Venezuela And United States Alliance Research Paper

timer Asked: Apr 2nd, 2019
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Question Description


-use at least 15-20 references please

-I have added some of the class readings, if you could try to reference those as well, that would be awesome!

Your answer should include:

international relations theory or a combination of theories you think best explains the behavior of each

state in terms of their decision to join the alliance and their decision to maintain it. You should also

include what you believe to be the most convincing alternative explanations and a justification for why

you think your preferred theory does a better job.

If your paper is about the security relationship it should include details, such as:

When did the alliance relationship begin? What was the relationship between the two states before the


Provide a brief history of the security aspects of the alliances. Has the U.S. engaged in military conflict

with or against this state?

Has the U.S. deployed troops to the country? How many troops has it deployed? Has the number of

troops changed over time? If so, how and why?

Does the U.S. keep bases in the country? If so, what is the purpose of the bases?

Does the U.S. engage in military exercises with the state?

Are the forces interoperable (i.e. do they have similar equipment and training so that they can fight with

one another)?

What are the primary security benefits for each state? What are the costs associated with the


For the economic relationship, the paper should provide a brief overview of the history of the economic

relationship between the two states:

What was the economic relationship between the two states before the alliance? What was it like after

the alliance?

What was the trade relationship and how has it changed over time? What does the state import from its

ally? What does it export to its ally? How have these trade flows changes over time?

What it the level and direction of Foreign Direct Investment?

Do the states loan to each other?

Do the states give one another economic or military aid?

Are there other economic costs or benefits associated with the relationship?


There is not one correct way to write this paper. This assignment was crafted to allow students freedom

to complete the assignment as they choose. Be that as it may, here are some suggestions for you to keep

in mind when writing the paper/preparing presentations. One, remember to focus the paper on the initial

questions. Two, although this paper has historical elements, all papers are making some kind of

argument, and all papers need to back up their arguments with evidence. Three, try to reference the

major ideas and theories from the class readings – they will help guide you. Four, the paper should look

organized and professional. Do your best to avoid spelling and grammar mistakes and include a


