Mass Internment Justification In Emergency Presidential Power

timer Asked: Feb 7th, 2019
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Question Description

Please respond to these questions: Which branches of government were involved in the decision to intern over 110,000 Japanese Americans on the west coast during World War Two? How was this mass internment justified, both as a matter of claimed facts (i.e. why it was claimed that internment was necessary) and a matter of power/legitimacy under the Constitution? Did the Supreme Court make the right decisions in Hirabayashi and Korematsu as a matter of constitutional law? Why or why not? Please consider both majority opinions and the dissents in Korematsu and use specific examples from the court opinions from both cases. Could the mass internment be justified as a response to an emergency? If so, how should that emergency have been defined, and what specific power was justified by the emergency (and why)? What emergency powers were available under the Constitution or statutory law to deal with the claimed threat, and could such power(s) be justified as a response?

Your paper should be about 4-6 pages (roughly 1,000 – 1,600 words) long. You do not have to do any outside research, but please use specific examples from the reading assigned for the week of February 5 (and reading covered already this semester) in writing your paper (that does not mean you have to agree with everything in the reading, but it is important to be specific in defending your position in order to explain why you think your answer is justified). As noted, please be sure to include appropriate citations in your paper.

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6 the intern­ment of jap­an ­ ese ­americans dur­ing world war ii Copyright © ${Date}. ${Publisher}. All rights reserved. A s ­Americans on the East Coast wor­ried about land­ings by Ger­man sab­o­teurs, ­Americans on the West Coast wor­ried about a pos­sible in­va­sion and won­dered ­whether they had to fear Jap­a­nese ­Americans who might ally with the in­vad­ing enemy. ­Elected of­fi­cials, in­clud­ing Earl War­ren, who was then ­California’s at­tor­ney gen­eral, began speak­ing of “re­lo­cat­ing” peo­ple of Jap­a­nese de­scent into the inter­ior of the coun­try, where they could not as­sist po­ten­tial in­vad­ers.1 While the ­threat of Jap­a­nese at­tack and per­haps even in­va­sion was based in part on the re­al­ity of the at­tack on Pearl Har­bor,2 con­cerns about Jap­an ­ ese ­Americans were based on gen­er­al­ized fears, not spe­cific proof. As David Cole notes, “there was never any ev­i­dence to sup­port the con­cern that the Jap­a­nese [Americans] liv­ing [in the ­United ­States] posed a ­threat.”3 In fact, like other ­Americans, Jap­a­nese ­Americans ­rushed to en­list in the U.S. mil­i­tary after Pearl Har­bor.4 How­ever, long­stand­ing prej­u­dice ul­ti­ mately led to the intern­ment of more than 100,000 Jap­a­nese ­Americans. In order to under­stand how and why Jap­a­nese ­Americans on the west coast were ­interned dur­ing World War II, it is im­por­tant to under­stand the his­tory that pre­dates the war. When Jap­a­nese im­mi­grants first came to the ­United ­States in the late nine­teenth cen­tury, they did not face the full fury of na­ti­vist prej­u­dices—­partly, per­haps, be­cause they were con­fused with Chi­nese im­mi­grants, who had pre­ceded Jap­a­nese im­mi­grants to the ­United ­States and were in­itially the focus of ugly prej­u­dice and stereo­typ­ing that de­scribed them as a “yel­low peril” bent on over­run­ning the West Coast.5 How­ever, by the turn of