Deterrence
Influence in
Counterterrorism
A Component in the War on al Qaeda
Paul K. Davis
Brian Michael Jenkins
Prepared for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
R
National Defense Research Institute
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
The research described in this report was sponsored by the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency. The research was conducted in
RAND’s National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded
research and development center supported by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the unified commands, and the
defense agencies under Contract DASW01-01-C-0004.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Davis, Paul K., 1943–
Deterrence and influence in counterterrorism : a component in the war on
al Qaeda / Paul K. Davis, Brian Michael Jenkins.
p. cm.
“MR-1619.”
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 0-8330-3286-0
1. Terrorism—Prevention. 2. Qaida (Organization) 3. September 11 Terrorist
Attacks, 2001. I. Jenkins, Brian Michael. II.Title.
HV6431 .D3 2002
363.3'2—dc21
2002035800
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PREFACE
This monograph summarizes the findings of a six-month project on deterrence of terrorism, conducted jointly by RAND and
the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA). The project was initiated at the request of Dr. Anthony Tether, the Director of the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). RAND
and IDA worked closely throughout the research and together
held two day-long seminar/discussion meetings with a senior
advisory group. The two organizations, however, developed
separate final reports. These were by no means independent,
because of the extensive prior interchange, but they provided
DARPA with separate “takes” on the issues. The material in
this monograph was initially provided to DARPA as an annotated briefing in July 2002, along with accompanying background papers.
The project was sponsored by the Director of DARPA and conducted within the Acquisition and Technology Center of RAND’s
National Defense Research Institute (NDRI), a federally funded
research and development center (FFRDC) for the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the defense agencies, and
the unified commands. RAND provided research support funds
to prepare this report.
Comments may be addressed to Paul K. Davis (pdavis@rand.
org), the project leader, or to RAND consultant Brian Jenkins
(Brian_Jenkins@rand.org).
iii
CONTENTS
Preface.........................................
iii
Figures and Tables ...............................
ix
Summary.......................................
xi
Acknowledgments ................................
xix
Chapter One
INTRODUCTION ..............................
Objectives ...................................
Approach ....................................
1
1
2
Chapter Two
BACKGROUND: WHY DETERRING TERRORISTS IS
SO DIFFICULT ...............................
Overview ....................................
Obstacles to Deterrence ........................
Terrorist Motivations Are Strong................
Deterrence and Eradication Do Not Fit Together
Easily ...................................
Terrorism Is a Way of Life .....................
Traditions of Violence Persist in the Clash of
Civilizations ..............................
There Is No Single Type of Terrorist .............
Chapter Three
PRINCIPLES FOR INFLUENCING TERRORISTS .....
Going Beyond Deterrence .......................
Viewing Terrorist Organizations as Complex
Adaptive Systems .........................
v
3
3
3
3
5
5
5
7
9
9
13
vi
Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism
A Broad View of System Influences .............
Decomposing the System into Classes of
Actors...................................
Decomposing the System into Classes of
Influence ................................
Decomposing the System into a Life-Cycle
Perspective ...............................
A Decomposition in the Realm of Ideas ..........
Other Decompositions ........................
Finding Situations Where Influencing Efforts May
Work....................................
Conducting a Broad-Front Strategy ...............
Developing a Persuasive, High-Minded Strategy .....
Manifest Strength, Purpose, and Determination ...
Relentlessness and Effectiveness ...............
Consistency with American Values and Moral
Validity Apparent to Others .................
Balanced Strategy ...........................
Chapter Four
BROAD ISSUES OF STRATEGY ..................
Orchestrating a Broad-Front Strategy .............
Improving the Capacity for Effective Distributed
Decisionmaking and Action .................
Improving the Capacity for Rapid Centralized
Decisions ................................
Relationship to the Influence Component of
Counterterrorism..........................
The Strategic Significance of Efficiency, Even
in War ..................................
A Paradigm for Defense ........................
Chapter Five
SOME CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES ................
Deterring Acquisition and Use of Weapons of
Mass Destruction .........................
Threatening Anyone Who Even Tolerates
WMD-Related Terrorism ....................
Deterring Biological Weapons ..................
Political Warfare: The Neglected Component of
Antiterrorism Strategy......................
13
14
16
18
20
21
22
23
24
25
27
27
28
31
31
31
33
35
36
37
39
39
40
41
46
Contents
Putting at Risk What the Terrorists Hold Dear ......
Challenges in U.S.-Saudi Relations ...............
Shared Interests but Competing Ideologies .......
The Next Steps..............................
The Pakistan Problem ..........................
Balancing Interests: Realpolitik versus Idealism ....
Upholding American Values in the War Against
al Qaeda .................................
Chapter Six
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ........
The Story in Brief .............................
Next Steps for Research ........................
Appendix
A. Cold War Concepts of Deterrence ................
B. Selected Definitions ...........................
C. Methods for Analyzing Counterterrorism in a
Complex Adaptive System ......................
D. Adapting the Constructs of Effects-Based Planning ..
vii
47
49
49
51
52
53
54
59
59
61
63
67
69
73
Bibliography ....................................
77
About the Authors................................
85
FIGURES AND TABLES
Figures
S.1. An Escalation Ladder of the Coerciveness of
Influence .................................
3.1. An Escalation Ladder of the Coerciveness of
Influence .................................
3.2. Two Types of Terrorists .....................
3.3. The Actors in a Terrorist System ..............
3.4. A Systemic Perspective ......................
3.5. The Life-Cycle Process of Individual Terrorists ...
3.6. A System Decomposition of a Would-Be Martyr’s
Decision..................................
C.1. A Simple Game-Structured View ..............
C.2. Factors in Red’s Decisions ...................
D.1. Effects-Based Operations Operate in Physical
and Cognitive Domains .....................
xii
10
11
15
17
19
21
70
71
75
Tables
3.1. Response to Islamist Terrorist Attacks Prior to
September 11 .............................
5.1. Threatening What the Terrorists and Their
Supporters Hold Dear .......................
ix
27
48
SUMMARY
PRINCIPLES
This study was initiated by a request to develop a framework
for deterring terrorism. It was subsequently broadened to address influence as well, which greatly increased the operating
space for our research (Figure S.1), allowing us to consider
measures ranging from co-optation to full-scale military attacks
executed to deter future terrorist attacks (by al Qaeda or by
others).
This broadening of the problem also reflected a lesson gleaned
from reviewing historical experience with terrorism: Successful
strategies to combat terrorism spawned by serious, deep-rooted
problems have involved first crushing the current threat and
then bringing about changes to make terrorism’s reemergence
less likely. Thus, although concepts such as co-optation and
inducement are not effective for dealing with terrorists who have
the unshakable commitment of a bin Laden, they do apply to
others that the United States must try to influence.
It is a mistake to think of influencing al Qaeda as though it
were a single entity; rather, the targets of U.S. influence are the
many elements of the al Qaeda system, which comprises leaders, lieutenants, financiers, logisticians and other facilitators,
foot soldiers, recruiters, supporting population segments, and
religious or otherwise ideological figures. A particular leader
may not be easily deterrable, but other elements of the system
(e.g., state supporters or wealthy financiers living the good life
while supporting al Qaeda in the shadows) may be. What is
xi
xii
Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism
Deter next time by crushing now
Deter next time by defeating now
Increasing
violence
Deter next time by punishing now
Deter by denial (defeat the attacks)
Deter by increasing risks and disruption
Deter by threat
Dissuade
Hold at risk
what is dear
to our enemies?
Persuade
Induce positively
Co-opt
Figure S.1—An Escalation Ladder of the Coerciveness
of Influence
needed is a multifaceted strategy that tailors influences to targets within the system. Terrorists are not a uniform group with
an on-off switch.
Deterrence, likewise, does not have an on-off switch. Although
causing a member of al Qaeda to change his stripes may be out
of the question, deterring individuals from attacking individual
targets is not. To the contrary, the empirical record shows that
even hardened terrorists dislike operational risks and may be
deterred by uncertainty and risk. A foot soldier may willingly
give his life in a suicide mission, and organizations may be
quite willing to sacrifice such pawns, but mission success is
very important and leaders are in some ways risk-averse. Terrorists recognize that their power depends on perceptions of
whether they are winning or losing; their leaders are deeply
concerned with control; and martyrdom in a stymied mission
lacks the appeal of dying in a spectacular, successful attack.
Summary xiii
It is also important to recognize that al Qaeda does not have a
single “center of gravity” whose destruction would bring down
the whole organization. Nor does the United States have the
information that would enable it to pursue such a finely tuned
strategy. Consequently, the United States should adopt a
broad-front strategy aimed at influencing the many different
parts of the al Qaeda system. Where and when the big payoff
will occur is a matter for future historians to ponder. This
approach is feasible because different organs of government
(regular military, special forces, law enforcement, and economic, diplomatic, and political elements) can be employed.
Finally, to sustain its effort for the long term, the United States
needs to have and disseminate a persuasive, high-minded
strategy, analogous to the Cold War strategy that served the
nation so well. Key attributes of that strategy should be:
•
Manifest strength and, perhaps even more important, manifest purpose and determination.
•
Consistency with American values in war and a moral validity apparent to others with whom the United States needs
to work.
•
A balance between efforts to crush a particular terrorist organization and efforts to mitigate the factors that give the
organization appeal and power (requiring consistent attention by policymakers and those who execute the strategy).
CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES OF STRATEGY
Turning to more specific issues, we conclude that the following
challenges are of particular cross-cutting significance.
Orchestrating the Broad-Front Strategy
The campaign to defeat al Qaeda cuts across all of the normal
boundaries of war (military, diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, etc.). It needs complex orchestration, requiring simultaneous initiatives at the polar ends of a dichotomy to develop the following:
xiv Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism
•
Distributed actions. Theory, doctrine, rules of thumb, rules
of engagement, and information systems are needed to facilitate near-continual distributed decisionmaking and
timely, effective action by the diverse elements of the U.S.
counterterrorism effort. Timely action is essential because
of the distributed, fleeting, and networked nature of the enemy. Centralized command-control is not a good model
here.
