PREFACE: Student’s personal commentary: This Continuity of Operations Plan has been constructed as a first step in the “Plan, Do, Check, Act” cycle mentioned in the NFPA 1600 for what I imagine I might create if I were a Continuity of Operations “consultant” working with the Risk committee of the Board of Directors of Casey’s General Stores, Inc. My intent is to persuade them of the wisdom and economic benefit to develop a rigorous – and vigorous - plan to prepare their stores to survive – and even thrive despite - the likely disasters of their region. Moreover, with Casey’s strong commitment to their respective communities, I confidently believe that implementing this COOP effort would result in Casey’s developing a reputation as a bulwark of stability, safety, and resilience throughout the region. My imagination took flight in considering which entity to select when I recalled an inspiring Wall Street Journal article in 2011 about Waffle House and the “Waffle House Index”, designated as such by FEMA director Craig Fugate. (See Bauerlein, V. [2011 Sep 1]. How to measure a storm’s fury one breakfast at a time. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from https://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424053111904716604576542460736605364) Director Fugate noted that the operational status of the local Waffle House operations, of which there are now more than 1650 restaurants open 24/7 in 25 states, is a dependable index of the severity of a disaster. He told The New York Times in 2012 about his “signature way of determining” how much aid a community needs after a disaster: If a Waffle House is damaged but open; keep driving. If it’s totally knocked out, that’s where you stop. … Waffle House has a very simple operational theory: get open. They never close. They run 24 hours a day. They have a corporate philosophy that if there is a hurricane or a storm, they try and get their stores open. It don’t matter if they don’t have power, it don’t matter if you don’t have gas. They have procedures that if they can get a generator in there, they’ll get going. They’ll make coffee with bottled water. (See Chuck, E. [2013 Sep 23]. ‘The old FEMA is gone’: Craig Fugate’s cleaned-up FEMA. NBC News. Retrieved from http://www.nbcnews.com/news/other/old-fema-gone-craig-fugatescleaned-fema-f4B11229783). Waffle House restaurants predominate in the US Southeastern states where they are well-known as a haven during hurricane season. I wanted to identify a company that might replicate in the tornado country of the US Midwest what Waffle House has done in the South. I surveyed stores and restaurants that originated in Iowa and have expanded throughout the Midwest region to identify a company whose resources and culture might embrace such a challenge. I selected Casey’s General Stores. Casey’s has expanded from three small combined gas station-convenience stores in Iowa more than 50 years ago to more than 1900 stores in all Midwest states northeast to Ohio and southwest to Oklahoma. It is converting many of its stores to operate 24 hours/day. It has in-house bakeries to produce fresh donuts and pizza, with online pizza home delivery service. Profit margins from “Prepared Food and Fountain” are 4-5 times as high as for that of gasoline. Stores thrive in smaller communities, with 57% being in towns with populations less than 5000. Last year Casey’s built its second distribution center in Terre Haute, Indiana with plans to build more stores within a second 700-mile radius around the Terre Haute distribution center as it has done around its original warehouse in Ankeny, Iowa. The company “self-supplies” its stores from its distribution centers on a weekly basis throughout the region, including fuel, with its own fleet of fuel tankers. Casey’s plans to add 100 more new stores nationwide this year. (Levin, K. (2017 Feb 19). Casey’s eyes expansion in Northeast Oklahoma. The Joplin Globe. Retrieved from http://www.joplinglobe.com/news/local_news/casey-s-eyes-expansion-innortheast-oklahoma/article_ffdfef4e-ff9e-5980-84c4-8938936a6af1.html ) As a private business, Casey’s provides to its communities the critical infrastructure of shelter and community gathering place with the potential of providing - in time of disaster - power by back-up generator, alternate potable water supply by filtration system, alternate sewer service by portapotties, and clearance of debris from roadways with on-site chainsaws. As a for-profit private business it provides to its communities the key resources of food, drinking water, fuel, basic supplies, and money from ATMs. With its focus on smaller communities, Casey’s is often the only source of these key resources for miles around. ~~~~~~ Here is the written proposal that I would develop with members of the Casey’s Risk Committee, based on the COOP Multi-Year Strategy and Program Management Plan Template. Without insider information I cannot reliably make accurate estimates of the budget needed or of the rate and direction that the Committee would want to proceed beyond this first organizing step. I would eagerly help the Risk Committee create a COOP team with anticipated enthusiastic support of Corporate Management and the Board of Directors. I would then work to facilitate implementation of the proposed first steps with individuals whose knowledge and expertise will identify a long-term step-by step process to improve Casey’s disaster readiness. ~~~~~~~ I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The mission of Casey’s General Stores, Inc. (“Casey’s) is 1) to provide quality products at competitive prices with courteous service in clean stores at convenient locations; 2) to provide a work environment where employees are treated with respect, dignity, and honesty and where high performance is expected and rewarded; 3) to provide shareowners with a fair return on investment. As of September 2016 we have 1940 corporate stores. We feel that our success has been attributed to our clean stores, restrooms, and the friendly employees who pride themselves in customer service. Our customers have come to know that inside each store they will find dedicated, helpful, and well-trained employees, exceptionally prepared food items, and a clean environment in which to shop. Casey’s values are the 4 P’s: POSITIVE: We believe a positive attitude and a passion for excellence can achieve anything. POLITE: We believe treating everyone with dignity and respect, the way that we all want to be treated, is simply the right thing to do. PROFESSIONAL: We believe in integrity and self-discipline: knowing and doing what is right, is the heart of our great team. PROUD: We believe in our purpose to make the daily lives of our customers and their communities better. To support our mission, Casey’s must be operationally prepared to continue operations during any type of threat or emergency, and to be able to effectively resume essential operations if they are interrupted. All of our stores are located in the Midwest region of the United States, which is susceptible to tornadoes, thunderstorms, extended periods of rain, flooding, ice storms, and severe winter snowstorms, with concomitant power outages and destruction of community infrastructure. Less likely natural disasters include earthquake, drought, landslide, and wildfire. Human-caused threats (also less likely) include armed intruder/robber, motor vehicle crash, fuel explosion at gas pumps, fuel shortage, information systems failure, cybersecurity attack, utilities failure (power, water, sewer), hazardous material exposure, bomb threat, and civil disturbance. Included in this responsibility is the requirement to formulate guidance and establish common objectives for Casey’s to use in developing a viable, executable Continuity Of Operations Plan (COOP). This document provides some strategic guidance, performance measures, and resource requirements of our Continuity of Operations Program. Casey’s will develop a program to implement the COOP for our stores throughout the multi-state region. We also will develop a plan to provide for the continuity of essential functions in the event of an emergency that prevents the use of Corporate Headquarters in Ankeny. II. INTRODUCTION This document contains strategy and program management concepts that we intend to use to ensure and improve Casey’s COOP capability over the next five years. It provides some objectives, performance measures and resource requirements to support the COO plan for FY-17 though FY-21. III. PURPOSE COOP planning is a good business practice and part of our fundamental mission as a private business committed to making Casey’s a great neighborhood place. With a vast majority of our stores situated in rural settings in towns across the Midwest, Casey’s values are rooted in a sense of belonging to these communities. Our stores are often