the cen­tury, ­anti-immigrant ac­ti­vists were 82 Copyright © ${Date}. ${Publisher}. All rights reserved. mak­ing room for an­i­mus di­rected spe­cif­i­cally ­against Jap­a­nese ­Americans. Na­ti­vists ­claimed that new­com­ers from Japan would ac­cept low wages that would drive down the in­come of white ­Americans, and they sug­gested that Jap­a­nese A ­ merican men might de­flower Cau­ca­sian women and girls.6 By the 1890s, the de­rog­a­tory term “Jap” was used to de­scribe Jap­a­nese ­Ameri­cans, and, by the 1920s, a sur­vey of Cal­if­ or­nia high ­school stu­dents and col­lege fresh­men found more dis­taste for Jap­a­nese than Chi­nese im­mi­grants, with Jap­a­nese ­Americans seen as “dis­hon­est, ­tricky and treach­er­ous.”7 As Japan ­emerged as a world power in the early twen­ti­eth cen­tury, fear of and prej­ud ­ ice ­against Jap­a­nese ­Americans in­ten­sified and found ex­pres­ sion in the law.8 In 1906, the San Fran­cisco ­school board re­quired Jap­a­nese ­American stu­dents to at­tend a seg­re­gated ­school pre­vi­ously used for Chi­nese ­Americans. In 1907, Pres­i­dent Theo­dore Roose­velt con­vinced the ­school board to re­con­sider its de­ci­sion 9 in ex­change for his nego­ti­a­tion of a ­so-called ­Gentleman’s Agree­ment with Japan that lim­ited fur­ther im­mi­gra­ tion to the ­United ­States. In 1913, Cal­i­for­nia law­mak­ers en­acted the Alien Land Act, which pro­hib­ited ­first-generation Jap­a­nese ­Americans or “Issei” born out­side the ­United ­States from pur­chas­ing ad­di­tional land.10 Many had al­ready es­tab­lished suc­cess­ful farms in Cal­i­for­nia and were seen as ­threats to white farm­ers. ­Eleven years later, Con­gress ­passed the Im­mi­gra­ tion Re­stric­tion Act of 1924. While the “Gentleman’s Agree­ment” had ­slowed im­mi­gra­tion,11 the Im­mi­gra­tion Re­stric­tion Act “com­pletely ­barred fur­ther Jap­a­nese im­mi­gra­tion.”12 For years be­fore the 1924 Act was ­passed, op­po­nents of Jap­an ­ ese im­mi­ gra­tion had ­claimed that Jap­a­nese ­Americans were sim­ply too dif­fer­ent from Cau­ca­sian ­Americans to be as­sim­il­ated into the ­American pop­u­la­ tion.13 In fact, Jap­a­nese ­Americans, es­pe­cially the Nisei gen­er­a­tion born in the ­United ­States and rec­og­nized as cit­i­zens by the Four­teenth Amend­ment, were often eager to as­sim­i­late. Jap­a­nese ­Americans who knew only the ­United ­States as their coun­try “were al­most ­wholly ­America-oriented” and ­formed quin­tes­sen­tially ­American or­gan­iza­tions like the Jap­a­nese ­American Young Re­pub­li­cans, Young Demo­crats, and ­American Le­gions posts, as well as the prom­i­nent Jap­a­nese ­American Cit­i­zens ­League,14 ­though, at the same time, they fre­quently en­coun­tered ra­cism and prej­u­dice.15 Many of the Issei had more dif­fi­culty as­sim­i­lat­ing, but these dif­fi­cul­ties can­not be sep­ar­ated from the con­text of ra­cism and laws that de­nied the Issei the op­por­tu­nity to seek cit­i­zen­ship. Al­though some of the Issei, even teen­ag­ers and ­adults, were will­ing to at­tend grade ­school in order to learn En­glish and ­joined Chris­tian ­churches or “American­ized Bud­dhist ­churches,”16 they fre­quently ex­pe­ri­enced “cul­tural iso­la­tion” as “mem­ber­ship in a broad spec­trum of American­iz­ing in­sti­tu­tions was de­nied to them.”17 the internment of japanese americans during world war ii 83 Copyright © ${Date}. ${Publisher}. All rights reserved. It was ­against this back­drop of ­forced ra­cial iso­la­tion, wide­spread prej­ud ­ ice, and de jure dis­crim­i­na­tion that the U.S. govern­ment de­vel­oped its plan for re­mov­ing Jap­a­nese ­Americans from their homes on the West Coast and hold­ing them in de­ten­tion camps dur­ing World War II.18 Con­gress rat­ified the ­president’s plan, which was im­ple­mented by the mil­i­tary, so this is not an ex­am­ple of uni­lat­eral emer­gency pres­i­den­tial power. How­ever, it is im­por­tant to under­stand the jus­tifi­ca­tions of­fered for mass intern­ment, as they help us to see how emer­gency pres­i­den­tial power can ­present prob­lems even when the pres­i­dent acts with Con­gress. Even be­fore ­Japan’s De­cem­ber 7, 1941, at­tack on Pearl Har­bor, the U.S. govern­ment had made con­tin­gency plans to ­intern non­cit­i­zens in the event of war with Japan, Ger­many, and Italy.19 After the at­tack, the Im­mi­ gra­tion and Nat­u­ral­iza­tion ­Service’s gen­eral coun­sel ­drafted a proc­la­ma­tion for Pres­id ­ ent Roose­velt au­thor­iz­ing “sum­mary ap­pre­hen­sion” of any Jap­a­nese A ­ merican who was not a U.S. cit­iz­ en.20 A few days later, Sec­re­tary of War Henry Stim­son clas­sified the West Coast and sev­eral west­ern ­states as a zone ­placed under mil­i­tary con­trol, sub­ject to the com­mand of Lieu­ ten­ant Gen­eral John De­Witt. How­ever, there was no im­me­di­ate de­ci­sion to round up Jap­a­nese ­Americans on the West Coast. In fact, Peter Irons re­marks that “the in­itial re­ac­tion [on the West Coast] . . . was one of tol­er­ ance and under­stand­ing [to­ward Jap­a­nese ­Americans].”21 That ­changed by the time the new year ar­rived as “the tide of pub­lic opin­ion ­abruptly ­shifted.”22 Lead­ers began to de­mand that Jap­a­nese ­Americans on the West Coast be re­moved from their homes and held in camps. Sec­re­tary of the Navy Frank Knox ­falsely ­claimed that Jap­a­nese ­Americans were re­spon­sible for the at­tack on Pearl Har­bor.23 A Los An­geles news­caster, John ­Hughes, urged At­tor­ney Gen­eral Fran­cis Bid­dle to ­intern Jap­a­nese ­Americans, cit­i­zens and non­cit­iz­ ens alike, and other mem­bers of the press ­joined ­Hughes’s call.24 Con­gress­man Le­land Ford (R-CA) also ­called for Jap­a­nese ­Americans to be “placed in in­land con­cen­tra­tion camps.”25 On Feb­ru­ary 19, 1942—more than two ­months after the at­tack on Pearl Har­bor—Pres­i­dent Roose­velt ­signed Ex­ec­u­tive Order 9066,26 au­thor­iz­ing the sec­re­tary of war or mil­i­tary com­mand­ers to des­ig­nate “mil­i­tary areas” from which “any per­sons may be ex­cluded.” Per­sons “ex­cluded” from such areas were to be trans­ported else­where and eu­phe­mis­ti­cally pro­vided “other ac­com­mo­da­tions as may be nec­es­sary.” Ul­ti­mately, that meant de­ten­tion camps en­cir­cled by ­barbed wire and ­watched over by armed ­guards.27 Roose­velt jus­tified the ex­ec­u­tive order on the basis of “the au­thor­ity ­vested in [him] as Pres­i­dent of the ­United ­States, and Com­mander in Chief of the Army and Navy.” The order ex­plained that these ac­tions were nec­es­sary “to [pro­tect] ­against es­pi­on­age and . . . sab­o­tage to na­tional de­fense 84 the internment of japanese americans during world war ii Copyright © ${Date}. ${Publisher}. All rights reserved. ma­te­rial.” The ex­ec­u­tive order did not spec­ify that it was to be ap­plied to Jap­a­nese ­Americans (it did not iden­tify any spe­cific group), but it was used ­mainly to re­lo­cate and in­car­cer­ate Jap­a­nese ­Americans, both cit­i­zens and non­cit­i­zens.28 In March 1942, Con­gress ­passed a law rat­ify­ing ­Roosevelt’s ac­tions by pro­vid­ing that any­one re­sist­ing re­lo­ca­tion or other in­struc­tions is­sued pur­su­ant to the ex­ec­u­tive order could be im­pris­oned.29 On March 2, 1942, act­ing pur­su­ant to Ex­ec­u­tive