Unformatted Attachment Preview

International Organization Foundation Sectoral Conflict and Foreign Economic Policy, 1914-1940 Author(s): Jeff Frieden Source: International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 1, The State and American Foreign Economic Policy (Winter, 1988), pp. 59-90 Published by: MIT Press Stable URL: Accessed: 14-01-2016 01:25 UTC Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact International Organization Foundation, MIT Press, University of Wisconsin Press and Cambridge University Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Organization. This content downloaded from on Thu, 14 Jan 2016 01:25:02 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions and foreign economicpolicy, Sectoralconflict 1914-1940 JeffFrieden The periodfrom1914to 1940is one of themostcrucialand enigmatic in modernworldhistory,and in the historyof modernU.S. foreignpolicy. WorldWarI catapultedtheUnitedStatesintointernational economicand politicalleadership, yetintheaftermath ofthewar,despitegrandiose Wilsonian plans, the United States quicklylapsed into relativedisregardfor eventsabroad:itdidnotjoin theLeague ofNations,disavowedresponsibilityforEuropeanreconstruction, wouldnotparticipate openlyinmanyinternationaleconomicconferences, and restoredhighlevelsoftariff protection forthedomesticmarket.Onlyinthelate 1930sand 1940s,aftertwenty years of bitterbattlesoverforeign policy,did theUnitedStatesmoveto center stageof worldpoliticsand economics:it builtthe UnitedNationsand a stringof regionalalliances,underwrote therebuilding of WesternEurope, almostsingle-handedly constructed a globalmonetary andfinancial system, and led theworldin commercial liberalization. This articleexaminesthe peculiarevolutionof U.S. foreigneconomic policyin theinterwar years,and focuseson theroleofdomesticsocioeconomicand politicalgroupsin determining foreignpolicy.The American interwarexperiencepowerfully demonstrates thatthe country'sinternationalpositionandeconomicevolutiondo notsufficiently explainitsforeign policy.Indeed,althoughthe contoursof theinternational systemand the place oftheUnitedStatesinitchangeddramatically during andafterWorld War I, thesechangeshad a verydifferent impacton different sectorsof The authorwouldliketo acknowledge thecomments andsuggestions ofBeverlyCrawford, RobertDallek,AmyDavis, BarbaraGeddes,Judith JoanneGowa, StephanHagGoldstein, gard,JohnIkenberry, RobertJervis,MilesKahler,Paul Kennedy,RobertKeohane,Charles Kindleberger, SteveKrasner,David Lake, MikeMastanduno, WilliamMcNeil,JohnRuggie, StephenSchuker,JackSnyder,Arthur Stein,andRichardSylla. InternationalOrganization42, 1, Winter1988 ? 1988bytheMassachusetts ofTechnology andtheWorldPeace Foundation Institute This content downloaded from on Thu, 14 Jan 2016 01:25:02 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 60 International Organization Americansociety.WorldWarI dramatically theoverseasecostrengthened nomicinterests of manymajorU.S. banksand corporations, who fought hardformorepoliticalinvolvement by the UnitedStatesin worldaffairs. Yet domestically orientedeconomicgroupsremainedextremely powerful withinthe United States and soughtto maintaina relativelyisolated America.Throughthe 1920s and early 1930s,the two broad coalitions battledto dominateforeigneconomicpolicy.The resultwas an uneasy in whichthe two campsentrenched stand-off themselves in different portionsofthestateapparatus,so thatpolicyoftenranon twotracksandwas sometimesinternally contradictory. Onlythe crisisof the 1930sand the eventualdestruction of mostof America'soverseascompetitors led to an "internationalist" victory thatallowedfortheconstruction oftheAmericanled post-World War II international politicaleconomy. The problem To virtually all observersthenand since,at the end of WorldWar I the UnitedStates seemedto dominatethe international politicaleconomy.It hadfinanced thevictorious wareffort andprovidedmostofthewarmateriel thatwentintoit;itsindustry was byfartheworld'slargestandmostproductive.Despiteits traditional economicinsulation, thesheersize oftheU.S. economymadethecountry theworld'slargesttrading power.The centerof worldfinancehad shiftedfromLondonto New York. The UnitedStates clearlyhad themilitary, industrial, and financial capacityto imposeitswill on Europe. Yet afterWorld War I the UnitedStates, in the current arcaneiconography of thefield,did notplaythepartof international economichegemon,arbiter,and bankroller oftheworldeconomicorder.The UnitedStateswas capable of hegemonicaction,and PresidentWoodrow Wilsonhad hegemonic plans,buttheyweredefeated.The problemwas not in Europe,foralthoughtheBritishand Frenchwerestronger in 1919than theywouldbe in 1946,theycouldhardlyhavestoodinthewayofAmerican hegemony.Indeed, European complaintsabout the UnitedStates after WorldWar I were in muchtheoppositedirection:theEuropeansbitterly