PLCY 701
DISCUSSION BOARD FORUM INSTRUCTIONS
In this course, Discussion Boards Forums play an exceptionally important role. The readings are
relatively short to allow for substantial reflection, personal research, and quality discussion to
occur. Consider these threads and replies to be formal communications on the same level as
those you would conduct with employers, clients, or colleagues in the professional, political, or
academic world. As such, they must be free of grammatical errors, must be properly formatted in
current Turabian style, and must consist of well-reasoned, contemplative, and substantive posts
and replies, rather than mere ipse dixit. These threads and replies must provide citations to the
sources of or support for your ideas as well as any quoted materials and/or borrowed ideas.
Open, courteous discussion will yield the greatest opportunities for growth in this course. Both
responding to other students and responding to the instructor will count as 1 reply post.
Remember that the art of communication is in many ways the essence of effective political
leadership. Everything you write—every paper, post, and email—creates or reinforces an
impression of you. You are encouraged to begin to cultivate the communication skills of the
statesmen and stateswomen—the ability to logically and persuasively speak the truth with
compassion and respect.
You will take part in 5 Discussion Board Forums in Modules/Weeks 1, 3, 4, 5, and 7. You will
compose an original post presenting your own interpretation of the assigned prompt,
writing 600–700 words, then, you will post replies of 300–350 words to at least 2 other students’
original threads. Each reply must be unique.
Responding to a classmate’s original post requires both the addition of new ideas and analysis. A
particular point made by the classmate must be addressed and built upon by your analysis in
order to move the conversation forward. Thus, the response post is a rigorous assignment that
requires you to build upon initial posts to develop deeper and more thorough discussion of the
ideas introduced in the initial posts. As such, reply posts that merely affirm, restate or
unprofessionally quarrel with the previous post(s) and fail to make a valuable, substantive
contribution to the discussion will receive appropriate point deductions. Posting the same reply
in two places is also not sufficient and may be treated as a form of academic misconduct.
Original posts must include at least 3 references to the course readings and 1 Scripture reference
in addition to any other sources you wish to include. Replies must include at least 1 reference to
the course readings and 1 Scripture reference in addition to any other sources you wish to
include. Scriptural excerpts with citations are required in all written assignments, including all
discussion board posts (both the original post and the replies).
File attachments are discouraged because they may slow up readings. See the attached grading
rubric for specific guidelines and grading procedures.
This course utilizes the Post-First feature in all Discussion Board Forums. This means you will
only be able to read and interact with your classmates’ threads after you have submitted your
thread in response to the provided prompt. For additional information on Post-First, click here
for a tutorial.
Submit your threads by 11:59 p.m. (ET) on Thursday of the assigned module/week. Submit your
replies by 11:59 p.m. (ET) on Sunday of the same module/week.
PLCY 700
DISCUSSION BOARD FORUM GRADING RUBRIC
Criteria
Content
(70%)
Thread:
Content
Thread:
Research
Engagement
• Each question/prompt is
answered thoroughly and
logically.
• Major points are stated clearly
and effectively.
• Clear, logical flow to post;
stayed on topic.
11.5 to 12.5 points:
•
•
Reply:
Content
Levels of Achievement
Proficient
84-91%
12.5 to 13 points:
Advanced
92-100%
13.5 to 15 points:
Ideas from all the required
reading and presentations from
the Module/Week and 2
scholarly sources are
integrated.
Relates topic to
Scripture/biblical principles
where appropriate.
• Each question/prompt is
answered.
• Major points are stated
clearly and effectively for the
most part.
• Clear, logical and focused for
the most part.
10.5 to 11 points:
•
•
Ideas from most the required
reading and presentations
from the Module/Week and 2
scholarly sources are
integrated.
Scripture/biblical principles
are included but unfocused at
times.
•
•
Developing
1-83%
1 to 12 points:
Not
present
0 points
• Not all facets of the
prompt/questions are
answered.
• Lack of clarity, coherence,
logic and focus in key areas.
Not
present
1 to 10 points:
0 points
Ideas from few of the
required reading and
presentations from the
Module/Week and 2
scholarly sources are
integrated.
Missing Biblical integration.
Total
Not
present
13.5 to 15 points:
12.5 to 13 points:
1 to 12 points:
0 points
• At least 3 unique interaction
posts with classmates
• One reply posted to each of 3
classmates’ threads.
• Moves the conversation
forward with new ideas,
research, and analysis.
• Student’s response delivered
in a thorough, thoughtful, and
analytical manner with the
• At least 3 unique interaction
posts with classmates
• One reply posted to each of 3
classmates’ threads.
• New ideas, research, and
analysis are not always
included.
• Some commentary is
repetitive from one reply to
the next.
• Missing one or more reply
posts.
• Reply posts are redundant.
• Little in the way of new
ideas, research, and analysis
are not always included.
Not
present
Page 1 of 2
PLCY 700
student’s position clearly
evident.
Reply:
Research
Engagement
Structure
(30%)
Grammar,
Spelling &
Turabian
9.5 to 10 points:
• Relates topic to
Scripture/biblical principles
where appropriate.
• Contains abundant citations
from required reading,
presentations, and scholarly
sources.
Advanced
92-100%
13.5 to 15 points:
Minimal to no errors in grammar,
spelling, or Turabian.
Word Count
7 to 7.5 points:
Appropriate word count:
400–500 words for thread; 200–
250 words per reply.
Instructor’s
Comments:
• At times, reply posts do not
seem to actually build upon
classmate’s post.
8.5 to 9 points:
1 to 8 points:
0 points
• Scripture/biblical principles
are included but unfocused at
times.
• Contains some citations from
reading, presentations, and
scholarly sources.
• Missing Biblical integration.
• Limited citations from the
required reading and
presentations.
Not
present
Proficient
84-91%
12.5 to 13 points:
Developing
1-83%
1 to 12 points:
Not
present
0 points
Some errors in grammar, spelling, Numerous errors in grammar,
or Turabian.
spelling, or Turabian.
6.25 to 6.75 points:
1 to 6 points:
Not
present
0 points
100 words more or less than the
required length.
Not
present
Over 100 words more or less
than the required length.
Total:
Total
/75
Page 2 of 2
PLCY 701
DISCUSSION BOARD FORUM GRADING RUBRIC
Criteria
Content
(70%)
Content
Master
Advanced
92-100%
25 to 27 points
The thread and replies display
clear content mastery while
critically analyzing/evaluating
each of the assignment
prompts.
There are at least two replies.
Levels of Achievement
Proficient
Developing
84-91%
1-83%
23 to 24.5 points
1 to 22.5 points
The thread and replies
address each of the
assignment prompts, yet
with modest evidence of
subject mastery or critical
analysis.
There are at least two
replies.
Clarity and
Coherence
Missing one reply.
1 to 22.5 points
0 points
The thread and
replies do not
provide evidence
of subject
mastery.
25 to 27 points
23 to 24.5 points
The thread and replies are
critical in its approach to each
of the assignment prompts,
providing evidence of
coherent reasoning, analytical
insight, and relevant research.
The thread and replies are
satisfactory, but does not
provide strong evidence of
coherent reasoning, clear
writing, or critical analysis
based on careful research or
current literature.
The thread and replies
demonstrate a clear bias
or does not provide a
clearly discernible
position on the issue.
Evidence of research is
not present.
There are at least two
replies.
13.5 to 14.5 points
Missing one reply.
1 to 13 points
0 points
The thread and replies
contain satisfactory
evidence yet is
insufficiently detailed,
defined, or explained,
and/or questionably
relevant to the assignment
prompts.
Evidence in the thread
and replies is
insufficiently detailed,
defined, or explained, and
is marginally relevant to
the assignment prompts,
if at all.
Contributions to
the discussion
are nominal.
There are at least two replies.
Evidence and
Detail
The thread and replies
loosely relate to or
neglect 1 or more of the
assigned prompts and do
not effectively develop
the discussion beyond
minimal or superficial
understanding of the
topic.
Not Present
15 to 16 points
The thread and replies provide
evidence that is sufficiently
detailed, defined, or
explained, and highly relevant
to the assignment prompts.
There are at least two replies.
Missing one reply.
0 points
The thread and
replies do not
display evidence
of individual
thought or
topical research.
Total
PLCY 701
Structure
(30%)
Organization,
Writing
Mechanics,
Grammar,
and Spelling
Current
Turabian
Format
Compliance
and
Assignment
Requirements
Professor
Comments:
Advanced
92-100%
18.5 to 20 points
There are at least two
replies.
Proficient
84-91%
17 to 18 points
Developing
1-83%
1 to 16.5 points
The argument, evidence, and
conclusion of the thread and
replies are coherently written
and organized with fewer than
2 errors in grammar or
spelling.
The argument, evidence,
and conclusion of the thread
and replies are relatively
clear, yet partially obscured
by poor organization,
writing mechanics, and/or
fewer than 5 errors in
grammar or spelling.
The argument, evidence,
and conclusion of the
thread and replies are
disrupted by poor
organization, writing
mechanics, and/or fewer
than 8 errors in grammar
or spelling.
9.5 to 10 points
8.5 to 9 points
1 to 8 points
There are only minimal errors
(1–2) noted in current
Turabian formatting. The
original thread is 600–700
words, and each reply is 300–
350 words. The original
thread has at least 3 citations
and at least 1 Scripture
reference. Each reply has at
least 1 citation and at least 1
Scripture reference.
There are a few errors (3–4)
noted in current Turabian
formatting. The thread
and/or replies may not meet
the word count
requirements and may be
lacking required citations.
There are numerous
errors (5+) noted in
current Turabian
formatting. The thread
and/or replies do not meet
the word count
requirements and lack
required citations.
Not Present
Total
0 points
The thread and
replies are
disorganized, are
poorly written,
and contain more
than 8 errors in
grammar or
spelling that
distract the
reader from the
content.
0 points
There are notable
absences in
required current
Turabian
formatting
elements. The
word count for
each post is not
within 20% of
the length
requirement. No
outside
references are
provided.
Total:
/100
St. Thomas Aquinas
The Summa Theologica
(Benziger Bros. edition, 1947)
Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province
Index [>]
First Part of the Second Part [>]
Question: 90 [>]
TREATISE ON LAW (Questions 90-108)
OF THE ESSENCE OF LAW (FOUR ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the extrinsic principles of acts. Now the extrinsic principle
inclining to evil is the devil, of whose temptations we have spoken in the FP, Question
[114]. But the extrinsic principle moving to good is God, Who both instructs us by
means of His Law, and assists us by His Grace: wherefore in the first place we must
speak of law; in the second place, of grace.
Concerning law, we must consider: (1) Law itself in general; (2) its parts.
Concerning law in general three points offer themselves for our consideration: (1) Its
essence; (2) The different kinds of law; (3) The effects of law.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether law is something pertaining to reason?
(2) Concerning the end of law;
(3) Its cause;
(4) The promulgation of law.
Index
First Part of the Second Part
Question: 90
Article: 1
[>]
[>]
[>]
[>]
Whether law is something pertaining to reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that law is not something pertaining to reason. For the
Apostle says (Rm. 7:23): "I see another law in my members," etc. But nothing
pertaining to reason is in the members; since the reason does not make use of a bodily
organ. Therefore law is not something pertaining to reason.
Objection 2: Further, in the reason there is nothing else but power, habit, and act.
But law is not the power itself of reason. In like manner, neither is it a habit of reason:
because the habits of reason are the intellectual virtues of which we have spoken
above (Question [57]). Nor again is it an act of reason: because then law would cease,
when the act of reason ceases, for instance, while we are asleep. Therefore law is
nothing pertaining to reason.