Order 9066, Gen­eral De­Witt des­ig­nated the west­ern parts of Cal­i­for­nia, Ore­gon, and Wash­ing­ ton State, as well as part of Ar­i­zona, as “mil­i­tary ex­clu­sion areas,” and pro­vided that all per­sons of Jap­a­nese de­scent were ­slated for re­moval from these areas.30 On March 24, 1942, a cur­few was in­sti­tuted for Jap­a­nese ­Americans on the West Coast.31 Mass re­moval and re­lo­ca­tion of Jap­a­nese ­Americans from the West Coast also began in March, al­though the re­moval pro­cess was not com­pleted until the end of Oc­to­ber 1942.32 More than 110,000 Jap­a­nese ­Americans, many of them chil­dren and al­most ­two-thirds of them ­American cit­i­zens born in the ­United ­States, were in­car­cer­ated for up to four years in ten camps lo­cated ­mainly in west­ern ­states.33 There was no proof that any of the in­car­cer­ated peo­ple were in­volved in es­pi­on­age or sab­o­tage, and no spe­cific ­charges were ever ­brought ­against any of them.34 Al­though most Jap­a­nese ­Americans ­obeyed the mil­i­tary or­ders, re­spected the cur­few, and re­ported for intern­ment,35 some of them pro­tested these ac­tions as vi­o­la­tions of their con­sti­tu­tional r­ ights and in­itiated legal chal­ lenges to the cur­few and de­ten­tion. Gor­don Hir­a­bay­a­shi re­fused to obey the cur­few and was ar­rested, tried, and sen­tenced to im­pris­on­ment. Hir­a­ bay­a­shi, a ­twenty-four-year-old col­lege stu­dent who was born in Seat­tle and had never vis­ited Japan, was also con­victed for fail­ing to obey a re­ lo­ca­tion order. He chal­lenged his con­vic­tion, and his case ­reached the U.S. Su­preme Court. The court, rul­ing only on the ques­tion of the con­sti­tu­ tion­al­ity of the cur­few as ap­plied to Jap­a­nese ­Americans who were U.S. cit­i­zens,36 unan­i­mously up­held ­Hirabayashi’s con­vic­tion, al­though three jus­tices wrote con­cur­ring opin­ions. Chief Jus­tice ­Stone’s opin­ion for the court iden­tified as the cen­tral ques­tion “whether, act­ing in coop­er­a­tion, Con­gress and the Ex­ec­u­tive have con­sti­tu­tional au­thor­ity to im­pose the cur­few re­stric­tion here com­plained of.”37 He rea­soned that the two ­branches, act­ing to­gether, pos­sess the com­plete war power of the na­tional govern­ment, which had been de­fined as “the power to wage war suc­cess­fully.”38 This power, Stone ex­plained, was “not re­stricted to the win­ning of vic­to­ries in the field and the re­pulse of enemy ­forces.”39 It in­cluded “every phase of the na­tional de­fense”; since the Con­sti­tu­tion as­signs the war power to the ex­ec­u­tive and Con­gress, the court must ex­tend the other ­branches “a wide scope for the ex­er­cise of the internment of japanese americans during world war ii 85 judg­ment and dis­cre­tion” in iden­tify­ing and de­fend­ing ­against po­ten­tial ­threats to the na­tion.40 In this case, decided in June 1943, the court con­cluded it was es­sen­tial to take con­text into ac­count. In early 1942, when the pres­id ­ ent and Con­ gress au­thor­ized the mil­i­tary to de­ter­mine who could be sub­ject to cur­few, Japan was win­ning vic­to­ries ­against the ­United ­States and its al­lies through­ out the Pa­cific. Under these circum­stances, “[t]hat rea­son­ably pru­dent men ­charged with the re­spon­sibil­ity of our na­tional de­fense had ample ­ground for con­clud­ing that they must face the dan­ger of in­va­sion, take meas­ures ­against it, and, in mak­ing the ­choice of meas­ures, con­sider our inter­nal sit­u­a­tion, can­not be ­doubted.”41 It was rea­son­able, the court said, for the U.S. govern­ment to take ac­tions de­signed to pro­tect ­against sab­o­tage