protested America's refusal toaccepttheresponsibilities ofleadership. TheEuropeanschargedthattheUnitedStateswas stingy withitsgovernment finance, hostileinitstradepolicy,scandalous initsrefusal tojointheLeagueofNations, to getinvolvedin overseeingand smoothing unwilling Europe'ssquabbles. The Britishand Frenchtriedfor yearsto enticeand cajole a reluctant Americaintoleadership.Americawouldnotbe budged,at leastuntil1940. The world'smostpowerful nationpursueda contradictory andshifting set offoreign economicpolicies.The country bothassertedand rejectedworld leadership,simultaneously initiated andblockedefforts at Europeanstabilization,andbegansuchmajorcooperative ventures as theLeagueofNations This content downloaded from on Thu, 14 Jan 2016 01:25:02 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Sectoralconflict61 in theseAmericaninitiaand theDawes Plan onlyto limititsparticipation tivesin ultimately fatalways. The analyticalproblembedevilsbothecoand politicalRealists.For those who believe in the nomicdeterminists toexplainwhya United primacy ofinternational powerpolitics,itis difficult theworldpoliticalsystemwas unwilling to do so. Statesable to reconstruct andforemost, Forthosewholookat economicaffairs first America'sunchallengedpositionas the world's leadingcapitalexportershouldhave acand international celeratedthetrendtowardstradeliberalization monetary leadershipbegunbeforeWorldWar I; instead,thependulumswungback towardsprotectionism and littlepublicU.S. government involvement in international monetary issues. The relevantinternational relationsliterature, facedwithsuchanalytical anomalies,generally fallsbackon vaguereference todomesticconstraints in explainingU.S. foreigneconomicpolicyin the interwar period.Charles whosecomparison oftheerawiththePax Britannica Kindleberger, andPax Americanais thefoundation stoneformostinternational relationsthinking on theinterwar to theeffectthat"in years,citesE. H. Carrapprovingly, 1918,worldleadershipwas offered, by almostuniversalconsent,to the UnitedStates. . [and]was declined,"andconcludesthat"theonecountry capable of leadership[i.e. the UnitedStates]was bemusedby domestic concernsand stoodaside."1 Seen fromtheperspectiveof Americandomesticpolitics,however,the problemis quitereversed.In thecontextoftraditional Americanapathyor even hostility towardsworldaffairs,the interwar yearssaw an amazing flurry of globalactivityby thecountry'spolitical,economic,and cultural leaders.Againstthebackdropofthelongstanding indifference ofmostofthe Americanpoliticalsystemto eventsabroad,thelevelof overseasinvolvementin the 1920sand 1930sappearsbothstartling and unprecedented.2 The contradictory roleoftheUnitedStatesin theinterwar periodcan be tracedto theextremely unevendistribution ofinternational economicinterestswithin Americansociety.America'sinternational economicpositiondid changeduringand afterWorldWar1,yetoverseasassetswereaccumulated by a veryconcentrated set of economicactors.This leftmostof theU.S. economyindifferent toforeign economicaffairs, whilesomeofthecountry's leadingeconomicsectorswerebothdeeplyinvolvedand deeplyconcerned withtheinternational economy.Americanforeign policywas thustornbetweeninsularity and internationalism; the segmentsof the foreign-policy 1. Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression 1929-1939 (Berkeley: Universityof California Press,1973),pp. 297-99.TheCarrcitation is from hisTheTwenty YearsCrisis,19191930(London:Macmillan,1939),p. 234.A popularBritish satirical history ofthe1930s,under theheading"A Bad Thing,"summarized theresultsoftheGreatWarsomewhatmoresuccinctly:"Americawas thusclearlytop nation,and Historycame to a ." WalterSellarand RobertYeatman,1066AndAll That(New York:Dutton,1931),p. 115. 2. Robert Dallek, The American Styleof Foreign Policy (New York: Knopf, 1983) is a good surveyoftraditional Americaninsularity. This content downloaded from on Thu, 14 Jan 2016 01:25:02 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 62 International Organization orientedintereststriedto use bureaucracythatreflectedinternationally American powertoreorganize theworld'spoliticaleconomy,whileportions ofthegovernment tiedto domestically orientedsectorsinsistedon limiting America'sinternational role.The crisisof the 1930sdissolvedmanyofthe entrenched intereststhathad keptpolicystalematedand alloweda new groupofpoliticalleadersto reconstitute a morecoherentset ofpolicies. This articlebuildson the workof historians the interwar investigating period3andon thecontributions ofothersocialscientists concerned withthe relationship betweenthe international and domesticpoliticaleconomies. The work of Charles Kindleberger and PeterGourevitch,amongmany others,has shownthe importanceof sectoraleconomicinterestsin explainingdomesticpoliticsand foreign policymaking in advancedindustrial societies.BothGourevitch