• Introduction the Debate; Realism, Liberalism, Marxism In what remains a seminal and immensely readable introduction to various worldviews (and their relationship to economics and the international system), Andrew Ross identifies and describes the three contending schools/paradigms that dominate analyses of international relations and international economics: • Realism • Liberalism • Marxism These perspectives have to do with what is called a “mental map”; mental maps matter because how we see the world subtly, but vitally, determines how we act in that world. We therefore recommend that you recognize your own perspective as we proceed through the free trade/protectionist debate in the coming weeks. Finally, we should also recognize that while the struggle between realists and liberals has always constituted the essential tensions in U.S. policymaking, the Marxist perspective, or some variant, has been a contrarian force to influence and challenge efforts to improve economics and the international system. To be specific, the efforts of a neo-liberal development economist to improve communities and regions might be viewed and acted against by a Marxist because such efforts are viewed merely as yet another form of subjugation. Each of these perspectives embeds underlying assumptions about the central problem of international relations and economics, the nature of the international system, actors, behavior of actors, the type of "game” being played (“zero sum” versus “positive sum”), specific agenda, and the relationship between politics and economics. Which of these perspectives is most useful for assessing the world today? For realists—or if we prefer to use Gilpin’s term, economic nationalists—the system now is either unipolar, multipolar, or in transition from unipolarity to multipolarity. At heart is the idea that power matters, and power drives economic choices. Thus, protectionism makes sense in many contexts. In essence, nation-states are the most powerful actors in the international system. This view does not ignore that there are other actors, but that the international system can best be understood by focusing on the actions of these primary actors. The international system is also anarchical. Thus, the international system is characterized by endless competition for power and resources as there is no central, global authority as is typical in a domestic environment. And, of course, it is assumed that state actions are rational. That is, all states actions are assumed to the be the result of a cost benefit analysis. Michael Mastanduno of Dartmouth College also examines three alternative images of the evolving international order; one, in particular has relevance to this course: Geoëconomic Competition. The end of great power military competition does not mean the end of great power competition. That competition has shifted to another arena: the economic and technological. “Competition for markets, raw materials, high value-added employment, and mastery of advanced technology becomes a surrogate for traditional military competition.” Great powers can be expected to mobilize for international economic competition. States will be sensitive to relative gains or relative economic position─some states benefit from economic exchange more than others. Major powers will organize their relations with weaker states to enhance their position in major power geoëconomic competition. We can thus expect to see regional economic blocs─in North (and South) America, Europe, East Asia─led by major powers. There is a realist alternative to this, of course. States emerging in power will align against those who might otherwise dominate the international economic system. Brazil, for example—although it faces truly daunting domestic economic challenges—has the potential to emerge in the next decades as a world economic power. It seems only natural that there will be resistance to the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) in the near future because Brazil would reasonably rather dominate a newly emerging economic block (say within Mercosur—or, in Portuguese, Mercosul) than itself be dominated by a larger power (the U.S.) in an older economic order. We cannot leave this discussion on realism, however, without acknowledging Robert Gilpin’s thoughts on economic nationalism and “hegemonic stability.”Gilpin openly states that the issue of “free trade versus protectionism” lies at the heart of the conflict between economic liberals and economic nationalists. Nationalists regard protectionism as an end in itself, while liberals regard protectionism at best as a necessary but temporary solution on the road to a wider system of free trade. Further, employing the original thoughts of Charles Kindleberger, the hegemon has the responsibility to guarantee provision to the collective goods of an open trading system and stable currency. Admittedly, the hegemon as Gilpin describes will degrade and lose power over time. Nonetheless, the U.S. as hegemon, needs to manage crises, the international debt problem, the increase in trade protectionism, and other issues of mutual international economic concern. Thus, in your final reading, you might notice how Soederberg deftly updates the economic nationalist/mercantilist arguments of the past to make it relevant for capital control and self-protection of economically powerful states in an age of global integration. Admittedly, this is not an easy read, but we look forward to your comments and discussion points. Though few have seemed to notice it, there does seem to be an inherent contradiction in “hegemonic stability theory” and its supposed roots in the realist perspective. Specifically, the realist perspective describes the international system as “anarchic” (which from the Greek literally means “without a leader”) and therefore is a “self-help” order for political action and economic choices, yet “hegemonic stability” suggests that the economic system cannot function well or long without the active presence of the “hegemon”—the “leader.” The Liberal Perspective and Its Economic Contribution to Strategic Issues How do liberals see the structure of the international system and how does that relate to economics? Dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University Joseph Nye (whose work with Robert Keohane you read here on “Complex Interdependence”) describes the international system as a wedding cake: at the top level, is the predominance of the U.S. unipolar military power; in the middle level, the basis of the system is tricolor (US, Europe, and Japan) and has been for decades; at the bottom layer are issues of transnational interdependence—whether it be banking or criminal networks. Clearly, the middle level of the cake is shifting to a wider dispersion in an age of global integration. Economic liberalism privileges the individual (whether the person or firm) as the focus and key actor in human society. It assumes that there is very little need for state interference (or other forms of centralized oversight) in ordering our economic discourse as "the market" emerges and evolves "naturally" to maximize efficiency and optimal output. There is a clear separation of economic progress from retrograde politics. Jessica Mathews, in an influential piece in Foreign Affairs in 1995 described as well a fundamental “power shift” that was taking place the would change the bases of how states act and how power and economics determine order. That is, he argues that the traditional Westphalian nation-state system in effect since 1648...of governing autonomy and monopoly of authority....is breaking down as newly emerging global issues, actors, and financial instruments force states to share power. Consider these issues in this section as we nominally mean to examine the free trade versus protectionist debate—increasing resource scarcity, rapid demographic shifts to urban areas, organized crime, drug trafficking, ethnic conflict, environmental decline, poverty. In the final sessions of the course, we will consider what relevance these issues have to economics and the international system. Has global integration left governments behind? Is it markets rather than governments that make the rules? Are international institutions indeed becoming more important? Are there alternatives to the state? What might those alternatives look like? Well, consider the following: The European Union—and more specifically the European Monetary Union. Subnational actors such as the fifty American states, most of which have trade offices in other countries─states have developed economic ties with other parts of the world and haven’t worked through Washington to do so. The World Trade Organization. The International Telecommunications Union. The International Standards Organization─a business NGO. The International Security Markets Association, a private regulator that oversees international trade in private securities markets. The Marxist Perspective and Its Economic Relevance to Strategic Issues Gilpin’s useful and readable piece on the “Three Ideologies of Political Economy” describes the Marxist view as:[In the overall corpus of Marxist writings, there are four essential elements.] The first element is the dialectical approach to knowledge and society that defines the nature of reality as dynamic and conflictual . . . The second element is a material approach to history; the development of productive forces and economic activities is central to historical change . . . The third is a general view of capitalist development; the capitalist mode of production and its destiny are governed by a set of “economic laws of motion of modern society.” The fourth is a normative commitment to socialism . . . [Yet the] principal weakness of Marxism as a theory of international political economy results from its failure to appreciate the role of political and strategic factors in international relations. As John Cassidy suggests, is Marx indeed “The Next Thinker”? Why would an investment banker say that “The longer I spend on Wall Street, the more convinced I am that Marx was right”? Was Marx right? Should we continue to take Marx and Marxism/neo- Marxism seriously? Is “economics the driving force in human history”? Is history the history of class struggle? Is the fundamental divide in society between those who own the means of production and those “whose only asset is their capacity for work”? What does class struggle look like on the international level? Is it possible that Marx was wrong about communism but right about capitalism? Has anyone since better understood the dynamics of capitalism? Does capitalism always tend toward monopoly, as Marx argued? Where does power lie in a capitalist society? Consider this provocative statement by Marx: “The executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the bourgeoisie.” In an age of corporate scandals and the continuing aggregation of power by the few, Marxists would only confirm their long-held views. • Intelligence Reform and the HSE In 2004, the Hoover Institute, a Stanford University based think tank noted, The intelligence community’s failure to warn with the clarity needed to disrupt the conspiracy of September 11 and its less-than-stellar performance in assessing Iraqi WMD programs highlight both the dangers to security and the demands for strategic intelligence in the twenty-first century. The community can hardly be trusted to do an honest and balanced critique of its performance in the wake of these events. It comprises numerous intelligence agencies, each with its own set of entrenched interests. As it stands today, the intelligence agencies are bureaucratically modeled after the management layers and