•
An improved capability for rapid, centralized decisions. No
matter how successful the distributed-decisonmaking effort
is, however, some tactical-level decisions that may have
profound strategic and political effects will have to be made
centrally. Traditional processes for such decisions are
likely to be too slow.
Efficiency
Although effectiveness, not efficiency, is most important in war,
the United States could defeat itself economically by attempting
to do everything everywhere and protect everything too well.
Because U.S. vulnerabilities are essentially infinite, the methods of systems analysis, including the influence component,
should be applied to the war on terrorism.
Focusing on Adaptiveness, Flexibility, and Robustness
Deterrence depends significantly on convincing organizations
such as al Qaeda and those who support it that any notion of
defeating the United States—much less “bringing the United
States down”—is ridiculous. Although it is unclear whether bin
Laden and his associates ever had such grandiose notions, we
know that the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan had a
major impact on their thinking. As bin Laden stated in a 1998
interview,1
______________
1 John Miller, “Greetings America, My Name Is Osama bin Laden,” Esquire,
February 1, 1999, based on an interview conducted in May 1998 (see Frontline,
“Hunting for bin Laden,” http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
binladen/, updated September 13, 2001).
Summary
xv
There is a lesson to learn from this for he who wishes to learn.
. . . The Soviet Union entered Afghanistan in the last week of
1979, and with Allah’s help their flag was folded a few years
later and thrown in the trash, and there was nothing left to
call the Soviet Union.
Even if bin Laden has finite goals, such as causing the United
States to leave Saudi Arabia and back away more generally
from Israel and the Middle East, he has spoken of defeating the
U.S. by hitting its economy,2 and the zealotry of his agents is
surely enhanced to the extent that the United States is seen as
deeply vulnerable at home. The United States needs to demonstrate that it will not be brought down and will not close itself
down; it must show that it is resilient and will take any
punches, recover, and hit back very hard. Strengthening capabilities in this regard will depend on incentives and standards that encourage modularity, networking, rapid adaptation, and recovery.
TROUBLESOME ISSUES
Weapons of Mass Destruction
A problem of profound concern is the specter of truly catastrophic terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), which some terrorists are eager and willing to use. We
suggest two approaches beyond those already being taken. The
first is to credibly announce that any state or nonstate organization that even tolerates the acquisition of WMD by terrorists
within its borders will be subject to the full wrath of the United
States. It must be clear that the United States will lower standards of evidence in ascribing guilt and may violate sovereignty; it may preemptively attack and remove regimes by force.
______________
2 Al Jazeera tape, December 28, 2001, and BBC transcripts, December 27,
2001. Quoted from http://www.truthout.org/docs_01/12.28A.OBL.Vid.Exrpts.
htm: “We say that the end of the United States is imminent, whether bin
Laden or his followers are alive or dead, for the awakening of the Muslim umma
(nation) has occurred. . . . It is important to hit the economy [of the United
States], which is the base of its military power.”
xvi Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism
The relentless U.S. efforts against al Qaeda and the Taliban
have helped in this regard, but causing states to turn actively
against terrorists in their midst who are involved with WMD
presents an additional challenge. Establishing the credibility of
a policy that makes tolerance of such terrorist actions intolerable is not easy. Actions will speak louder than words.
The second approach is quite different and controversial:
•
Deterrence of the use of biological weapons—a special and
frightening case—could be greatly enhanced if everyone in
the Middle East believed that such an attack on the United
States would inevitably lead to disease spreading into the
Middle East, where huge segments of the population would
die. A first step would be to encourage recognition of the
fact that, because of international travel, infectious diseases
such as smallpox would spread rapidly across borders,
causing a global pandemic.
Political Warfare
Political warfare is an essential component of any campaign. It
should not be confused with the issue of addressing root problems, although that is also a worthy objective; nor should
apologies be made for its use. Assuring, for example, that
broad-ranging debate occurs within the Middle East (rather
than leaving the field to Islamist extremists) is something that
can be accomplished in ways that are consistent with American
values, including aversion to false propaganda. This subject
needs urgent attention.
Placing at Risk What the Terrorists Hold Dear:
Convincing Regional Allies to Act
One of the lessons learned from reviewing the ways various influences could be used against the al Qaeda system was that
identifying instruments and targets is the easy part. The hard
part is making something happen, especially when many of the
possible measures would need to be taken by the states from
which terrorists come or in which they reside. America’s Euro-
Summary xvii
pean allies began crackdowns and extensive cooperation with
U.S. authorities soon after September 11. Egypt and Pakistan
are now doing the same, although Pakistani President Musharraf clearly has major political tensions to deal with.
Saudi Arabia is a special case. On the one hand, the United
States and Saudi Arabia have long had a strong strategic relationship. The two countries continue to have shared interests,
and Saudi Arabia has even attempted to help resolve the
Israeli-Palestinian problem. On the other hand, the spread of
religious fundamentalism in the form sometimes characterized
by Middle East scholars as “Wahhabiism” constitutes a root
problem. It encourages intolerance and can lead to a religious
fanaticism that is certainly not intended by the Saudi government, nor is it characteristic of mainstream Islam (which is
practiced by many Saudis).
Looking to the future, if influence is to be a meaningful component of counterterrorism, it would seem that the Saudi government will need to do much more than it has done so far to
restrain objectionable ideological teachings (and, of course, to
impede the support of foreign organizations that in turn support terrorism, a subject already much discussed between the
Saudi and U.S. governments).
Balancing Realpolitik and Idealism
The United States faces a dilemma in foreign policy. On the
one hand, working with current Arab heads of state in Saudi
Arabia, Egypt, and elsewhere is very important in the campaign
to crack down on elements of the al Qaeda terrorist system. It
is also important in pursuing the goal of a Palestinian state and
a secure Israel recognized and accepted by its neighbors. On
the other hand, maintaining and improving the quality of cooperation will prove difficult if, at the same time, the United
States exerts increased pressure to democratize. This dilemma
has existed for years and, in practice, the United States has not
emphasized democracy as a component of American policy in
the region. Many of the region’s profound problems, however,
including problems of terrorism, are related to the region’s lack
of democratization. It would be in the U.S. interest to promote
xviii
Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism
open discussion, tolerance, and politically effective compromise
rather than violence. The United States has a variety of instruments for this purpose, including increased support of
nongovernment organizations (NGOs) attempting to build civil
societies. The U.S. State Department could take a number of
useful steps if asked to do so. Ultimately, the dilemma is
somewhat artificial: It is possible to work with current state
leaders and to simultaneously encourage democracy.
Upholding American Values
National standards in war are different from standards in a
lengthy peace, but core American values can be preserved in
the war on terrorism. On the foreign front, the United States
should continue to emphasize being discriminate when using
force. It should also demonstrate continued support for democracy even when working with nations lacking qualities that
Americans value. Many of America’s Western European allies,
democracies all, have been forced to change laws and processes
to combat terrorism in recent decades. All of them, however,
have found it possible to do so without sacrificing their values.
The best ways to accomplish such adaptations deserve serious
study, with ground rules that permit open-minded rethinking.
On a subject such as incarceration, for example, publicity
about which has worldwide influence on people’s perceptions of
the United States, the goal of speedy justice requires due process, but due process does not require the heavy and ponderous machinery that we have become accustomed to in
peacetime.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The concept of deterrence is both too limiting and too naive to
be applicable to the war on terrorism. It is important to conceive an influence component of strategy that has both a
broader range of coercive elements and a range of plausible
positives, some of which we know from history are essential for
long-term success.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We are indebted to our RAND colleagues who either worked on
the project (and participated in many spirited disagreements) or
provided useful comments along the way. These include James
Dobbins, Bruce Hoffman, Jerrold Green, Laurent Murawiec,
Richard Neu, John Parachini, Jonathan Schachter, and Brett
Steele. We also appreciate the close collaboration with the
project team from the Institute for Defense Analyses—Victor
Utgoff (project leader), Brad Roberts, Caroline Ziemke, and Ray
Bonoan. Joe Braddock played a key role in conceiving the need
for the project and sketching initial ideas. Subsequently, he
worked with the RAND and IDA project teams throughout the
project.
The project also benefited from an advisory group chaired by
General Lawrence Welch (USAF, retired) and James Thomson,
presidents of IDA and RAND, respectively. The advisory group
consisted of James Schlesinger, General Andrew Goodpaster
(USA, retired), the honorable Richard Perle, Leon Sloss, Ted
Gold, and Jim Tegnelia.
Finally, we appreciate formal reviews of the draft manuscript by
Jerrold Green and Ambassador L. Paul Bremer.
Although we learned a great deal from interactions with our
colleagues, the reviewers, and the advisory group, the views
presented in this monograph are, of course, our own responsibility.
xix
Chapter One
INTRODUCTION
OBJECTIVES
Our initial goal in this study was to describe a framework for
understanding how best to deter terrorists, particularly extremists targeting the United States and its interests.1 More
specifically, we were asked to identify those things that terrorists—in particular, members of al Qaeda—hold dear and, in
turn, how the United States could place such things at risk.
The work stemmed from a perceived need to supplement ongoing efforts to attack terrorists directly and to defend against
their attacks. During the Cold War, the United States benefited
greatly from having a well-developed and broadly understood
theory of nuclear deterrence, which not only helped guide U.S.
planning, but also established a high ground. NATO strategy
was also built around concepts of deterrence. Those evolving
deterrence concepts were studied and effectively accepted as
legitimate throughout the world. Should the United States not
have a comparably powerful concept of deterrence for the war
on terrorism? After reviewing the issues, we concluded that
Cold War deterrence theory was not, in fact, a very good model
for our purposes, although it did include several important
features that carry over well (see Appendix A). Therefore, we
broadened the subject of our research to include influence,
rather than deterrence alone.
