In his use of critical reasoning, by his unwavering commitment to truth, and through the
vivid example of his own life, fifth-century Athenian Socrates set the standard for all
subsequent Western philosophy. Since he left no literary legacy of his own, we are
dependent upon contemporary writers like Aristophanes and Xenophon for our
information about his life and work. As a pupil of Archelaus during his youth, Socrates
showed a great deal of interest in the scientific theories of Anaxagoras, but he later
abandoned inquiries into the physical world for a dedicated investigation of the
development of moral character. Having served with some distinction as a soldier at
Delium and Amphipolis during the Peloponnesian War, Socrates dabbled in the political
turmoil that consumed Athens after the War, then retired from active life to work as a
stonemason and to raise his children with his wife, Xanthippe. After inheriting a modest
fortune from his father, the sculptor Sophroniscus, Socrates used his marginal financial
independence as an opportunity to give full-time attention to inventing the practice of
philosophical dialogue.
For the rest of his life, Socrates devoted himself to free-wheeling discussion with the
aristocratic young citizens of Athens, insistently questioning their unwarranted
confidence in the truth of popular opinions, even though he often offered them no clear
alternative teaching. Unlike the professional Sophists of the time, Socrates pointedly
declined to accept payment for his work with students, but despite (or, perhaps, because)
of this lofty disdain for material success, many of them were fanatically loyal to him.
Their parents, however, were often displeased with his influence on their offspring, and
his earlier association with opponents of the
democratic regime had already made him a
controversial political figure. Although the amnesty of
405 forestalled direct prosecution for his political
activities, an Athenian jury found other charges—
corrupting the youth and interfering with the religion
of the city—upon which to convict Socrates, and they
sentenced him to death in 399 B.C.E. Accepting this
outcome with remarkable grace, Socrates drank
hemlock and died in the company of his friends and
disciples.
Our best sources of information about Socrates's philosophical views are the early
dialogues of his student Plato, who attempted there to provide a faithful picture of the
methods and teachings of the master. (Although Socrates also appears as a character in
the later dialogues of Plato, these writings more often express philosophical positions
Plato himself developed long after Socrates's death.) In the Socratic dialogues, his
extended conversations with students, statesmen, and friends invariably aim at
understanding and achieving virtue {Gk. αρετη [aretê]} through the careful application of
a dialectical method that employs critical inquiry to undermine the plausibility of widelyheld doctrines. Destroying the illusion that we already comprehend the world perfectly
and honestly accepting the fact of our own ignorance, Socrates believed, are vital steps
toward our acquisition of genuine knowledge, by discovering universal definitions of the
key concepts governing human life.
Interacting with an arrogantly confident young man in Ευθυφρων (Euthyphro), for
example, Socrates systematically refutes the superficial notion of piety (moral rectitude)
as doing whatever is pleasing to the gods. Efforts to define morality by reference to any
external authority, he argued, inevitably founder in a significant logical dilemma about
the origin of the good. Plato's Απολογημα (Apology) is an account of Socrates's
(unsuccessful) speech in his own defense before the Athenian jury; it includes a detailed
description of the motives and goals of philosophical activity as he practiced it, together
with a passionate declaration of its value for life. The Κριτων (Crito) reports that during
Socrates's imprisonment he responded to friendly efforts to secure his escape by seriously
debating whether or not it would be right for him to do so. He concludes to the contrary
that an individual citizen—even when the victim of unjust treatment—can never be
justified in refusing to obey the laws of the state.
The Socrates of the Μενων (Meno) tries to determine whether or not virtue can be taught,
and this naturally leads to a careful investigation of the nature of virtue itself. Although
his direct answer is that virtue is unteachable, Socrates does propose the doctrine of
recollection to explain why we nevertheless are in possession of significant knowledge
about such matters. Most remarkably, Socrates argues here that knowledge and virtue are
so closely related that no human agent ever knowingly does evil: we all invariably do
what we believe to be best. Improper conduct, then, can only be a product of our
ignorance rather than a symptom of weakness of the will {Gk. ακρασια [akrásia]}. The
same view is also defended in the Πρωταγορας (Protagoras), along with the belief that
all of the virtues must be cultivated together.
