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prOmO CODE IrA1402
Government behind
the Wheel
More a Matter of Politics
Than of Economics
F
JIM F. COUCH, PHILIP A. BURTON,
KEITH D. MALONE, AND
DAVID L. BLACK
Closed [car] dealerships across the country deserve a transparent review
of their termination and the right to get back in business if they were
terminated on faulty grounds.
—Senator Richard Durbin (D–Ill.)
(qtd. in “Congress Plans Remedy” 2009)
My Administration is committed to creating an unprecedented level of
openness in Government. We will work together to ensure the public
trust and establish a system of transparency, public participation, and
collaboration. Openness will strengthen our democracy and promote
efficiency and effectiveness in Government.
—Barack Obama (White House Press Office 2009)
Jim F. Couch is a professor of economics; Philip A. Burton is an assistant professor of quantitative
methods; Keith D. Malone is an assistant professor of economics; and David L. Black is an assistant
professor of economics. All are at the University of North Alabama.
The Independent Review, v. 15, n. 4, Spring 2011, ISSN 1086–1653, Copyright © 2011, pp. 577–591.
577
578
F
J I M F. C O U C H E T A L .
T
he business of America is business,” President Calvin Coolidge once
famously opined, and no industry better represented American prowess than
automobile manufacturing.1 But that prowess has slowly eroded to the point
that more than half of the cars Americans buy are “foreign” (“America’s Other Auto
Industry” 2008).2 Domestic manufacturers—the so-called big three—have lost
market share and face perhaps insurmountable financial troubles.
The big three’s problems have several main sources, among others: high
labor costs (for every United Auto Worker member working at a car manufacturer, three collect generous retirement benefits [“America’s Other Auto Industry” 2008]); poor quality, whether perceived or real; inefficiency (in 1995, for
example, a General Motors [GM] automobile required forty-six hours to build,
whereas a Toyota required 29.4 [“America’s Other Auto Industry” 2008]); and
relatively low resale value. Escalating fuel costs worked against the sale of trucks
and sport utility vehicles—something domestic producers did well and had hung
their hats on. The financial crisis further exacerbated the problems Chrysler and
GM faced to the point that both faced certain bankruptcy as 2008 came to a
close. Domestic firms went from being the very symbol of American manufacturing strength to financial ruin.
Business has changed since Coolidge’s day as well, with government stepping
in to bail out struggling firms as never before. President George W. Bush,
encouraged by President-elect Barack Obama, provided funds for GM and
Chrysler from the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) at the end of his
term—a fund authorized by Congress to bail out banks and financial institutions.
Bush defended his action by saying: “In the midst of a financial crisis and a
recession, allowing the U.S. auto industry to collapse is not a responsible course
of action” (qtd. in Isadore 2008).3 Bush was simply keeping the firms afloat so
that his successor could find a more permanent solution for the moribund
manufacturers.
President Obama took responsibility for restoring the industry. In March
2009, he asserted: “Year after year, decade after decade, we’ve seen problems
papered over and tough choices kicked down the road, even as foreign competitors outpaced us. Well, we’ve reached the end of that road! And we, as a nation,
cannot afford to shirk responsibility any longer. Now is the time to confront our
1. The statement is from a speech by Coolidge called “The Press under a Free Government,” delivered to
the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington, D.C., on January 17, 1925. Coolidge apparently actually stated: “After all, the chief business of the American people is business.” The entire speech
indicates that he was not as materialistic as his detractors have asserted. See http://www.calvin-coolidge.
org/html/the_business_of_america_is_bus.html.
2. International manufacturers employ more than one hundred thousand U.S. workers building Hondas,
BMWs, Mercedes, Toyotas, Hyundais, and other foreign brands.
3. Owing in part to the timeliness of the issue and in part to the subject matter, we rely to a greater extent
than is typical on information from the popular press. The reader should be aware that these accounts are
not subject to the same scrutiny as refereed sources.
THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW
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problems head-on and do what’s necessary to solve them” (White House Press
Office 2009).4
The president formed an automobile task force cochaired by Treasury secretary
Tim Geithner and National Economic Council director Larry Summers, and Chrysler
and GM were instructed to submit restructuring plans to the group for approval. Task
force members included “the secretaries of Transportation, Commerce, Labor,
Energy, the director of the Office of Management and Budget, the administrator of
the Environmental Protection Agency, the director of the White House Office of
Energy and Climate Change and the chair of the Council of Economic Advisors”
(Shepardson and Trowbridge 2009).
Steven Rattner, an investment banker, was selected to head the team.
Rattner acknowledged the complexity of the task and his team’s inexperience in
regard to the automobile industry, confessing, “We’ve learned a lot about how car
dealers work, and how companies get paid when they sell a car to a dealer, and why
there are a certain number of dealers more than are optimal” (qtd. in King and
Stoll 2009).
The president seemed pleased with the automobile task force’s progress. In a
radio interview with Michael Smerconish, Obama criticized Bush’s actions and
praised his own efforts. “The only thing that we did was rather than just write GM
and Chrysler a blank check, we said, ‘You know what, if you’re going to get any more
taxpayer money, you’ve got to be accountable’” (“Obama Is Interviewed” 2009).
The task force rejected Chrysler’s initial viability plan but later accepted its second
plan. The company filed under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and as a
condition of the bankruptcy sought to close 789 of its 3,181 authorized dealerships.
Dealerships received a list of all the firms slated for closure and a message that stated:
“With regret, this letter is to inform you that on May 14, 2009, we are filing a motion
in bankruptcy court rejecting the Sales and Service Agreement (s) between Chrysler
Motors LLC and the dealerships listed above” (qtd. in Valdez-Dapena 2009).