______________
1The research was performed in collaboration with the Institute for Defense
Analyses (IDA) in a project led by Victor Utgoff (see Bonoan, Davis, Roberts,
Utgoff, and Ziemke (2002) for IDA’s final report).
1
2
Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism
APPROACH
The monograph is organized as follows. Chapter Two provides
background on the difficulty of deterring terrorism. Chapter
Three describes the principles that we found especially helpful
in thinking about a broad framework of influence. Chapter
Four moves from abstractions to more concrete matters, summarizing cross-cutting challenges of strategy that we concluded
are especially important. Chapter Five addresses a series of
controversial issues, one by one. Finally, Chapter Six summarizes our conclusions and recommendations and suggests next
steps for research. The monograph focuses on particular
framework concepts and on troublesome issues, rather than attempting to sketch a comprehensive strategy.
Chapter Two
BACKGROUND: WHY DETERRING TERRORISTS
IS SO DIFFICULT
OVERVIEW
This chapter and a companion report (Jenkins, 2002) examine
why deterring terrorism is so difficult.1 The discussion addresses motivations, the mismatch with de facto U.S. policy,
the unique characteristics of people involved in terrorist activities, the long-standing traditions of violence within the Greater
Middle East, and the fact that terrorists vary greatly in character, which means that no one approach will apply across the
board.
The difficulties of dealing with terrorism have not always been
apparent to Americans because prior to September 11, 2001,
the United States was perceived as virtually invulnerable. The
difficulties have been more apparent to America’s European
allies and, of course, to Israel.
OBSTACLES TO DETERRENCE
Terrorist Motivations Are Strong
However much we may wish it were not so, terrorism has been
common throughout history; sometimes, it has even succeeded
______________
1 We have drawn on a large body of RAND work on terrorism. See especially
Hoffman (1999) and Lesser, Hoffman, Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Zanini (1999). A
3
4
Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism
in bringing about change. To imagine that it could be easily
stigmatized out of existence would be both ahistorical and
naive. This is especially so when dealing with people who are
motivated to employ terrorist tactics because they have no
better instruments with which to pursue their aims. Historically, rebellions against real or perceived oppression have routinely included the use of terrorism when the rebels did not
have the power to succeed otherwise. 2 Although the United
States hardly sees al Qaeda and comparable groups as “rebels,”
some terrorists (e.g., the Palestinians who use terrorist tactics
against Israel) see themselves that way.
Terrorism is also difficult to combat because those relying on it
may feel they have nothing to lose or because they are motivated by religion or other ideologies in which martyrdom plays
an important role. As is now well known, bin Laden and other
top leaders of al Qaeda are strongly driven by a particular image of Islam and its crusade against the infidels. Bin Laden
may see himself as a prophet or at least as an instrument of
God’s will.
Nevertheless, some terrorists feel constraints and limit their
violence. Unfortunately, the taboo that once existed against
mass-casualty attacks may again have disappeared.3 We say
“again” because large-scale rape and pillage of cities is hardly
new in history, although the catastrophic potential of nuclear
and weaponized biological agents is. History is not encouraging about the prospect of restraining mass-casualty attacks
once they become the norm, but taboos have certainly been
established and reestablished over time. It is clearly important
to reestablish the taboos in our era (see also Chapter Four).
______________
larger bibliography is available at www.rand.org/publications/bib/SB2060.
pdf. An online source for communitywide bibliographies is http://library.nps.
navy.mil/home/terrorism.htm.
2 See Asprey (1994) and Carr (2002). Our project benefited from a historical
review by Brett Steele (unpublished RAND work, 2002).
3Roberts (1998).
Background: Why Deterring Terrorists Is So Difficult
5
Deterrence and Eradication Do Not Fit Together
Easily
The concept of deterring terrorism also runs into trouble because of a mismatch with U.S. policy. The concept of deterrence, after all, is ordinarily applied in a quid pro quo sense. It
is not clear, however, that there is any trade to be made here.
Ultimately, the United States is trying to eradicate terrorist organizations, and those organizations know it.
Terrorism Is a Way of Life
Deterrence is also difficult because for many of the people involved, terrorism is a way of life. Terrorist organizations may
be hurt badly, but those that cause the most concern seldom
go out of existence. For one thing, terrorism provides “positives”—notably status, power, recruits, and psychological rewards. More important than this, however, terrorism is the
very raison d’être of these organizations, so they can can hardly
moderate by disavowing it.
Terrorists are not irrational. Some of them, however, operate in
an introverted, closed universe and may have a high tolerance
for what an outsider would see as drastic conflicts between
their professed beliefs about the world and obvious facts.4
Traditions of Violence Persist in the Clash of
Civilizations
Combating terrorism is not synonymous with destroying al
Qaeda or other extremist Islamist groups, but al Qaeda is the
major focus today. Unfortunately, many of the most troublesome ideas and behaviors are not restricted to extremist groups
but apply to a much larger segment of the Arab world (most notably Saudi Arabia and portions of Egypt). Discussion of this
issue (see Chapter Five) raises hackles because Americans generally do not wish to tar entire peoples with stereotypical im______________
4Ziemke (2002).
6
Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism
ages. Americans believe fundamentally in universalist concepts
such as those underlying the Constitution, concepts also enshrined in the United Nations charter. Nonetheless, there is a
clash of cultures.5 Of primary concern is the question of
whether this clash can be moderated, channeled, and evolved
in benign ways. Denying that it exists will do no good. In particular, Americans believe fervently in religious tolerance,
whereas Islamist extremists reject it and embrace violence.
Gandhis, they are not. It must also be recognized that portions
of the Arab-Islamic world have long lived with traditions in
which power is fundamental and violence, including terrorism,
is a routine part of gaining and maintaining power.6,7 When
these cultural legacies are combined with social injustice and
extreme versions of Islamic fundamentalism, the results are not
encouraging: Those who are unhappy may resort to terrorism,
including terrorism against “enemies” such as the West, and
particularly the United States, on which so much is blamed.8
Another consequence of the culture is that terrorists can have
compelling reasons not to moderate or disband. Leaders who
counsel restraint risk accusations of betrayal and even death at
the hands of those who feel betrayed. Individuals in an organization may become disillusioned, but in their subculture of fanaticism and violence, they often have no easy way out.
______________
5See Huntington (1993, 1997) and the responses of his critics, many of them
published in Foreign Affairs.
6 See early chapters of Esposito (2002). Although Esposito has written
extensively and sympathetically about political developments in the Arab world,
the early chapters discuss many of the malign influences at work. Our project
also benefited from an unpublished review of such issues by Laurent Murawiec
(RAND).
7Interestingly, however, a recent survey in the Middle East shows much more
widespread respect for democratic concepts within society than has sometimes
been claimed in clash-of-civilizations discussions. See Richard Morin, “Islam
and Democracy,” Washington Post, April 28, 2002, p. B05. The survey was
conducted by Pippa Norris (Harvard) and Robert Inglehart (University of
Michigan).
8See Lewis (2002) and Pillar (2001, pp. 29–33) for discussion.
Background: Why Deterring Terrorists Is So Difficult
7
There Is No Single Type of Terrorist
In the Cold War, deterrence operated between two major powers. Terrorism, however, involves many groups, many instruments, and, often, no central command. Terrorists are not a
single foe, and no simple theory of deterrence can possibly apply to the spectrum that ranges from anti-U.S. or anti-Israeli
“martyrs” to members of American right-wing militias. To
make things worse, some of the newer terrorists are not motivated to spare innocents, are more generally uninhibited, and
do not calculate thresholds of pain and tolerance in society in
the same way that mainstream terrorists of earlier decades did.
According to accounts, bin Laden has said9
We—with God’s help—call on every Muslim who believes in
God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God’s order to
kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and
whenever they find it. We also call on Muslim ulema, leaders,
youths, and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan’s U.S. troops
and the devil’s supporters allying with them, and to displace
those who are behind them so that they may learn a lesson.
The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and
military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it
in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from
their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the
lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim.
While in prison, Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman (the “blind
sheikh” who was tried in connection with the 1993 World
______________
9 The full text of bin Laden’s February 22, 1998, edict can be found at a
Federation of American Scientists web site, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/
para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm. See “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, World
Islamic Front Statement,” February 22, 1998. The full English text is given at
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm. The original
Arabic can be found at http://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/fatw2.
htm. The quote appeared on the Frontline show “Hunting bin Laden,” http://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/
8
Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism
Trade Center attack) issued a fatwah, which included the order
to
sink their ships, bring their planes down. Slay them in air, on
land, on water . . . kill them wherever you find them.10
More recently, Sulemain bu Ghaith, who claims to be a
spokesman for al Qaeda, appeared on an al-Neda website and
said
we have the right to fight them by chemical and biological
weapons so they catch the fatal and unusual diseases Muslims have caught due to U.S. chemical and biological
weapons.11
Clearly, when dealing with such individuals, the normal forms
of deterrence will not be effective. Moreover, their passionate
hatreds are passed on successfully to other people, even to
children.12
For these and other reasons, deterrence of such messianic terrorist leaders is likely to be difficult. Nonetheless, there are
opportunities. The next chapter describes key features of a
framework for pursuing deterrence and influence.
______________
10 Bodansky (1999, p. 296).
11 Fox News, June 10, 2002. Quoted by the Emergency Net News Service, http:
//www.emergency.com/2001/ter-advsry-sum.htm.
12 One account describes how youth were motivated by a local Mullah to leave
Pakistan and join up with the Taliban. It tells of a village in which 500 young
boys were entranced by a spellbinding mullah who claimed that “those who die
fighting for God don’t die! Those who go on jihad live forever, in paradise.” In
some cases, at least, their fate could not have been worse. See Jeffrey
Gettleman, “Prisoner of Jihad,” Los Angeles Times, July 21, 2002, p. A.1.
