From Colonies To States
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The Second Treatise on Civil Government (1689), John
Locke
The philosopher John Locke (1632–1704), a supporter of the Glorious
Revolution that deposed King James II, enthroned William and Mary, and
established the supremacy of Parliament, attacked the divine right of
kings in his first treatise on civil government. In his second treatise, the
one excerpted here, he promulgated the idea that government rests in
the will of the people, thus those people have the right to challenge and
change their rulers and government. The colonists readily accepted
Locke's theory, but it would be a later generation of provincials who
would apply this revolutionary concept.
Of the State of Nature
To understand political power aright, and derive it from its original, we must
consider what estate all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect
freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and
persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of Nature, without
asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man.
A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction, is reciprocal,
no one having more than another, there being nothing more evident than
that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the
same advantages of Nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also
be equal one amongst another, without subordination or subjection, unless
the lord and master of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his
will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear
appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty. . . .
Of Property
God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also given them
reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life and convenience. The
earth and all that is therein is given to men for the support and comfort of
their being. And though all the fruits it naturally produces, and beasts it
feeds, belong to mankind in common, as they are produced by the
spontaneous hand of Nature, and nobody has originally a private dominion
exclusive of the rest of mankind in any of them, as they are thus in their
natural state, yet being given for the use of men, there must of necessity be
a means to appropriate them some way or other before they can be of any
use, or at all beneficial, to any particular men. The fruit or venison which
nourishes the wild Indian, who knows no enclosure, and is still a tenant in
common, must be his, and so his—i.e., a part of him, that another can no
longer have any right to it before it can do him any good for the support of
his life.
Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every
man has a "property" in his own "person." This nobody has any right to but
himself. The "labor" of his body and the "work" of his hands, we may say,
are properly his. Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that Nature
hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labor with it, and joined to it
something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him
removed from the common state Nature placed it in, it hath by this labor
something annexed to it that excludes the common right of other men. For
this "labor" being the unquestionable property of the laborer, no man but he
can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is
enough, and as good left in common for others. . . .
Of the Beginning of Political Societies
Men being, as has been said, by nature all free, equal, and independent, no
one can be put out of this estate and subjected to the political power of
another without his own consent, which is done by agreeing with other
men, to join and unite a community for their comfortable, safe, and
peaceable living, one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their
properties, and a greater security against any that are not of it. This any
number of men may do, because it injures not the freedom of the rest; they
are left, as they were, in the liberty of the state of Nature. When any number
of men have so consented to make one community or government, they are
thereby presently incorporated, and make one body politic, wherein the
majority have a right to act and conclude the rest.
For, when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual,
made a community, they have thereby made that community one body, with
a power to act as one body, which is only by the will and determination of
the majority. . . .
And thus every man, by consenting with others to make one body politic
under one government, puts himself under an obligation to everyone of that
society to submit to the determination of the majority, and to be concluded
by it; or else this original compact, whereby he with others incorporates into
one society, would signify nothing, and be no compact if he be left free and
under no other ties than he was in before in the state of Nature. For what
appearance would there be of any compact? What new engagement if he
were no farther tied by any decrees of the society than he himself thought
fit and did actually consent to? This would be still as great a liberty as he
himself had before his compact, or anyone else in the state of Nature, who
may submit himself and consent to any acts of it if he thinks fit.
For if the consent of the majority shall not in reason be received as the act
of the whole, and conclude every individual, nothing but the consent of
every individual can make anything to be the act of the whole, which,
considering the infirmities of health and avocations of business, which in a
number though much less than that of a commonwealth, will necessarily
keep many away from the public assembly; and the variety of opinions and
contrariety of interests which unavoidably happen in all collections of men,
it is next impossible ever to be had. . . .
Whosoever, therefore, out of a state of Nature unite into a community, must
be understood to give up all the power necessary to the ends for which they
unite into society to the majority of the community, unless they expressly
agreed in any number greater than the majority. And this is done by barely
agreeing to unite into one political society, which is all the compact that is,
or needs be, between the individuals that enter into or make up a
commonwealth. And thus, that which begins and actually constitutes any
political society is nothing but the consent of any number of freemen
capable of majority, to unite and incorporate into such a society. And this is
that, and that only, which did or could give beginning to any lawful
government in the world. . . .
Of the Extent of the Legislative Power
The great end of men's entering into society being the enjoyment of their
properties in peace and safety, and the great instrument and means of that
being the laws established in that society, the first and fundamental positive
law of all commonwealths is the establishing of the legislative power, as the
first and fundamental natural law which is to govern even the legislative.