the center of the community activities. Customers regularly enter our stores for directions or information about an event in town. Our customers give us a sense of purpose in our work and can be the basis for lasting relationships in support of the communities that we serve. True joy comes from helping others. COOP planning will help ensure that even when disaster strikes, Casey’s will still provide a safe, dependable, helpful, and functioning center for our communities. Today’s changing threat environment and recent emergencies, including local acts of nature, accidents, technological emergencies, civil unrest, and terrorist attacks, have increased the need for COOP capabilities and plans that enable businesses to continue their essential functions and services across a broad spectrum of emergencies. As of April 30, 2016 Casey’s General Stores was comprised of 35,000 personnel (41% full-time, 59% part-time) and 1940 Stores. IV. AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES Authorities and References include Casey’s General Stores 2016 Annual Report: https://www.caseys.com/media/cms/2016%20Caseys%20Annual%20Report.pdf Casey’s website, with the Risk Committee Charter: https://www.caseys.com/corporategovernance/risk-committee-charter FEMA Continuity of Operations (COOP) Multi-Year Strategy and Program Management Plan Template Guide: https://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/org/ncp/coop_multi_year_plan.pdf Continuity Plan Template and Instructions for Non-federal Governments; https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/13891946406071a5f9a6d6557846f6e5924eea089f798/Non_Federal_Continuity_Plan_Template_and_Instruction s.pdf the Waffle House website https://www.wafflehouse.com and media reports about the success of Waffle House in sustaining its disaster preparedness in the Southeastern US. https://www.wafflehouse.com/whcareers/culture-and-history V. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AND RESPONSIBILITIES The Risk Committee of the Board of Directors of Casey’s General Stores, Inc. (“Casey’s) has been appointed to assist the Board in overseeing Management’s identification and evaluation of Casey’s principal operational and business risks, including Casey’s risk management framework and the policies, procedures and practices to manage those risks. It meets at least four times a year. Risk assessment and risk management are the responsibility of the Chief Executive Officer and Casey’s Management. The Risk Committee’s responsibilities are to oversee Casey’s risk management policies and procedures dealing with the identification and assessment of the principal operational and business risks facing Casey’s, whether internal or external in nature. These include food safety; physical security and personal safety; vendor management; fleet safety; environmental matters – and most importantly for this COO plan --business continuity and disaster recovery. The Risk Committee periodically receives and reviews reports and presentations from Casey’s Management on the status of its risk management program. It provides oversight of Casey’s crisis management framework, including its incident response plans. It periodically reviews Casey’s approach to risk assessments and mitigation strategies with the Board of Directors. VI. SUMMARY OF STRATEGIC PLANNING OBJECTIVES This section defines the strategic planning objectives of Casey’s COOP program. The COOP strategic planning objectives were developed by utilizing an all-hazards planning approach to ensure that essential functions are continued regardless of the type of emergency. These strategic planning objectives are broad statements identifying the desired achievements of the projects. The objectives do not necessarily need to be measurable and tend to be general; however, they will be used to derive the performance measures, enabling tasks, and resource requirements. These have been selected from the list of Federal Preparedness Circular 65 Objectives of Viable COOP programs: 1) Ensuring the performance of Casey’s essential functions/operations 2) Reducing loss of life, minimizing damage and losses 3) Ensuring a successful succession for leadership in the event a disruption renders Casey’s leadership unable, unavailable, or incapable performing their responsibilities 4) Reducing or mitigating disruptions to operations 5) Ensuring that alternate facilities are available from which to continue to perform their essential functions 6) Protecting essential facilities, equipment, vital records, and other assets 7) Achieving a timely and orderly recovery from a COOP situation and maintenance of essential functions to both internal and external clients 8) Achieving a timely and orderly reconstitution from an emergency and resumption of full service to both internal and external clients 9) Ensuring and validating group readiness by a dynamic, integrated test, training and exercise program to support the implementation of COOP plans and programs VII. ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS To support Casey’s mission, the Risk Committee in discussion with the Board and representatives of Stores Managers and Employees have designated the following as Casey’s Essential Functions (EFs): EF1) Maintain safety of store environment EF2) Maintain power to keep store open EF3) Maintain capability to provide warm food to community members EF4) Maintain safe potable water for customers and employees EF5) Maintain functional sewer capabilities for toilets EF6) Maintain incoming supply of fuel for fuel tanks EF7) Maintain warm store in winter, and fans to cool store in summer EF8) Maintain security of cash flow and vital records EF9) Facilitate supply of money for store ATM machines EF10) Maintain functioning management team to provide oversight Essential Functions 1-9 support all of the Strategic Planning Objectives (SOPs) of Section VI except for SOP 3. Essential Function 10 supports specifically Strategic Planning Objective 3. VIII. PERFORMANCE MEASURES AND ENABLING TASKS This section usually defines each of the performance measures and enabling tasks corresponding to the 9 Strategic planning objectives listed in Section VI. These performance measures are central to the planning aspect of this COOP document. They are detailed in Annex C. For the purpose of initiating the first steps of planning for Continuity of Operations and educating the management and employees of Casey’s, here are options for the Management and Risk Committee members to consider implementing as they begin Casey’s plans to become wellprepared and resilient for any disaster that might strike the Midwest, notably tornados. Unlike the hurricanes, tornados do not give days’ warning to enable stores to increase their stock of supplies and equipment. A resilient company needs well-prepared, knowledgeable and skilled personnel, as well as the equipment and resources to facilitate the safety and continued operations of each Casey’s store. Here are steps for the initial orientation and education of Management, Risk Committee members, and other employees committed to Casey’s disaster preparedness and “staying safe – and open for business”. A) Plan and schedule meetings to obtain input from regional managers and store managers about plans to implement COO plan for ALL Casey’s stores: how to proceed, what to highlight, the step-by-step process. B) Ask Waffle House management to give presentation about their disaster preparedness, COO plan if available, “Lessons Learned” from examples of their implementation, and counsel for Casey’s. Seek to learn from others’ experiences and successes. C) Review past disasters involving Casey’s stores and ask Casey store managers who have experienced disasters to give stories of lessons learned. D) Write a manual template with emergency operations plan for each store manager to fill in with the specifics pertinent to his/her store & community. D1) Use the Fire Dept. 1600 (2016) as a check list. D2) Distribute the manuals and check on completion within one month. E) Designate the supply routes and schedules in case of disaster for the Ankeny distribution center and the Terre Haute Distribution center. The routine operation is weekly deliveries to every store. In case of disaster, discuss how often deliveries could be made. F) Introduce and designate ICS command structure at corporate headquarters, at distribution centers, in the stores and the communities /regions of multiple stores for mutual aid plans. F1) Develop phone tree for employees and on-call employees (Keep in store COOP manual). F2) Ask for volunteers who have interest/training in disaster recovery/ first responder training. G) Develop/purchase an alternate communications system to act as “back-up Plan B” for land and cell phone system for disaster communications G2) Give incentives to store managers and