Chapter Three
PRINCIPLES FOR INFLUENCING TERRORISTS
This chapter looks at principles for developing a framework for
analyzing deterrence and influence. Most of the principles relate to increasing the range of ways to counter al Qaeda (and
terrorism more generally). They deal with (1) broadening the
concept of deterrence to encompass influence, (2) approaching
terrorist organizations as complex systems, (3) finding situations where influence may work (rather than becoming easily
discouraged), (4) conducting a broad-front attack, and (5) developing a persuasive, high-minded strategy that can be sustained for years.
GOING BEYOND DETERRENCE
Our study of what terrorists hold dear and how the United
States could deter terrorism by placing those things at risk was
undertaken to supplement direct military and police actions
and defensive measures. However, we concluded that even
when we stretched definitions of deterrence, the concept was
too narrow to use as an organizing principle. As shown in Figure 3.1, the influence component of counterterrorism provides a
better framework. The spectrum of influences ranges from cooptation to deterring future actions by crushing terrorists
now.1
______________
1 Definitions used in this monograph for the terms in Figure 3.1 are given in
Appendix B.
9
10
Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism
Deter next time by crushing now
Deter next time by defeating now
Increasing
violence
Deter next time by punishing now
Deter by denial (defeat the attacks)
Deter by increasing risks and disruption
Deter by threat
Dissuade
Hold at risk
what is dear
to our enemies?
Persuade
Induce positively
Co-opt
Figure 3.1—An Escalation Ladder of the Coerciveness of Influence
The tactic of crushing terrorists to deter future actions deserves
elaboration. Some of the current actions to destroy al Qaeda
will contribute to general deterrence later, especially if the
United States is seen as strong and relentless. Evidence already exists that U.S. efforts against al Qaeda and the Taliban
are having such effects on others. After all, what state leader
or movement leader today believes that it is wise to take on the
United States? Maintaining that attitude should obviously be a
priority.2
In Figure 3.1, the spectrum is shown as an escalation ladder of
increasing violence. This, however, is a Cold War concept that
______________
2 Figure 3.1 is tuned for U.S. purposes. More-repressive states think less in
terms of deterrence or influence than in terms of putting their opponents out of
business, as illustrated by what has been called coup-proofing in Syria, Iraq,
and Egypt (Quinlivan, 1999).
Principles for Influencing Terrorists
11
applies poorly here. What is needed today is a portfolio of influences—some that are quite coercive and some that include
positive inducements. The contents of the portfolio will depend
on the target of the influence.
Our emphasis on influence, rather than traditional deterrence,
is derived largely from history, even a quick review of which 3
reminds us how common terrorism has been in both war and
rebellion.4 Our review of history also suggested distinguishing
between two classes of terrorists: internalists and externalists,
which we shall call Types A and B (Figure 3.2). Over the years,
Type A terrorists have ranged from notorious pirates to religious fanatics. However, they are all driven by the action and
passion itself. Even when they clothe themselves in ostensible
political objectives (as does bin Laden), their appetites for action have proven insatiable and they have changed objectives
as necessary to continue.
Type A: self-driven seekers of action,
causes, or religious commitment;
they may claim political goals, but
they are insatiable.
Type B: terrorists with pragmatic,
political world goals; will cease
terrorism when it is no longer
needed.
Must typically be eradicated,
deflected, or isolated.
Must be suppressed; inducements
are needed or terrorism will
regenerate.
Focusing only on power and toughness can make
heroes of Type A terrorists, who otherwise would
be repudiated.
The al Qaeda system (among others)
includes both types, even if al Qaeda
itself is clearly Type A.
Figure 3.2—Two Types of Terrorists
______________
3Unpublished work by Brett Steele (RAND).
4Our definition of terrorism includes acts undertaken in war (see Appendix B).
12
Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism
In al Qaeda, one of the most important characteristics of the
top leadership is their extremely strong, messianic, religious
views. To be sure, al-Qaeda-style Islam bears little relation to
more mainstream beliefs and practices, but the fact remains
that bin Laden, his top leaders, and many, if not most, of his
foot soldiers are driven in large part by what they see as their
spiritual commitment. Bin Laden probably sees himself as a
prophet. The commitment of such people, then, is very different in kind from that of the Palestinian terrorists who have
been waging a life-long struggle with Israel.
Extremist spiritual commitment, when embodied in individuals
such as bin Laden, lends itself readily to grandiose and unachievable objectives, such as forcing the United States and
other elements of “the West” to withdraw from the land of Islam.
In contrast, Type B terrorists have pragmatic, political world
goals. They may be equally ruthless and destructive, but they
will fade into the “normal world” when they have achieved their
aims. Some Type B terrorists end up with honorable positions
in society and even in history.
The distinctions are useful, however imperfect, because they
have implications for strategy. Type A terrorists, by and large,
must be eradicated (in other eras, they might be deflected or
isolated). Type B terrorists may need to be firmly suppressed,
but because they are often motivated by problems that others
also consider legitimate, suppression is not enough; nations
must address their concerns (usually in a second phase, after
the current terrorist threat has been crushed). This has consistently been necessary both to prevent a new round of terrorism from emerging and because it is ultimately the right thing
to do.
In practice, we must deal with a mix of Types A and B. Although al Qaeda leaders are Type A terrorists, many elements
of the larger al Qaeda system (discussed below) fall into Type B.
Enlightened strategy should eradicate the worst of al Qaeda,
while not creating martyrs and heroes; it should suppress or
otherwise deal with less-violent elements, but it should also
Principles for Influencing Terrorists
13
include elements of inducement for the longer run. Obviously,
“rewarding” terrorism is to be avoided, but at the end of the
day, changes should have been made that address some of the
root causes of conflict (including inflammatory Islamist teachings). Such changes will not affect the thinking of the bin
Ladens of the world, but they may influence the ordinary people who might otherwise join a cause that employs terrorism.
All of this seems to be recognized implicitly by current U.S.
strategy, which includes both the mailed fist (operations in
Afghanistan) and the velvet glove (e.g., attempts to work the
Palestinian problem).
VIEWING TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS AS
COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS
A Broad View of System Influences
We use the word system in the sense of system framework,
systems analysis, systems engineering, or complex adaptive
systems. The terrorist problem occurs in a rich context with
many interacting entities and processes. Some aspects of the
system are hierarchical; others are distributed; still others are
networked. Terrorist systems adapt over time (see also Appendix C).
One reason for our system approach is that deterring terrorism
is not simply about deterring a single individual or a small
group of like-minded individuals (such as the Cold War Soviet
Politburo). This is especially so in recent years, as a new class
of terrorists has emerged, most notably in the form of al Qaeda.
The system phenomenon is more general, however. The Palestinians who are terrorizing Israel are not a single, well-defined
group with a well-defined decision process, but rather are
members of competing groups that may be seen as parts of a
more general uprising.5 In the future, the United States may
be attacked by nonstate actors, such as émigrés with loyalties
to their original nation (e.g., Iraq or Serbia). Such attackers
______________
5See Ziemke (2002); Ziemke, Loustaunau, and Alrich (2000); Shadid (2002);
and Esposito (2002).
14
Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism
might or might not be controlled by the state that supports
them and might or might not depend on only one or a few leaders.
A second reason for the system approach is that prospects for
deterring committed terrorists such as Osama bin Laden or the
leaders of other prominent terrorist organizations are poor.
(Secretary Rumsfeld referred to such terrorists as “deadenders.”) As indicated in Chapter Two, these people are highly
motivated and have already discounted retaliation. Some have
nothing that they hold dear and that can be easily identified
and targeted in a way that would accomplish deterrence. This
is not to say that direct deterrence of leaders should not be attempted, but a betting man would favor a broader strategy.
Our strategy, then, emphasizes the fact that terrorists in a
given group operate within a much larger system, some elements of which are potentially more vulnerable than others.
One element of that system is ideology itself.
Decomposing the System into Classes of Actors
Taking a system perspective means, in part, paying attention to
the system’s constituents. That is, the system must be broken
down into parts (i.e., decomposed). Figure 3.3 indicates
schematically one such decomposition. In this case, the parts
are the different classes of actors—not only leaders, but also
lieutenants, foot soldiers, external suppliers and facilitators
(e.g., the Arab financiers who support bin Laden while enjoying
the good life at home), heads of supportive states, supportive
population segments from which terrorist groups draw recruits
and within which they find relative sanctuary and physical
support, and, finally, other sources of an organization’s moral
support (e.g., Islamist leaders preaching hate in neighborhood
mosques).6
______________
6Initial versions of this decomposition were developed and used by one of the
authors (Davis) in a recent study for the National Academy of Sciences
(National Research Council, 2002).
Principles for Influencing Terrorists
15
Top leaders
External suppliers
and facilitators
Lieutenants
Heads of supportive
states
Foot soldiers
Recruiters
Supportive population segments
Sources of moral and religious support
Figure 3.3—The Actors in a Terrorist System
Thinking about whether terrorists can be deterred or otherwise
influenced requires such a decomposition. Think about deterring a bin Laden. There are several possibilities to pursue, but
killing or incarcerating offers the most promise.7 However,
think next of the contrast between influencing bin Laden and
influencing the wealthy Arabs who continue to finance his activities. Bin Laden may feel he has nothing to lose, but at least
some of his financiers live comfortably with wealth, family, and
prestige. Obviously, they do have something to lose. The same
is true of most of the actors in a terrorist system, to different
degrees and at different times. The segments of society from
which the terrorists are drawn may be influenced by international actions and by attacks on terrorist ideology and tactics.