Itself is the preservation of the society and (as far as will consist with the
public good) of every person in it. This legislative is not only the supreme
power of the commonwealth, but sacred and unalterable in the hands where
the community have once placed it. Nor can any edict of anybody else, in
what form soever conceived, or by what power soever backed, have the
force and obligation of a law which has not its sanction from that legislative
which the public has chosen and appointed; for without this the law could
not have that which is absolutely necessary to its being a law, the consent
of the society, over whom nobody can have a power to make laws but by
their own consent and by authority received from them; and therefore all
the obedience, which by the most solemn ties anyone can be obliged to
pay, ultimately terminates in this supreme power, and is directed by those
laws which it enacts. Nor can any oaths to any foreign power whatsoever, or
any domestic subordinate power, discharge any member of the society from
his obedience to the legislative, acting pursuant to their trust, nor oblige
him to any obedience contrary to the laws so enacted or farther than they
do allow, it being ridiculous to imagine one can be tied ultimately to obey
any power in the society which is not the supreme.
Though the legislative, whether placed in one or more, whether it be always
in being or only by intervals, though it be the supreme power in every
commonwealth, yet, first, it is not, nor can possibly be, absolutely arbitrary
over the lives and fortunes of the people. For it being but the joint power of
every member of the society given up to that person or assembly which is
legislator, it can be no more than those persons had in a state of Nature
before they entered into society, and gave it up to the community. For
nobody can transfer to another more power than he has in himself, and
nobody has an absolute arbitrary power over himself, or over any other, to
destroy his own life, or take away the life or property of another. A man, as
has been proved, cannot subject himself to the arbitrary power of another;
and having, in the state of Nature, no arbitrary power over the life, liberty, or
possession of another, but only so much as the law of Nature gave him for
the preservation of himself and the rest of mankind, this is all he does, or
can give up to the commonwealth, and by it to the legislative power, so that
the legislative can have no more than this. Their power in the utmost
bounds of it is limited to the public good of the society. It is a power that
has no other end but preservation, and therefore can never have a right to
destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish the subjects; the obligations
of the law of Nature cease not in society, but only in many cases are drawn
closer, and have, by human laws, known penalties annexed to them to
enforce their observation. Thus the law of Nature stands as an eternal rule
to all men, legislators as well as others. The rules that they make for other
mens' actions must, as well as their own and other men's actions, be
comfortable to the law of Nature—i.e., to the will of God, of which that is a
declaration, and the fundamental law of Nature being the preservation of
mankind, no human sanction can be good or valid against it.
Secondly, the legislative or supreme authority cannot assume to itself a
power to rule by extemporary arbitrary decrees, but is bound to dispense
justice and decide the rights of the subject by promulgated standing laws,
and known authorized judges. For the law of Nature being unwritten, and so
nowhere to be found but in the minds of men, they who, through passion or
interest, shall miscite or misapply it, cannot so easily be convinced of their
mistake where there is no established judge; and so it serves not as it
ought, to determine the rights and fence the properties of those that live
under it, especially where everyone is judge, interpreter, and executioner of
it too, and that in his own case; and he that has right on his side, having
ordinarily but his own single strength, hath not force enough to defend
himself from injuries or punish delinquents. To avoid these inconveniences
which disorder men's properties in the state of Nature, men unite into
societies that they may have the united strength of the whole society to
secure and defend their properties, and may have standing rules to bound it
by which everyone may know what is his. To this end it is that men give up
all their natural power to the society they enter into, and the community put
the legislative power into such hands as they think fit, with this trust, that
they shall be governed by declared laws, or else their peace, quiet, and
property will still be at the same uncertainty as it was in the state of Nature.
Absolute arbitrary power, or governing without settled standing laws, can
neither of them consist with the ends of society and government, which
men would not quit the freedom of the state of Nature for, and tie
themselves up under, were it not to preserve their lives, liberties, and
fortunes, and by stated rules of right and property to secure their peace
and quiet. It cannot be supposed that they should intend, had they a power
so to do, to give anyone or more an absolute arbitrary power over their
persons and estates, and put a force into the magistrate's hand to execute
his unlimited will arbitrarily upon them; this were to put themselves into a
worse condition than the state of Nature, wherein they had a liberty to
defend their right against the injuries of others, and were upon equal terms
of force to maintain it, whether invaded by a single man or many in
combination. Whereas by supposing they have given up themselves to the
absolute arbitrary power and will of a legislator, they have disarmed
themselves, and armed him to make a prey of them when he pleases; he
being in a much worse condition that is exposed to the arbitrary power of
one man who has the command of a hundred thousand than he that is
exposed to the arbitrary power of a hundred thousand single men, nobody
being secure, that his will who has such a command is better than that of
other men, though his force be a hundred thousand times stronger. And,
therefore, whatever form the commonwealth is under, the ruling power
ought to govern by declared and received laws, and not by extemporary
dictates and undetermined resolutions, for then mankind will be in a far
worse condition than in the state of Nature if they shall have armed one or a
few men with the joint power of a multitude, to force them to obey at
pleasure the exorbitant and unlimited decrees of their sudden thoughts, or
unrestrained, and till that moment, unknown wills, without having any
measures set down which may guide and justify their actions. For all the
power the government has, being only for the good of the society, as it
ought not to be arbitrary and at pleasure, so it ought to be exercised by
established and promulgated laws, that both the people may know their
duty, and be safe and secure within the limits of the law, and the rulers, too,
kept within their due bounds, and not be tempted by the power they have in
their hands to employ it to purposes, and by such measures as they would
not have known, and own not willingly.