Chrysler officials noted that the decision to close dealerships—in particular
which franchises would be terminated—was difficult but necessary. James E. Press,
vice chairman of Chrysler, stated, “This has been the most difficult business decision I
have ever personally had to take. But the decision had to be made. They [sic] were
gut-wrenching, but absolutely necessary for Chrysler’s survival” (qtd. in Becker
4. One of the major philosophical debates on the federal government’s “acquisition” of domestic automobile manufacturers pertains to the fundamental role of government. Although most elected federal officials
avoided this question during the weeks leading up to the decision to acquire these companies, the question
looms large. The larger question remains as to whether the government can or should acquire the assets of
a failing major company, but the subtext of the “takeover” was not foreseen—the federal government now
has conflicting, dual roles as both a competitor and a referee. An appropriate analogy would be to an
umpire of a baseball game who wears the emblem of the team he prefers to win. This dual role reduces the
trust and transparency that free markets require. Under this new “market” arrangement, all federal government regulations are suspect. The recent congressional hearings about the mechanical problems various
Toyota models have experienced indicate that a third-way blend of government and corporations
establishing a cooperative relationship is ill suited for free markets.
VOLUME 15, NUMBER 4, SPRING 2011
580
F
J I M F. C O U C H E T A L .
2009). The exact criteria used to determine which Chrysler dealerships got the ax
were not clear. Chrysler’s executive vice president for North American sales, Steven
Landry, asserted that the process was a function of the numbers: “The decision,
though difficult, was based on a data-driven matrix that assessed a number of key
metrics” (qtd. in Valdez-Dapena 2009).
Various observers suggested that dealership profitability, customer-satisfaction
surveys, whether the full line of Chrysler products was offered to shoppers, and
dealership saturation in a particular area contributed to the decision to close a dealership. Heritage Foundation researchers argued that reducing intrabrand competition
should be a significant factor in the decision-making process: “A surplus of franchises
means dealers for the same manufacturer end up competing among themselves,
resulting in lower returns across the board” (Sherk and Gattuso 2009, 2).
Nevertheless, many dealers, facing the loss of their franchise, complained bitterly
that their firms were profitable and that “the criteria being used to determine which
dealerships survive is [sic] not clear” (qtd. in Tapscott 2009). Others suggested that
politics influenced the decision.
This assertion gained plausibility when it transpired that all of the dealerships in
the McLarty-Landers-Johnson chain escaped closure. Robert Johnson, one of the
firm’s owners, is the founder of Black Entertainment Television and is a heavy contributor to the Democratic Party. “Mack” McLarty, another owner, was an aide to
former president Bill Clinton. Accusations spread that dealerships owned by individuals with ties to the Republican Party were being targeted for closure.
In addition, adding fuel to the fire, people whose chief concern was politics
rather than economics provided assistance to the task force. “Senior aides advising
the task force include . . . former Obama campaign aides who are already hard at work
reviewing a number of issues related to the restructuring of General Motors Corp.
and Chrysler LLC” (Shepardson and Trowbridge 2009).
The Treasury Department responded with a statement claiming that the
government had played no role in selecting the dealerships whose franchise agreement
would be terminated. The “[d]epartment had no role in choosing which contracts
would be dropped or in the number dropped” (qtd. in Valdez-Dapena 2009).
Nevertheless, attorney Leonard Bellavia, who represents a number of closed
dealerships and has deposed senior Chrysler officials, told Reuters, “It became clear
to us that Chrysler does not see the wisdom of terminating 25 percent of its dealers. It
really wasn’t Chrysler’s decision. They [Chrysler officials] are under enormous pressure from the President’s automotive task force” (qtd. in Tapscott 2009).5
5. At least one Chrysler executive has changed his tune: “[A]s Chrysler continues to report dismal sales,
industry experts and even a former executive question whether the company blundered by dropping so
many dealers and giving them just over three weeks to wind down operations. Jim Press, who served as
Chrysler’s president and vice chairman until last month, said in an interview that he personally fought the
dealership closings. ‘I saw it fraught with terrible issues and short-term sales cost as well as dislocation of
customers,’ Mr. Press said. ‘Dealers are [Chrysler’s] only customers, the reason we are in business. How do
you eliminate your customer?’” (Maltby 2009).
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Political Considerations
The Heritage Foundation, intrigued by the notion that political contributions might
have shaped the decision to terminate Chrysler dealerships, conducted a study titled
Closing Car Dealerships: A Matter of Economics, Not Politics (Sherk and Gattuso
2009). The authors analyzed data provided in Chrysler’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy
filings with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. These
filings included the names of all dealerships—both those that were to remain open
and those slated for closure—as well as each firm’s address and owner(s).
The study’s authors compared the political contributions of the majority owner
of each dealership to the list of closures to determine if “Republican-leaning dealers
were treated more harshly than those that supported Democrats.” They concluded:
“[C]laims that the method by which dealers were selected was biased appear to be
unfounded, with no correlation between political contributions and terminations”
(Sherk and Gattuso 2009, 5).
A Matter of Politics, Not Economics
Public-choice theory asserts that politicians are motivated by a desire for reelection
and that this desire shapes which policies are pursued and how they are implemented.
Thus, the public’s outcry that government actions seldom solve real problems is
misguided because the policy goal is not to provide a solution, but instead to build a
winning coalition for the next election. In addition, government agencies—Obama’s
automobile task force certainly qualifies—are not immune to political influence. Both
the executive branch and the legislative branch of government use the apparatus of
government for reelection purposes. In short, politics trumps economics. A vast
literature supports this assertion.
Several scholars have found that politics played an important role in the allocation of New Deal appropriations during the Great Depression (Wright 1974; Anderson and Tollison 1991; Couch and Shughart 1998). Despite Roosevelt’s eloquent
speeches about helping those in distress, economic need was virtually ignored when
dollars were distributed across the nation. Instead, empirical evidence supports the
claim that there was a reelection strategy to the allocation.