Within the United States, those who assist terrorists (e.g., by
providing insider information or logistics) may be deterred or
______________
7Lest we be overinterpreted, even “reckless” leaders can sometimes be deterred
at a given time from doing a specific thing. Saddam Hussein was claimed by
some to be undeterrable, but he changed behavior drastically when his calculations warranted doing so (Davis, 1997).
16
Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism
apprehended. Finally, the terrorist actors themselves are often
concerned about operational risk—they may be willing to risk
or give their lives, but not in futile attacks. 8 Thus, better defensive measures can help to deter or deflect, even if they are
decidedly imperfect.9 In Chapter Five we pursue this type of
reasoning in more detail to suggest a range of deterrent measures.10
Decomposing the System into Classes of Influence
Next, let us consider a different decomposition, one that explicitly identifies different types of influence on the mind of a terrorist or terrorist group contemplating a course of action
(Figure 3.4). Here, an arrow from one item to another implies
that having more of the first item tends to increase the amount
of the second item. For example, the more fear, awe, and sense
of futility felt by terrorists as they contemplate the United
States (above and to the left of “Deterrence of act” in Figure
3.4), the greater is the deterrence. If the arrow bears a negative
sign, it means that more of the first item will mean less of the
second. For example, the greater the hatred and blame of the
United States and the West felt by the terrorists (below and to
the left of “Deterrence of act”), the less is the deterrence. Versions of such influence diagrams have proven useful in a number of disciplines.11
______________
8 This is supported by the empirical record of terrorism.
See, e.g., Jenkins
(2002) and his earlier writings; Roberts (2002); Hoffman (2001); and Lesser,
Hoffman, et al. (1999).
9A subtlety here is the difference between a defensive system that is imperfect
because it has “open doors” and one that is imperfect because it has reliability
that is random but much less than one. The first defense might provide no
deterrent at all, whereas the second might have substantial effect.
10 Some of these are drawn from Utgoff and Davis (2002).
11 The earliest use of the diagrams may have been by Jay Forrester (MIT), the
founder of the System Dynamics methodology. Variants called cognitive maps
have been used extensively in Britain and by some in the United States (e.g.,
Axelrod, 1976; Davis, 1997, 2002b).
Principles for Influencing Terrorists
U.S. power and
capability
Operational
uncertainty
Fear, awe,
sense of
futility
U.S. ruthlessness
Deterrence
of act
Respect for U.S.
Corrupt
regimes,
injustice
Some U.S.
policies,
presence
U.S. vulnerability
Societal support
National support
Information
Disruption
-
-
-
17
Hatred, blame
of U.S., West
Risk to power and
possessions
Risk to loved ones
-
-
Risk to cause
Religious, cultural
zealotry
Sense of relative
deprivation, no way out
Disapproval
by supporters
Historical, cultural
roots
Figure 3.4—A Systemic Perspective
Figure 3.4 has four quadrants. In the upper left-hand quadrant, the influences relate to U.S. power, effectiveness, and perceived ruthlessness. At the upper right, the influences are related to the perception of operational uncertainty and risk.
These, in turn, are reduced to the extent that U.S. targets are
highly vulnerable, or to the extent that the terrorists receive
societal or national support and information. They are increased if the terrorist organization itself is being disrupted. At
the lower right, the deterrent influences relate to threats to
things the terrorists care about, including their personal power
and possessions, loved ones, and their cause itself.
Finally, at the lower left, the influences are related primarily to
motivations. A basic problem here is that the support that bin
Laden receives has root causes. These create powerful motivations for rebellion, resistance, and even widespread terrorism
against innocents. Although bin Laden and many of his lieutenants and agents have not been the victims of poverty or deprivation, tens of millions of people in the region have been.
Further, as noted earlier, much of the Middle East suffers from
18
Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism
rule by authoritarian leaders, suppression of human rights,
and the absence of hope. These people also have convenient
alleged villains to blame, ranging from westernization generally
to Israel and the United States in particular. Many al Qaeda
members and supporters see their actions as pursuing a noble
cause. Moreover, the combination of historical Arab culture
and extreme (but not especially unusual) versions of Islamic
fundamentalism appears to provide a structure within which
passions can be played out by zealots.12 Others, however, disagree with this characterization.
Although political, social, and economic factors are among the
root causes of problems that foster terrorism, it should also be
emphasized that the perverse extremist view of Islam that has
been so prominently taught in some Islamist circles is another
root cause. Some would argue that it is the most important
root cause, since there are countless instances of deprivation in
the world that have not led to terrorism.
In thinking about influences, then, there are many levers to
work with. Deterrence of some actors depends on many factors, each of which is a potential target for U.S. strategy.
Decomposing the System into a Life-Cycle
Perspective
Each decomposition provides a different perspective and, potentially, a different way to conceive strategies and tactics.
Suppose, for example, that we consider the life cycle of an Islamist terrorist in the al Qaeda organization as we have seen it
operate. Those who hijacked airliners on September 11 for the
purpose of attacking the World Trade Center, the Pentagon,
and other targets did not come out of nowhere. They were the
product of a relatively lengthy process, as suggested in Figure
3.5.13
______________
12 See Lewis (2002).
13 Some of the steps of Figure 3.5 have also occurred in the West. Indeed, the
West’s open societies can be incubators of radicalism that no one notices until
an incident occurs.
Principles for Influencing Terrorists
Disaffection
Exposure
to ideas
Recruitment
19
Training/
bonding
Reinsertion
Filtering,
possible
testing
Employment (in
major terrorist
attacks)
Continuing
contact, control,
leadership,
logistics
Figure 3.5—The Life-Cycle Process of Individual Terrorists
The individuals represented in Figure 3.5 started out dissatisfied in one way or another, not because of economic deprivation
or lack of education, as is sometimes assumed, but for other
reasons. They may have fallen under the influence of peers,
teachers, or Muslim leaders who exposed them to ideas and
activities that they found interesting. They may have been
given minor tasks to do for a still-shadowy organization. At
some point, they were admitted and were sent to training
camps, where they received further inspiration and indoctrination and bonded with others of similar mindset. They were now
part of something, part of something big. They were then reassimilated into society in various ways. In some cases, they
became students. In general, they were admonished to behave
normally and to avoid trouble. There were continued communications and efforts to keep them in the fold, and at some
point they were trained and employed for the big mission. In
the case of the September 11 terrorists, it was also their last
mission—a mission of alleged martyrdom.
We do not know all the details of this life cycle, and it probably
varies across individuals, but the basic picture is correct.
What matters here is that there are numerous places where it
is possible to intervene. The interventions might lead to arrests; or they might disrupt or deter. As a now-familiar example, by destroying training grounds in Afghanistan and putting
20
Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism
nations on notice that similar facilities will not be tolerated on
their soil either, the United States is disrupting and possibly
dissuading some who would otherwise be hosts. The effort may
not be fully effective, but training camps in the jungles of Indonesia may be less troublesome than the continued large-scale
operation of the training camps in Afghanistan would have
been. As a second example, consider “reinsertion.” How are
developing terrorist foot soldiers able to reinsert themselves in
western civilization? Here, there are many opportunities for
action, including tighter monitoring of émigrés and visitors,
cooperation with foreign governments to obtain more information about the individuals, and truly integrated databases
among organs of government. Such ideas are not new, and related actions are under way in the U.S. government, but viewing them in this structure may provide context and may help
explain how the strands of de facto strategy relate to one another.
A Decomposition in the Realm of Ideas
As another example, Figure 3.6 suggests that the willingness of
an individual to martyr himself (sometimes in the process of
committing murder) probably depends on several subordinate
notions. It is at least possible that those notions could be
“attacked” in the realm of ideas, whether through the air waves,
by influencing the behavior of local Muslim clerics, by firm assertions (and associated actions) by respected Muslim leaders,
or by actions against loved ones (see also Chapter Five). 14
The point of the figure, of course, is again to emphasize that
there are many different opportunities for attacking the terrorist system.
______________
14 At a minimum, these actions could prevent the martyr’s family from
benefiting economically from his action. As has been widely reported, recent
Palestinian martyrs have gone to their deaths with the valid expectation that
their families would be honored and paid.
Principles for Influencing Terrorists
21
Willingness to be a
martyr in a terrorist
mission killing civilians
Certainty in the
righteousness
of the act
Profound dismay
with the baseline
future (need for
action)
Belief in a
heavenly
reward
Belief that loved
ones will either
benefit or not be
unreasonably
harmed
Figure 3.6—A System Decomposition of a Would-Be Martyr’s
Decision
Other Decompositions
A variety of other system decompositions are useful, depending
on the needs of a particular counterterrorist organization. If,
for example, we focus on all that is required to accomplish a
particular large-scale operation, such as the September 11 attacks or the attack on the USS Cole, we could construct a
campaign process (Roberts, 2002), one that would include conceptual planning, initial reconnaissance, initial logistical work,
recruiting, training, final logistical preparations, mission rehearsal, and the actual attack.
Yet another decomposition, described previously (Powers,
2001), refers to ideology and value formation; motivation;
planning and information gathering; acquisition (of materials
and equipment for weapon production); weapons production,
deployment, and use; and exploitation.
Again, the idea here is not that one particular decomposition is
“right,” but that a system perspective, coupled with a variety of
decompositions of the system, can provide intellectual and
22
Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism
practical frameworks for action. Organizations such as the FBI
and the CIA perform such examinations routinely, as do other
security organizations, but creating such system decompositions should be an explicit part of counterterrorist doctrine,
even for the “soft” subject of deterrence.
FINDING SITUATIONS WHERE INFLUENCING
EFFORTS MAY WORK
The next principle is to avoid talking in generalities about
whether influences will work (the answer will often seem to be
“No” when the discussion is too broad), and instead to look
specifically for circumstances in which various influences could
be brought to bear.
A useful admonition is to always use this syntax: “Under what
circumstances might a given effort influence whom, either from
doing something or refraining from something?”