Socrates: Philosophical Life
Socrates
The most interesting and influential thinker in the fifth century was
Socrates, whose dedication to careful reasoning transformed the
entire enterprise. Since he sought genuine knowledge rather than
mere victory over an opponent, Socrates employed the same logical
tricks developed by the Sophists to a new purpose, the pursuit of
truth. Thus, his willingness to call everything into question and his
determination to accept nothing less than an adequate account of the
nature of things make him the first clear exponent of critical
philosophy.
Socrates
Life and Teachings
. . Defining Piety
. . Methods / Aims
. . Civil Obedience
. . Knowing Virtue
Bibliography
Internet Sources
Although he was well known during his own time for his
conversational skills and public teaching, Socrates wrote nothing, so
we are dependent upon his students (especially Xenophon and Plato)
for any detailed knowledge of his methods and results. The trouble
is that Plato was himself a philosopher who often injected his own
theories into the dialogues he presented to the world as discussions
between Socrates and other famous figures of the day. Nevertheless,
it is usually assumed that at least the early dialogues of Plato provide a (fairly) accurate
representation of Socrates himself.
Euthyphro: What is Piety?
In the Ευθυφρων (Euthyphro), for example, Socrates engaged in a sharply critical conversation
with an over-confident young man. Finding Euthyphro perfectly certain of his own ethical
rectitude even in the morally ambiguous situation of prosecuting his own father in court,
Socrates asks him to define what "piety" (moral duty) really is. The demand here is for
something more than merely a list of which actions are, in fact, pious; instead, Euthyphro is
supposed to provide a general definition that captures the very essence of what piety is. But
every answer he offers is subjected to the full force of Socrates's critical thinking, until nothing
certain remains.
Specifically, Socrates systematically refutes Euthyphro's suggestion that what makes right
actions right is that the gods love (or approve of) them. First, there is the obvious problem that,
since questions of right and wrong often generate interminable disputes, the gods are likely to
disagree among themselves about moral matters no less often than we do, making some actions
both right and wrong. Socrates lets Euthypro off the hook on this one by aggreeing—only for
purposes of continuing the discussion—that the gods may be supposed to agree perfectly with
each other. (Notice that this problem arises only in a polytheistic culture.)
More significantly, Socrates generates a formal dilemma from a (deceptively) simple question:
"Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?"
(Euthyphro 10 a) Neither alternative can do the work for which Euthyphro intends his definition
of piety. If right actions are pious only because the gods love them, then moral rightness is
entirely arbitrary, depending only on the whims of the gods. If, on the other hand, the gods love
right actions only because they are already right, then there must be some non-divine source of
values, which we might come to know independently of their love.
In fact, this dilemma proposes a significant difficulty at the heart of any effort to define morality
by reference to an external authority. (Consider, for example, parallel questions with a similar
structure: "Do my parents approve of this action because it is right, or is it right because my
parents approve of it?" or "Does the College forbid this activity because it is wrong, or is it
wrong because the College forbids it?") On the second alternative in each case, actions become
right (or wrong) solely because of the authority's approval (or disapproval); its choice, then, has
no rational foundation, and it is impossible to attribute laudable moral wisdom to the authority
itself. So this horn is clearly unacceptable. But on the first alternative, the authority approves (or
disapproves) of certain actions because they are already right (or wrong) independently of it, and
whatever rational standard it employs as a criterion for making this decision must be accessible
to us as well as to it. Hence, we are in principle capable of distinguishing right from wrong on
our own.
Thus, an application of careful techniques of reasoning results in genuine (if negative) progress
in the resolution of a philosophical issue. Socrates's method of insistent questioning at least helps
us to eliminate one bad answer to a serious question. At most, it points us toward a significant
degree of intellectual independence. The character of Euthyphro, however, seems unaffected by
the entire process, leaving the scene at the end of the dialogue no less self-confident than he had
been at its outset. The use of Socratic methods, even when they clearly result in a rational
victory, may not produce genuine conviction in those to whom they are applied.
