigators Thomas, Chess, Birch, Hertzig, and Korn (1963) published the first of their volumes on the influential New York Longitudinal Study (NYLS). Beginning when their sample of infants was 3 to 6 months of age, parents were interviewed about their children’s behavior in varying contexts. Each infant reaction and its context was then typed on a separate sheet of paper, and Herbert Birch sorted the descriptions into categories that came to represent the nine NYLS temperament dimensions (Chess 56 BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS & Thomas, personal communication, October 1992; Thomas et al., 1963): Activity Level, Approach/Withdrawal, Adaptability, Mood, Threshold, Intensity, Distractibility, Rhythmicity, and Attention Span/Persistence. Later, Michael Rutter suggested the term temperament to describe their area of study, and this term was adopted by the NYLS group (Chess & Thomas, personal communication, October 1992). As reports from the NYLS emerged, researchers in social development were becoming increasingly aware of how individual children contribute to their own development (Bell, 1968; Sears, Maccoby, & Levin, 1957). Piagetian psychology also stressed children’s influences on their own development via their mental representations of events (Kohlberg, 1969), and temperament ideas suggested that individual differences in children’s emotional processing could affect children’s representations of themselves and the social world. Structure of Temperament More recent research on temperament has led to revision of the original list of nine NYLS dimensions (Tables 3.1 and 3.2). Much of this research employed factor analysis of large sets of items within the temperament domain. Factor analysis allows researchers to see simultaneously the relations and nonrelations among large sets of behavior descriptions. Several broad dimensions of temperament have consistently emerged from different sets of data. We have identified six dimensions of infant temperament, as shown in Table 3.1 (Rothbart & Bates, 2006; Rothbart & Mauro, 1990). Individual differences in positive emotionality were differentiated from negative emotionality, and two kinds of negative emotion were identified: fear and anger/irritable distress. Infant scales with different names were also found to measure similar constructs (Goldsmith & Rieser-Danner, 1986). Garstein and Rothbart (2003) studied the factor structure of an expanded number of infant scales (Table 3.2). Factor analysis of a large data set describing 3- to 12-monthold children yielded three broad dimensions: Surgency/Extraversion, defined primarily from scales of Approach, Vocal Reactivity, High Intensity Pleasure (stimulation seeking), Smiling and Laughter, Activity Level and Perceptual Sensitivity; Negative Affectivity, defined by Sadness, Frustration, Fear, and loading negatively, Falling Reactivity; and Orienting/Regulation, with loadings from Low Intensity Pleasure, Cuddliness, Du- TABLE 3.1 Dimensions of Temperament in Infancy Broad Factors Narrow Dimensions Negative emotionality Fear Frustration /irritability Sadness Falling reactivity Surgency/extraversion Approach Vocal reactivity High-intensity pleasure Smiling and laughter Activity level Perceptual sensitivity Orienting/regulation Low-intensity pleasure Duration of orienting Cuddliness Soothability Rhythmicity 57 TEMPERAMENT TABLE 3.2 Dimensions of Temperament in Childhood Broad Factors Narrow Dimensions Negative emotionality Fear Shyness Frustration /irritability Resistance to control Sadness Soothability Discomfort Surgency/extraversion Activity level High-intensity pleasure Positive anticipation Sociability Effortful control/self-regulation Inhibitory control Attentional focusing Persistence Low-intensity pleasure Perceptual sensitivity Agreeableness/adaptability Manageability Affiliation ration of Orienting, and Soothability and a secondary loading for Smiling and Laughter. As early as infancy, there is now evidence for at least three broad temperament dimensions. This research indicates that temperament traits correspond to reactivity in the basic emotions and attention/regulation. In addition, bipolar constructs such as approach versus withdrawal and good versus bad mood have not held together; instead, unipolar constructs of infant temperament have gained support. Furthermore, these dimensions correspond to individual differences emerging from studies of nonhuman animals (Gosling & John, 1999), allowing links between temperament in humans and the psychobiology of individual differences. In studying children past infancy, the Children’s Behavior Questionnaire (CBQ; Rothbart, Ahadi, Hershey, & Fisher, 2001) has consistently yielded three broad factors, found in U.S. replications and in research performed in China and Japan (Ahadi, Rothbart, & Ye, 1993; Kochanska, DeVet, Goldman, Murray, & Putnam, 1993; Rothbart et al., 2001). The first, called Surgency/Extraversion, is defined primarily by the scales of Approach, High Intensity Pleasure (sensation-seeking), Activity Level, and a negative contribution from Shyness. The second, called Negative Affectivity, is defined by the scales of Discomfort, Fear, Anger/Frustration, Sadness, and loading negatively, Soothability. The third factor, labeled Effortful Control, is defined by the scales of Inhibitory Control, Attentional Focusing, Low Intensity Pleasure, and Perceptual Sensitivity. These three factors map well on the second-order factors identified by Sanson et al. (Sanson, Smart, Prior, Oberklaid, & Pedlow, 1994): Surgency/Extraversion on Sociability; Negative Affectivity on Negative Emotionality, and Effortful Control on self-Regulation. Similar factors have been identified by others (Hegvik, McDevitt, & Carey, 1982; McClowry, Hegvik, & Teglasi, 1993; Presley & Martin, 1994). The factors emerging from research on temperament in childhood show strong conceptual similarities with the Big Three factors and three of the Big Five or Five Factor Model (FFM) factors that have been extracted from analyses of self- and peer descriptions of personality in adults (Goldberg, 1993) and children (Ahadi & Rothbart, 1994; Caspi & Shiner, 2006; Digman & Inouye, 1986). The Negative Affectivity factor is conceptually similar to the adult dimension of Neuroticism or Negative Emotionality. The Surgency and Sociability factors are similar to the adult dimension of Extraversion or 58 BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS Positive Emotionality. The Persistence, Self-Regulation, or Effortful Control factors map onto the adult dimension of Control/Constraint (see Ahadi & Rothbart, 1994; Evans & Rothbart, 2007), and Martin et al.’s (Martin, Wisenbaker, & Huttunen, 1994) Agreeableness/Adaptability and our Affiliation are related to the adult dimension of Agreeableness. In our research on adults, we have found strong correlations between temperament factor scores and Big Five measures (Evans & Rothbart, 2007), between Fearful Distress and Neuroticism, Positive Emotionality and Extraversion, and Effortful Control and Conscientiousness. In addition, Perceptual Sensitivity was related to Openness, and temperamental Affiliation and Anger (negatively) to Agreeableness. Neuroticism, however, often contains negative judgments about the self that may be strongly related to an individual’s experiences with others; these may have a strong temperamental base, and research on the development of personality from temperament becomes very important. SUMMARY As noted earlier, work to date on temperament structure in infancy and in childhood suggests revisions of the original NYLS nine dimensions to include (with broad, aggregated constructs in parentheses): Positive Affect and Activity Level (Surgency/Extraversion), Fearful Distress, Irritable Distress (General Negative Emotionality), Effortful Control/Task Persistence, and Agreeableness/Adaptability. In the next section, we consider links between these constructs and information processing. Neural Models of Temperament Neural models and recent neuroimaging studies enhance our understanding of reactive and attentional temperament (see reviews by Rothbart, Derryberry, & Posner, 1994: Rothbart, Sheese, & Posner, in press). EMOTION AS AN INFORMATION-PROCESSING SYSTEM Emotions represent systems that order feeling, thought, and action and respond to the meaning or affective significance of events for the individual (LeDoux, 1989). Object recognition systems and spatial processing systems ask: “What is it?” and “Where is it?” Emotion processing networks ask: “What does it mean?” “Is it good for me?” “Is it bad for me?” and “What shall I do about it?” In neural processing of emotion, thalamic connections route information about object qualities of a stimulus through sensory pathways (LeDoux, 1989). Simultaneously, information is routed to the limbic system and the amygdala, where memories of the affective meaning of the stimulus further influence the process. Later object processing can update the emotional analysis, but in the meantime, back projections from the amygdala can influence subsequent sensory processing. Output of the amygdala to organized autonomic reactions via the hypothalamus and to motor activation via the corpus striatum reflects the motivational aspect of the emotions (LeDoux, 1989). Reviews of neural models linked to temperament can be found in Rothbart and Posner (2006) and Whittle, Allen, Lubman, and Yucel (2006). TEMPERAMENT 59 Models from neuroscience have been developed related to general dimensions of Approach, Fear/Inhibition or Harm Avoidance, Irritability (Fight/Flight or Rage), and Affiliativeness or Social Reward Dependence, Orienting, and executive attention as a basis of Effortful Control (see reviews by Rothbart & Bates, 2006; Rothbart & Posner, 2006). These dimensions offer a beginning for future work that will more finely differentiate the temperament domain, its development, and relation to the development of personality. We now discuss measurement issues in the study of temperament in childhood, with extensive evaluation of parent reports. We then discuss recent genetics research and other psychobiological approaches to the study of temperament. Measurement of Temperament Approaches to measuring temperament in children have included caregiver reports, self-reports for older children, naturalistic observations, and structured laboratory observations (see Table 3.3). Each approach has advantages and disadvantages, as discussed in greater detail by Bates (1994), Rothbart and Bates (1998, 2006) and Slabach, Morrow, and Wachs (1991). We focus on the issue of the scientific acceptability of caregiver reports, because the literature so often counsels against parent reports. We recognize limitations of caregiver reports (e.g., Bates, 1980), but argue that caregiver reports have broadly established validity (Rothbart & Bates, 1998). Correlations between parent ratings and observer ratings are typically statistically significant but fairly small in size. Some conclude therefore that parent reports are not valid. However, low validity correlations could be due to problems with observer ratings as well as parent ratings. Measures are not simply valid or invalid, but valid in particular ways—with reference to particular criteria—and valid to a greater or lesser degree. Caregiver reports have demonstrated validity with respect to enough key criteria and in large enough degree that they are of definite scientific value. CAREGIVERS’ VANTAGE POINT VERSUS BIAS AND INACCURACY Temperament dimensions are by definition general patterns of responses by the child, and parents are in a good position to observe the child’s behavior on multiple, ecologically important occasions, including infrequent ones, such as distress to the vacuum cleaner, that may be critical to defining a particular temperament dimension. Parent observations also avoid ethical concerns about creating aversive situations to assess temperament in the laboratory. Bias and inaccuracy in parent report are real concerns, but they have been extensively dealt with in personality research. The major conclusion has been that traits can be reliably assessed by ratings of knowledgeable informants, including the self, friends, and parents (Kenrick & Funder, 1988; Moskowitz & Schwarz, 1982). In addition, validity is a problem for structured and naturalistic observational measures of temperament as well as for parent reports, and we have summarized potential sources of measurement error in three temperament assessment methods in Table 3.3. Kagan (1994) argued that the language of an individual item on a temperament questionnaire is subject to multiple interpretations. This ambiguity, however, is the main reason why researchers use scales rather than individual items to measure temperament. Attempts are made to write the best possible items, but by doing this, the researcher does not expect that all sources of error will be eliminated. Basic psychometric theory TABLE 3.3 Potential Sources of Measurement Error in Three Child Temperament Assessment Methods B. Bias in Assessment As a function of child behavior or rater-child interaction C. Method Factors Relatively independent of both child and rater characteristics 1. Comprehension of instructions, questions, and rating scales 2. Knowledge of child’s behavior (and general impression rater has of the child) 3. Inaccurate memory: recency effects, selective recall 4. State when completing rating task (e.g., anxiety) 5. Response sets (e.g., social desirability and acquiescence) 6. For ratings, knowledge of implicit reference groups 7. Accuracy in detecting and coding rare but important events 8. Kind of impression (if any) raters want child/self to make on researcher 1. Observed child behavior occurring in response to parental behavior 2. Parents’ interpretations of observed behavior a function of parental characteristics 1. Need to inquire about rarely observed situations 2. Adequacy of item selection, wording, and response options 1. Limited capacity of coder to process all relevant behavior 2. Coding of low-intensity ambiguous behaviors 3. State of coder during observation 4. Limits of precision of coding 5. For ratings, knowledge of implicit reference groups 1. Caregiver-child interaction moderating behavior coded (including I.8) 2. For ratings, halo effects 1. Change in child and caregiver behavior due to presence of coder (e.g., decreased conflict) 2. Difficulties of sensitively coding the context of behavior 3. Limitations of number of instances of behavior (especially rare ones) that can be observed 4. Lack of normative data 5. Lack of stability in observational time windows—limited sample of behavior A. Rater Characteristics Relatively independent of child behavior I. Parent questionnaires II. Home observation measures (in vivo coding) 60 TEMPERAMENT TABLE 3.3 61 (Continued) A. Rater Characteristics Relatively independent of child behavior III. Laboratory measures (objective measures scored from videotape in episodes designed to elicit temperament related reactions) 1. Scoring of low-intensity ambiguous reactions 2. For ratings, knowledge of implicit reference groups 3. Limited capacity of coder to process all relevant behavior 4. State of coder during observation 5. Limits of precision of coding 6. Accuracy in detecting and coding of rare but important events B. Bias in Assessment As a function of child behavior or rater-child interaction C. Method Factors Relatively independent of both child and rater characteristics 1. Effects of uncontrolled caregiver behavior or other experience prior to or during testing 2. Selection of sample, including completion of testing on the basis of child reactions (e.g., distress-prone infants not completing procedures) 3. Subtle variations in experimenter reactions to different children (e.g., more soothing behavior toward distress-prone infant) 1. Lack of adequate normative data 2. Limitations of number of instances of behavior that can be recorded 3. Carryover effects in repeated testing 4. Constraints on range of behavioral options 5. Novelty of laboratory setting 6. Adequate identification of episodes appropriate to evoking temperamental reactions holds that the reason a set of convergent, but imperfectly correlated items tends to have better test-retest reliability, better stability over time, and better validity is that the error components of individual items tend to cancel each other out when the item scores are added to each other, yielding a closer approximation to a “true” score. This same principle applies to aggregation across multiple observations. Analytical tools such as the computer programs EQS and AMOS can also explicitly model links between items’ and scales’ error components, creating latent constructs that more precisely control for measurement error. Other approaches are validity scale filters, as in the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), and studies of how parents construe child behavior and the items researchers present to them (Bates, 1994). As one example of the value of aggregation, Asendorpf (1990) used multiple measures on multiple occasions to assess children’s behavioral inhibition to strangers (shyness) across a 4-year period beginning at age 3. Measures included a parent-report assessment as well as observations of children’s behavior with strange adults and children. Of all the measures taken by Asendorpf, parent report consistently showed the strongest relations with the other measures; for example, parent reported shyness predicted observed latency to talk to a stranger at 3 years with r = .67; the overall average r between parent-report and other shyness measures across the 4 years ranged from .43 to .53. Bishop, Spence, and McDonald (2003) also reported convergence between parent ratings, teacher ratings, and structured observation, using a new behavioral inhibition questionnaire. Forman et al. (2003) also showed that aggregating laboratory measures of temperament across multiple tasks enhances convergence with motherreport questionnaire measures. Laboratory measures have been found to be positively related to the Infant Behavior Questionnaire (IBQ) and Toddler Behavior Assessment Questionnaire (TBAQ; see 62 BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS Goldsmith & Rothbart, 1991) and between temperament measures and tasks designed to reflect underlying brain function; for example, a positive relation was found between a laboratory spatial conflict task designed to measure executive attention and the Children’s Behavior Questionnaire (CBQ) measure of inhibitory control (r = .66) for 36month-old children (Gerardi-Caulton, 2000). Hagekull, Bohlin, and Lindhagen (1984) asked parents to directly record infant behavior, such as infants’ reactions to loud sounds, over extended periods in specific situations. Parent data converged strongly with independent observers’ data: Correlations between parents’ and observers’ direct observation data for two, 4-hour visits ranged from .60 (for attentiveness) to .83 (for sensory sensitivity). This suggests that parents were not deficient or strongly biased in their powers of observation, especially since their training for the task was minimal. For an open time frame, general questionnaire scales completed by the parents converged to a modest to moderately strong degree with scales based on independent direct observation, with correlations ranging from .21 to .63. USING PARENT REPORTS Evidence to date supports the careful use of parent-report measures of temperament. Two basic reasons to use parent-report measures are (1) that they provide a useful perspective on the temperament of children because parents can see a wide range of child behaviors, and (2) that they possess a fair degree of objective validity. In addition, parent-report measures have contributed to substantial empirical advances, including our understanding of the structure of temperament in relation to the Big Five or Big Three models, as described earlier, and their parallels in psychophysiological systems (Bates, Wachs, & Emde, 1994; Rothbart, Derryberry, et al., 1994). A further reason for using parent reports is that the social relationship aspects of temperament obtained from parents may in themselves be important to understanding development. Nevertheless, we do recognize such concerns as: • Caregiver reports must be carefully interpreted as reflecting a combination of subjective and objective factors (Bates & Bayles, 1984; Seifer, 2003). • Improvements in caregiver-report measures should recognize possible sources of bias, such as parents’ tendency to contrast one child with another in rating temperament (Saudino, 2003) on some, but not all, parent report questionnaires (Hwang & Rothbart, 2003). We should also develop subscales to detect specific biases in reporters and improve the generalizability of the observational measures we use to validate caregiver reports (Goldsmith & Hewitt, 2003). Observational and laboratory measures are appealing and can be used in temperament studies; however, they should not at this time be the sole measure of temperament. Psychobiological Research Approaches Many interesting approaches to the biological bases of temperament traits have been explored, including psychophysiological, neuroimaging, and neurohormonal approaches. These have been reviewed in detail in Rothbart and Bates (2006) and other sources (Gunnar, 1990). Here, we focus on just one psychobiological approach—genetics. TEMPERAMENT 63 BEHAVIORAL GENETICS The pathways to personality that run through temperament include genetic contributions (Bouchard & Loehlin, 2001; Caspi & Shiner, 2006; Goldsmith, Losoya, Bradshaw, & Campos, 1994; Plomin, Chipuer, & Loehlin, 1990). Heritability estimates from behavioral genetics studies show that about half of phenotypic (observable) variance in most temperament and personality traits is attributable to genetic variation in a population (Bouchard & Loehlin, 2001). These results do not tell us what might be accomplished via environmental intervention. They also do not reveal the specific developmental processes involved in temperament and personality outcomes. To learn more about the latter questions, studies of temperament and development are essential. Zuckerman (1995) addressed the question of “What is inherited?” and proposed this answer: We do not inherit personality traits or even behavior mechanisms as such. What is inherited are chemical templates that produce and regulate proteins involved in building the structure of nervous systems and the neurotransmitters, enzymes, and hormones that regulate them. . . . How do these differences in biological traits shape our choices in life from the manifold possibilities provided by environments? . . . Only cross-disciplinary, developmental, and comparative psychological research can provide the answers. (pp. 331–332) We now recognize that experiential and environmental processes themselves build changes in brain structure and functioning (Posner & Raichle, 1994), both before and after birth (Black & Greenough, 1991). MOLECULAR GENETICS The mapping of the human genome has provided a promising new direction for studying genes and environment in development (Carey, 2003; Plomin & Caspi, 1999). One example is the association between the 7-repeat allele of the dopamine D4 receptor (DRD4) and novelty seeking in adults, which was reported in 1996 (Benjamin, Ebstein, & Belmaker, 1996; Ebstein et al., 1996), although its replication has been inconsistent. Another is the short polymorphism of the serotonin transporter gene, found to be associated with susceptibility to fear and distress (Auerbach et al., 1999). Ebstein and his colleagues used a longitudinal sample to investigate these two genetic polymorphisms in relation to neonatal and later infant behavior (Auerbach et al., 1999; Ebstein et al., 1998). Ebstein and Auerbach used the Neonatal Behavioral Assessment Scale (NBAS) to measure temperament in newborns, and the IBQ (Rothbart, 1981) to measure temperament at 2 months (Auerbach et al., 1999; Ebstein et al., 1998). The DRD4 long variant that has been linked to sensation seeking in adults was associated with newborns’ orientation, range of state, regulation of state, and motor organization. An interaction was also found between DRD4 and the 5-HTTLPR polymorphisms. The serotonin transporter gene s/s polymorphism that has been linked to fear and distress in adults was related to lower orientation scores, but only for newborns who did not have the long repeat variant of DRD4. For those who did, presence of the 5-HTTLPR s/s genotype had no effect. Newborns with high orientation and motor organization showed lower negative emotionality at 2 months. In addition, 2-month-old infants with long repeat DRD4 alleles had lower scores on IBQ negative 64 BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS emotionality and distress to limitations. Finally, at 1 year of age, infants with the long DRD4 allele had lower negative emotionality scores, and showed less fear and less social inhibition (Auerbach et al., 1999). Schmidt and Fox (2002) found a relation between the long repeat form of DRD4 and high scores on observed disruptive behavior and parent-reported aggressive behavior in 4-year-olds. Schmidt, Fox, Perez-Edgar, Hu, and Hamer (2001) also found a link between the long repeat form and mothers’ reports of attention problems. Children with the long 7-repeat allele of DRD4 show behavioral aspects of ADHD, but no deficits in conflict performance as measured by the color-word Stroop task (Swanson et al., 2000). Evidence from evolutionary studies suggests that the 7-repeat allele may confer an advantage during human evolution (Ding et al., 2002), and an interaction has been found between the 7-repeat and parenting in sensation-seeking outcomes (Sheese, Voelker, Rothbart, & Posner, 2007). Dopamine genes pertain to individual differences in attention (Posner & Fan, in press; Posner, Rothbart, & Sheese, 2007). The anterior cingulate, associated with executive attention, has five types of DA receptor, and is only one synapse away from the ventral tegmental area, a major source of DA. The DRD4 gene and the monoamine oxidase A (MAOA) gene, related to the synthesis of DA and norepinepherine, were related to executive attention as measured by the Attention Network Task (ANT), which assesses efficiency of alerting, orienting, and executive attention (Fossella, Posner, Fan, Swanson, & Pfaff, 2002). Presence of the more common 4 repeat allele, rather than the long repeat allele of DRD4 that has been related to sensation seeking, was associated with greater difficulty in resolving conflict (Fossella et al., 2002). It will be particularly exciting in the future to look at genetic relationships at different ages and in connection with different life experiences. Human studies have also identified significant interactions between genes and environment in maladaptive outcomes, and we discuss these in the Temperament and Adjustment section. Temperament and Development Early theorists of temperament stressed that temperament was stable over time, even from infancy to adulthood (Buss & Plomin, 1975). We have now learned, however, that temperament itself develops, and our study of this development lets us consider different pathways of individual differences (Goldsmith, Buss, & Lemery, 1997; Rothbart, 1989; Rothbart & Derryberry, 1981). Temperamental measures may change over time, for example, but genetically related individuals can show strong similarities in their patterns of change (Eaton, 1994; Matheny, 1989). Expressions of temperament also change over time. For example, 6-year-olds spend much less time crying than do 6-month-olds, but they worry a good deal more. To assess stability of temperamental characteristics, there must be conceptual continuity in the temperament constructs studied. A meta-analysis by Roberts and DelVecchio (2000), using the Big Five conceptual model, showed considerable stability in measures of temperament and personality after about the age of 3 years, with estimated crosstime correlations for 0 to 2.9 years = .35; 3 to 5.9 years = .52; 6 to 11.9 years = .45; and 12 to 17.9 years = .47. In the next section, we consider issues of temperament stability and change in social-emotional and personality development. We review research in the TEMPERAMENT 65 areas of positive affect/approach and inhibition, distress proneness, activity level, and two forms of control of reactivity (reactive) fear and effortful control. CONTRIBUTIONS OF TEMPERAMENT TO DEVELOPMENT Some children are temperamentally high in responsiveness to reward, others to punishment, and some children are highly responsive to both (Rothbart, Ahadi, & Hershey, 1994). Temperament is also linked to the development of coping strategies. If one child experiences high distress to strangers, for example, and another child little distress, coping involving avoidance of strangers may be elicited for the first child, but not for the second. If the second child also experiences delight in the interaction with a stranger, increasingly rapid and confident approach to interactions with strangers is likely. Thus, the practice and reinforcement of children’s temperamentally based responses may serve to magnify initial differences through positive feedback. Temperament differences also promote the child’s active seeking of environments, or “niche picking” (Scarr & McCartney, 1983). The child who stays at the edge of a nursery school class or a party is selecting a different experience than the child who goes directly to the center of social excitement. In Gray’s (1991) theory, extraverts, high in positive affect and approach (the BAS), are seen as more susceptible to reward, and introverts, high in fear and shyness, to punishment (the BIS). Other models, optimal level theories (e.g., Bell, 1974; Strelau, 1983), stress individual preferences for high or low levels of stimulation. A child easily overwhelmed by stimulation will try to keep things quiet, whereas a child who requires high levels of stimulation for pleasure will attempt to keep things exciting. Mismatches between child stimulation preferences and environments may lead to developmental challenges for both child and caregiver. A child’s temperamental characteristics can also elicit reactions from others that may influence the child’s development (Scarr & McCartney, 1983). Thus, a positive and outgoing disposition may serve as a protective factor by eliciting the support of others in a high-risk environment (Werner, 1985). Radke-Yarrow and Sherman (1990) noted that in a high-risk situation, a buffering effect can occur when the child’s characteristics somehow meet the needs of the parent. This notion is similar to Thomas and Chess’s (1977) “goodness-of-fit” argument. Because temperament itself develops (Rothbart, 1989), new systems of behavioral organization (e.g., smiling and laughter, frustration, fear, executive attention) will also come “online” over time. When these new systems modulate characteristics that were previously present, there will likely be instability of temperament across the developmental transition. In addition to the direct effects of later developing control systems of fear and effortful control, children who develop a given control system early in life may have quite different experiences from children who develop the system later (Rothbart & Derryberry, 1981). For example, the child who develops fear-related inhibition late will likely experience a greater number of interactions with potentially threatening objects or situations than the child who develops fearful inhibition early. The child who is fearful and inhibited by threats early in development may spend more time watching and making sense of events in the environment than the less inhibited child. We now consider a selection of dimensions of temperament in a developmental context. For a more detailed discussion of this topic, see Rothbart and Bates (2006). 66 BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS EXTRAVERSION/SURGENCY VERSUS SHYNESS AND BEHAVIORAL INHIBITION By 2 to 3 months, infants show a pattern of smiling, vocalization, and motor cycling of the limbs to social and nonsocial stimuli. These reactions appeared to increase in duration and decrease in latency into the second and third months of life (Kistiakovskaia, 1965). This cluster of intercorrelated behaviors (smiling and laughter; vocal and motor activity) is also found in parents’ reports of temperament and in home observations (Rothbart, 1986). Beyond 3 to 4 months, positive affect shows normative increases in probability and duration across the first year of life, both in home observation and parent-report data (Rothbart, 1981, 1986). Continuity over 3 to 9 months has also been found for a composite positive emotionality measure assessed by parent report and home observation, including smiling and laughter, motor and vocal activity, and stability of a laboratory measure of smiling and laughter has been found between 3 and 13.5 months of age (Rothbart, 1986). Smiling and laughter in infancy observed in the laboratory predicted both concurrent (Rothbart, 1988) and 6- to 7-year-old approach tendencies (Rothbart et al., 2001). Pedlow, Sanson, Prior, and Oberklaid (1993) also found stability from infancy to 7 to 8 years on their dimension of Approach/Sociability. An important form of control over approach develops in the second half of the first year because some infants who were highly approaching at 5 or 6 months now inhibit their approach responses when stimuli are unfamiliar and/or intense, such as novel or intense toys (Rothbart, 1988; Schaffer, 1974). Infants’ approach latency to lowintensity stimuli showed stability from 6.5 months to later ages (10 and 13.5 months), but to high-intensity stimuli, it did not (Rothbart, 1988). Once inhibition of approach is established, it will be a relatively enduring aspect of temperament and an important social trait. This has been shown in a number of studies, following children from infancy to late adolescence (Bayley & Schafer, 1963), early to later childhood (Asendorpf, 1993; Gest, 1997), early childhood to adolescence and adulthood (Honzik, 1965; Kagan & Moss, 1962), and adolescence to adulthood (Tuddenham, 1959). Further evidence of stability of behavioral inhibition and outgoingness has been provided by Caspi and Silva (1995), Kagan (1998), Kagan and Fox (2006), and Pfeifer, Goldsmith, Davidson, and Rickman (2002). These results can be added to evidence from Kagan (1998; Kagan & Fox, 2006) on stability of behavioral inhibition, and to Caspi and Silva’s (1995) and Pfeifer et al.’s (2002) work on stability of outgoingness and inhibition. In summary, evidence for approach tendencies related to positive affect can be seen early in development. Later in infancy, behavioral inhibition related to fear develops. Once established, tendencies toward approach versus inhibition demonstrate significant stability over relatively long developmental periods, with important implications for social development and for the measurement of temperament (Rothbart & Sheese, 2007). ATTENTIONAL ORIENTING AND EFFORTFUL CONTROL Attention has both reactive and self-regulative aspects. Reactive attention and its development in the early months of life are considered in some detail in Rothbart and Bates (2006) and Rothbart, Derryberry, et al. (1994). Here, we focus on the selfregulative aspects of attention, which begins its development late in the first year of TEMPERAMENT 67 life (Kagan, Kearsley, & Zelazo, 1978; Kochanska, Murray, & Harlan, 2000; Posner & Rothbart, 2007a, 2007b; Rothbart & Rueda, 2005; Ruff & Rothbart, 1996). Effortful control—the ability to activate and inhibit action, thought and emotion—is based on the efficiency of executive attention, including the ability to inhibit a dominant response and/or to activate a subdominant response, to plan, and to detect errors, also appears to be linked to the child’s developing ability to maintain a sustained focus of attention. Krakow, Kopp, and Vaughn (1981) studied sustained attention to a set of toys in 12- to 30-month-old infants. Duration increased across this period, with stability of individual differences between 12 and 18 months, and between 24 and 30 months. Sustained attention was also positively related to self-control measures, independent of developmental quotient, at 24 months. Emerging differences in effortful control also appear to be linked to differences in children’s emotional expression. In a major longitudinal study, Kochanska (Kochanska & Knaack, 2003; Kochanska et al., 2000) used multiple methods to assess effortful control and emotionality. Mother report of effortful control was aggregated with laboratory measures, which included delay, slowing motor activity, lowering the voice, suppressing and initiating activity to a signal, and effortful attention at 22, 33, and 45 months of age. Focused attention at 9 months predicted children’s later effortful control (Kochanska et al., 2000). Between 33 and 45 months, stability was equivalent to that of IQ. Children who showed more regulated anger and joy and more fear-related inhibition at 22 months demonstrated later higher levels of effortful control (Kochanska & Knaack, 2003). The link between inhibition and later effortful control was further supported by Aksan and Kochanska (2004). In our research using spatial conflict tasks, children began to demonstrate effective management of conflict at 30 months, and 36-month-old children who showed greater interference in reaction time for conflicting responses were reported by their mothers as exhibiting lower levels of inhibitory control (Rothbart, Ellis, & Posner, 2004). Less accurate children were also reported as showing higher levels of anger/frustration in the IBQ (Gerardi-Caulton, 2000), suggesting attentional control over emotion as well as action. Direct links have also been found between children’s disengagement of attention and decreases in negative affect (Stifter & Braungart, 1995), and infants’ use of selfregulation in anger inducing situations has predicted their early childhood ability to delay responses (Calkins & Williford, 2003). Mechanisms used to cope with negative emotion may later be transferred to control of cognition and behavior (see also Posner & Rothbart, 1998). Further support of this idea was found by Mischel and his colleagues (Sethi, Mischel, Aber, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 2000). Toddlers were briefly separated from their mothers and children’s coping strategies coded. Later, at age 5, their behavior was observed in a situation where they could delay gratification for a more valued reward. Children who used more distraction strategies during the maternal separation at the younger age were later able to delay longer. Long-term stability in the ability to delay gratification and later attentional and emotional control has been reported (Mischel, 1983). In Mischel’s work, the number of seconds delayed by preschool children while waiting for rewards that were physically present (a conflict situation) significantly predicted parent-reported attentiveness and ability to concentrate when the children were adolescents (Shoda, Mischel, & Peake, 1990). Children less able to delay in preschool were also reported as more likely to “go to pieces” under stress as teenagers, and to show lower academic competence in SAT 68 BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS scores, even when controlling for intelligence (Shoda et al., 1990). In follow-up studies, preschool delay predicted goal setting and self-regulatory abilities when the participants reached their early 30s (Ayduk et al., 2000), suggesting remarkable continuity in self-regulation. In Caspi and Silva’s (1995) study, preschool children characterized as “well adjusted” were described as flexible in orientation, and “capable of reserve and control when it was demanded of them” (p. 492). These children’s flexibility of responsiveness may have been linked to greater executive attention and effortful control. At age 18, children earlier identified as “well adjusted” by Caspi and Silva had high scores on Social Potency, including leadership and low social shyness. Studies are now underway exploring contributions of both temperament and parent treatment to the development of self-control, and Olson, Bates, and Bayles (1990) have found relationships between parent-child