and ThomasFergusonhave used a sectoralapproachto elucidatedomesticand international eventsin the 1930s.The presentarticleis thusan attempt to buildon existing sectoralinterpretations of modernpoliticaleconomies,and an extensionof theapproachto problemsin international relations.4 The argument summarized Between1900and 1920,theUnitedStateswentfroma positionofrelative international economicinsignificance tooneofpredominance. A majorinter3. Thehistorical literature ontheperiodis so enormous thatitis feasibleonlytocitethemost recentimportant additions.Two reviewessaysand a forum are a goodstart:KathleenBurk, "EconomicDiplomacyBetweentheWars,"Historical Journal 24 (December1981),pp. 100315; JonJacobson,"Is Therea New International Historyofthe1920s?"American Historical Review88 (June1983),pp. 617-45;and CharlesMaier,StephenSchuker,and CharlesKindleberger, "The Two PostwarEras and the ConditionsforStability in Twentieth-Century Western Europe,"American HistoricalReview86 (April1981).Otherimportant worksinclude Denise Artaud, La question des dettes interallieeset la reconstructionde l'Europe (Paris: Champion, 1979); Frank Costigliola,AwkwardDominion: AmericanPolitical, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe 1919-1933 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress, 1984); Michael J. Hogan, InformalEntente: The Private Structureof Cooperation in Anglo-American EconomicDiplomacy,1918-1928(Columbia:University of MissouriPress, 1977);Melvyn Leffler,TheElusive Quest: America's PursuitofEuropean Stabilityand FrenchSecurity,1919- 1933 (Chapel Hill: University of NorthCarolinaPress, 1979);WilliamMcNeil,American Moneyand the WeimarRepublic(New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1986);Stephen Schuker, The End of French Predominance in Europe (Chapel Hill: Universityof North Carolina Press, 1976); and Dan Silverman,ReconstructingEurope afterthe Great War (Cam- bridge:HarvardUniversity Press,1982).Manyoftheleadingscholarsin thefieldsummarize their views in Gustav Schmidt, ed., Konstellationen InternationalerPolitik 1924-1932 (Bochum,W. Ger.: Studienverlag Dr. N. Brockmeyer, 1983). 4. CharlesKindleberger, "GroupBehaviorand International Trade,"JournalofPolitical Economy59 (February1951),pp. 30-46; PeterGourevitch, "International Trade,Domestic Coalitions, andLiberty:Comparative Responsesto theCrisisof 1873-1896,"Journal ofInterdisciplinary History8 (Autumn1977),pp. 281-313;PeterGourevitch, "BreakingwithOrthodoxy:the Politicsof EconomicPolicy Responsesto the Depressionof the 1930s," International Organization 38 (Winter1984),pp. 95-129;ThomasFerguson, "FromNormalcy to New Deal: Industrial Structure, PartyCompetition, andAmerican PublicPolicyintheGreat Depression,"International Organization 38 (Winter1984),pp. 41-94. This content downloaded from on Thu, 14 Jan 2016 01:25:02 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Sectoralconflict63 nationalborrower andhostofforeign directinvestment before1900,by 1920 the UnitedStateswas the world'sleadingnew lenderand foreigndirect investor.The development of Americanoverseasinvestments was in itself and in thistheUnited States simplyrepeatedthe experienceof unsurprising, otherdevelopedcountries.Yet the rapidityof the country'sshiftfroma majorcapitalimporter andraw-materials to theleadingexporter exporter of capital,largelybecause of thepeculiarities oftheinternational economyin the ten yearsafter1914,was quite extraordinary. Even as a few major Americaneconomicactorswerecatapulted intoglobaleconomicleadership, mostof theeconomyremainedas inward-looking as ever.Thisdivisionin Americaneconomicorientation was at therootoftheforeign-policy problemsofthe 1920sand 1930s. As American andfinance matured andthecountry industry becamericher in capital,manylargeAmericancorporations and bankslooked abroadfor marketsand investment opportunities. UnitedStatesoverseasinvestment thusgrewgradually fromthe1890suntiltheeve ofWorldWarI. As Table I indicates,Americanforeigndirectinvestment was appreciableby 1900;it was concentratedin raw materialsextractionand agriculturein the Caribbeanbasin. By 1912,foreigndirectinvestment was quitesubstantial andoverseaslendinghadbecomeofsomeimportance; thefocuswas stillthe Caribbeanarea. The gradualexpansionofAmericanoverseasinvestment, especiallyoverseas lending, was givena tremendous shovebyWorldWarI. Thewarforced severalbelligerent countriesto borrowheavilyfromtheUnitedStates,and previousborrowersfromEuropean capital marketsnow turnedto the UnitedStatesto satisfy theirneedsforcapital.As Table 1 shows,American holdingsofforeign bondssoaredfromless than5 percentoftotalAmerican holdingsof non-government bonds in 1912to nearly17 percentin 1922. Foreigndirectinvestment also grewrapidly,as Europeanpreoccupation withwar and reconstruction clearedthewayformanyAmericancorporationsto expandfurther