hierarchies of the blue-chip companies of old, such as IBM.” This is quite a statement regarding the Intelligence Community and its’ intersection with homeland security. But is it a fair assessment?? The al Qaeda quad terrorist attacks in September 2001 were not a surprise to American intelligence agencies, who were expecting something major that summer or fall. However, what was a surprise was that the attack was not overseas but directed at homeland -- as well as the fully fueled commercial airliners being used as suicide cruise missiles employed against us domestically by terrorists who had infiltrated the country months earlier. The 9/11 Commission Report (2004) laid bare the many mistakes by government agencies such as the lack of effective inter and intra-agency information sharing, and the perception that the intelligence community (IC) was a leaderless and tribal constellation of various uncoordinated agencies. The CIA and FBI did not share effective what each agency knew about al Qaeda, neither agency shared with state and local officials that terrorists were known to be among us, and the NSA had collected (but not translated) communications that may have prevented the attack if analyzed in context of the intelligence held by other agencies (Bamford, 2015). Some of the major resulting reforms of the IC included the creation of a Director of National Intelligence, a National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC), and the creation of the vast Department of Homeland Security with its own intelligence and analysis office. There has been a new emphasis on Homeland Security focused intelligence. Another hotly debated topic was the concept to create a new domestic intelligence agency along the lines of the British Mi-5 or reshaping the FBI to perform such a role (Burch, 2007). There was also consideration to absorb the FBI into the new DHS as it was created. Ultimately the decision was made to keep the FBI separate from DHS and to keep the mandate to be a law enforcement agency as well as protect the nation from terrorists within the homeland. "In response to criticisms of its intelligence capabilities, the FBI over the last decade has introduced a series of reforms intended to transform the Bureau from a largely reactive law enforcement agency focused on criminal investigation into a more proactive, agile, flexible, and intelligence agency that can prevent acts of terrorism" (Bjelopera, 2013, p. 14). Within the FBI a new National Security Branch "which integrated the FBI’s Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence Divisions with the (Directorate of Intelligence) DI, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate, and the Terrorist Screening Center...established Field Intelligence Groups (FIGs), which could be viewed as a cornerstone of his reforms, at each of the FBI’s 56 field offices in an effort to improve the Bureau’s intelligence capacity by combining its intelligence and investigative capabilities" (Bjelopera, 2013, p. 15). In short, the IC needs to provide support for national security efforts overall and in particular the homeland security enterprise with timely and accurate intelligence to secure the nation. However, reforming the 16 various member agencies and organizations of the intelligence community with diverse and sometimes competing interests remains a challenge. Noted the same Hoover Institute Report, that started this lesson, Sharpening the dull intelligence blade will require a strong hand from outside the intelligence community. Left to their own devices, the CIA’s do and di managements have no incentive to bring about reforms; they have clearly vested interests in the perpetuation of a system in which they benefit regardless of the worth of intelligence to American policymakers. CIA’s persistent operational and analytic shortcomings elude quick and easy fixes. Instead of probing deeply and critically into these “software” problems, outside reviewers are drawn by an almost gravitational force to look at “hardware” and bureaucratic wire diagram changes as vehicles for reform. The new commission would be well advised to look for ways to nurture operational and analytic talent and avoid bureaucratic changes that are akin to rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. References 9/11 Commission Report (2004). Retrieved from https://9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf Bamford, J. (2015, July 21). Missed calls: Is the NSA lying about its failure to prevent 9/11? Foreign Policy. Retrieved from http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/21/missed-calls-nsa-terrorism-osama-binladen-mihdhar/ Bjelopera, J. P. (2013). The Federal Bureau of Investigation and terrorism investigations. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41780.pdf Burch. (2007). A domestic intelligence agency for the United States? A comparative analysis of domestic intelligence agencies and their implications for homeland security. Homeland Security Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.hsaj.org/articles/147 Nelson, R. (2013). Homeland security at a crossroads: Evolving DHS to meet the next generation of threats. Retrieved https://www.csis.org/analysis/homeland-security-crossroads-evolving-dhs-meetnext-generation-threats SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES: PERSISTENT PROBLEMS EXIST IN MONITORING BULK CASH FLOWS AT KABUL INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT This product was completed under SIGAR’s Office of Special Projects, the Special Inspector General’s response team created to examine emerging issues in prompt, actionable reports to federal agencies and the Congress. The work was conducted pursuant to the Special Inspector General’s authorities and responsibilities under the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008 (P.L. 110-181). DECEMBER 11, 2012 SIGAR SP-13-1 SIGAR SP-13-1 Anti-Corruption / Currency Movement at KBL December 11, 2012 The Honorable Janet Napolitano Secretary of Homeland Security The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton Secretary of State The Honorable James B. Cunningham U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan The international community, including the U.S. government, has long held serious concerns about the flow of cash out of the Kabul International Airport (KBL). According to the Congressional Research Service, an estimated $4.5 billion was taken out Afghanistan in 2011. 1 While large cash movements are typical in Afghanistan because it is a cash-based economy, these bulk cash flows raise the risk of money laundering and bulk cash smuggling—tools often used to finance terrorist, narcotics, and other illicit operations. Recognizing the seriousness of this problem, a civilian-military interagency working group based at the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan developed the “bulk cash flow action plan” in 2010 to better regulate cash flow at KBL. 2 That same year, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) pledged to adopt and implement regulations or laws within one year to govern the bulk transfers of cash outside the country. 3 In July 2011, SIGAR reported on U.S. government efforts to strengthen oversight over the flow of U.S. funds through the Afghan economy, including the bulk cash flow action plan. 4 We initiated this review in August 2012, to follow up on concerns we raised in that report regarding implementation of the plan, particularly Operation FinTRAX—an initiative to place bulk currency counters at KBL to monitor the outflow of funds from Afghanistan. 5 We conducted a site visit to the airport to observe the use of bulk currency counters and other measures designed to monitor outflows of currency. We also interviewed U.S. officials responsible for helping 1U.S. officials report that only about 5 percent of the population use banks and 90 percent use informal cash transfer “hawalas” systems. See Congressional Research Service report, “Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance”, November 30, 2012, p.48. 2This action plan outlined 33 short-term, medium-term, and long-term measures designed to make it more difficult for illicit funds to leave Afghanistan and to enhance the airport authorities’ ability to secure KBL from an array of illegal activities. These 33 measures covered a range of areas, such as terminal controls for employees and passengers, cargo and baggage controls, currency and merchandise declaration procedures, training and investigative efforts, revenue collection, and regulatory enforcement. 3See Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan Communiqué: A Renewed Commitment by the Afghan Government to the Afghan People, A Renewed Commitment by the International Community to Afghanistan; 20 July 2010, p.4. 4 See SIGAR Audit-11-13, “Limited Interagency Coordination and Insufficient Controls over U.S. Funds in Afghanistan Hamper U.S. Efforts to Develop the Afghan Financial Sector and Safeguard U.S. Cash”, July 20, 2011, p.12-13. Another SIGAR report noted that DHS was proposing a currency tracking program, including at KBL, to trace the source of exported funds and exploit the intelligence gained from tracking bulk cash. See SIGAR Audit-10-15, “U.S. Reconstruction Efforts in Afghanistan Would Benefit from a Finalized Comprehensive U.S. Anti-Corruption Strategy,” August 5, 2010, p.15. Operation FinTRAX (Financial Tracking, Recording, and Exploitation) is also designed to place currency counters in banks engaged in processing electronic fund transfers on behalf of U.S. and international donors. 5 SIGAR SP-13-1 Anti-Corruption / Currency Movement at KBL Page 1 the Afghans strengthen controls over the flow of cash throughout Afghanistan and Afghan officials working at KBL. We conducted our work in Kabul, Afghanistan, from September 2012 to November 2012 in accordance with SIGAR’s quality control standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the review to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to meet our stated objectives and to discuss any limitations in the work. We believe that the information and data obtained, and the analysis performed, provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions. This work was conducted under the authority of Public Law No. 110-181, as amended; the Inspector General Act of 1978; and the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008. Background Bulk currency counters are an important anti-money laundering tool because they can capture currency serial numbers, data useful for detecting and investigating financial crimes. The machines purchased for KBL 6 were designed to record currency serial numbers, create databases, and process up to 900 bills per minute. They also were intended to transmit these data via an internet link to the Financial Transactions and Records Analysis Center of Afghanistan (FinTRACA). FinTRACA—part of Afghanistan’s Central Bank (Da Afghanistan Bank)—uses data on financial activity to identify financial crimes and assist law enforcement agencies in the investigation and prosecution of criminal activity. In 2011, SIGAR found that: • • • Although the contract to install these bulk currency counters at airport customs areas was awarded in July 2010, they were not installed until April 2011, in part because U.S. and Afghan officials disagreed on where to put them. When we visited the airport in April 2011, the machines were being used to count declared cash, but not to record currency serial numbers and report financial data to FinTRACA. Passengers designated by GIRoA as Very Important Persons (VIPs) could bypass the main security and customs screenings and instead use a separate facility to enter the airport’s secured area. While these VIPs were required to declare the amount of currency they were carrying, their cash was not scanned through bulk currency counters, and Afghan officials reportedly had no plans to do so. Despite this lack of cooperation from Afghan officials to fully implement the bulk cash flow action plan, GIRoA has continued to make public commitments to combat corruption and institute stronger border controls. At the July 2012 Tokyo Conference, 7 for example, GIRoA agreed to implement recommendations from the Financial Action Task Force Asia Pacific Group, which publishes internationally recognized standard to protect against money laundering and terrorist financing. 