This may seem obvious, but a great deal of
counterterrorism discussion is confused by
overaggregation. Can al Qaeda be deterred? Of
course not. But wait, what do we mean by that?
If we ask, instead, whether elements of the al
Qaeda system can be deterred from doing specific things, the
answer is “Yes.” Moreover, even the most dangerous elements
in a system may be deflected from one mode of activity to
another, or from one set of targets to another. Deterrence and
influence are not simple switches.
Getting beyond “it
won’t work”: Everyone can be influenced sometime.
It is also worth recognizing that even the most dangerous terrorist leaders go through stages, depending on age, successes
and failures, opportunities, and associations with others. And
even killers can “retire.”15 Thus, we should avoid blanket
statements about nondeterrability. Finally, it is virtually a law
of social science that people do not behave consistently from
one day to the next. Someone who may seem zealous and un______________
15 Some examples of this involving Black September and the Irish Republican
Army were noted during the project by John Parachini (RAND), who cited
earlier work by Hoffman.
Principles for Influencing Terrorists
23
bending one day may be “reachable” the next. This is something on which law-enforcement and intelligence agencies have
long depended. In practice, “No” may only mean “Not today.”
Nevertheless, to the extent that bin Laden and other al Qaeda
leaders are driven by messianic zeal and a sense of religious
mission, retirement seems most unlikely.
When thinking about how to influence whom from doing what,
substantial humility is needed: Reliable predictiveness is not
likely to exist. Instead, we should get in the habit of thinking
in terms of likely outcomes, and also of upside potentials and
downside risks.16
CONDUCTING A BROAD-FRONT STRATEGY
It is a principle of classical maneuver warfare that a commander should concentrate his resources. Broad-front attacks are
often viewed as wasteful and unwise. Far better, it is believed,
to find and attack the enemy’s “center of gravity.” This notion
is sometimes sensible and concrete; at other times, it is a form
of mysticism. When dealing with some kinds of terrorist organizations, and certainly al Qaeda, the United States has discovered that the beast may have no single head or single heart—
there may be no center of gravity to attack. 17 This is not certain. Indeed, bin Laden’s death might prove profoundly significant, and the organization might never recover. However, the
distributed and networked aspects of the organization (Arquilla
and Ronfeldt, 2001), as well as the breadth of its ideological
appeal, give us reasons to avoid banking on a center-of-gravity
strategy. Instead, the preferred approach is a broad-front attack on all aspects of the terrorist system that are vulnerable.
This may be wasteful in one sense, but the stakes are enormous and the alternative is too risky. Further, from an operational perspective, the downside to the broad-front approach is
greatly mitigated by the fact that the resources being employed
are in many cases different. Military operations are useful for
______________
16 Davis (2001, 2002b). See also Appendix D.
17 Bodansky (1999, p. 406) warns of this, arguing that bin Laden is only part of
a much bigger whole.
24
Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism
some purposes, while vigorous police work (including that of
the FBI) is useful in others, so there are different roles for
“resources” associated with foreign affairs, economics, ideas,
and communications. Although managing the overall counterterrorist process is proving incredibly complex for many reasons, the virtues and feasibility of the broad-front approach
appear to us evident. Indeed, it is what the United States
adopted ad hoc shortly after September 11. At that time, there
was no preexisting theory, but the theory that emerged appears
to us to have been basically correct. 18
DEVELOPING A PERSUASIVE, HIGH-MINDED
STRATEGY
The last of our principles is that the United States, despite
having already developed much of a de facto strategy that has
served well in the first phase, now needs to develop, articulate,
and “sell” a persuasive strategy for the long term. Some of this
is under way, but the intellectual framework is still emerging.
This might be a matter of merely academic interest, except for
the fact that the struggle with terrorism will probably be of long
duration,19 and this will require a high degree of coherence
throughout the layers of U.S. society as well as internationally.
It is only natural for people, governments, and businesses to
stray from the fold when the immediately visible danger has
lessened, other interests intrude, and the “messiness” of counterterrorism is widely seen and deplored. A core reason for
NATO’s victory in the Cold War was its remarkable commitment
(not unwavering, but remarkable nonetheless) (Kugler, 1993).
______________
18 For related discussion about multifront efforts and the challenges of
coordination, see Pillar (2001, p. 29 and Ch. 4).
19 We say “probably” because it is possible that al Qaeda has already been
grievously wounded and that within perhaps another year it will prove possible
to relax to some degree. Some argue that September 11 may have been a
turning point, after which support of extremists such as al Qaeda will wane
substantially (Ibrahim, 2002). Currently, we are not sanguine, because of the
powerfully negative demographics in the Middle East and the depth of the
emotions in that region, many of which are directed against the United States.
Further, it currently appears that remnants of al Qaeda remain quite active,
even if the organization is still suffering from its major disruption.
Principles for Influencing Terrorists
25
If something similar is needed here, and we believe it is, then
permanent changes of attitude are needed in legislatures, the
intellectual elites, and other groups, not only in the United
States, but in other countries, especially those that are the
breeding grounds of terrorism. Thus, however uphill the
struggle may be to change some matters, such as the contents
of schoolbooks and the sermons given in the local mosques, the
effort is worthwhile.
The key attributes of a counterterrorism strategy appear to us
to be the following:
•
Manifest strength and, perhaps even more important, manifest purpose and determination.
•
Relentlessness and effectiveness of actions.
•
Consistency with American values and moral validity apparent to others.
•
A balanced mid- and long-term strategy that includes both
coercive measures and inducements.
These are necessary for the United States, but not sufficient.
The Israelis, for example, have long been strong, purposeful,
determined, and relentless, and arguably, they have attempted
to maintain moral values and to offer inducements to the
Palestinians. Yet their deterrence has not succeeded.
Manifest Strength, Purpose, and Determination
In the war on terrorism, perhaps even more than was the case
during the Cold War, it is essential to project a sense of America’s strength, purpose, and determination. Its strength has
probably been evident enough, but purpose and determination
have not. Consider the days before September 11. We believe
that September 11 represented a profound failure of deterrence.20,21 Before the attack, most Americans probably be______________
20 Here we draw heavily on material in Schachter (2002).
21 Others disagree with the conclusion that September 11 was a failure of
deterrence due to the appearance of weakness, arguing that the United States
26
Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism
lieved that U.S. strength, purpose, and determination were selfevident (although some of us grumbled about the ineffectiveness of counterterrorism actions in Sudan and Afghanistan). If
we take bin Laden at his word—which we believe is reasonable
even if we discount somewhat for his propagandistic purposes—a very different image existed in his mind. Consider his
statements after the U.S. cruise-missile attack in Afghanistan:
The American bombardment had only shown that the world is
governed by the law of the jungle. That brutal, treacherous
attack killed a number of civilian Muslims. As for material
damage, it was minimal. By the grace of God, the missiles
were ineffective. The raid proved that the American army is
going downhill in its morale. Its members are too cowardly
and too fearful to meet the young people of Islam face to
face.22
Consider the score card prior to September 11, as suggested in
Table 3.1. In 1983, U.S. forces left Beirut after the successful
attack on the Marine barracks. In 1984–1986, the United
States made concessions to buy the freedom of hostages in
Lebanon. In 1993, the United States withdrew its forces after
the Black-Hawk-down incident in Mogadishu. After the attack
on the al-Khobar Towers in 1998, there was no obvious U.S.
response. When embassies were bombed that same year in
Kenya and Tanzania, the response consisted of ineffectual
cruise-missile attacks, as mentioned above. There was no visible response to the USS Cole incident in 2000. Finally, of
course, came September 11, which did indeed spawn a massive
and powerful response, Operation Enduring Freedom. It is not
hard to believe, however, that before then, bin Laden and other
al Qaeda leaders saw the United States as something that
______________________________________________________________
is already believed by many in the Middle East to be strong, determined, and
even ruthless. However, its vulnerabilities to homeland attack were objective
realities. It simply “made sense” to strike the homeland if the purpose was to
change U.S. policy in the Middle East. This was done despite the certainty of
retaliation, which might even help al Qaeda’s cause if it is seen as an attack on
the Muslim world.
22 “Wrath of God:
Osama bin Laden Lashes Out Against the West,” Time,
January 11, 1999; available at http://www.time.com/time/asia/asia/
magazine/1999/990111/osama1.html .
Principles for Influencing Terrorists
27
Table 3.1
Response to Islamist Terrorist Attacks Prior to September 11
Year
1983
19841986
1993
1998
1998
2000
Attack
Beirut
American hostages in
Lebanon
Mogadishu
Al-Khobar Towers
Kenya/Tanzania
USS Cole
Overt U.S. Military Response
Withdrawal
U.S. concessions to buy
freedom of hostages
Withdrawal
None
Cruise-missile attacks
None
SOURCE: Adapted from Schachter (2002).
could be driven out. Their grandiose interpretation of the
Afghan war having brought down the Soviet Union also came
into play.
Relentlessness and Effectiveness
It is not sufficient for the United States to have strength and to
show determination at a single point in time. Rather, deterrence (and other forms of influence) will be enhanced if the
United States conveys clearly that its determination is for the
long run, with no respite, no forgetting, and no quarter. Here
and elsewhere, we are impressed by the extent to which NATO’s
Cold War strategy, which combined deterrence with containment, proved appropriate and effective.
The emphasis on strength, determination, and relentlessness is
entirely consistent with President Bush’s approach. Maintaining the pressure, however, will not be easy.
Consistency with American Values and Moral
Validity Apparent to Others
We shall return to this theme in Chapter Five, but it should be
a core attribute of U.S. strategy that any actions taken be consistent with American values. Further, the strategy should
have a moral validity that is apparent to others who are able to
28
Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism
make reasonable assessments. After all, the United States
must depend heavily on allies and other international institutions, as well as on other ad hoc nation-to-nation arrangements.