interaction at 13 months and 2 years (but not at 6 months) and children’s self-control at age 6. Attention thus shows major developments over the first years of life, with a more self-regulative system added to a more reactive one (Rothbart, Posner, & Rosicky, 1994). TWO CONTROL SYSTEMS Early individual differences in motor and emotional reactivity thus appear to be influenced by development of at least two temperament-related control systems: One is part of an emotional reaction (fear and behavioral inhibition), the other is more strictly selfregulatory (effortful control), with the first system developing earlier than the second. This view is related to the two control systems of Block and Block (1980): ego-control, involving fearful or inhibitory control over impulsive approach; and ego-resiliency, defined by flexible adaptation to changing circumstances. Eisenberg et al. (1996) found a relationship between ego-resiliency and CBQ attentional control in kindergarten to third-grade children. Eisenberg et al. (2004) also studied parent- and teacher-reported effortful control and impulsivity in relation to ego resiliency in children 4.5 to 8 years, with a 2-year follow-up. At both ages, effortful control and impulsivity directly predicted resiliency and externalizing problems, and temperament also predicted internalizing problems indirectly, through resiliency. All relations held in predictions from Time 1 to Time 2, except the path from impulsivity to externalizing. Where there is high ego-control, fear and its correlates may develop into a relatively constricted life, with approach tendencies strongly opposed, and rigid functioning a likely result. Ego-resiliency, alternatively, is strengthened by a set of life experiences that build on capacities for both expression and control of impulses. Effortful control appears to provide an important underlying system for the development of ego resiliency, as seen also in the research of Kochanska summarized earlier. Block and Block (1980) stress the importance of experience in the development of adaptation, with endogenous control systems allowing cultural influences on the particular behavior, thoughts, and emotions to be controlled, as well as on the self-regulatory capacities and strategies used by the child. SUMMARY Early reactive systems of emotionality and approach are modulated by the development of at least two temperamental control systems. The first, fearful inhibition, is TEMPERAMENT 69 linked to developments in fearfulness late in the first year of life. The second, effortful control, develops across the preschool period and later shows considerable stability. Another likely control mechanism for the support of socialization is the development of a social reward system, connected with children’s desires to please and to refrain from hurting their parents and other persons, likely linked to temperamental affiliation. Any failure of these controls may be linked to the development of behavior problems. Because these temperamental systems are open to experience, high quality socialization will be necessary for positive outcomes. Temperament and the Development of Personality Life experiences influence connections between children’s emotional reactions, their understanding of events, and their use of coping strategies to deal with these events. Coping strategies, which may have been originally based on temperamental predispositions, become part of mental affective and cognitive units linked to particular situations. Mischel and Ayduk (2004) give the example of individual differences in rejection sensitivity (RS). RS is a disposition leading to coding of ambiguous events in interpersonal situations (e.g., when a friend doesn’t say hello) as a sign of rejection. Signs of rejection are then responded to with sadness or anger. As RS becomes habitual, the person’s attention may become quite narrowly focused on the likelihood of rejection, and defensive behaviors (e.g., anger or preventive rejection of the other) may be used to fend off expected rejection. Thus, the experience of early criticism and rejection, which may have its strongest impact on children prone to distress, can have long-term consequences for habitual mental units and problems in development. Mischel and Ayduk’s (2004) analysis of RS describes an anxious or defensive set, but alternatively, children’s experiences with others may be generally of acceptance. If so, the child will be less likely to be on guard about rejection or to show a defensive perceptual set. Instead, the child’s attention can be directed more broadly, allowing greater conscious awareness of the state and needs of others. More distress prone, fearful, and irritable children may be more likely to develop such habits as RS, but after experiencing high levels of rejection, even a low distress-prone child is likely to develop RS. Surgent and approaching children may also be more likely to expect acceptance, but if even distress-prone children never learn about the possibility of rejection, they would not develop RS. When repeatedly exercised, habitual activations of clusters of thoughts, emotions, and action tendencies become more likely to occur and difficult to change, especially when they involve fear and distress. When mental habits involve distress, how might they be changed? In Eastern traditions, this is done partly through diminishing the role of the ego so that situations become less threatening to the self. Mental discipline and meditation also allow weakening of links between thoughts and emotions or thoughts and action tendencies. Western therapies similarly work through the clients’ patterns of reaction, attempting to reconstruct previously consolidated patterns and provide new frameworks for meaning. Developmental psychologists, however, would desire that children be given the kinds of experiences that form favorable mental habits in the first place. In a temperament view, the biological equipment underlying temperament is similar across cultures, but specific mental habits and representations of self, the world and 70 BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS other, will vary from culture to culture, and from context to context. By the time a child is a well-socialized member of the society, more biologically based temperament will have been shaped into a set of values, goals, and representations of the self and others that specify what is good and bad for the person. Even for children who are not wellsocialized, values stressed by the culture may nevertheless have an effect. Children in the United States, for example, may still attempt to promote a positive self-concept, but pursue it though a delinquent peer group, even when the goals and values followed may not be socially acceptable ones. Several longitudinal studies have described the continuity of personality from childhood to adulthood. Shiner and her colleagues considered the period of 8 to 12 to 20 years (Shiner, Masten, & Tellegen, 2002). They found that positive emotionality at age 20 was moderately predicted by childhood mastery motivation, surgent engagement, and self-assurance (Shiner et al., 2002). Negative emotionality at 20, however, was predicted by low adaptation in all areas in childhood, and was linked to all 20-year-old adaptation measures except romantic competence. Lower academic achievement and greater conduct problems in childhood predicted adult negative emotionality, and childhood mastery motivation and surgent engagement were related to low adult negative emotionality. Positive emotionality may be more closely linked to current adaptation, whereas negative emotionality shows more continuity with earlier adaptation. In our section on adjustment, we note other strong links between negative emotionality and psychopathology, particularly when negative emotionality is associated with low effortful control (Caspi, 2000; Eisenberg, Fabes, Guthrie, & Reiser, 2000). Shiner et al. (2002) note that adults high on negative emotionality tend to be upset by daily problems (Suls, Martin, & David, 1998). How might the development of mental habits contribute to these findings? First, when a habit is related to distress, there may be numerous attempts to decrease distress through thinking about the problem, which when repeated may make distress even more likely. Positive experiences are less of a challenge and thus less likely to be rehearsed. When thoughts have been tied to distress in difficult and painful situations in the past, one faces not only problems of the moment, but also stored thoughts and affects related to them. Each time they are rehearsed, the negative affect, cognition, and action links become stronger. Thus, early failure, such as poor achievement in school, may create the possibility of long-term negative affect or neuroticism that extends to achievement situations later in life. Caspi, Harrington, et al. (2003) related children’s characteristics at age 3 to their self-reported personality at age 26: Undercontrolled children (10% of the sample) had been temperamentally impulsive, restless, distractible, and negativistic at age 3; Confident children (28%) were friendly, eager, and somewhat impulsive; Inhibited children (8%) were fearful, reticent, and easily upset; Reserved children (15%) were timid but not extreme in shyness; Well-adjusted children (40%) appeared to be capable of selfcontrol, were adequately self-confident, and did not become upset during testing. Undercontrolled children, who combined extraversion/surgency, negative affect, and low attentional control at age 3, showed neurotic and alienated tendencies as 26-year-old adults. Confident extraverted children were confident and unfearful as adults. More shy and fearful Inhibited and Reserved children maintained their caution and fearfulness into adulthood and were also low in social potency, whereas the more extremely Inhibited children were also high in Constraint (a mixture of fearfulness and selfcontrol) and low in positive emotionality and social support. Kubzansky, Martin, and Buka (2004) related children’s temperament and personality at age 7 to self-ratings at TEMPERAMENT 71 age 35. Children’s behavioral inhibition did not predict adult functioning, but their anger proneness (Distress) predicted adult hostility/anger, and children who showed low interpersonal self-regulation were low in interpersonal sensitivity in adulthood. Strong relations were found between child distress proneness and adult somatization, another very intriguing finding. Temperament and Adjustment In the preceding section, we began to consider temperament and some aspects of adjustment. Now we consider in more detail theoretical models and research findings relating temperament to adjustment. The term adjustment means not only psychopathology but also positive behaviors, including the development of conscience. We consider dimensions of adjustment rather than categorical diagnostic systems, and think of adjustment as adaptation to particular contexts and related experiences. A child may carry temperament traits from one context to another, but their implications for adjustment will depend on the specific context and expectations of the parent, peer, or teacher (Chess & Thomas, 1984; Lerner & Lerner, 1994), as well as on the child’s specific mental habits, as described in preceding paragraphs. DOES TEMPERAMENT PREDICT ADJUSTMENT? Meaningful patterns of relationship exist between constructs of temperament and constructs of adjustment in children’s development. This was clear by the late 1980s (Bates, 1989) and has become more firmly established since then, with many studies showing temperament links with psychopathology (e.g., see reviews by Eisenberg, Guthrie, et al., 2000; Lonigan, Vasey, Phillips, & Hazen, 2004; Rothbart, 2007: Rothbart & Bates, 1998; Rothbart & Posner, 2006; Sanson, Hemphill, & Smart, 2004; Wachs & Bates, 2001). In these studies, temperament has been measured in a variety of ways, including parent reports, teacher reports, and direct observation. Adjustment has been assessed at home and at school, using cross-sectional and longitudinal designs. In this review, we focus mainly on a differentiated view of how temperament might contribute to the child’s adjustment. We mention two methodological and conceptual issues before describing findings. One issue is measurement contamination. Sanson, Prior, and Kyrios (1990) argued that relations between a temperament measure and an adjustment measure might be an artifact of content overlap between the two scales. Items in a temperament scale, for example, might concern behaviors that are the same as those indicating psychopathology or vice versa. Bates (1990) argued that adjustment and temperament should actually have some conceptual overlap. The child’s adjustment could reflect a component of temperament, and psychopathology could be, at least in part, an extreme point on a temperament dimension. For theoretical reasons, however, we tend to regard temperament and adjustment as separate. One support for this distinction comes from studies where expert raters and psychometric principles are used to remove items with overlapping content. Findings demonstrate links between temperament and psychopathology even after “decontamination” (Lemery, Essex, & Smider, 2002; Lengua, West, & Sandler, 1998; Oldehinkel, Hartman, de Winter, Veenstra, & Ormel, 2004). A second way of supporting a distinction between temperament and adjustment is shown by studies 72 BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS on change and development. One study, for example, found that therapy led to changes in parents’ descriptions of their children’s psychopathology but not their descriptions of the child’s temperament (Sheeber, 1995). Other studies address the question of the developmental processes through which temperament and adjustment are related, and these are discussed after considering the second methodological issue. This issue is called source bias. As we have argued, caregivers’ reports do show validity. However, when a relation is inferred from two constructs measured via the same source, for example, parents, it is possible that relations are due to preconceptions in the minds of the informant rather than the behavior of the subject. Bates and Bayles (1984) have nevertheless argued, on the basis of many different tests of subjective and objective components in parents’ perceptions of their children, that measures of subjective bias do not account for more of the variance than measures of objective phenomena. In addition, as is discussed later, the different measures are related to one another within and across time in a differentiated pattern. For example, early novelty distress (fear) predicts later novelty distress or internalizing problems more than externalizing problems. Studies have also shown objectivity in caregivers’ descriptions of children’s temperament, even when subjective factors, such as depression, play some role (e.g., Bishop et al., 2003; Forman et al., 2003). Thus, source biases are not as powerful as one might have feared, and caregivers perceive children’s behavioral traits in a relatively differentiated rather than global or unitary ways. This brings us to the central question: How does temperament predict adjustment? Temperament might be involved in the development of behavior problems in a number of ways. Clark, Watson, and Mineka (1994) listed four ways in which mood and anxiety disorders might be related to personality characteristics (also see Shiner & Caspi, 2003): 1. A vulnerability model, where there is a predisposition to the development of disorders (e.g., distress in response to stressors) 2. The pathoplasty model, in which personality shapes the course of a disorder (e.g., by producing an environment that maintains the disorder) 3. The scar hypothesis, in which a disorder produces enduring changes in personality (e.g., increased levels of insecurity) 4. The spectrum or continuity hypothesis where the psychopathological condition is an extreme manifestation of the underlying temperament or personality trait These four models need not be mutually exclusive. Generally, available evidence does not allow for a choice among the models, but in recent years, behavioral and molecular genetics research is offering the promise of choices (e.g., Eaves, Silberg, & Erkanli, 2003). DIRECT LINKAGE Most studies of the relations between temperament and adjustment have considered direct, linear effects, where a particular temperament trait contributes to the development of an adjustment pattern. Additive effects of multiple temperament traits are also possible, as when two or more temperament traits increase the risk of some disorder, such as negative affectivity and lack of impulse control predicting behavior problems (Eisenberg et al., 1996), negative emotionality and fearfulness predicting TEMPERAMENT 73 levels of young boys’ internalizing problems (Gilliom & Shaw, 2004), and both impulsivity and negative emotionality associated with adolescents’ antisocial behavior (Stice & Gonzales, 1998). In evaluating direct linkage models, studies examining multiple temperament traits in relation to multiple dimensions of adjustment are critical. According to current theories of psychopathology, individual differences in specific temperament-related brain circuits are linked to specific forms of motivation or functioning (Table 3.4; Bates et al., 1994; Clark et al., 1994; Fowles, 1994; Gray, 1991; MacDonald, 1988; Rothbart, Derryberry, et al., 1994; Rothbart & Posner, 2006). There are systems controlling inhibition to novelty and signals of punishment and nonreward, as well as unconditioned fear, positive affectivity and reward seeking, sensitivity to social rewards, and attentional control. We now use these systems as general constructs to organize the evidence on temperament and adjustment. At present, only a limited number of studies permit a differentiated view of links between temperament and adjustment, and none are methodologically strong enough to stand alone in support or rejection of a psychobiological systems model. However, enough convergence exists that we are confident about the broad outlines of direct linkage models. THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS Direct linkage models will become more detailed as neurobehavioral systems are better understood and as measures of adjustment are meaningfully differentiated. For now, we would expect early irritability, or general tendencies toward negative affect, to predict a wide variety of adaptive difficulties, including internalizing (anxiety problems), and externalizing (conduct problems), as well as deficits in social competencies. As measures of irritability are more finely differentiated, however, more clearly defined pathways to later adjustment may be identified. For example, sensitivity to minor aversive stimuli might predispose a child to both internalizing (e.g., whining and withdrawal) and externalizing (e.g., reactive aggression) behavior problems, whereas irritability to frustration of reward or of stimulation-seeking behavior (Rothbart, Derryberry, et al., 1994) would likely be more related to externalizing tendencies than to internalizing ones. Temperamental tendencies toward fearfulness in novel or potentially punishing situations should predict internalizing-type adjustments most directly, although they may also serve to predict externalizing problems in inverse or interactive ways, as discussed later. A finer differentiation of fearfulness will ultimately be important for predicting different kinds of internalizing adjustment. For example, separation distress may differ in some ways from novelty fear. See Fowles’ (1994) discussion of theories placing separation fear in a panic or fight/flight brain system and novelty fear in a behavioral inhibition system, and Panksepp’s (1998) psychobiological theory. Positive affectivity or surgency, involving activity, stimulation seeking, assertiveness, and possibly some aspects of manageability, should be more involved in externalizing than in internalizing problems, except that depression has a strong component of low positive affectivity (Tellegen, 1985). However, a trait of prosocial tendency, affiliation and agreeableness, perhaps involving sensitivity to social rewards (MacDonald, 1992), might prove separable from the more general extraversion or surgency (positive affectivity) system, as Rothbart and Victor’s (2004) findings suggest. Low levels of prosocial interest and concern would be expected to be associated with the TABLE 3.4 Processes that May Link Temperament and Adjustment Processes Examples A. Direct, Linear Effects 1. Temperament extreme constitutes psychopathology or positive adaptation. Extreme shyness, attention deficit disorder, high attentional control 2. Temperament extreme predisposes to a closely related condition. Fearfulness → general anxiety disorder, agoraphobia/panic disorder; high attentional control → good social adjustment 3. Temperament characteristics affect particular symptomatology of a disorder. Anxiety versus hopelessness in depression B. Indirect, Linear Effects 1. Temperament structures the immediate environment, which then influences development of positive adjustment or psychopathology. High stimulation seeking → leaving home early, marrying poorly; high attentional control → planning → good school adjustment 2. Temperament biases others to behave in ways that provide experiences leading to risk factors, pathology, or more positive outcome. High positive affect → attention from caregivers in institutional situations; infant irritability → coercive cycles in parent-child interactions 3. Temperament biases processing of information about self and others, predisposing to cognitively based psychopathology or positive adjustment. Negative affectivity → negatively biased social information processing → aggression; positive affectivity → positively biased social information processing → optimism about others C. Temperament × Environment Interactions 1. Temperament buffers against risk factors or stressors. Fear protecting against aggression or criminal socialization; positive affect protecting against peer or parent rejection 2. Temperament heightens response to event. Negative affectivity augmenting response to stress, increasing risk of depression or likelihood of posttraumatic stress disorder; attentional orienting augmenting response to teachersÅf instructions D. Temperament × Temperament Interactions 1. Self-regulation of a temperament extreme qualitatively changes its expression. High surgency with nonregulation → ADHD, high surgency with good regulation → high competence; high negative emotionality with low attentional control → sensitization and increasing anxiety; high negative emotionality plus high attentional control → no maladjustment 2. One temperament trait protects against risk consequences of another temperament-based trait. Fearfulness or higher attentional control protecting against impulsivity E. Miscellaneous 1. Different temperament characteristics may predispose to similar outcomes. Shyness, impulsivity, lack of affiliativeness, and negativity may each predispose to development of social isolation 2. Temperament or personality may be shaped by psychopathological disorder. Anxiety disorder → increased dependency Note: Some of the wording and examples have been changed. Note that many of the examples are theoretically plausible, but not based on empirical evidence. From “Temperament” (p. 137), by M. K. Rothbart, and J. E. Bates, in Handbook of child psychology: Vol. 3. Social, emotional, and personality development, sixth edition, W. Damon and R. M. Lerner (Series Eds.) and N. Eisenberg (Vol. Ed.), 2006, Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. Adapted with permission. 74 TEMPERAMENT 75 development of externalizing but not internalizing problems, and perhaps with failure to acquire positive social competencies independent of behavioral problems. Finally, systems controlling attention, especially the executive attention system described earlier, would be expected to be related to both externalizing and internalizing, but to have more to do with externalizing problems than with internalizing ones. As with fear systems, attentional control should also play an additive or interactive role with other temperament characteristics. In addition, a well-functioning set of attentional controls is likely to be linked to more positive developmental outcomes. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS OF DIRECT LINKAGE A number of studies provide support for the models just described. In general, predictive relations between temperament and adjustment are of modest to moderate size. Correlations between infancy measures and adjustment in late preschool and middle childhood tend to be smaller, and those between preschool or middle childhood and later periods larger. Even though the correlations may be modest to moderate, they have been well replicated, and are clearly not chance findings. Moreover, the size of the relations is usually not less than and sometimes greater than predictions from other theoretically linked variables, such as parenting quality. Lytton (1995), for example, performed a metaanalysis of studies predicting conduct disorder (a diagnosis of extreme externalizing problems) and criminality, finding child temperament variables to be the single most powerful predictor of the outcomes, even in comparison with qualities of parenting. In the Bloomington Longitudinal Study (BLS), infancy and toddlerhood temperamental difficultness (frequent and intense negative affect and attention demanding) predicted later externalizing and internalizing problems as seen in the mother-child relationship, from preschool to the middle-childhood periods (Bates & Bayles, 1988; Bates, Bayles, Bennett, Ridge, & Brown, 1991; Bates, Maslin, & Frankel, 1985; Lee & Bates, 1985). Early negative reactivity to novel situations (unadaptability) predicted less consistently, but when it did, it predicted internalizing problems more than externalizing problems. Early resistance to control (perhaps akin to the manageability dimension of Hagekull, 1989, and perhaps at least partly related to the construct of effortful control) predicted externalizing problems more than internalizing problems. This was also found in predicting externalizing problems at school in both the BLS and a separate longitudinal study, the Child Development Project (CDP; Bates, Pettit, Dodge, & Ridge, 1998). In a structural modeling analysis of CDP data, dealing with the overlap in externalizing and internalizing symptoms, Keiley, Lofthouse, Bates, Dodge, and Pettit (2003) separated mothers’ and teachers’ reports of behavior problems across 5 to 14 years into pure externalizing, pure internalizing, and covarying factors, and then considered their early childhood predictors. Resistant temperament (unmanageability) predicted the pure factors of mother- and teacher-rated externalizing, but not the pure internalizing factors. Unadaptable temperament (novelty distress) predicted both mother and teacher pure internalizing factors, and to a lesser degree, and negatively, the pure mother and teacher externalizing factors. It is reasonable that fearfulness and sensitivity would be likely to inhibit externalizing behavior (Bates, Pettit, & Dodge, 1995). Finally, difficult temperament (negative emotionality and demandingness) predicted, in the multivariate analysis, none of the pure factors, but only the covarying externalizing plus internalizing factor in mothers’ reports. 76 BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS These findings are all consistent with models where temperament extremes either constitute pathology themselves or predispose to risk for these conditions. The linkages are modest, but they obtain from early in life. They are also not eliminated when family and parenting characteristics are included in the prediction, so they are not simply artifacts of family functioning. Also supporting the general pattern, Gilliom and Shaw (2004) found that, in a sample of preschool-age boys from low-income families, high negative emotionality was associated with initial levels of both externalizing and internalizing problems, whereas high fearfulness was associated with decreases in externalizing problems over time. High initial internalizing was also associated with increases in internalizing problems over time. Russell, Hart, Robinson, and Olsen (2003), however, found that negative emotionality as measured by parent report on the EAS did not predict preschoolers’ adjustment as rated by teachers. However, EAS shyness was related to both lower prosocial behavior and lower aggressive behavior at preschool. Lemery et al. (2002) also provide support for a differential linkage model. Motherrated child anger on the CBQ at ages 3 to 4 predicted mother and father reports of externalizing problems at age 5 more strongly than it predicted age 5 internalizing problems. Early fear and sadness predicted later internalizing problems more strongly than they predicted later externalizing problems. Early inhibitory control also inversely predicted later externalizing or Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) problems more strongly than it predicted later internalizing problems. These studies provide support for a differential linkage between specific temperament dimensions and particular dimensions of later adjustment. For a review of additional studies on this, see Rothbart and Bates (2006). SUMMARY The literature on temperament and adjustment supports a direct linkage model. With a few exceptions, specific temperament dimensions also relate in a differentiated way to internalizing and externalizing, with early inhibition relating more to later internalizing, and early unmanageability to later externalizing, and with early negative affect relating to both outcomes. Evidence does not yet answer the question of which of the direct linkage models listed previously applies best to the observed relations between temperament and adjustment. Given generally modest predictive relations, we would favor a vulnerability or predisposition model; a spectrum/continuity model might also apply. However, early individual differences likely become transformed, via developmental processes that include experience, into the more complex forms of adjustment in later years, and these processes must shape adjustment outcomes. Many child temperament researchers agree with Thomas, Chess, and Birch (1968) that temperament in itself does not constitute a negative versus positive adjustment, but that it conditions developmental processes that determine adjustment. This concept fits a vulnerability model better than a simpler continuity or spectrum model. EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL LIMITS ON CONTINUITY Predictive correlations tend to be modest to moderate in size, especially when temperament is assessed in early life. Several factors may influence this result. Measurement error is almost always a problem, but when power is sufficient, it can be controlled in TEMPERAMENT 77 structural models. However, even with a statistical control for measurement error, there will be limited predictive power (e.g., see Keiley et al., 2003). Limited predictiveness can also occur because of conceptual limitations in the measure of either temperament or adjustment. For example, the sample of situations used in a set of items may not be sufficient to capture the relevant construct. One particular problem involves the lower levels of prediction from temperament at home to adjustment at school. This is sometimes ascribed to parental rating biases, but many differences in incentive conditions are present at home and school, and even if a child’s temperament is measured accurately, the child’s expression of that temperament could differ in the two settings. For example, the same child could be resistant and angry with the mother and yet inhibited and adequately compliant at school, a pattern seen empirically by Dumas and LaFreniere (1993) and clinically in some young children in our treatment program for oppositional behavior problems. It is not that the child is inconsistent in temperament, but rather that a child with a disposition toward anxiety can be quite uncooperative and disruptive in familiar situations and more reserved in the highly stimulating and more novel school setting. Alternatively, a child with an anxiety-prone temperament could be angry as a way to reduce anxiety aroused in a chaotically stressful home, by gaining a sense of control, and be calm in a more well-ordered, supportive school environment. The habit model described earlier (linking thoughts, emotions, and actions) allows for different experiences across situations. These situations differ in the constraints they offer for temperament expression and allow for different histories of experience that may be relatively idiosyncratic. Another factor in limiting prediction is that temperament itself can change with development, as a result of either experience or later-emerging traits such as effortful control. It remains an interesting possibility that we may discover laws to account for changes in temperament. The adaptive behavior of shy children who were highly intelligent improved more over development than that of shy children who were less intelligent (Asendorpf, 1994). Negatively reactive infants, at high risk for behavioral inhibition, were more likely to show behavioral inhibition across age 14 months to 4 years if they also showed right frontal EEG asymmetry (indicating in another way a strong disposition to negative affect; Fox, Henderson, Rubin, Calkins, & Schmidt, 2001). They were also more likely to be continuously inhibited if they were exclusively in the care of their parents rather than receiving some nonparental care. The limited size of prediction from temperament to adjustment may also be due to other major factors in development such as parenting, family stress, or school environment. In other words, temperament might be linked to adjustment through indirect processes. These include mediator models, as when a child’s negative temperament influences negative parenting, which, in turn, plays the dominant role in producing the child’s aggressive behavior problems, or moderator models, as when a child’s negative temperament has one implication for development of adjustment in the context of negative parenting and another in the context of positive parenting. We next consider such processes, most sharply focusing on temperament X environment moderator models. MODERATED LINKAGE Rothbart and Bates (1998) discussed two possible indirect processes by which temperament and adjustment could be related. The first was mediated linkage in which 78 BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS temperament influences transactions with the environment, which in turn shape the child’s developing adjustment. For example, a child’s negative emotional reactivity might evoke hostile responses from caregivers, which build habitual frustration and hostility in the child. Research, especially longitudinal research, on such temperamentparenting-adjustment processes has been relatively sparse. Given space limitations, we will not discuss this work. Another indirect process was a moderated linkage in which one temperament trait interacted with another in accounting for an adjustment outcome. Temperament X temperament interaction findings are not numerous, but would be worth a detailed review. For example, relations between effortful control and externalizing and prosocial behavior are stronger for children high in negative emotionality than for children low in negative emotionality (Belsky, Friedman, & Hsieh, 2001; Diener & Kim, 2004; Eisenberg, Fabes, et al., 2000; Eisenberg, Guthrie, et al., 2000; Stifter, Spinrad, & BraungartRieker, 1999). However, review of this topic will not be done here. Another indirect process was moderated linkage in which we address how temperament and a feature of the environment might interact in the development of adjustment. For example, a child with high temperamental negative emotionality exposed to stress might be more likely to develop behavior problems than a less reactive child. There has been a striking growth in studies of moderated linkage, and this research direction is especially exciting because developmental theory has emphasized the likelihood of temperament-environment interaction. Although these connections have been posited for decades, they are just now beginning to take empirical shape. Researchers sometimes focus on environmental moderation of how a temperament trait is associated with adjustment, as in parental hostility moderating the relation between child negative emotionality and adjustment. They also focus on how an environmental feature is moderated by the child’s temperament, as when self-regulation tendencies moderate the adjustment implications of family stress. Choice between these two perspectives reflects the basic interests of the researchers, but an interaction from one perspective could often have also been described from the other perspective. A bigger methodological challenge, however, is simply to find the interaction effect. Nonexperimental studies typically have to deal with correlated predictor and moderator variables, problems in the joint distributions of the variables, and insufficient statistical power for detecting effects (McClelland & Judd, 1993; Stoolmiller, 2001; Wachs & Plomin, 1991). Sometimes, interaction effects may be present but not found by statistical tests, or statistically significant effects may be specific to a sample or spurious. For these reasons, we focus especially on effects that have been replicated in some fashion. Many, but not all of the findings we review consider the interaction of temperament and environment in the context of the main effects, which is typically preferred by methodologists. We concentrate more on the substantive patterns of results than on methodological features (see Bates & McFadyen-Ketchum, 2001, for more discussion of methods). Most of the emerging literature concerns three kinds of temperament trait: Those related to (a) low self-regulation, including low effortful control, unmanageability, and resistance to control, probably related to the Big Five personality dimensions of agreeableness and conscientiousness; (b) negative emotional reactivity, sometimes called difficult temperament; and (c) novelty distress, fear, or unadaptability. Each of these areas is reviewed in detail in Rothbart and Bates (2006) and Bates and Pettit (2007). Here we focus only on interactions involving low self-regulation. We are especially TEMPERAMENT 79 drawn to studies showing temperament X environment interaction effects in longitudinal studies of development of adjustment, but some useful cross-sectional findings have also emerged. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN SELF-REGULATION AND ENVIRONMENT Temperamental tendencies toward dysregulation, such as impulsivity or resistance to control, may be rooted not only in underdeveloped effortful control systems, but also in strong behavioral approach systems, or surgency. Such tendencies have shown direct associations with adjustment, especially with externalizing problems. At least 20 studies show traits in this broad domain interacting with characteristics of the rearing environment in the development of adjustment, and most of these consider the effects of temperament and parenting. One emerging theme is that a disposition to dysregulation is more highly associated with problem behavior when parenting is negative or harsh rather than gentle. Calkins (2002) found that 18-month-old children high on distress and resistant in frustrating situations were likely to be high on angry and aggressive behavior in similar situations at 24 months when their mothers were low in positive parenting, but not when their mothers were highly positive. Rubin, Burgess, Dwyer, and Hastings (2003) measured children’s self-regulation in laboratory tasks at age 2 and mother reports on the TBAQ at age 2. They also measured intrusive and hostile mothering in a snack situation and by mother report. Poor child self-regulation predicted mother-reported externalizing behavior problems at age 4 to a greater extent for children who at age 2 received higher levels of intrusive and hostile mothering. This pattern was found cross-sectionally at age 2 in the same study, but only for boys (Rubin, Hastings, Chen, Stewart, & McNichol, 1998). Other cross-sectional examples include the finding that positive parenting as measured by interview and incidental observations matters more for temperamentally unmanageable children’s adjustment in preschool than for less resistant children (Bates, Viken, & Williams, 2003). Morris et al. (2002) found that children rated by their mothers as low in effortful control (CBQ) showed an especially strong relationship between mother hostility (child report) and teacher-reported externalizing behavior, whereas Patterson and Sanson (1999) reported that mother-rated temperamental inflexibility (negative emotionality and resistance to demands) was more strongly associated with mother-reported externalizing problems when the mothers described themselves as relatively high in harsh punishment. The general pattern also extends to a prosocial behavior—expression of sympathy. Valiente et al. (2004) found that parents’ expressivity of negative emotion (self-rated and observed) was associated with children’s self-reported sympathetic responses, but only when the child was high in effortful control (parent and teacher ratings on the CBQ and observation). This was true for self-rated general dispositions and personal distress to an empathy-inducing film, but not for sympathy responses to the film. A number of other studies show this general pattern (see Rothbart & Bates, 2006; Bates & Pettit, 2007). A second emerging theme is supported by fewer studies, but it raises the possibility that disciplinary responses by parents can have positive rather than adverse implications for children with tendencies toward dysregulation. Adolescents’ ratings of parental control and support were positively correlated and, for highly impulsive youth, 80 BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS high parental control and support were more associated with low levels of adolescent antisocial behavior than for nonimpulsive youth (Stice & Gonzales, 1998). Even more clearly showing the effectiveness of control for dysregulated children, boys who were highly unmanageable (disposed to have tantrums) in their early years showed a stronger relationship between mothers’ unskilled discipline techniques and higher externalizing problems (as rated by teachers from elementary school to middle school) than boys who were low or medium in their unmanageability (Stoolmiller, 2001). In two studies with community samples, early childhood temperamental resistance to control (mother report on the ICQ) better predicted externalizing problems in middle childhood (mother and teacher reports) for children who received low levels of parent control (observed in the home) than for children receiving high levels of control (Bates et al., 1998). Parent control was measured as reactions to misbehavior, and these reactions were sometimes but not always negative, for example, scolding. The researchers almost never saw harsh discipline such as spanking. Although hostile parenting and lack of warmth might well lead dysregulated temperament traits to become acting-out problems, the findings of Stice and Gonzales (1998) and Bates et al. (1998) suggest that parent control might also lessen the likelihood that dysregulated temperament will lead to problem behavior. However, high levels of parental control may not be ideal for all children: high levels of maternal control with highly manageable children sometimes resulted in higher externalizing behavior than would have been predicted by temperament alone, suggesting that mothers’ control somehow prevented the development of truly internalized self-control (Bates et al., 1998). A third emerging theme concerns a trait not usually discussed in the temperament literature—the core psychopathy trait, callous-unemotional, nonempathic, manipulative, and lacking anxiety and guilt. This pattern seems likely to be a form of temperamental dysregulation, even though its regulatory core appears to involve low prosocial orientation more than impulsivity to reward or low effortful control. It may also be related to very low levels of fear, but this does not seem likely to be the dominant component. In a combined clinical and normal sample when children were described by parents and teachers as low on the callous-unemotional scale, less positive parenting, as described by parent and child, was associated with greater conduct problems as measured by parent and teacher report (Wootton, Frick, Shelton, & Silverthorn, 1997). When high on the callous-unemotional scale, however, children were high on conduct problems whether the parenting was positive or not. This pattern was replicated, in essence, by O’Connor and Dvorak (2001) in a community sample, and by Oxford, Cavell, and Hughes (2003) in a sample more similar to that of Wootton et al. (1997). It has been encouraging to see the emerging body of interactions between temperament and parenting environment in the development of adjustment. However, the studies do not provide sufficient evidence on developmental processes. The parent and child are also genetically related, and interaction effects might be confounded or obscured by gene-environment correlations. This makes it valuable to have relevant findings from studies considering variables other than standard temperament/personality, behavioral adjustment, and parenting. One example is the Hart, Atkins, and Fegley (2003) study, which shows, among other things, Head Start experience was especially beneficial in developing academic skills for children with resilient (well-regulated) personalities living in highly stressful family environments. Other examples include Lengua and Long (2002), considering the interaction of family stress and child effortful control, Fabes et al. (1999), considering the interaction of intensity of peer interac- TEMPERAMENT 81 tions and child effortful control, and Goodnight, Bates, Newman, Dodge, and Pettit (2006), considering the interaction of the deviance of friends of teens and the teens’ impulsivity. Even further examples include El-Sheikh, Harger, and Whitson (2001), evaluating the interaction of parental marital quarrels and child vagal tone (a measure of self-regulation via the parasympathetic nervous system), and Caspi et al. (2002) and Caspi, Sugden, et al. (2003), showing the interaction between stressful experiences and alleles for two different genes related to self-regulation. FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN RESEARCH ON TEMPERAMENT MODERATOR EFFECTS Research has begun to demonstrate that child characteristics related to low behavioral regulation interact with a range of environmental qualities in the development of competencies and problems. In general, negative experiences and the absence of positive experiences appear to have less adverse effect on the development of children with stronger self-regulation, and greater effects on the development of children with weaker self-regulation. Ten years ago, this pattern was essentially undiscovered. Now, after an inspiring flurry of studies on interactions involving self-regulation, reviewed here, as well as negative emotionality and fearfulness (see Bates & Pettit, 2007; Rothbart & Bates, 2006), we can begin to envision research on the actual developmental processes by which temperament and environment moderate one another’s effects on child adjustment. What are the limits of these phenomena? More precisely, which environmental factors interact with which particular child characteristics? What are the developmental processes by which these effects are found? What are the psychological products of the temperament and environment? It may also be valuable to more extensively explore interactions between multiple temperament variables and environmental variables simultaneously. About 10 years ago, the typical limit of complexity found in research was considering temperament and environment variables’ main effects as linear, additive contributors to a developmental outcome. Currently, the typical limit considers main effects plus the interaction of one temperament variable and one environment variable as predictors of an outcome, or main effects plus the interaction of two temperament variables (e.g., between negative emotionality and effortful control) as predictors. Where the meaning of a given temperament variable in isolation is not always clear, however, it might be helpful to consider the effect of a profile of temperament variables as moderating or moderated by an environmental variable (see also Rothbart & Sheese, 2007). Conclusions There has been considerable progress in identifying both broad outlines and more specific dimensions of temperament in childhood. The general framework includes broad dimensions of Positive Affect and Approach, Negative Affectivity, including differentiated subconstructs of Irritability and Fear, Effortful Control, and possibly Affiliation or Social Orientation. These broad dimensions share similarities with four of the Big Five Factors of Personality (Extraversion, Neuroticism, Conscientiousness, and Agreeableness), and with all of the Big Three broad factors of personality (Extraversion, Neuroticism, and Conscientiousness), but are by no means identical. Research establishing 82 BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS links between measures of these early temperament dimensions and later personality has now begun to appear, and will continue to be one of the major continuing projects for our area, along with further differentiating temperament and personality measures. DIFFERENTIATING TEMPERAMENT DIMENSIONS It is important to differentiate between fearful and irritable distress, and both biological and clinical studies have benefited from this distinction. Further evidence links anger and early surgency/extraversion to the development of externalizing problems and indicates that fear may be a protective factor against aggression and other externalizing problems as well as a contributor to the early development of conscience. A great deal of recent research has established connections between effortful control and the regulation of both affect and behavior. Future research will consider the limits of fearful and effortful control on adaptation, in connection with the Blocks’ (Block & Block, 1980) construct of overcontrol, and allow us to study the way in which effortful control may become part of a resilient approach to life’s challenges. Probably the most striking new findings involve interactions between temperament and environment. The child’s effortful control, manageability, and agreeableness have been found to moderate the effects of adverse environments. Not reviewed here (see Rothbart & Bates, 2006), but important, are patterns of findings in which negative emotionality amplifies the effects of adverse experience, and in which more fearful or inhibited children appear to benefit from early challenge, at least in measures of the later strength of this system, whereas they appear to benefit in early conscience development in the context of gentle socialization methods. MEASURES Good measures of temperament are crucial to our theoretical understanding. Further advances in defining the structure of temperament and understanding its neural and developmental substrates will continue to rely on advances in measurement. For this reason, we advocate the further development of sound measures, using parent-report, naturalistic observation, and structured or laboratory observation measures in converging and complementary ways. Aside from the important future work of comparing results of alternative methods, another important focus in research should be identification of nonrelationships among constructs—tests for discriminant as well as convergent validity. Partly on the basis of differential, discriminating patterns of correlations between parent-reports of temperament and other measures, we are able to argue for the validity of parent-reports. The use of brain marker tasks in the study of development of executive attention and effortful control has also made significant strides in the past 5 years. We encourage the continued use of marker tasks to link performance to the development of brain functioning. DEVELOPMENT As the dimensions of temperament have been further delineated and measures improved, real advances have occurred in our understanding of temperament-environment interactions. Future research is needed to examine the processes supporting these effects. There may also be times when emotionality or effortful control systems are more sensitive to environmental conditions than others, or times when the child’s irritable and TEMPERAMENT 83 frustrative distress might be most easily directed toward or away from coercive responses and tendencies to aggressive action. These are basic developmental questions with profound implications for our understanding of the nature of temperament and the development of personality. Establishing closer links with our understanding of the developing neurophysiological substrate of temperament is a related task for our area, where findings from each domain illuminate the other. Thus, behavioral research on the developing structure of temperament helps to specify the operations necessary to link the psychology of temperament to its neurophysiology. Scholars who relate parallel research carried out in these two domains will aid in this work. The use of physiological assays, behavioral measures in research designs and the use of marker tasks will lead to further advances. Finally, we have identified possible trajectories in the development of social and personality traits from early temperamental characteristics, most strongly in Kochanska’s (1995) work on multiple routes to conscience. The task of identifying routes to other significant outcomes requires progress in all of the tasks described earlier. The study of developmental pathways or trajectories requires establishing stronger links between our work and more environmentally oriented areas of our field such as social learning and social cognition research. Temperament constructs do not conflict with these areas of research: The temperament dimensions we have described are open to experience, although some systems are likely more open than others. In addition, the functioning of control systems will be highly dependent on what the culture indicates should be controlled. Prospects for effective longitudinal research will be much improved by integrating research on individual differences, cross-cultural psychology, social learning, and social cognition. Developmental research in our area may also eventually answer questions like the following: To what degree is temperament plastic and susceptible to change? To what degree does experience alter only the expression of temperamental characteristics? If distress and maladaptive social cognitions can result from a painful life history, how much of early temperament may have been overlain by these negative experiences? Could the original core of temperament be uncovered by imaginative assays, intervention, further social experience, or even by further changes in social or physical development? We know someone who, through the aging process, lost many of her memories, including information that had troubled her over many years and led to major conflicts in herself and with others. What remained after her memory loss was a positive and expressive person, loved by all who met her. Was this the child she once was? If so, could other less serious interventions have uncovered it? Better yet, could developmental research inform both child rearing and children’s prospects in society so that the accumulating pain might never have occurred? We have made much progress in our field in the past decades, but a number of questions remain. Many of these questions are hopeful about a future for our parents, our children, and us. References Ahadi, S. A., & Rothbart, M. K. (1994). Temperament, development and the big five. In C. F. Halverson, G. A. Kohnstamm, & R. P. Martin (Eds.), The developing structure of temperament and personality from infancy to adulthood (pp. 189–207). 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Good and bad humors: Biochemical bases of personality and its disorders. Psychological Science, 6(6), 325–332. PA R T I I I PA R E N TA L A N D P E E R R E L AT I O N S Chapter 4 Socialization in the Family: Ethnic and Ecological Perspectives ROSS D. PARKE and RAYMOND BURIEL Socialization is a process in which an individual’s standards, skills, motives, attitudes, and behaviors change to conform to those regarded as desirable and appropriate for his or her present and future role in society. Many agents and agencies play a role in the socialization process, including family, peers, schools, and the media. Moreover, it is recognized that these various agents function together rather than independently. Families have been recognized as an early pervasive and highly influential context for socialization. Children are dependent on families for nurturance and support from an early age, which accounts, in part, for their prominence as a socialization agent. Our goal is to expand our framework for conceptualizing the family’s role in socialization. This takes several forms, including treating the family as a social system in which parent-child, marital, and sibling subsystems, among others, are recognized. The diversity of family forms has increased in the past several decades and a second goal is to explore the implications of various family configurations for the socialization process. Cultural and ethnic variations in family traditions, beliefs, and practices are increasingly being recognized, and a further aim of this chapter is to explore how ethnic diversity informs our understanding of socialization. A further goal is to locate family socialization in an ecological context to appreciate how family environments shape and constrain their socialization practices. We demonstrate the value of a life-course perspective on socialization that recognizes the importance of both developmental changes in adult lives and the historical circumstances under which socialization unfolds. Finally, we recognize that families are increasingly diverse in their organization, form, and lifestyle. Some issues are beyond the scope of the chapter including the work Preparation of this chapter was facilitated by National Science Foundation grants BNS 8919391 and SBR 9308941 and NICHD grand HD 32391 to Parke. Finally, thanks to Faye Harmer for her preparation of the manuscript. 95 96 PARENTAL AND PEER RELATIONS on gay and lesbian families and research on adopted children (see Brodzinsky & Pinderhughes, 2002; C. J. Patterson, 2002, for reviews). Contemporary Theoretical Approaches to Socialization in the Family Several themes are evident in current theoretical approaches to socialization. First, systems theory (Sameroff, 1994) has transformed the study of socialization from a parentchild focus to an emphasis on the family as a social system (Parke, 2004a). To understand fully the nature of family relationships, it is necessary to recognize the interdependence among the roles and functions of all family members. For example, as men’s roles in families shift, changes in women’s roles in families must also be monitored. Second, family members—mothers, fathers, and children—influence each other both directly and indirectly (Minuchin, 2002). Examples of fathers’ indirect impact include various ways in which fathers modify and mediate mother-child relationships. In turn, women affect their children indirectly through their husbands by modifying both the quantity and the quality of father-child interaction. Children may indirectly influence the husband-wife relationship by altering the behavior of either parent and that, in turn, changes the interaction between spouses. Third, different units of analysis are necessary to understand families. Although the individual—child, mother, and father—remains a useful level of analysis, recognition of relationships among family members as units of analysis is necessary. The marital relationship, the mother-child relationship, and the father-child relationship require separate analysis (Parke et al., 2001). Finally, the family as a unit that is independent of the individual or dyads in the family requires recognition (Cook, 2001). A fourth shift is from unidirectional to transactional models of relationships among family members. There have been various phases in the conceptual thinking in this domain. First, scholars traditionally were guided by unilateral models of parent-child relations in which the direction of causality was unidirectional, from parent to child. The child’s role was relatively passive, the focus was on individuals rather than relationships, and power relations were relatively static. A bilateral model has emerged as the dominant paradigm in the parent-child relationship domain (Kuczynski, 2003) in which the direction of causality is bidirectional, equal agency on the part of parent and child is recognized, and power relations are characterized as “interdependent asymmetry.” Fifth, under the influence of Bronfenbrenner’s ecological theory (1989), recognition is being given to the embeddedness of families in other social systems as well as the cultures in which they exist (Parke & Kellam, 1994). These include a range of extrafamilial influences, such as extended families, and informal community ties such as friends and neighbors, work sites, and social, educational, and medical institutions (Repetti, 1994). Sixth, the importance of considering family relationships from a developmental perspective is now recognized. Although developmental changes in child capacities continue to represent the most commonly investigated aspect of development, other aspects of development are viewed as important too. Under the influence of life-course and life-span perspectives (Elder, 1998), examination of developmental changes in adults is gaining recognition because parents continue to change and develop during adult years. This involves an exploration of the tasks faced by adults such as self- SOCIALIZATION IN THE FAMILY: ETHNIC AND ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 97 identity, education, and career, and an examination of the relation between these tasks and parenting. Developmental analysis need not be restricted to the individual level since relationships (e.g., the marital, the mother-child, or the father-child relationship) may follow separate and partially independent developmental courses over childhood (Parke, 1988). In turn, the mutual impact of different sets of relationships on each other will vary as a function of the nature of the developmental trajectory. Families change their structure (e.g., through the addition of a new child or the loss of a member through death or divorce), norms, rules, and strategies over time. Tracking the family unit itself over development is an important and neglected task (Cook, 2001). Seventh, a major shift over the past 2 decades is the challenge to the universality of socialization theories. As cross-cultural work accumulated, it became evident that generalizations from a single culture (e.g., American) may not be valid in other cultural contexts (Rogoff, 2003). Social class differences in socialization challenged the generality of findings even in one cultural or national context (Gauvain, 2001; Hoff, Laursen, & Tardif, 2002). Currently, there is an increased awareness of the importance of both recognizing and studying variations in families and family socialization strategies in both other cultures (Rogoff, 2003) and across ethnic groups in our own culture (Parke, 2004b). It is important not only to examine the diversity of familial organization, goals, and strategies across ethnic groups but it is equally critical to explore variations within different ethnic groups (Garcia Coll & Magnuson, 1999). An eighth assumption involves the recognition of the impact of secular shifts on families. There have been many social changes in American society that have had an impact on families including the decline in fertility and family size, changes in the timing of the onset of parenthood, increased participation of women in the workforce, rise in the divorce rate, and the subsequent increase in single-parent families and remarried step families (Elder, 1998; Hetherington & Kelly, 2001). The ways in which these societal changes impact relationships between parents and children merit examination. A related theme involves the recognition of the importance of historical time periods that provide the social conditions for individual and family transitions. Examples include the 1960s (the Vietnam War era), the 1930s (the Great Depression), or the 1980s (Farm Belt Depression; Conger & Elder, 1994; Elder & Conger, 2000). Across these periods, family interaction may be quite different due to the unique conditions of each era. The distinctions among different developmental trajectories, as well as social change and historical period effects, are important because these different forms of change do not always harmonize (Modell & Elder, 2002). For example, a family event such as the birth of a child may have different effects on a man early rather than later in his career. Moreover, individual and family developmental trajectories are embedded in both the social conditions and the values of the historical time in which they exist. Ninth, renewed interest in the biological bases of behavior has altered our views of socialization. Recognition of the role of genetics across development has produced a more sophisticated understanding of the potential role genetics can play in the onset of certain behaviors and also in the unfolding of behavior across development. Moreover, the reformulation of genetic questions has led to studies of the effects of nonshared family environment on children’s development (O’Connor, 2003); this work has suggested that individual differences between children—some of which are genetically based—play a central role in eliciting and shaping parent’s socialization strategies. Studies of hormones and behavior, especially during infancy and adolescence (Corter & Fleming, 2002) have illuminated another biological aspect of socialization. The 98 PARENTAL AND PEER RELATIONS increased use of psychophysiological and neurological assessments with families represents a further instance of how the study of biological processes is changing socialization studies (Eisenberg, 2000). In addition, the resurgence of interest in evolutionary approaches to socialization is producing new and provocative hypotheses and research directions (Geary & Bjorklund, 2000). Tenth, affect and cognition are increasingly viewed as central socialization processes. The study of affect includes the development of emotion regulation (Denham, 1998), emotional production, and understanding of the role of emotion in the enactment of the parenting role (Dix, 1991). Cognition comes in many guises, including the child’s own cognitive capacities as determinants of socialization strategies and parents’ cognitions, beliefs, values, and goals as constraints on their socialization practices (Goodnow, 2002). These processes are interdependent, mutually influencing each other with cognition and affect often operating together in determining parenting practices (Dix & Branca, 2003). Eleventh, just as processes are viewed as interdependent, there is a new appreciation of the need for multidisciplinary perspectives to understand the family socialization process. Beyond developmental psychology, the family socialization field includes history, anthropology, sociology, demography, pediatrics, psychiatry, and economics (Parke, 2004b). Finally, methodological rigor has increased in recent years. Instead of sole reliance on cross-sectional and/or correlational studies, greater weight is being given to carefully designed longitudinal studies (Gottfried, Gottfried, & Bathurst, 2002) and experimental studies (Cowan & Cowan, 2002) because these approaches allow more confidence in interpreting direction of effects. Recent studies avoid the problems of shared method or reporter variance by reliance on either multiple reporters and/or methods. There is recognition of rival explanations of apparent socialization effects (Harris, 1998; Plomin, 1994). There is a move beyond description by the emergence of theories that specify the mediating and moderating variables that can account for the relation between parenting and child outcomes (Parke, McDowell, Kim, & Leidy, 2006) and the moderating influences, such as social context, ethnicity, or family structure that alter socialization processes (Mounts, 2002). Throughout our review, we focus on work that meets these new standards of scientific rigor whenever possible. Family Systems Approach to Socialization Consistent with a family systems viewpoint, recent research has focused on a variety of subsystems, including parent-child, marital, and sibling-sibling systems. We focus on each of these subsystems as contexts for socialization and examine conceptualizations of the family as a unit of analysis. PARENT-CHILD SUBSYSTEM: A TRIPARTITE APPROACH In this section, we consider the parent-child subsystem and the relation between this parent-child subsystem and children’s social adaptation. Although traditional paradigms focus on the impact of the parent-child relationship or parental child-rearing styles, according to the Parke, Burks, Carson, Neville, and Boyum tripartite model (1994), this represents only one pathway (see Figure 4.1). In addition, this scheme posits that parents may influence their children through a second pathway namely as SOCIALIZATION IN THE FAMILY: ETHNIC AND ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES Parent-child interaction Parent as direct instructor 99 Parent as provider of opportunities Peer competence FIGURE 4.1 A Tripartite Model of Family-Peer Relationships. (Source: “Family-Peer Relationships: A Tripartite Model” (pp. 115–145), by R. D. Parke, V. M. Burks, J. V. Carson, B. Neville, and L. A. Boyum in Exploring Family Relationships with Other Social Contexts: Family Research Consortium—Advances in Family Research, R. D. Parke and S. Kellam (Eds.), 1994, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.) direct instructor, educator, or consultant. In this role, parents may explicitly set out to educate their children concerning appropriate norms, rules, and mores of the culture. According to this second socialization pathway, parents may serve as coaches, teachers, and supervisors who provide advice, support, and directions about strategies for managing new social situations or negotiating social challenges. In a third role, parents function as managers of their children’s social lives and serve as regulators of opportunities for social contacts and cognitive experiences. Although the model has been largely applied to the issue of family peer relationships, it is useful for explaining a wide range of socialization outcomes such as gender roles and aggression (see S. M. McHale, Crouter, & Whiteman, 2003, for an application to gender roles). Parent-Child Relationships: Interaction and Child-Rearing Styles Two approaches to the issue of the effect of parent-child interaction on children’s socialization outcomes have been used in research. One adopts a typological approach and examines styles of child-rearing practices. The other employs a social interaction approach and focuses on the nature of the interchanges between parent and child. Typological Approach. The most influential typology was offered by Baumrind (1973), who distinguished between three types of parental child-rearing typologies, namely authoritative, authoritarian, and permissive. Baumrind (1991) followed her authoritarian, authoritative, and permissive parents and their children from the preschool period through adolescence in a longitudinal study and found that authoritative parenting continued to be associated with positive outcomes for adolescents as with younger children and that responsive, firm parent-child relationships were especially important in the development of competence in sons. Moreover, authoritarian child rearing had more negative long-term outcomes for boys than for girls. Sons of authoritarian parents were low in both cognitive and social competence. Maccoby and Martin (1983) extended the Baumrind typology based on combinations of the warm/responsive, unresponsive/rejecting dimension and the restrictive/ demanding, permissive/undemanding dimension and included a fourth type of parenting 100 PARENTAL AND PEER RELATIONS style—disengaged—which is characterized by neglect and lack of involvement. These parents are “motivated to do whatever is necessary to minimize the costs in time and effort of interaction with the child” (p. 11). Such parents keep the child at a distance and focus on their own rather than their child’s needs. They are parent rather than child centered. With older children, this is associated with the parents’ failure to monitor the child’s activity or to know where the child is, what the child is doing, and who the child’s companions are. In infants, such a lack of parental involvement is associated with disruptions in attachment; in older children, it is associated with impulsivity, aggression, noncompliance, moodiness, and low self-esteem (Baumrind, 1991). Older children also show disruptions in peer relations and in cognitive development, achievement, and school performance (Hetherington & Clingempeel, 1992). It is the combined impact of not having the skills to be able to gain gratification in either social or academic pursuits that frequently leads to delinquency in children with neglecting parents (Reid, Patterson, & Snyder, 2002). Parental involvement plays an important role in the development of both social and cognitive competence in children. A major concern about the focus on parental style is the limited attention to the delineation of the processes that account for the effects of different styles on children’s development. Throughout the history of socialization research, there has been a tension between molar (Baumrind, 1991; Steinberg, Dornbusch, & Brown, 1992) and molecular levels of analysis (Reid et al., 2002). Over the past 3 decades, the pendulum has swung back and forth between these levels of analysis. Currently, these two strands of research coexist and are seldom united in a single study. However, Hetherington and Clingempeel (1992) have used parenting style in combination with sequential analyses of children’s levels of compliance to parental control in a useful bridging of the two levels of analyses. In an attempt to resolve this issue, Darling and Steinberg (1993) argued that parental style and parental practices need to be distinguished. Parenting style is “a constellation of attitudes toward the child that are communicated to the child and create an emotional climate in which parents’ behaviors are expressed” (p. 493). In contrast to style, “parenting practices are behaviors defined by specific content and socialization goals” (p. 492) such as attending school functions and spanking. Style is assumed to be independent of both the content of parenting behavior and the specific socialization content. Critical to their model is the assumption that parenting style has its impact on child outcomes indirectly. First, style transforms the nature of parent-child interaction and thereby moderates the impact of specific practices. Second, style modifies the child’s openness to parental influence, which, in turn, moderates the association between parenting practices and child outcomes. A second concern is the issue of direction of effects. It is unclear whether the styles described by Baumrind are, in part, responses to the child’s behavior. Placing the typology work in a transactional framework (Sameroff, 1994) would argue that children with certain temperaments and/or behavioral characteristics would determine the nature of the parental style. A third concern is the universality of the typological scheme. Recent studies have raised questions about the generalizability of these styles across either socioeconomic status (SES) or ethnic/cultural groups. Two issues are involved here. First, does the rate of utilization of different styles vary across groups? Second, are the advantages of positive social outcomes associated with a particular style (e.g., authoritative) similar across groups? The answer to both questions seems to be negative. In lower-SES fami- SOCIALIZATION IN THE FAMILY: ETHNIC AND ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 101 lies, parents are more likely to use an authoritarian as opposed to an authoritative style, but this style is often an adaptation to the ecological conditions, such as increased danger and threat, which may characterize the lives of poor families (Furstenberg, Cook, Eccles, Elder, & Sameroff, 1999). Moreover, studies find that the use of authoritarian strategies under these circumstances may be linked with more positive outcomes for children (Dodge, McLoyd, & Lansford, 2005). A second challenge to the presumed universal advantage of authoritative child-rearing styles comes from cross-ethnic studies. Accumulating evidence underscores the nonuniversality of these stylistic distinctions and suggests the importance of developing concepts that are based on an indigenous appreciation of the culture in question (Chao, 1994). Both contextual and cultural considerations need more attention in typological approaches to child rearing. Parent-Child Interactional Approach. Research in this tradition is based on the assumption that face-to-face interaction with parents may provide the opportunity to learn, rehearse, and refine social skills that are common to successful social interaction with other social partners. This work has yielded several conclusions. First, the style of the interaction between parent and child is linked to a variety of social outcomes. To illustrate this approach, studies of children’s social competence are considered. Parents who are responsive, warm, and engaging are more likely to have children who are more socially competent (Grimes, Klein, & Putallaz, 2004). Moreover, high levels of positive synchrony and low levels of nonsynchrony in patterns of mother-child interaction are related to school adjustment rated by teachers, peers, and observers (Harrist, Pettit, Dodge, & Bates, 1994). In contrast, parents who are hostile and controlling have children who experience more difficulty with age-mates in the preschool period (Harrist et al., 1994) and middle childhood. Although there is an overlap between mothers and fathers, fathers make a unique and independent contribution to their children’s social development since fathers continue to contribute to children’s social behavior with peers—after accounting for the mothers’ contribution (Isley, O’Neil, & Parke, 1996). Although father involvement is quantitatively less than mother involvement, fathers have an important impact on their offspring’s development. Quality rather than quantity of parent-child interaction is the important predictor of cognitive and social development. Beyond Description: Processes Mediating Relations between Parent-Child Interaction and Children’s Social Competence Several processes have been hypothesized as mediators between parent-child interaction and peer outcomes. These include emotion-encoding and decoding skills, emotional regulatory skills, cognitive representations, attributions and beliefs, as well as problem-solving skills and attention-deployment abilities (Eisenberg, 2000; Ladd, 1992; Parke et al., 2006). These abilities or beliefs are acquired in parent-child interchanges during development and, in turn, guide the nature of children’s behavior with their peers. We focus on three sets of mediating processes that are promising: (1) affectmanagement skills, (2) cognitive representational processes, and (3) attention regulatory processes (see Figure 4.2). Affect-Management Skills as a Mediating Mechanism. Children learn more than specific affective expressions, such as anger, sadness, or joy in the family. They learn a cluster of processes associated with the understanding and regulation of affective 102 PARENTAL AND PEER RELATIONS Parent-Child Interaction Parent Emotional Expressiveness Children’s emotional mediators: 1. Decoding skills 2. Encoding skills 3. Understanding of emotional causes and consequences 4. Display rules 5. Emotional regulation Parent Cognitive Representations Children’s cognitive representations: 1. 