Economist William Shughart adds, “One key conclusion of public choice is that
changing the identities of the people who hold public office will not produce major
changes in policy outcomes” (Shughart 2008). Thus, the results of a Mercatus
Center analysis of the Obama administration’s distribution of stimulus funds should
not be surprising. Examining fourth-quarter expenditures from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009—Obama’s stimulus package totaling more than
$800 billion in expenditures and, to a much lesser extent, tax cuts—Jerry Brito and
Veronique de Rugy found “no correlation between economic indicators and stimulus
funding. Preliminary results find no effect of unemployment, median income, or even
VOLUME 15, NUMBER 4, SPRING 2011
582
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J I M F. C O U C H E T A L .
mean income on stimulus funds allocation” (2009, 6). Instead, the authors determined that stimulus dollars flowed disproportionately to Democratic-controlled congressional districts. Like FDR, the current administration has put political
considerations ahead of economic need.
Bureaus and agencies succumb to political pressure as well. Jim Couch and
associates (1999) found that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) conducted fewer
audits in states that had delivered more votes to Clinton. Marilyn Young and
associates (2001) also found a political component to IRS enforcement activity.
Thomas Garrett and Russell Sobel (2003) note that Federal Emergency Management Agency disaster expenditures have been guided at least in part by the current
president’s reelection strategy. Enforcement by the Environmental Protection
Agency (Couch, Williams, and Wells 2008) and by antitrust authorities (Faith,
Leavens, and Tollison [1982] 1995) has likewise been found to be politically
motivated. Even the allocation of troops during the Vietnam War was discovered
to be influenced by politics: more troops from states with less political clout were
deployed to more dangerous locations and in more risky activities (Goff and
Tollison 1987).
Empirical Evidence: Dealership Closure
Dealerships provide both direct and indirect employment opportunities; advertising
revenue for local media; and generous tax revenue for city, county, and state governments derived from the sale of big-ticket items. Moreover, they are frequently called
on to meet community philanthropic needs. Closure of a dealership, whether justified
or not, is obviously unpopular with residents in the surrounding area. A politician
seeking reelection would have a strong incentive to see that his supporters are not
subjected to the negative effects of a closure.
Obama administration officials were quick to point out that they did not have a
voice in the determination of which dealerships would be closed. They claimed that
Chrysler officials made the call. Both the administration and Chrysler executives
asserted that economics drove the calculation. An analysis of the data provides evidence as to whether the administration sought to shield its supporters from the
difficulties associated with the closure of dealerships.
Data Analysis
We began by determining the percentage of dealerships in each state that were closed.
The percentage varied widely from state to state, ranging from a high of 40 percent of
total dealerships closed in North Dakota, Utah, and West Virginia to a low of only 10
percent of total dealerships closed in Vermont (Alaska actually had no dealerships
closed). These data appear in table 1.
THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW
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Table 1
Percentage of Dealerships Closed, by State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Percentage of
Dealerships
Closed
Percentage of
Dealerships
Closed Full Line 1, 2*
Percentage of
Dealerships
Closed Full Line 3, 4*
31.6
70.0
17.9
0.0
0.0
0.0
14.7
10.0
16.7
Arkansas
22.9
100.0
15.6
California
26.0
39.2
15.5
Colorado
27.5
29.4
26.1
Connecticut
16.3
35.3
3.8
Delaware
30.0
60.0
0.0
Florida
34.3
63.6
10.9
Georgia
17.8
50.0
11.5
Hawaii
14.3
0.0
14.3
Idaho
13.6
50.0
5.6
Illinois
27.7
59.3
9.0
Indiana
22.5
56.0
9.4
Iowa
25.0
53.8
19.7
Kansas
27.5
75.0
18.6
Kentucky
14.5
50.0
10.2
Louisiana
39.5
50.0
38.5
Maine
20.0
100.0
0.0
Maryland
34.7
61.5
4.3
Massachusetts
25.5
39.1
12.5
Michigan
26.0
57.6
6.3
Minnesota
25.0
33.3
22.4
Mississippi
15.6
50.0
10.7
Missouri
30.5
69.6
15.3
Montana
16.7
100.0
6.3
Nebraska
23.5
100.0
16.1
Nevada
35.7
50.0
20.0
New Hampshire
25.0
66.7
7.1
New Jersey
35.8
49.1
7.7
New Mexico
13.6
40.0
5.9
New York
17.7
52.6
5.5
North Carolina
18.1
35.3
12.7
(continued)
VOLUME 15, NUMBER 4, SPRING 2011
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J I M F. C O U C H E T A L .
Table 1
(Continued)
Percentage of
Dealerships
Closed
Percentage of
Dealerships
Closed Full Line 1, 2*
Percentage of
Dealerships
Closed Full Line 3, 4*
North Dakota
40.0
85.7
15.4
Ohio
31.3
63.3
15.3
Oklahoma
21.3
42.9
17.5
Oregon
14.3
22.2
11.1
Pennsylvania
30.1
53.8
8.2
Rhode Island
33.3
100.0
0.0
South Carolina
23.9
40.0
16.1
South Dakota
29.2
55.6
13.3
Tennessee
25.5
66.7
17.4
Texas
24.9
52.6
13.6
Utah
40.0
100.0
28.6
Vermont
10.0
25.0
0.0
Virginia
37.7
61.3
18.4
Washington
31.1
54.5
8.7
West Virginia
40.0
62.5
25.0
Wisconsin
16.0
63.2
4.9
Wyoming
26.3
66.7
18.8
*The “full-line” variable refers to the number of lines of Chrysler products a dealership offers.
A value of 1 indicates the dealership offers only a single line of Chrysler products; a value of
4 indicates that the dealership offers the complete line of Chrysler products (three plus trucks).