Objection 3: Further, the law moves those who are subject to it to act aright. But it
belongs properly to the will to move to act, as is evident from what has been said
above (Question [9], Article [1]). Therefore law pertains, not to the reason, but to the
will; according to the words of the Jurist (Lib. i, ff., De Const. Prin. leg. i):
"Whatsoever pleaseth the sovereign, has force of law."
On the contrary, It belongs to the law to command and to forbid. But it belongs to
reason to command, as stated above (Question [17], Article [1]). Therefore law is
something pertaining to reason.
I answer that, Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is induced to act or is
restrained from acting: for "lex" [law] is derived from "ligare" [to bind], because it
binds one to act. Now the rule and measure of human acts is the reason, which is the
first principle of human acts, as is evident from what has been stated above (Question
[1], Article [1], ad 3); since it belongs to the reason to direct to the end, which is the
first principle in all matters of action, according to the Philosopher (Phys. ii). Now
that which is the principle in any genus, is the rule and measure of that genus: for
instance, unity in the genus of numbers, and the first movement in the genus of
movements. Consequently it follows that law is something pertaining to reason.
Reply to Objection 1: Since law is a kind of rule and measure, it may be in
something in two ways. First, as in that which measures and rules: and since this is
proper to reason, it follows that, in this way, law is in the reason alone. Secondly, as in
that which is measured and ruled. In this way, law is in all those things that are
inclined to something by reason of some law: so that any inclination arising from a
law, may be called a law, not essentially but by participation as it were. And thus the
inclination of the members to concupiscence is called "the law of the members."
Reply to Objection 2: Just as, in external action, we may consider the work and the
work done, for instance the work of building and the house built; so in the acts of
reason, we may consider the act itself of reason, i.e. to understand and to reason, and
something produced by this act. With regard to the speculative reason, this is first of
all the definition; secondly, the proposition; thirdly, the syllogism or argument. And
since also the practical reason makes use of a syllogism in respect of the work to be
done, as stated above (Question [13], Article [3]; Question [76], Article [1]) and since
as the Philosopher teaches (Ethic. vii, 3); hence we find in the practical reason
something that holds the same position in regard to operations, as, in the speculative
intellect, the proposition holds in regard to conclusions. Such like universal
propositions of the practical intellect that are directed to actions have the nature of
law. And these propositions are sometimes under our actual consideration, while
sometimes they are retained in the reason by means of a habit.
Reply to Objection 3: Reason has its power of moving from the will, as stated above
(Question [17], Article [1]): for it is due to the fact that one wills the end, that the
reason issues its commands as regards things ordained to the end. But in order that the
volition of what is commanded may have the nature of law, it needs to be in accord
with some rule of reason. And in this sense is to be understood the saying that the will
of the sovereign has the force of law; otherwise the sovereign's will would savor of
lawlessness rather than of law.
Index
First Part of the Second Part
Question: 90
Article: 2
[>]
[>]
[>]
[>]
Whether the law is always something directed to the common good?
Objection 1: It would seem that the law is not always directed to the common good
as to its end. For it belongs to law to command and to forbid. But commands are
directed to certain individual goods. Therefore the end of the law is not always the
common good.
Objection 2: Further, the law directs man in his actions. But human actions are
concerned with particular matters. Therefore the law is directed to some particular
good.
Objection 3: Further, Isidore says (Etym. v, 3): "If the law is based on reason,
whatever is based on reason will be a law." But reason is the foundation not only of
what is ordained to the common good, but also of that which is directed private good.
Therefore the law is not only directed to the good of all, but also to the private good of
an individual.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 21) that "laws are enacted for no private
profit, but for the common benefit of the citizens."
I answer that, As stated above (Article [1]), the law belongs to that which is a
principle of human acts, because it is their rule and measure. Now as reason is a
principle of human acts, so in reason itself there is something which is the principle in
respect of all the rest: wherefore to this principle chiefly and mainly law must needs
be referred. Now the first principle in practical matters, which are the object of the
practical reason, is the last end: and the last end of human life is bliss or happiness, as
stated above (Question [2], Article [7]; Question [3], Article [1]). Consequently the
law must needs regard principally the relationship to happiness. Moreover, since
every part is ordained to the whole, as imperfect to perfect; and since one man is a
part of the perfect community, the law must needs regard properly the relationship to
universal happiness. Wherefore the Philosopher, in the above definition of legal
matters mentions both happiness and the body politic: for he says (Ethic. v, 1) that we
call those legal matters "just, which are adapted to produce and preserve happiness
and its parts for the body politic": since the state is a perfect community, as he says in
Polit. i, 1.
Now in every genus, that which belongs to it chiefly is the principle of the others,
and the others belong to that genus in subordination to that thing: thus fire, which is
chief among hot things, is the cause of heat in mixed bodies, and these are said to be
hot in so far as they have a share of fire. Consequently, since the law is chiefly
ordained to the common good, any other precept in regard to some individual work,
must needs be devoid of the nature of a law, save in so far as it regards the common
good. Therefore every law is ordained to the common good.
Reply to Objection 1: A command denotes an application of a law to matters
regulated by the law. Now the order to the common good, at which the law aims, is
applicable to particular ends. And in this way commands are given even concerning
particular matters.
Reply to Objection 2: Actions are indeed concerned with particular matters: but
those particular matters are referable to the common good, not as to a common genus
or species, but as to a common final cause, according as the common good is said to
be the common end.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as nothing stands firm with regard to the speculative
reason except that which is traced back to the first indemonstrable principles, so
nothing stands firm with regard to the practical reason, unless it be directed to the last
end which is the common good: and whatever stands to reason in this sense, has the
nature of a law.
Index
First Part of the Second Part
Question: 90
Article: 3
[>]
[>]
[>]
[>]
Whether the reason of any man is competent to make laws?
Objection 1: It would seem that the reason of any man is competent to make laws.
For the Apostle says (Rm. 2:14) that "when the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by
nature those things that are of the law . . . they are a law to themselves." Now he says
this of all in general. Therefore anyone can make a law for himself.
Objection 2: Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1), "the intention of the
lawgiver is to lead men to virtue." But every man can lead another to virtue. Therefore
the reason of any man is competent to make laws.
Objection 3: Further, just as the sovereign of a state governs the state, so every
father of a family governs his household. But the sovereign of a state can make laws
for the state. Therefore every father of a family can make laws for his household.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 10): "A law is an ordinance of the people,
whereby something is sanctioned by the Elders together with the Commonalty."
I answer that, A law, properly speaking, regards first and foremost the order to the
common good. Now to order anything to the common good, belongs either to the
whole people, or to someone who is the viceregent of the whole people. And therefore
the making of a law belongs either to the whole people or to a public personage who
has care of the whole people: since in all other matters the directing of anything to the
end concerns him to whom the end belongs.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (Article [1], ad 1), a law is in a person not
only as in one that rules, but also by participation as in one that is ruled. In the latter
way each one is a law to himself, in so far as he shares the direction that he receives
from one who rules him. Hence the same text goes on: "Who show the work of the
law written in their hearts."
Reply to Objection 2: A private person cannot lead another to virtue efficaciously:
for he can only advise, and if his advice be not taken, it has no coercive power, such
as the law should have, in order to prove an efficacious inducement to virtue, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 9). But this coercive power is vested in the whole people
or in some public personage, to whom it belongs to inflict penalties, as we shall state
further on (Question [92], Article [2], ad 3; SS, Question [64], Article [3]). Wherefore
the framing of laws belongs to him alone.
Reply to Objection 3: As one man is a part of the household, so a household is a part
of the state: and the state is a perfect community, according to Polit. i, 1. And
therefore, as the good of one man is not the last end, but is ordained to the common
good; so too the good of one household is ordained to the good of a single state, which
is a perfect community. Consequently he that governs a family, can indeed make
certain commands or ordinances, but not such as to have properly the force of law.
Index
First Part of the Second Part
Question: 90
Article: 4
[>]
[>]
[>]
[>]
Whether promulgation is essential to a law?
Objection 1: It would seem that promulgation is not essential to a law. For the
natural law above all has the character of law. But the natural law needs no
promulgation. Therefore it is not essential to a law that it be promulgated.
Objection 2: Further, it belongs properly to a law to bind one to do or not to do
something. But the obligation of fulfilling a law touches not only those in whose
presence it is promulgated, but also others. Therefore promulgation is not essential to
a law.
Objection 3: Further, the binding force of a law extends even to the future, since
"laws are binding in matters of the future," as the jurists say (Cod. 1, tit. De lege et
constit. leg. vii). But promulgation concerns those who are present. Therefore it is not
essential to a law.
On the contrary, It is laid down in the Decretals, dist. 4, that "laws are established
when they are promulgated."
I answer that, As stated above (Article [1]), a law is imposed on others by way of a
rule and measure. Now a rule or measure is imposed by being applied to those who
are to be ruled and measured by it. Wherefore, in order that a law obtain the binding
force which is proper to a law, it must needs be applied to the men who have to be
ruled by it. Such application is made by its being notified to them by promulgation.
Wherefore promulgation is necessary for the law to obtain its force.
Thus from the four preceding articles, the definition of law may be gathered; and it
is nothing else than an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who
has care of the community, and promulgated.
Reply to Objection 1: The natural law is promulgated by the very fact that God
instilled it into man's mind so as to be known by him naturally.
Reply to Objection 2: Those who are not present when a law is promulgated, are
bound to observe the law, in so far as it is notified or can be notified to them by
others, after it has been promulgated.
Reply to Objection 3: The promulgation that takes place now, extends to future time
by reason of the durability of written characters, by which means it is continually
promulgated. Hence Isidore says (Etym. v, 3; ii, 10) that "lex [law] is derived from
legere [to read] because it is written."
This document converted to HTML on Fri Jan 02 19:1
ON KINGSHIP
TO THE KING OF CYPRUS
by
Thomas Aquinas
translated by
Gerald B. Phelan,
revised by
I. Th. Eschmann, O.P.
Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949
Re-edited and chapter numbers aligned with Latin, by Joseph Kenny,
O.P.
CONTENTS
Address to the King of Cyprus
BOOK ONE: THE THEORY OF MONARCHY
[1] As I was turning over in my mind what I might present to Your Majesty as a gift at
once worthy of Your Royal Highness and befitting my profession and office, it seemed
to me a highly appropriate offering that, for a king, I should write a book on kingship, in
which, so far as my ability permits, I should carefully expound, according to the authority
of Holy Writ and the teachings of the philosophers as well as the practice of worthy
princes, both the origin of kingly government and the things which pertain to the office of
a king, relying for the beginning, progress and accomplishment of this work, on the help
of Him, Who is King of Kings, Lord of Lords, through Whom kings rule, God the Mighty
Lord, King great above all gods.
Liber 1
BOOK ONE
Caput 1
Quod necesse est homines simul
viventes ab aliquo diligenter regi
CHAPTER 1
[That people living together must be
ruled responsibly by someone]
Principium autem intentionis nostrae hinc
[3] In all things which are ordered
sumere oportet, ut quid nomine regis
intelligendum sit, exponatur. In omnibus
autem quae ad finem aliquem ordinantur,
in quibus contingit sic et aliter procedere,
opus est aliquo dirigente, per quod directe
debitum perveniatur ad finem. Non enim
navis, quam secundum diversorum
ventorum impulsum in diversa moveri
contingit, ad destinatum finem perveniret
nisi per gubernatoris industriam dirigeretur
ad portum. Hominis autem est aliquis finis,
ad quem tota vita eius et actio ordinatur,
cum sit agens per intellectum, cuius est
manifeste propter finem operari. Contingit
autem diversimode homines ad finem
intentum procedere, quod ipsa diversitas
humanorum studiorum et actionum
declarat. Indiget igitur homo aliquo
dirigente ad finem.
towards an end, wherein this or that
course may be adopted, some directive
principle is needed through which the
due end may be reached by the most
direct route. A ship, for example, which
moves in different directions. according
to the impulse of the changing winds,
would never reach its destination were it
not brought to port by the skill of the pilot.