2. 3. 4. Goals Strategies Anticipated consequences Efficacy beliefs Attentional processes: 1. 2. 3. 4. Selective attention Sustained attention Ability to shift focus Joint attention abilities Peer interaction Peer sociometric status FIGURE 4.2 Emotional, Cognitive, and Attentional Mediating Links between Family and Peer Systems. displays, which we term affect-management skills (Parke, Cassidy, Burks, Carson, & Boyum, 1992). These skills are acquired during the course of parent-child interaction and are available to the child for use in other relationships. Moreover, it is assumed that these skills play a mediating role between family and children’s social competence. One set of skills that is relevant to successful peer interaction and may, in part, be acquired in the context of parent-child play, especially arousing physical play, is the ability to encode emotional signals and to decode others’ emotional states. Through physically playful interaction with their parents, especially fathers, children may learn how to use emotional signals to regulate the social behavior of others. In addition, they learn to accurately decode the social and emotional signals of social partners. Several studies have found positive relations between children’s ability to encode emotional expressions and children’s social competence with peers (Halberstadt, Denham, & Dunsmore, 2001). Successful peer interaction requires not only the ability to recognize and produce emotions but also a social understanding of emotion-related experiences, of the meaning of emotions, of the cause of emotions, and of the responses appropriate to others’ emotions (Cassidy, Parke, Butkovsky, & Braungart, 1992) . Research suggests that parental support and acceptance of children’s emotions is related to children’s ability to manage emotions in a constructive fashion. Several investigators (Eisenberg, 2000; Parke et al., 2006) have found links between the ability to regulate emotional arousal and social competence. Similarly, children who either have limited knowledge of emotional display rules (Saarni, 1999) or are poor at utilizing display rules are less well accepted by their peers (McDowell, O’Neil, & Parke, 2000; McDowell & Parke, 2000). Parental comforting of children when they experience negative emotion has been linked with constructive anger reactions (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1992) and children’s emotional regulation and their knowledge of and use of display SOCIALIZATION IN THE FAMILY: ETHNIC AND ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 103 rules are linked with high positive parental affect and low levels of parental control (McDowell & Parke, 2005). These studies suggest that various aspects of emotional development—encoding, decoding, cognitive understanding, and emotional regulation—play a role in accounting for variations in peer competence and serve as mediators between the parents and peers. At the same time, the contribution of genetics to individual differences in emotionality and emotional regulation probably plays a role in the emergence of these emotional processes (Eisenberg, 2000; Kochanska, 1993). Cognitive Representational Models: A Second Mediating Mechanism. How do children transfer the strategies they acquire in the family to their peer relationships? Several theories assume that individuals possess internal mental representations that guide their social behavior. Attachment theorists offer working models (Bretherton & Munholland, 1999), while social and cognitive psychologists suggest that scripts or cognitive maps serve as guides for social action (Grusec & Ungerer, 2003). Attachment researchers have found support for Bowlby’s argument that representations vary as a function of child-parent attachment history (Bretherton & Munholland, 1999). Children who had been securely attached infants were more likely to represent their family in their drawings in a coherent manner, with a balance between individuality and connection, than were insecurely attached children (Carlson, Sroufe, & Egeland, 2004). Research in a social interactional tradition reveals links between parent and child cognitive representations of social relationships. McDowell, Parke, and Spitzer (2002) found that the cognitive representations of social behavior of both fathers and mothers were related to their children’s representations. Moreover, fathers’ but not mothers’ cognitive models of relationships were linked to children’s social competence. Fathers’ strategies that were related high on confrontation and instrumental qualities were associated with low teacher ratings of children’s social competence. Fathers with relational-prosocial goals have children who are rated as more competent by teachers and peers. These studies suggest that cognitive models of relationships may be transmitted across generations and these models, in turn, may serve as mediators between family contexts and children’s relationships with others outside of the family. Finally, this work implies that both children and parents actively construct their own dyadic relationships and other social relationships and both are influenced in their behavior with each other by these cognitive constructions. Coordination and coregulation rather than simply a bidirectional pattern of influence probably increasingly characterizes the parent-child relationship in middle childhood and adolescence (Kuczynski, 2003). Attention Regulation: A Third Mediating Mechanism. Attentional regulatory processes have come to be viewed as another mechanism through which familial socialization experiences influence children’s social competence. These processes include the ability to attend to relevant cues, to sustain attention, to refocus attention through such processes as cognitive distraction and cognitive restructuring. Evidence suggests that attentional regulation may have direct effects on children’s social functioning (Eisenberg, 2000) and, in some circumstances, attentional control may function in interaction with dimensions of emotionality and social information processing. Other work (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1992) suggests that attentional control and emotional negativity may interact when predicting social competence. Attention regulatory skills 104 PARENTAL AND PEER RELATIONS appear to be more critical among children who experience higher levels of emotional negativity (Eisenberg, 2000). The role of attention in a laboratory task as a mediator between parenting and peer outcomes was examined in the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD) Study of Child Care and Youth Development (NICHD Child Care Research Network, 2003b). Children who had fewer errors of omission in a lab task of attention had greater ability to sustain attention; children with errors of commission were more impulsive. Sustained attention and less impulsivity were associated with higher social competence scores while impulsivity served as a mediator between family- and social-outcome measures. In a follow-up (NICHD Early Child Care Research Network, 2008), attention regulation mediated between mother and father sensitivity measures and children’s peer competence in first and third grade. Together these studies provide evidence for the role of attention as a mediator of the links between family and peer systems. Parental Instruction, Advice Giving, Consultation, and Monitoring Learning about relationships through interaction with parents can be viewed as an indirect pathway because the goal is often not explicitly to influence children’s social relationships with extrafamilial partners such as peers. In contrast, parents may influence children’s relationships directly in their role as a direct instructor, educator, or advisor. In research with preschool (Russell & Finnie, 1990) and elementary school age children (Mize & Pettit, 1997) the quality of parental advice was positively related to children’s peer competence. As children grow, caregiver forms of management shift from direct involvement or supervision of the ongoing activities of children and their peers to consultation, a less public form of management, involving advice or consultation concerning appropriate ways of handling peer problems (Ladd & Pettit, 2002). Parents use verbal guidance (e.g., discussion about future consequences, talk of values, and offering their advice) more often than direct interventions (e.g., limiting the adolescent’s activities with peers or inviting friends over to the house to shape peer influence; Mounts, 2000). These indirect forms of supervision that emerge as the child reaches adolescence are linked with positive outcomes. Another way in which parents can affect their children’s social relationships is through monitoring of their children’s social activities. This form of management is particularly evident as children move into adolescence and is associated with the relative shift in importance of family and peers as sources of social influence. Moreover, direct monitoring is more common among younger children, whereas distal monitoring is more evident among adolescents. Monitoring refers to a range of activities, including the supervision of children’s choice of social settings, activities, and friends. Parents of delinquent and antisocial children engage in less monitoring and supervision of their children’s activities than parents of nondelinquent children (G. R. Patterson & Stouthamer-Loeber, 1984; Xiaoming, Stanton, & Feigelman, 2000). Although monitoring has been viewed as a parent to child effect, Kerr and Stattin (2000) have reconceptualized this issue and argued that monitoring is a process that is jointly co-constructed by the parent and child. Monitoring may be a function of the extent to which children share information about their activities and companion choices with their parents. Given this reconceptualization, prior research could be reinterpreted to suggest that children with poorer social adjustment discussed their activities with parents less than did well-adjusted children. Parental attempts to learn more about their SOCIALIZATION IN THE FAMILY: ETHNIC AND ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 105 children’s activities must be met with the child’s own willingness to discuss such information (Mounts, 2000). Parents as Managers of Children’s Opportunities Parents influence their children’s social relationships not only through their direct interactions with their children but also as managers of their children’s social lives (Furstenberg et al., 1999; Parke et al., 2003). This parental role is of theoretical importance given the recent claims that parents’ impact on children’s development is limited and peer group-level processes account for major socialization outcomes (Harris, 1998). In contrast, we conceptualize the parental management of access to peers as a further pathway through which parents influence their children’s development. Parents make choices about neighborhoods and schools as well as the formal and informal activities in which their children can participate. In these ways, “parents act as designers when they seek to control or influence the settings in which children are likely to meet and interact with peers” (Ladd & Pettit, 2002, p. 286). These design decisions can influence children’s social and academic outcomes. Instead of viewing parents as acting alone in their designer roles, we view parents and children as co-designers. Many decisions—even in the designer domain—are influenced by children’s and parents’ needs, wishes, and decisions. Neighborhoods as Determinants of Peer Contact. Although it is assumed that parents choose their neighborhoods, many constraints limit the range of locations from which to choose, especially economic (i.e., cost) and geographic (i.e., distance from work or transportation). Choice of neighborhood is not equally available to parents; lower-SES and minority group parents have a more restricted set of options than higher-SES and nonminority parents. However, there is considerable variability in “neighborhood effects” on children because of the ways in which parents manage their children’s access to aspects of their neighborhood setting. A second conceptual assumption about neighborhoods concerns children’s role in neighborhood selection. Although children—especially young children—are not usually direct participants in the choice of neighborhoods, parents generally consider children’s needs (safety, access to other children) in their choice of neighborhood. Adolescents may be more active participants by articulating their concerns about moving to a new neighborhood that, for example, involves loss of community-based friendships and shifts in school district. What is the impact of neighborhood variations on peer competence? Youngsters in areas with high levels of poverty differed from those in low-poverty areas on several outcomes, including reading scores, birth weight, infant death, and juvenile delinquency (Coulton & Pandey, 1992). A related Australian study (Homel & Burns, 1989) found that children in the most disadvantaged neighborhoods, reported higher loneliness, feelings of rejection by peers, worry, and lower life satisfaction compared to children in less disadvantaged neighborhoods. The effects of neighborhoods on children’s outcomes are often mediated by parenting practices such as supervision and monitoring. When mothers and fathers perceived their neighborhoods as dangerous and low in social control, they placed more restrictions on their fourth grade children’s activities, which was related to higher peer competence for their children (O’Neil, Parke, & McDowell, 2001). Parents and Children as Partners in Schooling. Parents choose not only neighborhoods but also the type and quality of day care and elementary schools that their children 106 PARENTAL AND PEER RELATIONS will attend. The quality and amount of time in child care are linked to children’s cognitive and social development (Clarke-Stewart & Allhusen, 2005). Social behavior, despite the opportunity to have increased peer contact, is not consistently linked with day-care quality: Some evidence suggests that children who are in day care for more than 40 hours per week may show some increases in aggression (NICHD Early Childcare Research Network, 2003a). As children develop, parents especially middle-class parents who have options, select neighborhoods as a function of quality of the schools that are available (Furstenberg et al., 1999). Moreover, the ability to choose is not inconsequential because exercising the ability to choose a school has been linked to adolescent academic outcome (Furstenberg et al., 1999). The extent of parental involvement in school-related activities (e.g., parent-teacher associations or school conferences) is positively related to children’s academic outcomes. Practices of partnerships between parents and schools decline across development; in recognition of adolescents’ need for autonomy and independence, parental involvement decreases in high school, but young adolescents still want their families to support their learning and activities at home (Epstein & Sanders, 2002). These developmental changes suggest that the child is active in shaping the form that the parent-school partnership will assume at different points in the child’s educational career. Parents and children are frequently active in religious organizations. Parental facilitation of children’s involvement in religious institutions is another important way in which parents manage their children’s lives. It is important to distinguish between the issue of involvement in religious institutions and religious beliefs because these two aspects of religion may have partially independent effects on family functioning and child outcomes (see Mahoney, Pargament, Tarakeshwar, & Swank, 2001, for a review). When both parents attended church on a regular basis, children were more likely to be involved in religious organizations (Elder & Conger, 2000). Involvement in church activities was associated with higher endorsement of school, good grades, and—especially for boys—community activities. Religiously involved youth perceived their friends as less involved in deviance and less likely to encourage deviant activities. Both parents and children are active players in the process of involvement in religious activities. Although parents—through their own involvement and through their introduction of the child to religious beliefs and functions—play an important initial role, children, and especially adolescents, themselves are central agents in choosing to continue their regular participation in religious institutions. These findings are most easily understood through the lens of the bilateral model that guides our chapter. Finally, parental religiousness (frequency of church attendance and importance of religion) was associated with better child adjustment as well (Brody, Stoneman, & Flor, 1996). The relative importance of beliefs or involvement in organized religious activities in accounting for these effects remains unclear. Interdependence among Components of the Tripartite Socialization Model. Although we have treated parental style and/or parent-child interaction, advice giving, and parental management as separate influences, these components often operate together during children’s socialization. Similarly, Grusec and Goodnow (1994) suggested that parental strategies vary in their effectiveness as a function of the quality of the parent-child relationship. These three components can be usefully viewed as a cafeteria model (Parke et al., 1994). Two issues need to be addressed. First, are there natural occurring combinations of these components? Second, do the different components SOCIALIZATION IN THE FAMILY: ETHNIC AND ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 107 moderate the relative effectiveness of each component depending on the level of the other components? Mounts (2002) examined the co-occurrence of different types of parenting management practices—prohibiting, guiding, monitoring, supporting—with various parenting styles (authoritarian, authoritative, permissive, and uninvolved). She found that all parents, regardless of their parenting style, use prohibiting and guiding as management strategies. In contrast, monitoring and supporting are more common in authoritative style homes relative to the other parenting style environments. When mothers were low in parental responsiveness (parental style), higher levels of constructive coaching (parental practices) aimed at improving peer relationships were linked to lower levels of aggression than when mothers had low levels of responsiveness and low levels of constructive coaching (Mize & Pettit, 1997). In contrast, when mothers had moderate or high levels of responsiveness, their level of coaching was unrelated to the level of children’s aggression. In this case, coaching compensated for a less adequate parenting style. These studies illustrate the interdependence among the components of our tripartite model and the importance of moderating effects among the components. Co-Parenting as a Socialization Strategy Co-parenting recognizes that mothers and fathers operate as a parenting team and as individual parents (J. P. McHale & Rasmussen, 1998). Co-parenting alliances include “a pattern signifying antagonistic and adult centered or hostile competitive, a pattern marked by significant imbalance or parenting discrepancy in levels of parental engagement with the child and a pattern reflecting cooperation, warmth, cohesion, and child centeredness or high family harmony” (J. P. McHale, Lauretti, Talbot, & Pouquette, 2002, p. 142). These patterns have been observed with infants, preschoolers, and school-age children, and in European and African American families (Brody, Flor, & Neubaum, 1998; Fivaz-Depeursinge & Corboz-Warnery, 1999). J. P. McHale and Rasmussen (1998) found that hostile-competitive co-parenting during infancy was related to aggression, whereas large parenting discrepancies were related to parent-rated anxiety. Others have found links between problematic family alliances in the first year and insecure mother-child attachments and clinical symptomatology in the preschool years (Fivaz-Depeursinge & Corboz-Warnery, 1999; J. P. McHale et al., 2002). Finally, coparenting accounts for unique variance in child measures and clearly needs to be distinguished from traditional parent-child and marital level processes. BEYOND THE PARENT-CHILD DYAD: THE MARITAL SUBSYSTEM AS A CONTRIBUTOR TO CHILDREN’S SOCIALIZATION Children’s experiences in families extend beyond their interactions with parents and their understanding of relationships is shaped through their active participation in other family subsystems (e.g., child-sibling) and through exposure to the interactions of other dyadic subsystems (e.g., parent-parent) or participation in triadic relationships (e.g., child-sibling-parent, child-parent-parent). Influence of Marital Satisfaction and Discord on Child Outcomes Marital functioning is related to children’s short-term coping and long-term adjustment. Exposure of children to marital discord and conflict is related to poorer quality of interpersonal relationships with siblings and peers and more internalizing and externalizing behavior problems (Cummings & Davies, 1994; Grych & Fincham, 2001). 108 PARENTAL AND PEER RELATIONS Two alternative, but not mutually exclusive, models have been proposed to account for the impact of marital relations on children’s developmental outcomes. Until recently, theoretical frameworks typically conceptualized marital discord as an indirect influence on children’s adjustment that operated through its effect on the quality of parenting (Fauber & Long, 1991). Factors such as affective changes in the quality of the parent-child relationship, lack of emotional availability, and adoption of less optimal parenting styles have been implicated as potential mechanisms through which marital discord disrupts parenting processes In their meta-analytic review, Erel and Burman (1995) found a positive relation between the quality of the marital relationship and the quality of the parent-child relationship. Theoretically, two models have been offered to account for these effects—the spillover hypothesis and the compensatory hypothesis. According to the spillover hypothesis, mood or behavior in one subsystem transfers to another subsystem (e.g., from marital subsystem to parent-child subsystem). In contrast, the compensatory hypothesis suggests that positive parent-child relationships can be maintained even in the face of martial conflict and can serve as a buffer on children. The meta-analysis clearly supported the spillover hypothesis and underscores the difficulty of buffering children from marital conflict. Although much of the prior work has focused on the transfer of negativity between marital and parentchild subsystems, some evidence suggests that marital satisfaction is a predictor of positive parenting (Russell, 1997). A second model (Cummings & Davies, 1994; Grych & Fincham, 2001) focuses on the direct effects of witnessed marital conflict on children’s outcomes. Recent lab analog studies show that the form of expression of marital conflict plays a role in how children react. More frequent interparental conflict and more intense or violent forms of conflict have been found to be particularly disturbing to children and likely to be associated with externalizing and internalizing difficulties (Cummings, Goeke-Morey, & Raymond, 2004). Conflict that was child-related in content was more likely than conflict involving other content to be associated with behavior problems in children (Grych & Cardoza-Fernandez, 2001). Resolution of conflict, even when it was not viewed by the child, reduces children’s negative reactions to exposure to interadult anger and conflict. Exposure to unresolved conflict is associated with negative affect and poor coping responses in children (Kerig, 1996). Conflict is inevitable in most parental relationships and is not always detrimental to family relationships and children’s functioning. When conflict is expressed constructively, is moderate in degree, is expressed in the context of a warm and supportive family environment, and shows evidence of resolution, children may learn valuable lessons regarding how to negotiate conflict and resolve disagreements (Cummings & Davies, 1994). Siblings and Children’s Socialization Sibling relationships have been hypothesized to contribute to children’s socialization in a number of significant ways. A social-learning framework analogous to the one posited to explain parental contributions to the development of children’s social competence (Parke & O’Neil, 1999) predicts that through their interactions with siblings children develop specific interaction patterns and social-understanding skills that generalize to relationships with other children. Relationships with siblings also may provide a context in which children can practice the skills and interaction styles that have been learned from parents or others. Older siblings function as tutors, managers, SOCIALIZATION IN THE FAMILY: ETHNIC AND ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 109 or supervisors of their younger brother’s or sister’s behavior during social interactions (Edwards & Whiting, 1993) and may function as gatekeepers who extend or limit opportunities to interact with other children outside of the family (Zukow-Goldring, 2002). Also paralleling the indirect influence that the observation of parent-parent interaction has on children, a second avenue of influence on children’s development is their observation of parents interacting with siblings (Dunn, 1993). These interactions have been hypothesized to serve as an important context in which children deal with issues of differential treatment and learn about complex social emotions such as rivalry and jealousy. Children’s experiences with siblings provide a context in which interaction patterns and social skills and understanding may generalize to relationships with other children but evidence of straightforward “carryover” of interaction styles between children’s relationships is limited. When associations emerge, they may be complicated by birthorder effects and other processes (Dunn, 1993, 2004). Moreover, sibling relationships may play a role in compensating for other problematic relationships by providing an alternative context for experiencing satisfying social relationships and protecting children from adjustment difficulties. East and Rook (1992) found that children who were socially isolated in their peer relationships were buffered from adjustment problems when they reported positive relationships with a favorite sibling. Similarly, Stocker (1994) reported support for the compensatory role of at least one positive relationship (sibling, friend, or mother) as protection from the development of behavioral conduct difficulties. In view of our focus on bidirectionality of influence, it is important to consider the impact of friendships on sibling relationships. Kramer and Gottman (1992) examined the role that positive relationships with peers play in children’s adaptation to the birth of a new sibling. Children who displayed a more positive interaction style with a best friend and who were better able to manage conflict and negative affect, behaved more positively toward their new sibling at 6 and 14 months. Management of conflict, a valuable skill when interacting with siblings, may be more likely to be learned in interactions with peers than in direct interactions with parents. Kramer (2004) developed a social skills training program aimed at improving children’s relationships with their siblings. In comparison to a control group of 4- to 6-year-olds, children with a younger sibling who received social skills training showed more positive and less negative sibling relationships. The challenge is to discover the contexts under which strong, weak, or compensatory connections may be expected between relationship systems and the processes through which children’s experiences with siblings are translated into skills that are used in other relationships. There is a need to examine the moderating and mediating influences of these factors to uncover normative patterns of associations between siblings and peer relationships. Family Unit as a Contributor to Children’s Socialization Consistent with our systems theory perspective (Sameroff, 1994), the properties, functions, and effects of the family unit cannot necessarily be inferred from these smaller units of analysis such as the parent-child, marital or sibling-sibling dyads. Families as units change across development in response to changes in the individual members, life circumstances, and scheduled and unscheduled transitions. Families develop distinct “climates” (Moos & Moos, 1981), “styles” of responding to events (Reiss, 1989) and distinct “boundaries” (Boss, 1999), which provide differing socialization contexts 110 PARENTAL AND PEER RELATIONS for the developing child. Several investigators (Fiese, 2006; Reiss, 1989) have argued that the family regulates the child’s development through a range of processes, including myths, stories, and rituals. Family myths refer to beliefs that influence family process, provide continuity across generations, and are generally not open to discussion or debate (Sameroff, 1994). Family-of-origin experiences may be transmitted across generations through stories and shared memories and shape contemporary interactions among family members (Fiese, 2006) as well as children’s social competence (Putallaz, Costanzo, & Smith, 1991). Rituals and routines are associated with better child health and better behavioral regulation in intact families (Fiese, 2006). PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER: TOWARD A MULTIPLE SOURCES MODEL OF SOCIALIZATION Our family systems’ viewpoint argues for the construction of a comprehensive model in which the contribution of parent-child, parent-parent, and sibling relationships are all recognized. Figure 4.3 outlines a comprehensive model of family socialization that includes the influence of all family members. Few studies have simultaneously addressed how these subsystems combine to produce their impact on children’s relationship learning. Little is known about the relative weighting of parent-child relationships versus other family relationships (Parke & O’Neil, 1999). Nor do we understand how the impact of these different relationships changes as the child develops. The most crucial issue remains the specification of the pathways through which these different relationships exert their influence. In our model, multiple pathways are possible and there is support for both direct and mediated effects. As noted earlier, marital relationships exert both direct (e.g., witnessed effects) and indirect effects (e.g., marital relationships influence parent-child patterns). Similarly, parent-child relationships could influ- Parent–child subsystem • Interaction • Direct instruction • Provision of opportunities Co-parent subsystem Marital/ parent–parent subsystem Children’s socialization outcomes Sibling–child and Sibling–parent subsystems Family unit system FIGURE 4.3 Model Indicating the Hypothesized Relations among Family Subsystems and Children’s Socialization Outcomes. SOCIALIZATION IN THE FAMILY: ETHNIC AND ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 111 ence marital but less is known about the impact of parent-child relationships on marital interactions than the reverse. Do all combinations produce equally socially competent children, or are some ingredients in this mix more important than others? Do different combinations produce children who are different, but equally well-adjusted in their social relationships? Can children in a family with a poor marriage compensate by investing “relationship energy” into another subsystem such as the sibling-sibling or parent-child system? Studies of divorce suggest that a close sibling-sibling relationship can help buffer children during a stressful divorce (Hetherington & Kelly, 2001). Determinants of Family Socialization Strategies A major advance in the field has been recognition of the importance of understanding the determinants of parenting behavior. Belsky (1984) proposed a three-domain model of the determinants of parenting, which included the characteristics of the child, the personal resources of the parents, and the contextual sources of stress and support. CHILD CHARACTERISTICS Child characteristics take two forms: (1) universal predispositions that are shared by all children and (2) individual differences in particular characteristics. Consistent with an evolutionary approach (Geary & Bjorklund, 2000), infants are biologically prepared for social, cognitive, and perceptual challenges and these prepared responses play a significant role in facilitating children’s adaptation to their environment. Under the influence of behavior genetics (Plomin, 1994), there is a recognition of the role of individual differences in a wide variety of behavioral characteristics in shaping parental socialization strategies. The most well-researched determinant of parenting behavior is child temperament. Infants with difficult temperaments elicit more arousal and distress from caregivers than less-difficult infants (Putnam, Sanson, & Rothbart, 2002). Children who are more difficult may elicit increasingly coercive strategies from parents (Reid et al., 2002). Alternatively, fearful children may respond optimally to subtle parental socialization strategies (Kochanska, 1997). Other characteristics have been examined, including activity level, social responsiveness, and compliance level. In general, more active, less responsive, and more noncompliant children elicit more negative parenting and more negative parental arousal and affect (Crouter & Booth, 2003). The impact of these individual differences on parental socialization behavior depends on environmental conditions. Crockenberg and Leerkes (2003) showed that the impact of a difficult infant temperament on the parent-infant attachment relationship varied with the degree of social support available to the mother, which underscores the modifiability of temperament-based influences. PERSONAL RESOURCES Personal resources—conceptualized as knowledge, ability, and motivation to be a responsible caregiver—alter parenting behaviors (Belsky, 1984). Parental psychopathology, such as depression, will alter parenting behavior from infancy onward (Goodman & Gotlib, 2002). Patterns of interaction between depressed and nondepressed parents (usually mothers) and their offspring are less positive, less stimulating, and less contingent 112 PARENTAL AND PEER RELATIONS and infants show less attentiveness, more fussiness, and lower activity levels (Field, 1992) especially when depression is protracted and not merely transient (Campbell, Cohn, & Meyers, 1995). Infants and preschoolers of depressed mothers are more likely to develop insecure attachments, including disorganized attachment behavior (LyonsRuth, Lyubchik, Wolfe, & Bronfman, 2002). Other personal problems (e.g., antisocial personality disorder or schizophrenia, limited education, poverty) contribute to poorer parenting (Cummings et al., 2004). However, positive personal characteristics (e.g., high intelligence and self-regulation) and a transpersonal orientation (i.e., a focus on family, work, and child rearing) are linked to better quality parenting (Pulkkinen, Nurmi, & Kokko, 2002). Some have argued that some of these individual differences across parents, such as depression and proneness to abuse or coerciveness, may, in part, be genetically based (Caspi et al., 2002). SOCIALIZATION AND SOCIAL CAPITAL The concept of social capital considers the relations among people, institutions, and organizations of the community outside the immediate family structure. Social capital is both the flow of information and the sharing of norms and values that serve to facilitate or constrain the actions of people who interact in the community’s social structures (e.g., schools, places of worship). Children benefit from the presence of norm and value consensus among members of their family and the wider community (Coleman, 1988). Monitoring of children is facilitated, as is their socialization, through multiple efforts of network members who hold shared family-community norms and values (Elder & Conger, 2000). Moreover, if a child’s own family is negligent in fulfilling the socialization role, other adults are available to assume the responsibility. Community networking has implications for youth development. Adolescent boys have better school performance and attendance and more positive social behavior when their social networks include large numbers of nonrelated adults (Cochran & Bo, 1989). When parents as well as nonrelated adults (adolescent’s friends’ parents) were perceived as authoritative in their parenting style, adolescents were lower in delinquency and substance abuse (Fletcher, Darling, Steinberg, & Dornbusch, 1995). When both parents and their children are acquainted with other parents and their children, they form network closure that involves more shared values and more social control over their offspring that is related to better social outcomes (Darling, Steinberg, Gringlas, & Dornbusch, 1995). In sum, the social capital can aid parents’ socialization of their children through several pathways. First, when parents and children have community ties, more social support is available. Second, parental awareness of community services and their participation in shaping community institutions promote the maintenance of values and norms that influence their children. Third, parental participation with their children enables closer child supervision and reduces children’s time with peers. Parenting is a community enterprise and both children and adults are active players in the distribution of social capital. SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS There is a long history of research concerning the links between socioeconomic status (SES) and parenting. Although the debate concerning the best strategy for measuring SES continues (Bornstein & Bradley, 2003), most scholars agree that SES is multiply SOCIALIZATION IN THE FAMILY: ETHNIC AND ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 113 determined, and therefore the links with parenting are likely to be multiple as well. In contrast to traditional assumptions that SES is a static state, most argue that SES is a dynamic concept (Hoff et al., 2002). Over the course of childhood and adolescence, families change social class and change is greatest in the youngest ages. Over 50% of American children change social class prior to entering school (Featherman, Spenner, & Tsunematsu, 1988). There are SES differences in parental socialization practices and beliefs; lower-SES parents are more authoritarian and more punitive than higher-SES families (Hoff et al., 2002). Additionally, there are more SES differences on language measures than on nonverbal measures with higher-SES mothers being more verbal than lower-SES mothers (Hoff et al., 2002). Some SES differences are independent of race and income. In China, where there are relatively small differences in income across groups who vary in terms of education, Tardif (1993) found that less-educated parents used more imperatives with their toddlers than better-educated mothers. Similarly, Hess and Shipman (1965) in their studies of cognitive socialization found clear SES differences in African American lower-class and middle-class families. Social Change and Family Socialization Families are continuously confronted by challenges, changes, and opportunities. A number of societywide changes have produced shifts in family relationships. Fertility rates and family size have decreased, the percentage of women in the workforce has increased, the timing of onset of parenthood has shifted, divorce rates and the number of single-parent families have increased. These social trends provide an opportunity to explore