and es­pi­on­age, in­clud­ing by or­der­ing the cur­few. More­over, the court found, it was rea­son­able for the govern­ment to de­ter­mine that only Jap­a­nese ­Americans who were U.S. cit­i­zens, in ad­di­tion to non­cit­i­zens of Jap­a­nese, Ger­man, or Ital­ian de­scent, ­should be sub­ject to the cur­few. The court cited state­ments by the chair­man of the Sen­ate Mil­i­tary Af­fairs Com­mit­tee dur­ing de­bate over the leg­is­la­tion rat­ify­ing Pres­id ­ ent ­Roosevelt’s ex­ec­ut­ ive order. The chair­man said it was rea­son­able to focus at­ten­tion on Jap­a­nese ­Americans be­cause there was “sus­pected wide­spread ­fifth-column ac­tiv­ity among Jap­a­nese” in the ­United ­States, and such sus­pi­cions were ­linked to “the ­system of dual cit­i­zen­ship which Japan ­deemed ap­pli­cable to ­American-born Jap­a­nese, and in the prop­a­ganda dis­semi­nated by Jap­a­nese con­suls, Bud­dhist ­priests and other lead­ers, among ­American-born chil­dren of Jap­a­nese.”42 The court added: Copyright © ${Date}. ${Publisher}. All rights reserved. There is sup­port for the view that so­cial, eco­nomic and po­lit­i­cal con­di­tions which have pre­vailed since the close of the last cen­tury, when the Jap­a­nese began to come to this coun­try in sub­stan­tial num­bers, have in­ten­sified their sol­i­ dar­ity and have in large meas­ure pre­vented their as­sim­i­la­tion as an in­te­gral part of the white pop­u­la­tion. . . . Con­gress and the Ex­ec­u­tive, in­clud­ing the mil­i­tary com­mander, could have at­trib­uted spe­cial sig­nif­i­cance, in its bear­ing on the loy­al­ties of per­sons of Jap­a­nese de­scent, to the main­te­nance by Japan of its ­system of dual cit­i­zen­ship. Chil­dren born in the ­United ­States of Jap­a­nese alien par­ents, and es­pe­cially those chil­dren born be­fore De­cem­ber 1, 1924, are, under many circum­stances, ­deemed, by Jap­a­nese law, to be cit­i­zens of Japan. The as­so­ci­a­tion of in­fluen­tial Jap­a­nese res­i­dents with Jap­a­nese Con­su­lates has been ­deemed a ready means for the dis­semi­na­tion of prop­a­ganda and for the main­te­nance 86 the internment of japanese americans during world war ii Copyright © ${Date}. ${Publisher}. All rights reserved. of the in­flu­ence of the Jap­a­nese Govern­ment with the Jap­a­nese pop­u­la­tion in this coun­try. As a re­sult of all these con­di­tions af­fect­ing the life of the Jap­a­nese, both ali­ens and cit­i­zens, in the Pa­cific Coast area, there has been rel­a­tively lit­tle so­cial inter­course ­between them and the white pop­u­la­ tion. The re­stric­tions, both prac­ti­cal and legal, af­fect­ing the priv­i­leges and op­por­tu­nities af­forded to per­sons of Jap­an ­ ese ex­trac­tion re­sid­ing in the ­United ­States have been ­sources of ir­ri­ta­tion, and may well have ­tended to in­crease their iso­la­tion, and in many in­stances their at­tach­ments to Japan and its in­sti­tu­tions. View­ing these data in all their as­pects, Con­gress and the Ex­ec­u­tive could rea­son­ably have con­ cluded that these con­di­tions have en­cour­aged the con­tin­ued at­tach­ment of mem­bers of this group to Japan and Jap­an ­ ese in­sti­tu­tions.43 The court ac­knowl­edged that the cur­few order “nec­es­sar­ily in­volves some in­fringe­ment of in­di­vid­ual lib­erty, just as does the po­lice es­tab­lish­ ment of fire lines dur­ing a fire, or the con­fine­ment of peo­ple to their ­houses dur­ing an air raid alarm—nei­ther of which could be ­thought to be an in­ fringe­ment of con­sti­tu­tional right.”44 It re­jected ­Hirabayashi’s ar­gu­ment that the cur­few un­con­sti­tu­tion­ally de­prived him and other