employees to get training as Amateur radio operators. G3) Provide handheld transceivers for employee Amateur radio operators. H) Determine how much stockpile is needed of these materials in tornado season and winter storm seasons at the two distribution centers and at the individual stores in order to support essential functions: (prefer not to depend upon availability of alternate local vendor). EF1) Maintain safety of store environment. Snow plow, chainsaw, flashlights, tarps, boards, dumpster for damaged material EF2) Maintain power to keep store open. Portable generator, lanterns/light source EF3) Maintain capability to provide warm food to community members Gas stove, propane supply, food ingredients, utensils, paper products EF4) Maintain safe potable water for customers and employees Water tank, Life Straws for use, pump for nearby river/lake as alternate water supply EF5) Maintain functional sewer capabilities for toilets Portapotty EF6) Maintain incoming supply of fuel for fuel tanks Chain supply for fuel delivery from distribution center; generator for pump power EF7) Maintain warm store in winter and cool store in summer Portable space heaters, fans EF8) Maintain security of cash flow and vital records. Secure safe in store EF9) Facilitate supply of money for store ATM machines. Inquire whether manager may use cash from cash register to replenish ATM machine by prior agreement with bank. Check if ATM yields money with power outage EF10) Maintain functioning management team to provide oversight Three ring-binders for in-store COOP manuals I) In consultation with Financial department determine what items would be best to stock to meet community needs and increase profit margin. From the recent quarterly reports, since food and fountain yielded 62.9% margin (vs 32% for groceries and 8.9% for fuel), I suspect that the initial emphasis would be on food and fountain) J) Determine how many units of disaster recovery equipment should be on-site and how fast other units should/can be obtained from nearby unaffected Casey’s stores, distribution centers, and local vendors (with MOUs, if needed) K) Determine the cost-benefit value of building a safe room in middle of Casey’s stores for tornados, first for new stores in 2017, and later for remodeled stores. IX. EXTERNAL FACTORS The Risk Committee will designate two of its members, one for the region of each distribution center, to monitor weekly for new threats and developments (i.e. weather, political changes, community events) that would accelerate our rate of preparation for these changes. X. COOP PROGRAM RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS This section usually provides a summary of the company’s budget requirements to support the COOP program. The detailed COOP budget requirements will be maintained as a separate addendum. It will account for the resource requirements needed to support the COOP objectives, including personnel, equipment, and other costs. We need to consult with Casey’s Management about how much margin can we spare for this investment, especially for the on-site generators and other equipment needed for disaster preparedness. That discussion will include how to determine the number of back-up generators we can purchase and how to transport them “just-intime” if we do not purchase one for every store. XI. MYSPMP MAINTENANCE This section describes how Casey’s Risk Committee members will maintain, review, and update the COOP plan as a multi-year process. At a minimum, the Risk committee will report to management on progress and upcoming changes at each of its required quarterly meetings. ANNEX A: SUGGESTED AUTHORITIES & REFERENCES Authorities ~The Homeland Security Act of 2002, PL 107-296, enacted 11/25/02. ~Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5121, et seq.). ~White House Memorandum, Continuity Policy/Department and Agency Essential Functions, dated January 10, 2005, by Francis Fragos Townsend ~White House Memorandum, Background paper on Essential Functions Concept and Implementation and Recommended Guidelines for Submitting Department/Agencies Priority Mission Essential Functions Information, dated January 10, 2005, by David W. Howe References ~Homeland Security Presidential Directive 3 (HSPD 3), Homeland Security Advisory System, dated, March 11, 2002. ~HSPD 7, Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection (CIP), dated Dec 17, 2003. ~HSPD 8, National Preparedness, dated December 17, 2003. ~FPC 65, Federal Executive Branch Continuity of Operations (COOP), dated June 15, 2004. ANNEX B: ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS INFORMATION This Annex usually describes the critical essential functions that government organization must be able to perform, either continuously or without significant disruption, during and following a crisis, if required, in the assurance of COOP. Though it may not be necessary for every function to be performed during every emergency, procedures must be in place to enable each function to be performed regardless of the disruption that is occurring or has occurred. In 2005 the Homeland Security Council approved eight National Essential Functions (NEFs) that must be performed by the federal government during an emergency. Since it is not a Federal legislative body, Casey’s has none of the National Essential Functions (NEFs) listed in Annex B; but in reflecting on the principles underlying these essential functions we can apply them to illustrate how each Casey’s store can provide leadership and stability within its community. The NEFs are bolded. The local applications for Casey’s in the community are italicized. 1. Preserve our constitutional form of government. Contact county EMA and mayor to see how we can help. 2: Provide physical leadership to the nation; maintain the trust and confidence of the American people. Provide active leadership to community by providing safety, food, fuel, and information. 3. Defend the country against all enemies, foreign or domestic, and prevent and interdict future attacks. Provide safe haven as needed to community residents. 4. Maintain and foster effective relationships with foreign nations. Collaborate with other sources of disaster relief in the community. 5. Protect against threats to the homeland and bring to justice perpetrators of crimes or attacks against the nation, its citizens or interests. Collaborate with police and other security personnel. 6. Provide a rapid and effective response to and recovery from the domestic consequences of an attack or other incident. Work with others to stabilize community and repair infrastructural damage. 7. Protect and stabilize the nation’s economy; ensure confidence and financial systems. Promote financial stability of Casey’s and other businesses; maintain ATMs and sales. 8 Provide for critical Federal government services that address the national health, safety and welfare needs of the nation. Help provide basic needs of individuals in community, including food, shelter, supplies. Here are several definitions of terms for understanding the framework of the COOP planning. The “Mission Essential Functions” for the Government are those “departmental” specific mission essential functions. For Casey’s as a private business, its mission stated in the Executive Summary yields the previously-listed 10 Essential Functions (EFs). FEMA further delineated these EFs according to the urgency of their resumption in case of emergency or disaster. 1. Priority Mission Essential Functions (PMEFs) must be performed before, during, and in the immediate aftermath of an emergency. They must be uninterrupted, or resumed, during the first 24-48 hours after an emergency and continued through full resumption of all functions. 2. Secondary Mission Essential Functions (SMEFs) need to occur within a very short period of time or several days depending on the emergency or disaster. For our purposes, we designate this time “within 72 hours”. 3. Supporting Activities are the activities that Casey’s needs to conduct in order to perform its 10 Essential Functions. 