important to Read!!
How to Prepare a Draft Resolution Paper
Simply put, if you have followed along, you should know how to prepare
a Draft Resolution Paper. It is simply a working paper in the further
stages. You will notice that the wording is much more developed and
concrete than that of a working paper. This is the formal document in
which a committee spells out the particular steps to be taken in order to
solve a given problem. The resolution should meet the following
criteria:
o It must fully address the points that are of importance to the topic
at hand;
o It must be well-written, concise, and substantive;
o It must have the minimum number of signatories as determined
by the given committee;
o It must receive the approval and signature of the Director in
order to be copied and distributed to the full committee.
Remember that when you submit your resolution, your battle is not
over. There will be debate, compromise, and more work involved in
order to gain the approval of the entire committee and pass the
resolution. The finished product will be realistic, concrete and specific,
and a workable compromise for all parties involved.
Your resolution may be subject to amendments. If amendments present
themselves, they will be dealt with before the resolution is voted upon.
Once all amendments have been voted on, your resolution will make its
way to the voting process and be subject to approval or disapproval by
all member states.
. Following is a Resolution Paper that was submitted and passed at the
Midwest Model United Nations in 2005.
Most conferences will have a template prepared for you in which you
can input your data and submit your resolution. Each conference may
have a different template so be flexible.
Resolution 1-B-6
ܐܐܐܐܐܐܐ ܐܐܠܐ
Topic: The Role of the United Nations in Compliance Verification
Submitted to: First Committee
Submitted by: Algeria, Belize, Bhutan, Chad, Congo, Ghana, Guinea, Mauritius,
Malaysia, Mexico, Mozambique, Nigeria, Qatar, Senegal, South
Africa, Thailand, Tanzania
Signatories: Denmark, Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Lithuania, Romania, Antigua and
Barbuda, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Turkey, Indonesia,
Columbia, Ecuador, Argentina, Bolivia, Philippines, Tunisia, Costa
Rica, Libya, Zambia, Saudi Arabia, Namibia
REAFFIRMING the importance of the NPT and the CTBT as the cornerstone documents
for an effective nuclear non-proliferation regime as indicated at the 1995 NPT Review
and Extension Conference and the 2005 NPT Review Conference,
RECOGNISING the role of safeguards as necessary for the early detection and
deterrence of the diversion of significant quantities of nuclear materials from peaceful
uses to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or for unknown purposes,
NOTING the need to provide credible assurance on the absence of undeclared nuclear
material and activities for states and the need for the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) to be able to conduct all necessary verification and evaluation activities
through the Additional Protocol,
STRONGLY SUPPORTING Member States in their compliance with efforts to carry out
on-site inspections of safeguards,
FURTHER NOTING that increased adoption rates of the Additional Protocol require that
additional resources continue to be made available and that strengthened safeguards
continue to be a top priority for peaceful nuclear cooperation and in the wider context of
| international security, disarmament, and non-proliferation,
CONCERNED that existing protocols for verification as set out by the IAEA in the
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements are insufficient at this time to detect undeclared
nuclear activities,
ALARMED that in the past 10 years there have been over 175 instances of terrorist and
criminal attempts to obtain radioactive sources and almost 400 cases of illicit trafficking
or inadvertent movement of radioactive sources,
DISTURBED by the potential for nuclear waste to be utilized in the production of
weapons or radiological dispersal devices,
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REQUESTING that all Member States take into consideration the IAEA's Code of
Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources for securing orphan sources
and their discovery,
DEEPLY CONCERNED by the USD $30-50 million of under funding for the IAEA and
its
programmes and the need for the concentration on regional measures to increase
funding,
REALISING that vulnerable nuclear facilities pose the most severe threat to Member
States from inside and outside sources,
ACKNOWLEDGING the inalienable right of all nations to develop research, production
and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and the right for all parties to the NPT to
facilitate the exchange of technological information as stated in Article IV of the NPT,
BELIEVING that strengthened safeguards will prevent the diversion of nuclear material
to non-state actors,
1. URGES all Member States that have not already done so to immediately sign
