3
Life Beyond the Bubbl<
e are at the beginning of a long journey. Still, there is a
simple overarching metaphor that has helped us appreciate the revolution we are starting to experience.
To understand this metaphor, you must first appreciate that we are not
the first highly successful society to find itself in trouble. History is full of
examples of people who've succeeded so thoroughly in expanding their
way of living that they found themselves in circumstances for which they
were tragically unprepared.
Historian and Pulitzer Prize winner Jared Diamond has chronicled
(most recently in his book Collapse) how many once-dominant civilizations grew significantly and then expired, often quite suddenly. Few societies of the time, for instance, achieved such sophistication in mathematics,
astronomy, and social structure as the Maya of Central America. Yet despite its accomplishments, the Mayan civilization—five hundred years
before the Spaniards' arrival in their lands—all but disappeared within a
generation, apparently the victim of an environmental collapse brought
about by the unsustainable slash-and-burn agriculture the Maya had
practiced for generations.
34
the necessary REVOLUTION
The larger the Mayan population grew, the more their agricultural activity deforested the areas where they lived. Deforestation, in turn, caused
soil erosion, which eventually ruined the storage reservoirs that held their
drinking water and destroyed their ability to grow crops. Without food
and water, the Mayan city-states died and the people moved back to the
jungles and forests.
Given the history of the Maya as well as the other examples Diamond
shares of sophisticated societies that succeeded in destroying their own
resource base, is our situation hopeless?1 Hardly. In a recent article, Lester
Brown, one of the elders of environmental analysis and founder of the
Worldwatch Institute, recounts an example of a people who were successfully able to change.
Six centuries ago, Icelanders realized that overgrazing on their grasscovered highlands was leading to extensive loss of the inherently thin soils
of the region. Rather than lose the grasslands and face economic decline,
farmers joined together to determine how many sheep the highlands
could sustain and then allocated quotas among themselves, thus preserving their grasslands.
Just as the Icelanders understood the consequences of overgrazing and
reduced their sheep numbers to a level that could be sustained, we now
understand the consequences of burning fossil fuels and the resulting CO2
buildup in the atmosphere. Yet, unlike the Icelanders, who were able to
restrict their livestock numbers, we have not yet been able to significantly
restrict our CO2 emissions.
Our success in doing so will depend on more than awareness of the
side effects of global industrialization we discussed earlier. The real threats
of collapse have more to do with denial than with unawareness, and it is
here that we can build upon a metaphor frequently used by historians: the
bubble.
We are all familiar with financial bubbles, the metaphor invented by
economic historians to make sense of a recurring puzzle: How is it that
financial overexpansion and collapse occur time and again, drawing otherwise bright and clever people into ruin?
The answer is that during a period of expansion, in effect, two parallel
Life Beyond the Bubble
35
realities develop, one inside the bubble and one outside. Both feel equally
real to those who live within them. But the more the bubble grows, the
more people are drawn into its powerful reinforcing beliefs and perceptions. Eventually, those inside the bubble become so absorbed by their
reality that they literally can no longer understand the point of view of
those outside.
Recall the exchanges between those inside and outside the dot-corn
bubble of the late 1990s. Those inside the bubble were living in a "new
economy" with new rules, and its success spoke for itself. What mattered
was technology, hits to your website, "stickiness" (how long people stayed
on your website once they arrived), and frequently a cool, anti-corporate
image. Profit—that old-economy word—would come in time, the neweconomy zealots argued. And many investors agreed—so much so that
profitable old-economy businesses often saw their market value decline in
comparison to their dot-corn counterparts, despite the fact that the dotcoms had little or no profits.
But there was a larger reality outside the bubble where profits actually
did matter. Eventually this larger reality asserted itself and the bubble
burst, wiping out a great many paper millionaires and a few billionaires in
the process.
As Diamond shows, societal bubbles can last decades or even centuries.
In the meantime, the longer the bubble grows, the more people and resources get drawn into it, the more people may benefit from it, and the
more its beliefs become deeply entrenched.
After generations, it becomes hard to even imagine an alternative, a way
of living outside the bubble. But at some point the tensions and inconsistencies between life inside the bubble and the larger reality outside of it
must be resolved. The bubble cannot continue expanding indefinitely.
We believe the Industrial Age constitutes an extended bubble of just
this sort. Its expansion has continued for several centuries, so it is easy to
assume that it will continue forever. But there is a world outside the bubble, what biologist E. O. Wilson calls "the real real world," and, as we are
beginning to witness, signs that the Industrial Age Bubble has run its
course are already out in plain sight.2
the necessary REVOLUTION
36
THE "REAL" REAL WORLD
As the saying goes, "Gravity isn't just a good idea; it's the law." The Industrial Age Bubble violates several aspects of the larger "gravity" of the natural world. Those of us who have been living inside this Bubble must now
recognize this in order to see our path forward.
Consider, for example, how within the Industrial Age Bubble we go
about meeting the fundamental human needs for energy, food and water
and products and services that ensure our physical security and wellbeing.
For some 2 billion years, life has flourished on earth based on one
source of energy: solar radiation, the same energy that powers a forest, a
prairie, a marine ecosystem, or a caterpillar.
By contrast, 90 percent or more of our energy within the Industrial Age
Bubble comes from burning fossil fuels.
Similarly, in nature, most food is local (although in some cases seeds
may be carried a great distance). Our food is rarely local, traveling instead
Nature
Industrial
Fossil
ENERGY
Global Production
FOOD
9HHHM '>»»•*•'
MATERIALS
Huge Waste
BBBHMI
Standardization
VARIETY
laximize Income SOCIAL WELL-BEING
FIGURE 3.1
Life Beyond the Bubble
37
thousands of miles, and is often genetically modified or otherwise preserved so that it can survive the trip.
In nature there is no waste: every by-product of one natural system is a
nutrient for another. Within the Industrial Age Bubble, society generates
enormous amounts of waste.
The contradictions of the Industrial Age Bubble also extend to the way
society is organized and sets its priorities. For example, the Industrial Age
quest for efficiency and standardization has gradually unleashed relentless forces for homogenization, destroying cultural diversity just as it has
destroyed biological diversity. Today, people around the world watch
the same television shows, buy the same products, and, increasingly, embrace the same consumer ideals of the "good life." In stark contrast to this
drive to homogenize, everywhere we see nature's love affair with diversity
and uniqueness: No two trees, leaves, dragonflies, polar bears, or people
are the same.