4. Capabilities are communications, facilities, information, trained personnel. And other assets necessary to conduct the essential functions and supporting activities. Hence for Casey’s: First 24-48 hours: Priority Mission Essential Functions EF1) Maintain safety of store environment. EF2) Maintain power to keep store open. EF3) Maintain capability to provide warm food to community members Casey’s Index: (Styled after the “Waffle House Index” for Disasters) Green: Come on in for hot fresh pizza and donuts! Yellow: Come get some cold sandwiches and hot coffee. Red: We’re working on getting our power back & running today. EF4) Maintain safe potable water for customers and employees EF5) Maintain functional sewer capabilities for toilets EF6) Maintain incoming supply of fuel for fuel tanks EF7) Maintain warm store in winter, and fans to cool store in summer EF8) Maintain security of cash flow and vital records. EF9) Maintain ongoing supply of money for store ATM machines. EF10) Maintain functioning management team to provide oversight Within 72 hours: Secondary Mission Essential Functions Cleaning up and expanding operations, internal & external Plan continuing deliveries of supplies from distribution centers Mutual aid between Casey’s stores Replenishing ATM cash Within 30-60 days Rebuilding as needed Supporting Activities to perform Casey’s Essential Functions: Gain access to store and secure against threat/elements Activate alternate power generator if power outage Activate alternate communications system and pre-arranged plan to report to work Activate call-in system to check redundant/back-up communication system Check in with Corporate headquarters and designated distribution center Set up kitchen and cooking Set up signs Check-in with local EMA, government, police, bank Establish portapotty Check supply of fuel and power needed to maintain gas pumps Activate alternate cash register system if no power Clean out debris to gain easy access to road and to store Capabilities Store managers and employees Intact building structure Redundant Communications systems Electrical power and back-up generator Running, potable water or backup filtration supply Portapotty for sewer back-up Delivery and fuel trucks with intact supply routes for supplies and fuel Generators, chainsaws, tools and equipment Wood planks and signs ICS system and Management communications ANNEX C: PERFORMANCE MEASURES & ENABLING TASKS These relate to the nine Strategic Planning Objectives of Section VI OBJECTIVE 1: Essential Functions Performance Measures 1.1-1.3 Identify and prioritize priority and secondary Essential Functions with supporting measures and capabilities. Completed - See Annex B OBJECTIVE 2: Minimizing Loss Performance Measure 2.1 Develop COOP policy, plans and guidance through the Risk Committee in 2017 and coordinate measures with IT, budgeting, and distribution centers. Performance Measure 2.2 Develop redundant communications plan for operations, both vertically and horizontally. Performance Measure 2.3 Develop schedule for quarterly review and update of COOP. OBJECTIVE 3: Executing Succession of Leadership and delegation of Authority Performance Measures 3.1-3.2: Delineate leadership succession with contact information and distribute guidance in the COOP plan in store COOP manuals. OBJECTIVE 4: Mitigating Interruptions of Operations Performance Measure 4.1: Mitigate disruptions to operations through a comprehensive COOP plan., with particular attention to functioning of distribution centers, weekly supply chain routes, and generator power needed to maintain store and fuel pumps. OBJECTIVE 5: Alternate Facilities Performance Measures 5.1-5.2: Provide guidance and manage plans and resources to identify and support alternate COOP facilities, with particular attention to redundancy between the two distribution centers in Iowa and Indiana and facilitating exchange of resources between the two in case either is incapacitated. For stores where another Casey’s is in close proximity, the COOP plan should describe mutual aid protocol for sharing resources and personnel. OBJECTIVE 6: Protection of Assets Performance Measures 6.1-6.2: Ensure the availability, maintenance, and protection of assets to support COOP operations. Develop and ensure availability of a COOP vital records and data base management plan within an infrastructure to facilitate their storage and accessibility, particularly between the two distribution centers. Continually update and protect the vital records and data base. OBJECTIVE 7: COOP Recovery Performance Measures 7.1-7.2: Develop plans and procedures to ensure timely and rapid business recovery from a disaster so that essential functions continue, with the necessary human capital, equipment, communication system, and resources. OBJECTIVE 8: Reconstitution Performance Measure 8.1: Ensure an effective and orderly reconstitution from a disaster to attain full service without interruption and continued operation of essential functions. OBJECTIVE 9: COOP Tests, Training/Exercises Performance Measure 9.1: Provide COOP training to support implementation of COOP plans and programs to Corporate leadership, Regional Managers, Store Managers, and Employees. Performance Measure 9.2: Develop assessment tools to support and monitor the successful implementation of the COOP, and conduct quarterly testing of communication capabilities; semiannual testing of plans for recovery of services and vital records, and maintenance of disaster equipment; and annual testing of redundant infrastructure and updating of store manuals. Performance Measure 9.3: Conduct annual COO exercises (alternating tabletop and functional) to train and test personnel, plans, and capabilities at the local and regional level; identify areas for improvement, develop “best practices”, and complete after-action reports for exercise and actual disasters. Use ZOOM capabilities first at the interstate level, then at the intrastate level. Optional: develop COOP games for store teams to compete in recovering essential functions with a power outage, starting with hooking up the generator and cooking pizzas and coffee for a crowd of 20 hungry people. Performance Measure 9.4: Promote disaster preparedness and awareness with newsletters to all employees, including success stories, tips for success, educational briefs, games. Final Comment: Implementing the template of Appendix C was rather dry and nondescript. It seems concerned only with the structure and not much with the actions of preparedness. The most dynamic portion of this document is Section VIII which lists the activities needed to build a rigorous COOP for Casey’s. Discussing these options will merit significant thought and consideration, and this process has characterized Casey’s operations for years. Senior Vice President and CFO Bill Walljasper noted in a 2014 interview for Wholesale & Distribution International that Casey’s is set apart by the discipline of its operations: “We don’t necessarily change quickly without a lot of study and thought.” I am optimistic that Casey’s would embrace this COOP plan. In the same article Chairman and then CEO Robert J Myers stated that for Casey’s General Stores, the key to success is not always sales. Instead the relationships that the company forms are most important. He declared in 2014, “Our business is always about people.” (http://www.wdimagazine.com/sections/non-durable-goods/211-casey-s-general-store) WILLIAM PENN CHARTER SCHOOL Continuity of Operations Plan 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The mission of William Penn Charter School (Penn Charter) is educating students to live lives that make a difference. Penn Charter is an independent private school located in Philadelphia. With excellence as the standard, Penn Charter challenges students in a vigorous program of academics, arts and athletics. Through global connections, civic engagement and a focus on environmental sustainability, the school inspires students to be thinkers, collaborators, innovators and leaders. A school community that honors difference, Penn Charter seeks to be a place where diversity is understood, represented and valued. The curriculum embraces a plurality of cultures and celebrates an array of voices, instilling a deeper understanding and empathy for individuals in the community and in the world. The school provides students with the knowledge and skills they need to thrive in this complex and changing world. As students progress through Penn Charter, social responsibility to others and to the world is instilled, by providing opportunities for service, thereby, standing by the goal of educating students to live lives that make a difference. To accomplish this mission, Penn Charter must ensure its operations are performed efficiently with minimal disruption, especially during an emergency. This document provides Planning and program guidance for implementing and enabling the school to conduct its essential missions and functions under all threats and conditions. Having experienced floods, blizzards, hurricanes, a nuclear accident and terrorist attack-related incidents in the state of Pennsylvania, the need for a viable continuity plan that enables the school to continue their essential functions while ensuring student and faculty safety during such events is the school’s foremost priority. 