Now, man has an end to which his whole
life and all his actions are ordered; for
man is an intelligent agent, and it is
clearly the part of an intelligent agent to
act in view of an end. Men also adopt
different methods in proceeding towards
their proposed end, as the diversity of
men’s pursuits and actions clearly
indicates. Consequently man needs
some directive principle to guide him
towards his end.
Est autem unicuique hominum naturaliter
insitum rationis lumen, quo in suis actibus
dirigatur ad finem. Et si quidem homini
conveniret singulariter vivere, sicut multis
animalium, nullo alio dirigente indigeret ad
finem, sed ipse sibi unusquisque esset rex
sub Deo summo rege, in quantum per
lumen rationis divinitus datum sibi, in suis
actibus se ipsum dirigeret. Naturale autem
est homini ut sit animal sociale et
politicum, in multitudine vivens, magis
etiam quam omnia alia animalia, quod
quidem naturalis necessitas declarat.
[4] To be sure, the light of reason is
placed by nature in every man, to guide
him in his acts towards his end.
Wherefore, if man were intended to live
alone, as many animals do, he would
require no other guide to his end. Each
man would be a king unto himself, under
God, the highest King, inasmuch as he
would direct himself in his acts by the
light of reason given him from on high.
Yet it is natural for man, more than for
any other animal, to be a social and
political animal,
to live in a group.
[5] This is clearly a necessity of man’s
nature.
Aliis enim animalibus natura praeparavit
cibum, tegumenta pilorum, defensionem,
ut dentes, cornua, ungues, vel saltem
velocitatem ad fugam. Homo autem
institutus est nullo horum sibi a natura
praeparato, sed loco omnium data est ei
For all other animals, nature has
prepared food, hair as a covering, teeth,
horns, claws as means of defence or at
least speed in flight, while man alone
was made without any natural provisions
for these things. Instead of all these, man
ratio, per quam sibi haec omnia officio
manuum posset praeparare, ad quae
omnia praeparanda unus homo non
sufficit. Nam unus homo per se sufficienter
vitam transigere non posset. Est igitur
homini naturale quod in societate
multorum vivat.
was endowed with reason, by the use of
which he could procure all these things
for himself by the work of his hands.
Now, one man alone is not able to
procure them all for himself, for one man
could not sufficiently provide for life,
unassisted. It is therefore natural that
man should live in the society of many.
Amplius: aliis animalibus insita est
naturalis industria ad omnia ea quae sunt
eis utilia vel nociva, sicut ovis naturaliter
aestimat lupum inimicum. Quaedam etiam
animalia ex naturali industria cognoscunt
aliquas herbas medicinales et alia eorum
vitae necessaria. Homo autem horum,
quae sunt suae vitae necessaria,
naturalem cognitionem habet solum in
communi, quasi eo per rationem valente
ex universalibus principiis ad cognitionem
singulorum,
quae
necessaria
sunt
humanae vitae, pervenire. Non est autem
possibile quod unus homo ad omnia
huiusmodi per suam rationem pertingat.
Est igitur necessarium homini quod in
multitudine vivat, ut unus ab alio adiuvetur
et diversi diversis inveniendis per rationem
occupentur, puta, unus in medicina, alius
in hoc, alius in alio.
[6] Moreover, all other animals are able
to, discern, by inborn skill, what is useful
and what is injurious, even as the sheep
naturally regards the wolf as his enemy.
Some animals also recognize by natural
skill certain medicinal herbs and other
things necessary for their life. Man, on
the contrary, has a natural knowledge of
the things which are essential for his. life
only in a general fashion, inasmuch as
he is able to attain knowledge of the
particular things necessary for human life
by reasoning from natural principles. But
it is not possible for one man to arrive at
a knowledge of all these things by his
own individual reason. It is therefore
necessary for man to live in a multitude
so that each one may assist his fellows,
and different men may be occupied in
seeking, by their reason, to make
different discoveries—one, for example,
in medicine, one in this and another in
that.
Hoc etiam evidentissime declaratur per
hoc, quod est proprium hominis locutione
uti, per quam unus homo aliis suum
conceptum totaliter potest exprimere. Alia
quidem
animalia
exprimunt
mutuo
passiones suas in communi, ut canis in
latratu iram, et alia animalia passiones
suas diversis modis. Magis igitur homo est
communicativus alteri quam quodcumque
aliud animal, quod gregale videtur, ut grus,
formica et apis. Hoc ergo considerans
[7] This point is further and most plainly
evidenced by the fact that the. use of
speech is a prerogative proper to man.
By this means, one man is able fully to
express his conceptions to others. Other
animals, it is true, express their feelings
to one another in a general way, as a
dog may express anger by barking and
other animals give vent to other feelings
in
various
fashions.
But
man
communicates with his kind more
Salomon in Eccle. IV, 9, ait: melius est
esse duos quam unum. Habent enim
emolumentum mutuae societatis.
completely than any other animal known
to be gregarious, such as the crane, the
ant or the bee.—With this in mind,
Solomon says: “It is better that there be
two than one; for they have the
advantage of their company.”’
Si ergo naturale est homini quod in
societate multorum vivat, necesse est in
hominibus esse per quod multitudo
regatur.
Multis
enim
existentibus
hominibus et unoquoque id, quod est sibi
congruum, providente, multitudo in diversa
dispergeretur, nisi etiam esset aliquis de
eo quod ad bonum multitudinis pertinet
curam habens; sicut et corpus hominis et
cuiuslibet animalis deflueret, nisi esset
aliqua vis regitiva communis in corpore,
quae ad bonum commune omnium
membrorum intenderet. Quod considerans
Salomon dicit: ubi non est gubernator,
dissipabitur populus.
[8] If, then, it is natural for man to live in
the society of many, it is necessary that
there exist among men some means by
which the group may be governed. For
where there are many men together and
each one is looking after his own interest,
the multitude would be broken up and
scattered unless there were also an
agency to take care of what appertains to
the commonweal. In like manner, the
body of a man or any other animal would
disintegrate unless there were a general
ruling force within the body which
watches over the common good of all
members. With this in mind, Solomon
says [Eccl. 4:9]: “Where there is no
governor, the people shall fall.”
Hoc autem rationabiliter accidit: non enim
idem est quod proprium et quod
commune. Secundum propria quidem
differunt, secundum autem commune
uniuntur. Diversorum autem diversae sunt
causae. Oportet igitur, praeter id quod
movet ad proprium bonum uniuscuiusque,
esse aliquid quod movet ad bonum
commune multorum. Propter quod et in
omnibus quae in unum ordinantur, aliquid
invenitur alterius regitivum. In universitate
enim corporum per primum corpus, scilicet
caeleste, alia corpora ordine quodam
divinae providentiae reguntur, omniaque
corpora per creaturam rationalem. In uno
etiam homine anima regit corpus, atque
inter
animae
partes
irascibilis
et
concupiscibilis ratione reguntur. Itemque
inter membra corporis unum est principale,
[9] Indeed it is reasonable that this
should happen, for what is proper and
what is common are not identical. Things
differ by what is proper to each: they are
united by what they have in common. But
diversity of effects is due to diversity of
causes. Consequently, there must exist
something which impels towards the
common good of the many, over and
above that which impels towards the
particular good of each individual.
Wherefore also in all things that are
ordained towards one end, one thing is
found to rule the rest. Thus in the
corporeal universe, by the first body, i.e.
the celestial body, the other bodies are
regulated according to the order of Divine
Providence; and all bodies are ruled by a
rational creature. So, too in the individual
quod omnia movet, ut cor, aut caput.
Oportet igitur esse in omni multitudine
aliquod regitivum.
Caput 2
Distinguitur multiplex dominium
sive regimen
Contingit autem in quibusdam, quae
ordinantur ad finem, et recte, et non
recte procedere. Quare et in regimine
multitudinis et rectum, et non rectum
invenitur.
Recte
autem
dirigitur
unumquodque quando ad finem
convenientem deducitur; non recte
autem
quando ad finem
non
convenientem. Alius autem est finis
conveniens multitudini liberorum, et
servorum. Nam liber est, qui sui causa
est; servus autem est, qui id quod est,
alterius est. Si igitur liberorum
multitudo a regente ad bonum
commune multitudinis ordinetur, erit
regimen rectum et iustum, quale
convenit liberis. Si vero non ad bonum
commune multitudinis, sed ad bonum
privatum regentis regimen ordinetur,
erit
regimen
iniustum
atque
perversum, unde et dominus talibus
rectoribus comminatur per Ezech.
XXXIV, 2, dicens: vae pastoribus qui
pascebant semetipsos (quasi sua
propria commoda quaerentes): nonne
greges a pastoribus pascuntur?
Bonum siquidem gregis pastores
quaerere debent, et rectores quilibet
bonum multitudinis sibi subiectae.
man, the soul rules the body; and among
the parts of the soul, the irascible and the
concupiscible parts are ruled by reason.
Likewise, among the members of a body,
one, such as the heart or the head, is the
principal and moves all the others.
Therefore in every multitude there must
be some governing power.
CHAPTER 2 DIFFERENT KINDS OF RULE
[10] Now it happens in certain things which
are, ordained towards an end that one may
proceed in a right way and also in a wrong
way. So, too, in the government of a
multitude there is a distinction between right
and wrong. A thing is rightly directed when it
is led towards a befitting end; wrongly when
it is led towards an unbefitting end. Now the
end which befits a multitude of free men is
different from that which befits a multitude of
slaves, for the free man is one who exists for
his own sake, while the slave, as such, exists
for the sake of another. If, therefore, a
multitude of free men is ordered by the ruler
towards the common good of the multitude,
that rulership will be right and just, as is
suitable to free men. If, on the other hand, a
rulership aims, not at the common good of
the multitude, but at the private good of the
ruler, it will be an unjust and perverted
rulership. The Lord, therefore, threatens
such rulers, saying by the mouth of Ezekiel:
“Woe to the shepherds that feed themselves
(seeking, that is, their own interest) : should
not the flocks be fed by the shepherd?”
Shepherds indeed should seek the good of
their flocks, and every ruler, the good of the
multitude subject to him.
Si igitur regimen iniustum per unum
tantum fiat qui sua commoda ex
regimine quaerat, non autem bonum
multitudinis sibi subiectae, talis rector
tyrannus vocatur, nomine a fortitudine
derivato, quia scilicet per potentiam
opprimit, non per iustitiam regit: unde
et apud antiquos potentes quique
tyranni vocabantur. Si vero iniustum
regimen non per unum fiat, sed per
plures,
siquidem
per
paucos,
oligarchia vocatur, id est principatus
paucorum, quando scilicet pauci
propter divitias opprimunt plebem, sola
pluralitate a tyranno differentes. Si
vero iniquum regimen exerceatur per
multos, democratia nuncupatur, id est
potentatus populi, quando scilicet
populus plebeiorum per potentiam
multitudinis opprimit divites. Sic enim
populus totus erit quasi unus tyrannus.