Apology: The Examined Life
Because of his political associations with an earlier regime, the Athenian democracy put Socrates
on trial, charging him with undermining state religion and corrupting young people. The speech
he offered in his own defense, as reported in Plato's Απολογημα (Apology), provides us with
many reminders of the central features of Socrates's approach to philosophy and its relation to
practical life.
Ironic Modesty:
Explaining his mission as a philosopher, Socrates reports an oracular message telling him
that "No one is wiser than you." (Apology 21a) He then proceeds through a series of
ironic descriptions of his efforts to disprove the oracle by conversing with notable
Athenians who must surely be wiser. In each case, however, Socrates concludes that he
has a kind of wisdom that each of them lacks: namely, an open awareness of his own
ignorance.
Questioning Habit:
The goal of Socratic interrogation, then, is to help individuals to achieve genuine selfknowledge, even if it often turns out to be negative in character. As his cross-examination
of Meletus shows, Socrates means to turn the methods of the Sophists inside-out, using
logical nit-picking to expose (rather than to create) illusions about reality. If the method
rarely succeeds with interlocutors, it can nevertheless be effectively internalized as a
dialectical mode of reasoning in an effort to understand everything.
Devotion to Truth:
Even after he has been convicted by the jury, Socrates declines to abandon his pursuit of
the truth in all matters. Refusing to accept exile from Athens or a commitment to silence
as his penalty, he maintains that public discussion of the great issues of life and virtue is a
necessary part of any valuable human life. "The unexamined life is not worth living."
(Apology 38a) Socrates would rather die than give up philosophy, and the jury seems
happy to grant him that wish.
Dispassionate Reason:
Even when the jury has sentenced him to death, Socrates calmly delivers his final public
words, a speculation about what the future holds. Disclaiming any certainty about the fate
of a human being after death, he nevertheless expresses a continued confidence in the
power of reason, which he has exhibited (while the jury has not). Who really wins will
remain unclear.
Plato's dramatic picture of a man willing to face death rather than abandoning his commitment to
philosophical inquiry offers up Socrates as a model for all future philosophers. Perhaps few of us
are presented with the same stark choice between philosophy and death, but all of us are daily
faced with opportunities to decide between convenient conventionality and our devotion to truth
and reason. How we choose determines whether we, like Socrates, deserve to call our lives
philosophical.
Crito: The Individual and the State
Plato's description of Socrates's final days continued in the Κριτων (Crito). Now in prison
awaiting execution, Socrates displays the same spirit of calm reflection about serious matters that
had characterized his life in freedom. Even the patent injustice of his fate at the hands of the
Athenian jury produces in Socrates no bitterness or anger. Friends arrive at the jail with a
foolproof plan for his escape from Athens to a life of voluntary exile, but Socrates calmly
engages them in a rational debate about the moral value of such an action.
Of course Crito and the others know their teacher well, and they come prepared to argue the
merits of their plan. Escaping now would permit Socrates to fulfil his personal obligations in life.
Moreover, if he does not follow the plan, many people will suppose that his friends did not care
enough for him to arrange his escape. Therefore, in order to honor his commitments and preserve
the reputation of his friends, Socrates ought to escape from jail.
But Socrates dismisses these considerations as irrelevant to a decision about what action is truly
right. What other people will say clearly doesn't matter. As he had argued in the Apology, the
only opinion that counts is not that of the majority of people generally, but rather that of the one
individual who truly knows. The truth alone deserves to be the basis for decisions about human
action, so the only proper apporoach is to engage in the sort of careful moral reasoning by means
of which one may hope to reveal it.
Socrates's argument proceeds from the statement of a perfectly general moral principle to its
application in his particular case:
•
•
•
One ought never to do wrong (even in response to the evil committed by another).
But it is always wrong to disobey the state.
Hence, one ought never to disobey the state.