For millennia, healthy societies that have endured have fostered a sense
of belonging and security, confidence that basic material needs will be
met, and the opportunity for each person to grow and express his or her
own unique gifts and aspirations. By contrast, within the Bubble, social
well-being is often reduced to material growth, specifically GDP growth.
Though we are regularly reminded of how important this is, few of us
actually feel more secure or happier when GDP rises. Indeed, research has
shown that after basic needs are met, there is little correlation between
increased material comfort and people's sense of well-being.3
These contradictions between how nature, including human nature,
works and how modern society works cannot continue indefinitely. The
question is not if the Industrial Age Bubble will end. The question is when
and how—keeping in mind Jared Diamond's point that collapse can occur
much more rapidly than those inside a bubble expect.
For a long time, those who have pointed to problems with the Industrial Age have mostly been relegated to the backbench of social critiques,
their arguments the stuff of academic debates, not practical policy and
organizational strategy. But the urgency of climate change is altering that.
The 80-20 Challenge demands immediate shifts in energy use and our
modern way of living.
38
the necessary REVOLUTION
Lite Beyond the Bubble
Obviously, the Industrial Age Bubble is a metaphor, but it is a useful
way of looking at the current situation and can help guide our choices
going forward. The Bubble is sustained by the choices we make every
jay— what we buy, what we make and how we make it, how we interact
with one another. Choices that reinforce the extractive "take-make-waste"
economy are based on a set of assumptions, beliefs, and ways of seeing the
world that we have developed over time and that have by now become
deeply embedded in modern society. For example:
Take-make-waste
solutions
Short-term fixes
Easier, faster
Societal
needs
Damage to social and
environmental systems
Fundamental solutions
Harder, take time
Regenerative solutionsall life flourishes
• Energy is infinite and cheap.
• There will always be enough room to dispose of all our waste.
• Humans can't possibly alter the global environment. For instance,
weather patterns will remain relatively stable no matter how we act.
• Humans are the primary species on earth; others are less important,
and many are irrelevant.
• Basic resources such as water and topsoil are unlimited. If limits or
problems are encountered, markets and new technologies will reallocate financial resources so we can continue with our current
ways of living and working.
• Productivity and standardization are keys to economic progress.
• Economic growth and rising GDP are the best way to "lift all boats"
and reduce social inequities.
FIGURE 3.2
Which brings us to the question of how, the answer to which is relatively
simple—although far from easy. Up until now, we have been shifting the
burden to nature to handle the side effects of our fragmented, short-term
take-make-waste solutions (see Figure 3.2).4
Either we continue on this path, perhaps making the occasional incremental adjustment (the equivalent of choosing between paper and plastic
bags), or we invest seriously and immediately in building a regenerative
economy and society that mimics nature as fully as possible.
By contrast, life beyond the Bubble will be based on choices reflecting
very different beliefs, assumptions, and guiding principles, such as:
THE CHOICE BEHIND OUR CHOICES
A core principle of a regenerative society is that life creates conditions
for life.
When it comes to deciding how we deal with key issues such as energy,
water, and other resources, we can either adopt that principle or resign
ourselves to the fact that our time here will be short. Why? Because the
more we opt for the old Industrial Age model, the more we compromise
the conditions that support and generate life. And the more severe our
sustainability problems become, the more difficult it becomes to invest in
alternatives, because the increasingly stressed ecosystems will demand im-
;
• Surf the flux.5 Live within our energy income by relying on forms of
energy that come from renewable sources such as solar, wind, tidal,
and bio-based inputs.
• Zero to landfill. Everything, from cars and iPods to office buildings
and machine tools, is 100 percent recyclable, remanufacturable, or
compostable.
•
We are borrowing the future from our children; we have to pay it
back. Our first responsibility is to
~i u: — i
40
th
Life Beyond the Bubble
e necessary REVOLUTION
• We are only one of nature's wonders. We are just one of the species
that matter, and we all depend on each other in ways we cannot even
imagine.
• Value the earth's services; they come free of charge to those
who treasure them. Healthy ecosystems are precious and must be
treated as such.
• Embrace variety; build community. Harmony amid diversity is a
feature of healthy ecosystems and societies.
• In the global village, there is only one boat, and a hole sinks us all.
Our mutual security and well-being depend on respect and concern
for all. If any of us is insecure, then we all are.
Lastly, a regenerative society is a flourishing society. The revolution is
not about giving up; it's about rediscovering what we most value. It is
about making quality in living central in our communities, businesses,
schools, and societies. It is about reconnecting with ourselves, one another, and our fellow non-human inhabitants on earth.
Over twenty years ago, the tiny country of Bhutan embarked on a project of devising a new set of indicators for national progress. What became
known as the gross national happiness, or GNH, index included forest
cover, child nutrition, education levels, and health of the elderly. Interestingly, in the years since it began using the GNH index, Bhutan has consistently been rated at the top of the performance index maintained by the
World Bank for all countries that receive financing from its International
Development Assistance arm, an index that takes into account both governance and social and economic indicators.
Life beyond the Bubble will require suspending "either/or" thinking.
Assuming that we must choose either a better standard of living or healthy
ecosystems and cannot have both is a by-product of the Industrial Age.
This is not to assume that a regenerative society will not involve changes
that will be difficult, such as adjusting to higher energy prices, having fewer
material acquisitions, or taking greater responsibility for our impact on the
world. But to assume that this is automatically a step backward in terms of
overall quality of living is to assume that our answers from the past are
THE
41
WAY IN IS ALSO THE WAY OUT
Just as our way of thinking got us into the situation we are in today, so,
too, will our thinking—differently—help us find our way out. We can't
attack the problems piecemeal. Solving isolated social and environmental
problems will not get us very far; at best it will provide short-term relief.
Neither will preserving the status quo while imagining naively that new
technologies alone will somehow save the day.
We need to ask, "What would a way of thinking, a way of living, and
ultimately an economic system look like that worked based on the prin-.
ciples of the larger natural world? And how do we create such a way of
living in our organizations and societies, one step at a time?"