2. INTRODUCTION This document contains the strategy and program management concepts that will be used to ensure and improve Penn Charter’s COOP capability over the next five years. This COOP plan establishes policy and guidance to ensure the sustainability and execution of the critical functions for the school if an emergency within the city threatens or incapacitates operations, and/or requires the relocation of selected personnel and functions. This Multi Year Strategy and Program Management Plan (MYSPMP) provides the objectives, performance measures, and resource requirements to support the COOP plan and program for FY-17 through FY-21. Key Penn Charter personnel upon activation, will establish an operational capability and perform essential functions within 12 hours from the time of the activation of the continuity plan, for up to a 30-day period or until normal operations can be resumed. 3. PURPOSE COOP planning is a good education practice and is part of the fundamental mission of Penn Charter to prepare their students to be responsible, reliable and service-oriented. Recent emergencies and disasters have shifted awareness to the need for COOP capabilities to continue its critical functions across a broad spectrum of emergencies. The capability to prepare for, respond to and recover from emergencies affecting Penn Charter’s operations is dependent upon the proficiency and wellbeing of its employees and the clarity of its leadership. To ensure the capability to support employees and students, Penn Charter has adopted this COOP plan. This COOP plan describes how the school will sustain the capability to perform critical functions during and after a disruption in internal operations, whether caused by severe weather, other natural or man-made disasters, or malevolent attack. The plan ensures that Penn Charter 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Has the capability to implement the COOP plan both with and without warning Can perform critical functions within 12 hours after activation of the COOP plan Can maintain critical functions for up to 30 days Conducts regularly scheduled testing, training and exercising of district personnel, equipment, systems, processes and procedures used to support the district during a COOP event Provides for a regular risk analysis Plans the location of alternate facilities in areas where the ability to initiate, maintain and terminate continuity operations is maximized Develops standard operating procedures which enable the performance of critical functions Promotes the development, maintenance and annual review of COOP capabilities. 4. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE The Continuity of Operations planning process: 1. 2. 3. 4. Identifies educational activities that are essential Identifies potential impacts that affect essential activities Provides a framework for building resilience Creates effective responses that will safeguard the student’s learning, the organization and the community This COOP plan is designed to provide a coordinated and practiced response to enhance efforts in controlling the impacts of disruptions and continue to conduct essential critical activities. The plan details the processes and principles for dealing with several key issues, such as employee and student support, key suppliers, internal and external communications. The COOP plan is not a step-by-step set of actions that must be rigidly followed. It is intended as a coordinated and practiced guide, designed to assist leaders and employees in their response to disruptive events and situations. While the plan assigns roles, it does not replace or suspend day-to-day responsibilities and authorities. During recovery and resumption operations, decisions must be made by executive management, based on the nature of the event and in the best interests of the staff, students and partners. The Principal and various assigned teams within the COOP plan need to be conversant with the overall structure and design of the plan. They are responsible for assessing the impacts of the disruption and they must maintain an awareness of the situation so that they can take the actions necessary to control the situation and enhance the recovery efforts of their team. This COOP plan describes: 1. Roles, responsibilities and authorities during disruptive events 2. Plans and procedures for responses to a disruption at the strategic executive management level, the operational department level and the tactical branch and school levels 3. Plans and procedures to ensure support and communication to staff, students, parents, partners and the community during the response and recovery process 4. Responsibilities for the recovery of each essential critical activity 5. Key personnel, vital records and resources required to ensure the continuation of essential critical activities. 5. SITUATION OVERVIEW Penn Charter’s current enrollment is approximately 964 school students, who are located in three buildings on campus. These students are supported by a committed staff and faculty consisting of: • • • • • • • 144 Teachers and specialists 20 Administrators 7 Office/support staff 2 health service staff 5 library staff 5 IT staff 4 security staff members The school is located on a 47-acre campus and includes three academic buildings and four building designated for sports, six grass playing fields, one synthetic turf field, one running track, seven tennis courts and four parking lots. A map of the buildings and fields is included in Annex C. 6. HAZARD ANALYSIS Penn Charter is exposed to many hazards, all of which have the potential for disrupting the school community, causing casualties, and damaging or destroying public or private property. The following table briefly discusses the school’s high-priority hazards. Floods Flooding in Philadelphia predominates throughout the winter and early spring due to melting snow, breakaway ice, and rainy weather. Philadelphia’s sewer system was originally built in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Since then, the amount of pavement in the city has increased. Rain that used to soak into the ground now quickly runs across pavement into the sewer. When a storm hits, large volumes of water can fall in a relatively small area within a short period. This can overwhelm the sewers and cause flooding and property damage. Flooding could threaten the safety of students and staff whenever storm water or other sources of water threaten to inundate school grounds or Snow Storm Fire Chemical Active shooter Outbreak Terrorism buildings. Flooding may occur if a water pipe breaks or prolonged rainfall causes urban streams to rise. Penn Charter and its surrounding areas are vulnerable to severe local storms, resulting in high snowfall, cold temperatures and significant snow accumulations that can be aggravated by rain, drifting snow, and ice in roof drains. The effects are generally transportation problems and loss of utilities, but can vary with the intensity of the storm, the level of preparation by the school, and the equipment and staff available to perform tasks to lessen the effects of severe local storms. Fire hazards are the most prevalent types of hazard in the city of Philadelphia. Hazardous chemicals are used for educational purposes in laboratories within the school buildings and are regularly transported through many areas in and around the school campus. Currently, ammonia, chlorine, and propane are all used and stored on school grounds. While an active shooting incident has never occurred in a school within the city of Philadelphia, Penn Charter, like any school, is vulnerable to hostile active shooters. Penn Charter, like any other public institution, is vulnerable to outbreaks of communicable diseases. Penn Charter School, like any other public institution, is vulnerable to terrorist activities 7. AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES Authorities and References include: William Penn Charter School Faculty and staff directory. Retrieved from http://www.penncharter.com/page.cfm?p=2030 FEMA Continuity of Operations (COOP) Multi-Year Strategy and Program Management Plan Template Guide. Retrieved from https://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/org/ncp/coop_multi_year_plan.pdf FEMA Sample School Emergency Operation Plan Template. Retrieved from: https://training.fema.gov/programs/emischool/el361toolkit/assets/sampleplan.pdf Colorado School Safety Resource Center Best Practices Continuity of Operations (COOP) Template for Schools. Retrieved from: http://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/safeschools/CSSRC%20Documents/CSSRC%20Best%20Practices%2 0COOP%20Template.pdf 8. DECISION AND ALERT PROCESS As the decision authority, the Principal will be kept informed of the threats/ hazards using all available means, including the school’s Emergency Communications Center, regional notification systems, school emergency communications systems, local operations and State and local reporting channels and news media. The school will evaluate all available information based on: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Direction and guidance from higher authorities The health and safety of students and personnel The ability to execute essential functions Changes in threat advisories Intelligence reports The potential or actual effects on communications systems, information systems, office facilities, and other vital equipment 7. The expected duration of the emergency The following decisions are made for continuity of operations planning by the school, which includes: 1. Upon declaration of COOP activation by the Principal, employees will be instructed about their responsibilities under the activation and relocation phases of the COOP plan 2. Appropriate resources and funding shall be available for the planning, implementation and maintenance of the COOP program. Required resources shall be dedicated in a timely fashion following activation of the COOP plan. 3. When a COOP event is declared, the school shall implement a predetermined plan using trained and equipped personnel. 