and ratify the NPT and the CTBT without conditions as non-nuclear weapon
states;
2 2. CALLS UPON Member States that have non concluded comprehensive
safeguard agreements with the IAEA pursuant to Article III of the NPT to do
so at the earliest possible time;
3 3. ENCOURAGES the expansion of training programmes for IAEA inspectors
and Member State personnel responsible for safeguard implementation
through national and regional workshops, such as the Asian Network for
Higher Education in Nuclear Technology as a model framework, continual
training and biannual recertification organized by the IAEA, and through
bilateral cooperation;
4. REITERATES the role of the United Nations Monitoring Verification and
Inspection Commission in their efforts to assist the IAEA in compliance
verification;
5. SEEKS the closer cooperation between the IAEA and regional systems in the
interests of accounting for and control of nuclear material programmes in
Member States;
6. CALLS for the strengthening of the International State System for Accounting
and Control Services in order to help Member States in the purposes of
upgrading the quality and performance of both state and regional systems;
3
7. RECOMMENDS the increased facilitation of informational exchange and
analysis between nations, the IAEA, and open sources with regards to the
evaluation of information derived from state declarations in order to increase
access to information and transparency,
8. URGES that states require mandatory reporting of transport of nuclear
material and exports and imports of dual-use technology and non-nuclear
material;
9. FURTHER REQUESTING the free and unconstrained trade of potential dual-
use technologies that play a minor role in weapons development;
10. URGES that the international community immediately work to discover and
regain control over orphan sources from unsecured and unauthorized agents
using the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources;
11. EMPHASIZES the need to implement the Plant Modification Assessment
Tool as a means to determine vulnerable components of nuclear facilities and
work toward compliance with recommended standards under the IAEA;
12. STRONGLY ENCOURAGES that all Member States adopt the Additional
Protocol to the IAEA's Comprehensive Safeguard Agreements as an
integrated safeguards plan, in order to ensure the correct and complete
accounting of a state's nuclear activities;
13. RECOMMENDS that the IAEA continue to hold national and regional
seminars to promote understanding and conclusion of strengthened safeguards
through the Additional Protocol;
14. FURTHER REQUESTS that the IAEA be granted a greater extent of surprise
and short notice inspections to all buildings of a nuclear site;
15. ESTABLISHES that nuclear waste has the potential to be as dangerous as
nuclear arms and strongly urges increased security measures, such as more
secure and effective disposal methods, with consideration of each facility's
varying circumstances;
16. CALLS FOR enhanced surveillance and monitoring of disposal locations,
especially near surface disposal sites using the Surveillance and Monitoring
Programme for Waste of the IAEA;
17. URGES Member States to increase the predictability and flexibility of funding
with new and additional resources to the regular budget of the IAEA in real
terms, in order to implement and effective safeguards verification regime;
37
18. FURTHER URGES the voluntary increase of funding the extra-budgetary
initiatives, such as the Nuclear Security Fund in order to enhance the physical
protection of nuclear material;
19. ENCOURAGES promotion of bilateral initiatives that expand the provision of
necessary information, assistance, and expertise from states that have already
concluded Additional Protocols to help overcome technical and other
obstacles that states might encounter in preparing for the conclusion and
implementation of the Additional Protocol;
20. PROMOTES the increased participation of Member States in the IAEA's
Illicit Trafficking Database to further provide a comprehensive inventory of
illicit transfers of nuclear materials;
21. FURTHER PROMOTES Member States to support and contribute to the use
of the Illicit Trafficking Radiation Detection Assessment Programme (ITRAP)
in their collection of information about illicit trafficking incidents and the
equipment to be used to enhance security of borders;
22. DESIGNATES the Additional Protocol of the IAEA as a standard for
cooperation in the exchange of nuclear technology and technical expertise for
the peaceful use of nuclear technology;
23. AFFIRMS the IAEA as the global nuclear inspectorate regarding safeguards
and compliance verification, and encourages the continued cooperation of all
Member States with the IAEA towards the goal of complete nuclear weapons
disarmament;
24. HAS RESOLVED that these recommendations allow for the implementation
of a voluntary programme with respect to the sovereignty of all, without
regard to a nations signatory status to the NPT or CTBT.
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