VOLUME 9, NUMBE R 2
Reflections
The SoL Journal
on Knowledge, Learning, and Change
F E A T U R E A RT I C L E S
The Role of the Corporation
in Supporting Local
Development
Muhammad Yunus
Serving the Underserved:
Progressive Energy Solutions
Through a Sustainable
Business Model
Roberto Bocca and Prema Gopalan
Matrix Sales University
Eric Mellet, Philippe Pierre,
Béatrice Quasnik
Book ExcerptS
The Necessary Revolution
Peter Senge, Bryan Smith,
Nina Kruschwitz, Joe Laur,
Sara Schley
Limits to Growth
Donella Meadows, Jorgen Randers,
Dennis Meadows
IBERDROLA RENEWABLES
Published by The Society for Organizational Learning
reflections.solonline.org
ISSN 1524-1734
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reflections.solonline.org
Book Excerpt 9.2
The Necessary Revolution
How We Got Into This Predicament
Something important has happened in the last stage of the industrial era that sets it
apart from the past: Globalization has brought a level of interdependence between nations
and regions that never existed before, along with truly global problems that also have no
precedent. The Industrial Age isn’t ending because of a decline in opportunities for further
expansion. It is ending because individuals, organizations, and governments are realizing
that its side effects are unsustainable. But endings are also beginnings. In The Necessary
Peter Senge
Revolution, Peter Senge and his coauthors share the guiding ideas that are essential for
creating a more sustainable future: seeing systems, collaborating across boundaries, and
moving from problem solving to creating. The book is full of stories and examples of individuals and organizations
who are putting these ideas into action, many of whom are associated with SoL. This excerpt explains “how we
got here” and lays out the case for urgency in radically shifting the kind of thinking that has made the industrial
era so successful, and so disastrous.
The Wages of Success
H
ow did we get to the point where we are running out of the resources (such as oil) that support our way of life, and others (such as clean air
and fresh drinking water) that support life itself? And
how did entire industries, such as fishing and agriculture, find themselves in trouble as well, as chronic overfishing and the drive for ever-higher crop yields led
to widespread depletion of fish stocks and a historic
loss of topsoil?
How on earth did we get here? The short answer is
because of our success, success beyond anyone’s
wildest dreams.
In the first stage of the Industrial Revolution (1750
to 1820), the rise of large-scale manufacturing caused
labor productivity in England to rise a hundredfold.
But the Revolution did not simply change the way
we worked; it transformed the way we lived, the way
we thought about ourselves, and the way we viewed
the world. Nothing like it had ever occurred before.
The Necessary
Revolution: How
Individuals and
Organizations are
Working Together
to Create a
Sustainable World
Peter Senge, Bryan Smith,
Nina Kruschwitz, Joe Laur,
Sara Schley
Doubleday, 2008
It didn’t take long for innovations such as the assembly
line to spread to other countries in northern Europe
and to the hinterlands of the United States, whose exploding population and vast store of natural resources
enabled the former colony to become the next industrial power. Industry was booming and so, too, were
book excerpt
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S enge , S mi t h , k r us c h wi t z , lau r , s c h ley
the material standards of living. As the United States’
population increased from about 10 million to 63 million between 1820 and 1890, the country’s industrial
production grew thirtyfold. The resulting fivefold
growth in output per person was even greater than
the productivity gains on the other side of the
Atlantic.
The impacts the Industrial Revolution had on quality
of life were undeniable. As industrial expansion continued into the twentieth century, life expectancy in
the industrial world roughly doubled, literacy jumped
from 20 percent to over 90 percent, and benefits hitherto
unimaginable sprang up in the form of products (from
private cars to iPods), services (from air travel to eBay),
and astounding advances in medicine, communication, education, and entertainment. With this kind of
success, it is little wonder that the side effects of the
Industrial Age success story went largely ignored.
But the downsides of this great prosperity were
steadily accumulating from the very beginning. Some
were hard not to notice. In the 1800s, England’s level
of fossil fuel combustion grew dramatically, and so too
did levels of water and air pollution. In the late 1800s,
London’s infamous “fog,” particulate emissions from
burning coal, caused a virtual epidemic of respiratory
diseases once confined to coal-mining communities.
By 1952, air quality in London was so bad that the “great
smog” (four days of toxic air trapped over the city) killed
more than 4,000 people and galvanized the government
to create air pollution regulations.1
Other side effects went unseen. Invisible CO2 emissions in the United Kingdom rose from virtually zero
to over a million tons per year by the end of the nineteenth century. During America’s twentieth-century
economic miracle, the amount of fossil fuels burned
grew so much that by the end of the century CO2
emissions totaled almost two billion tons annually,
or about seven tons per person.
Despite growing awareness of the importance of a
healthy environment and successes in pollution reduction, even a cursory summary shows that things have
mostly gone from bad to worse worldwide. Let’s look
at the problems by category.
Industrial Waste
• The U.S. economy consumes over 100 billion tons
of raw materials per year; more than 90 percent of
this, by weight, ends up as waste from extraction
and production processes. That works out to
about 1 ton of waste per person per day.2
• Solid and liquid industrial wastes (such as plastics
and petrochemical wastes) disperse through
groundwater, and airborne pollutants (such as
acids) can travel hundreds or thousands of miles
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before they end up in rainfall, soil, and water. These
pollutants affect health both directly (they’ve played
a role in the significant increase in asthma since
1960) and indirectly (by decreasing food and
water quality).3
• The “Asian Brown Cloud,” a dense blanket of
airborne, mostly industrial particulates, has been
blamed for 500,000 deaths from respiratory
illness per year in India alone.4
• Seventy percent of the developing world’s untreated industrial waste is dumped into rivers,
lakes, oceans, or soil.5
Consumer and Commercial Waste and Toxicity
• Approximately 8 billion tons per year of carbon in
the form of carbon dioxide are emitted globally
through the burning of fossil fuels for transportation,
heat, and electricity worldwide. This is approximately
5 billion tons more than the biosphere can absorb.6
• Around the world, more than 90 percent of computers, TVs, video and audio recorders, PDAs, and
other consumer and commercial electronics end up
in landfills. About 20 to 30 million cars are taken off
the road every year around the world; in the United
States, about three-quarters by weight are recovered as scrap metal, but in the developing world,
most old cars end up as waste in landfills.7
• Packaging waste has grown 400 percent in the past
twenty years, mostly cardboard and diverse plastic
containers and wrappings. While a few types of plastic containers are recycled at higher rates (such as
water and soft drink bottles in developed countries), the vast majority of plastics worldwide –
more than 90 percent – end up as solid waste.