As noted previously, various economic factors and dealership characteristics have
been cited as possible reasons for closing certain Chrysler dealerships. We combined
both individual dealership characteristics and political factors in our analysis to determine which of these variables played a role in the calculation of franchise termination.6
6. The selection of explanatory variables in the analysis was guided by specific factors that Chrysler officials
mentioned and by political variables standard in the literature. Thus, we examine intrabrand competition,
the number of products offered by each dealership, and a proxy for dealership profitability—namely, the
unemployment rate. At first glance, interbrand competition might have contributed to the decision to close
a Chrysler franchise. However, the literature suggests that competing dealerships cluster together. “Dealerships have become concentrated into a small number of large suburban clusters with the spacing between
clusters influenced by territorial security concerns for dealers selling the same make of automobile. The
strong clustering tendency of dealerships has been attributed to comparison shopping opportunities for
consumers and advertising advantages to sellers” (Lord 1992, 283). The term auto mile has been used to
describe a collection of competing automobile dealerships that cluster together to market their product
better. Hence, empirical evidence suggests that firms seek out their competitors and locate in close
proximity to them rather than avoid them.
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We based our analysis on public-choice theory. Thus, rather than suggesting that
political contributions by the owner of each closed dealership to the political party
opposing the current administration were paramount in the closure decision, as the
Heritage study does,7 we employed a more direct measure, reelection efforts, which is
standard in public-choice literature when analyzing the influence of the executive branch.
The percentage of the vote cast for Obama in each state served as a political
variable in our investigation (for example, we entered the same Obama vote percentage for each dealership in Alabama). Electoral votes per capita at the state level and
party of the congressperson in the U.S. House of Representatives in each dealership’s
district are included as additional measures of political influence.
We also factored individual dealership characteristics into our analysis. Chrysler
officials noted that the decision to terminate a dealership franchise was based on a
number of factors, but they specifically mentioned dealerships’ profitability and level
of customer service. These variables unfortunately are proprietary in nature, so our
investigation admittedly suffers from their exclusion. We made an effort to account
for profitability by including unemployment as a variable. Thus, the unemployment
rate functions as a proxy for profitability in the analysis. If profitability is indeed a
pertinent issue, then dealerships located in economically depressed areas—those with
high unemployment rates—were more likely to be closed.
Additional dealership characteristics included in the study were the number of
Chrysler products that each dealership offered for sale and dealership saturation in a
particular area. It was expected that dealerships with more extensive offerings and
larger customer bases were more likely to escape closure.
Our first model examined the percentage of total dealerships (data from table 1)
in each state that was closed, so we investigated data at the state level first. Next we
focused the analysis on individual dealerships. We analyzed the data to determine
which factors played a statistically significant role in the decision to terminate a
dealership franchise. A more technical analysis of the data and a description of the
statistical models appear in the appendix to this article.
Both the state-level analysis and the individual-dealership analysis suggest that a
relationship did exist between not offering a full line of Chrysler products and the
likelihood of losing a franchise. Chrysler spokespersons indicated before the closures
that this factor would be a determining one, and we found evidence that it was indeed
considered in their calculation.
We found little evidence, however, to support the notion that Chrysler officials
sought to limit intrabrand competition. In fact, the results from the dealership-level
analysis indicate that Chrysler franchises facing less competition in the county were
more likely to be closed, whereas dealerships in more heavily saturated areas were
more likely to remain open.
7. The Heritage study examines whether a dealership remained open or was closed and the dollar amount donated to candidates, but it does not control for other factors associated with the decision to terminate franchises.
VOLUME 15, NUMBER 4, SPRING 2011
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J I M F. C O U C H E T A L .
Based on the empirical analysis, we also found that the economic health of the
area surrounding the dealership did not affect the decision to terminate a dealership.
Our proxy for economic vitality in the county, the unemployment rate, was not
significantly related to dealership closure.
Thus, of all the factors that various officials offered to explain how dealerships to
be closed were selected, only “offering the full line of Chrysler products” was valid.
None of the other explanations is supported by the analysis. However, we did find
evidence that politics played a role.
After controlling for other factors thought to influence the decision to close, we
found evidence that dealerships were more likely to remain open in states that offered
political support for Obama.8 This result is consistent in both the state-level and the
dealership-level analyses. The evidence therefore suggests that the Obama administration was concerned with more than Chrysler’s long-term viability—namely, it was
concerned with protecting Obama’s supporters from the negative consequences of a
dealership closure.
Conclusion
Our results strongly support the notion that the Obama administration—either
directly through the automotive task force or indirectly by putting pressure on
Chrysler executives—played a key role in the selection of which dealerships would be
closed. Although some observers argue that the government can effectively regulate
the private sector, our results suggest that the temptation to succumb to political
considerations is strong and, indeed, cannot be avoided.
All of the model specifications we estimated support a political motivation behind
the selection of dealerships slated for closure.9 President Obama ran on a platform of
change and promised a more open, efficient, and effective government. In the case of
8. A more innocuous explanation can account for the relationship between Obama and dealership closure.
Suppose both Obama support in a state and dealership closures in a state are correlated with income. States
with higher incomes may have given Obama greater political support and provided a more profitable
environment for dealerships. Thus, the significance of the Obama variable may not indicate a political
motivation but rather simply reveal that the Obama variable is a proxy for high income. We also tested for
this possibility, and the evidence supporting the political hypothesis remains strong. Although state median
income is positively and significantly related to state support for Obama, the percentage of dealerships
closed in each state and median income are unrelated. The technical detail of the relationship among these
variables is provided in the appendix.