4. School and non-school personnel and resources located outside the area affected by the emergency or threat shall be available as necessary to continue critical functions. 5. The school shall provide operational capability within 12 hours of the event and can continue critical operations for 30 days, or until termination of the event, whichever is earlier. 6. Normally available staff members may be rendered unavailable by a disaster or its aftermath, or may be otherwise unable to participate in the recovery. Procedures to enable another individual, other than the person primarily responsible for the work, are to be developed. 7. In compliance with the National Incident Management System (NIMS), and Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) - 5, all COOP program activities shall incorporate the principles of NIMS and the Incident Command System (ICS). Alerting and maintaining efficient communications are a critical part of incident management. The school’s communications plan supports its mission to provide clear, effective internal and external communication between the school, staff, students, parents, responders, and media. The communication tools used are • • Standard telephones Cell phones • • • • • • Intercom systems Megaphones Two-way radio Computers Fax machines Alarm systems and whistles It is expected that, in many cases, the school will receive a warning of at least a few hours prior to an event. This will normally enable the full execution of the COOP plan with a complete and orderly alert, notification, and deployment of key personnel to an assembly site or pre-identified deployment location. Priority of alert will always be considered with safety of the personnel within the school district in mind, then the identified COOP, response, alternate facility, and recovery teams will be alerted as needed in accordance with the plan. The ability to execute the COOP plan following an event that occurs with little or no warning will depend on the severity of the emergency and the number of personnel available. 9. ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS When confronting events, which disrupt normal operations, Penn Charter is committed to ensuring that critical education functions will be continued even under the most challenging emergency circumstances. During activation of this COOP plan, all other activities may be suspended to enable the school to concentrate on providing the critical functions and building the internal capabilities necessary to increase and eventually restore operations. The critical and essential functions identified are: • • • • • • • • Administration Human Resources/Administrative Support Academics First Aid Food Services Transportation Information Technology Facilities and Sanitation Critical functions and their supporting critical processes and services, support personnel, and resources shall be reviewed and updated on an as-needed basis or, at minimum, on an annual basis if there are no changes within the organization. 10. ALTERNATE FACILITIES Penn Charter recognizes that normal operations may be disrupted and that there may be a need to perform essential education functions at alternate facilities. The school will therefore identify an alternate facility that provides • • • • • • Sufficient space and equipment Capability to perform essential functions within 12 hours, up to 30 days Reliable logistical support, services, transportation, and infrastructure systems Consideration for health, safety, and emotional well-being of personnel Interoperable communications Computer equipment and software If a single building or office should be involved in a disaster, the impacted functions and operations would be relocated to another facility on campus. In the event of a campus-wide major disruption all functions would be relocated to the pre-planned alternate facilities. 11. MISSION CRITICAL SYSTEMS The critical systems necessary to perform the essential function are, 1. Vital facilities: This includes classrooms, electricity, water, heating and air, restrooms etc. 2. Information Technology: This critical function provides most means of delivering the School’s educational needs. This critical function may experience disruption from either natural or man-made emergencies such as a tornado, storms, or loss of power from the electric company. 3. Transportation: This critical function provides the means to transport students from home and to school daily, and transport for all extra-curricular activities as well. A disruption of this critical function may be a result of various natural and man-made emergencies as well as mechanical malfunctions and the inability to access certain bus routes. 4. Food Services: This critical function provides the required meals to the students daily. A disruption of this critical function may be caused by any natural or man-made emergency such as structural damage to the facility or to the loss of power causing a major loss of food inventory. 5. Academics: All other critical functions support Academics. The continuation of the other critical functions must occur to a certain level before this function will be able to continue. For example, the students must be able to attend school in a facility with the use of food services and certain information technologies. 6. Administration: This critical function is broad in nature and covers many aspects of support for academics and continuity of education. For example, insurance support, financial support, and records mostly occur from this critical function. 7. First Aid: This critical function is primarily concerned with student health. For example, this function includes administering required medicines for students and maintain the required student health records. 12. INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS Faculty and staff will be notified by the principal, when an incident occurs via telephone or faculty meetings and kept informed as additional information becomes available and as plans for management of the situation evolve. The Incident Commander on the other hand, will notify the principal of the school’s status/needs. The principal will also notify the district office. The district office will notify the County Office of Education. He/she will designate staff member(s) to monitor all communications. In the event of an incident, parents, media, and first responders will require clear and concise messages from the school about the incident, what is being done about it, and the safety of the children and staff as well. Before an incident occurs, Penn Charter will work to develop a relationship with parents so that they • • • • • • Trust and know how to access alerts and incident information Inform parents about the school’s Emergency Operations Plan, its purpose, and its objectives Identify parents who are willing to volunteer in case of an incident, include them in preparation efforts and in trainings Be prepared with translation services for non-English-speaking families and students with limited English proficiency. Disseminate information via text messages, radio announcements, and emails to inform parents about what exactly is known to have happened during an event. Implement the plan to manage phone calls from parents during an event Once a Public Information Officer is designated an off-campus briefing area for media representatives will be established to coordinate information from the principal and the incident commander to the media. In addressing rumors, the most effective strategy is to provide facts as soon as possible. To combat rumors, the school will provide appropriate information to internal groups including administrators, teachers, students, custodians, secretaries, instructional assistants, cafeteria workers, and bus drivers. These people are primary sources of information and are likely to be contacted first. This can be accomplished by holding a faculty/staff meeting before staff members are allowed to go home so that what is (and is not) known can be clearly communicated and enlist the help of the media to provide frequent updates to the public, particularly providing accurate information where rumors need to be dispelled. After the incident when the safety and status of staff and students have been assured, and emergency conditions have abated following an incident, staff/faculty should assemble to support the restoration of the school’s educational programs. Defining mission-critical operations and staffing will be a starting point for the recovery process. Collecting and disseminating information will facilitate the recovery process. 