intotheThirdWorldand, afterthewarended,in Europe itself.The 1920s saw a continuation of the wartimeincreasein overseasAmericanlendingand investment. Americanoverseasinvestment inindustrial production-especially manufacturing andutilities-andpetroleumgrewparticularly rapidly. By 1929Americanoverseasprivateassets-directand portfolio investments,alongwithotherassortedlong-and short-term assets-were twentyone billiondollars.Overseasinvestments in 1929wereequivalentto over one-fifth of thecountry'sgrossnationalproduct,a level thatwas reached againonlyin 1981.5 Although America'soverseasinvestments weresubstantial by the1920s, theywereveryunevenlydistributed amongimportant sectorsof theU.S. 5. Forfigures on U.S. foreign privateassets,see Raymond Goldsmith, A StudyofSavingsin theUnitedStates,vol. 1 (Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press,1955),p. 1093. This content downloaded from on Thu, 14 Jan 2016 01:25:02 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 64 International Organization TABLE 1. Indicatorsof theimportance of U.S. foreigninvestment, 1900-1939(in millionsof dollarsand percent) 1900 1. U.S. foreign directinvestment 2. Domestic corporateand agricultural wealtha 3. Row 1 as a percent ofRow 2 4. U.S. foreign bondholdingsb 5. U.S. holdingsof non-govemnment bondsc 6. 4/5,percent 1912 1922 1929 1933 1939 751 2,476 5,050 7,850 7,000" 6,750 37,275 75,100 131,904 150,326 109,375 119,324 2.0% 3.3% 3.8% 5.2% 6.4% 159d 623 4,000 7,375 5,048' 2,600g 5,151 14,524 23,687 38,099 37,748 32,502 3.1% 4.3% 16.9% 19.4% 13.4% 8.0% 5.7% a. Net reproducible tangiblewealthof U.S. corporations andagriculture. b. Due to thedifferent sourcesused,figures hereconflict withthosein Table4; thoseof Table 4 are probablymorereliable,butto ensurecomparability Goldsmith's figures are used throughout thetable. c. Excludesonlyholdingsofsecurities issuedby U.S. federal,state,or localgovernments. d. Includesstocks(for1900only). e. Author'sestimates. f. Figuresare for1934,fromForeignBondholders Protective Council,AnnualReportfor 1934(Washington, D.C.: FBPC, 1935),p. 224.Thisincludesonlybondsbeingserviced;a morereasonablemeasurewouldincludethemarket valueofbondsin default.Ifthisaveraged30% ofparvalue,figures for1933-34wouldbe $5,954millionand 15.8%forrows4 and 6, respectively. g. Figuresfor1939holdings offoreign bondsarefromGoldsmith andare probably understated. Sources. Foreign investment:Raymond Goldsmith,A Studyof Saving in the UnitedStates, vol. 1 (Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press,1955),p. 1093. Domesticdata: RaymondGoldsmith, RobertLipsey,andMorrisMendelson, Studiesin the National Balance Sheet of the United States, vol. 2 (Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversity Press,1963),pp. 72-83. was economy.Tables 2 and 3 illustratethat,whileoverseasinvestment and industrial some the financial secfor extremely important community American assetswereinsignificant. tors,mostothersectors'foreign foreign both and were in and investments mining petroleum considerable, absolutely activitieswithinthe United relativeto capitalinvestedin corresponding to corporawas also ofgreatrelativeimportance States.Foreigninvestment electrical in tions machinery and equipment(especially appliances),motor these Yet vehicles,rubberproducts,and chemicals. sectors,whichacin manufacturing, countedforwelloverhalfofall overseasinvestment repreof the country'smanufacturing sentedbarelyone-fifth plant; far more in overseasproduction. werequiteuninvolved Americanindustries lendhadmajorforeign Although onlya fewindustries operations, foreign on WallStreet.As Table 3 shows,between1919 ingwas a favorite activity and 1929new foreigncapitalissues in New York averagedover a billion This content downloaded from on Thu, 14 Jan 2016 01:25:02 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Sectoralconflict65 Foreign directinvestmentand book value offixed capital of selected U.S. industries,1929 (in millionsof dollars and percent) TABLE 2. A Foreign direct investment B Book value of fixed capital A/Bin percent Miningandpetroleumab $2,278 $12,886 17.7% Publicutilities, transport andcommunications 1,625 41,728c Manufacturing 1,534 23,672 Sector Machinery and equipment Motorvehicles Rubberproducts Chemicals Foodstuffs Lumberand products Metalsand products Textilesandproducts Stone,clayand glassproducts Leatherand products Agriculture' 444 184 60 130 222 69 150 71 23 4 875 3.9% 6.5% 1,907 1,232 434 1,497 4,001 2,001 4,788 2,932 1,451 269 23.3% 14.9% 13.8% 8.7% 5.5% 3.4% 3.1% 2.4% 1.6% 1.3% 51,033 1.5% a. Figuresfortotalmanufacturing refining, whichis includedunder do notincludepetroleum "Miningand petroleum." b. Figuresfordomesticmining and petroleum investedcapitalare forthebookvalueofcapworking capital. italincluding landbutexcluding c. Value ofplant ...
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