A historical rule of thumb here has been to maintain discrimination in the use of force. Although critics of the United States
are quick to remember the firebombings and nuclear weapons
of World War II, the long-term norm of U.S. behavior in war has
been the discriminate use of force.
Balanced Strategy
Finally, strategy should have parallel components. As mentioned at the outset, history strongly suggests that the United
States must seek simultaneously to crush al Qaeda and to address sources of unrest. History also suggests that the crushing phase should be accomplished first (in part to avoid encouraging terrorism), but the groundwork for the more positive
features must be begun early if the strategy is to bear fruit
later.
To reiterate, there is no doubt that the United States must
crush al Qaeda, while taking care not to make its members into
heroes. In this task of eradication, “deterrence” is a mere tactic. This is not controversial. To succeed in the long run, however, the United States must address root causes or a next
generation of terrorists will emerge. In our view, the principal
root cause of today’s terrorism is the virulent form of Islam
adopted by al Qaeda.23 It must be defeated. In addition, however, we unabashedly acknowledge that some of bin Laden’s
supporters have legitimate concerns. Their grievances are illposed, self-serving, and dysfunctional (as when Islamists blame
______________
23 Ambassador Bremer said some years ago, “There’s no point in addressing the
so-called root causes of bin Laden’s despair with us. We are the root cause of
his terrorism. He doesn’t like America. He doesn’t like our society. He doesn’t
like what we stand for. He doesn’t like our values. And short of the United
States going out of existence, there’s no way to deal with the root cause of his
terrorism” (Bremer, 1998).
Principles for Influencing Terrorists
29
the West and the United States for the plight of Islamic states
in the Middle East), but their problems exist nonetheless.
Developing a balanced strategy is necessary, but its execution
will remain extremely difficult. We need look no further than
the current (2002) Israeli dilemma of how to deal with Palestinian suicide bombers to appreciate the problem. It is easy to
deplore Israeli tactics in the West Bank (e.g., the razing of
buildings and neighborhoods or the deporting of terrorists’
family members),24 but precisely what alternatives suggest
themselves in the current environment?
______________
24 A recent tactic, a crude assassination by bombing that killed many civilian
Palestinians, does not fit in this list. It was beyond the pale and was deplored
by President Bush and other world leaders.
Chapter Four
BROAD ISSUES OF STRATEGY
In this chapter, we discuss certain cross-cutting considerations
that should play a major role in U.S. counterterrorism strategy,
including its influence component. They are not so much controversial as they are unappreciated (controversial topics are
the subject of Chapter Five). The items we mention here relate
to counterterrorism strategy generally, not just to influence.
ORCHESTRATING A BROAD-FRONT STRATEGY
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the war on al Qaeda
should be a deliberate broad-front attack. It is already that in
practice, but the rationale for sustaining this approach is less
established and troubles are certain because such a strategy
requires relating the efforts of multiple agencies, subagencies,
and even nations, and it sometimes necessitates rapid action.
This would seem to require two enhancements of capability
which may at first seem contradictory, but they are complementary and equally important.
Improving the Capacity for Effective Distributed
Decisionmaking and Action
International terrorism involves what some refer to as netwar:
The enemy is highly distributed, makes good use of semiautonomous cells, and encourages local entrepreneurial actions, rather than demanding central control of all actions. In
addition, targets for counterterrorism actions are often fleeting,
31
32
Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism
as are opportunities to attack preemptively or take other special defensive measures.
All of this suggests the need for near-continual,
distributed decisionmaking and procedures that
allow timely actions. The agent on the street, the
company commander in the field, the diplomat
seeking to bring influence to bear, and the
operative seeking to influence public opinion in
the Middle East will need to be able to act
promptly, based on information available from
many sources. To put it differently, defeating networked terrorists probably requires sophisticated netwar in response.1 That,
in turn, is much more than a matter of linking databases and
assuring communications. To wage netwar properly will require that those who are empowered operate under a theory, a
set of principles, and a doctrine that is readily understood and
disseminated. This should include rules of engagement and an
understanding of higher-level issues and tradeoffs permitting
rapid adaptation by actors on the scene. Such discipline must
be revisited and reinstilled because the pressures of action operate against it.
Timely, sound actions by distributed
actors will require
sophisticated doctrine and nuanced
rules of engagement.
Although the analogy is imperfect, the United States has relevant experiences. Some have been positive, while others have
been sobering and cautionary. U.S. Special Forces units, for
example, have often been given a great deal of autonomy and
license. They have been expected to make nuanced calls and to
avoid serious and visible blunders that would have higher-level
ramifications. For the most part, they have been successful,
largely because the personnel in these units are chosen for intelligence as well as physical prowess and are trained to understand well the context of their missions. There have also been
very positive examples of special police antigang units. In contrast, there have been many examples of military or lawenforcement units (including other antigang units) that have
been given a great deal of autonomy and have then run amok.
In summary, the kinds of distributed fast-acting capability
______________
1See Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001).
Broad Issues of Strategy 33
needed may be clear enough, but achieving them is not
straightforward and should begin with what might be broadly
called doctrine.
Improving the Capacity for Rapid Centralized
Decisions
The value of distributed operations is apparent throughout the
American economy and does not need to be defended so much
as encouraged. Nonetheless, even with superbly networked
counterterrorism forces that have first-rate doctrine for on-thescene decisionmaking and action, there will also be a need for
some decisions to be kicked to central authorities and for those
authorities to orient, assess, and decide on actions quickly.
The “tactical” actions contemplated will have strategic implications and will simply not be candidates for local initiative.2
In the war on terrorism, many of the issues involved will be
more like those of grand strategy than those of purely military
matters. The United States, for example, cannot violate
sovereignty lightly in pursuit of terrorists or in preemptive actions. Such actions may well be ordered, as President Bush
has hinted on more than one occasion, but they will not be
taken lightly and they will be decided by central authorities
who can see across political, military, and economic boundaries
and who can orchestrate actions with other nations and agencies.
Decisions of this type are already being made, with committees
of deputies as the common mechanism for debate and decision.
However, if it is believed that there will be a need for rapid decisionmaking and complex orchestration of actions, then such
business-as-usual committee approaches will not suffice. Two
examples are illustrative: The first is the U.S. cruise-missile
______________
2 It is instructive to observe that commanders in chief (CINCs), now called
combatant commanders, or their deputies have often found it necessary to
make tactical-level or even engagement-level decisions in recent military
operations, such as those in the Balkans, precisely because “small events” can
have strategic consequences. It is not that the commanders in question
wanted to micromanage.
34
Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism
strike against a training camp in Afghanistan, which came too
late. An assembly of important al Qaeda figures had met there,
but they had dispersed by the time the missiles struck. The
second example is the missed opportunity to strike bin Laden
and his associates with a drone-mounted missile operated by
the CIA. In this case, one might argue that there “should” have
been better rules of engagement, but there will always be surprises for which prior thinking proves to have been inadequate,
and these will require central decisionmaking.
In such cases, there will be a need for an improved form of
continual staffing and rapid decisionmaking, even by dispersed
high officials, including the President. The political challenges
involved are, of course, enormous. So also are the technological challenges, since there is no good precedent as yet. Indeed,
the history of decision-support systems for complex strategiclevel work is not encouraging, and we therefore believe that it
will be necessary to have competitive approaches and an unusual emphasis on assuring that results add value to the hypothesized orchestration group.3
It might even be asked here whether the war on al Qaeda
should be run not by a region-focused CINC, but by a full-time,
round-the-clock task force dedicated to this mission and looking at all relevant information worldwide. It is beyond the
scope of our work to make proposals on this issue, but at least
two very different models suggest themselves for analysis. The
first would be to have the task force report directly to the National Security Council, which would have the advantage of
emphasizing the cross-agency, grand-strategy aspects of the
challenge. It would have the disadvantage of not having a
home in an agency experienced in operations. The second
model would have the task force be more like a global analog to
a regional CINC, but reporting to the Secretary of Defense and
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. It would have substantial
______________
3 DARPA is currently conducting research on advanced versions of decision
support that will include extensive networking and will enable some of what we
have in mind. Over the past decade, considerable progress has also been made
within the executive branch in bringing about cross-agency political and
strategic-level work (Hawley, 2002).
Broad Issues of Strategy 35
support from the non-Department of Defense (DoD) agencies
and one or more deputy “commanders” from such agencies to
assure the appropriate balance of discussion and decision.
Relationship to the Influence Component of
Counterterrorism
The examples above related primarily to direct actions; analogous issues also arise within the influence component of U.S.
strategy. Indeed, the distinction between direct actions and influencing actions is often blurred in practice because a given
action may have both direct and indirect effects (a theme of socalled effects-based operations, as described in Appendix D).
For example:
•
Decisions to engage ambiguous targets on the battlefield
may have profound effects on attitudes toward the United
States, ranging from enhanced appreciation of U.S. power
and determination to bitterness about attacks on innocents.
•
Decisions to encourage allied actions against extremist religious schools and individual Islamic-cleric firebrands
probably need to be made locally but they should be informed by broader policies.
•
Some domestic law-enforcement actions might have to be
initiated immediately for effectiveness but could be perceived as the actions of “jack-booted feds” if they are not orchestrated with local authorities and political figures.
•
The extreme disruption of air travel resulting from mandated evacuation of facilities creates major vulnerabilities to
terrorist false-alarm tactics; more local discretion is needed,
but the analog to rules of engagement is also needed.
A much larger issue here is how the U.S. government should
approach the concept of terrorism and the communication of
threat. The more extreme the disruption that terrorists regard
as plausible, the weaker is deterrence. This has major ramifications for how the general threat of terrorism is framed and
how more-specific threats are communicated. As a conse-
36
Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism
quence of September 11, the United States is already spending
about $100 billion for homeland security (on the public, private, federal, and local levels). The indirect consequences on
the economy probably increase this figure to several hundreds
of billions annually.
THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF EFFICIENCY,
EVEN IN WAR
A second cross-cutting challenge relates to efficiency. We are
not especially interested in efficiency on the battlefield—effectiveness is good enough. However, aspects of counterterrorism
must necessarily be efficient, because U.S. internal vulnerabilities are essentially infinite. Current political requirements
call for 100 percent screening of airline passengers and baggage, but such comprehensive approaches are infeasible for the
nation’s activities as a whole. This suggests the need for DoDstyle analysis—in particular, portfolio-management analysis—
to allocate resources wisely and to assure focus and coherence
in “strategy-to-tasks” work (such work is, of course, consistent
with the thrust of the new Homeland Defense Strategy). The
same can be said of allocating resources for the influence war
abroad.4 Even with a broad-front strategy, there are too many
possibilities and too few trained people to do everything everywhere.
Another consideration here is that overzealousness in protective measures creates enormous vulnerability to terrorists even
if those terrorists lack competence: The mere threat of attack
or half-baked efforts that end in capture can drive the United
States to greater and greater expenditures that can only be
considered overhead expense. This, we believe, is a major economic problem that has not yet been addressed well. The
United States appears to still be in a phase in which citizens
______________
4The need for such methods is referred to also in National Research Council
(2002). See Hillestad and Davis (1997) for a portfolio-management tool that
has been used in a number of defense and nondefense applications. The Air
Force and the Joint Staff have implemented versions of the strategies-to-task
methodology, originally developed by Glenn Kent and others (see, e.g., Lewis
and Roll, 1993).
Broad Issues of Strategy 37
and political leaders are demanding ever-higher levels of protection, with little discussion of the tradeoffs.
A PARADIGM FOR DEFENSE
The third cross-cutting challenge relates to the necessity to depend upon adaptation and recovery in defense. This, in turn,
leads to the need for improved modularity and so-called
“capabilities-based planning,” rather than “scenario-based
planning.” That is, it is necessary to develop broad wherewithal to cope with diverse circumstances, rather than finetuning plans based on specific scenarios. The goal is to have
flexible, adaptive, and robust capabilities, rather than capabilities designed for a particular scenario that assumes a specific
enemy; specific circumstances of warning time, allies, and enemy and friendly strategies; and specific national objectives. 5
Achieving such capabilities is notoriously complex. It requires
a passion for adaptiveness and substantial analysis leading to
a combination of incentives, standards, and policies.
Aside from their direct value for defense per se, such preparations and their exercise could contribute significantly to deterrence by helping to dispel any notion that the United States
can be easily toppled. Recovery from the attacks of September
11 was remarkable and gratifying to Americans, but the message sent to al Qaeda may have been different from the one intended. Newspaper accounts pointed out that the attack on
the Pentagon would have had a much greater effect had it
struck another side of the building; the entire airline system
was temporarily brought to a halt; recovery expenses and indirect consequences will cost hundreds of billions of dollars.
And, of course, the presumably unrelated anthrax letters had a
massive effect on the U.S. Senate and much of the federal government.
______________
5The reasons for capabilities-based planning are discussed in Rumsfeld (2001).
A more detailed discussion of analytical implications is given in Davis (2002a),
and an earlier treatment is given in Davis (1994).
38
Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism
For more than a decade, U.S. economic growth has been driven
in directions (e.g., toward just-in-time scheduling) that in some
respects create vulnerabilities and the potential for major disruptions from which it would be difficult to recover. To be
sure, not all the trends have gone in this direction—in particular, the infrastructure for networking has improved the situation a great deal. Nonetheless, major studies are needed on
how best to modify economic and other incentives so as to encourage more adaptive and recoverable systems. One goal
of the information campaign should be to communicate a sense
of that American capacity to adapt and recover. No terrorist
leader should be easily able to imagine that the United States
can be brought down by a few discrete attacks of a sort that he
might bring about. The key point is that
•
Some deterrence can be achieved by demonstrating that
terrorist attacks will not bring the United States down or
cause it to close itself down and that the nation is able to
take the punches, recover, and hit back very hard.
Deterrence depends heavily on this, but the United States is
still giving the impression that it is closing itself down to a
considerable extent, which in turn gives terrorists enormously
more power. There may be lessons here from the experiences
of others, such as the British, who had to deal with Irish Republican Army terrorism in London and who did so with only
modest disruption, and the Israelis, who have for many years
dealt with chronic terrorism. The current rash of suicide
bombings is in part testimony to Israeli successes with lessviolent forms of terrorism.
Chapter Five
SOME CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES
In this chapter we address a discrete set of controversial topics:
(1) deterring acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction1 (WMD); (2) political warfare; (3) threatening the things
that the terrorists hold dear; (4) challenges in U.S.-Saudi relations; (5) the Pakistan problem; (6) balancing U.S. interests in
enlisting regional allies, maintaining stability, and promoting
democracy; and (7) the feasibility of maintaining American values during a war against al Qaeda.
DETERRING ACQUISITION AND USE OF
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Deterring acquisition and use of WMD is profoundly important
and difficult. Terrorists appear to have grandiose intentions,
and some have intense interest in such weapons. Moreover,
they may believe that they have what a Cold War theorist would
call “escalation dominance.” That is, al Qaeda could use WMD
against the United States, but retaliation—and certainly escalation—would be difficult because (1) the United States will not
use chemical, biological, or radiological weapons; (2) its nuclear
weapons will seldom be suitable for use; and (3) there are no
good targets (the terrorists themselves fade into the woodwork).
And, of course, the United States has constraints. Although
______________
1Some observers refer to these as mass-casualty or mass-disruption weapons,
believing that even major terrorist efforts are more likely to cause casualties
and massive disruption than mass destruction.
39
40
Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism
this gap in the deterrent framework is dismissed by some, we
regard it as very dangerous.
We see two approaches: (1) threatening anyone who even tolerates WMD-related terrorism, and (2) deterring biological weapons.
Threatening Anyone Who Even Tolerates
WMD-Related Terrorism
The United States could announce credibly that the response to
WMD would be powerful and would be sustained (for as long as
necessary). It could make clear that the United States would
violate sovereignty and preemptively attack as necessary, deep
into other nations, and that it would act upon “reasonable” evidence and would even make some assumptions about who is
supporting terrorists in possession of WMD. Further, it would
punish not only active supporters, but even those states and
factions that merely tolerate the terrorists or indirectly facilitate
their acquisition of WMD. The purpose would be to so alarm
heads of state and heads of substate organizations that they
would work actively to get rid of elements that might bring destruction down upon them. 2
The credibility of such announcements has improved in the
wake of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Despite
the criticisms of President Bush’s “axis-of-evil” comments, the
heads of state of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea know that they
have been put on notice. Actions will speak more loudly than
words, however.
Critics of this approach say that the United States has already
declared this level of retaliation, since al Qaeda has already
crossed an unacceptable line. Thus, what threat still remains
that can be used for deterrence? Such criticism misses the
point: The target here is not al Qaeda or the Taliban, but the
______________
2John Parachini (RAND) has discussed such issues in terms of the necessity to
broaden and deepen the red line that seems to have operated in the past. So
far, relatively few states have been known to be cooperating with terrorist
organizations in acquiring WMD.
Some Controversial Issues
41
states and substate groups that might aid or tolerate such organizations. Deterring them is a continuing problem. Deterrence is probably operating now to a substantial degree. What
state today would emulate the Taliban? Unfortunately, such
deterrence will fade unless it is continually renewed.
Deterring Biological Weapons
Deterring biological weapons is especially controversial—it was
controversial even within our own research team and among
colleagues with whom we consulted in the course of this research.
The Problem. The single kind of act against which deterrence
is most important is mass-casualty attack, e.g., attack using
radiological, biological, or nuclear weapons. It seems clear that
some terrorist leaders would use such weapons if they could do
so and that others are seeking weapons with related capabilities. Furthermore, many people in some countries would probably cheer if the target were the United States or Israel. Because some such weapons will almost surely fall into terrorists’
hands at some point, and because foolproof defense is very unlikely to exist, it is crucial that attitudes be hardened against
their use. How might this be done?
The United States could attempt to incite certain attitudes
within the terrorist systems, such as:
•
Moral repugnance.
•
Fear of backlash from supporting populations.
•
Fear of mass-casualty retaliation or the passive spreading
of disease.
The first two items create challenges but no dilemmas. If the
United States can stimulate clerics and other respected figures
to speak strongly and consistently against the immorality of
mass-casualty weapons, it should certainly do so. The last
item, however, does raise a dilemma. It is worrisome, especially to those who believe that fear is often a better deterrent
than appeals to morality, because no such fear of mass-
42
Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism
casualty retaliation seems to exist today. The absence of such
fear must increase substantially the likelihood that terrorists
will actually use mass-casualty weapons if they can do so. The
dilemma arises in determining how the United States might go
about stimulating that fear.
Ironically, it would be only logical for would-be users of masscasualty weapons to be very concerned about retaliation. If
they believe their own rhetoric, they should also
•
See the U.S. firebombing of Japanese cities in World War II
and the subsequent A-bombing as clear evidence of U.S.
willingness to use mass-casualty weapons if aroused.
•
See the deaths of Iraqi innocents resulting from westernimposed sanctions as a more recent example of determined
ruthlessness toward Arabs and Muslims.
•
See violent retaliation from Israel or its Mossad as a constant threat by a state capable of anything.
Polls indicate that vast numbers of people in the Middle East
erroneously believe that Israel was responsible for the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon,
and that there was a massacre at Jenin. Should they not logically be concerned, then, that Israel would resort to masscasualty weapons if that Pandora’s box were opened? Even
though the actual perpetrators of September 11 know full well
who was responsible, and even though Palestinian leaders may
know that no massacre occurred in Jenin, their supporters
may not.
These speculations are ...
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