9. Public choice assumes that decisions are influenced by the desire to build a strong reelection coalition.
However, this behavior can manifest itself in several forms: politicians may choose to reward their loyal
supporters or may instead attempt to influence swing voters. We entered the percentage of the vote for
Obama in the model tests to see if supporters were favored. We also entered a second variable in the model
to capture efforts to win swing voters. In order to test this hypothesis,
of electoral
we calculated a measure
importance for each state. The variable was calculated as Ei ¼ EVi P 1 4 ðPi 0:5Þ2 , where EVi is the
number of electoral votes per state and Pi is the percentage margin of victory for President Obama per state.
Thus, a state in which the voting results were close would have greater importance in building a reelection
strategy. We included this variable in one version of the model but found that it offers no explanatory
power. Given the timing of the Chrysler reorganization—very early in Obama’s term—it seems reasonable
that the administration would have chosen a “reward your supporters” strategy over a “win a swing state”
strategy.
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Chrysler dealership closures, however, this administration’s behavior displays politics as
usual. Our results, unlike those of the Heritage Foundation’s study, support the notion
that political considerations, not economics, influenced the decisions.
Appendix
Procedure
As noted previously, we divided the political analysis into two parts: a study at the
state level and an investigation at the individual-dealership level. First, we examined
the state level, employing an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The percentage
of total dealerships closed in each state served as the dependent variable in our
empirical analysis. The data appear in table 1. Independent variables include the
percentage of dealerships in each state that carry either the full line of Chrysler
products or the full line of Chrysler products plus trucks. We derived information
about the line of vehicles carried by each dealership from Chrysler’s filings with the
Bankruptcy Court.
The state unemployment rate in 2009 is included as an explanatory variable for
dealership profitability. If maximizing sales per dealership was the decision makers’
goal, then it was expected that more dealerships would be closed in states with weaker
economies. In the first OLS model, we included the total number of dealerships in the
state divided by state population in millions. In the second specification, we entered
total number of dealerships per ten thousand square miles. Both obviously measure
dealership saturation, and the expectation was that more franchise agreements would
a priori likely be voided in states with greater intrabrand competition. The court
filings provided the location of each dealership.
We included two political variables in the models. The first is the percentage of a
state’s vote cast for Obama in the presidential election. The second is the number of
electoral votes per capita in each state. OLS regression results are presented in table 2.
Next, we conducted an examination of each individual dealership. Because the
variable of interest in this case is whether a particular firm was allowed to remain open
or forced to close, a logistic model is estimated. To determine the extent to which
nonpolitical considerations influenced the closure decision, once again we included a
number of independent variables suggested by Chrysler spokespersons.
The number or “line” of Chrysler products that each dealership offered for sale
served as one such independent variable. If carrying a more extensive line of Chrysler
products was associated with remaining open, as suggested, then this variable’s
regression coefficient was expected to be negative and statistically significant. To
determine whether reducing intrabrand competition played a role in the decision to
close, we calculated the ratio of county population to the number of dealerships in the
county for each firm. A smaller ratio indicates fewer potential customers per dealership. Hence, the likelihood of closure should have increased as the ratio of potential
customers per dealership declined. Finally, we included the county unemployment
VOLUME 15, NUMBER 4, SPRING 2011
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Table 2
OLS Regressions
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Constant
76.55 (5.56*)
81.0 (6.2*)
Obama Vote
–0.298 (2.22**)
–0.31 (2.34**)
Unemployment Rate
–0.72 (1.24)
–0.85 (1.55)
Full Line
–0.39 (4.61*)
–0.41 (4.41*)
Electoral Votes
–1.77 (1.28)
–1.48 (1.19)
Dealerships/Population
0.121 (0.57)
Dealerships/Area
R-squared
–0.028 (0.38)
0.358
0.356
Note: T-statistics in parentheses.
*Statistical significance at the 1 percent level of confidence.
**Statistical significance at the 5 percent level of confidence.
rate in the model. If economic considerations played a role in the decision to close a
dealership, this variable’s regression coefficient would be expected to be positive and
significant. High levels of unemployment should have translated into lower dealership
profitability and thus greater likelihood of termination—at least according to Chrysler
officials. Table 3 provides the results for the logistic model.
Results
The OLS models that examine the percentage of dealerships closed in each state both
explain approximately 36 percent of the variance in the dependent variable. Neither
the unemployment rate nor either of the measures of intrabrand competition has any
explanatory power. However, as the percentage of total dealerships offering a more
Table 3
Logit Analysis
Parameter
Estimate
Pr > ChiSq
Intercept
3.56
0.0001*
Full Line
–0.992
0.0001*
Unemployment
Population/Dealership
0.001
0.936
0.0000001
0.029**
Representative
–0.148
0.127
Obama Vote
–3.12
0.0001*
Note: “Representative” is equal to one if the congressperson representing the dealership’s
district is a Democrat and zero otherwise.
*Significant at the 1 percent level of confidence.
**Significant at the 5 percent level of confidence.
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589
complete line of Chrysler products in the state increased, the percentage of dealerships closed in the state decreased, and this result is statistically significant at the
1 percent level of confidence.
Electoral votes per capita has the correct sign but lacks statistical significance.
The results do indicate that a smaller percentage of dealerships was closed in states
that offered greater political support for Obama. This result is significant at the
5 percent level of confidence. Both specifications indicate that political considerations influenced dealership franchise termination. In particular, the results indicate
that rather than attempting to win new voters, Obama instead used his influence
to reward his allies by protecting dealerships where his support was stronger.
The logistic regression likewise supports the service of a political motivation in
the decisions regarding which dealerships to close. The county unemployment rate
offers no explanatory power in the model. Population per dealership is significant at
the 5 percent level of confidence, but its sign is the opposite of what was expected:
Chrysler dealerships with a larger customer base were terminated, whereas firms with
a smaller base were allowed to remain open. However, the full-line variable is significantly related to closure and behaves as expected.10 Dealerships that did not offer as
many Chrysler products were more likely to lose their franchise.
Because we examine individual firms, the variable “Representative” is included.