8 Among these recommendations is one stating that countries’ financial intelligence units 9 should have access on a timely basis to the financial, administrative and law 6The currency counter machines were among those purchased by the United States for Operation FinTRAX for a total cost of $117,275. 7On July 8, 2012, representatives from 70 countries, international organizations, and non-profits groups met in Tokyo, Japan to create a framework for continued international support for Afghanistan’s economic development. 8The Financial Action Task Force Asia Pacific Group is an independent intergovernmental body, established in 1989, was mandated to set standards and promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory, and operational measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of proliferation, and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system. 9 Typically, financial intelligence units are based within the central bank, the Ministry of Finance, or the regulatory agency of a country and provide intelligence on suspicious transactions to law enforcement organizations for investigation and arrest. FinTRACA is Afghanistan’s financial intelligence unit. To see the recommendations, see http://www.fatf-gafi.org SIGAR SP-13-1 Anti-Corruption / Currency Movement at KBL Page 2 enforcement information that it requires to undertake its functions properly—the type of information meant to be collected and transmitted by the currency counters at KBL. Afghan Government Still Does Not Use Bulk Currency Counters at KBL to Monitor Currency Movement We found that, more than 1 year since our last visit to KBL, the cash counters are still not being used for their intended purpose, and VIPs continue to bypass key controls. In coordination with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials, we visited KBL on September 20, 2012, to assess implementation of the bulk cash flow action plan, including use of the currency counters. These machines are located in the international terminal in a small closet-like area. (See figure 1). Figure 1: Bulk Currency Counters at KBL Source: SIGAR 20 September 2012. We observed the following weaknesses: • • The two bulk currency counters were located in an area not easily accessible to Customs and FinTRACA officials in the international terminal. Although DHS officials told us that Afghan customs officials have been provided on-the-job training on the use of the bulk currency counters, we did not observe any use of the machines. 10 However, we were able to check that each machine was plugged into an electrical outlet and appeared to be in working order. 10In April 2011, DHS officials told us that many of the airport workers felt uncomfortable using the machines and needed time to gain familiarity with the machines’ basic function of counting cash. SIGAR SP-13-1 Anti-Corruption / Currency Movement at KBL Page 3 • • • Neither bulk currency counter was connected to the internet or a computer server, which is essential for sending data to FinTRACA. (In our July 2011 report, we noted that the installation of an internet connection at the airport would be postponed until FinTRACA had moved to its new facility. According to a DHS official, this move occurred in 2011.) No bulk currency counter was available for the counting or data collection of currency declared by VIPs, who do not undergo main customs or security screenings. According to a DHS official, many of the individuals who traffic money leave from the VIP area. A new Very Very Important Persons (VVIP) lounge was built to provide easier boarding access for high-ranking officials, again allowing transit without main customs screenings or use of a bulk currency counter. DHS officials told us that their efforts to address these problems have stalled, even though the use of bulk currency counters to record and transmit data is critically important for their law enforcement activities. According to one official, Afghan officials have neither committed to connecting the machines to the internet nor agreed to establish a working link to FinTRACA. Notably, GIRoA has been able to resolve internet connectivity issues for other technical infrastructure items at KBL, calling into question its commitment to connecting the machines and improving controls over the movement of bulk currency. During our visit, Afghan customs and FinTRACA officials were unable to explain why the machines remained without internet connectivity. However, one DHS official told us that Afghan customs at KBL were afraid that they would experience negative repercussions from GIRoA if progress in instituting controls at the airport was made. As of October 2012, according to DHS officials, efforts to connect the bulk currency counters to the internet or a computer server were “at a standstill.” To improve accountability for bulk cash transfers, DHS officials have reportedly conducted several training and ongoing mentorship programs. Since 2010, the U.S. Embassy reports that DHS has trained over 400 students from over seven different Afghanistan law enforcement agencies in programs that contain elements aimed at addressing the flow of currency out of the country, including Cross Border Financial Investigation training and the Afghan Advanced Border Management course. The U.S. Embassy Kabul reports that further trainings are planned for 2013. Other Weaknesses Limit the Ability to Monitor the Flow of Cash at KBL In addition to problems with the bulk currency counters, we identified other weaknesses that negatively impact the ability to monitor currency flows. First, U.S. officials have raised concerns about a February 2012 GIRoA decree that raised the limit on the amount of currency persons travelling outside of Afghanistan are required to declare from $10,000 to $20,000. According to these officials, this change is likely to increase the risk of illicit bulk cash movement and further weaken controls for monitoring money movements at KBL because it makes it easier for individuals to engage in a practice called “structuring,” in which transactions such as money transfers or drug purchases are conducted repeatedly in small amounts to avoid suspicion. According to comments received from the U.S. Embassy Kabul, prior to the decree, there was no limit to the amount that could be taken out of the country, although travelers were required to report anything over $10,000. Under the current system, it is illegal to carry over $20,000 out of the country but there is no requirement to report anything under $20,000. The U.S. Embassy Kabul noted that the legal limit has increased out-bound electronic fund transfers by “hawalas” using banks to bypass the limit. However, the increased declaration limit encourages smuggling amounts over $20,000 and no tracking of funds under $20,000, according to the U.S. Embassy. The U.S. Embassy Kabul further stated that an effort was reportedly underway by the Afghan government to lower the legal limit to $10,000. It remains unclear whether such a change would impact declaration requirements. Second, we observed that the customs office is not in a secure, undisturbed area suitable for search, seizure, and storage of confiscated items, as recommended by the Bulk Cash Flow Action Plan. In the international SIGAR SP-13-1 Anti-Corruption / Currency Movement at KBL Page 4 terminal, the airport janitors’ office was down the hall, and we observed custodians looking at the video surveillance monitor in the Customs area of the terminal as they passed. Third, although the Bulk Cash Flow Action Plan calls for video surveillance cameras to be installed and used in the baggage screening and cargo areas of the airport, we observed that these cameras were installed and used only in the baggage screening area inside the main international terminal. They were not installed inside the VIP baggage screening or cargo areas. Conclusion The persistent delays in instituting basic anti-money laundering procedures by GIRoA at KBL are deeply troubling. Although proper controls to monitor cash flows are important for any country to institute, they are particularly critical for a country fraught with corruption, narcotics trafficking, and insurgent activity. In 2010, Ambassador Eikenberry presciently noted that “many of these measures [in the bulk cash flow action plan] require few, if any, additional resources; their success depends largely on the degree of GIRoA political will.” It is now imperative that GIRoA live up to its commitments to combat corruption and, particularly, to strengthen FinTRACA by ensuring that FinTRACA has all of the information required to undertake its functions properly. That means full use of the bulk currency counters and video security system as intended, and an immediate end to the practice of exempting designated VIPS and VVIPs from the customs procedures required of all other passengers. We will continue to monitor this problem and expect that the Department of the State will hold GIRoA accountable for meeting their stated commitments. Agency Comments We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of State and the U.S. Embassy Kabul for their review and comment. The U.S. Embassy Kabul provided technical comments that we have considered and incorporated, as appropriate, in this report. In its comments, the U.S. Embassy Kabul discussed ongoing USG efforts to complete tasks outlined in the Bulk Cash Action Plan, noting that 26 of the 33 tasks have been completed and that the Embassy plans to coordinate the issue of the bulk currency flows at the interagency level and will continue to raise the issues with senior levels of the Afghan government. ____________________________________________________________ This product is one in a series of products completed under SIGAR’s Office of Special Projects, the SIGAR response team created to examine emerging issues in prompt, actionable reports to federal agencies and the Congress. (This work was initiated under SIGAR-067A). The work was conducted in accordance with SIGAR’s quality control standards and under the authority of Public Law No. 110-181, as amended; the Inspector General Act of 1978; and the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008. Major contributors to this report were Emmitt Candler, Larry Dare, Tim McQuay, and Jenniffer Wilson. Please contact my Director for Special Projects, Ms. Monica Brym at Monica.j.brym.civ@mail.mil or 703-545-6003 if you have any questions or concerns regarding this work. John F. Sopko Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction SIGAR SP-13-1 Anti-Corruption / Currency Movement at KBL Page 5 SIGAR’s Mission The mission of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) is to enhance oversight of programs for the reconstruction of Afghanistan by conducting independent and objective audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of taxpayer dollars and related funds. SIGAR works to provide accurate and balanced information, evaluations, analysis, and recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, U.S. agencies, and other decision-makers to make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions to: • improve effectiveness of the overall reconstruction strategy and its component programs; • improve management and accountability over funds administered by U.S. and Afghan agencies and their contractors; • improve contracting and contract management processes; • prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; and • advance U.S. interests in reconstructing Afghanistan. Obtaining Copies of SIGAR Reports and Testimonies To obtain copies of SIGAR documents at no cost, go to SIGAR’s Web site (www.sigar.mil). SIGAR posts all publically released reports, testimonies, and correspondence on its Web site. To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Afghanistan Reconstruction Programs To help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, and reprisal, contact SIGAR’s hotline: Public Affairs • Web: www.sigar.mil/fraud • Email: sigar.pentagon.inv.mbx.hotline@mail.mil • Phone Afghanistan: +93 (0) 700-10-7300 • Phone DSN Afghanistan 318-3912 ext. 7303 • Phone International: +1-866-329-8893 • Phone DSN International: 312-664-0378 • U.S. fax: +1-703-601-4065 Public Affairs Officer • Phone: 703-545-5974 • Email: sigar.pentagon.ccr.mbx.public-affairs@mail.mil • Mail: SIGAR Public Affairs 2530 Crystal Drive Arlington, VA 22202 Understanding Trafficking in Persons in the MENA region: the Causes, the Forms, the Routes and the Measures to Combat a Serious Violation of Human Rights Training Manual to Combat Trafficking in Persons The Arab Initiative to Combat Human Trafficking i Training Manual to Combat Trafficking in Persons Contents Acknowledgements 1 INTRODUCTION 3 1. The scope of the training manual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. The methodology of this training manual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. A overview of forms and routes of trafficking in persons . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2. Prevention, protection, prosecution and participation: the four Ps of trafficking in persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.3. Review questions and practical exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 CHAPTER I: The Underling Causes and Consequences of Trafficking in Persons 7 1. A human rights approach to combating trafficking in persons . . . . . . . . . 7 1.1. A debate on the nature of trafficking in persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.2. Shifting the focus to the human rights of the victims . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2. The Recruitment of Trafficking Victims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.1. The recruitment techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3. Demand and trafficking in persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4. The causes of trafficking in persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.1. Poverty and underdevelopment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.2. Social and cultural traditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.3. Weak legal institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.4. Civil war and political unrest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4.5. Corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5. The consequences of trafficking in persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.1. The harm suffered by a victim of trafficking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.2. Trafficking in persons: a crime against the State . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.3. The economic impact of trafficking in persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Applying Your Knowledge: Introduction 12 Exercise A: Review Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Exercise B: Practical tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 ii Understanding Trafficking in Persons in the MENA region Chapter II: What is trafficking in persons? 15 1. Trafficking in persons under International Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 1.1. The United Nations definition of trafficking in persons . . . . . . . . . . 15 1.1.1. The elements: The twenty-plus formula . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 1.1.2. The consent of the victim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 1.1.3. The forms of trafficking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 1.2. Trafficking in children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 1.2.1. The special status of children under international law . . . . . . . 19 1.2.2. Trafficking for the purpose of illegal adoption . . . . . . . . . . . 20 1.2.3. Child sex tourism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 1.2.4. Pornography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 1.3. Trafficking in persons under other international legal instruments . . . . . 23 1.3.1. The United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 1.3.2. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court . . . . . . . 24 1.3.3. ILO Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (1999) . . . 24 1.3.4. WHO Guiding Principles on Human Cell, Tissue and Organ Transplantation (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 1.3.5. ILO Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (1930) . 25 2. Definition of trafficking in persons under regional law . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 2.1. The Arab Charter on Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 2.2. The Council of Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 2.3. The European Union (EU) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 3. Model legislation on trafficking in persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 3.1 The United Nations Model Law against Trafficking in Persons . . . . . . . 27 3.2. The League of Arab States Model Law to Combat the Crime of Trafficking in Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 3.3. The Model Law to Combat Human Trafficking of the GCC . . . . . . . . . 27 4. Definitions of trafficking in persons in the countries of the MENA region . . . . 28 4.1. Thirteen Arab countries defining trafficking in persons or human trafficking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 4.2. United Arab Emirates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 4.3. Bahrain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 4.4. Algeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 4.5. Oman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 4.6. Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 4.7. Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 4.8. Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 iii Training Manual to Combat Trafficking in Persons 4.9. Qatar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4.10. Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4.11. Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4.12. Are illegal means required for the establishment of the crime of trafficking in persons? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 5. Trafficking and slavery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 6. Smuggling of migrants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 6.1. Trans-nationality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 6.2. Exploitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 6.3. Source of profit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 7. The routes of trafficking in persons in the MENA region . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Applying Your Knowledge: What is Trafficking in Persons? 36 Exercise A: Review Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Exercise B: Practical task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Chapter III. Combating Trafficking in Persons in the MENA region: Prevention 39 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 1.1. Prevention: the first P of the 4 Ps approach to combat trafficking in persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 1.2. Strengthening prevention measures and procedures: a main goal of the Arab Strategy to Combat Trafficking in Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 1.3. Six main categories of preventative measures to combat trafficking in persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 2. Measures to prevent trafficking in persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 2.1 Research and collection of data on trafficking in persons . . . . . . . . . 40 2.2. Monitoring and reporting on the status of trafficking in persons . . . . . . 41 2.2.1. Reporting models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 2.2.2. Reporting on trafficking in persons in the MENA region . . . . . . 43 2.3. Organization of public awareness campaigns on trafficking in persons . . 45 2.3.1. The role of civil society in raising awareness . . . . . . . . . . . 46 2.3.2. The role of religious leaders in raising awareness . . . . . . . . . 46 2.3.3. The role of the arts in raising awareness . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 2.4. Reform of school education to include trafficking in persons in the curriculum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 2.5. Alleviation of factors that render people vulnerable to trafficking . . . . . 47 2.5.1. Economic insecurity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 2.5.2. Social and cultural insecurity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 2.5.3. Legal insecurity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 2.5.4. Political insecurity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 2.5.5. Special attention to the youth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 iv Understanding Trafficking in Persons in the MENA region 2.6. Discouragement of demand for victims of trafficking in persons . . . . . . 49 2.6.1. The employer, the consumer and the third party . . . . . . . . . . 50 2.6.2. The United Nations’ approach to discouraging demand . . . . . . 50 2.6.3. Prosecuting demand for victims of trafficking . . . . . . . . . . 50 Applying Your Knowledge: Combating Trafficking in Persons in the MENA region: Prevention 52 Exercise A: Review Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Exercise B: Practical tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Chapter IV. Combating Trafficking in Persons in the MENA region: Prosecution 55 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 2. The prohibition of trafficking in persons under international law . . . . . . . . 55 2.1. The U.N. Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 2.2. Other international instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 2.2.1. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A prohibition against slavery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 2.2.2. The 1949 Convention: Asserting the dangers of prostitution . . . . 56 2.2.3. The CCPR: A Prohibition against slavery, servitude or forced labor . 56 2.2.4. The CEDAW: Suppression of trafficking in women . . . . . . . . . 56 2.2.5. CRC: A call for prevention of trafficking in children . . . . . . . . 57 2.2.6. The Migrant Workers Convention: Prohibition against slavery, servitude or forced labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 2.2.7. ILO 182 Convention on Decent Work for Domestic Workers . . . . 57 3. Regional law prohibiting trafficking in persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 3.1. The Arab Charter on Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 3.1.1. A distinction between slavery and trafficking . . . . . . . . . . . 