how families change in response to these shifting circumstances and represent natural experiments in family adaptation. Moreover, they challenge our traditional assumption that families can be studied at a single point in time because the historical contexts are constantly shifting. Our task is to establish how socialization processes operate similarly or differently under varying historical circumstances. In this section, the effects of recent shifts in family employment and unemployment patterns is explored to illustrate the impact of social change on family relationships (for reviews of timing of parenthood, see Moore & Brooks-Gunn, 2002; of divorce, see ClarkeStewart & Brentano, 2006). Some of these changes are scheduled or planned, such as reentry into the workforce or delaying the onset of parenthood; other changes, such as job loss or divorce, are unscheduled or nonnormative transitions. According to a lifecourse view, both scheduled and unscheduled transitions need to be examined to fully appreciate how these different types of change alter family socialization strategies (Elder, 1998). These family transitions are adult-focused in contrast to child-focused transitions (e.g., entry to day care or junior high school) and underscore our assumption that adult developmental issues need to be directly addressed to understand how these transitions alter parental socialization beliefs and behaviors. At the same time, child developmental status plays a major role in determining how adults respond to these transitions. It is insufficient to focus on individual levels of analysis—either adult or child since individual, dyadic, triadic, and family units each follow their own developmental trajectory and the interplay among these separate developmental trajectories can produce a diverse set of effects on children. The role of these units (i.e., individual, dyad, or family) in modifying the impact of family transitions will vary as a result of these interlocking developmental curves. Both the timing and nature of family transitions and reactions to these alterations will be determined by the points at which 114 PARENTAL AND PEER RELATIONS particular individuals, dyads, triads, or families fall along their respective developmental life-course trajectories. Moreover, individual families can vary widely in the particular configuration of life-course trajectories. The particular configurations of these multiple sets of developmental trajectories needs to be considered to understand the impact of societal change on families. WOMEN’S AND MEN’S EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS AND FAMILY SOCIALIZATION Since the 1960s, there has been a dramatic shift in the participation rate of women in the labor force, especially married women with children. In the United States in 1998, over 75% of married women with school-age children and over 63% of mothers with children under age 6 were in the paid workforce (U.S. Census Bureau, 1998). In 1960, fewer than 19% of mothers with children were employed. How does maternal employment alter mother-child involvement? There is little difference in the amount of time that mothers spend with their children or in the types of activities engaged in dual or father-only employed families (Gottfried et al., 2002). Between 1981 and 1997, there was little change in mother’s time with children even though there were dramatic increases in maternal employment (Bianchi, 2000). Not surprisingly, there are few negative outcomes of maternal employment on children across age (infancy to age 17), developmental domain, and gender, in part, because “there has been reallocation of mothers’ time and priorities, delegation of family work to others, increased preschool enrollment of children of employed and nonemployed mothers, and redefinition of parenting roles” (Gottfried et al., 2002, p. 214). Maternal employment is associated with more egalitarian views of sex roles by their children and higher educational and occupational goals in children (Hoffman & Youngblade, 1999) and duration of employment among African American mothers is associated with longer school attendance in their daughters (Wolfer & Moen, 1996). However, the effects of maternal employment can be evaluated only in relation to other factors, such as the reason why the mother is working, the mother’s satisfaction with her role, the demands placed on other family members, the attitudes of the other family members toward the mother’s employment, and the quality of substitute care and supervision provided for the children. QUALITY OF MOTHER’S AND FATHER’S WORK AND FAMILY SOCIALIZATION In addition to examining whether one or both parents are employed, researchers have addressed the impact of the quality of work on parenting behavior. This shift in focus is due to the fact that many workers experienced an increase in work hours, a decrease in job stability, a rise in temporary jobs, and, especially among low-wage workers, a decrease in income (Mishel, Bernstein, & Schmitt, 1999). There are two types of linkage between family and work (Crouter, 1994). One type focuses on work as an “emotional climate,” which may have short-term carryover effects to the enactment of roles at home. A second type focuses on the kinds of skills, attitudes, and perspectives that adults acquire in their work settings and how these variations in job experience alter their behavior in family contexts. In the first tradition, Repetti (1994) studied the impact of working in a high-stress job (air-traffic controller) on subsequent family interaction patterns. Male air traffic controllers were behaviorally and emotionally withdrawn dur- SOCIALIZATION IN THE FAMILY: ETHNIC AND ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 115 ing interactions with their children after high-stress shifts. Distressing social experiences at work were associated with higher expressions of anger and greater use of discipline during interaction with the child later in the day. Similarly, Crouter, Bumpus, Maguire, and McHale (1999) found that parents who reported high work pressure and role overload had more conflicts with their adolescents. Research in the second tradition has focused on the outcomes of job characteristics for children’s development. Children had fewer behavior problems when their mother’s work involved more autonomy working with people and more problem-solving opportunities (Cooksey, Menaghan, & Jekielek, 1997). Similarly, fathers with greater job complexity and autonomy were less authoritarian (Grimm-Thomas & Perry-Jenkins, 1994). The process operates in both directions: The home experience of parents affects their job performance as well. Arguments at home with a wife or with a child were negatively related to work performance (Frone, Yardley, & Markel, 1997). It is important to move beyond employment status per se to a detailed exploration of the nature of work in studies of family work linkages. Single versus Multiple Transitions To date, societal changes, such as shifts in the timing of parenting, work participation, or divorce, have been treated relatively independently, but these events co-occur rather than operate in any singular fashion. As work on the impact of multiple transitions, such as the onset of puberty and entry into junior high school, on children’s adjustment has found, co-occurrence of several changes can have a cumulative impact on the adolescent’s adaptation (Simmons & Blyth, 1987). Similarly, as the number of environmental risk variables increases, the level of family functioning and child outcomes decrease (Sameroff, 1994). We would expect that the co-occurrence of the arrival of a new infant accompanied by job loss would have different effects than either of these events occurring singly. Moreover, the impact of any historical change may be different as a result of its occurrence in the same period as another change or changes. For example, women’s increased presence in the workplace and delay in the onset of parenthood covary, and probably each event has different meaning without the other change. Multivariate designs are needed to capture the simultaneous impact of multiple events on family socialization strategies. Children and Families of Color in the United States: Issues of Race, Ethnicity, and Culture The term ethnic minority does not accurately capture the most salient aspects in the lives of non-Whites, which distinguish them from the White population—skin color and physical appearance. Therefore, the term people of color has gained greater acceptance as the preferred designation for groups typically considered ethnic minorities— American Indians, African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans. Nationally, people of color comprise approximately 35% of the U.S. population, and by the year 2020, about 40% of all children will be African American or Latino. Ethnicity refers to an individual’s membership in a group sharing a common ancestral heritage based on nationality, language, and culture. Ethnic identity or the psychological attachment to the group is also a dimension of ethnicity (Phinney, 2003). Culture is a multidimensional construct referring to the shared values, behaviors, and beliefs of a people that 116 PARENTAL AND PEER RELATIONS are transmitted from one generation to the next. Unlike ethnicity and race, which are usually self- and other-ascribed attributes, respectively, culture is learned behavior and can vary both across and within ethnic and racial groups. It is invalid to equate ethnicity and race with culture. The terminology regarding race, ethnicity, and culture is changing as a result of demographic shifts and more informed awareness of how these factors contribute to development. However, to maintain consistency between past and present group designations, the terms minority group, ethnic minority, and people of color will be used interchangeably. CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES FOR STUDYING CHILDREN AND FAMILIES OF COLOR Cross-cultural and intracultural theories have emphasized the importance of socialization goals, values, and beliefs as organizing principles for understanding cultural variations (Harkness & Super, 1995). In contrast to older cultural deficit models of socialization, recent models emphasize how ecological demands shape socialization goals, values, and practices, and are viewed as adaptive strategies to meet the demands of the ecological settings. Ecological and family systems perspectives have been useful in explaining how socialization goals for children derive from their parents’ experiences with adaptive strategies that have helped them meet the challenges faced as people of color (Harrison, Wilson, Pine, Chan, & Buriel, 1990). Earlier cultural deficit perspectives were reinforced by the popularity of two-group studies that compared European Americans with ethnic/racial minorities and assumed that differences between the groups were cultural in nature. Ethnicity and race were equated with culture as if all members of an ethnic/racial group were equally involved with the culture of their group. It was assumed that people of color needed to assimilate or become like European Americans to correct deficiencies in their development (Ramirez & Castaneda, 1974). More recently, the focus on families of color has shifted away from majority-minority comparisons toward withingroup studies (Garcia Coll & Magnuson, 1999; Parke, 2004b) which tell us how within-group variations account for differences in outcomes among children of the same ethnic/racial group. The complexity of diversity means that some children of color belong to two or more ethnic/racial groups or claim an identity that is not consistent with our ethnic/racial categorization system based primarily on color. Thus, some Afro-Latinos from Puerto Rico or the Dominican Republic may self-identify as Latinos, whereas they are identified as African Americans on the basis their skin color. Researchers need to allow children and families of color to self-identify rather than to assume membership in a racial/ethnic group on the basis of phenotype or surname. One of the problems in cross-cultural or intracultural research about different ethnic groups is the issue of the equivalence of measures across groups. Because most standard measures of family functioning are developed and standardized in White middleclass populations, efforts have been made to develop culturally and linguistically equivalent measures. Focus groups consisting of members of the ethnic/racial group of interest to generate items and issues that are culturally relevant are common (DeMent, Buriel, & Villanueva, 2005; Vazquez-Garcia, Garcia Coll, Erkut, Alarcon, & Tropp, 1995). Another innovation is the use of translation and back translation to ensure that the meaning is retained in the translation process. SOCIALIZATION IN THE FAMILY: ETHNIC AND ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 117 Socialization of Children of Color As with most children, the socialization of children of color usually takes place in a family setting that includes adult caregivers who are usually biological parents but may include grandparents, relatives, godparents, and other nonbiologically related adults. An important goal of socialization in ethnic minority families is teaching children how to interact effectively in dual cultural contexts: the context of their ethnic/racial group and the context of the larger European American society. Harrison et al. (1990) have adopted an ecological orientation that views the socialization of ethnic/racial minority children by the interconnectedness between the status of ethnic/racial minority families, adaptive strategies, socialization goals, and child outcomes. Family status involves socioeconomic resources such as housing, employment, health care, and education. Despite considerable within-group diversity in SES, a growing number of ethnic minority children live in poverty (National Center for Children in Poverty, 2000). Adaptive strategies are the cultural patterns that promote the well-being of group members. Some are adaptations of the original ethnic/racial culture to life circumstances in the United States while other patterns arise as a result of coping with the conflicting demands of being an ethnic/racial minority in a predominately European American society. Thus, biculturalism (the simultaneous adoption of two cultural orientations), which arose in response to conflicting cultural demands, is now part of the ethnic minority/racial culture. Other adaptive strategies include role flexibilities and ancestral worldviews. Emerging out of the adults’ adaptive strategies are socialization goals for children to help them meet the ecological challenges they face as ethnic/racial minorities. Ethnic/racial pride and interdependence are two goals that enable ethnic/racial minority children to function competently as members of both minority and majority cultures (Harrison et al., 1990). Families of Color Between 1990 and 2000, all groups of people of color increased in size, whereas the number of Whites decreased from 80% to 75% of the U.S. population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000); Latinos now are the largest minority group in the United States. Whites have a higher median age and a smaller percentage of children under the age of 18 (37.7 years and 23.5%, respectively) than all groups of people of color: African Americans (30.2 years and 31.4%, respectively); American Indians (28 years and 33.9%, respectively); Asian Americans (32.7 years and 24%, respectively); and Latinos (25.8 years and 35%, respectively; U.S. Census Bureau, 2002). In public schools, approximately 40% of students in kindergarten through 12th grade are children of color (Young, 2002). The growth of the Asian American and Latino populations was due in large measure to increases in immigration. As immigrant groups, Latinos and Asian Americans share common characteristics, including diverse subpopulations with distinct histories, nonEnglish native languages, and relatively young age. Both groups include economic immigrants who seek a better quality of life and political immigrants who seek refuge from persecution in their countries of origin. The influx of Latino and Asian immigrants into this country means that these two groups will constantly be characterized by within-group differences in generational status and degree of acculturation. The importance of generational status and acculturation to diversity in family ecologies is illustrated with the following example using Mexican Americans. 118 PARENTAL AND PEER RELATIONS Generational Differences in Family Ecologies. The first generation includes those persons born in Mexico who later immigrated to the United States. Some parents immigrate with only some of their children, leaving the other children in Mexico under the care of relatives. As the parents’ economic condition improves, children are brought to the United States. These children often experience multiple socializing influences in both Mexico and the United States which gives rise to a dual frame of reference for these parents and children (Perez, 2004; Valenzuela, 1999). Socialization goals related to the immigrant experience are self-reliance, productive use of time, biculturalism, a Mexican ethnic identity, and use of Spanish as their primary home language (Buriel, 1993a, 1993b). The second generation represents the U.S. born children of immigrant parents. Their family environments are similar to those of their first-generation peers owing to the foreign-born status of their parents. Although Spanish is usually the native language of second-generation children, English becomes their dominant language after the onset of schooling. However, Spanish continues as the primary language of parents and they stress the retention of Spanish as the home language. Socialization of first- and second-generation children is similar, particularly in areas such as respect for adults, personalismo (Valdes, 1996), and family obligation (Fuligni, Tseng, & Lam, 1999). The second generation’s exposure to European American culture impacts on their child-rearing practices as adults and the longer families live in the United States, the more socialization practices and child behavior shift in an individualistic direction (Delgado-Gaitan, 1994). Foreign-born parents prefer a Mexican identity, whereas their second-generation children prefer either a Mexican American or Chicano identity (Buriel & Cardoza, 1993). The third generation refers to persons of Mexican descent whose parents were born in the United States, including persons in the fourth and subsequent generations whose grandparents and great grandparents were born in this country. This generation is socialized in homes where all family members are U.S. citizens, where English is the primary language, where parental schooling has taken place in the United States, and where children and parents express a Mexican American ethnic identity (Buriel & Cardoza, 1993). Buriel (1993b) found that among parents of third-generation children, parental schooling was associated with a child-rearing style involving more support, control, and equality. Although family incomes are higher in the third generation, schooling outcomes are often lower than in the previous generation. Second-generation children complete more years of schooling and have higher educational aspirations than their third-generation peers (Buriel, 1987, 1994; Valenzuela, 1999). Acculturation Acculturation is the process of learning a new culture and is typically measured by increasing English proficiency, English media preferences, and European American friendships (Cuellar, Arnold, & Maldonado, 1995). The measurement of acculturation has included culturally related values, attitudes, and identity in acknowledgment of the multidimensional nature of this construct (Felix-Ortiz de la Garza, Newcomb, & Meyers, 1995). Acculturation across generations is not a uniform process. In each generation, there is diversity in individuals’ involvement with both native and European American culture. In addition, acculturation is not a unidirectional process such that movement toward European American culture is necessarily associated with a corresponding loss of the native culture. Ecological variables such as societal discrimination, educational and SOCIALIZATION IN THE FAMILY: ETHNIC AND ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 119 employment opportunities, and participation in native culture can all contribute to variations in both the rate and direction of acculturation across generations. Bicultural Adaptation Many ethnic/racial minority group members strive for a bicultural orientation that allows for selective acculturation to European American culture while simultaneously retaining aspects of the native culture. Using Mexican Americans as an example, Figure 4.4 illustrates a bidirectional model of cultural adaptation. This bidirectional model posits four acculturation adaptation styles for Mexican immigrants and their descendants, depending on their involvement with both Mexican immigrant culture and European American culture. The four acculturation styles are: (1) the bicultural orientation, (2) the Mexican orientation, (3) the marginal orientation, and (4) the European American orientation. Ramirez (1983) has defined biculturalism as the simultaneous adoption of the language, values, and social competencies of two cultures. Ethnic/racial minorities who develop bicultural competencies have better physical and psychological health than those who do not (Buriel & Saenz, 1980; LaFromboise, Coleman, & Gerton, 1993). EMIC DEVELOPMENTAL RESEARCH ISSUES Immigrants and their children face many sociocultural adaptation challenges that have implications for parenting and child development. Three experiences common to immigrant families and children include language and cultural brokering, children as family workers, and dual frames of reference. (High) EuroAmerican Mexican American Marginal Orientation Bicultural Orientation 3 Cultural Identification Euro-American (Low) 1 Cultural Identification 5 Mexican Orientation 1 (Low) FIGURE 4.4 Bicultural Model of Acculturation. 5 (High) 120 PARENTAL AND PEER RELATIONS Language and Cultural Brokers Approximately one in every five children in the United States comes from a home where at least one parent is of foreign birth (Federal Interagency Forum on Child and Family Statistics, 2002). Most of these children are the first in their families to learn English and attend U.S. schools. As a result, these children are often delegated adultlike responsibilities by their parents, such as interpreting and making decisions with English-speaking agents that affect the whole family (Chao, 2001; DeMent et al., 2005; Orellana, Dorner, & Pulido, 2003; Tse, 1996; Valdes, 2003). Children who serve as interpreters for their non-English speaking parents are referred to as “language brokers” and as the links between their parents’ culture and European American society; they are also “cultural brokers.” Child cultural brokers are unique because in addition to the stress related to their own acculturation, they experience additional stressors arising from their role as mediators between their parents and U.S. society. In public, child cultural brokers act with adult authority on behalf of their parents, but at home they are expected to behave as children and show deference and respect to parents. The stress connected to language brokering may be particularly pronounced among young children because their cognitive and social capacities are not fully developed (Weisskirch & Alva-Alatorre, 2002). However, among adolescents, there is little evidence that language brokering is associated with psychological distress (Buriel, Love, & DeMent, 2006), particularly among girls. A strong affective parent-child bond buffers adolescents against stress connected to language brokering (Buriel et al., 2006). Among Latino adolescents, more language brokering was associated with greater biculturalism and more social self-efficacy (Buriel et al., 1998). Children who broker in diverse settings such as stores, banks, hospitals, and schools have more opportunities to develop accelerated linguistic, cognitive, and interpersonal skills and have higher school grades. Children as Family Workers Family obligation and duty are strong values among immigrant children from collectivist cultures (Fuligni et al., 1999). These values often take the form of young children devoting time assisting parents in their occupations, which is viewed not so much as helping parents as much as contributing to the welfare of the entire family. These workrelated experiences can influence children’s perceptions and values about work, family relations, and gender roles. In addition to household chores, children in immigrant families often assume adultlike responsibilities as workers whose labor is beneficial, and sometimes essential, to the financial well-being of the family (Orellana, 2001). Many immigrants in manual and service labor occupations “bring children along” to help with the work and make extra money. From a social learning perspective, children in family worker roles may have more opportunities to develop personal responsibility, autonomy, and self-efficacy by observing and modeling their parents in work-related activities. Dual Frames of Reference The immigrant adaptation experience may give rise to a dual frame of reference that allows immigrant children to compare their socioeconomic and cultural status in the United States to their past situation in their country of origin. A dual frame of reference is an enabling quality that gives foreign-born children higher expectations and feelings of positive self-worth relative to their native-born counterparts (Suarez-Orozco & SOCIALIZATION IN THE FAMILY: ETHNIC AND ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 121 Suarez-Orozco, 1995). By having been raised in a culturally supportive environment in their native country, immigrant children have a frame of reference to counter the negative stereotypes ascribed to many immigrant groups (Perez, 2004). A dual frame of reference is a useful psychological mechanism for understanding generational differences in school achievement, motivation, and feelings of self-worth. SOCIALIZATION CONCERNS IN ETHNIC MINORITY FAMILIES African American Families The focus on African American family research has shifted from a pathological/disorganizational model to a strength/resilient model, characterized by (a) an examination of African Americans in an African American sociocultural context, (b) a consideration of the role of grandmothers and other extended family members in child-rearing activities, (c) an analysis of the presence of fathers rather than their absence in the family, and (d) the role of grandfathers in the transmission of family values and beliefs (McWright, 2002; Wilson, 1992). Characteristics of African American extended-kin systems include: (a) a high degree of geographical propinquity; (b) a strong sense of family and familial obligations; (c) fluidity of household boundaries, with great willingness to absorb relatives, both real and fictive; (d) frequent interaction with relatives; (e) frequent extended-family gettogethers; and (f) a system of mutual aid (Harrison et al., 1990; Hatchett & Jackson, 1993). The extended family is important because of the large number of female-headed households that require child-rearing assistance and economic support (Wilson, 1992). The proportion of African American households with elderly heads that have young family members is also high, numbering about one in three families (Pearson, Hunter, Ensminger, & Kellam, 1990). When coupled with the fact that many African American grandparents live in close proximity to their married children and families, grandparents have many opportunities to influence the development of their grandchildren. Pearson et al. (1990) found that in multigenerational households, mothers were the primary caregivers, followed by grandmothers and then fathers. Grandmothers also showed more supportive behaviors in mother-grandmother families than in motherfather-grandmother families. In mother-absent families, grandmothers were more involved in control and punishment of children. Tolson and Wilson (1990) found that the presence of grandmothers increases the moral-religious emphasis in the household. Grandfathers also play an important role. Given that two-parent households were the plurality in the African American community before 1980, many grandfathers are currently involved in the socialization of grandchildren. In a study of the transmission of family values through the use of proverbs, McWright (2002) found that grandfathers’ influence was greatest in the area of family connectedness. Working-class African American fathers use more physical than verbal discipline and focus on the transgression’s consequences rather than the child’s intent (Dodge et al., 2005). However, they rarely couple physical discipline with love withdrawal, which may reduce some of the anxiety and resentment associated with this method. Because African American socialization stresses obedience to adults, parents have been described as harsh, rigid, and strict (Portes, Dunham, & Williams, 1986) and as being parent-centered rather than child-centered (Kelley, Power, & Wimbush, 1992). However, these parents often raise children in dangerous neighborhoods having greater risks of involvement in antisocial behavior. Under these circumstances, strict obedience to parental authority is 122 PARENTAL AND PEER RELATIONS an adaptive strategy that parents may endeavor to maintain through physical discipline (Dodge et al., 2005; Kelley et al., 1992). This disciplinary method underscores for children the importance of following societal rules and the consequences of rule breaking as a member of an ethnic/racial group that is unfairly stereotyped as violent (Willis, 1992). A socialization goal of many ethnic minority parents is fostering a sense of ethnic/racial pride in children (Harrison et al., 1990) in order to confront the hostility they will encounter as African Americans. Parents of successful African American children emphasized ethnic pride, self-development, awareness of racial barriers, and egalitarianism in their socialization practices (Bowman & Howard, 1985). African American youth exposed to race empowerment strategies were higher in racial identity and self-concept than those exposed to a race-defensiveness strategy, which taught dislike of other groups and the usefulness of acting White (Murray & Mandara, 2002). American Indian Families Although American Indians were known as the “Vanishing Americans,” the American Indian population has increased at every census count since 1940. American Indians are a socioculturally diverse group of over 450 distinct tribal units who speak over 100 different languages (Trimble & Medicine, 1993). Today, approximately 70% of American Indians live away from reservations (Banks, 1991), mostly in urban areas, although most research focuses on those living on reservations. American Indian families may be characterized as a collective cooperative social network that extends from the mother and father union to the extended family, the community, and the tribe (Burgess, 1980). A strong extended-family system and tribal identity characterizes many urban and rural American Indian families (Harrison et al., 1990). Extended families include several households representing significant relatives that give rise to village-like characteristics even in urban areas. In such families, grandparents retain an official symbolic leadership role. Children seek daily contact with grandparents, who monitor children’s behavior and have a voice in child rearing (Lum, 1986). Despite the many social problems faced by these families (e.g., poverty, alcoholism, accidents, and adolescent suicide), the majority (68%) are two parent families. Base year data from the early childhood longitudinal study (Flanagan & Park, 2005), shows that 45% of American Indian children live with both of their married biological parents, and 27% live with cohabitating biological parents. The remaining 24% live with one parent. Although there are variations among tribes, some common American Indian values include (a) present-time orientation—a primary concern for the present and acceptance of time as fluid and not segmented; (b) respect for elders; (c) identity with group so that the interests of the family and tribe are the same as one’s own selfinterest; (d) cooperation (“Help each other so the burden won’t be so heavy,” a Pueblo Indian saying; Suina & Smolkin, 1994, p. 121); (e) the concept of partnership as the desirable way of conducting most activities; and (f) living in harmony with nature. In traditional-oriented Indian culture, knowledge and learning are prescribed to help individuals live fulfilling lives as fully integrated members of the family and tribe. Among the Navajo, knowledge is organized around three life goals: (1) lifetime knowledge concerns language, kinship, religion, customs, values, beliefs, and the purpose of life; (2) occupational knowledge, which involves an apprenticeship with teaching experts such as herders, weavers, and hunters, is gained through listening, modeling and practice (Suina & Smolkin, 1994); and (3) healing and leadership knowledge is restricted to a few and involves specialized instruction that is usually in addition to learning other means of livelihood (Joe, 1994). SOCIALIZATION IN THE FAMILY: ETHNIC AND ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 123 Two major tribal concerns are infant health and the child-rearing abilities of adolescents, which are critical for the tribes’ survival (Berlin, 1987). American Indian teens are nearly two and a half times more likely to become pregnant before reaching their 18th birthday. Although infant death at birth is among the lowest of any racial/ethnic group, the rate of sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS) is three times the national average and infants have a 500% greater chance of being born with Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (Fuller, 2004). Indian Health Services and greater tribal selfdetermination in the areas of education (the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975), family life (The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978), and culture (The American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978) have made it possible for some tribes to sustain healthy families and to recover traditional child-rearing practices. Zimmerman, Ramirez, Washienko, Walter, and Dyer (1998) have proposed an “enculturation hypothesis” to explain how involvement with American Indian culture buffers children from the negative effects of acculturation, such as alcohol and substance abuse. In their research with Odawa and Ojibwa tribes, they found that cultural affinity positively predicted youths’ self-esteem. Youth with the highest levels of self-esteem and cultural identity had the lowest levels of alcohol and substance abuse, which was consistent with the enculturation hypothesis. Asian American Families The Asian American population includes people from 28 Asian countries or ethnic groups. It is a very diverse group in terms of languages, cultures, number of generations in the United States, and reasons for immigrating to the United States. Today, the largest groups, are Chinese Americans (2.7 million), Filipino Americans (2.4 million), Asian Indians (1.9 million), Vietnamese Americans (1.2 million), Korean Americans (1.2 million), and Japanese Americans (1.1 million; U.S. Census Bureau, 2002). Little research exists on the structure and process of Asian American families. Most studies have sampled from Chinese and Japanese American populations with the goal of identifying the family characteristics that contribute to children’s academic performance (Huntsinger, Jose, & Larson, 1998) with less focus on the socioemotional development of children. Discussions of Asian American families usually invoke Confucian principles to explain family structure and roles. Confucius developed a hierarchy defining a person’s roles, duties, and moral obligations in the state. This hierarchical structure is also applied to the family, and each member’s role is dictated by age and gender. Typically, Asian American families are seen as patriarchal, with the father maintaining authority and emotional distance from other members (Wong, 1995). Traditionally, the family exerts control over family members, who are taught to place family needs before individual needs. Children show obedience and loyalty to their parents and, especially male children, are expected to take care of elderly parents (filial piety). Confucian influences on family life are stronger in some Asian American populations (e.g., Chinese and Vietnamese) than others (e.g., Japanese) due to differences in immigration patterns and degree of Westernization of the country of origin. Length of U.S. residence and acculturation also contribute to extensive within-group differences in family structure and roles. Kibria (1993) found that large Vietnamese families varying in age and gender fared better economically than smaller nuclear families by sharing a variety of social and economic resources. Chao (1994) has argued that the traditional view of Chinese parents as authoritarian, restrictive, and controlling is misleading because these parenting behaviors do not have cross-cultural equivalence for European Americans and Chinese: these 124 PARENTAL AND PEER RELATIONS child-rearing concepts are rooted in European American culture and do not reflect the socialization styles and goals of Chinese parents. Chinese parenting should be viewed from the concepts of chiao shun, which means training or teaching appropriate behaviors by exposing children to examples of proper behavior and limiting their view of undesirable behaviors in the context of a supportive parent-child relationship and guan which means to govern, to care for or to love. Thus, control and governance have positive connotations for the Chinese. Chao (1994) compared European American and immigrant Chinese American mothers on standard measures of control and authoritarian parenting, as well as measures of chiao shun and guan. Chinese American mothers scored higher on both standard measures of parental control and authoritarian parenting and on measures of chiao shun and guan. Thus, Chinese American parenting style could not be captured using European American concepts. Instead, parenting of Chinese American mothers is conceptualized as a type of training performed by parents who are deeply concerned and involved in the lives of their children. Future research should take into account within-group difference in childrearing practices due to generation and acculturation since larger acculturation gaps between Asian immigrant parents and their children are associated with more parental difficulties and communication problems and lower parenting satisfaction (Buki, Ma, Strom, & Strom, 2003). Latino Families The term Latino is used here to describe those persons often referred to as Hispanics, a word coined by the Department of Commerce to enumerate persons in the United States whose ancestry derives from the Spanish-speaking countries and peoples of the Americas. Mexican Americans make up the majority of Latinos (67%), followed by Central and South Americans (14%), Puerto Ricans (9%), and Cuban Americans (4%; U.S. Census Bureau, 2002). Ramirez and Castaneda (1974) have divided cultural values of Latinos into four conceptual categories: (1) identification with family, community, and ethnic group; (2) personalization of interpersonal relationships; (3) status and roles based on age and gender; and (4) Latino Catholic ideology. Identification with Family, Community, and Ethnic Group. Latino child-rearing practices encourage the development of a self-identity embedded firmly in the context of the family. One’s individual identity is therefore part of a larger identity with the family. For many Latinos, family refers to a combination of nuclear and extended family members, including fictive kin such as godparents. The desire for closeness often results in many members of the same family living in the same community. The family network extends further into the community through kinships formed by intermarriage among families and el compadrazco, which is the cultural practice of having special friends become godparents of children in baptisms. Personalization of Interpersonal Relationships. Latino culture socializes children to be sensitive to the feelings and needs of others and to personalize interpersonal relationships (personalismo). This socialization goal encourages the development of cooperative social motives while discouraging individual competitive behaviors that set apart the individual from the group (Kagan, 1984). The importance of the social domain is reflected in the term bien educado (well educated), a term referring not only to someone with a good formal education but also to someone who can function SOCIALIZATION IN THE FAMILY: ETHNIC AND ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 125 interpersonal situations without being disrespectful. Children in particular are expected to be bien educado in their relations with adults (Valdes, 1996; e.g., by addressing adults in Spanish with the formal “you” [usted] rather than the informal “you” [tu]). Status and Roles Based on Age and Gender. Latino culture has clearly defined norms governing an individual’s actions in the family and the community. Age and gender are important determinants of status and respect. Children are expected to be obedient and respectful toward their parents, even after they are grown and have children of their own. Grandparents and older persons in general receive respect and have considerable status owing to their knowledge of life. Males are expected to have more knowledge about politics and business, whereas females are expected to know more about child rearing, health care, and education. However, Latino husbands and wives most often share responsibility for major family decisions (Zavella, 1987). Latino Catholic Ideology. Religion strongly influences the lives of Latinos because Latino Catholicism, a synthesis of Spanish European Catholicism and indigenous religious beliefs and practices supports cultural values. Identity with family and community is facilitated through religious practices, such as weddings and el compadrazco, which help extend family networks. The emphasis on respect, group harmony, and cooperation is in line with the religious themes of peace, community, and self-denial. Many cultural events and developmental milestones are celebrated in religious contexts, such as a quinceañera—a coming-of-age celebration that marks the beginning of adulthood for a young girl on her fifteenth birthday. Role of Family in Latino Adaptation. The longer immigrants live in the United States, the more their family networks expand through marriage and birth and from continued immigration of family members. Thus, even as individual family members become acculturated, their local extended family becomes larger. Second- and thirdgeneration Mexican Americans have larger and more integrated extended families than immigrants (Keefe & Padilla, 1987). Buriel (1993b) found that early assumption of responsibility was a dominant socialization goal of Mexican immigrant parents that persists into adolescence. He also found greater similarity in socialization styles among immigrant mothers and fathers than among native-born mothers and fathers. Consensus in socialization styles may reflect an area of domestic interdependence conditioned by the immigrant experience. Because immigrants lack extended kinship networks, parents may depend more on each other for socialization of children, which encourages agreement in parents’ socialization styles. Researchers are beginning to examine how traditional theories of parenting and socialization “fit” with family relations and child outcomes in Latino families. In both Mexican American and European American families, those with low levels of conflict and hostile control had children with fewer conduct problems and depressive symptoms (Hill, Bush, & Roosa, 2003). In the Mexican American sample, lower acculturation was associated with a stronger negative relationship between maternal acceptance and child conduct problems. Moreover, among Spanish-speaking parents, hostile control co-occurred with acceptance. The combination of hostile control and acceptance may represent an adaptive parenting strategy for families living in culturally unfamiliar environments involving high levels of acculturative stress. 