Representative measures the party of the congressperson in the U.S. House of
Representatives in each dealership’s district. The variable is insignificant in the analysis. But the independent variable that measured support for Obama in his contest
with John McCain is significant at the 1 percent level of confidence. As the percentage
of the vote for Obama increased in a state, the probability that dealerships in that state
would survive increased as well.
As noted previously, support for Obama in the presidential contest is correlated
with higher state average income. In other words, richer states offered more political
support for Obama than did poorer states. Thus, the Obama variable may be serving
as a proxy for income in our models, so that executives, in making the decision to
close dealerships, simply terminated firms in lower-income areas.
To examine this possibility, we estimated regressions that include state median
income, full line of Chrysler products, and Obama. In all the specifications, the
Obama and full-line variables behaved as before and are statistically significant. However, median income does not offer any explanatory power. In addition, we
constructed a correlation matrix with median income, Obama vote, and the percentage of dealerships closed. Although the Obama vote and median income are highly
correlated, median income and percentage of dealerships closed are not related.
Therefore, our evidence of political influence remains strong. The regressions and
the correlation matrix are included in table 4.
10. The full-line variable might represent higher income and more prosperous locations. The variable is
not significantly correlated with income per capita or with the unemployment rate.
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J I M F. C O U C H E T A L .
Table 4
Correlations
Percentage of
Obama Vote
Unemployment Rate
Unemployment Rate
0.207 (0.149)
Percentage of
Dealerships Closed
–0.056 (0.701)
–0.011 (0.941)
0.481 (0.000)
–0.151 (0.294)
Median Income
Percentage of
Dealerships Closed
0.065 (0.655)
Note: Pearson correlation values are in parenthesis. A number of regressions were run with
income included as an explanatory variable. Median income was never statistically significant in
any of the models, but both the full-line and Obama variables retained their statistical significance. The results from two specifications are:
% Dealerships Closed = 54.1 - 0.283 %Full Line - 0.000181 Median Income
% Dealerships Closed = 64.4 - 0.328 %Full Line - 0.252 %Obama - 0.000072 Median Income
References
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VOLUME 15, NUMBER 4, SPRING 2011
An Analysis of the Financial Services
Bailout Vote
Jim F. Couch, Mark D. Foster, Keith Malone,
and David L. Black
Washington’s remedy to the financial problems that began in
2008 was the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)—the socalled bailout of the banking system. Whatever its merits, it was,
for the most part, unpopular with the American public. Lawmakers, fearful that the economy might actually collapse without some
action, were likewise fearful that action—in the form of a payout
to the Wall Street financiers—would prove to be harmful to them
at the polls. Thus, politicians sought to assure the public that their
vote on the measure would reflect Main Street virtues, not Wall
Street greed.
Members of Congress, addressing the public’s misgivings about
the bailout, asserted that they were wrestling with difficult issues
such as fairness and equity, banking regulation, executive pay, job
losses, moral hazard, 401(k) values, and the proper role of the state.
Furthermore, they argued, these complex issues were difficult for
the public to understand, and legislators, vigilant in carrying out
their duty, were weighing the pros and the cons in order to cast a
vote that was in the best interest of the nation.
Cato Journal, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Winter 2011). Copyright © Cato Institute. All
rights reserved.
Jim F. Couch is Professor of Economics at the University of North Alabama;
Mark D. Foster is Associate Professor of Finance at the University of North Alabama; Keith Malone is Associate Professor of Economics at the University of
North Alabama; and David L. Black is Instructor of Economics at the University
of North Alabama.
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Cato Journal
But it turns out that when one moves beyond the speeches, the
underlying motivation behind most votes cast was hardly complex
and actually quite simple. In this article, we construct a model
to analyze the bailout vote of each legislator. A simple reelection
model of legislator behavior explains a majority of the votes taken
either for or against the measure from politician to politician.
Wall Street vs. Main Street
Those with an appreciation of the merits of limited government
enjoy reflecting on the past. They recall those halcyon days when
a balanced budget amendment—a rather quant notion by today’s
standards—failed by only a single vote in the Senate. How things
have changed.
The economic zeitgeist is government takeovers, bailouts, and
stimulus plans along with escalating debt and deficits. Indeed,
commenting on the federal budget for FY 2009, Stanford University economist Michael Boskin (2009) put government borrowing
in perspective: “The budget more than doubles the national debt
held by the public, adding more to the debt than all previous presidents—from George Washington to George W. Bush—combined.”
Indeed, the FY 2009 budget deficit was larger than the entire
economy of India and almost as much as the Canadian economy.
“Forecasts of more red ink mean the federal government is heading
toward spending 15 percent of its money by 2019 just to pay interest
on the debt, up from 5 percent this fiscal year” (Crutsinger 2009).
It could be argued, however, that the staggering explosion of
federal debt under the Obama administration was precipitated
by unprecedented spending during the Bush administration. The
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, otherwise known
as TARP, whatever its merits in terms of rescuing the economy,
represented a dramatic departure from normal government operations. As President Bush all but acknowledged in his November 12,
2009, address at Southern Methodist University, TARP opened the
floodgates of government intrusion into the private sector:
I went against my free-market instincts and approved a temporary government intervention to unfreeze credit and prevent
a global financial catastrophe. . . . As the world recovers, we
will face a temptation to replace the risk-and-reward model of
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Financial Services Bailout Vote
the private sector with the blunt instruments of government
spending and control. History shows that the greater threat
to prosperity is not too little government involvement, but too
much [Bush 2009].
The $700 billion dollar stabilization package was designed to
provide liquidity to the nation’s banking and financial firms that
faced, at best, uncertain futures. Assisting the financial industry
through taxpayer loans and grants proved to be unpopular with the
American public.