58 3.1.2. A prohibition of prostitution and exploitation of prostitution of others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 3.1.3. A prohibition of all forms of trafficking including forced labour . . . 58 3.1.4. Abolition of specific forms of trafficking . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 4. Arab laws prohibiting trafficking in persons: General principles and specific rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 4.1. The principle of non punishment of the victim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 4.1.1. The principle of non-punishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 4.1.2 The two models of non-punishment: Duress and Causation . . . . . 60 4.1.3 The principle of non-punishment in Arab legislation . . . . . . . . 61 v Training Manual to Combat Trafficking in Persons 4.1.3.1. Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 4.1.3.2. Qatar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 4.1.3.3. Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 4.1.3.4. Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 4.2. The statute of limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 4.3. Aggravating circumstances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 4.3.1. Aggravating circumstances regarding the offender . . . . . . . . 64 4.3.2. Aggravating circumstances regarding the victim . . . . . . . . . . 65 4.3.3. Aggravating circumstances regarding the crime . . . . . . . . . . 66 4.4. Extraterritoriality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 5. International cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 5.1. The UNODC International Framework for Action to Implement the Trafficking in Persons Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 5.2. The need for international cooperation agreements . . . . . . . . . . . 69 6. Crimes related to trafficking in persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 6.1. Participation in an organized criminal group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 6.2. Obstruction of justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 6.3. Corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 6.4. Money-laundering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 7. Related human rights legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Applying Your Knowledge: Combating Trafficking in Persons in the MENA region: Prosecution 72 Exercise A: Review Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 Exercise B: Practical task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Chapter V. Combating Trafficking in Persons in the MENA region: Protection 75 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 2. Identifying the victims of trafficking in persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 2.1. The types of victims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 2.1.1. Victim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 2.1.2. Derivative victim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 2.1.3. Potential victim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 2.1.4. Vulnerable victim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 2.1.5. Presumed victim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 3. The bill of rights for victims of trafficking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 3.1. The right to safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 3.2. The right to privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 3.3. The right to information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 vi Understanding Trafficking in Persons in the MENA region 3.4. The right to legal representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 3.5. The right to be heard in court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 3.6. The right to compensation for damages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 3.6.1. Mandatory restitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 3.6.2. Confiscation of assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 3.6.3. State fund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 3.6.4. Civil action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 3.6.5. Punitive damages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 3.7. The right to assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 3.8. The right to seek residence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 3.9. Right to recovery and reflection period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 3.10. The right to return . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 4. Procedural protection of victims of trafficking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 4.1. Witness protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 4.2. Investigation and court proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 4.2.1. Privacy of victim witnesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 4.2.2. Gender sensitivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 4.2.3. Child victim witnesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 4.2.4. Double witness rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 4.2.5. Inadmissibility of past behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 4.2.6. Avoiding over-reliance on victim testimony . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 Applying Your Knowledge: Combating Trafficking in Persons in the MENA region: Protection 93 Exercise A: Review Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Exercise B: Practical task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 Chapter VI. Combating Trafficking in Persons in the MENA region: Participation 95 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 1.1. The importance of participation in the implementation of prevention, prohibition and prosecution efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 1.2. An International obligation of cooperation with civil society . . . . . . . . 95 2. Models of participation of civil society in government efforts to combat trafficking in persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 2.1. Representation model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 2.2. Consultation model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 2.3. The place of civil society in Arab committees to combat trafficking in persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 vii Training Manual to Combat Trafficking in Persons 3. Engaging the five elements of civil society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 3.1. Non-governmental organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 3.2. Corporations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 3.2.1. Code of Conducts for businesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 3.2.2. Regulating the work of private employment agencies . . . . . . 101 3.2.3. Limitations on match-making organizations and international marriage brokers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 3.3. Academia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 3.4. Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 3.5. Religious institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 4. The use of new technologies to promote effective partnership . . . . . . . . 105 Applying Your Knowledge: Combating Trafficking in Persons in the MENA region: Participation 106 Exercise A: Review Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 Exercise B: Practical task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 Endnotes 110 viii Understanding Trafficking in Persons in the MENA region Training Manual to Combat Trafficking in Persons ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This training manual was prepared by The Protection Project at The Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies and supported by the Qatar Foundation for Combating Human Trafficking. The effort was led by Dr. Mohamed Mattar, Senior Research Professor of International Law and Executive Director of The Protection Project, with key contributions made by Ms. Elaine Panter and editorial support made by Ms. Mandy Davis, Ms. Marie-Pier Dupont and Ms. Virginie Gagnon. A special thanks goes to Ms. Maryam Al-Maliki, Head of the Qatar Foundation for Combating Human Trafficking, for her relentless commitment to eradicating trafficking in persons in the MENA region and for her continual support of the work of The Protection Project. The Protection Project would also like to acknowledge the valuable work of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the League of Arab States in combating trafficking through the Arab Initiative to Combat Human Trafficking. For further information regarding The Protection Project, please go to its website at www.protectionproject.org. The Protection Project can be contacted by email at protection_project@jhu.edu, and by phone at (+1) 202 663 5896. 1 2 Understanding Trafficking in Persons in the MENA region Training Manual to Combat Trafficking in Persons INTRODUCTION 1. The scope of the training manual In today’s globalized world in which many principles and traditions are being called into question, few rights such as the right to freedom and security enjoy such broad consensus. Trafficking in persons and all forms of enslavement, states around the world agree, must be confronted relentlessly and with all means available. Since the adoption of the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons in 2000, many countries have therefore reformed their legislation to criminalize trafficking in persons within their jurisdictions and have taken concrete steps to eradicate the problem through the engagement of civil society, law enforcement personnel and the judiciary. To assist governments and the international community in implementing these new laws, a plethora of excellent training manuals on trafficking in persons have been published by national and international institutions. Some of these manuals are sector-specific, some of them focus on a region; others provide a general overview of the problem of trafficking without a specific regional or functional focus. Drawing from over 10 years of experience in providing capacity building trainings on trafficking in persons to all levels of society and to the governments in the greater MENA region, The Protection Project at the Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies wrote this training manual with two objectives in mind: firstly, developing a training manual for practitioners specifically tailored to the forms and routes of trafficking in 3 4 Understanding Trafficking in Persons in the MENA region persons in the MENA region; secondly, addressing in detail some of the specific and particular issues of the region, including the Islamic law perspective on the combat against trafficking in persons. In referring to the MENA region the manual includes the following countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestinian Authority, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Sudan, Yemen. 2. The methodology of this training manual The training manual aims at providing the reader with a useful tool to understand the problem of trafficking in the MENA region through a three level approach: firstly, it provides an overview of the forms and routes of trafficking in persons in the MENA region; secondly, it analyzes the measures either taken or that should be taken to address the problem of trafficking in the region through the established 4 Ps approach; thirdly, it helps the understanding and memorization of the content of each chapter though review questions and practical exercises. 