13. VITAL RECORDS To continue normal school operations following an incident, vital records must be protected. These include legal documents and student files as well as property and tax records. The principle causes of damage to records are fire and water; therefore, essential records should be protected accordingly. Following are the recovery procedures that are to be used by the IT team immediately after a disaster to restore IT functionality to an acceptable level following a disruptive event: 1. Initiate the IT Continuity of Operations procedures when directed by Administration. 2. Determine the scope of the event; number of buildings involved. 3. Initiate the Information Technology call lists as appropriate for the incident. This includes the IT Team, Outsourced Host and Critical Vendor Points-of-Contact. 4. Check status of servers, local and wide-area network connectivity, power, and other support functions. 5. Power down and disconnect all equipment as appropriate. 6. Assess extent of damage to IT resources and most feasible method to implement recovery and notify Administration of extent of damages and recommended method for recovery. 7. Coordinate alternate IT site selection with the Administration. 8. Notify vendors of additional resources needed. 9. Move IT operations and available resources to alternate site, if required. 10. Report on status of recovery effort. 11. Coordinate media and press releases with the Principal. 12. Provide support to cleanup of the server area and associated IT equipment following the disaster. 13. Operate at alternate sites until reconstitution at the primary location has been completed. 14. HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT This section identifies the roles of key groups within the school in the event of an emergency requiring COOP activation. The following lists identify major responsibilities of key and designated members required to implement Penn Charter’s COOP plan. The school’s Board of Directors are responsible for: • • • • • • Approval of the Continuity of Operations Program. Designation and delegation of authorities. Resource allocation to support the Continuity of Operations Plans. Approval of essential and critical activity designation for response and recovery. Approval of strategic continuity responses. Approval of risk management control activities. The Principal is responsible for: • • • • • • • • • Continuity plan development and implementation. Risk monitoring and control. Impact assessment and development of methods of declaration. Activation recommendations. Activation of response teams. Direction and coordination of event responses. Activation and implementation of communications plan. District and School level internal communications. Maintenance of department continuity plans. The Administration is responsible for: • • • • • • • Development and implementation of school emergency response plans. Development and implementation of school continuity plans. Risk monitoring and control. Activation of school emergency response plans and continuity teams. Recovery of assigned critical activities. Resumption of non-essential critical activities. Maintenance and rehearsal of school emergency response and continuity plans. The Human Resources/Administrative Support Team is responsible for: • • • • Determining priority and phasing of restoring human resources, payroll, purchasing, accounting, and financial functions Planning locations/staffing/resources requirements for restored human resources areas of responsibility. Activating and administering restored human resources, payroll, purchasing, accounting, and financial functions. Planning and administering full reconstitution of academics. The Academics Team (teachers) are responsible for: • • • • • Determining priority and phasing of restoring academic functions and classes. Planning locations/staffing/resources requirements for restored academics. Notifying faculty and staff of assignments, location, and schedules. Activating and administering restored academics Planning and administering full reconstitution of academics. The First Aid Team is responsible for: • • Assuring that student special health needs are restored during the continuity phase. Reconstituting full student health functionality as directed by the Administration. The Food Services Team is responsible • • • coordination of the clean-up and repairs to the damaged food service facilities and work areas Recovery of food service operations at the designated recovery/alternate locations. Full reconstitution of food services. The Transportation Team is responsible for: • • • Acquiring and coordinate resumption of transportation support. Assist in logistics of resourcing the alternate work facilities. Planning and implementing transportation support for alternate work facilities The IT Team is responsible for: • • Assuring that critical IT functions are restored during the continuity phase. Reconstituting full IT functionality as directed by the Administration Team. The Facilities and Sanitation Team is responsible for: • • • • Ensuring continuity of sanitation facilities throughout recovery and reconstitution phases. Assessing physical damage to facilities and support infrastructure. Acquiring and coordinate the occupation of all alternate work facilities. Coordinating reconstitution of facilities and infrastructure for normal district operations. 15. DEVOLUTION Devolution is the capability to transfer statutory authority and responsibility for essential functions from an organization’s primary operating staff and facilities to another organization’s employees and facilities in the event catastrophic or other disasters render the organization’s leadership and staff unavailable or incapable of performing its essential functions from either its primary or alternate facilities. If devolution is necessary for Penn Charter, prioritized essential functions are transferred to a pre-identified devolution organization. Direction and control of the school’s mission essential functions is transferred to the devolution organization site and/or identified personnel. Devolution planning involves several special issues: 1. Personnel at the devolution site must be trained to perform the essential functions to the same level of proficiency as the Penn Charter school personnel. 2. Vital records, documents, and databases must be up to date and available at the devolution site. 3. Communications and information management systems must be able to be transferred to the devolution site. 4. Delegations of authority planning must include senior personnel at the devolution site. Should sufficient staff be unavailable to conduct the mission essential, all the affected operations will initiate the activation of devolution operations. Devolution will be triggered when the available staff determines that there are insufficient resources to maintain and carry out the Penn Charter’s prioritized mission essential functions. 