126 PARENTAL AND PEER RELATIONS Parke et al. (2004) found that for both Mexican American and European American families, feelings of economic hardship were positively related to depression for both parents while paternal hostile parenting was related to higher levels of children’s internalizing and externalizing behaviors. However, among Mexican American families, maternal acculturation was associated with higher levels of marital problems and lower levels of both maternal and paternal hostile parenting. Although higher maternal acculturation may disrupt traditional male-centered authority patterns in the family, it may also serve as the catalyst for altering parenting styles in a less hostile direction. A widely misunderstood issue is the role of Latino fathers and grandparents in socialization. The stereotype of machismo has characterized Latino fathers as neither caring nor involved with their spouses and children. However, less-acculturated Mexican American men supervise and engage their children in conventionally feminine activities more than their more acculturated counterparts (Coltrane, Parke, & Adams, 2004). Paternal participation in family rituals, which are often cultural in nature, is positively associated with monitoring and interacting with children in these families (Coltrane et al., 2004). Father involvement may represent an important dimension of familism, which is the most important value in Latino culture. Research on grandparent involvement, particularly grandmothers, suggests that grandmothers are often the symbolic heads of extended families and are sought after for advice and support in child rearing (Ramos-McKay, Comas-Diaz, & Rivera, 1988). Using a Puerto Rican sample, Contreras et al. (1999) found grandmother support was related to less symptomatology and parenting stress among less-acculturated adolescent mothers. When mothers were more unidirectionally acculturated, greater grandmother support was associated with more symptomatology and parenting distress. This research, like the work with fathers, illustrates the moderating role of acculturation in family relationships with Latinos. PERSPECTIVES ON ETHNIC INFLUENCES ON FAMILY SOCIALIZATION At present, and for the foreseeable future, the growth of minority families will be due primarily to immigration from Latin America and Asia. Research with families of these groups needs to take into account the acculturation level and generational status of parents and children and the effects these factors have on family processes and child outcomes. Together with acculturation, recognition of biculturalism as both an adaptation strategy and socialization goal should guide future research. The effects of prejudice and discrimination on ethnic minorities, in areas such as social and emotional development, ethnic/racial identity, and achievement motivation, deserve more attention. Language development research should also give greater attention to second-language acquisition (usually English) and bilingualism and their relation to cognitive development and school achievement. More attention must be given to the role of fathers, grandparents, and extended family members in the socialization of children. Remaining Issues and Future Trends A number of issues remain to be examined in future research if we are to describe fully the complexities, specify the determinants and processes, and outline the consequences SOCIALIZATION IN THE FAMILY: ETHNIC AND ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 127 of family-child relationships. These include the effects of family variation, types of developmental change, the role of historical change, and methodological issues. One advance of the past decade is recognition of the importance of individual differences in children; one of the next advances will be the recognition of individual differences among families and the expansion of sampling procedures. Despite greater awareness of family diversity, the range of family types that are studied is still relatively narrow. Although progress has been made in describing parents and children in different cultures (Rogoff, 2003) and in different ethnic groups in the United States (Contreras, Kerns, & Neal-Barnett, 2002; McLoyd, Hill, & Dodge, 2005), this work represents only a beginning. Particularly critical is an examination of other subsystems such as the marital, sibling, and family systems in families with different ethnic backgrounds, organizations, and structure. Developmental issues need to be addressed more fully to include children at a wider range of ages. We are only beginning to map developmental changes in parental socialization strategies. Moreover, we need to move beyond childhood and examine more closely parental relationships with their adult children—if we are to achieve a life-span view of family socialization. Parents’ management of a variety of life-course tasks, such as marriage, work, and personal identity, will clearly determine how they will execute parental tasks; in turn, these differences may find expression in measures of parent-child interaction. The description of the interplay between child and adult developmental curves is necessary to capture adequately the nature of developmental changes in a families’ role in the socialization process. There is a continuing need to monitor secular trends and to describe their impact on family relationships (Modell & Elder, 2002). Secular change is complex and clearly does not affect all individuals equally or all behavior patterns to the same extent. Moreover, better guidelines are necessary to illuminate which particular processes in families are most likely to be altered by historical events and which processes are less amenable to change (Parke, 2004a). No single methodological strategy will suffice to understand the development of family socialization. Instead, a wide range of designs and data collection and data analysis strategies is necessary. There is still little information concerning interrelations across molar and molecular levels of analysis or when each level is most useful. Ethnographic approaches can play a role in family research as well, particularly to gain a better understanding of contextual factors that affect parental functioning (see Burton & Price-Spratlen, 1999). Reliance on nonexperimental strategies are insufficient to address the important issue of direction of effects in work on the impact of parents on children and families. Experimental strategies have been underutilized in studies of families. By experimentally modifying either the type of parental behavior or the level of involvement, firmer conclusions concerning the direct causative role that parents play in modifying their children’s and their spouse’s development will be possible. As Cowan and Cowan (2002) argued, intervention studies provide the “gold standard” for testing causal hypotheses. In addition to intervention designs, natural experiments continue to be a useful tool for aiding us in sorting out causal issues For example, work on adopted Romanian children has shown that the length of institutionalization is a major predictor of later functioning (Rutter, Pickles, Murray, & Eaves, 2001). Under the influence of the behavior geneticists, there has been an increased focus on the value of nonshared environmental designs, which allow measurement of the differential impact of families on different children in the same family. The field has progressed 128 PARENTAL AND PEER RELATIONS beyond the simple environment-gene partitioning argument toward a conceptual framework that reframes the debate as gene × environment interactions. According to this view (Reiss, 2003), family processes mediate genetic influence in children’s outcomes, and the future challenge is to determine how this gene × environment family model plays out across development. Several designs, including cross-fostering studies with nonhuman primates (Suomi, 2000), modified sibling designs (Reiss, Neiderhiser, Hetherington, & Plomin, 2000), and prospective adoption designs (Reiss, 2003) are promising new approaches for addressing this issue. A major challenge is to determine the unique contribution of families to socialization outcomes and the limits of family effects (Harris, 1998). However, our recognition of the family as a partner with other institutions, such as peers, schools, media, religious institutions, and government policy makers that together influence children’s development, has significantly expanded our view of the family’s role in the socialization process and suggests that the family—directly and indirectly—may have a larger impact on children’s outcomes than previously thought. However, our understanding of the ways in which families influence their children’s socialization through their links with other institutions is still poorly understood. Conclusion Families continue to play a central role in the socialization process but their role has undergone dramatic change during the past several decades. 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Our thesis is that interactions, relationships, and groups reflect social participation at different interwoven orders of complexity. Our goal, in introducing these levels of analysis, is to establish a framework for further discussion of the origins, development, and significance of children’s peer experiences. Moreover, discussion of the interaction, relationships, and group levels of social complexity allows subsequent commentary on conceptual issues that pertain to individual differences in children’s behavioral tendencies and peer relationships. Orders of Complexity in Children’s Peer Experiences Over the past 25 years, recognition and articulation of the multiple levels of analysis and perspectives that comprise the peer system have greatly increased. Especially significant in this regard has been the contribution of Robert Hinde (e.g., 1987, 1995) who has articulated the features and dialectical relations between successive levels of The writing of this chapter was supported, in part, by a grant from the National Institute of Mental Health (MH-58116) to Kenneth H. Rubin and by grants from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Fonds Québécois de la Recherche sur la Société et la Culture to William M. Bukowski. 141 142 PERSONALITY, SELF, AND SELF-CONCEPT social complexity. Borrowing heavily from Hinde, in this section we discuss the nature of three successive levels of complexity in children’s experiences with peers—interactions, relationships, and groups. INTERACTIONS The simplest order of complexity of peer experience involves interactions. Interaction refers to the social exchange between two individuals. Behaviors that simply (and only) complement one another (like riding on either end of a teeter-totter) would ordinarily not be considered true interaction unless it was clear that they were jointly undertaken. Instead, the term interaction is reserved for dyadic behavior in which the participants’ actions are interdependent such that each actor’s behavior is both a response to, and stimulus for, the other’s behavior. Conversational turn-taking is a quintessential illustration: Child A requests information from Child B (“What’s your name?”), Child B responds (“My name is Julius. What’s yours?”), Child A replies (“Elodie.”), and so on. Such a simple exchange as that of Julius and Elodie belies the richness and complexity of the ways that children of most ages communicate with and influence one another. Thus, besides introducing themselves, children in conversation may argue, gossip, selfdisclose, and joke, among other things. And during interaction, children also cooperate, compete, fight, withdraw, respond to provocation, and engage in a host of other behaviors that includes everything from ritualized sexual contact to rough-and-tumble (R&T) play to highly structured sociodramatic fantasy. Typically, researchers have been less interested in cataloguing the myriad of interactional experiences than in understanding the origins and consequences of three broad childhood behavioral tendencies: (1) moving toward others, (2) moving against others, and (3) moving away from others. As a consequence, our understanding of children’s experiences at the interactional level may be disproportionately organized around the constructs of sociability and helpfulness, aggression, and withdrawal. Although many social exchanges have their own inherent logic (as in the questionanswer sequence of Julius and Elodie), it is also the case that the forms and trajectories of episodes of interaction are shaped by the relationships in which they are embedded. For example, friends are more committed to resolving conflict with each other than nonfriends, are more likely than nonfriends to reach equitable resolutions, and continue to interact following a disagreement (Laursen, Finkelstein, & Betts, 2001; Laursen, Hartup, & Koplas, 1996). Beyond this, children engaged in interaction vary their behavior as a function of such factors as their short-term and long-term personal goals, their understanding of their partner’s thoughts and feelings in the situation, the depth of their repertoire of alternative responses, and various “ecological” features of the context of the interactions (such as the presence of bystanders). It is precisely the demonstration of such range and flexibility in responding to the challenges of interpersonal interaction that many writers think of as social competence (e.g., Bukowski, Rubin, & Parker, 2001). RELATIONSHIPS Relationships introduce a second and higher-order level of complexity to children’s experiences with peers. Relationships refer to the meanings, expectations, and emotions that derive from a succession of interactions between two individuals known to each other. Because the individuals are known to each other, the nature and course of each interaction is influenced by the history of past interactions between the individuals as PEER INTERACTIONS, RELATIONSHIPS, AND GROUPS 143 well as by their expectations for interactions in the future. It has been suggested that the degree of closeness of a relationship is determined by such qualities as the frequency and strength of influence, the diversity of influence across different behaviors, and the length of time the relationship has endured. In a close relationship, influence is frequent, diverse, strong, and enduring. Alternatively, relationships can be defined with reference to the predominant emotions that participants typically experience in them (e.g., affection, attachment, or enmity). As a form of social organization, dyadic relationships share features with larger social organizations, such as a family, a class, or a team. For instance, dyads, like larger organizational structures, undergo role differentiation, specialization, and division of labor (McCall, 1988). However, there are certain features of dyadic relationships that are distinct to this level of social organization and vital to understanding its functioning and impact on interactions and individuals. Unlike most social organizations, dyadic relationships do not vary in membership size. This makes the dyad peculiarly vulnerable, for the loss of a single member terminates the dyad’s existence. Because members appreciate this vulnerability, issues of commitment, attachment, and investment loom larger in dyadic relationships than in other forms of social organization. Indeed, an understanding of the surface behavior of members of relationships can be elusive unless the deeper meaning of behavior in relation to the relationship’s mortality is considered. A final point is that relationships must be understood according to their place in the network of other relationships. For example, children’s friendships are influenced by the relationships they have at home with parents and siblings (Belsky & Cassidy, 1995). Friendship In the literature on children’s peer experiences, one form of dyadic relationship has received attention above all others—friendship. The issue of what constitutes friendship is a venerable philosophical debate beyond the scope of this chapter. However, some points from this debate warrant noting here because of their operational significance. First, there is widespread agreement that friendship is a reciprocal relationship that must be affirmed or recognized by both parties. Reciprocity is the factor that distinguishes friendship from the nonreciprocal attraction of only one partner to another. A second point of consensus is that reciprocity of affection represents an essential, though not necessarily exclusive, tie that binds friends together (Hays, 1988). Similarities or complementarities of talents and interests may lead to friendships and can help sustain them; however, they do not constitute the basis of the friendship itself. The basis is reciprocal affection. Third, friendships are voluntary, not obligatory or prescribed. In some cultures and in some circumstances, children may be assigned their “friends,” sometimes even at birth (Krappmann, 1996). Although these relationships may take on some of the features and serve some of the same interpersonal ends as voluntary relationships, most scholars would agree that their involuntary nature argues against confusing them with friendship. GROUPS A group is a collection of interacting individuals who have some degree of reciprocal influence over one another. Hinde (1987) suggests that a group is the structure that emerges from the features and patterning of the relationships and interactions present in a population of children. Accordingly, groups possess properties that arise from the manner in which the relationships are patterned but are not present in the individual 144 PERSONALITY, SELF, AND SELF-CONCEPT relationships themselves. Examples of such properties include cohesiveness, or the degree of unity and inclusiveness exhibited by the children or manifest by the density of the interpersonal relationships; hierarchy, or the extent of intransitivity in the ordering of the individual relationships along interesting dimensions (e.g., If Fred dominates Brian and Brian dominates Peter, does Fred dominate Peter?); and homogeneity, or consistency across members in the ascribed or achieved personal characteristics (e.g., sex, race, age, or attitudes toward school). Finally, every group has norms, or distinctive patterns of behaviors and attitudes that characterize group members and differentiate them from members of other groups. Many of our most important means for describing groups speak to these core characteristics or processes. Thus, researchers may address the degree to which the relationships and interactions in a group are segregated along sex or racial lines (e.g., Killen, Lee-Kim, McGlothlin, & Stangor, 2002); they may compare the rates of social isolation among groups that differ in composition; or they may investigate the extent to which a group’s hierarchies of affiliation, dominance, and influence are linear and interrelated. In addition, group norms can be used as a basis for distinguishing separate “crowds” in the networks of relationships among children in high school (e.g., Brown, 1989). It is worth noting that the construct that has dominated the peer literature during the past 25 years, namely that of popularity, is both an individual- and a group-oriented phenomenon. Measures of popularity refer to the group’s view of an individual in relation to the dimensions of liking and disliking. In this regard, popularity is a group construct and the processes of rejection and acceptance are group processes. Yet, despite this reality, most peer researchers treat popularity as characteristic of the individual (e.g., Newcomb, Bukowski, & Pattee, 1993). SUMMARY To understand children’s experiences with peers, researchers have focused on children’s interactions with other children and on their involvements in peer relationships and groups. Analyses in each level—interactions, relationships, groups—are scientifically legitimate and raise interesting questions. However, until recently, studying individual, dyadic, and group measures was challenging, both conceptually and statistically. Advances in multilevel modeling techniques and in the availability of moreor-less user-friendly software have given researchers the tools to examine the effects of group, dyadic, and individual variables simultaneously. These procedures can be used to assess how the effects of variables describing individual tendencies (e.g., aggressiveness, sociability, or inhibition) on an outcome (e.g., one’s subsequent aggressiveness, sociability, or reticence) will vary as a function of dyadic-relationship characteristics (e.g., quality of friendship; quality of the mother-child relationship). In turn, a researcher can assess variations in dyadic effects due to the characteristics of the groups in which they are embedded. These techniques have been used with success already (e.g., Kochenderfer-Ladd & Wardrop, 2001). Culture It is important to recognize that each of the social levels described earlier falls under the all-reaching umbrella of culture. Culture is defined as “the set of attitudes, values, PEER INTERACTIONS, RELATIONSHIPS, AND GROUPS 145 beliefs, and behaviors shared by a group of people, communicated from one generation to the next” (Matsumoto, 1997, p. 5). Cultural beliefs and norms help interpret the acceptability of individual characteristics and the types and ranges of interactions and relationships that are likely or permissible. Given that the majority of the world’s inhabitants do not reside in culturally Westernized countries, the cross-cultural work on peer interactions, relationships, and groups requires careful review: Child development is influenced by many factors. In any culture, children are shaped by the physical and social settings in which they live as well as culturally regulated customs, childrearing practices, and culturally based belief systems (Harkness & Super, 2002). The bottom line is that the psychological “meaning” attributed to any given social behavior is, in large part, a function of the ecological niche in which it is produced. If a given behavior is viewed as acceptable, then parents (and significant others) will attempt to encourage its development; if the behavior is perceived as maladaptive or abnormal, then parents (and significant others) will attempt to discourage its growth and development. And the very means by which people go about encouraging or discouraging the given behavior may be culturally determined and defined. Thus, in some cultures, the response to an aggressive act may be to explain to the child why the behavior is unacceptable; in others, physical discipline may be the accepted norm; in yet others, aggression may be ignored or perhaps even reinforced (for a discussion, see Bornstein & Cheah, 2006). It would appear most sensible for the international community of child development researchers not to generalize to other cultures their own culture-specific theories of normal and abnormal development. In this regard, we describe relevant extant research pertaining to cross-cultural similarities and differences in children’s peer interactions and relationships throughout this chapter. Peer Interactions, Relationships, and Groups: A Developmental Perspective Children’s peer experiences become increasingly diverse, complex, and integrated with development. In some cases, the impetus for these developments rests in children (i.e., changes in interpersonal understanding), while others derive from situational or contextual phenomena. In the following sections, we review many developmental mileposts in the interactional, relational, and group levels of children’s involvement with other children. THE INFANT AND TODDLER YEARS Interactions Infants do have obvious social limitations. Babies are unable, for example, to comprehend the social and cognitive needs, capacities, or zones of proximal development of their age-mates (Hay, 1985). Yet, careful observation of infants reveals remarkable strides taken during the 1st year of life. These include (a) the careful observation of peers and seemingly intentional direction of smiles, frowns, and gestures to their play partners (Hay, Nash, & Pederson, 1983); and (b) the response, often in kind, to their play partner’s behaviors (Mueller & Brenner, 1977). With the emergence of 146 PERSONALITY, SELF, AND SELF-CONCEPT locomotion and the ability to use words to communicate during the second year of life, interactive bouts become lengthier, and toddler play becomes organized around particular themes or games. Often, these toddler games are marked by reciprocal imitative acts (Ross, 1982). These developments promote more effective social commerce between toddlers and contribute a generally positive affective quality to their interaction (Hay, Castle, Davies, Demetriou, & Stimson, 1999). However, toddler social interaction is also marked by conflict (e.g., Hay & Ross, 1982; Rubin, Hastings, Chen, Stewart, & McNichol, 1998). Rubin et al. (1998) found that over 70% of 25-month-old children participated in a conflict situation at least once in a 50-minute laboratory setting. In a comparable setting, Hay and Ross (1982) observed 87% of 21-month-old toddlers engaged in at least one conflict. As such, it appears that conflict is neither infrequent nor limited to a small percentage of toddlers. Importantly, it appears as if many of those toddlers who frequently instigate conflicts with peers are the most socially outgoing and initiating (National Institute of Child Health and Human Development Early Child Care Research Network, 2001). It is also the case that toddlers are highly attentive to, and are more likely to imitate and initiate interactions with, highly sociable age-mates (Howes, 1988). Taken together, these data suggest that during the second year of life, toddlers do display social skills of modest complexity. Relationships It has been demonstrated that toddlers are more likely to initiate play, direct positive affect to, and engage in complex interactions with familiar than unfamiliar playmates (Howes, 1988). But can familiarity be equated with the existence of a relationship? Ross and colleagues have demonstrated that toddlers do develop reciprocal relationships with familiar others that are characterized not only by the mutual exchange of positive overtures, but also by agonistic interactions. Positive interactions are directed specifically to those who have directed positive initiations to the child beforehand; conflict is initiated specifically with those who have initiated conflictual interactions with the child beforehand (e.g., Ross, Conant, Cheyne, & Alevizos, 1992). To the extent that reciprocal interchanges of positive overtures may characterize particular dyads, it may be said that toddlers do have friendships. Howes (1988) defined toddler friendship as encompassing the response to a peer’s overture at least once, the production of at least one complementary or reciprocal dyadic exchange, and the demonstration of positive affect during at least one such exchange. Vandell and Mueller (1980) identified toddler friends as those who initiated positive social interaction more often with each other than with other potential partners. Thus, during the toddler period, friendships, as defined earlier, do exist; however, it is doubtful that they carry the same strength of psychological meaning as the friendships of older children. Nevertheless, these early relationships may lay the groundwork for the establishment and maintenance of friendships throughout the childhood years. Groups Even young toddlers spend much of their time in small groups such as with day-care mates. But there is little empirical evidence that this level of social organization is salient to, or influential on, these young children. Nevertheless, some authors (e.g., Legault & Strayer, 1991) have observed dominance hierarchies in small groups of PEER INTERACTIONS, RELATIONSHIPS, AND GROUPS 147 young toddlers, as well as in subsets of children who invest greater attention and interaction to one another than to outside nonmembers. Interestingly, some members of these groups appear more central to their functioning than others, perhaps illustrating the earliest examples of individual differences in popularity and influence. EARLY CHILDHOOD Interaction From 24 months to 5 years, the frequency of peer interaction increases and becomes more complex. To begin with, children at these ages engage in a variety of different types of play behaviors and activities, including unoccupied, onlooking (the child observes others but does not participate in the activity), solitary, parallel (the child plays beside but not with other children), and group activities (Rubin, Watson, & Jambor, 1978). Importantly, the categories of solitary, parallel, and group behavior comprise a variety of play forms that differ in cognitive complexity. Thus, whether alone, near, or with others, children may produce simple sensorimotor behaviors (functional play, e.g., aimlessly bouncing a ball), construct structures from blocks or draw with crayons (constructive play), or engage in some form of pretense (dramatic play). The examination of these cognitive forms of play reveals interesting developmental trends. For example, solitary-sensorimotor behaviors become increasingly rare over the preschool years, while the relative frequency of solitary-construction or exploration remains the same (Rubin et al., 1978). Furthermore, the only types of social interactive activity to increase over the preschool years are sociodramatic play and games with rules (Goncu, Patt, & Kouba, 2002). Perhaps the most complex form of group interactive activity during the preschool years is sociodramatic play (Goncu et al., 2002). The ability to engage easily in this form of social activity represents mastery of one of the essential tasks of early childhood—the will and skill to share and coordinate decontextualized and substitutive activities. Researchers have reported that by the 3rd year of life, children are able to share symbolic meanings through social pretense (e.g., Howes, 1988). This is a remarkable accomplishment, as it involves the capacity to take on complementary roles, none of which matches real-world situations, and to agree on the adoption of these imaginary roles in a rule-governed context. The ability to share meaning during pretense has been referred to as intersubjectivity (Goncu, 1993), which research findings suggest reflect the increasing sophistication of preschooler’s naive “theory of mind” (Watson, Nixon, Wilson, & Capage, 1999). Researchers have also demonstrated that engaging in sociodramatic play is associated with social perspective-taking skills and the display of skilled interpersonal behavior (Howes, 1992). Several other significant advances are made during the preschool period. For one, prosocial caring, sharing, and helping behaviors become more commonplace with increasing age. Four-year-olds direct prosocial behavior to their peers more often than 3year-olds (e.g., Benenson, Markovits, Roy, & Denko, 2003). Importantly, aggression increases until age 3 and then declines, and the nature of conflict changes from the toddler to the preschool period. During toddlerhood, most conflict appears to center on toys and resources; during the preschool years, conflict becomes increasingly centered on differences of opinion (e.g., D. W. Chen, Fein, & Tam, 2001)—a reflection of the child’s growing ability to focus on others’ ideas, attitudes, and opinions. 