2.1. A overview of forms and routes of trafficking in persons Through best practices, case studies and victims’ stories, the training manual offers useful insights in the problem of trafficking in the MENA region to assist the reader in relating the information in the manual to real case scenarios. 2.2. Prevention, protection, prosecution and participation: the four Ps of trafficking in persons Following an introductory chapter on the causes and consequences of trafficking in persons, the manual addresses the four main strategies that experts in the field of trafficking in persons have developed to confront and combat the crime, namely prevention, prosecution, protection and participation. In addressing these measures, a special emphasis is given to the international, regional and domestic legal frameworks that have come to shape these policies in recent years. When appropriate, the manual also mentions the Islamic law perspective, in order to encourage the reader to approach each issue in a comprehensive and comparative manner. Training Manual to Combat Trafficking in Persons 2.3. Review questions and practical exercises Each chapter concludes with review questions and practical tasks. The goal of the exercises is to assist the reader in memorizing the key concepts presented in the chapter and to develop his practical skills to prepare him to be an active player in the anti-trafficking movement in the MENA region. 5 6 Understanding Trafficking in Persons in the MENA region Training Manual to Combat Trafficking in Persons CHAPTER I: The Underling Causes and Consequences of Trafficking in Persons 1. A human rights approach to combating trafficking in persons 1.1. A debate on the nature of trafficking in persons Trafficking in persons is a complex crime that affects many spheres of law and criminal justice. Since the passage in 2000 of the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime1 (hereafter U.N. Protocol), international legal experts have been debating to which discipline does trafficking in persons belong to. Today, many experts agree that the human rights approach to trafficking in persons is the most appropriate as it recognizes the trafficked person as a victim entitled to human rights and, as such, entitled to protection and assistance if those human rights have been violated, regardless of the sex, age, or nationality of the victim. 1.2. Shifting the focus to the human rights of the victims The same approach is supported by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) which prescribes in its Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and Trafficking in Persons provide that: “Violations of human rights are both a cause and a consequence of trafficking in persons. Accordingly, it is essential to place the protection of all human rights at the centre of any measures taken to prevent and end trafficking. Antitrafficking measures should not adversely affect the human rights and dignity of persons and, in particular, the rights of those who have been trafficked, migrants, internally displaced persons, refugees and asylum-seekers.”2 2. The Recruitment of Trafficking Victims 2.1. The recruitment techniques A variety of techniques are used by traffickers to recruit their victims, ranging from kidnappings to the simple promise of a low wage job. Traffickers intentionally seek out the weakest and most vulnerable members of society 7 8 Understanding Trafficking in Persons in the MENA region in order to exploit them for personal gain, frequently by taking advantage of conditions of poverty, economic collapse, civil unrest, and social upheaval. Often, the trafficker gains the confidence of the victim through a combination of flattery and physiological manipulation. At times, unscrupulous employment agencies deceive workers into entering abusive work situations, and what first appears as a legitimate job can easily turn into forced labor or sexual exploitation. Women and children are especially vulnerable to trafficking and are often trafficked by their own communities, families, and in public places of business and commerce. Promise of an immediate payment may lead families to sell their children to traffickers. 3. Demand and trafficking in persons Discouraging demand for trafficking victims is increasingly at the heart of many anti-trafficking policies focusing on preventing the crime. For instance, Article 9(5) of the U.N. Protocol makes it clear that addressing the demand for the services of trafficking victims is an essential part of effectively preventing and combating trafficking in persons. The Article states: “States Parties shall adopt or strengthen legislative or other measures, such as educational, social or cultural measures, including through bilateral and multilateral cooperation, to discourage the demand that fosters all forms of exploitation of persons, especially women and children, that leads to trafficking.”3 4. The causes of trafficking in persons The causes of trafficking are economic, social, cultural, legal and political in nature. Populations that are rendered vulnerable by one or more of these factors have a higher rate of trafficking in persons. Traffickers intentionally target the weakest and most vulnerable members of society in order to exploit them. Among the major causes of trafficking are: poverty and underdevelopment, social and cultural traditions, weak legal institutions, civil war and political unrest and corruption. 4.1. Poverty and underdevelopment Economic factors are directly addressed in the U.N. Protocol, which mentions poverty, underdevelopment and lack of equal opportunities as being the main root causes of trafficking in persons. Economic vulnerability may also include unemployment and lack of access to opportunities, which make people want to migrate in search of better conditions. Even a normal, legitimate Training Manual to Combat Trafficking in Persons flow of economic migration from a poor country to a richer one provides opportunities for traffickers to victimize immigrants who are more vulnerable having left their home areas. 4.2. Social and cultural traditions Social exclusion relates to a lack of access to social rights and prevents groups from receiving the benefits and protection to which all citizens should be entitled. Marginalization from social security derives from complex factors, including gender, ethnicity and the low status of groups within societies. This involves discrimination in education, employment practices, access to legal and medical services and access to information and social welfare. Social exclusion is particularly important when discussing how to prevent re-victimization and re-trafficking. Trafficked persons face considerable obstacles upon their return home, including the attitudes and biases within their own communities. Social and cultural practices are sensitive to context and therefore must be considered with special caution so as to avoid generalization. For example, cultural practices such as arranged, early or forced marriages, and other practices such as temporary marriages, marriages by catalogue or mailorder brides, if they lack consent and they entail an element of exploitation, can all contribute to trafficking in persons. Furthermore, in many societies, cultural norms affect the manner in which women are treated, making gender-based discrimination a contributing factor to women’s vulnerability to trafficking. In addition, women from certain societies who are trafficked into prostitution find it more difficult to reintegrate into their families and communities after being freed from exploitation. 4.3. Weak legal institutions Legal factors are manifested in the lack of access to the criminal justice system, which occurs either because the trafficked person is a foreigner or lacks access to legal representation, or the system itself does not offer an appropriate remedy. In addition, insecurity may be fostered by the “double witness” or “corroborative evidence” rule which disqualifies the evidence unless a witness’s testimony is corroborated by another witness or other material evidence implicating the accused. A possible consequence of this rule is that victims of trafficking are not given a chance to be heard in court. 9 10 Understanding Trafficking in Persons in the MENA region 4.4. Civil war and political unrest In addition to economic, social and cultural factors, political instability, war and conflict may contribute to trafficking in persons. This is particularly the case in transitional societies where civil unrest, loss of national identity and political instability may create a favorable environment for organized crime, including trafficking in persons. In such cases, the disruption of traditional community life, along with its protective framework, make people extremely vulnerable to exploitation. In cases of civil war and ethnic conflicts, there is often a single, targeted minority group who suffers a complete breakdown of social mechanisms, increasing their vulnerability. Finally, the resulting displacement of people in cases of strife leads to isolation of people, increasing the ease by which traffickers can victimize them. 4.5. Corruption Corruption is one of the major contributing factors to the crime of trafficking in persons; it is both an underlying root cause and a facilitating tool. It is important to remember that trafficking in persons may thrive in no small part due to the implicit or explicit participation or inaction on the part of public officials. An example is represented by a border control officer turning a blind eye on people without legal documents crossing the border accompanied by their trafficker. There have also been cases reported in which officials accepted or extorted bribes or sexual services, falsified identity documents, discouraged trafficking victims from reporting their crimes, or tolerated child prostitution and other trafficking in persons activities in commercial sex sites. 5. The consequences of trafficking in persons 5.1. The harm suffered by a victim of trafficking Trafficking is a crime against the human being and against State security that has both long and short term effects on the victim and State institutions. A victim will suffer from both physical and psychological harm. Even if eventually rescued, the trauma suffered by victims of trafficking is long-lasting and may never fully dissipate. Victims of trafficking generally work in sub-standard conditions, under increased risk of injuries or death while on the job, due to unregulated and unsafe working conditions or to lack of proper health care. Workers in the construction industry may suffer exposure to dust, chemicals and other hazardous materials that can cause respiratory infections, scabies, Training Manual to Combat Trafficking in Persons tuberculosis and other diseases associated with overcrowded, unsanitary conditions. Victims of sexual exploitation are more susceptible to contracting HIV/AIDS or other sexually transmitted diseases, but rarely report them due to fear of stigmatization and of retaliation by the traffickers, thus aggravating their health conditions. Among the most common psychological consequences of trafficking are depression, memory loss, dizziness, suicidal thoughts and many forms of shame, grief, fear, distrust, self-hatred and post-traumatic stress disorder. 5.2. Trafficking in persons: a crime against the State Trafficking in persons also undermines the legitimacy of state whose goal is that of promoting the rule of law and the respect of human rights. Traffickers are often criminals who violate the rights of the victims but also commit crimes against the state, such as violation of immigration, tax and business laws. In transnational trafficking in persons, the destination country often suffers an unlawful crossing of its borders and the country of origin suffers an unlawful loss of its people and a disruption to the social fabric of its society. 