[11] If an unjust government is carried on by
one man alone,
who seeks his own
benefit from his rule and not the good of the
multitude subject to him, such a ruler is
called
a
tyrant—a
word
derived
from strength—because he oppresses by
might instead of ruling by justice. Thus
among the ancients all powerful men were
called tyrants. If an. unjust government is
carried on, not by one but by several, and if
they be few, it is called an oligarchy, that is,
the rule of a few. This occurs when a few,
who differ from the tyrant only by the fact that
they are more than one, oppress the people
by means of their wealth. If, finally, the bad
government is carried on by the multitude, it
is called a democracy, i.e. control by the
populace, which comes about when the
plebeian people by force of numbers oppress
the rich. In this way the whole people will be
as one tyrant.
Similiter autem et iustum regimen
distingui oportet. Si enim administretur
per aliquam multitudinem, communi
nomine politia vocatur, utpote cum
multitudo bellatorum in civitate vel
provincia
dominatur.
Si
vero
administretur per paucos, virtuosos
autem, huiusmodi regimen aristocratia
vocatur, id est potentatus optimus, vel
optimorum, qui propterea optimates
dicuntur. Si vero iustum regimen ad
unum tantum pertineat, ille proprie rex
vocatur: unde dominus per Ezech.
dicit: servus meus David rex super
omnes erit, et pastor unus erit omnium
eorum.
[12] In like manner we must divide just
governments.
If
the
government
is
administered by many, it is given the name
common to all forms of government, viz.
polity, as for instance when a group of
warriors exercise dominion over a city or
province. If it is administered by a few men of
virtue, this kind of government is called an
aristocracy, i.e. noble governance, or
governance by noble men, who for this
reason are called the Optimates. And if a just
government is in the hands of one man
alone, he is properly called a king.
Wherefore the Lord says by the mouth of
Ezekiel:” “My servant, David, shall be king
over them and all of them shall have one
shepherd.”
Ex quo manifeste ostenditur quod de
ratione regis est quod sit unus, qui
praesit, et quod sit pastor commune
multitudinis bonum, et non suum
[13] From this it is clearly shown that the idea
of king implies that he be one man who is
chief and that he be a shepherd, seeking the
common good of the multitude and not his
commodum quaerens.
own.
Cum autem homini competat in
multitudine vivere, quia sibi non sufficit
ad necessaria vitae si solitarius
maneat, oportet quod tanto sit
perfectior multitudinis societas, quanto
magis per se sufficiens erit ad
necessaria vitae. Habetur siquidem
aliqua vitae sufficientia in una familia
domus unius, quantum scilicet ad
naturales actus nutritionis, et prolis
generandae, et aliorum huiusmodi; in
uno autem vico, quantum ad ea quae
ad unum artificium pertinent; in civitate
vero, quae est perfecta communitas,
quantum ad omnia necessaria vitae;
sed adhuc magis in provincia una
propter necessitatem compugnationis
et mutui auxilii contra hostes. Unde qui
perfectam communitatem regit, id est
civitatem
vel
provinciam,
antonomastice rex vocatur; qui autem
domum
regit,
non
rex,
sed
paterfamilias dicitur. Habet tamen
aliquam similitudinem regis, propter
quam aliquando reges populorum
patres vocantur.
[14] Now since man must live in a group,
because he is not sufficient unto himself to
procure the necessities of life were he to
remain solitary, it follows that a society will
be the more perfect the more it is sufficient
unto itself to procure the necessities of
life.
There is, to some extent, sufficiency
for life in one family of one household,
namely, insofar as pertains to the natural
acts of nourishment and the begetting of
offspring and other things of this kind. Selfsufficiency
exists,
furthermore,
in
one street
with regard to those things
which belong to the trade of one guild. In
a city, which is the perfect community, it
exists with regard to all the necessities of life.
Still more self-sufficiency is found in
a province
because of the need of fighting
together and of mutual help against enemies.
Hence the man ruling a perfect community,
i.e. a city or a province, is antonomastically
called the king. The ruler of a household is
called father, not king, although he bears a
certain resemblance to the king, for which
reason kings are sometimes called the
fathers of their peoples.
Ex dictis igitur patet, quod rex est qui
unius
multitudinem
civitatis
vel
provinciae,
et
propter
bonum
commune, regit; unde Salomon in
Eccle. V, 8, dicit: universae terrae rex
imperat servienti.
[15] It is plain, therefore, from what has been
said, that a king is one who rules the people
of one city or province, and rules them for
the common good. Wherefore Solomon says
[Eccl. 5:8]: “The king rules over all the land
subject to him.”
Caput 3
Quod utilius est multitudinem hominum
simul viventium regi per unum quam per
plures
CHAPTER 3
WHETHER IT IS MORE EXPEDIENT
FOR A CITY OR PROVINCE TO BE
RULED BY ONE MAN OR BY MANY
His autem praemissis requirere oportet quid
[16] Having set forth these preliminary
provinciae vel civitati magis expedit: utrum a
pluribus regi, vel uno. Hoc autem considerari
potest ex ipso fine regiminis.
points we must now inquire what is
better for a province or a city: whether
to be ruled by one man or by many.
Ad hoc enim cuiuslibet regentis ferri debet
intentio, ut eius quod regendum suscepit
salutem procuret. Gubernatoris enim est,
navem contra maris pericula servando,
illaesam perducere ad portum salutis.
Bonum autem et salus consociatae
multitudinis est ut eius unitas conservetur,
quae dicitur pax, qua remota, socialis vitae
perit utilitas, quinimmo multitudo dissentiens
sibi ipsi sit onerosa. Hoc igitur est ad quod
maxime rector multitudinis intendere debet,
ut pacis unitatem procuret. Nec recte
consiliatur, an pacem faciat in multitudine
sibi subiecta, sicut medicus, an sanet
infirmum sibi commissum. Nullus enim
consiliari debet de fine quem intendere
debet, sed de his quae sunt ad finem.
Propterea apostolus commendata fidelis
populi unitate: solliciti, inquit, sitis servare
unitatem spiritus in vinculo pacis. Quanto
igitur regimen efficacius fuerit ad unitatem
pacis servandam, tanto erit utilius. Hoc enim
utilius dicimus, quod magis perducit ad
finem. Manifestum est autem quod unitatem
magis efficere potest quod est per se unum,
quam plures. Sicut efficacissima causa est
calefactionis quod est per se calidum. Utilius
igitur est regimen unius, quam plurium.
[17] This question may be considered
first from the viewpoint of the purpose
of government. The aim of any ruler
should be directed towards securing
the welfare of that which he undertakes
to rule. The duty of the pilot, for
instance, is to preserve his ship amidst
the perils of the sea. and to bring it
unharmed to the port of safety. Now
the welfare and safety of a multitude
formed into a society lies in the
preservation of its unity, which is called
peace. If this is removed, the benefit of
social life is lost and, moreover, the
multitude in its disagreement becomes
a burden to itself. The chief concern of
the ruler of a multitude, therefore, is to
procure the unity of peace. It is not
even legitimate for him to deliberate
whether he shall establish peace in the
multitude subject to him, just as a
physician does not deliberate whether
he shall heal the sick man encharged
to him,
for no one should deliberate
about an end which he is obliged to
seek, but only about the means to
attain that end. Wherefore the Apostle,
having commended the unity of the
faithful people, says: “Be ye careful to
keep the unity of the spirit in the bond
of peace.” Thus, the more efficacious
a. government is in keeping the unity of
peace, the more useful it will be. For
we call that more useful which leads
more directly to the end. Now it is
manifest that what is itself one can
more efficaciously bring about unity
than several—just as the most
efficacious cause of heat is that which
is by its nature hot. Therefore the rule
of one man is more useful than the rule
of many.
Amplius, manifestum est quod plures
multitudinem nullo modo conservant, si
omnino dissentirent. Requiritur enim in
pluribus quaedam unio ad hoc, quod quoquo
modo regere possint: quia nec multi navem
in unam partem traherent, nisi aliquo modo
coniuncti. Uniri autem dicuntur plura per
appropinquationem ad unum. Melius igitur
regit unus quam plures ex eo quod
appropinquant ad unum.
[18] Furthermore, it is evident that
several persons could by no means
preserve the stability of the community
if they totally disagreed. For union is
necessary among them if they are to
rule at all: several men, for instance,
could not pull a ship in one direction
unless joined together in some fashion.
Now several are said to be united
according as they come closer to being
one. So one man rules better than
several who come near being one.
Adhuc: ea, quae sunt ad naturam, optime se
habent: in singulis enim operatur natura,
quod optimum est. Omne autem naturale
regimen ab uno est. In membrorum enim
multitudine unum est quod omnia movet,
scilicet cor; et in partibus animae una vis
principaliter praesidet, scilicet ratio. Est
etiam apibus unus rex, et in toto universo
unus Deus factor omnium et rector. Et hoc
rationabiliter.
Omnis
enim
multitudo
derivatur ab uno. Quare si ea quae sunt
secundum artem, imitantur ea quae sunt
secundum naturam, et tanto magis opus
artis est melius, quanto magis assequitur
similitudinem eius quod est in natura,
necesse est quod in humana multitudine
optimum sit quod per unum regatur.
[19] Again, whatever is in accord with
nature is best, for in all things nature
does what is best. Now, every natural
governance is governance by one. In
the multitude of bodily members there
is one which is the principal mover,
namely, the heart; and among the
powers of the soul one power presides
as chief, namely, the reason. Among
bees there is one king bee’ and in the
whole universe there is One God,
Maker and Ruler of all things. And
there is a reason for this. Every
multitude is derived from unity.
Wherefore, if artificial things are an
imitation of natural things’ and a work
of art is better according as it attains a
closer likeness to what is in nature, it
follows that it is best for a human
multitude to be ruled by one person.
Hoc etiam experimentis apparet. Nam
provinciae vel civitates quae non reguntur
ab uno, dissensionibus laborant et absque
pace fluctuant, ut videatur adimpleri quod
dominus per prophetam conqueritur, dicens:
pastores multi demoliti sunt vineam meam.
E contrario vero provinciae et civitates quae
sub uno rege reguntur, pace gaudent,
[20] This is also evident from
experience. For provinces or cities
which are not ruled by one person are
torn with dissensions and tossed about
without peace, so that the complaint
seems to be fulfilled which the Lord
uttered through the Prophet [Jer 12:10]:
“Many pastors have destroyed my
iustitia florent, et affluentia rerum laetantur.
Unde dominus pro magno munere per
prophetas populo suo promittit, quod
poneret sibi caput unum, et quod princeps
unus erit in medio eorum.
Caput 4
Quod, sicut dominium unius optimum
est, quando est iustum, ita oppositum
eius est pessimum, probatur multis
rationibus et argumentis
vineyard.” On the other hand,
provinces and cities which are ruled
under one king enjoy peace, flourish in
justice, and delight in prosperity.
Hence, the Lord by His prophets
promises to His people as a great
reward that He will give them one head
and that “one Prince will be in the midst
of them” [Ez 34:24, Jer 30:21].
CHAPTER 4
THAT THE DOMINION OF A TYRANT IS
THE WORST
Sicut autem regimen regis est optimum,
ita regimen tyranni est pessimum.
[21] Just as the government of a king is the
best, so the government of a tyrant is the
worst.
Opponitur
enim
politiae
quidem
democratia, utrumque enim, sicut ex
dictis apparet, est regimen quod per
plures exercetur; aristocratiae vero
oligarchia, utrumque enim exercetur per
paucos; regnum autem tyrannidi,
utrumque enim per unum exercetur.
Quod autem regnum sit optimum
regimen, ostensum est prius. Si igitur
optimo opponitur pessimum, necesse
est quod tyrannis sit pessimum.