Jonathan Weisman, writing in the Washington Post, acknowledged the unusual nature of the vote: “Rarely has a congressional
vote held such high drama and produced such immediate repercussions, directly from the House floor to the trading floor” (Weisman
2008).
Congress, fearful that the economy might actually collapse without the bailout but aware that rewarding Wall Street would agitate
voters, did what they do best—they made speeches appealing to
populism. Most castigated Wall Street greed, differentiating between Main Street virtue and Wall Street avarice. Others took aim
at Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson. Representative Brad Sherman (D-CA) provides a useful example:
We live in an era of great concentration of power in the Executive Branch and great concentration of wealth on Wall Street.
Today we are asked to approve the greatest power grab any executive has ever asked for and the greatest transfer of wealth
Wall Street could imagine. . . . We can make a bill that reflects
American values and not Wall Street values [Sherman 2008].
Senator Sherrod Brown (D-OH) acknowledged the public’s displeasure with TARP: “I don’t think a single call to my office on this
proposal has been positive. I don’t think I have gotten one yet of the
literally thousands of emails and calls we’re getting” (Brown 2008).
Representative Peter DeFazio (D-OR) criticized Wall Street but,
in addition, attacked Secretary Paulson directly:
He wants to take care of Wall Street’s illiquid assets, as what
he nicely labels them. Nice charitable pundits have said Cash
for Trash. Wall Street could then return to business as usual.
That is Mr. Paulson’s plan. He is of, by, for and about Wall
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Street, former head of Goldman Sachs. We should not be
rolled by a Wall Street exec who is masquerading as Secretary
of the Treasury [DeFazio 2008].
Senator Chris Dodd (D-CT), chairman of the Senate Banking
Committee, echoed the Wall Street versus Main Street theme and
pointed out who was likely to benefit from the expenditures:
It would do nothing, in my view, to help a single family save a
home, at least not upfront. It would do nothing to stop even a
single CEO from dumping billions of dollars of toxic assets on
the backs of American taxpayers, while at the same time do
nothing to stop the very authors of this calamity to walk away
with bonuses and golden parachutes worth millions of dollars
[Dodd 2008].
Richard Shelby (R-AL) agreed with his Democratic colleagues,
asserting:
The Treasury’s plan has little for those outside of the financial
industry. It is aimed at rescuing the same financial institutions that created this crisis, with the sloppy underwriting
and reckless disregard for the risks they were creating, taking
or passing on to others. Wall Street bet that the government
would rescue them if they got into trouble. It appears that bet
may be the one that pays off [Shelby 2008].
Lawmakers unequivocally pronounced that Wall Street elites
would not win the day. It was made clear that Main Street had the
ear of the Congress. Taxpayers would not bear the brunt of the miscalculations of the bankers, brokers, and financiers.
Government Allocation of TARP Funds
A few politicians were uncomfortable with the expanded role
that government was playing in the market. Representative William
Thornberry (R-TX) made this observation and pointed out that he
had wrestled with the issue:
Deciding how to vote on this issue has been among the most
difficult votes I have cast in Congress. The economic condi122
Financial Services Bailout Vote
tion and well-being of every American will be affected. I continue to be uncomfortable with the degree of government intrusion into our economy that this bill would authorize. I also
continue to be concerned about the economic consequences
to all Americans if some sort of action is not taken. It is balancing those two positions that make this vote extremely difficult [Thornberry 2008].
While we are admittedly getting a little ahead of ourselves, Representative Thornberry’s fears proved to be valid. The bailout vote
did indeed pass, but the funds were not directed in a manner consistent with an effort to increase liquidity—and thereby, hopefully,
bring about recovery. Instead, funds were directed to financial institutions with political clout.
Healthy banks that could make loans and supply liquidity were
supposed to receive TARP funds in order to head off financial calamity. OneUnited Bank certainly did not meet that requirement.
The bank was in deep trouble. However, the bank was tied to two
powerful legislators: Congressman Barney Frank (D-MA) and
Congresswoman Maxine Waters (D-CA). Both Frank and Waters
served on the House Financial Services Committee, with Frank
serving as chairman and Waters as the third-highest Democrat in
seniority. Until recently, Waters’s husband, Sidney Williams, was a
director of the bank. Representative Waters at one time had investments in the bank and her husband also owned stock in the firm. In
addition, bank executives donated to Waters’s political campaigns.
She acknowledged calling the Treasury Department on
OneUnited’s behalf. The bank eventually received $12 million in
TARP funds. The money made its way to the bank through a special provision written into the bailout legislation. Wall Street Journal reporter Susan Schmidt explained, “A provision designed to aid
OneUnited was written into the federal bailout legislation by Mr.
Frank, who is chairman of the financial services panel. Mr. Frank
said he inserted the provision to help the only African-American
owned bank in his home state” (Schmidt 2009).
Financial regulators were not impressed with many of the bank’s
practices and the bank was ordered to name a new independent
board. In addition, “the bank was ordered to stop paying for a
Porsche used by one of its executives and its chairman’s $6.4 million
beachfront home in Pacific Palisades” (Schmidt 2009).
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Empirical evidence also shows a systematic political component
to the distribution of TARP funds. Duchin and Sosyura (2009) examined the Capital Purchase Program, the largest TARP initiative
in terms of the amount of expended capital. They measured political
influence by examining the number of seats held by bank executives
on the board of directors at Federal Reserve banks or branches,
whether the bank’s headquarters was located in the district of a
U.S. House member serving on a key congressional committee or
subcommittee dealing with the financial service sector, the bank’s
lobbying expenditures, and the bank’s campaign contributions to
congressional candidates.