5.3. The economic impact of trafficking in persons Trafficking in persons is an illegal criminal activity that fuels the black market and encourages money laundering practices. The lost tax revenue to the government, deriving from tax evasion and the law enforcement costs of detecting and combating money laundering are just two of the most obvious negative economic impacts of trafficking in persons. In countries with a high number of trafficked children, various reports have proven the long-term negative impact on the economy due to the decreased productivity of these children by the time they reach adulthood.4 11 12 Understanding Trafficking in Persons in the MENA region Applying Your Knowledge: Introduction Exercise A: Review Questions 1) What is a human rights approach to trafficking in persons? 2) What are the main root causes of trafficking in persons? 3) Why, in your opinion, governments in the MENA region should address the issue of demand? 4) What, in your opinion, are the main long term consequences of trafficking in persons in your country of origin? Training Manual to Combat Trafficking in Persons Exercise B: Practical tasks 1) Write a one-page summary of what you believe your government should do to confront trafficking in persons in your country. 13 14 Understanding Trafficking in Persons in the MENA region Training Manual to Combat Trafficking in Persons Chapter II: What is trafficking in persons? 1. Trafficking in persons under International Law 1.1. The United Nations definition of trafficking in persons An international consensus was created in December 2000 when countries adopted the U.N. Protocol. The U.N. Protocol was the first international legal instrument to define trafficking in persons and provide for a comprehensive approach to combating the problem. Today, it remains the primary reference tool for countries in developing and implementing their national policies to combating trafficking in persons and in guiding regional frameworks and international cooperation in this field. The U.N. Protocol entered into force on 25 December 2003 when 20 countries deposited their instrument of ratification. As of April 2012, 147 countries are parties to the U.N. Protocol. Article 3(a) of the U.N. Protocol states: “Trafficking in persons shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfers, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or the giving or receiving of payments or the benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or service, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.”5 1.1.1. The elements: The twenty-plus formula Based on this definition, three elements of the crime can be identified: 1) The act (what is done): The act is the level of interaction a person has with the victim whether it be on the supply or demand side. It can occur on five different levels: recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, and receipt of persons. 2) The means (how it is done): Means is how the trafficker or purchaser of the trafficked person obtains the victim. Eight forms are most commonly recognized: threat or use of force/coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power, abuse of a position of vulnerability, and the giving or 15 16 Understanding Trafficking in Persons in the MENA region receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person. Coercion may be defined as: ‘‘threats of serious harm to or physical restraint against any person; any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that failure to perform an act would result in serious harm to or physical restraint against any person; or the abuse or threatened abuse of law or the legal process.”6 3) The exploitative purpose (why it is done): This element is the demand side of the trafficking market. It includes, at a minimum, seven purposes, including the exploitation of the prostitution of others, other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery, practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs. With five acts, eight means and seven exploitative purposes, the U.N. Protocol’s definition of trafficking can be identified by the so-called “20-plus formula”. The “plus” indicates that the list of exploitative purposes is not a closed list and that states may choose to add other forms of exploitation to define more specifically the various forms of trafficking in persons that are to be criminalized within their jurisdictions. Although the Protocol generally requires that the crime of trafficking be defined through a combination of the three constituent elements, in some cases, the individual elements will constitute criminal offences independently. For example, the means of abduction or the non-consensual application of force (assault) will likely constitute separate criminal offences under domestic criminal legislation. 1.1.2. The consent of the victim Under the U.N. Protocol the victim’s consent is linked to the means used. The Protocol states that the consent of a victim of a crime “shall be irrelevant” only in cases where illegal means have been used. This is why the U.N. Protocol is broad in defining the means element, which is not limited to force, fraud or coercion. It suffices that a case of trafficking involves abuse of a position of vulnerability. Article 3 (b) states: “The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) have been used”.7 Training Manual to Combat Trafficking in Persons 1.1.3. The forms of trafficking Exploitation can take various forms, which may be grouped in: Sex trafficking: This may include exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation such as pornography, sexually-oriented performances and child sex-tourism. Case Study In 2010 in Lebanon, the government issued Artiste visa permitted the entry of over 5,000 women for the purpose of working in the adult entertainment industry. With the practice of passport confiscation and restrictions on movement, a significant amount of these women were forced to engage in prostitution and the sex-slave industry. (United States Department of State, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, Trafficking in Persons Report – Lebanon, 27 June 2011) Trafficking for non-commercial sex purposes: This may include early marriage (child marriage), forced or servile marriage, arranged marriage, compensation marriage, transactional marriage, temporary marriage which lack consent and entail an element of exploitation, or marriage for childbearing. In the MENA region, trafficking for the purpose of non-commercial sex most often manifests itself in the form of temporary or forced marriages. Temporary marriages often occur between daughters of poor families from Egypt and wealthy men from the Gulf States. Women in North Africa are sometimes kidnapped under the guise of temporary marriages to force them into prostitution.8 Case Study In Egypt, young girls are increasingly being trafficked through the so-called siqueh marriages. A siqueh marriage involves the marrying of young girls to wealthy men in the Gulf region that lasts for a short period of time. These marriages are illegal, yet are on the rise due to the financial gain the girl’s family receives. It is a transaction of sorts, where a broker coordinates meetings between future husbands and the families of prospective brides. Often there are several girls that the husband may choose from, and when he makes his final decision, a contract is drawn up between him and the family. A dowry is negotiated and the broker receives a percentage of the money. (ECPAT International, Egypt, March 2002) 17 18 Understanding Trafficking in Persons in the MENA region Labor trafficking: This may include domestic servitude, sweatshop or agricultural or construction labor, or enforced enrollment in an armed force. Other forms may include use of the trafficked person in criminal activities or begging. By far the most common form of labour trafficking in the Arab world is domestic servitude. Often, domestic servants in the MENA region are forced to work 12 to 16 hours a day with little or no pay, very limited time off, insufficient nutrition, and often are subject to verbal and physical abuse, including sexual exploitation. The domestic servants often do not complain or report cases of this abuse because they fear imprisonment, deportation, or retaliation by their employers upon their return to the household. Domestic servants who do attempt to escape are often returned to their employer by the authorities. Employers often hold the domestic servant’s passports and travel documents, thus preventing them from leaving their job for other work and from returning home. Trafficking for domestic service involves primarily people from South and Southeast Asia. Other forms of labour trafficking in the region include begging, slavery, forced labour and recruitment into armed forces. Forced begging is especially present as a form of internal trafficking in countries such as Egypt where street children, a vulnerable population, are often subject to exploitation by human traffickers. Case Study Jordan: Case number 2605/2011 In this case, the defendant was charged with the crime of human trafficking as defined in Article 3 of the Jordanian law Number 9, 2009. The defendant took 265 Dinars from the plaintiff in consideration for procuring a domestic worker from Sri Lanka, without a residency ID or a work permit. The worker was never paid and she escaped. The defendant was sentenced with a fine of 1,000 Dinars. Trafficking for the purpose of organ removal: This amounts to trafficking when it is carried out by means of a commercial transaction with or without the consent of the donor. In the MENA region, the country from which most organ “donation” originates is Egypt. The most common recipient countries are Saudi Arabia and Oman. Training Manual to Combat Trafficking in Persons Case Study In 2010, 11 people were arrested for involvement in an organ trafficking ring stretching from Egypt to Syria. Kidneys were sold, reportedly for $6,600 each, to wealthy buyers in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The removal of the organs took place in a private hospital in Cairo. The leader of the ring, a woman named “Fadia” was charged with coordinating trafficking operations by organizing travel from Cairo to the Gulf States for donors. A kidney can sell for up to US$15,000 on Egypt’s black market. (Egypt Independent, 2010) 1.2. Trafficking in children 1.2.1. The special status of children under international law Trafficking in children must be distinguished from trafficking in adults because the law often grants additional protection to the child victim of trafficking due to his high vulnerability. According to UNICEF, as many as two million children are subjected to prostitution in the global commercial sex trade. Sex trafficking has devastating consequences for minors, including long-lasting physical and psychological trauma, disease (including HIV/ AIDS), drug addiction, unwanted pregnancy, malnutrition, social ostracism, and possible death. 