[22] For democracy stands in contrary
opposition to polity, since both are
governments carried on by many persons,
as is clear from what has already been
said; while oligarchy is the opposite of
aristocracy, since both are governments
carried on by a few persons; and kingship
is the opposite of tyranny since both are
carried on by one person. Now, as has
been shown above, monarchy is the best
government. If, therefore, “it is the contrary
of the best that is worst.” it follows that
tyranny is the worst kind of government.
Adhuc: virtus unita magis est efficax ad
effectum inducendum, quam dispersa
vel divisa. Multi enim congregati simul
trahunt quod divisim per partes
singulariter a singulis trahi non posset.
Sicut igitur utilius est virtutem operantem
ad bonum esse magis unam, ut sit
virtuosior ad operandum bonum, ita
[23] Further, a united force is more
efficacious in producing its effect than a
force which is scattered or divided. Many
persons together can pull a load which
could not be pulled by each one taking his
part separately and acting individually.
Therefore, just as it is more useful for a
force operating for a good to be more
magis est nocivum si virtus operans
malum sit una, quam divisa. Virtus
autem iniuste praesidentis operatur ad
malum multitudinis, dum commune
bonum multitudinis in sui ipsius bonum
tantum retorquet. Sicut igitur in regimine
iusto, quanto regens est magis unum,
tanto est utilius regimen, ut regnum
melius est quam aristocratia, aristocratia
vero quam politia; ita e converso erit et
in iniusto regimine, ut videlicet quanto
regens est magis unum, tanto magis sit
nocivum. Magis igitur est nociva tyrannis
quam oligarchia: oligarchia autem quam
democratia.
united, in order that it may work good more
effectively, so a force operating for evil is
more harmful when it is one than when it is
divided. Now, the power of one who rules
unjustly works to the detriment of the
multitude, in that he diverts the common
good of the multitude to his own benefit.
Therefore, for the same reason that, in a
just government, the government is better
in proportion as the ruling power is onethus monarchy is better than aristocracy,
and aristocracy better than polity—so the
contrary will be true of an unjust
government, namely, that the ruling power
will be more harmful in proportion as it is
more unitary. Consequently, tyranny is
more harmful than oligarchy; and oligarchy
more harmful than democracy.
Amplius: per hoc regimen fit iniustum,
quod spreto bono communi multitudinis,
quaeritur bonum privatum regentis.
Quanto igitur magis receditur a bono
communi, tanto est regimen magis
iniustum. Plus autem receditur a bono
communi in oligarchia, in qua quaeritur
bonum paucorum, quam in democratia,
in qua quaeritur bonum multorum; et
adhuc plus receditur a bono communi in
tyrannide, in qua quaeritur bonum
tantum unius: omni enim universitati
propinquius est multum quam paucum,
et paucum quam unum solum. Regimen
igitur tyranni est iniustissimum.
[24] Moreover, a government becomes
unjust by the fact that the ruler, paying no
heed to the common good, seeks his own
private good. Wherefore the further he
departs from the common good the more
unjust will his government be. But there is
a greater departure from the common good
in an oligarchy, in which the advantage of a
few is sought, than in a democracy, in
which the advantage of many is sought;
and there is a still greater departure from
the common good in a tyranny, where the
advantage of only one man is sought. For a
large number is closer to the totality than a
small number, and a small number than
only one. Thus, the government of a tyrant
is the most unjust.
Similiter
autem
manifestum
fit
considerantibus divinae providentiae
ordinem, quae optime universa disponit.
Nam bonum provenit in rebus ex una
causa perfecta, quasi omnibus adunatis
quae ad bonum iuvare possunt, malum
autem
singillatim
ex
singularibus
[25] The same conclusion is made clear to
those who consider the order of Divine
Providence, which disposes everything in
the best way. In all things, good ensues
from one perfect cause, i.e. from the totality
of the conditions favourable to the
production of the effect, while evil results
defectibus. Non enim est pulchritudo in
corpore, nisi omnia membra fuerint
decenter disposita; turpitudo autem
contingit,
quodcumque
membrum
indecenter se habeat. Et sic turpitudo ex
pluribus causis diversimode provenit,
pulchritudo autem uno modo ex una
causa perfecta: et sic est in omnibus
bonis et malis, tanquam hoc Deo
providente, ut bonum ex una causa sit
fortius, malum autem ex pluribus causis
sit debilius. Expedit igitur ut regimen
iustum sit unius tantum, ad hoc ut sit
fortius. Quod si in iniustitiam declinat
regimen, expedit magis ut sit multorum,
ut sit debilius, et se invicem impediant.
Inter iniusta igitur regimina tolerabilius
est democratia, pessimum vero tyrannis.
from any one partial defect. There is
beauty in a body when all its members are
fittingly disposed; ugliness, on the other
hand, arises when any one member is not
fittingly disposed. Thus ugliness results in
different ways from many causes; beauty in
one way from one perfect cause. It is thus
with all good and evil things, as if God so
provided that good, arising from one cause,
be stronger, and evil, arising from many
causes, be weaker. It is expedient
therefore that a just government be that of
one man only in order that it may be
stronger; however, if the government
should turn away from justice, it is more
expedient that it be a government by many,
so that it may be weaker and the many
may mutually hinder one another. Among
unjust governments, therefore, democracy
is the most tolerable, but the worst is
tyranny.
Idem etiam maxime apparet, si quis
consideret mala quae ex tyrannis
proveniunt,
quia
cum
tyrannus,
contempto communi bono, quaerit
privatum, consequens est ut subditos
diversimode gravet, secundum quod
diversis passionibus subiacet ad bona
aliqua affectanda. Qui enim passione
cupiditatis detinetur, bona subditorum
rapit: unde Salomon: rex iustus erigit
terram, vir avarus destruet eam. Si vero
iracundiae passioni subiaceat, pro nihilo
sanguinem fundit, unde per Ezech. XXII,
27, dicitur: principes eius in medio eius
quasi lupi rapientes praedam ad
effundendum sanguinem. Hoc igitur
regimen fugiendum esse, sapiens
monet, dicens: longe esto ab homine
potestatem habente occidendi, quia
scilicet non pro iustitia, sed per
potestatem occidit pro libidine voluntatis.
Sic igitur nulla erit securitas, sed omnia
sunt incerta cum a iure disceditur, nec
[26] This same conclusion is also apparent
if one considers the evils which come from
tyrants. Since a tyrant, despising the
common good, seeks his private interest, it
follows that he will oppress his subjects in
different ways according as he is
dominated by different passions to acquire
certain goods. The one who is enthralled
by the passion of cupidity seizes the goods
of his subjects; whence Solomon says
[Prov 29:4]: “A just king sets up the land; a
covetous man shall destroy it.” If he is
dominated by the passion of anger, he
sheds blood for nothing; whence it is said
by Ezekiel: ‘ “Her princes in the midst of
her are like wolves ravening the prey to
shed blood.” Therefore this kind of
government is to be avoided as the Wise
man admonishes [Sirach 9:13]: “Keep far
from the man who has the power to kill,”
because he kills not for justice’ sake but by
his power, for the lust of his will. Thus there
can be no safety. Everything is uncertain
firmari quidquam potest quod positum
est in alterius voluntate, ne dicam
libidine. Nec solum in corporalibus
subditos gravat, sed etiam spiritualia
eorum bona impedit, quia qui plus
praeesse appetunt quam prodesse,
omnem
profectum
subditorum
impediunt,
suspicantes
omnem
subditorum excellentiam suae iniquae
dominationi praeiudicium esse. Tyrannis
enim magis boni quam mali suspecti
sunt, semperque his aliena virtus
formidolosa est.
when there is a departure from justice.
Nobody will be able firmly to state: This
thing is such and such, when it depends
upon the will of another, not to say upon
his caprice. Nor does the tyrant merely
oppress his subjects in corporal things but
he also hinders their spiritual good. Those
who seek more to use, than to be of use to,
their subjects prevent all progress,
suspecting all excellence in their subjects
to be prejudicial to their own evil
domination. For tyrants hold the good in
greater suspicion than the wicked, and to
them the valour of others is always fraught
with danger.
Conantur igitur praedicti tyranni, ne
ipsorum
subditi
virtuosi
effecti
magnanimitatis concipiant spiritum et
eorum iniquam dominationem non
ferant, ne inter subditos amicitiae foedus
firmetur et pacis emolumento ad invicem
gaudeant, ut sic dum unus de altero non
confidit, contra eorum dominium aliquid
moliri non possint. Propter quod inter
ipsos discordias seminant, exortas
nutriunt, et ea quae ad foederationem
hominum pertinent, ut connubia et
convivia,
prohibent,
et
caetera
huiusmodi, per quae inter homines solet
familiaritas et fiducia generari. Conantur
etiam ne potentes aut divites fiant, quia
de subditis secundum suae malitiae
conscientiam suspicantes, sicut ipsi
potentia et divitiis ad nocendum utuntur,
ita timent ne potentia subditorum et
divitiae eis nocivae reddantur. Unde et
Iob XV, 21, de tyranno dicitur: sonitus
terroris semper in auribus eius, et cum
pax sit (nullo scilicet malum ei
intentante),
ille
semper
insidias
suspicatur.
[27] So the above-mentioned tyrants strive
to prevent those of their subjects who have
become virtuous from acquiring valour and
high spirit in order that they may not want
to cast off their iniquitous domination. They
also see to it that there be no friendly
relations among these so that they may not
enjoy the benefits resulting from being on
good terms with one another, for as long as
one has no confidence in the other, no plot
will be set up against the tyrant’s
domination. Wherefore they sow discords
among the people, foster any that have
arisen, and forbid anything which furthers
society and co-operation among men, such
as marriage, company at table and
anything of like character, through which
familiarity and confidence are engendered
among men. They moreover strive to
prevent their subjects from becoming
powerful and rich since, suspecting these
to be as wicked as themselves, they fear
their power and wealth; for the subjects
might become harmful to them even as
they are accustomed to use power and
wealth to harm others.
Whence in the
Book of Job it is said of the tyrant [15:21]:
“The sound of dread is always in his ears
and when there is peace (that is, when
there is no one to harm him), he always
suspects treason.”
Ex hoc autem contingit ut, dum
praesidentes, qui subditos ad virtutes
inducere deberent, virtuti subditorum
nequiter invident et eam pro posse
impediunt, sub tyrannis pauci virtuosi
inveniantur. Nam iuxta sententiam
philosophi apud illos inveniuntur fortes
viri, apud quos fortissimi quique
honorantur, et ut Tullius dicit: iacent
semper et parum vigent, quae apud
quosque improbantur. Naturale etiam
est ut homines, sub timore nutriti, in
servilem
degenerent
animum
et
pusillanimes fiant ad omne virile opus et
strenuum: quod experimento patet in
provinciis quae diu sub tyrannis fuerunt.
Unde apostolus, Col. III, 21, dicit: patres,
nolite ad indignationem provocare filios
vestros, ne pusillo animo fiant.
[28] It thus results that when rulers, who
ought to induce their subjects to virtue,” are
wickedly jealous of the virtue of their
subjects and hinder it as much as they can,
few virtuous men are found under the rule
of tyrants. For, according to Aristotle’s
sentence [Eth. III, 11: 1116a 20], brave
men are found where brave men are
honoured. And as Tullius says [Tuscul.
Disp. I, 2, 4]: “Those who are despised by
everybody are disheartened and flourish
but little.” It is also natural that men,
brought up in fear, should become mean of
spirit and discouraged in the face of any
strenuous and manly task. This is shown
by experience in provinces that have long
been under tyrants. Hence the Apostle
says to the Colossians: “Fathers, provoke
not your children to indignation, lest they
be discouraged.”