In the United States, for example, 93 percent of
plastics end up in landfills.8
• Toxins embedded in everyday products also pose
significant health risks even before they are discarded to landfills. For example, immunologists
have shown that a great many diseases (such as
many cancers) have become far more prevalent to-
reflections.solonline.org
day due to toxins in our bodies that come not only
from food ingredients but also from chemicals in
products, dyes used in cloth, and plastic compounds
in children’s toys, computer screens, and household appliances.9
Non-regenerative (Non-renewable) Resources
• In a study commissioned by the U.S. government,
the U.S. petroleum industry recently reported that
world oil and gas supplies will be unable to keep up
with rising global demand over the next twenty-five
years, which could lead to continually rising prices
(oil rose from $25 per barrel to $100 per barrel between 2000 and the end of 2007), shortages, and
social instability in both producer and consumer
economies.10
• The United States consumes about 20 million
barrels of oil a day (about 25 percent of global
consumption); China consumes about 6 million;
Japan, 5 million. About 80 percent of the oil
consumed in the United States is imported.11
• Other mineral resources in significant decline
include zinc, copper, and iridium, all critical
for technological innovations we’ve come to
depend on, such as computers and cell phones.
• Coal is relatively abundant (known stocks are
expected to last 50 to 100 years at current extraction rates) but problematic: It is the single biggest
source of air pollution in the United States (and
includes substantial amounts of highly toxic
elements such as mercury), and CO2 emitted per
unit of energy (BTU) is roughly double that of
natural gas. Coal generates 54 percent of the
United States’ electricity, 80 percent of Australia’s,
and 80 percent of China’s growing electricity use.12
Regenerative (Renewable) Resources
• Freshwater quality. More than one-fifth of the
world’s people do not have reliable access to clean
drinking water, and many are chronically dehydrated. Many natural water supplies – rivers, lakes,
book excerpt
groundwater – have become increasingly degraded.
Roughly two-thirds of the water we use goes to
agriculture, and runoff from pesticides and fertilizers
is the single biggest polluter.13
• Topsoil. Overproduction has caused severe or
extreme soil degradation of over 1 billion hectares
(or over two and a half billion acres) in the past fifty
years – more than the size of India and China
combined.14
• Fisheries. Over 70 percent of the world’s fisheries
are chronically overfished. Many species are so
depleted that if drastic actions are not taken soon,
their populations will likely be unable to recover.
This will affect more than just consumers; the fishing industry itself will suffer, and as coastal economies are ruined, the unemployed will migrate,
becoming part of the growing millions of unwelcome migrants worldwide.15
• Forests. More than a third of the world’s forests
have disappeared in the past fifty years. Their loss,
especially in the tropics, affects the lives of many
communities and species and reduces the rate at
which CO2, the main greenhouse gas driving climate change, is absorbed from the atmosphere.16
Our diminishing resources and growing waste underlie
a host of related economic stresses and reflect environmental and social imbalances that all but ensure that,
without significant change, these problems will worsen.
The first imbalance concerns nature’s capacities to
continue regenerating resources and providing the
“eco-services” upon which human life depends – clean
water, breathable air, fertile soil, pollination, and a
stable climate. In economic terms, most of these services either have no substitute or are prohibitively
expensive to generate by alternative means.17 Today,
according to the UN’s Millennium Ecosystem Assessment report, one-third of the major ecosystems that
provide these essential services worldwide – from
forests to grasslands and wetlands – are in “significant
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S enge , S mi t h , k r us c h wi t z , lau r , s c h ley
decline,” and another one-third are “in danger.” Since
1900, more than half of the world’s wetlands have
been lost. Today, 50 percent of the world’s five hundred
major rivers are heavily polluted or drying up in their
lower reaches. The acidification of oceans (primarily
due to the absorption of CO2 from fossil fuels) has, in
the past twenty years, caused the loss of 20 percent
of the world’s coral reefs, while 20 percent more have
been seriously degraded. Many of these reefs protect
coastal areas from flooding and serve as critical
breeding areas for marine life.18
As the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment report
also discusses, declining ecosystems and increasing
pollution tend to correlate with the erosion of our
sense of spiritual and non-material well-being, in
developing and developed countries alike. Growing
social stresses are all too often taken as the norm today.
In the developed world, we are plagued by anxiety,
overwork, stress, mistrust, fear, and anger. America
isn’t the only advanced country “bowling alone,” to
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borrow Robert Putnam’s famous phrase for the breakdown of social community; similar signs of social
stresses have been increasing in other nations, such
as the tensions in Europe over growing African and
Islamic immigrations.
In developing countries, environmental and social
stresses often have a harder economic edge. According
to the World Bank, from 1980 to 2000 the bottom quartile of the world’s people found that their share of global
income fell from 2.5 percent to 1.2 percent.19 Today, about
50 million people globally migrate each year to cities,
usually driven by the collapse of traditional economies
and environmental degradation of land and fisheries (as
noted previously). This migration rate is far greater than
can be absorbed by urban economies, and as a consequence approximately 500 million chronically underemployed people currently live in squatter camps or slums.20
Inevitably, these underlying imbalances – deteriorating
ecosystems and fraying social harmony – reinforce one
another. The poor invariably bear a disproportionate
share of the consequences of industrial waste and compromised ecosystems. This is one reason the extremes
in inequity persist and are largely getting worse worldwide. Second, people living under growing stress,
whether physical, psychological, or economic, have
great difficulty acting as stewards for the future.
An inventory such as this can go on forever, becoming
more exhausting as it becomes more exhaustive. The
point, however, is not to be comprehensive but rather to
be systemic: to see the deeper patterns behind all these
problems, which at first glance might seem unrelated.
What these examples demonstrate is that the industrial system that has brought us so many benefits is
now generating countless dangerous side effects that
are swamping its ability to continue advancing standards of living. One of two outcomes is possible: Either
we keep on with business as usual, leaving the accumu-
reflections.solonline.org
lating side effects to continue growing until they
overwhelm us, or we step back far enough to rethink
where we are headed. Notice we said the first thing
that needs to be done is to take a step back.
Not surprisingly, when we – individuals, companies,
non-profits, governments – first acknowledge problems such as the ones we’re discussing, our instinct
is to do the opposite, to apply exactly the same kind
of thinking that created these challenges in the first
place. We focus on the symptoms in front of us – the
river is dirty, we emit too much CO2 – and ignore the
underlying forces contributing to them. We devise
ways – usually through some combination of stopgap regulations or find-the-villain blame games –
to try to fix the symptoms.