9 The U.N. Protocol recognizes the special status of children when, in Article 6 (4) it states that: “Each State Party shall take into account, in applying the provisions of this article, the age, gender and special needs of victims of trafficking in persons, in particular the special needs of children, including appropriate housing, education and care.”10 In providing special protection for children, the U.N. Protocol prescribes that proof of means is irrelevant when trafficking children. In these cases, only the act and the exploitative purpose must be proven. Article 3 (c) reads: “The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered “trafficking in persons” even if this does not involve any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article.”11 As a consequence of this provision, a child cannot give consent even if none of the means are used. Therefore, the consent of the child is, in every circumstance, irrelevant. 19 20 Understanding Trafficking in Persons in the MENA region Case Study Yemeni children, mostly boys, are trafficked across the northern border with Saudi Arabia or to the Yemeni cities of Aden and Sana’a for forced labor, primarily as beggars, but also for domestic servitude or work in small shops. Some of these children are subjected to commercial sexual exploitation in transit or once they arrive in Saudi Arabia. To a lesser extent, Yemen is also a source country for girls trafficked internally and to Saudi Arabia for commercial sexual exploitation. Girls as young as 15 years old are exploited for commercial sex in hotels, casinos, and bars in the governorates of Mahweet, Aden, and Taiz. The majority of child sex tourists in Yemen originate from Saudi Arabia, with a smaller number possibly coming from other Gulf nations. Yemeni girls who marry Saudi tourists often do not realize the temporary and exploitative nature of these agreements and some are forced into prostitution or abandoned on the streets after reaching Saudi Arabia (United States Department of State, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, Trafficking in Persons Report – Yemen, 27 June 2011) Certain forms of trafficking only relate to children. These include: trafficking for the purpose of illegal adoption, child sex tourism and trafficking for the purpose of pornography. 1.2.2. Trafficking for the purpose of illegal adoption Adoption may be a form of trafficking if the child is exploited. In the absence of exploitation, adoption does not constitute a form of trafficking even if the child is being sold, although adoption in such a case would be illegal. Under Article 1(d) of the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 1956, the sale of children is considered slavery through: “[A]ny institution or practice whereby a child or young person under the age of 18 years is delivered by either or both of his natural parents or by his guardian to another person, whether for reward or not, with a view of the exploitation of the child or young person or of his labour.” 12 Consequently, the sale of children in the name of intercountry adoption may be considered a practice similar to slavery. As stated in the Travaux Training Manual to Combat Trafficking in Persons Preparatoirs of the U.N. Protocol, Article 3, section C (Interpretative Notes): “Where illegal adoption amounts to a practice similar to slavery, it will fall within the scope of the Protocol.”13 Further, the 1993 Convention on the Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Inter-Country Adoption sets in the preamble, as its objective: “To ensure that inter-country adoption takes place in the interest of the child and to prevent abduction, sale of, or traffic in children.” 14 Baby trafficking, however, is not subject to any explicit international conventional prohibition. Article 32(1) of the 1993 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect to Intercountry Adoption merely provides that “[n]o one shall derive improper financial or other gains from an activity related to an intercountry adoption.” 15 The Islamic Law Perspective Illicit sale of children for the purpose of intercountry adoption does not constitute a form of trafficking in most countries of the Middle East because Islamic law does not recognize the institution of adoption in accordance with the Qur’an, which states in Surah XXXIII: 4-5: “...[N or] has He made your adopted sons your sons. Such is only your manner of speech by your mouths. But God tells you the Truth, and He shows the right way. Call them by (the names of) their fathers: that is juster in the sight of God.”16 Islamic law recognizes Kafala, as an alternative to adoption. Kafala is a system of fosterage where a child may be placed under the guardianship of a family, but the child continues to retain his lineage. This explains why many countries of the Middle East that follow Islamic law had reservations regarding Article 21 of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, which recognizes adoption, because it is inconsistent with Islamic law. Unlike other regions where baby trafficking is prevalent, there is no demand for adopted children in the Middle East. 1.2.3. Child sex tourism Child sex tourism amounts to trafficking when a person travels to a foreign country for the purpose of engaging in prostitution of children. Child sex tourism is not specifically defined in the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the child and on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and 21 22 Understanding Trafficking in Persons in the MENA region Child Pornography. Article 2(b) of the Convention does however provide a definition for child prostitution which is “[…] the use of a child in sexual activities for remuneration or any other form of consideration.”17 Article 10(1) states that: “States Parties shall take all necessary steps to strengthen international cooperation by multilateral, regional and bilateral arrangements for the prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution and punishment of those responsible for acts involving the sale of children, child prostitution, child pornography and child sex tourism. States Parties shall also promote international cooperation and coordination between their authorities, national and international non-governmental organizations and international organizations.”18 Article 10(3) also mentions that: “States Parties shall promote the strengthening of international cooperation in order to address the root causes, such as poverty and underdevelopment, contributing to the vulnerability of children to the sale of children, child prostitution, child pornography and child sex tourism.”19 Child sex tourism occurs is many countries of the MENA region. Cases of child sex tourism have been reported in Bahrain, Comoros, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, UAE and Yemen. In Tunisia, children under sixteen are being trafficked for Libyan tourists.20 Egyptian children are trafficked for child sex tourism particularly in Cairo, Alexandria and Luxor.21 In Kuwait, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs asked some Sunni Mosques to give specific sermons on improper sexual behavior, including child sex tourism abroad.22 For its part, the government of Morocco conducted a variety of public awareness campaign focused on the issue of child sex tourism.23 In Qatar, the government went further in enforcing strict legislation on morality to target Qataris travelling abroad to popular child sex tourism destinations.24 1.2.4. Pornography As detailed in Article 3 of the Travaux Preparatoirs of U.N Protocol, section A (Negotiation text) “(ii) Of a child, prostitution, sexual servitude or use of a child in pornography.”25 In addition, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography, Article 2 (c) provides that: “Child pornography means any representation, by whatever means, of a child engaged in real or simulated explicit sexual activities or any representation of the sexual parts of a child for primarily sexual purposes.”26 Training Manual to Combat Trafficking in Persons Particularly active in the fight for children’s rights is the International Center for Missing and Exploited Children (ICMEC), an international NGO based in the United States.27 ICMEC sustains that today child pornography has become a global crisis. In an effort to promote the harmonization of the law on child pornography, in 2006 ICMEC published The Child Pornography Model Legislation. The model legislation was compiled by examining child pornography legislation in 196 countries and it details seven criminal offense objectives, including: Incorporate child pornography offenses into the penal code; Criminalize the knowing possession of child pornography, regardless of the intent to distribute; Criminalize knowingly downloading or knowingly viewing child pornography images on the Internet and using the Internet to distribute child pornography; Penalize those who make known to others where to find child pornography; Criminalize the actions of parents or legal guardians who acquiesce to their child’s participation in child pornography; Criminalize grooming offenses; and Punish attempted crimes.28 1.3. Trafficking in persons under other international legal instruments A variety of other international legal instruments have addressed trafficking in persons as an element of their provisions. Alongside the U.N. Protocol, these provisions constitute an integral part of the international legal framework on trafficking in persons. These conventions include: 1.3.1. The United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women The United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women was adopted in 1993 and includes trafficking in persons in the definition of violence against women. In particular, Article 2 defines violence against women to include: “rape, sexual abuse, sexual harassment and intimidation at work, in educational institutions and elsewhere, trafficking in women and forced prostitution.”29 23 24 Understanding Trafficking in Persons in the MENA region Best Practice In 2008, Jordan passed a law on the protection against family violence which authorizes the competent authorities to issue an injunction to protect a victim of domestic violence and, in case of eminent danger, it authorizes the competent authorities to issue an order of restrain to prevent the offender from entering the marital home. The law also establishes family reconciliation committees aimed at assisting the parties involved in resolving the family dispute. 1.3.2. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Adopted in Rome in July 1998 and entered into force in 2002 with the ratification of the sixtieth state, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court represents an important cornerstone in international law as it unambiguously defines trafficking in persons as a crime against humanity, therefore falling under the jurisdiction of the international criminal court. Article 7 of the Statue defines crimes against humanity to include enslavement and defines enslavement to mean: “the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and children.” 30 1.3.3. ILO Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (1999) A further international convention that sheds light on the meaning and scope of trafficking in persons is the International Labour Organization’s 182 Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention of 1999. The Convention includes trafficking in children in the definition of worst forms of child labor and states, in Article 3: “For the purposes of this Convention, the term the worst forms of child labour comprises: (a) all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory labour, including forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict; (b) the use, procuring or offering of a child for prostitution, for the production of pornography or for pornographic performances; (c) the use, procuring or offering of a child for illicit activities, in particular for the production and trafficking ...
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