Haec igitur nocumenta tyrannidis rex
Salomon considerans, dicit: regnantibus
impiis, ruinae hominum, quia scilicet per
nequitiam tyrannorum subiecti a virtutum
perfectione deficiunt; et iterum dicit: cum
impii sumpserint principatum, gemet
populus, quasi sub servitute deductus;
et iterum: cum surrexerint impii,
abscondentur homines, ut tyrannorum
crudelitatem evadant. Nec est mirum,
quia homo absque ratione secundum
animae suae libidinem praesidens nihil
differt a bestia, unde Salomon: leo
rugiens et ursus esuriens princeps
impius super populum pauperem; et
ideo a tyrannis se abscondunt homines
sicut a crudelibus bestiis, idemque
videtur tyranno subiici, et bestiae
saevienti substerni.
[29] So, considering these evil effects of
tyranny King Solomon says [Prov 28:12]:
“When the wicked reign, men are ruined”
because, forsooth, through the wickedness
of tyrants, subjects fall away from the
perfection of virtue. And again he says
[Prov 29:2]: “When the wicked rule the
people shall mourn, as though led into
slavery.” And again [Prov 28:28]: “When
the wicked rise up men shall hide
themselves”, that they may escape the
cruelty of the tyrant. It is no wonder, for a
man governing without reason, according
to the lust of his soul, in no way differs from
the beast. Whence Solomon says [Prov
28:15]: ”As a roaring lion and a hungry
bear, so is a wicked prince over the poor
people.” Therefore men hide from tyrants
as from cruel beasts and it seems that to
be subject to a tyrant is the same thing as
to lie prostrate beneath a raging beast.
Caput 5
Quomodo variatum est dominium apud
Romanos, et quod interdum apud eos
magis aucta est respublica ex dominio
plurium
CHAPTER 5
WHY THE ROYAL DIGNITY IS
RENDERED HATEFUL TO THE
SUBJECTS
Quia igitur optimum et pessimum
consistunt in monarchia, id est principatu
unius, multis quidem propter tyrannorum
malitiam redditur regia dignitas odiosa.
Quidam vero dum regimen regis
desiderant,
incidunt
in
saevitiam
tyrannorum, rectoresque quamplures
tyrannidem exercent sub praetextu regiae
dignitatis.
[30] Because both the best and the worst
government are latent in monarchy, i.e. in
the rule of one man, the royal dignity is
rendered hateful to many people on
account of the wickedness of tyrants.
Some men, indeed, whilst they desire to
be ruled by a king, fall under the cruelty of
tyrants, and not a few rulers exercise
tyranny under the cloak of royal dignity.
Horum quidem exemplum evidenter
apparet in Romana republica. Regibus
enim a populo Romano expulsis, dum
regium vel potius tyrannicum fastum ferre
non possent, instituerant sibi consules et
alios magistratus per quos regi coeperunt
et dirigi, regnum in aristocratiam
commutare volentes et, sicut refert
Salustius: incredibile est memoratu,
quantum, adepta libertate, in brevi
Romana civitas creverit. Plerumque
namque contingit, ut homines sub rege
viventes, segnius ad bonum commune
nitantur, utpote aestimantes id quod ad
commune bonum impendunt non sibi
ipsis conferre sed alteri, sub cuius
potestate vident esse bona communia.
Cum vero bonum commune non vident
esse in potestate unius, non attendunt ad
bonum commune quasi ad id quod est
alterius, sed quilibet attendit ad illud quasi
suum:
[31] A clear example of this is found in the
Roman Republic. When the kings had
been driven out by the Roman people,
because they could not bear the royal, or
rather
tyrannical,
arrogance,
they
instituted consuls and other magistrates
by whom they began to be ruled and
guided. They changed the kingdom into
an aristocracy, and, as Sallust relates
[Bellum Catilinae VI, 7]: “The Roman city,
once liberty was won, waxed incredibly
strong and great in a remarkably short
time.” For it frequently happens that men
living under a king strive more sluggishly
for the common good, inasmuch as they
consider that what they devote to the
common good, they do not confer upon
themselves but upon another, under
whose power they see the common goods
to be. But when they see that the common
good is not under the power of one man,
they do not attend to it as if it belonged to
another, but each one attends to it as if it
were his own.
unde experimento videtur quod una
civitas per annuos rectores administrata,
plus potest interdum quam rex aliquis, si
haberet tres vel quatuor civitates;
parvaque servitia exacta a regibus
gravius ferunt quam magna onera, si a
communitate civium imponantur. Quod in
promotione
Romanae
reipublicae
servatum fuit. Nam plebe ad militiam
scribebatur, et pro militantibus stipendia
exsolvebant,
et
cum
stipendiis
exsolvendis non sufficeret commune
aerarium, in usus publicos opes venere
privatae, adeo ut praeter singulos
annulos aureos, singulasque bullas, quae
erant dignitatis insignia, nihil sibi auri ipse
etiam senatus reliquerit.
[32] Experience thus teaches that one city
administered by rulers, changing annually,
is sometimes able to do more than some
kings having, perchance, two or three
cities; and small services exacted by
kings weigh more heavily than great
burdens imposed by the community of
citizens. This held good in the history of
the Roman Republic. The plebs were
enrolled in the army and were paid wages
for military service. Then when the
common treasury was failing, private
riches came forth for public uses, to such
an extent that not even the senators
retained any gold for themselves save
one ring and the one bulla (the insignia of
their dignity).
Sed cum dissensionibus fatigarentur
continuis, quae usque ad bella civilia
excreverunt, quibus bellis civilibus eis
libertas, ad quam multum studuerant, de
manibus erepta est, sub potestate
imperatorum esse coeperunt, qui se
reges a principio appellari noluerunt, quia
Romanis fuerat nomen regium odiosum.
Horum autem quidam more regio bonum
commune fideliter procuraverunt, per
quorum studium Romana respublica et
aucta et conservata est. Plurimi vero
eorum in subditos quidem tyranni, ad
hostes vero effecti desides et imbecilles,
Romanam rempublicam ad nihilum
redegerunt.
[33] On the other hand, when the Romans
were worn out by continual dissensions
taking on the proportion of civil wars, and
when by these wars the freedom for which
they had greatly striven was snatched
from their hands, they began to find
themselves under the power of emperors
who, from the beginning, were unwilling to
be called kings, for the royal name was
hateful to the Romans. Some emperors, it
is true, faithfully cared for the common
good in a kingly manner, and by their zeal
the commonwealth was increased and
preserved. But most of them became
tyrants towards their subjects while
indolent and vacillating before their
enemies, and brought the Roman
commonwealth to naught.
Similis etiam processus fuit in populo
Hebraeorum. Primo quidem dum sub
iudicibus
regebantur,
undique
diripiebantur
ab
hostibus.
Nam
unusquisque quod bonum erat in oculis
suis, hoc faciebat. Regibus vero eis
divinitus datis ad eorum instantiam,
[34] A similar process took place, also,
among the Hebrew people. At first, while
they were ruled by judges, they were
ravished by their enemies on every hand,
for each one “did what was good in his
sight” (1 Sam 3:18). Yet when, at their
own pressing, God gave them kings, they
propter regum malitiam, a cultu unius Dei
recesserunt et finaliter ducti sunt in
captivitatem.
departed from the worship of the one God
and were finally led into bondage, on
account of the wickedness of their kings.
Utrinque igitur pericula imminent: sive
dum timetur tyrannus, evitetur regis
optimum dominium, sive dum hoc
consideratur, potestas regia in malitiam
tyrannicam convertatur.
[351 Danger thus lurks on either side.
Either men are held by the fear of a tyrant
and they miss the opportunity of having
that very best government which is
kingship; or, they want a king and the
kingly power turns into tyrannical
wickedness.
Caput 6
Quod in regimine plurium magis
saepe contingit dominium tyrannicum,
quam ex regimine unius; et ideo
regimen unius melius est
CHAPTER 6
THAT IT IS A LESSER EVIL WHEN A
MONARCHY TURNS INTO TYRANNY
THAN WHEN AN ARISTOCRACY
BECOMES CORRUPT
Cum autem inter duo, ex quorum utroque
periculum imminet, eligere oportet, illud
potissime eligendum est ex quo sequitur
minus malum. Ex monarchia autem, si in
tyrannidem convertatur, minus malum
sequitur quam ex regimine plurium
optimatum, quando corrumpitur.
[36] When a choice is to be made between
two things, from both of which danger
impends, surely that one should be
chosen from which the lesser evil follows.
Now, lesser evil follows from the
corruption of a monarchy (which is
tyranny) than from the corruption of an
aristocracy.
Dissensio enim, quae plurimum sequitur
ex regimine plurium, contrariatur bono
pacis, quod est praecipuum in multitudine
sociali: quod quidem bonum per
tyrannidem non tollitur, sed aliqua
particularium hominum bona impediuntur,
nisi fuerit excessus tyrannidis quod in
totam communitatem desaeviat. Magis
igitur praeoptandum est unius regimen
quam multorum, quamvis ex utroque
sequantur pericula.
[37] Group government [polyarchy] most
frequently
breeds
dissension.
This
dissension runs counter to the good of
peace which is the principal social good. A
tyrant, on the other hand, does not destroy
this good, rather he obstructs one or the
other individual interest of his subjects—
unless, of course, there be an excess of
tyranny and the tyrant rages against the
whole community. Monarchy is therefore
to be preferred to polyarchy, although
either form of government might become
dangerous.
Adhuc: illud magis fugiendum videtur, ex
[38]
Further,
that
from
which
great
quo pluries sequi possunt magna
pericula. Frequentius autem sequuntur
maxima pericula multitudinis ex multorum
regimine, quam ex regimine unius.
Plerumque enim contingit ut ex pluribus
aliquis ab intentione communis boni
deficiat, quam quod unus tantum.
Quicumque
autem,
ex
pluribus
praesidentibus, divertat ab intentione
communis boni, dissensionis periculum in
subditorum multitudine imminet, quia
dissentientibus principibus consequens
est ut in multitudine sequatur dissensio.
Si vero unus praesit, plerumque quidem
ad bonum commune respicit; aut si a
bono communi intentionem avertat, non
statim sequitur ut ad subditorum
depressionem
intendat,
quod
est
excessus tyrannidis et in malitia regiminis
maximum gradum tenens, ut supra
ostensum est. Magis igitur sunt fugienda
pericula quae proveniunt ex gubernatione
multorum, quam ex gubernatione unius.
dangers may follow more frequently is, it
would seem, the more to be avoided.
Now, considerable dangers to the
multitude follow more frequently from
polyarchy than from monarchy. There is a
greater chance that, where there are many
rulers, one of them will abandon the
intention of the common good than that it
will be abandoned when there is but one
ruler. When any one among several rulers
turns aside from the pursuit of the
common good, danger of internal strife
threatens the group because, when the
chiefs quarrel, dissension will follow in the
people. When, on the other hand, one
man is in command, he more often keeps
to governing for the sake of the common
good. Should he not do so, it does not
immediately follow that he also proceeds
to the total oppression of his subjects.
This, of course, would be the excess of
tyranny and the worst wickedness in
government, as has been shown above.
The dangers, then, arising from a
polyarchy are more to be guarded against
than those arising from a monarchy.