Focusing on eliminating the symptoms is always
tempting. Taking two aspirin to relieve the pain of
a headache can be an effective solution that works
quite quickly. But if a person gets severe headaches
every few days, there are probably deeper, longerterm sources of the problem, such as stress or overwork, that all the aspirin in the world will not help.
In fact, the aspirin can even make matters worse by
masking the pain, and along with it the signals that
there are deeper sources of the problem. Over time,
this neglect leads to a worsening of symptoms and
the need for still more intense symptomatic fixes, such
as more powerful drugs that simply continue the pattern of ignoring the underlying cause of the pain.
In most organizational situations, this pattern, known
as “shifting the burden,” often includes shifting the locus
of responsibility for dealing with difficult problems to
various “others” or “experts.” Business executives
have been doing this for years, hiring consultants to
sort out their chronic management problems, safety
specialists to reduce the number of accidents, and,
today, environmental specialists, such as pollution
experts, to scrub emissions from smokestacks.
book excerpt
Figure 2.1 Shifting the Burden
to “Expert” Specialists
How We Got into This Predicament
Specialists (e.g., lobbyists)
intervene to reduce pressure
Short-term symptomatic fixes
Easier, faster
Pressure to meet tougher
environmental standards
Fundamental solutions
Harder, take time
Y
LA
DE
Managers develop capacity for
innovative solutions, e.g., new products,
better government regulations
The net effect of decades of shifting the burden to
experts is that many people today regard issues involving water, waste and toxicity, energy, and community health as “someone else’s problems.” While
businesspeople often have strong views about the
ineffectiveness of government regulation, many also
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S enge , S mi t h , k r us c h wi t z , lau r , s c h ley
simultaneously advocate that it is up to government
to tackle such problems. And many, rather than working proactively with government to come up with
more innovative fundamental solutions (lower loop in
Figure 2.1), have shifted the burden to lobbyists who
fight to preserve the status quo (the upper loop).
And, of course, government leaders likewise have
their own set of “experts” for addressing symptoms in
the form of environmental departments and agencies
to whom they shift responsibility. These groups are
often isolated from the core functions of government
such as economic and foreign policy, taxation, and
national security, and as a result their actions have
marginal impact.
But the time for shifting responsibility to others, or
covering up deep problems with simplistic solutions
that only make problems “go away” for a short time,
is running out.
In the earlier phases of the Industrial Age, the wealthy
simply moved away from factories and their waste
by-products. Later, we found ways to dump wastes
farther away from population centers (New York City
Tips on Reading Causal Loop Diagrams
Throughout the book, you will find causal loop diagrams such as Figure 2.1, which portray interactions that
give rise to patterns of change (or non-change) and forces over time. For example, in the shifting-the-burden
pattern, the problem symptom “Pressure to meet tough environmental standards” can be addressed in two
ways: a short-term symptomatic fix, such as using lobbyists, or a more fundamental solution, such as new
environmentally friendly products or working proactively with government for better regulations. Think of
these two loops as competing: If the symptomatic fix wins out, pressure to meet tougher standards diminishes and there is less need for fundamental solutions. But this leads to new forces. If fundamental solutions are neglected, the problem symptom will eventually return: Since nothing is being done to actually
address the underlying environmental problems, pressures will build up again. If the company still opts for
the symptomatic solution when these pressures again need to be addressed (which is likely, given that the
fundamental solution is no easier and they now are used to working with the lobbyists), it will lead to still more
lobbying. In this way, forces build over time to shift the burden to depending more and more on lobbyists.
25
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exports over 10,000 tons of solid waste per day).21
But in today’s interconnected world, “away” is going
away. As population and industrialization have continued to grow geometrically, waste generated in
one region affects others. The earth, after all, is a finite
system. Particulate emissions from Beijing affect air
quality in Los Angeles, and those from Los Angeles
affect asthma rates in New York. Our common atmosphere, oceans, and groundwater systems have always
connected us, but the scale of industrial activity has
now reached a point where the consequences of local
actions are no longer simply local. The space in which
short-term, Band-Aid solutions to fundamental challenges will work is contracting as fast as the space for
more landfills and toxic waste dumps. The time for
rethinking and redesigning is at hand.
Seeing the Whole Picture
For most of us, the endless litany of environmental and
societal crises is overwhelming, both emotionally and
cognitively. It is no wonder that so many simply “turn
off” when confronted with another story of climatechange-related severe weather, water shortages, or
toxic waste. The first problem to deal with is simply
“How do I take all of this in without frying my circuits?”
“Systems thinking” has long been a cornerstone in
our work on organizational learning, but the term
often seems more daunting (it can easily sound like
an intellectual task reserved for Ph.D.’s) than helpful. In
fact, systems thinking is not about fighting complexity
with more complexity. It simply means stepping back
and seeing patterns that are, when seen clearly,
intuitive and easy to grasp.
Several years ago, working with the Rocky Mountain
Institute, an energy and resource research and consultancy group, we developed a simple “systems picture”
to help people make sense of the situation in which
we find ourselves today.22 The gist of the picture
centers on six basic ideas.
reflections.solonline.org
If you had to explain our predicament to a ten-yearold, this would be a good way to start:
1. The industrial system – what we make, buy, and use
(from cars and TVs to buildings and power plants) –
sits within the larger systems of nature.
2. This larger natural world includes living, regenerative
resources, such as forests, croplands, and fisheries,
and other resources that, from a human time perspective, do not regenerate, such as oil and minerals.
3. The regenerative resources can sustain human
activities indefinitely, so long as we do not “harvest”
them more rapidly than they replenish themselves.
4. The non-regenerative resources can only be depleted or “extracted.” (That is why mining, oil production, and other similar industries are called “extractive industries.”) And not surprisingly, since they
cannot be replenished, sooner or later – as is
happening right now – many start to run out.
Because modern societies are set up to focus on the
benefits and output of industry, we tend to either not
see or pay less attention to the fifth and sixth features:
5. In the process of extracting and harvesting resources in order to produce and use goods, the
industrial system also generates waste – waste
from extracting and harvesting resources, and from
how we produce, use, and eventually discard goods.
This waste damages the ability of nature to replenish resources.