148 PERSONALITY, SELF, AND SELF-CONCEPT Relationships During early childhood, children express preferences for some peers over others as playmates. It appears that one important influence on this process is that preschoolers are attracted to peers who are similar to them in some noticeable regard. For example, similarities in age and sex draw young children together. Furthermore, preschoolers appear to be attracted to, and become friends with peers whose behavioral tendencies are similar to their own, a phenomenon known as behavioral homophily (e.g., Rubin, Lynch, Coplan, Rose-Krasnor, & Booth, 1994). Once preschoolers form friendships, their behavior with these individuals is distinctive from their behavior with other children who are familiar but not friends. Children as young as 3.5 years direct more social overtures, engage in more social interactions, and play in more cooperative and prosocial ways with friends than nonfriends (e.g., Dunn & Cutting, 1999). Compared to nonfriends, preschool friends also demonstrate more quarreling and more active (assaults and threats) and reactive hostility (refusals and resistance; Dunn & Cutting, 1999). Moreover, Hartup, Laursen, Stewart, and Eastenson (1988) demonstrated that preschool children engage in more conflicts with their friends than with neutral associates. These differences are best understood by recognizing that friends spend much more time actually interacting with each other than do nonfriends. Hartup and his colleagues also reported qualitative differences in how preschool friends and nonfriends resolve conflicts and in what the outcomes of these conflicts are likely to be. Friends, as compared with nonfriends, make more use of negotiation and disengagement, relative to standing firm, in their resolution of conflicts. In conflict outcomes, friends are more likely to have equal resolutions, relative to win or lose occurrences. Also, following conflict resolution, friends are more likely than neutral associates to stay in physical proximity and continue to engage in interaction. While approximately 75% of preschoolers have reciprocally nominated best friendships (Dunn, 1993), not all young children have a best friend. And, Ladd, Kochenderfer, and Coleman (1996) have shown that not all friendships in early childhood are equally stable. Those friendships that involve higher levels of positive friendship qualities (e.g., validation) and lower levels of negative friendship qualities (e.g., low conflict) are most likely to be stable. Importantly, during this period of early childhood, the ability to make friends, friendship quality, and stability of young children’s friendships are associated with, and predicted by, social-cognitive and emotional maturity. For example, the abilities to understand emotional displays and social intent and to perspective-take are associated with friendship formation, maintenance, and friendship quality (Dunn & Cutting, 1999; Ladd & Kochenderfer, 1996). Furthermore, the young child’s ability to regulate emotions is associated with and predictive of both the number of mutual friends and friendship quality (Walden, Lemerise, & Smith, 1999). Groups Many researchers have found that the social dominance hierarchy is an important organizational feature of the preschool peer group (e.g., Vaughn, Vollenweider, Bost, AzriaEvans, & Snider, 2003). And researchers have argued that dominance hierarchies develop naturally in groups to serve adaptive functions. In the case of preschool-aged children, dominance hierarchies appear to reduce overt aggression among members of the group. Observations of exchanges between children in which physical attacks, threats, and object conflicts occur reveal a consistent pattern of winners and losers. PEER INTERACTIONS, RELATIONSHIPS, AND GROUPS 149 And children who are losers in object struggles rarely initiate conflict with those who have proven “victorious” over others or who have been victorious over them (Strayer & Strayer, 1976). MIDDLE CHILDHOOD AND EARLY ADOLESCENCE The school-age years represent a dramatic shift in social context for most children in Western cultures. During this time, the proportion of social interaction that involves peers increases. The peer group also grows in size, and peer interaction becomes less closely supervised by adults. The settings of peer interaction also change. Preschool children’s peer contacts are centered in the home and in day-care centers, whereas school-age children come into contact with peers in a wide range of settings (e.g., “hanging out” at school or after-school, talking on the telephone; Zarbatany, Hartmann, & Rankin, 1990). Interaction During middle childhood, verbal and relational aggression (insults, derogation, threats, gossip) gradually replace direct physical aggression. Further, relative to preschoolers, the aggressive behavior of 6- to 12-year-olds is less frequently directed toward possessing objects or occupying specific territory and more specifically hostile toward others (Dodge, Coie, & Lynam, 2006). With regard to positive social behavior, Eisenberg, Fabes, and Spinrad (2006) report the levels of generosity, helpfulness, or cooperation that children direct to their peers increases somewhat during the primary and middle school years. The frequency of “pretend” or “nonliteral” aggression, or R&T play increases in early elementary school, and thereafter declines in middle childhood and early adolescence. Interestingly, it has been proposed that the primary function of R&T, especially among young adolescent boys, is to establish dominance status and thereby delimit aggression among peers (Pellegrini, 2002). Children’s concerns about acceptance in the peer group rise sharply during middle childhood, and these concerns appear related to an increase in the salience and frequency of gossip (Kuttler, Parker, & La Greca, 2002). Gossip, at this age, reaffirms children’s membership in important same-sex social groups and reveals, to its constituent members, the core attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors comprising the basis for inclusion in or exclusion from these groups. Thus, gossip may play a role in fostering friendship closeness and in promulgating children’s social reputations. One additional form of interaction has received specific attention in the recent literature. Deviancy training occurs when children model and reward aggressive behaviors in each other; the process by which these exchanges take place is thought to increase individual tendencies in aggressiveness and to strengthen ties to aggressive and substanceabusing friends and delinquent peer groups. In this regard, deviancy training “hits” at all levels of the social enterprise (Dishion, McCord, & Poulin, 1999). Yet another form of interaction emerging fully blown during middle childhood and early adolescence is bullying and victimization (Espelage, Bosworth, & Simon, 2000). Bullying refers to acts of verbal and physical aggression on the part of an individual that are chronic and directed toward particular peers (victims). Bullying accounts for a substantial portion of the aggression that occurs in the peer group (Olweus, 1978, 1993). The dimension that distinguishes bullying from other forms of aggressive behavior is its specificity—bullies direct their behavior toward only 150 PERSONALITY, SELF, AND SELF-CONCEPT certain peers, comprising approximately 10% of the school population (National Institute of Child Health and Human Development Early Child Care Research Network, 2001). Research on bullying suggests that bullies are characterized by strong tendencies toward aggressive behavior, relatively weak control over their aggressive impulses, and a tolerance for aggressive behavior (Olweus, 1978, 1993). Children who are greatest risk for victimization are those who have elevated scores on measures of either aggression or social withdrawal. Nearly every study that has assessed the association between aggressiveness and victimization has revealed a positive correlation (e.g., Hanish & Guerra, 2004; Snyder et al., 2003). These findings appear to be culturally universal; victimization and aggression have been found to be positively associated in North American, Southern Asian (Khatri & Kupersmidt, 2003) and East Asian (Schwartz, Farver, Chang, & Lee-Shin, 2002) samples. Finally, there is evidence that anxious and socially reticent children are also victims of bullying behavior (Kochenderfer-Ladd, 2003; Olweus, 1993). There are at least two explanations for the observation that aggression and social withdrawal are associated with victimization. First, a withdrawn child is likely to be victimized because she or he is an easy prey who is unlikely to retaliate when provoked (e.g., the construct of “whipping boy”; Olweus, 1978, 1993); alternatively, an aggressive child is victimized because his or her behavior is irritating and likely to provoke victimization from others (“the provocative victim”; Olweus, 1993). According to this view different mechanisms underlie victimization for different types of children. Another view uses a single model to explain victimization. It claims that children victimize peers who do not promote the basic group goals of coherence, harmony, and evolution. According to this view, aggressive and withdrawn children do not promote these positive aspects of group functioning and as a result they are victimized. Relationships The period of middle childhood and early adolescence brings marked changes in children’s understanding of friendship. For example, children’s friendship conceptions at the start of middle childhood (7 to 8 years) involve rewards and costs—friends are rewarding to be with, whereas nonfriends are difficult or uninteresting to be with. At this age, a friend is also someone who is convenient (i.e., who lives nearby), has interesting toys or possessions, and shares the child’s expectations about play activities. By about 10 to 11 years, children recognize the importance of shared values and social understanding, and friends are expected to stick up for and be loyal to one another. Later, at 11 to 13 years, children acquire the view that friends share similar interests, are required to make active attempts to understand each other, and are willing to engage in self-disclosure (Bigelow, 1977). Changes in the understanding of friendship are accompanied by changes in the patterns and nature of involvement in friendships. Children’s friendship choices are more stable and more likely to be reciprocated in middle childhood than at earlier ages (Berndt & Hoyle, 1985). Friendships that are high in relationship quality are more likely to persist over time, and this is also true in early childhood. Furthermore, stable friendships in middle childhood and early adolescence are more likely to comprise dyads in which the partners are sociable and altruistic; friendships that dissolve during the course of a school year are more likely to comprise partners who are aggressive and victimized by peers (Hektner, August, & Realmuto, 2000; Wojslawowicz Bowker, Rubin, Burgess, Booth-LaForce, & Rose-Krasnor, 2006). PEER INTERACTIONS, RELATIONSHIPS, AND GROUPS 151 With respect to the features of friendships in middle childhood and early adolescence, Newcomb and Bagwell (1995) reported that children are more likely to behave in positive ways with friends than nonfriends or to ascribe positive characteristics to their interactions with friends. Although the effect size of this difference may, in some cases, be small, this pattern of findings is observed across a broad range of studies using a variety of methods, including direct observations (e.g., Simpkins & Parke, 2002), and interviews (Berndt, Hawkins, & Hoyle, 1986). More important, Newcomb and Bagwell’s (1995) meta-analysis showed that the expression of affect varied considerably for pairs of friends and nonfriends. In their interactions with friends, relative to interaction with nonfriends, children show more affective reciprocity and emotional intensity, and enhanced levels of emotional understanding. Moreover, young adolescent friends use distraction to keep their friends from potentially harmful rumination about social attributions that may induce guilt or shame (Denton & Zarbatany, 1996). In this regard, friendship is a socially and positive relational context, and it provides opportunities for the expression and regulation of affect. Friend-nonfriend differences are stronger during early adolescence than during either middle childhood or during the preschool years. One of the few dimensions of interaction in which there are no differences between friends and nonfriends is that of conflict. Research has shown repeatedly that after early childhood, pairs of friends engage in about the same amount of conflict as pairs of nonfriends (Laursen et al., 1996). There is a major difference, however, in the conflict resolution strategies that friends and nonfriends adopt. In particular, friends are more likely than nonfriends to resolve conflicts in a way that will preserve or promote the continuity of their relationship (Laursen et al., 2001). The beneficial effects of friendship are qualified by the characteristics of the best friend: Young adolescents with aggressive friends, compared with those who have nonaggressive friends, adopt increasingly aggressive solutions to conflicts; young adolescents who are nonaggressive and who have nonaggressive friends use more prosocial solutions (Brendgen, Bowen, Rondeau, & Vitaro, 1999). There appear to be consistent qualitative differences in boys’ and girls’ best friendships in the middle childhood and early adolescent years. For example, girls’ friendships are marked by greater intimacy, self-disclosure, and validation and caring than those of boys (e.g., Zarbatany, McDougall, & Hymel, 2000). Ironically, it is because of the intimacy of girls’ best friendships that they appear to be less stable and more fragile than those of boys (e.g., Benenson & Christakos, 2003). According to Benenson and Christakos, intimate disclosure between female friends may become hazardous when best friends have a conflict. In such cases, the conflicting friends can divulge personal information to outsiders (Crick & Grotpeter, 1995). Intimate disclosure within the friendships of girls also appears hazardous to psychological well-being when conducted in a “co-ruminative” fashion (Rose, 2002). Significantly, when boys’ best friendships are with girls rather than boys, intimacy is higher, thus suggesting that there may be two different “worlds” of relationships defined by context and activity (Zarbatany et al., 2000). Throughout this age period, children are attracted to and become best friends with those who resemble them in age, sex, ethnicity, and behavioral status (Hartup & Abecassis, 2002). Researchers in both Western and Eastern cultures have reported that greater behavioral similarities exist between friends than nonfriends, and children share friendships with other children who resemble themselves in terms of prosocial 152 PERSONALITY, SELF, AND SELF-CONCEPT and antisocial behaviors (e.g., Haselager, Hartup, van Lieshout, & Riksen-Walraven, 1998; Poulin & Boivin, 2000), shyness and internalized distress (e.g., Rubin, Wojslawowicz, Burgess, Booth-LaForce, & Rose-Krasnor, 2006), sociability, peer popularity, and academic achievement and motivation (e.g., Altermatt & Pomerantz, 2003). Finally, researchers have begun to study enmity and mutual antipathies (e.g., Abecassis, Hartup, Haselager, Scholte, & van Lieshout, 2002). Whereas the topic of disliking is certainly not new (e.g., Hayes, Gershman, & Bolin, 1980), the emphasis of recent research has been on the frequency of mutual antipathies, their correlates, and their developmental significance. Abecassis et al. (2002) have shown that rates vary across classrooms, with the frequencies of dyadic enmity being as high as 58% in some classrooms. Although all children experience mutual antipathies, they are most common among rejected children and they are more common among boys than girls, especially during middle childhood compared with adolescence (Rodkin & Hodges, 2003). Children in such relationships tend to be more depressed than are other children, and the presence of a mutual antipathy appears to exacerbate the effect of other negative experiences, such as peer rejection. Nevertheless, the developmental significance of mutual antipathies is unclear, and many issues related to the study of mutual antipathies require further exploration. Perhaps the most important concerns the issue of how we define and measure the concept of enemy. To paraphrase the important discussions provided by Hartup and Abecassis (2002), having an enemy implies warfare. Consequently, researchers would do well to examine whether children who nominate each other as “Someone I do not like,” actually interact. It may be that mutual antipathies merely capture an affective dimension, not an interactional one. “True” enemies may be proactive about their relationship. They may spread gossip about one another and engage in relational or other forms of aggression. At present, there are virtually no data indicating how and whether those who mutually nominate each other as “Someone I do not like” actually have a clearly defined relationship. Groups During the upper elementary school and middle school years, the structure of the peer group changes from a relatively unified whole to a more differentiated structure. In this new structure, children organize themselves into social groups, clusters, networks, or cliques (e.g., Bagwell, Coie, Terry, & Lochman, 2000). Peer networks and cliques are voluntary, friendship-based groups, and stand in contrast to the activity or work groups to which children can be assigned by circumstance or by adults. Cliques generally include three to nine same-sex children of the same race (X. Chen, Chang, & He, 2003; Kindermann, McCollom, & Gibson, 1995). By 11 years of age, most of children’s peer interaction takes place in the context of the clique, and nearly all children report being a member of one. With respect to group size, boys, compared with girls, show a preference for larger groups (Benenson, Apostoleris, & Parnass, 1997). Peer networks, whether identified observationally (e.g., Gest, Farmer, Cairns, & Xie, 2003) or via peer reports (e.g., Bagwell et al., 2000), or whether identified in or out of school (Kiesner, Poulin, & Nicotra, 2003), are typically organized to maximize within-group homogeneity (Rodkin, Farmer, Pearl, & Van Acker, 2000). Thus, in studies of preadolescents conducted in both Western (e.g., Canada, Finland, United States) and Eastern (e.g., China) cultures, group membership has been found to comprise children similar with regard to the following characteristics: aggression (Espelage, Holt, & Henkel, 2003; Gest et al., 2003; Xie, Cairns, & Cairns, 1999), bullying (e.g., PEER INTERACTIONS, RELATIONSHIPS, AND GROUPS 153 Espelage et al., 2003), and school motivation and performance (e.g., X. Chen et al., 2003; Kindermann, 1993). Apart from cliques, the other primary organizational feature of children’s groups in middle childhood and early adolescence is the popularity hierarchy. There have been recent attempts to distinguish between sociometric popularity and perceived popularity. In the case of sociometric popularity or peer acceptance, the questions asked of children are “Who do you most like?” and “Who do you most dislike?” In the case of perceived popularity, the child is asked who he or she believes is the most popular in the classroom, grade, or school (Parkhurst & Hopmeyer, 1998; LaFontana & Cillessen, 2002). Whereas being liked or accepted occurs at the dyadic level (i.e., one person has affection for someone else), the perception of someone as being popular in a classroom or school reflects a group level of analysis (i.e., the person is perceived according to her/his position in the group). Thus, in the study of peer group relationships, the word (and traditional measurement of) “acceptance” is most properly taken as a direct assessment of the extent to which a child is liked by his or her peers, whereas the word popularity refers to a child’s perceived standing or status in the group. More recently, researchers have focused on the study of such negative characteristics as aggression to clarify the distinction between the meanings and measurement of peer acceptance and perceived popularity. Findings show that children whose level of aggression is moderately above the mean and who use aggression for instrumental reasons are perceived as more popular in their groups than are children who are low in aggression or whose aggression is high and undifferentiated (e.g., Hawley, 2003; Vaughn at al., 2003). Although the association between aggression and popularity may be seen even during the preschool period (Vaughn et al., 2003), this association appears to be stronger during early adolescence (Cillessen & Mayeux, 2004; Prinstein & Cillessen, 2003). Yet, whereas aggression is positively associated with measures of popularity during early adolescence, it is not related to acceptance. Moderately aggressive children may be given status and power in the peer group; however, this does not mean they are well-adjusted or that they will receive or benefit from the affection or kindness from their peers. These findings are consistent with ideas about how groups function and reward persons who promote the group’s functioning (see Bukowski & Sippola, 2001). Whereas the main reward that one can provide at the level of the dyad is affection, the main rewards that can be provided at the level of the group are power, attention, and status. And whereas group members victimize peers who impede the group’s evolution and coherence, groups give power, attention, and status to group members who promote the group’s well-being. Given that group leaders may, at times, have to be forceful, strong, assertive, indeed Machiavellian, their behavior may include a larger coercive or aggressive component than is seen among other children. This tendency to ascribe power and status to moderately aggressive individuals may be more pronounced in adolescence when aggression is seen as a more normative entity than among younger children (Moffitt, 1993). ADOLESCENCE Interaction The trend of spending increasingly substantial amounts of time with peers that begins in middle childhood continues in adolescence (e.g., Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1984). Moreover, adolescent peer interaction takes place with less adult guidance and control 154 PERSONALITY, SELF, AND SELF-CONCEPT than peer interaction in middle childhood, and is more likely to involve individuals of the opposite-sex (Brown & Klute, 2003). These phenomena are largely consistent across cultural groups. Relationships As they enter adolescence, both boys and girls already understand a great deal about the reciprocal operations and obligations of friendship, about the continuity of friendships, and about the psychological grounds that evoke behavior. During adolescence, however, youngsters begin to accept the other’s need to establish relationships with others and to grow through such experiences. Thus, adolescents’ discussions of friendship and friendship issues show fewer elements of possessiveness and jealousy, and more concern with how the relationship helps the partners enhance their respective selfidentities (Berndt & Hoyle, 1985). During adolescence, friendships are relatively stable and best maintained when the partners have similar attitudes, aspirations, and intellect (Berndt et al., 1986). Samesex friends account for an increasingly larger proportion of adolescents’ perceived primary social network, and friends equal or surpass parents as sources of support and advice to adolescents in many significant domains (e.g., Furman & Buhrmester, 1992). One hallmark of friendship in adolescence is its emphasis on intimacy and selfdisclosure: adolescents report greater levels of intimacy in their friendships than do younger children (Buhrmester & Furman, 1987). Romantic relationships are first seen during early adolescence with approximately 25% of 12-year-olds claiming they have had a romantic relationship during the past 18 months (Carver, Joyner, & Udry, 2003). This frequency increases in a largely linear fashion during adolescence with roughly 70% of boys and 75% of girls making this claim at age 18 (Carver et al., 2003; Seiffge-Krenke, 2003). The average duration of a romantic relationship has been observed to be 3.9 months at age 13, and 11.8 months at age 17 months (Seiffge-Krenke, 2003). Importantly, adolescent boys and girls have clear conceptions of the properties that distinguish romantic relationships from friendships (Connolly, Craig, Goldberg, & Pepler, 2004). Whereas romantic relationships are conceived in terms of passion and commitment, other-sex friendships are largely characterized by affiliation. There are large differences between those adolescents who do and do not participate in romantic relationships. These differences vary during the adolescent period and they are often characterized by complex patterns. Early involvement in romantic relationships has been linked to problem behaviors and emotional difficulties during adolescence, although this difference appears to be strongest among boys and girls who are unpopular among their same-sex peers (Brendgen, Vitaro, Doyle, Markiewicz, & Bukowski, 2002). It has been reported also that early daters show lower levels of scholastic achievement (Seiffge-Krenke, 2003), especially among girls (Brendgen et al., 2002). Among older adolescents, however, participation in romantic relationships is associated with positive experiences among same-sex peers and emotional and behavioral well-being (Seiffge-Krenke, 2003). Connolly, Furman, and Konarski (2000) reported that being part of a small group of close same-sex friends predicted being involved in other-sex peer networks, which, in turn, predicted the emergence of future romantic relationships. There is evidence also that the quality of a child’s same-sex friendships predicts the quality of their concurrent and subsequent romantic relationships (Connolly et al., 2000). PEER INTERACTIONS, RELATIONSHIPS, AND GROUPS 155 Although there appears to be some inter-relatedness between romantic relationships and other relationship experiences, this association is often complex. Using an attachment framework, Furman, Simon, Shaffer, and Bouchey (2002) studied adolescents’ internal working models for their relationships with parents, friends, and romantic partners. Adolescents’ perceived support in relationships with their parents tended to be related to their perceived support in romantic relationships and friendships; support in friend and romantic relationships, however, were not related to each other. Nevertheless, self and other controlling behaviors in friendships were related to corresponding behaviors in romantic relationships. Perceived negative interactions in the three types of relationships were also significantly associated with each other. This pattern of results indicates greater generalizability of negative than positive features across relationship types. Groups As in middle childhood, cliques are readily observed in adolescence, and group membership comprises individuals who are similar with regard to school achievement (Kindermann, 1995), substance use (cigarettes and alcohol; Urberg, Degirmencioglu, & Pilgrim, 1997), and delinquency (Kiesner et al., 2003). Whereas cliques represent small groups of individuals linked by friendship selections, the concept of peer subcultures, or “crowds” (Brown & Klute, 2003), is a more encompassing organizational framework for segmenting adolescent peer social life. A crowd is a reputation-based collective of similarly stereotyped individuals who may or may not spend much time together. Crowds are defined by the primary attitudes or activities their members share. Thus, crowd affiliation is assigned through the consensus of the peer group and is not selected by the adolescents themselves. Brown (1989) listed the following as common crowd labels among American high school students: jocks, brains, eggheads, loners, burnouts, druggies, populars, nerds, and greasers. Crowd membership is an especially salient feature of adolescent social life and children’s perceptions of crowds change in important ways with age. For example, between the ages of 13 and 16 years, adolescents alter the ways that they identify and describe the crowds in their school (O’Brien & Bierman, 1987). Whereas young adolescents focus on the specific behavioral proclivities of group members, older adolescents center on members’ dispositional characteristics and values. This observation reflects broader changes that characterize developmental shifts in person-perception between the childhood and adolescent years. The stigma that is placed on members of a particular crowd channels adolescents into relationships and dating patterns with those sharing a similar crowd label. This may prevent adolescents from the exploration of new identities and discourage shifts to other crowd memberships. There is evidence that the stigma associated with some large peer groups or crowds influences the judgments that adolescents form about their peers (Horn, 2003). In particular, Horn (2003) found that adolescents are biased in their use of reputational or stereotypical information about particular groups, particularly when presented with ambiguous situations. It is likely that these crowd-specific evaluations help to perpetuate group stereotypes and the structure of peer groups in a school. Despite the differences that exist in the structures of peer groups, all of them inevitably disintegrate by late adolescence. This is largely due to the integration of the sexes that accompanies this period. To begin with, mixed-sex cliques emerge. Eventually, the larger groups divide into couples, and by late adolescence, girls and boys feel 156 PERSONALITY, SELF, AND SELF-CONCEPT comfortable enough to approach one another directly without the support of the clique. Another contributing factor to the decline in importance of crowds results from adolescents creating their own personal values and morals. In this regard, they no longer see it as necessary to broadcast their membership in a particular social group and are therefore content to be separate and apart from particular crowds. SUMMARY In this chapter, we have outlined developmental differences that mark the changing nature of social interactions and peer relationships from infancy to adolescence. Hopefully, this review provides a normative basis for the discussion that follows concerning the development of individual differences in children’s social behaviors and peer relationships. Proximal Correlates and Distal Predictors of Children’s Peer Relationships The literature on individual differences in popularity and friendship can be divided into two domains. First, the largest concentration of investigations center on the individual characteristics associated with (a) acceptance or rejection in the peer group at large, (b) the ability to make and keep friends, and (c) the quality of friendship. A second body of research is concerned with the associations between peer acceptance and rejection and friendship and both the child’s family relationship experiences and the social environments in which the child functions. This literature deals with the distal correlates of peer acceptance and friendship. We focus on these proximal correlates and distal predictors next. PROXIMAL CORRELATES—PEER ACCEPTANCE In studies involving play groups (e.g., Coie & Kupersmidt, 1983) and/or peerassessment techniques (Newcomb & Bukowski, 1984), researchers interested in behavioral explanations for peer acceptance and rejection typically examine differences between children classified as sociometrically popular, rejected, and average. A thorough review of the voluminous literature on the concomitants of popularity is presented in Rubin, Bukowski, and Parker (1998). Whereas some reviews of research serve as renaissances that renew the study of a topic, the reviews of the sociometric classification studies served as a requiem. Although many of the basic questions of sociometric classification remain unanswered, research on the differences between children in the different sociometric groups has waned. Herein we provide a cursory discussion of the literature. Popular Children Popular children are high in acceptance and low in rejection. Relative to other children, those of popular status are skilled at initiating and maintaining qualitatively positive relationships. When entering new peer situations, popular children do not talk exclusively or overbearingly about themselves and their own social goals or desires, and they are not disruptive of the group’s activity (Dodge, McClaskey, & Feldman, 1985). Pop- PEER INTERACTIONS, RELATIONSHIPS, AND GROUPS 157 ular children are seen as cooperative, friendly, sociable, and sensitive by peers, teachers, and observers (e.g., Newcomb & Bukowski, 1984; Parkhurst & Hopmeyer, 1998). In a meta-analysis of research on popularity, Newcomb et al. (1993) distinguished between assertive/agonistic behaviors and behaviors that reflected disruptiveness. Popular children did not differ from others on the former category of behavior whereas they did on the latter. Popular children, it appears, do engage in some forms of assertive behavior, but they rarely engage in behaviors that are likely to interfere with the actions and goals of others. Rejected Children The most commonly cited behavioral correlate of peer rejection is aggression, regardless of whether aggression is indexed by peer evaluations, teacher ratings, or observations (e.g., McNeilly-Choque, Hart, Robinson, Nelson, & Olsen, 1996). The association between rejection and aggression appears to be rather broad; Newcomb et al. (1993) revealed that rejected children, relative to average popular and neglected children, showed elevated levels on three forms of aggression—specifically, disruptiveness, physical aggression, and negative behavior (e.g., verbal threats). A small number of studies provide evidence of a causal link between aggression and rejection. In groundbreaking play group studies (Dodge, 1983; Coie & Kupersmidt, 1983), the interactions between unfamiliar peers in small groups were observed in a laboratory context over several days. Gradually, some of the children became popular and others became rejected. The behavior that most clearly predicted peer rejection was aggression. With increasing age, however, it appears as if aggression becomes decreasingly associated with rejection, especially among boys (e.g., Sandstrom & Coie, 1999). Also, aggressive behavior may not lead to rejection if it is balanced by a set of positive qualities (e.g., social skill) that facilitate links with other children (Farmer, Estell, Bishop, O’Neal, & Cairns, 2003). Indeed, researchers have found that there is a high level of heterogeneity among the behavioral tendencies of rejected children. Detailed analyses indicate that aggressive children comprise 40% to 50% of the rejected group; children who are highly withdrawn, timid, and wary comprise 10% to 20% of the rejected group (e.g., Cillessen, van IJzendoorn, van Lieshout, & Hartup, 1992). Finally, victimization has been observed to be associated with peer rejection, either as a correlate (e.g., Kochenderfer-Ladd, 2003), as a mediator that explains the association between withdrawal and victimization, or as a moderator that increases the stability of victimization (e.g., Hanish & Guerra, 2004). VARIATIONS IN THE BEHAVIORAL CORRELATES OF POPULARITY: SEX, GROUP, AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES Groups have norms, or standards, regarding the “goodness” of particular acts. The acceptability of a behavior, and of the child who displays that behavior, is determined by whether the behavior conforms to the group’s norms. If a behavior is universally valued, it should correlate with peer acceptance; if the normalcy of a behavior varies across groups, the extent to which the behavior is linked to popularity should vary across these groups also. It is this logic that has provided the basis for much of the research on group variations in the correlates of popularity. Sex Differences Given the widespread concern with sex differences in the literature on child development, it seems surprising to discover how little work exists on the topic of sociometric 158 PERSONALITY, SELF, AND SELF-CONCEPT peer acceptance. Typically, researchers have failed to examine whether general findings are equally valid for boys and girls. Further, sex differences have been neglected despite (a) the long-standing view that the relationships formed and maintained by females are qualitatively distinct from those of males (Leaper, 1994) and (b) the evidence that some aspects of social behavior may be differentially normative for boys and girls (e.g., Humphreys & Smith, 1987). This gap in the literature is striking and it severely compromises our current understanding of the peer system (see Ruble, Martin, & Berenbaum, 2006). Variations across Groups The argument that a child’s popularity will be associated with particular peer group norms has been the central focus of a number of investigations. Boivin, Dodge, and Coie (1995), for example, reported that reactive aggression, proactive aggression, and solitary play were more negatively linked to a measure of social preference when high levels of these specific behaviors were nonnormative and unrelated to preference when high levels on these behaviors were normative. Stormshak et al. (1999) also found support for the person-group similarity model. These researchers reported that for boys, social withdrawal was associated with peer acceptance in those classrooms in which withdrawal was normative; for boys, aggression was linked to peer preference in those classrooms in which aggression was more normative. Findings for girls were, complex and in some cases not supportive of the person-group similarity model. For example, in classrooms marked by high aggression, aggressive girls were not better liked than nonaggressive girls. These studies show clearly that the association between a particular form of behavior and popularity depends on whether the behavior is normative for a group. Considering the importance of group norms as moderators of the associations between behaviors and popularity, researchers should be cautious about drawing broad conclusions about the correlates of popularity. Indeed, researchers would do well to assess the person/group interaction and similarity as a major determinant of peer acceptance and rejection. Variations across Culture Cross-cultural research on the correlates of peer acceptance and rejection has been aimed at asking whether given behaviors known to be associated with acceptance or rejection in North American samples demonstrate similar relations in other cultures. One shortcoming in this work may be that investigators have taken measures originally developed for use in a Western cultural context, and have employed them in other cultural milieus. The general conclusion from this research has been that aggression and helpfulness are associated with rejection and popularity respectively in a wide range of cultures (e.g., Chang et al., 2005; Cillessen et al., 1992). Alternatively, researchers have found that among young Chinese children, sensitive, cautious, and inhibited behavior are positively associated with competent and positive social behavior and with peer acceptance (e.g., X. Chen, Rubin, & Sun, 1992). However, Hart and colleagues (2000) found that social reticence, defined as unoccupied and onlooking behavior, was associated with a lack of peer acceptance, not only in young American children, but also among Russian and Chinese youngsters. Relatedly, X. Chen, Cen, Li, and He (2005) reported that over the years, since the early 1990s, shy, reserved behavior among Chinese elementary school children has increasingly become associated with negative PEER INTERACTIONS, RELATIONSHIPS, AND GROUPS 159 peer reputations. Chen and colleagues have argued that the changing economic and political climate in China is being accompanied by preferences for more assertive, yet competent, social behavior. In short, researchers would do well not to generalize findings drawn from children of one cultural group to children from another context. Moreover, changing socioeconomic climates may prove to have significant influences on that which is deemed acceptable behavior by significant peers and adults in the child’s environment. Social Cognitive Correlates of Peer Acceptance and Rejection In this section, we review research in which social cognition has been associated with sociometric status. The majority of this research has been guided by social informationprocessing models, such as those of Rubin and Rose-Krasnor (1992), Crick and Dodge (1994), and Lemerise and Arsenio (2000). For a complete description of these models and others, see Dodge et al. (2006). Much research on social cognition and peer relationships has focused on rejected children’s deficits or qualitative differences in performance at various stages of these social information-processing models. For instance, when considering the motives or intentions of others, rejected-aggressive children are more disposed than their popular counterparts to assume that negative events are the product of malicious, malevolent intent on the part of others (e.g., Dodge et al., 2003). This bias is evident when children are asked to make attributions for others’ behaviors in situations where something negative has happened but the motives of the instigator are unclear. In these ambiguous situations, rejected-aggressive children appear unwilling to give a provocateur the benefit of the doubt—for example, by assuming that the behavior occurred by accident. This “intention cue bias” is often suggested as an explanation for why it is that aggressive and oppositional-defiant children choose to solve their interpersonal problems in hostile and agonistic ways (e.g., see Orobio de Castro, Veerman, Koops, Bosch, & Monshouwer, 2002, for a review). But why would aggressive children think that when negative, but ambiguously caused events befall them, the protagonist means them harm? In keeping with Lemerise and Arsenio (2000), a transactional perspective would suggest that aggressive children, many of whom are already rejected (and victimized) by their peers, believe that certain others do not like them, those others have a history of rejecting of them or acting mean toward them, and thus the negative act must be intentionally caused. This conclusion of intentional malevolence is posited to elicit anger and a rapid fire response of reactive aggression. Many researchers have found that when asked how they would react to an ambiguously caused negative event, aggressive children respond with a choice of agonistic strategies (Orobio de Castro et al., 2002). And aggressive children also regard aggression to be an effective and appropriate means to meet their interactive goals (Vernberg, Jacobs, & Hershberger, 1999). The processes leading to the enactment of aggression and the behavioral display itself no doubt reinforces an already negative peer profile. By the elementary and middle school years, many socially withdrawn children are also rejected by their peers. Thus, one may ask whether these children view their social worlds in ways that vary from those of nonwithdrawn and/or nonrejected children. To begin with, when socially withdrawn 4- and 5-year-olds are asked how they would go 160 PERSONALITY, SELF, AND SELF-CONCEPT about obtaining an attractive object from another child, they produce fewer alternative solutions, display more rigidity in generating alternative responses, and are more likely to suggest adult intervention to aid in the solution of hypothetical social problems when compared to their more sociable age-mates (Rubin, Daniels-Beirness, & Bream, 1984). Rubin, Burgess, Kennedy, and Stewart (2003) have argued that as a result of frequent interpersonal rejection by peers, withdrawn children may begin to attribute their social failures to internal causes. Supporting these notions, Rubin and Krasnor (1986) found that extremely withdrawn children tended to blame social failure on personal, dispositional characteristics rather than on external events or circumstances. These results are in keeping with findings by Wichmann, Coplan, and Daniels (2004) who reported that when 9- to 13-year-old withdrawn children were presented with hypothetical social situations in which ambiguously caused negative events happened to them, they attributed the events to internal and stable “self-defeating” causes. Moreover, withdrawn children suggested that when faced with such negative situations, they were more familiar with