And since avoiding the sentence of death handed down by the Athenian jury would be an action
in disobedience the state, it follows Socrates ought not to escape.
The argument is a valid one, so we are committed to accepting its conclusion if we believe that
its premises are true. The general commitment to act rightly is fundamental to a moral life, and it
does seem clear that Socrates's escape would be a case of disobedience. But what about the
second premise, the claim that it is always wrong for an individual to disobey the state? Surely
that deserves further examination. In fact, Socrates pictures the laws of Athens proposing two
independent lines of argument in favor of this claim:
First, the state is to us as a parent is to a child, and since it is always wrong for a child to disobey
a parent, it follows that it is always wrong to disobey the state. (Crito 50e) Here we might raise
serious doubts about the legitimacy of the analogy between our parents and the state. Obedience
to our parents, after all, is a temporary obligation that we eventually outgrow by learning to make
decisions for ourselves, while Socrates means to argue that obeying the state is a requirement
right up until we die. Here it might be useful to apply the same healthy disrespect for moral
authority that Socrates himself expressed in the Euthyphro.
The second argument is that it is always wrong to break an agreement, and since continuing to
live voluntarily in a state constitutes an agreement to obey it, it is wrong to disobey that state.
(Crito 52e) This may be a better argument; only the second premise seems open to question.
Explicit agreements to obey some authority are common enough—in a matriculation pledge or a
contract of employment, for example—but most of us have not entered into any such agreement
with our government. Even if we suppose, as the laws suggest, that the agreement is an implicit
one to which we are committed by our decision to remain within their borders, it is not always
obvious that our choice of where to live is entirely subject to our individual voluntary control.
Nevertheless, these considerations are serious ones. Socrates himself was entirely convinced that
the arguments hold, so he concluded that it would be wrong for him to escape from prison. As
always, of course, his actions conformed to the outcome of his reasoning. Socrates chose to
honor his commitment to truth and morality even though it cost him his life.
How you, O Athenians, have been affected by my
accusers, I
Jowett's Notes
cannot tell; but I know that they almost made me forget who I
was so persuasively did they speak; and yet they have hardly
uttered a word of truth. But of the many falsehoods told by
them, there was
one
which quite
amazed
me; I mean when
they
said that
you should be
Law Court in Athens whereSocrates would have given
this speech.
Full View of Athens (207K)
Artist: Ru Dien-Jen
upon your guard
and
not allow
yourselves to
be deceived by the
force
of my eloquence. To say this, when they were certain to be detected
as soon as I opened my lips and proved myself to be anything but
17b a great speaker, did indeed appear to me most shameless unless
by the force of eloquence they mean the force of truth; for if such
their meaning, I admit that I am eloquent. But in how different
a way from theirs! Well, as I was saying, they have scarcely
spoken the truth at all; but from me you shall hear the whole
truth: not, however, delivered after their manner in a set
oration duly ornamented with words and phrases. No, by
heaven! but I shall use the words and arguments which occur
to me at the moment; for I am confident in the justice of my
cause: at my time of life I ought not to be appearing before
you, O men of Athens, in the character of a juvenile orator -
Socrates begs to be allowed to speak
accustomed manner.
17c let no one expect it of me. And I must beg of you to grant me
favor: If I defend myself in my accustomed manner, and you
hear me using the words which I have been in the habit of
using in the agora, at the tables of the money-changers, or
anywhere else, I
would ask you not
to
be surprised, and
not
to interrupt me on
this
account. For I am
Ruins of the Agora
Photo: Kevin T. Glowacki and Nancy Klein
The Ancient City of Athens
more than seventy
years
of age, and
appearing
now for the first time in a court of law, I am quite a stranger to
17d the language of the place; and therefore I would have you regard
me as if I were really a stranger, whom you would excuse if he
spoke in his native tongue, and after the fashion of his country:
18a - Am I making an unfair request of you? Never mind the manner,
which may or may not be good; but think only of thetruth of my
words, and give heed to that: let the speaker speak truly and
the judge decide justly.
The judges must excuse Socrates if h
himself in his own fashion.
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