6. The industrial system also sits within a larger social
system of communities, families, schools, and culture. Just as overproduction and waste damage
natural systems, they also cause anxiety, inequity,
and stresses in our societies.
These six ideas are captured in Figures 2.2a through c
on page 27, starting with the initial phase of the Industrial Age, driven primarily by expansion of production
and employment, and continuing into the last half
book excerpt
Figure 2.2a Industrial Age (1750–1950)
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S
EN OL
ER AR
GY
NT
HE
SIS
Figure 2.2C
SY
TO
P HO
Ha
rve
Clean Air
Drinkable Water
Fertile Soil
Pollination
Stable Climate
Growth
sti
ng
Natural Resources
g
tin
ac
r
t
Ex
Goods in
Production
Ecological
Systems
Production
Regeneration
CONSUMPTION
Ha
rve
sti
ng
Natural Resources
ng
cti
tra
Ex
Figure 2.2b Industrial Age (1950–Present)
NonRegenerative
Resources
PRODUCTS SERVICES
Goods in
Production
Production
Waste from
Extracting and
Manufacturing
Goods
in Use
Waste
fromUse
Waste from
Discard
Accumulating Waste
CONSUMPTION
PRODUCTS
Ha
rve
SERVICES
sti
ng
Natural Resources
g
tin
ac
r
t
Ex
27
Goods in
Production
Production
Goods
in Use
century, driven increasingly by growing consumption.
This includes consumption of both tangible consumer
goods (such as cellular phones and iPods) and services
(such as air travel and music downloads), both of
which are produced by companies based on their
capital equipment and facilities.
But seeing the whole picture is difficult (see figure
on page 28). Until very recently, most politicians, businesspeople, and media have focused on only the
“system within a system” – the industrial economy and
how to keep it expanding. Concern for the health of
the larger social and ecological systems within which
the industrial system sits has been confined largely to
the “back page,” even though public concern for these
larger systems has been growing for more than a generation. Only in the last couple of years have we seen
more front-page articles about the economy, business,
and technology that mention the declining health
of the ecosystems that enable the global economic
system to function.
That relatively few paid much attention to these larger
problems is perfectly understandable. Ignoring unintended side effects is hardly limited to this environment.
Indeed, it is one of the most common underlying pat-
28
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reflections.solonline.org
The Case for Urgency: The 80-20 Challenge
NT
HE
SIS
S
EN OL
ER AR
GY
Figure 2.2D
SY
TO
P HO
Clean Air
Drinkable Water
Health vs. Stress
Fertile Soil
Security vs. Fear
Pollination
Social Harmony vs. Mistrust
Stable Climate Peace vs. Unresolvable Conflicts
Growth
Growth
Ecological
Systems
Social
Systems
Regeneration
CONSUMPTION
Ha
rve
sti
ng
Natural Resources
ng
cti
tra
Ex
NonRegenerative
Resources
Regeneration
PRODUCTS SERVICES
Goods in
Production
Production
Waste from
Extracting and
Manufacturing
Goods
in Use
Waste
fromUse
Waste from
Discard
Accumulating Waste
terns that we have experienced when helping companies understand systems thinking. For example,
managers are often rewarded generously for cutting
costs and improving short-term profits, but the side
effects of their maneuvers, such as demoralized workers
or angry customers, often end up costing the company more in the long run.
Put differently, we have gotten into our predicament
today because of a way of thinking that focuses on
parts and neglects the whole. We have become masterful at focusing on immediate goals – such as shortterm profits – and neglecting the larger systems of
which quarterly profits are but one small part. But this
is changing because the larger reality can no longer
be ignored.
Although the problems of the Industrial Age have
been evident for decades, there is now one important
difference, an increasingly inescapable mandate urging
us to wake up and start operating differently: global
climate change.
Though but one of many side effects of global
industrial growth, climate change has two unique
aspects: The current and prospective costs are enormous for both rich and poor, and it provides simple,
numerical indicators of just how far out of balance we
are – and how rapid and strong the adjustments must
be if we are to avert disaster.
Although science rarely provides absolute certainty, a
consensus has emerged among scientists, and among
a small but growing cadre of influential leaders, that
the changes needed to avert extreme and possibly uncontrollable climate change will be greater and must
happen far more quickly than we imagined even a few
years ago. In this sense, climate change is a particular
sort of gift, a time clock telling us how fast the
Industrial Age is ending.
As for the costs of climate change, they already are considerable, and will be far greater if we do not address
the issue quickly and systematically. In 2007, Oxfam International, one of the world’s largest and most respected
civil society organizations (often called non-governmental organizations or NGOs), published the first study
on climate change “compensation” costs for the poor –
what it would take to compensate for the suffering
from disease, failed crops, and dislocation arising from
climate change. This report placed the costs at $50 billion globally and noted that they will rise precipitously
in the coming years. In preparing the report, Oxfam’s
larger goal is to establish a method to make these escalating costs visible. The costs to the insurance industry already can be seen: Insurance premiums are rising
dramatically – up to 40 percent in Florida, 20 percent in
book excerpt
coastal Massachusetts, and 400 percent for some offshore oil rigs – reflecting the risks of climate instability.
These rates make self-insurance (dropping coverage
and taking your chances) more economical for many
businesses and homeowners in high-risk areas such as
southern Florida. The influential Stern Report, commissioned by the UK government in 2006 and led by a
former World Bank chief economist, concluded that if
dramatic changes are not made soon, the costs to the
world of climate change in the next decade could
equal or exceed the costs of World War II.23
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S enge , S mi t h , k r us c h wi t z , lau r , s c h ley
29
Figure 2.3
400
Carbon Dioxide (CO2)
CO2 (ppm)
350
300
250
Unlike so many other global social and environmental problems, in one sense climate change is simple –
because its primary dimensions are measurable.
Scientists now have extensive evidence of how rapidly
CO2 and other greenhouse gases are accumulating in
the atmosphere, and how that compares with historical levels.
0
500
1000
Year
1500
CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere have been
rising throughout the industrial era, with the current
level more than 30 percent higher than in 1850.24 This
level is continuing to increase rapidly because the
The CO2 Bathtub
The difference between inflows and
outflows of CO2 in the atmosphere works
just like a bathtub: The CO2 level rises as
long as more flows in than flows out. This
simple fact has confused many people,
including many in important leadership
positions, who believe that curtailing
emissions growth alone would solve
the climate change problem.26
So long as the inflow of CO2 emissions
exceeds the outflow of CO2 removed from
the atmosphere, at some point the bathtub
will “overflow.” This means that unless we
reduce emissions to equal CO2 removed
from the atmosphere – in other words,
a 60 percent to 80 percent reduction of
worldwide emissions – we will likely enter
an era of irreversible climate change.