Controlling for nonpolitical bank characteristics thought to influence the distribution of TARP funds, Duchin and Sosyura found
that employing a bank executive that also serves at a Federal Reserve bank was associated with a 31 percent increase in the likelihood of receiving TARP funds. Having the bank’s headquarters
located in the district of a U.S. Representative serving on a key
financial service committee improved the chances of TARP funding by 26 percent. In addition, TARP funds flowed to those institutions that spent large sums of money lobbying and made significant
contributions to politicians.
Duchin and Sosyurn also found that political influence was strongest for poorly performing banks. Thus, political ties shifted funds
to weaker institutions, a result at odds with the original stated purpose of TARP. The public, like Representative Thornberry, should
be uncomfortable with the expanded role of the state. Instead of
allocating funds in an effort to bring about economic recovery, legislators distributed dollars to politically connected banks.
Our focus is on the original bailout vote of each legislator. We
seek to determine to what extent political considerations drove the
decision by legislators to support or reject TARP.
Political Evidence
Lawmakers made it clear that they faced a complex bill that
grappled with extremely difficult issues. They assured the public
that much time and effort had gone into assessing the merits of
the proposed legislation. Issues such as fairness and equity, banking
regulation, executive pay, and job losses all entered into their calculation. In addition, moral hazard, 401(k) values, and the proper
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Financial Services Bailout Vote
role of the state made the vote difficult at best. But it turns out
that when one moves beyond the speeches, the underlying motivation behind most votes cast was hardly complex and actually quite
simple.
An examination of the bailout vote reveals that almost threefourths of the variation in the vote from politician to politician is explained by only four variables in the House of Representatives and
only five variables in the Senate. The model investigating the House
vote included the following independent variables: party affiliation,
tenure, membership on the Financial Services Committee, and
recent contributions to each politician from the financial-services
sector. In the Senate model the same variables were included with
the exception that the House Committee is replaced with a Senate
Committee—membership on the Banking and Urban Affairs Committee. Also, a new variable is added—the number of years until
each senator faces the voters in the next election.
The dependent variable in the model is the vote—a yea or a
nay—and thus, a Logit model is estimated. The first bill was defeated in the House with 228 members voting against the measure
and 205 voting in favor.1 Democrats offered the most support with
140 voting in favor and 95 voting against the legislation. Only 65 Republicans supported the bill while 133 opposed. In the Senate, the
measure passed with 74 members favoring the bill and 25 against.
Campaign contributions to politicians from the financial service
industry covering the years from 2003 through 2008 is used in the
analysis. The industry includes security brokers and investment
companies; commercial banks and bank holding companies; credit
unions; finance, insurance, and real estate businesses; private equity and investment firms; banks and lending institutions; credit
agencies and finance companies; stock exchanges; commodity brokers/dealers; venture capital funds; securities, commodities, and
investment firms; and hedge funds. Both the vote and the amount
of contributions to each member of Congress came from opensecrets.org and maplight.org. Party affiliation (1=Democrat; 0 other1
In the end, of course, the bill ultimately passed after it was altered (made better,
according to lawmakers). Some of the alterations: NASCAR racetrack builders
received over $100 million, Movie and television producers that made films in
America were to receive $478 million over the next 10 years, a 39 cent excise tax
on toy wooden arrows was repealed and rum producers in Puerto Rico and the
Virgin Islands were to receive $192 million (Kang 2008).
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wise), tenure (number of years in Congress), membership on key
financial committees (1=member; 0 otherwise), and the number of
years until the next election in the Senate are from the Maplight.
org website.
Tables 1 and 2 present the results for the House and Senate bailout vote analysis. Table 1 reveals that party affiliation, tenure, and
contributions from the financial services sector are all significant
at the 1 percent level. Specifically, the House model indicates that
if members are Democrats, served for a longer period of time, or
received contributions from the financial service sector, they were
more likely to vote for the bill. Committee assignments are insignificant in the model.
An investigation of the Senate bailout vote analysis in Table
2 yields results that are similar to the House of Representatives
but not identical. Again, we find that the committee assignments
included in the model did not offer any explanatory power. Likewise, party affiliation and years until the next election are not significantly related to the vote. Senators with greater years of service
were more likely to support the measure (at the 10 percent level of
statistical significance). Contributions were associated with a vote
in favor of the bailout package and this variable was significant at
the 1 percent level.
TABLE 1
House Bailout Vote Analysis
Variables
Constant
Estimate
Significance
–1.89
0.0001*
Party
1.36
0.0001*
Tenure
0.05
0.0002*
Committee
Contributions
Percent Concordant
–0.43
0.000005
0.204
0.0001*
72.2
Notes: * indicates significance at the 1 percent level. Dependent Variable: 1 if vote in favor of bailout bill, 0 otherwise.
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Financial Services Bailout Vote
TABLE 2
Senate Bailout Vote Analysis
Variables
Estimate
Constant
–1.26
0.135
Party
0.62
0.265
Tenure
0.057
0.077**
Years until Election
0.154
0.373
–0.437
0.481
Committee
Contributions
Percent Concordant
0.000001
Significance
0.0174*
74.7
Notes: * indicates significance at the 1 percent level; ** indicates significance at the 10 percent level. Dependent Variable: 1 if vote in favor of
bailout bill; 0 otherwise.
Conclusion
In the end, as the results make clear, the vote had very little to
do with representing those on Main Street. Instead, politicians were
guided by political considerations. In the House of Representatives,
the longer politicians had served (safe seat), the more likely they were
to vote in favor of the bill. Also, Democrats in the House were more
likely to support the measure. In the Senate, party did not play a role
but tenure was significantly and positively related to a yes vote.
The most interesting factor in the model is the level of campaign
contributions from the financial service sector. With the public
paying unprecedented attention to the decision, those politicians
that had received greater contributions from the financial service
industry were the same politicians more likely to vote for the wealth
transfer. Wall Street, like other special interest groups in America,
continues to exert an inordinate amount of influence on Congress—
and Main Street, as usual, picks up the tab.
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128
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