Thirdly, the supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his
property without his own consent. For the preservation of property being
the end of government, and that for which men enter into society, it
necessarily supposes and requires that the people should have property,
without which they must be supposed to lose that by entering into society
which was the end for which they entered into it; too gross an absurdity for
any man to own. Men, therefore, in society having property, they have such
a right to the goods, which by the law of the community are theirs, that
nobody has a right to take them, or any part of them, from them without
their own consent; without this they have no property at all. For I have truly
no property in that which another can by right take from me when he
pleases against my consent. Hence it is a mistake to think that the supreme
or legislative power of any commonwealth can do what it will, and dispose
of the estates of the subject arbitrarily, or take any part of them at pleasure.
This is not much to be feared in governments where the legislative consists
wholly or in part in assemblies which are variable, whose members upon the
dissolution of the assembly are subjects under the common laws of their
country, equally with the rest. But in governments where the legislative is in
one lasting assembly, always in being, or in one man as in absolute
monarchies, there is danger still, that they will think themselves to have a
distinct interest from the rest of the community, and so will be apt to
increase their own riches and power by taking what they think fit from the
people. For a man's property is not at all secure, though there be good and
equitable laws to set the bounds of it between him and his fellow-subjects,
if he who commands those subjects have power to take from any private
man what part he pleases of his property, and use and dispose of it as he
thinks good.
It is true governments cannot be supported without great charge, and it is
fit everyone who enjoys his share of the protection should pay out of his
estate his proportion for the maintenance of it. But still it must be with his
own consent—i.e., the consent of the majority, giving it either by
themselves or their representatives chosen by them; for if anyone shall
claim a power to lay and levy taxes on the people by his own authority, and
without such consent of the people, he thereby invades the fundamental
law of property, and subverts the end of government. For what property
have I in that which another may by right take when he pleases to himself ?
Fourthly, the legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any
other hands, for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who
have it cannot pass it over to others. The people alone can appoint the form
of the commonwealth, which is by constituting the legislative, and
appointing in whose hands that shall be. And when the people have said,
"We will submit, and be governed by laws made by such men, and in such
forms," nobody else can say other men shall make laws for them; nor can
they be bound by any laws but such as are enacted by those whom they
have chosen and authorized to make laws for them.
These are the bounds which the trust that is put in them by the society and
the law of God and Nature have set to the legislative power of every
commonwealth, in all forms of government. First, they are to govern by
promulgated established laws, not to be varied in particular cases, but to
have one rule for rich and poor, for the favorite at Court, and the
countryman at plow. Secondly, these laws also ought to be designed for no
other end ultimately but the good of the people. Thirdly, they must not raise
taxes on the property of the people without the consent of the people given
by themselves or their deputies. And this properly concerns only such
governments where the legislative is always in being, or at least where the
people have not reserved any part of the legislative to deputies, to be from
time to time chosen by themselves. Fourthly, legislative neither must nor
can transfer the power of making laws to anybody else, or place it anywhere
but where the people have.
Of the Dissolution of Government
* * *
The reason why men enter into society is the preservation of their property;
and the end while they choose and authorize a legislative is that there may
be laws made, and rules set, as guards and fences to the properties of all
the society, to limit the power and moderate the dominion of every part and
member of the society. For since it can never be supposed to be the will of
the society that the legislative should have a power to destroy that which
everyone designs to secure by entering into society, and for which the
people submitted themselves to legislators of their own making: whenever
the legislators endeavor to take away and destroy the property of the
people, or to reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power, they put
themselves into a state of war with the people, who are thereupon absolved
from any farther obedience, and are left to the common refuge which God
hath provided for all men against force and violence. Whensoever,
therefore, the legislative shall transgress this fundamental rule of society,
and either by ambition, fear, folly, or corruption, endeavor to grasp
themselves, or put into the hands of any other, an absolute power over the
lives, liberties, and estates of the people, by this breach of trust they forfeit
the power the people had put into their hands for quite contrary ends, and it
devolves to the people, who have a right to resume their original liberty, and
by the establishment of a new legislative (such as they shall think fit),
provide for their own safety and security, which is the end for which they
are in society.