Figure 2.4
Fossil Fuel Burning
8 billion
CO 2 IN ATMOSPHERE
tons go in
5
billion
tons added
every year
800 billion tons
(380 ppm)
3 billion tons go out, absorbed by land and ocean
The atmosphere as a bathtub, with annual inputs and
outputs of CO2. The level in the tub is rising by about
5 billion tons per year (2.1 billion tons of carbon
equivalent = 1 part per million (ppm) CO2).
(An interactive simulation of the CO2 bathtub is available at
http://www.sustainer.org/tools_resources.)
2000
30
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amount of CO2 emitted from combusting fossil fuels in
our power plants, buildings, cars, trucks, airplanes, and
factories each year – about 8 billion tons of carbon
equivalent per year worldwide – is more than double
what can be removed from the atmosphere and
absorbed by natural biomass (trees, plants, and
plankton) and dissolved in oceans.25
No one can say with certainty how much CO2 in the
atmosphere is too much, but a few basic facts are
starting to coalesce into a strong consensus.
First, current levels of CO2 are almost one-third higher
than at any other time in the past 650,000 years.27 This
includes much of human history, a period of time in
which, despite periodic ice ages, the overall climate
was conducive to human life.
Second, concentrations of CO2 in oceans and biomass
are far above historic levels, causing problems such as
ocean acidification and raising questions about how
much more these natural CO2 sinks can absorb. If they
start to absorb less, more CO2 will concentrate faster
in the atmosphere, driving global warming faster.
Third, there is a long time lag before the full effects
of CO2 are felt on temperature and climate; scientific
estimates put this at thirty to fifty years. This means
that the full effects of current atmospheric CO2 levels
will not be felt until 2050 or even later.
And finally, at some point, rising CO2 and greenhouse
gas levels trigger “runaway” effects in which climate
change causes further climate change, such as melting arctic permafrost releasing methane (another greenhouse gas) into the atmosphere, leading to still more
warming.28 Once these “tipping point” feedbacks take
off, our ability to influence the future may decline
significantly.
reflections.solonline.org
So how much CO2 is too much? Some scientists feel
that present levels of CO2 (about 380 ppm) are already
too high. Others believe the risks of triggering irreversible and uncontrollable effects will increase substantially if CO2 levels continue rising as they have for
another one to two decades (reaching levels exceeding 425 ppm or so). By contrast, continued businessas-usual growth in CO2 emissions would lead to midcentury CO2 levels about twice as high (approximately
550 ppm) as the historic maximum for the last 650,000
years, and far more dangerous – levels that few with
any sense of stewardship for future generations,
let alone present ones, should tolerate.29
In some sense, the “How high is too high?” debate
is academic because simply stabilizing CO2 levels
will require extraordinary and dramatic reductions
in emissions worldwide – a crucial point to which
the people of the world have just begun to awaken.
A little more than a decade ago, a number of nations
came together to shape the Kyoto Protocol, the first
intergovernmental agreement to confront climate
change (which the United States never signed). The
accord focused on curbing emissions growth. But as
we now know, stopping the rise of CO2 levels in the
atmosphere, the primary source of climate change,
will actually require significant emissions reductions.
Accomplishing this will require a sea change in the
kinds of energy we use, cars we drive, buildings we
live and work in, cities we design, and ways both
people and goods move around the world, as well
as other changes no one can even imagine.
Advances in climate science will continue to be
crucial for understanding the specifics of how rising
average temperatures are likely to affect rainfall and
drought patterns, storm activity and intensity, the
spread of disease, and significant increases in sea
levels. But science can take us only so far. Sooner or
later, it becomes a matter of making choices, not
simply waiting for more predictions.30
book excerpt
Already, people and institutions around the world are
starting to formulate bold “stretch goals” – aspirational
targets that can galvanize the imagination, creativity,
and courage truly called for.31 Though the details of
these goals differ, their central message is the same: To
stabilize CO2 in the atmosphere at levels that minimize
the threat of catastrophic consequences will require a
60 percent to 80 percent reduction in emissions within
the next two decades!32 We call this the 80-20 Challenge, the bell tolling the end of the Industrial Age.
While focusing on CO2 levels helps us to understand
the urgency we face, it is equally important to remind
ourselves that climate change is not an isolated problem. Rather, it is part and parcel of all the other problems that are signaling the end of the Industrial Age:
accumulating waste by-products that derive from the
take-make-waste industrial system; diminishing resources (some of which are driving CO2 levels further
upward: about 6 billion tons of CO2 per year are
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S enge , S mi t h , k r us c h wi t z , lau r , s c h ley
released from deforestation – including the burning
and decaying of wood – alone); deteriorating ecosystems; the intensification of social stresses (such as
the United States’ foreign policies, driven by dependency on Middle East oil). Climate change is but one
thread in a larger cloth; we cannot simply remove
the thread, but must reweave the cloth.
Because the side effects of globalization are interrelated, meeting the 80-20 Challenge of reducing
emissions 80 percent in twenty years will require
changes in all the major global industrial systems:
food and water, energy and transportation, and the
global production and distribution of goods. Little
in our modern way of living will be unaffected.
In other words, the change will not happen without
a radical shift in the thinking that has made the industrial era so successful – and so disastrous. n
ENDNOTES
May 3, 2007.7 U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity
Summaries, January 2004, http://minerals.er.usgs.gov/
minerals/pubs/commodity/iron_&_steel_scrap/festscmcs04.
pdf.
1 David Urbinato, “London’s Historic ‘Pea-Soupers,’” EPA
Journal, Summer 1994, www.epa.gov/history/topics/
perspect/london.htm.
2 Paul Hawken, Amory Lovins, and E. Hunter Lovins, Natural
Capitalism (Boston: Little, Brown, 1999), 8. The waste equals
1.5 tons per day if you assume the average American weighs
150 pounds, and twenty times a person’s weight per day.
3 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human
Well-being: General Synthesis (Washington, DC: Island Press,
2005), www.millenniumassessment.org/en/Synthesis.aspx.