U.S. cit­i­zens of Jap­an ­ ese an­ces­try of the equal pro­tec­tion of the laws by ar­bi­trar­ily dis­crim­i­ nat­ing ­against them.45 The court con­ceded that “[d]is­tinc­tions ­between cit­i­zens ­solely be­cause of their an­ces­try are by their very na­ture odi­ous to a free peo­ple whose in­sti­tu­tions are ­founded upon the doc­trine of equal­ity.”46 In­deed, it ac­knowl­edged, in nor­mal times it would be in­ap­pro­pri­ate to make dis­tinc­tions ­between U.S. cit­i­zens on the basis of race or an­ces­try alone. How­ever, dur­ing war­time and fac­ing the ­threat of in­va­sion, Con­gress and the ex­ec­ut­ ive were jus­tified in giv­ing the mil­i­tary au­thor­ity to do what was nec­es­sary to de­fend the na­tion and, in doing so, were jus­tified in sin­gling out Jap­an ­ ese ­American U.S. cit­i­zens for dis­crim­i­na­tory treat­ ment.47 Again, con­text was key to the court: if Con­gress and the ex­ec­u­tive ­wanted to pro­tect the West Coast ­against sab­o­tage in areas be­lieved to be threat­ened by Jap­a­nese in­va­sion or at­tack, they were jus­tified in sub­ject­ing only Jap­an ­ ese ­Americans to the cur­few, es­pe­cially in light of the “facts and circum­stances with re­spect to the ­American cit­i­zens of Jap­a­nese an­ces­try re­sid­ing on the Pa­cific Coast which sup­port the judg­ment of the ­warwaging ­branches of the Govern­ment that some re­stric­tive meas­ure was ur­gent.”48 Re­lat­edly, the court con­cluded, “we can­not re­ject as un­founded the judg­ment of the mil­i­tary au­thor­ities and of Con­gress that there were dis­loyal mem­bers of that pop­u­la­tion, whose num­ber and ­strength could the internment of japanese americans during world war ii 87 Copyright © ${Date}. ${Publisher}. 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Hello pal, Work completed as agreed. Have a look at it and let me know if there are any revisions or clarifications that you might need. It was a pleasure working with you. Thanks, Smithwiliams.



Emergency Power
Course Code:



Branches of Government Involved in the Decision to Intern Over 110,000
Japanese Americans on the West Coast
The decision to intern the Japanese Americans during the Second World War was
reached by the government, with Congress, the President, and the military. The decision to hold
these Japanese Americans in detention camps during the Second World War was initially the
President’s plan, which was in turn ratified by Congress and ultimately implemented by the
military (Edelson, 2013).
How the Mass Internment was justified
Public opinion was against the Japanese population even before the Second World
War. People of Japanese descent in America faced negative public opinion that stems from the
early years of the 20th Century. In the 1920s, a survey showed college freshmen, and high school
students thought Japanese Americans were ‘tricky, dishonest and treacherous.’ This period in
history was marred by racial isolation, widespread prejudice, and discrimination against the
Japanese population (Edelson, 2013).
This form of public opinion gained deeper prominence in the US community after
the Pearl Harbor Attack. Although the fore mentioned racial prejudice against the Japanese was
present before the Second World War, it was only after the attack, that public opinion wan...

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Tutor went the extra mile to help me with this essay. Citations were a bit shaky but I appreciated how well he handled APA styles and how ok he was to change them even though I didnt specify. Got a B+ which is believable and acceptable.

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