Amplius, non minus contingit in
tyrannidem verti regimen multorum quam
unius, sed forte frequentius. Exorta
namque
dissensione
per regimen
plurium, contingit saepe unum super
alios superare et sibi soli multitudinis
dominium usurpare, quod quidem ex his
quae pro tempore fuerunt, manifeste
inspici potest. Nam fere omnium
multorum regimen est in tyrannidem
terminatum, ut in Romana republica
manifeste apparet; quae cum diu per
plures magistratus administrata fuisset,
exortis simultatibus, dissensionibus et
bellis civilibus, in crudelissimos tyrannos
incidit. Et universaliter si quis praeterita
facta et quae nunc fiunt diligenter
consideret, plures inveniet exercuisse
[39] Moreover, in point of fact, a polyarchy
deviates into tyranny not less but perhaps
more frequently than a monarchy. When,
on account of there being many rulers,
dissensions arise in such a government, it
often happens that the power of one
preponderates and he then usurps the
government of the multitude for himself.
This indeed may be clearly seen from
history. There has hardly ever been a
polyarchy that did not end in tyranny. The
best illustration of this fact is the history of
the Roman Republic. It was for a long time
administered by the magistrates but then
animosities, dissensions and civil wars
arose and it fell into the power of the most
cruel tyrants. In general, if one carefully
considers what has happened in the past
tyrannidem in terris quae per multos
reguntur, quam in illis quae gubernantur
per unum.
and what is happening in the present, he
will discover that more men have held
tyrannical sway in lands previously ruled
by many rulers than in those ruled by one.
Si igitur regium, quod est optimum
regimen, maxime vitandum videatur
propter tyrannidem; tyrannis autem non
minus, sed magis, contingere solet in
regimine plurium, quam unius, relinquitur
simpliciter magis esse expediens sub
rege uno vivere, quam sub regimine
plurium.
[40] The strongest objection why
monarchy, although it is “the best form of
government”, is not agreeable to the
people is that, in fact, it may deviate into
tyranny. Yet tyranny is wont to occur not
less but more frequently on the basis of a
polyarchy than on the basis of a
monarchy. It follows that it is, in any case,
more expedient to live under one king than
under the rule of several men.
Caput 7
Conclusio, quod regimen unius
simpliciter sit optimum. Ostendit
qualiter multitudo se debet habere
circa ipsum, quia auferenda est ei
occasio ne tyrannizet, et quod etiam in
hoc est tolerandus propter maius
malum vitandum
CHAPTER 7
HOW PROVISION MIGHT BE MADE
THAT THE KING MAY NOT FALL INTO
TYRANNY
Quia ergo unius regimen praeeligendum
est, quod est optimum, et contingit ipsum
in
tyrannidem
converti
quod
est
pessimum, ut ex dictis patet, laborandum
est diligenti studio ut sic multitudini
provideatur de rege, ut non incidant in
tyrannum.
[41] Therefore, since the rule of one man,
which is the best, is to be preferred, and
since it may happen that it be changed
into a tyranny, which is the worst (all this
is clear from what has been said), a
scheme should be carefully worked out
which would prevent the multitude ruled
by a king from falling into the hands of a
tyrant.
Primum autem est necessarium ut talis
conditionis homo ab illis, ad quos hoc
spectat officium, promoveatur in regem,
quod non sit probabile in tyrannidem
declinare. Unde Samuel, Dei providentiam
erga institutionem regis commendans, ait I
Reg.: quaesivit sibi dominus virum
[42] First, it is necessary that the man
who is raised up to be king by those
whom it concerns should be of such
condition that it is improbable that he
should become a tyrant. Wherefore
Daniel, commending the providence of
God with respect to the institution of the
secundum cor suum et praecepit ei
dominus ut esset dux super populum
suum. Deinde sic disponenda est regni
gubernatio, ut regi iam instituto tyrannidis
subtrahatur occasio. Simul etiam sic eius
temperetur potestas, ut in tyrannidem de
facili declinare non possit. Quae quidem ut
fiant, in sequentibus considerandum erit.
Demum vero curandum est, si rex in
tyrannidem diverteret, qualiter posset
occurri.
king says [1 Sam 13:14]: “The Lord
sought a man according to his own heart,
and the Lord appointed him to be prince
over his people.” Then, once the king is
established, the government of the
kingdom must be so arranged that
opportunity to tyrannize is removed. At
the same time his power should be so
tempered that he cannot easily fall into
tyranny.
How these things may be
done we must consider in what follows.
[43] Finally, provision must be made for
facing the situation should the king stray
into tyranny.
Et quidem si non fuerit excessus
tyrannidis, utilius est remissam tyrannidem
tolerare ad tempus, quam contra
tyrannum agendo multis implicari periculis,
quae sunt graviora ipsa tyrannide. Potest
enim contingere ut qui contra tyrannum
agunt praevalere non possint, et sic
provocatus tyrannus magis desaeviat.
Quod si praevalere quis possit adversus
tyrannum, ex hoc ipso proveniunt
multoties gravissimae dissensiones in
populo; sive dum in tyrannum insurgitur,
sive post deiectionem tyranni dum erga
ordinationem
regiminis
multitudo
separatur in partes. Contingit etiam ut
interdum, dum alicuius auxilio multitudo
expellit tyrannum, ille, potestate accepta,
tyrannidem arripiat, et timens pati ab alio
quod ipse in alium fecit, graviori servitute
subditos opprimat. Sic enim in tyrannide
solet contingere, ut posterior gravior fiat
quam praecedens, dum praecedentia
gravamina non deserit et ipse ex sui
cordis malitia nova excogitat. Unde
Syracusis quondam Dionysii mortem
omnibus desiderantibus, anus quaedam,
ut incolumis et sibi superstes esset,
continue orabat; quod ut tyrannus
[44] Indeed, if there be not an excess of
tyranny it is more expedient to tolerate
the milder tyranny for a while than, by
acting against the tyrant, to become
involved in many perils more grievous
than the tyranny itself. For it may happen
that those who act against the tyrant are
unable to prevail and the tyrant then will
rage the more. But should one be able to
prevail against the tyrant, from this fact
itself very grave dissensions among the
people frequently ensue: the multitude
may be broken up into factions either
during their revolt against the tyrant, or in
process of the organization of the
government, after the tyrant has been
overthrown. Moreover, it sometimes
happens that while the multitude is
driving out the tyrant by the help of some
man, the latter, having received the
power, thereupon seizes the tyranny.
Then, fearing to suffer from another what
he did to his predecessor, he oppresses
his subjects with an even more grievous
slavery. This is wont to happen in
tyranny, namely, that the second
becomes more grievous than the one
preceding,
inasmuch
as,
without
cognovit, cur hoc faceret interrogavit. Tum
illa: puella, inquit, existens, cum gravem
tyrannum haberemus, mortem eius
cupiebam, quo interfecto, aliquantum
durior
successit;
eius
quoque
dominationem finiri magnum existimabam:
tertium te importuniorem habere coepimus
rectorem. Itaque si tu fueris absumptus,
deterior in locum tuum succedet.
abandoning the previous oppressions, he
himself thinks up fresh ones from the
malice of his heart. Whence in Syracuse,
at a time when everyone desired the
death of Dionysius, a certain old woman
kept constantly praying that he might be
unharmed and that he might survive her.
When the tyrant learned this he asked
why she did it. Then she said: “When I
was a girl we had a harsh tyrant and I
wished for his death; when he was killed,
there succeeded him one who was a little
harsher. I was very eager to see the end
of his dominion also, and we began to
have a third ruler still more harsh—that
was you. So if you should be taken away,
a worse would succeed in your place.”
Et si sit intolerabilis excessus tyrannidis,
quibusdam visum fuit ut ad fortium virorum
virtutem pertineat tyrannum interimere,
seque
pro
liberatione
multitudinis
exponere periculis mortis: cuius rei
exemplum etiam in veteri testamento
habetur. Nam Aioth quidam Eglon regem
Moab, qui gravi servitute populum Dei
premebat, sica infixa in eius femore
interemit, et factus est populi iudex.
[45] If the excess of tyranny is
unbearable, some have been of the
opinion that it would be an act of virtue
for strong men to slay the tyrant and to
expose themselves to the danger of
death in order to set the multitude free.
An example of this occurs even in the Old
Testament, for a certain Aioth slew
Eglon, King of Moab, who was
oppressing the people of God under
harsh slavery, thrusting a dagger into his
thigh; and he was made a judge of the
people [Judges 3:14 ff].
Sed hoc apostolicae doctrinae non
congruit. Docet enim nos Petrus non bonis
tantum et modestis, verum etiam dyscolis
dominis reverenter subditos esse. Haec
est enim gratia si propter conscientiam
Dei sustineat quis tristitias patiens iniuste;
unde cum multi Romani imperatores fidem
Christi
persequerentur
tyrannice,
magnaque multitudo tam nobilium quam
populi esset ad fidem conversa, non
resistendo sed mortem patienter et
animati sustinentes pro Christo laudantur,
[46] But this opinion is not in accord with
apostolic teaching. For Peter admonishes
us to be reverently subject to our
masters, not only to the good and gentle
but also the froward [1 Pet 2:18-19]: “For
if one who suffers unjustly bear his
trouble for conscience’ sake, this is
grace.” Wherefore, when many emperors
of the Romans tyrannically persecuted
the faith of Christ, a great number both of
the nobility and the common people were
converted to the faith and were praised
ut in sacra Thebaeorum legione manifeste
apparet; magisque Aioth iudicandus est
hostem
interemisse,
quam
populi
rectorem, licet tyrannum: unde et in veteri
testamento leguntur occisi fuisse hi qui
occiderunt Ioas, regem Iuda, quamvis a
cultu Dei recedentem, eorumque filii
reservati secundum legis praeceptum.
for patiently bearing death for Christ.
They did not resist although they were
armed, and this is plainly manifested in
the case of the holy Theban legion.”
Aioth, then, must be considered rather as
having slain a foe than assassinated a
ruler, however tyrannical, of the people.
Hence in the Old Testament we also read
that they who killed Joas, the king of
Juda, who had fallen away from the
worship of God, were slain and their
children spared according to the precept
of the law” (2 Sam 14:5-6).
Esset autem hoc multitudini periculosum
et
eius
rectoribus,
si
privata
praesumptione
aliqui
attentarent
praesidentium necem, etiam tyrannorum.
Plerumque enim huiusmodi periculis
magis exponunt se mali quam boni. Malis
autem solet esse grave dominium non
minus regum quam tyrannorum, quia
secundum sententiam Salomonis, Prov.:
dissipat impios rex sapiens. Magis igitur
ex huiusmodi praesumptione immineret
periculum multitudini de amissione regis,
quam remedium de subtractione tyranni.
[47] Should private persons attempt on
their own private presumption to kill the
rulers, even though tyrants, this would be
dangerous for the multitude as well as for
their rulers. This is because the wicked
usually expose themselves to dangers of
this kind more than the good, for the rule
of a king, no less than that of a tyrant, is
burdensome to them since, according to
the words of Solomon [Prov 20:26]: “A
wise
king
scatters
the
wicked.”
Consequently, by presumption of this
kind, danger to the people from the loss
of a good king would be more probable
than relief through the removal of a
tyrant.
Videtur autem magis contra tyrannorum
saevitiam non privata praesumptione
aliquorum,
sed
auctoritate
publica
procedendum.
[48] Furthermore, it seems that to
proceed against the cruelty of tyrants is
an action to be undertaken, not through
the private presumption of a few, but
rather by public authority.