failure experiences and that a preferred strategy would be to withdraw and escape. Given the earlier noted conceptual associations between social withdrawal, victimization, and peer rejection, the findings by Wichmann et al. (2004) are reminiscent of work by Graham and Juvonen (1998). These latter researchers reported that youngsters who identified themselves as victimized by peers tended to blame themselves for their peer relationship problems. And Nolen-Hoeksema, Girgus, and Seligman (1992) have argued that self-blame can lead to a variety of negative outcomes of an internalizing nature, such as depression, low self-esteem, and withdrawal, thereby suggesting a selfreinforcing cycle of negative socioemotional functioning. SELF-SYSTEM CORRELATES OF PEER ACCEPTANCE AND REJECTION An important repercussion that has been ascribed to negative experiences with peers is their effect on the self-concept. Indeed, researchers have consistently reported that it is mainly rejected-withdrawn children who believe they have poor social skills and relationships (Hymel, Bowker, & Woody, 1993). Rejected-aggressive children do not report thinking poorly about their social competencies or their relationships with peers (Zakriski & Coie, 1996). Given rejected-withdrawn children’s negative perceptions of their social competencies and relationships, and given their negative experiences in the peer group, it is not surprising that these children report more loneliness and social detachment than popular children or children who are rejected but aggressive (e.g., Gazelle & Ladd, 2003). These relations have been reported throughout childhood and early adolescence (e.g., Crick & Ladd, 1993). A further distinction between rejected children is the chronicity of their peer problems. Whereas rejection is temporary for some children, it is an enduring experience for others. Ladd and Troop-Gordon (2003) showed that chronic rejection was related to subsequent views of the self and that these negative self-perceptions partially mediated the relation between peer difficulties and internalizing problems and loneliness. CHILDREN’S FRIENDSHIPS: CORRELATES AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES Beginning with the correlates of friendship involvement, researchers have found that the lack of a best friendship, whether at a given point in time or chronically, can be ac- PEER INTERACTIONS, RELATIONSHIPS, AND GROUPS 161 companied by numerous risks. Friendless children are more likely to be lonely and victimized by peers (e.g., Brendgen, Vitaro, & Bukowski, 2000). Chronic friendlessness during childhood has been associated contemporaneously with social timidity, sensitivity, and the lack of social skills (Parker & Seal, 1996; Wojslawowicz Bowker et al., 2006), and predictively with subsequent internalizing problems (Ladd & TroopGordon, 2003). Friendship dissolution may have a serious impact on children’s adjustment. Disruptions of close peer relationships have been associated with depression, loneliness, guilt, and anger (e.g., Laursen et al., 1996; Parker & Seal, 1996). In addition, friendship loss in early adolescence may be particularly painful, due to the special role of friends’ loyalty during this developmental period (Buhrmester & Furman, 1987). Wojslawowicz Bowker et al. (2006) reported that 10- and 11-year-old children who had a best friend at the beginning of the school year but who lost that friendship and failed to replace it by the end of the school year were at increased risk for victimization by peers. Thus, it may be that if a dissolved best friendship is not replaced, the “advantages” of once having a best friend may quickly vanish. Individual child characteristics are also related to the prevalence of friendship and the quality of their dyadic relationships with peers. Given that many rejected children appear to be aggressive and/or withdrawn, it is surprising to note that few investigators have examined the friendships of these children. Not all aggressive and withdrawn children and certainly not all rejected children experience later adjustment difficulties. Thus, the best friendships of these children may function protectively and buffer them from later problems. Alternately, some best friendships may actually serve to exacerbate existing problems. An example of the protective role that friendship may play for children who have difficulties in the peer group may be drawn from research by Hodges, Boivin, Vitaro, and Bukowski (1999). These researchers found that peer victimization predicted increases in internalizing and externalizing difficulties during the school year for those children who lacked a mutual best friendship. The relation between peer victimization, internalizing, and externalizing problems was nonsignificant for children who possessed a mutual best friendship, thereby suggesting that friendship may function protectively for children who are victimized by their peers. We now compare the friendships of those children who appear at greatest risk for peer rejection (i.e., those who have been identified as aggressive or socially withdrawn) with their age-mates who have do not evidence such behavioral or psychological difficulties. Friendship Prevalence and Quality Investigators have shown that the majority of aggressive children have a mutual best friendship and are as likely as well-adjusted children to have mutual friends (e.g., Vitaro, Brendgen, & Tremblay, 2000). Aggression, however, does seem to be negatively related to friendship stability (e.g., Hektner et al., 2000). Moreover, aggressive children have friends who are more aggressive and their relationships are more confrontational and antisocial in quality (e.g., Dishion, Eddy, Haas, Li, & Spracklen, 1997). High levels of relational aggression (e.g., threatening friendship withdrawal) within the friendship, and high levels of exclusivity/jealously, and intimacy characterize the friendships of relationally aggressive children. In contrast, overtly aggressive children direct their overt aggression outside their friendship dyads, and report low levels of intimacy (Grotpeter & Crick, 1996). 162 PERSONALITY, SELF, AND SELF-CONCEPT The prevalence of best friendships among young socially withdrawn children is not significantly different from that among nonwithdrawn children (Ladd & Burgess, 1999), and approximately 60% of withdrawn 8-, 9-, and 10-year-olds have reciprocated, stable friendships (e.g., Rubin et al., 2006). These data suggest that social withdrawal and shyness are individual characteristics that do not influence the formation, prevalence, and maintenance of friendship in childhood. In terms of relationship quality, however, it has been shown that the friendships of withdrawn children are viewed as relatively lacking in fun, intimacy, helpfulness and guidance, and validation and caring (Rubin et al., 2006). These findings suggest a “misery loves company” scenario for withdrawn children and their best friends. We may conjure up images of victimized friends coping poorly in the world of peers, images reflected in media accounts of peer victimization and its untimely consequences. There is some evidence to suggest that socially withdrawn children are more likely than their age-mates to be chronically friendless. In a summer camp study conducted by Parker and Seal (1996), chronically friendless children were rated by their peers to be more shy and timid, to spend more time playing alone, and to be more sensitive than children who possessed a mutual best friendship during the summer camp program. Additionally, counselors rated these friendless children as less mature, less socially skilled, and as displaying more withdrawn and anxious behaviors than children with friends. DISTAL PREDICTORS OF CHILDREN’S SOCIAL SKILLS AND PEER RELATIONSHIPS The quality of children’s extrafamilial social lives is likely a product of factors internal and external to the child. Drawing from Hinde (1987), for example, it seems reasonable to suggest that such individual characteristics as biological or dispositional factors (e.g., temperament; self-regulatory mechanisms) may influence children’s peer interactions and relationships. It is equally plausible that the interactions and relationships children experience with their parents are important. Temperament Temperament has been construed as constitutionally based individual differences in emotional, motoric, and attentional reactivity and the regulation thereof (Rothbart, Ellis, & Posner, 2004). Researchers who study temperament report that individuals differ not only in the ease with which positive and negative emotions may be aroused (emotionality) but also in the ease with which emotions, once aroused, can be regulated (Rothbart et al., 2004). In some respects, a better term for emotionality is reactivity because most research on the phenomenon is focused on the extent to which children react to situations or events with anger, irritability, or fear. And again, most contemporary researchers have been interested in the ways in which reactive responses can be self-regulated. Thus, researchers have centered on the effortful self-control of emotional, behavioral, and attentional processes (Sanson, Hemphill, & Smart, 2004). The constructs of difficult temperament, activity level, inhibition, and sociability merit special attention in the study of peer interactions and relationships. Difficult temperament refers to the frequent and intense expression of negative affect (Thomas & Chess, 1977). Fussiness and irritability would be characteristic of a “difficult” infant or toddler. In reactivity/regulation terminology, the difficult child is one whose PEER INTERACTIONS, RELATIONSHIPS, AND GROUPS 163 negative emotions are easily aroused and difficult to soothe or regulate. The highly active baby/toddler is one who is easily excited, motorically facile, and highly reactive. Inhibited infants/toddlers are timid, vigilant, and fearful when faced with novel social stimuli; like the other groups of children, their emotions are easily aroused and difficult to regulate. Finally, children who are outgoing and open in response to social novelty are described as sociable (Kagan, 1999). Each of these temperamental characteristics is relatively stable, and each is related to particular constellations of social behaviors that we described earlier as characteristic of either popular or rejected children. Infants and toddlers who have been identified as having difficult and/or active temperament, or as emotionally reactive are more likely to behave in aggressive, impulsive ways in early childhood (e.g., Rubin, Burgess, Dwyer, & Hastings, 2003). Contemporaneous and predictive connections between negative emotionality and/or difficult temperament and children’s aggressive and oppositional behavior have been discovered by researchers the world over (e.g., Russell, Hart, Robinson, & Olson, 2003). And, as we noted earlier, undercontrolled, impulsive, and aggressive behavior is associated contemporaneously and predictively with peer relationships characterized by rejection. Similarly, behavioral inhibition, an individual trait identified in toddlerhood predicts the display of shyness and socially reticent behavior in early childhood (Rubin, Burgess, & Hastings, 2002). Shy, socially reticent children display less socially competent and prosocial behaviors, employ fewer positive coping strategies, and are more likely to develop anxiety problems than their nonreticent age-mates (e.g., Coplan, Rubin, Fox, Calkins, & Stewart, 1994). Moreover, reticence and social withdrawal predict peer rejection and victimization from as early as the preschool years (e.g., Gazelle & Ladd, 2003). It has been suggested that dispositional characteristics related to emotion regulation may lay the basis for the emergence of children’s social behaviors and relationships. For example, Rubin, Coplan, Fox, and Calkins (1995) have argued that the social consequences of emotion dysregulation vary in accord with the child’s behavioral tendency to approach and interact with peers during free play. They found that sociable children whose approach behaviors lacked regulatory control were disruptive and aggressive; those who were sociable but able to regulate their emotions were socially competent. Unsociable children who were good emotion regulators appeared to suffer no ill effects from their lack of social behavior. Yet, unsociable children who were poor emotion regulators were more behaviorally anxious and wary and more reticent than constructive when playing alone. Thus, emotionally dysregulated preschoolers may behave in ways that will elicit peer rejection and inhibit the development of qualitatively adaptive friendships. Further, this is the case for emotionally dysregulated sociable as well as unsociable children (see also Eisenberg, Cumberland, et al., 2001; Fabes, Hanish, Martin, & Eisenberg, 2002). Relatedly, researchers have found that the abilities to regulate negative emotions and to inhibit the expression of undesirable affect and behavior (regulatory control) are associated with, and predictive of, social competence and peer acceptance (e.g., Eisenberg, Pidada, & Liew, 2001), findings that are consistent across cultures (e.g., Zhou, Eisenberg, Wang, & Reiser, 2004). It is important to note that very little is known about the associations between temperament and aspects of friendship. When compared to highly emotional children, some findings indicate that sociable children have more positive relationships with friends (e.g., Pike & Atzaba-Poria, 2003). Dunn and Cutting (1999), in a study of young children, found that negative emotionality was associated with the observed frequency of 164 PERSONALITY, SELF, AND SELF-CONCEPT failed social bids and with less amity directed to the best friend; as a counterpoint, children showed less amity to friends who were inhibited or shy. Parent-Child Attachment Relationship A basic premise of attachment theory is that the early mother-infant relationship lays the groundwork for children’s understanding of, and participation in, subsequent extrafamilial relationships. And, since the quality of attachment relationships with the mother may vary, subsequent social success and relationships with peers is expected to vary as well. For a thorough review of attachment theory in relation to peer relationships, see Rubin and Burgess (2002). Studies of attachment and peer relationships have demonstrated that securely attached infants are more likely than their insecure counterparts to demonstrate socially competent behaviors amongst peers during the toddler (e.g., Pastor, 1981), preschool (e.g., Booth, Rose-Krasnor, & Rubin, 1991), and elementary school periods (e.g., Elicker, Englund, & Sroufe, 1992). Insecure babies, especially those classified as avoidant, later exhibit more hostility, anger, and aggressive behavior in preschool settings than their secure counterparts (e.g., Burgess, Marshall, Rubin, & Fox, 2003). Insecure-ambivalent infants are more easily frustrated, and socially inhibited at 2 years than their secure age-mates (e.g., Fox & Calkins, 1993). Finally, evidence that disorganized/disoriented attachment status in infancy predicts the subsequent display of aggression amongst preschool and elementary school peers derives from several sources (e.g., Lyons-Ruth, Easterbrooks, & Cibelli, 1997). It is also the case that secure and insecure attachments, as assessed in early and middle childhood, as well as in early adolescence are associated contemporaneously with and predictive of adaptive and maladaptive social behaviors respectively. For example, children who experience a secure relationship with their mothers (and fathers) have been found to be more sociable and competent than their insecure counterparts, whilst insecure children exhibit more aggression and withdrawal (Allen, Moore, Kuperminc, & Bell, 1998; Rose-Krasnor, Rubin, Booth, & Coplan, 1996). If the quality of the attachment relationship is associated with, and predictive of, patterns of social interaction, it seems logical to propose a relation between attachment status and the child’s standing in the peer group. In a meta-analysis of the extant literature on links between attachment and peer acceptance, Schneider, Atkinson, and Tardif (2001) found a small-to-moderate effect size between these domains. Importantly however, these researchers found a larger effect size linking attachment security with friendship than with peer relationships more generally. Booth, Rubin, Rose-Krasnor, and Burgess (2004), argue that although associations between attachment security and social competence and peer acceptance are theoretically meaningful, there is an even more compelling rationale for the link between attachment security and friendship. From attachment theory, one would expect that the trust and intimacy characterizing secure child-parent relationships should produce an internalized model of relationship expectations that affects the quality of relationships with friends. In support, secure parent-child attachment in late childhood and early adolescence is associated positively (and contemporaneously) with positive qualities of children’s close peer relationships (Lieberman, Doyle, & Markiewicz, 1999). Parental Beliefs and Children’s Social Behaviors and Peer Relationships Parents’ ideas, beliefs, and perceptions about the development and maintenance of children’s social behaviors and relationships predict, and presumably partially explain the PEER INTERACTIONS, RELATIONSHIPS, AND GROUPS 165 development of socially adaptive and maladaptive interactive behaviors and peer relationships in childhood. This is true because parents’ child-rearing practices represent a behavioral expression of their ideas about how children become socially competent, how family contexts should be structured to shape children’s behaviors, and how and when children should be taught to initiate and maintain relationships with others (Bugental & Happaney, 2002). These ideas about child rearing and about what is acceptable and unacceptable child behavior in the social world are culturally determined. Extended discussions of such cultural determination may be found in Rubin and Chung (2006). Investigators have shown that parents of socially competent children believe that, in early childhood, they should play an active role in the socialization of social skills via teaching and providing peer interaction opportunities (Rubin, Mills, & Rose-Krasnor, 1989). They believe also that when their children display maladaptive behaviors, it is due to transitory and situationally caused circumstances. Parents whose preschoolers display socially incompetent behaviors, alternatively, are less likely to endorse strong beliefs in the development of social skills. Furthermore, they are more likely to attribute the development of social competence to internal factors, to believe that incompetent behavior is difficult to alter, and to believe that interpersonal skills are best taught through direct instructional means. Child as Parental Belief Evocateur There is growing evidence that parental beliefs may be evoked by child characteristics and behavior, and that parental beliefs and child characteristics influence each other in a reciprocal manner (Bornstein, 2002). For example, in the case of aggressive children, any hostile behavior, whether directed at peers, siblings, or parents may evoke (a) strong parental feelings of anger and frustration (Eisenberg, Gershoff, et al., 2001) and (b) biased attributions that “blame” the child’s noxious behavior on traits, intentions, and motives internal to the child (e.g., Strassberg, 1995). These parental cognitions and emotions, predict the use of power assertive and restrictive disciplinary techniques (Coplan, Hastings, Lagace-Seguin, & Moulton, 2002). This type of low warmth-high control parental response, mediated by affect and beliefs/cognitions about the intentionality of the child behavior, the historical precedence of child aggression, and the best means to control child aggression, is likely to evoke negative affect and cognitions in the child. The result of this interplay between parent and child beliefs, affects, and behavior may be the reinforcement and extension of family cycles of hostility (e.g., Granic & Lamey, 2002). Parental reactions to social wariness and fearfulness are less well understood. Researchers have found that when children produce a high frequency of socially wary, withdrawn behaviors their parents (a) recognize this as a problem; (b) express feelings of concern, sympathy, guilt, embarrassment, and, with increasing child age, a growing sense of frustration; and (c) are more inclined than parents of nonwary children to attribute their children’s social reticence to dispositional traits (Hastings & Rubin, 1999). Perhaps in an attempt to regulate their own expressed guilt and embarrassment emanating from their children’s ineffectual behaviors, mothers of socially withdrawn preschoolers indicate that they would react to their children’s displays of social withdrawal by providing them with protection and direct instruction (Mills & Rubin, 1998). Parenting Behaviors, Children’s Social Skills, and Peer Relationships Parental discipline of unacceptable, maladaptive peer-directed behaviors has also been associated with their children’s peer relationships. Parents (usually mothers) of unpopular 166 PERSONALITY, SELF, AND SELF-CONCEPT and/or peer-rejected children use inept, intrusive, harsh, and authoritarian disciplinary and socialization practices more frequently than those of their more popular counterparts (e.g., McDowell & Parke, 2000). Alternately, parents of popular children use more feelings-oriented reasoning and induction, responsivity, warm control (authoritative), and positivity during communication than their unpopular counterparts (e.g., Mize & Pettit, 1997). With regard to parenting behavior and children’s socially incompetent behaviors, researchers have shown consistently that aggressive children have parents who model and inadvertently reinforce aggressive and impulsive behavior, and who are cold and rejecting, physically punitive, and inconsistent in their disciplinary behaviors. In addition to parental rejection and the use of high power-assertive and inconsistent disciplinary strategies, parental permissiveness, indulgence, and lack of supervision have often been found to correlate with children’s aggressive behavior (see Rubin & Burgess, 2002 for a review). Importantly, these findings appear to have cross-cultural universality (e.g., Cheah & Rubin, 2004). Research concerning the parenting behaviors and styles associated with social withdrawal focuses clearly on two potential socialization contributors—overcontrol and overprotection. Parents who use high power-assertive strategies and who place many constraints on their children tend to rear shy, reserved, and dependent children. Thus, the issuance of parental commands combined with constraints on exploration and independence may hinder the development of competence and deprive the child of opportunities to interact with peers. It should not be surprising that children who are socially withdrawn are on the receiving end of parental overcontrol and overprotection (e.g., Rubin et al., 2002). These findings concerning parental overcontrol and restriction stem from very few studies, most of which center on young children. Furthermore, the contexts in which parents of socially withdrawn children display overcontrol and overprotection have not been well specified. Parenting Behaviors and Children’s Social Competence: A Model There is some support for the contention that parental behavior is associated, not only with the development of children’s social competence, but also with their peer relationships. The assumption has been that parenting leads to social competence or incompetence, which in turn leads to peer acceptance or rejection. This causal model has been tested in a number of studies. Dishion (1990) examined the relations among grade-school boys’ sociometric status, academic skills, antisocial behavior, and several elements of parental discipline practices and family circumstances. Causal modeling suggested that the relation between inept parenting and peer rejection was mediated by boys’ antisocial behavior and academic difficulties: Lower levels of parental skill were associated with higher levels of antisocial behavior and lower levels of academic performance; antisocial behavior and poor academic performance, in turn, were associated with higher levels of peer rejection. These findings have been replicated and extended in a similar study conducted in the People’s Republic of China (X. Chen & Rubin, 1994). There is also the possibility that the link between parenting and child outcomes of an adaptive or maladaptive nature can be attenuated by the quality of the child’s status in the peer group or the quality of his or her friendships. For example, the longitudinal relation between harsh parenting and negative outcomes of an externalizing nature is augmented when children have poor peer relationships (e.g., Lansford, Criss, Pettit, Dodge, PEER INTERACTIONS, RELATIONSHIPS, AND GROUPS 167 & Bates, 2003). Research findings also indicate that an insecure attachment relationship may predict difficulties of an externalizing or internalizing nature, but only for those children or young adolescents who lack friendship or qualitatively rich friendship (e.g., Rubin et al., 2004). Thus, in recent models pertaining to the links between parenting and adaptive or maladaptive outcome, it appears as if, by middle to late childhood, children’s friendships may buffer or exacerbate the statistical associations. Childhood Peer Experiences and Later Adjustment Our goal, in this section, is to provide a summary of research in which the primary focus has been to identify aspects of childhood peer relationship experiences at the dyadic and group levels that predict subsequent adaptation and maladaptation. Here, we focus only on studies in which prospective, follow-forward designs have been employed. A lengthy overview of retrospective studies may be found in Rubin, Bukowski, and Parker (1998). ACADEMIC ADJUSTMENT It has been shown that adjustment to school derives from several aspects of children’s relationships with peers. Wentzel and Asher (1995) found that popular children were viewed as helpful, good students. Rejected/aggressive students, relative to average and rejected/submissive children, showed little interest in school, were perceived by teachers as dependent, and were seen by peers and teachers as inconsiderate, noncompliant, and prone to causing trouble in school. These findings were consistent with longitudinal findings reported by Ollendick, Weist, Borden, and Greene (1992) who showed that children who were actively disliked by their peers were anywhere from two to seven times more likely to fail a subsequent grade than better accepted children. Similarly, higher levels of rejection predict later grade retention and poorer adjustment after the transition to middle school (Coie, Lochman, Terry, & Hyman, 1992). Given these longitudinal connections between peer rejection and later poor school performance, it is not surprising to learn that children who have troubled relationships with their peers are more likely to drop out of school than are other children (Ollendick et al., 1992). Factors other than peer rejection appear to be important also. Most notably friendships appear to influence school adjustment. For example, children typically associate with peers who had a motivational orientation similar to their own (Kindermann, 1993). Adolescents who drop out of school are more likely than other students to have associated with peers who do not regard school as useful and important (Hymel, Comfort, Schonert-Reichl, & McDougall, 2002). These findings are important because they show that friendships via peer group norms can influence academic adjustment. In two studies, the effect of early adolescent friendship was demonstrated clearly and in richer ways than seen previously. Berndt, Hawkins, and Jiao (1999) showed that adjustment to junior high school was facilitated by engagement in friendships that were stable and of high quality (e.g., rated as high in closeness and support). Wentzel, McNamara-Barry, and Caldwell (2004) also examined friendship and the adjustment to a junior high school. They showed that friendless children were lower in prosocial behavior and higher in affective distress both concurrently and 2 years later. They noted that friends’ characteristics can act as a form of social motivation that can either increase or decrease an early adolescent’s adjustment to school. 168 PERSONALITY, SELF, AND SELF-CONCEPT Similar friendship factors seem to be important with younger children also. Children with many friends at the time of elementary school entry develop more favorable attitudes toward school in the early months than children with fewer friends (Ladd, 1990, 1991; Ladd, Kochenderfer, & Coleman, 1996, 1997). Those who maintained their friendships also liked school better as the year went by. Findings also revealed positive associations between children’s perceptions of best friendship quality in kindergarten and later indices of scholastic adjustment (school-related affect, perceptions, involvement, and performance) in grade school. PSYCHOLOGICAL ADJUSTMENT Externalizing Problems Results of longitudinal studies have indicated that peer rejection in childhood predicts a wide range of externalizing problems in adolescence, including delinquency, conduct disorder, attention difficulties, and substance abuse (e.g., Ollendick et al., 1992). These findings are not particularly surprising given the well-established link between aggression and peer rejection, and especially given that aggressive-rejected children are more likely to remain rejected over time. Importantly, research has shown that early peer rejection provides a unique increment in the prediction later antisocial outcomes, even when controlling for previous levels of aggression and externalizing problems (e.g., Laird, Jordan, Dodge, Pettit, & Bates, 2001; Miller-Johnson, Coie, MaumaryGremaud, Bierman, & Conduct Problems Prevention Research, 2002). Given the less than perfect stability of rejected status, it would seem reasonable to ask whether psychological risk status is equivalent for children with chronic versus episodic and transient rejection by peers. To address this question, Miller-Johnson et al. (2002) showed that peer rejection in first grade added incrementally to the prediction of early starting conduct problems in third and fourth grades, over and above the effects of aggression. Similarly, Dodge and colleagues (2003) reported that peer rejection predicted longitudinal “growth” in aggression over time from early to middle childhood, and from middle childhood to adolescence. These researchers also found a developmental pathway in which peer rejection led to more negative information processing patterns (i.e., hostile cue interpretation), which led to increased aggression. Certainly part of the association between rejection and externalizing involves the network of peer involvement experiences by rejected children. Rejected children were more likely than other boys and girls to associate with delinquent peers and these associations accounted for their subsequent delinquency (Brendgen, Vitaro, & Bukowski, 1998). Consistent with expectations related to the process of deviancy training, at-risk children, especially boys, who have aggressive friends appear to influence each other with reinforcements and enticements (Bagwell & Coie, 2004), which increase each other’s aggression. These mechanisms also appear to account for the development of substance abuse problems (e.g., Dishion, Capaldi, & Yoerger, 1999). Internalizing Problems Results from a growing number of studies have indicated that anxious-withdrawal is contemporaneously and predictively associated with internalizing problems during the life span, including low self-esteem, anxiety problems, loneliness, and depressive symptoms (e.g., Coplan, Prakash, O’Neil, & Armer, 2004). In a longitudinal study from kindergarten (age 5 years) to the ninth grade (age 14 years), Rubin and colleagues PEER INTERACTIONS, RELATIONSHIPS, AND GROUPS 169 reported that withdrawal in kindergarten and second grade predicted peer rejection, self-reported feelings of depression, loneliness, and negative self-worth and teacher ratings of anxiety in the fifth grade (Hymel, Rubin, Rowden, & LeMare, 1990; Rubin & Mills, 1988). In turn, social withdrawal in the fifth grade predicted self-reports of loneliness, depression, negative self-evaluations of social competence, the lack of perceived peer social support, and parental assessments of internalizing problems in the ninth grade (Rubin, Chen, McDougall, Bowker, & McKinnon, 1995). Researchers have also begun to explore the unique role of peer rejection in the prediction of internalizing problems. For example, Kraatz-Keily, Bates, Dodge, and Pettit (2000) reported that peer rejection predicted increases in both internalizing and externalizing problems from kindergarten to seventh grade. Children’s self-perceived rejection has been associated with increases in internalizing problems over time (e.g., Kistner, Balthazor, Risi, & Burton, 1999). Relatedly, Gazelle and Ladd (2003) found that shy-anxious kindergarteners who were also excluded by peers displayed a greater stability in anxious solitude through the fourth grade and had elevated levels of depressive symptoms as compared to shy-anxious peers who did not experience peer exclusion. Further, Gazelle and Rudolph (2004) found that in the fifth and sixth grades, high exclusion by peers led anxious solitary youth to maintenance or exacerbate the extent of social avoidance and depression; increased social approach and less depression resulted from the experience of low exclusion. The majority of the research regarding friendship and subsequent internalizing problems has considered the effects of friendship as either a moderator or as a mediator. In addition to the previously described study by Hodges, Boivin, et al. (1999), Rubin et al. (2004) demonstrated that when 10- to 11-year-olds reported difficulties in their relationships with their mothers and fathers, having a strong supportive best friendship buffered them from negative self-perceptions and internalizing problems. The notion that friendship may buffer rejected children from negative outcomes has been examined in a number of studies. However, the findings in these studies have been somewhat counterintuitive. For example, Hoza, Molina, Bukowski, and Sippola (1995) and Kupersmidt, Burchinal, and Patterson (1995) reported that having a best friend actually augmented negative outcomes for children who were earlier identified as rejected and aggressive. One explanation for these findings emanates from findings indicating that the friendship networks of aggressive-rejected children comprise other aggressive children; the existence of a friendship network supportive of maladjusted behavior may actually exacerbate the prospects of a negative developmental outcome for rejected children (e.g., Cairns, Gariepy, & Kindermann, 1989). Conclusions In this chapter, we examined the remarkable progress that has been made in describing and explaining the features, processes, and effects of children’s experiences with their age-mates. A consequence of this progress is that peer research must now answer new questions and deal with new challenges. An additional repercussion of our progress is that the gaps in our understanding of the peer system become clear. We address these concerns in this concluding section. Specifically, we identify two current challenges and opportunities for peer research, and we identify two topics that deserve more attention than they have received in the past. 170 PERSONALITY, SELF, AND SELF-CONCEPT TWO CRITICAL CHALLENGES First, we propose that the efforts to study peer relationships as a system need to be continued and intensified. The study of peer relationships has been frequently predicated on the concept that peer relationships, however construed, must be viewed as either an antecedent or consequence. Consistent with the view that development is a dynamic, multidirectional process (Sameroff & MacKenzie, 2003), the study of peer relationships needs to be understood as a complex system. Children bring various behaviors, needs, and cognitions into their peer experiences at the dyadic and group level. In turn, these individual characteristics affect the features of these experiences and the provisions that children derive from these experiences leading to changes, for better or worse, in the child’s subsequent short-term and long-term functioning. Although the study of transactional models of development has been aided by the evolution of statistical procedures (e.g., structural equation modeling, growth curve analyses, hierarchical linear modeling), the number of investigations incorporating these models and techniques remains lower than one might expect. Second, the features and effects of experiences with peers need to be understood according to the larger systems in which they are embedded and according to how they interface with other systems. Opportunities for peer interaction and relationships vary from one culture to another and different cultures ascribe different degrees of significance to them. The “content” of peer interactions and relationships is likely to vary, for example, as a function of how much power is ascribed to kinship structures and by who makes primary decisions about allowable extrafamilial relationships. Because the defining features or characteristics of what it means to be adapted to one’s social context will differ across contexts, the impact on adaptation of particular characteristics of peer relationships is likely to vary also. Finally, in a culture, the effect of the peer system is likely to vary according to differences between children in provisions they obtain in their families. TWO QUESTIONS IN SEARCH OF ANSWERS In spite of its diversity and breadth, at least two fundamental aspects of peer interactions, relationships, and groups are nearly absent from our review. First, what aspects of peer interactions, relationships, and groups affect boys and girls differently? The study of sex differences is covered sporadically throughout this chapter. There are many exemplary studies of how peer interactions and relationships differ for boys and for girls. A central gap in the literature is the understanding of whether some aspects of peer interactions and relationships affect boys and girls differently. This question is not about whether there are differences between the features of peer interactions and relationships of boys and girls. Instead, it is concerned with potential differences in the functions and the developmental significance of peer experiences for boys and girls. Knowing if and how the peer system works differently for boys and girls would certainly add to our understanding of peer relationships; it would augment our understanding of sexual differentiation as well. Second, what are the provisions of peer relationships? Friendship, acceptance, and popularity have been studied extensively. We know how to measure these constructs, and we know a good deal about their antecedents and their consequences. Yet, we know little about what it is that children and adolescents “get” from these relationships. To be sure there have been theoretical propositions about why friendship is important and PEER INTERACTIONS, RELATIONSHIPS, AND GROUPS 171 how acceptance and rejection can influence child and adolescent development. But there have been few studies of the specific opportunities and experiences that are afforded by friendship, acceptance, and popularity. And there have been fewer studies of the significance of friendship and/or peer acceptance and rejection for children who vary with regard to sex, ethnicity, and behavioral characteristics. Certainly, the role of culture remains to be fully explored. This question is not simply one of description. Research on friendship, for example, is based on claims about the putative provisions of this relationship. Similar comments can be offered about acceptance and, to a lesser extent, popularity. 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