4 UNEP, “The Asian Brown Cloud,” Executive Summary, 2002,
www.scientificjournals.com/sj/espr/Pdf/aId/5339.
5 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human
Well-being: General Synthesis.
6 See carbon bathtub diagram, page 29, Scientists debate
how much of the CO2 emitted from burning fossil fuels can
be absorbed in “carbon sinks” such as plants and algae and
dissolved into the oceans. Peter N. Spotts, “Nature’s Carbon
‘Sink’ Smaller than Expected,” Christian Science Monitor,
8 www.epa.gov/epaoswer/non-hw/muncpl/pubs/06data.pdf.
9
W. R. Orr and J. W. Roberts, “Everyday Exposure to
Toxic Pollutants,” Scientific American, February 1998, 90;
W. McDonough and M. Braungart, Cradle to Cradle (New
York: North Point Press, 2002).
10 Jad Mouawad, “Big Rise Seen in Demand for Energy,”
New York Times, July 19, 2007.
11 Energy Information Administration, www.eia.doe.gov,
and www.energyliteracy.org/compare-oil.html.
12 International Energy Outlook, 2007, www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/
ieo/pdf/electricity.pdf; Union of Concerned Scientists, www.
ucsusa.org/clean_energy/coalvswind/c01.html.
13 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human
Well-being: General Synthesis.
14 Ibid.
31
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15 Ibid.; Jason DeParle, “A Global Trek to Poor Nations, from
Poorer Ones,” New York Times, December 27, 2007.
16 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human
Well-being: General Synthesis.
17 For example, Biosphere 2, an experimental man-made
closed ecological system built in the 1980s, failed to provide
clean air, water, and food for eight people over the first
mission’s two years. The project cost about $200 million.
18 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human
Well-being: General Synthesis.
19 Similar shifts in income and wealth have occurred in
developing countries; for example, the poorest 10 percent
of Americans have seen their income share fall from 3.5
percent to less than 1 percent in the past twenty years. 20
Mark Kinver, “The Challenges Facing an Urban World,” BBC
News, June 15, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/
nature/5054052.stm.
21 Annie Correal, “12,000 Tons a Day, and What to Do with It,”
New York Times, September 18, 2007; John Rather, “A Long,
Long Haul from the Curb,” New York Times, December 4,
2005.
reflections.solonline.org
22 See Hawken, Lovins, and Lovins, Natural Capitalism.
23 Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern
Review (Cambridge University Press, 2007), Overall financial
impact and benefits of early action; Gordon Brown speech
on climate change, WWF, November 19, 2007.
24 CO2 concentrations are measured in parts per million (ppm),
a standard method of measuring the concentrations of
atmospheric gases. CO2 in 2007 was estimated at 380 ppm,
versus about 280 ppm in 1850.
25 The scientific convention for measuring CO2 flows is in
equivalent tons of carbon per year. Estimates on how much
of present emitted CO2 is absorbed by the biosphere and
oceans range from 2 to over 3 billion tons a year. J. Hansen
and M. Sato, PNAS 101,16109, 2004; Greenblatt, Princeton.
26 John Sterman and Linda Booth Sweeney, “Cloudy Skies:
Assessing Public Understanding of Global Warming,”
Reflections: The SoL Journal 7, 3 (2007); Linda Booth Sweeney
and John Sterman, “Understanding Public Complacency
about Climate Change: Adults’ Mental Models of Climate
Change Violate Conservation of Matter,” Climatic Change
Journal, February 2007, Vol. ,80, No. 3-4, 213-238.
ab o u t t h e au t h o r s
Peter Senge, senior lecturer at MIT and the founding chair of the Society for Organizational Learning (SoL),
is the author or co-author of several bestselling books, including The Fifth Discipline, Schools That Learn
and Presence. reflections@solonline.org
Bryan Smith, coauthor with Senge of The Dance of Change and two other Fifth Discipline fieldbooks, is a
member of the faculty at York University’s Sustainable Enterprise Academy, and president of Broad Reach
Innovations, Inc. reflections@solonline.org
Nina Kruschwitz, manager of the Fifth Discipline Fieldbook Project, is the editor of Reflections: The SoL
Journal on Knowledge, Learning, and Change. nina@solonline.org
Joe Laur co-founded the SoL Sustainability Consortium in 1998. He is the vice president of content for
Greenopolis.com. reflections@solonline.org
Sara Schley, co-founder of the SoL Sustainability Consortium, is a mentor for the Harold Grinspoon
Foundation. reflections@solonline.org
book excerpt
27 Long-term data on CO2 and temperature fluctuations,
based on ice-core studies, shows cycles in both, such as
have produced periodic ice ages, but at no time was CO2
above 300 ppm (as compared to today’s 380 ppm). The
Industrial Age came at the end of a long warming period
where CO2 levels had risen to about 280 ppm by 1850.
28 Examples of these “tipping points” are melting ice cover
leading to reduced reflectivity of the earth and further
warming (the albedo effect); melting artic permafrost
releasing stored greenhouse gases, also leading to further
warming; and rising temperatures reducing forest cover,
leading to less carbon sequestration and still more
warming.
29 S. Pacala and R. Socolow, “Stabilization Wedges: Solving
the Climate Problem for the Next 50 Years with Current
Technologies,” Science 305 (2004): 969–72.
30 For example, on March 11, 2002, in a speech given at Stanford University, Sir John Browne, then chairman and CEO of
British Petroleum, explained why his company broke ranks
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S enge , S mi t h , k r us c h wi t z , lau r , s c h ley
with other oil corporations in 1997 and decided to face up
to climate change. First, it was clear that reputable science
could not be ignored. The science wasn’t complete—but
science is never complete. Still, they knew enough to say
that there were long-term risks and that precautionary
action was necessary if we were to avoid the greater risk—
of delaying until the point where draconian action was
unavoidable.
31 For example, the Sustainable Development Commission
in Britain (involving many senior business and government
executives) is working on setting targets for reductions in
emissions from all forms of personal mobility of 30 percent
by 2010 and 60 percent by 2020.
32 While a 60 percent reduction relative to present global
emissions (8 to 3 gtc/year) might be sufficient, the 80 percent target is needed because of uncertainties regarding
whether carbon sinks can continue to absorb this much
excess CO2 and virtual certainties that China and India
will be unable to achieve such 60 percent decreases.
33
Reflections
The SoL Journal
on Knowledge, Learning, and Change
Volume 9, Number 2
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