What I have said here concerning the legislative in general holds true also
concerning the supreme executor, who having a double trust put in him,
both to have a part in the legislative and the supreme execution of the law,
acts against both, when he goes about to set up his own arbitrary will as the
law of the society. He acts also contrary to his trust when he employs the
force, treasure, and offices of the society to corrupt the representatives and
gain them to his purposes, when he openly pre-engages the electors, and
prescribes, to their choice, such whom he has, by solicitation, threats,
promises, or otherwise, won to his designs, and employs them to bring in
such who have promised beforehand what to vote and what to enact. Thus
to regulate candidates and electors, and new model the ways of election,
what is it but to cut up the government by the roots, and poison the very
fountain of public security? For the people having reserved to themselves
the choice of their representatives as the fence to their properties, could do
it for no other end but that they might always be freely chosen, and so
chosen, freely act and advise as the necessity of the commonwealth and
the public good should, upon examination and mature debate, be judged to
require. This, those who give their votes before they hear the debate, and
have weighed the reasons on all sides, are not capable of doing. To prepare
such an assembly as this, and endeavor to set up the declared abettors of
his own will, for the true representatives of the people, and the law-makers
of the society, is certainly as great a breach of trust, and as perfect a
declaration of a design to subvert the government, as is possible to be met
with. To which, if one shall add rewards and punishments visibly employed
to the same end, and all the arts of perverted law made use of to take off
and destroy all that stand in the way of such a design, and will not comply
and consent to betray the liberties of their country, it will be past doubt
what is doing. What power they ought to have in the society who thus
employ it contrary to the trust went along with it in its first institution, is easy
to determine; and one cannot but see that he who has once attempted any
such thing as this cannot any longer be trusted. . . .
Here it is like the common question will be made: Who shall be judge
whether the prince or legislative act contrary to their trust? This, perhaps,
ill-affected and factious men may spread amongst the people, when the
prince only makes use of his due prerogative. To this I reply, The people
shall be judge; for who shall be judge whether his trustee or deputy acts
well and according to the trust reposed in him, but he who deputes him and
must, by having deputed him, have still a power to discard him when he fails
in his trust? If this be reasonable in particular cases of private men, why
should it be otherwise in that of the greatest moment, where the welfare of
millions is concerned and also where the evil, if not prevented, is greater,
and the redress very difficult, dear, and dangerous?
But, farther, this question, Who shall be judge? cannot mean that there is no
judge at all. For where there is no judicature on earth to decide
controversies amongst men, God in heaven is judge. He alone, it is true, is
judge of the right. But every man is judge for himself, as in all other cases so
in this, . . .
If a controversy arise betwixt a prince and some of the people in a matter
where the law is silent or doubtful, and the thing be of great consequence, I
should think the proper umpire in such a case should be the body of the
people. For in such cases where the prince hath a trust reposed in him, and
is dispensed from the common, ordinary rules of the law, there, if any men
find themselves aggrieved, and think the prince acts contrary to, or beyond
that trust, who so proper to judge as the body of the people (who at first
lodged that trust in him) how far they meant it should extend? But if the
prince, or whoever they be in the administration, decline that way of
determination, the appeal then lies nowhere but to Heaven. Force between
either persons who have no known superior on earth, or which permits no
appeal to a judge on earth, being properly a state of war, wherein the appeal
lies only to Heaven; and in that state the injured party must judge for
himself when he will think fit to make use of that appeal and put himself
upon it.
To conclude. The power that every individual gave the society when he
entered into it can never revert to the individuals again, as long as the
society lasts, but will always remain in the community; because without this
there can be no community—no commonwealth, which is contrary to the
original agreement; so also when the society hath placed the legislative in
any assembly of men, to continue in them and their successors, with
direction and authority for providing such successors, the legislative can
never revert to the people whilst that government lasts; because, having
provided a legislative with power to continue forever, they have given up
their political power to the legislative, and cannot resume it. But if they have
set limits to the duration of their legislative, and made this supreme power
in any person or assembly only temporary; or else when, by the
miscarriages of those in authority, it is forfeited; upon the forfeiture of their
rulers, or at the determination of the time set, it reverts to the society, and
the people have a right to act as supreme, and continue the legislative in
themselves or place it in a new form, or new hands, as they think good.
[From John Locke, The Second Treatise of Civil Government, ed. John W.
Gough (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946), pp. 4, 15, 48–50, 66–72, 107–109,
118–19.]
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