Primo quidem, si ad ius multitudinis
alicuius pertineat sibi providere de rege,
non iniuste ab eadem rex institutus potest
destitui vel refrenari eius potestas, si
potestate regia tyrannice abutatur. Nec
putanda est talis multitudo infideliter agere
tyrannum destituens, etiam si eidem in
[49] If to provide itself with a king belongs
to the right of a given multitude, it is not
unjust that the king be deposed or have
his power restricted by that same
multitude if, becoming a tyrant, he
abuses the royal power. It must not be
thought that such a multitude is acting
perpetuo se ante subiecerat: quia hoc ipse
meruit, in multitudinis regimine se non
fideliter gerens ut exigit regis officium,
quod ei pactum a subditis non reservetur.
Sic Romani Tarquinium superbum, quem
in regem susceperant, propter eius et
filiorum tyrannidem a regno eiecerunt,
substituta minori, scilicet consulari,
potestate. Sic etiam Domitianus, qui
modestissimis imperatoribus Vespasiano
patri et Tito fratri eius successerat, dum
tyrannidem exercet, a senatu Romano
interemptus est, omnibus quae perverse
Romanis fecerat per senatusconsultum
iuste et salubriter in irritum revocatis. Quo
factum est ut beatus Ioannes Evangelista,
dilectus Dei discipulus, qui per ipsum
Domitianum in Patmos insulam fuerat
exilio relegatus, ad Ephesum per
senatusconsultum remitteretur.
unfaithfully in deposing the tyrant, even
though it had previously subjected itself
to him in perpetuity, because he himself
has deserved that the covenant with his
subjects should not be kept, since, in
ruling the multitude, he did not act
faithfully as the office of a king demands.
Thus did the Romans, who had accepted
Tarquin the Proud as their king, cast him
out from the kingship on account of his
tyranny and the tyranny of his sons; and
they set up in their place a lesser power,
namely, the consular power. Similarly
Domitian, who had succeeded those
most moderate emperors, Vespasian, his
father, and Titus, his brother, was slain
by the Roman senate when he exercised
tyranny, and all his wicked deeds were
justly, and profitably declared null and
void by a decree of the senate. Thus it
came about that Blessed John the
Evangelist, the beloved disciple of God,
who had been exiled to the island of
Patmos by that very Domitian, was sent
back to Ephesus by a decree of the
senate.
Si vero ad ius alicuius superioris pertineat
multitudini
providere
de
rege,
expectandum est ab eo remedium contra
tyranni nequitiam. Sic Archelai, qui in
Iudaea pro Herode patre suo regnare iam
coeperat, paternam malitiam imitantis,
Iudaeis contra eum querimoniam ad
Caesarem Augustum deferentibus, primo
quidem potestas diminuitur ablato sibi
regio nomine et medietate regni sui inter
duos fratres suos divisa; deinde, cum nec
sic a tyrannide compesceretur, a Tiberio
Caesare relegatus est in exilium apud
Lugdunum, Galliae civitatem.
[50] If, on the other hand, it pertains to
the right of a higher authority to provide a
king for a certain multitude, a remedy
against the wickedness of a tyrant is to
be looked for from him. Thus when
Archelaus, who had already begun to
reign in Judaea in the place of Herod his
father, was imitating his father’s
wickedness, a complaint against him
having been laid before Caesar Augustus
by the Jews, his power was at first
diminished by depriving him of his title of
king and by dividing one-half of his
kingdom between his two brothers. Later,
since he was not restrained from tyranny
even by this means, Tiberius Caesar sent
him into exile to Lugdunum, a city in
Gaul.
Quod si omnino contra tyrannum auxilium
humanum haberi non potest, recurrendum
est ad regem omnium Deum, qui est
adiutor in opportunitatibus in tribulatione.
Eius enim potentiae subest ut cor tyranni
crudele convertat in mansuetudinem,
secundum Salomonis sententiam, Prov.:
cor regis in manu Dei, quocumque
voluerit, inclinabit illud. Ipse enim regis
Assueri crudelitatem, qui Iudaeis mortem
parabat, in mansuetudinem vertit. Ipse est
qui ita Nabuchodonosor crudelem regem
convertit, quod factus est divinae
potentiae praedicator. Nunc igitur, inquit,
ego Nabuchodonosor laudo, et magnifico,
et glorifico regem caeli, quia opera eius
vera et viae eius iudicia, et gradientes in
superbia potest humiliare. Tyrannos vero,
quos reputat conversione indignos, potest
auferre de medio vel ad infimum statum
reducere, secundum illud sapientis: sedes
ducum superborum destruxit Deus, et
sedere fecit mites pro eis. Ipse est qui
videns afflictionem populi sui in Aegypto et
audiens eorum clamorem, Pharaonem
tyrannum deiecit cum exercitu suo in
mare.
Ipse
est
qui
memoratum
Nabuchodonosor prius superbientem, non
solum eiectum de regni solio sed etiam de
hominum consortio, in similitudinem
bestiae commutavit. Nec etiam abbreviata
manus eius est, ut populum suum a
tyrannis liberare non possit. Promittit enim
populo suo per Isaiam requiem se
daturum a labore et confusione, ac
servitute dura, qua antea servierat. Et per
Ezech. dicit: liberabo meum gregem de
ore eorum, scilicet pastorum qui pascunt
se ipsos.
[51] Should no human aid whatsoever
against a tyrant be forthcoming, recourse
must be had to God, the King of all, Who
is a helper in due time in tribulation. For it
lies in his power to turn the cruel heart of
the tyrant to mildness. According to
Solomon [Prov 21:1]: “The heart of the
king is in the hand of the Lord,
withersoever He will He shall turn it.” He
it was who turned into mildness the
cruelty of King Assuerus, who was
preparing death for the Jews. He it was
who
so
filled
the
cruel
king
Nabuchodonosor with piety that he
became a proclaimer of the divine power.
“Therefore,” he said, “I, Nabuchodonosor
do now praise and magnify and glorify
the King of Heaven; because all His
works are true and His ways judgments,
and they that walk in pride He is able to
abase” (Dan 4:34). Those tyrants,
however, whom he deems unworthy of
conversion, he is able to put out of the
way or to degrade, according to the
words of the Wise Man [Sirach 10:17]:
“God has overturned the thrones of proud
princes and has set up the meek in their
stead.” He it was who, seeing the
affliction of his people in Egypt and
hearing their cry, hurled Pharaoh, a tyrant
over God’s people, with all his army into
the sea. He it was who not only banished
from his kingly throne the abovementioned Nabuchodonosor because of
his former pride, but also cast him from
the fellowship of men and changed him
into the likeness of a beast. Indeed, his
hand is not shortened that He cannot free
His people from tyrants. For by Isaiah
(14:3) He promised to give his people
rest from their labours and lashings and
harsh slavery in which they had formerly
served; and by Ezekiel (34:10) He says:
“I will deliver my flock from their mouth,”
i.e. from the mouth of shepherds who
feed themselves.
Sed ut hoc beneficium populus a Deo
consequi mereatur, debet a peccatis
cessare, quia in ultionem peccati divina
permissione impii accipiunt principatum,
dicente domino per Oseam: dabo tibi
regem in furore meo; et in Iob dicitur quod
regnare facit hominem hypocritam propter
peccata populi. Tollenda est igitur culpa,
ut cesset a tyrannorum plaga.
Caput 8
Quid praecipue movere debeat regem
ad regendum, utrum honor, vel gloria.
Opiniones circa hoc, et quid sit
tenendum
[52] But to deserve to secure this benefit
from God, the people must desist from
sin, for it is by divine permission that
wicked men receive power to rule as a
punishment for sin, as the Lord says by
the Prophet Hosea [13:11]: “I will give
you a king in my wrath” and it is said in
Job (34:30) that he “makes a man that is
a hypocrite to reign for the sins of the
people.” Sin must therefore be done
away with in order that the scourge of
tyrants may cease.
CHAPTER 8
THAT MUNDANE HONOUR AND
GLORY ARE NOT AN ADEQUATE
REWARD FOR A KING
Quoniam autem, secundum praedicta,
regis est bonum multitudinis quaerere,
nimis videtur onerosum regis officium nisi
ei aliquod proprium bonum ex hoc
proveniret. Oportet igitur considerare, in
qua re sit boni regis conveniens praemium.
[53] Since, according to what has been
said thus far, it is the king’s duty to seek
the good of the multitude, the task of a
king may seem too burdensome unless
some advantage to himself should result
from it. It is fitting therefore to consider
wherein a suitable reward for a good
king is to be found.
Quibusdam igitur visum est non esse aliud
nisi honorem et gloriam, unde et Tullius in
libro de republica definit principem civitatis
esse alendum gloria; cuius rationem
Aristoteles in Lib. Ethic. assignare videtur,
quia princeps, cui non sufficit honor et
gloria, consequenter tyrannus efficitur.
Inest enim animis omnium, ut proprium
bonum quaerant. Si ergo contentus non
fuerit princeps gloria et honore, quaeret
voluptates et divitias, et sic ad rapinas et
subditorum iniurias convertetur.
[541 By some men this reward was
considered to be nothing other than
honour and glory. Whence Tullius says
in the book On the Republic [De
Republica V, 7, 9]: “The prince of the city
should be nourished by glory,” and
Aristotle seems to assign the reason for
this in his Book on Ethics [V, 10: 1134b
7]: “because the prince for whom honour
and glory is not sufficient consequently
turns into tyrant.” For it is in the hearts of
all men to seek their proper good.
Therefore, if the prince is not content
with glory and honour, he will seek
pleasures an riches and so will resort to
plundering and injuring his subjects.
Sed si hanc sententiam receperimus,
plurima sequuntur inconvenientia. Primo
namque hoc regibus dispendiosum esset,
si tot labores et sollicitudines paterentur
pro mercede tam fragili. Nihil enim videtur
in rebus humanis fragilius gloria et honore
favoris hominum, cum dependeat ex
opinionibus
hominum,
quibus
nihil
mutabilius in vita hominum: et inde est
quod Isaias propheta huiusmodi gloriam
nominat florem foeni.
[55] However, if we accept this opinion a
great many incongruous results follow. In
the first place, it would be costly to kings
if so many labours and anxieties were to
be endured for a reward so perishable,
for nothing, it seems, is more perishable
among human things than the glory and
honour of men’s favour since it depends
upon the report of men and their
opinions, than which nothing in human
life is more fickle. And this is why the
Prophet Isaiah calls such glory “the
flower of grass.”
Deinde humanae gloriae cupido animi
magnitudinem aufert. Qui enim favorem
hominum quaerit, necesse est ut in omni
eo quod dicit aut facit eorum voluntati
deserviat, et sic dum placere hominibus
studet, fit servus singulorum. Propter quod
et idem Tullius in Lib. de officiis, cavendam
dicit gloriae cupidinem. Eripit enim animi
libertatem, pro qua magnanimis viris omnis
debet esse contentio. Nihil autem
principem, qui ad bona peragenda
instituitur, magis decet quam animi
magnitudo. Est igitur incompetens regis
officio humanae gloriae praemium.
[56] Moreover, the desire for human
glory takes away greatness of soul. For
he who seeks the favour of men must
serve their will in all he says and does,
and thus, while striving to please all, he
becomes a slave to each one. Wherefore
the same Tullius says in his book On
Duties[De officiis, I, 20, 68] that “the
inordinate desire for glory is to be
guarded against; it takes away freedom
of soul, for the sake of which highminded men should put forth all their
efforts.” Indeed there is nothing more
becoming to a prince who has been set
up for the doing of good works than
greatness of soul. Thus, the reward of
human glory is not enough for the
services of a king.
Simul etiam est multitudini nocivum, si tale
praemium statuatur principibus: pertinet
enim ad boni viri officium ut contemnat
gloriam, sicut alia temporalia bona. Virtuosi
enim et fortis animi est pro iustitia
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