16. RECONSITUTION During continuity operations, the Principal must determine the status of the primary operating facility affected by the event. Upon obtaining the status of the facility, the school will determine how much time is needed to repair the primary operating facility and/or acquire a new facility. Reconstitution will commence when the Principal or other authorized person ascertains that the emergency has ended and is unlikely to reoccur. These reconstitution plans are viable regardless of the level of disruption that originally prompted implementation of the COOP. Once the authority has made this determination in coordination with other State, local and/or other applicable authorities, one or a combination of the following options may be implemented, depending on the situation: • • • • • • • • • Continue to operate from the continuity facility Reconstitute the school’s primary operating facility and begin an orderly return to the facility Before relocating to the primary operating facility or another facility, the management will conduct appropriate security, safety, and health assessments to determine building suitability and verify if all systems, communications, and other required capabilities are available and operational. Authorized individual must notify families, agencies, the community, and other applicable operations centers with information regarding continuity activation and relocation status, operational and communication status, and anticipated duration of relocation. The school will notify all personnel that the emergency or threat of emergency has passed and actions required of personnel in the reconstitution process The school will develop procedures, as necessary, for restructuring staff. Upon verification that the required capabilities are available and operational, the Administration will begin supervising a return of personnel, equipment, and documents to the primary operating facility or a move to a temporary or new permanent primary operating facility. The school will continue to operate at its continuity facility until ordered to cease operations. At that time, essential functions will transfer to the primary operating facility. The IT department should identify any records affected by the incident. In addition, they will also effectively transition or recover vital records and databases, as well as other records that had not been designated as vital records When the continuity personnel, equipment, and documents are in place at the new or restored primary operating facility, the remaining staff at the continuity facility or devolution site will transfer essential functions, cease operations, and deploy to the new or restored primary operating facility. The Administration will oversee the orderly transition from the continuity facility of all functions, personnel, equipment, and records to a new or restored primary operating facility. The school will then conduct an After-Action Review (AAR) once back in the primary operating facility or in a new primary operating facility, where all offices within the school will have the opportunity to provide input to the report. The AAR will address the effectiveness of the COOP and procedures, identify areas for improvement, document these and then develop a remedial action plan as soon as possible after the reconstitution. In addition, the AAR can also identify which, if any, records were affected by the incident, and hence, an effective way of recovering vital records and databases can be identified if needed. 17. COOP PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES This section establishes the operational organization that will be relied on to manage the incident. Without assistance, the Principal and assistant principals will not be able to manage all the aspects associated with an incident. The school relies on other key school personnel to perform tasks that will ensure the safety of students and staff during a crisis or critical incident. The Incident Command System (ICS) uses a team approach to manage incidents. It is difficult to form a team while a crisis or critical incident is unfolding. Therefore, roles will be pre-assigned based on training and qualifications. Each staff member and volunteer must be familiar with his or her role and responsibilities before an incident occurs. The following table includes additional delineation of COOP responsibilities of each key staff position in the planning team. Principal • • • • • • • Incident Commander • The principal may serve as the Incident Commander or delegate that authority to a qualified individual. Implement the COOP when necessary, or when directed by a higher authority Coordinate between the school and the Incident Commander. Update and promulgate orders of succession and delegations of authority Update COOP Annex annually Ensure adequate funding is available for emergency operations Ensures students and faculty participate in continuity exercises Assume overall direction of all incident management procedures based on actions and procedures outlined in this EOP. • • • Teachers • • • • • • • Counselors, Social Workers, and Psychologists • • • • • School Nurses/Health Assistants • • Take steps deemed necessary to ensure the safety of students, staff, and other individuals. Arrange for transfer of students, staff, and other individuals when safety is threatened by a disaster. Keep the principal and other officials informed of the situation. Responsible for the supervision of students and shall remain with students until directed otherwise. Take steps to ensure the safety of students, staff, and other individuals in the implementation of incident management protocols. Give appropriate action command during an incident. Take attendance when class relocates to an outside or inside assembly area or evacuates to another location. Report missing students to the Incident Commander or designee. Execute assignments as directed by the Incident Commander Render first aid if necessary. School staff will be trained and certified in first aid and CPR. Take steps to ensure the safety of students, staff, and other individuals in the implementation of incident management protocols. Direct students in their charge as per established incident management protocols. Render first aid if necessary. Assist in the transfer of students, staff, and other individuals Execute assignments as directed by the Incident Commander or ICS supervisor Administer first aid or emergency treatment as needed. Organize first aid and medical supplies. Maintenance Personnel • • • • • Office Staff • • • • • • Food Service/Cafeteria Workers • • Bus Drivers • • • • Students • • Survey and report building damage to the Incident Commander or Operations Section Chief. Control main shutoff valves for gas, water, and electricity and ensure that no hazard results from broken or downed lines. Provide damage control as needed. Assist in the conservation, use, and disbursement of supplies and equipment. Keep Incident Commander informed of condition of school. Answer phones and assist in receiving and providing consistent information to callers. Provide for the safety of essential school records and documents. Execute assignments as directed by the Incident Commander or ICS supervisor. Aid the principal Monitor radio emergency broadcasts. Assist with health incidents as needed, acting as messengers, etc. Use, prepare, and serve food and water Execute assignments as directed by the Incident Commander or ICS supervisor. Supervise the care of students if disaster occurs while students are in the bus. Transfer students to new location when directed. Execute assignments as directed by the Incident Commander or ICS supervisor. Transport individuals in need of medical attention Cooperate during emergency drills and exercises, and during an incident. Learn to be responsible for themselves and others in an incident. • • • Parents/Guardians • • • • • Understand the importance of not being a bystander by reporting situations of concern. Develop an awareness of natural, technological, and human-caused hazards and associated prevention, preparedness, and mitigation measures. Take an active part in school incident response/recovery activities, as age appropriate. Encourage and support school safety, violence prevention, and incident preparedness programs within the school. Participate in volunteer service projects for promoting school incident preparedness. Provide the school with requested information concerning the incident, early and late dismissals, and other related release information. Practice incident management preparedness in the home to reinforce school training and ensure family safety. Understanding their roles during a school emergency. To provide for the effective direction, control, and coordination of an incident, the School Emergency operations plan (EOP) will be activated including the implementation of the Incident Command System (ICS). The Incident Commander is delegated the authority to direct tactical on-scene operations until a coordinated incident management framework can be established with local authorities. Penn Charter is responsible for providing the Incident Commander with the school’s current strategic guidance, information analysis, and needed resources. 18. TEST, TRAINING & EXERCISES Penn Charter understands the importance of training, drills, and exercises in maintaining and planning for an incident. To ensure that the teaching faculty and staff are aware of their duties and responsibilities under the school plan and the most current procedures, trainings, drills, and exercise will be conducted. The Exercise Planning Team will coordinate training and exercising efforts in accordance with the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program. School EOP training will include: 1. 2. 3. 4. Hazard and incident awareness training for all staff. Orientation to the School EOP. First aid and CPR for all staff. Team training to address specific incident response or recovery activities, such as ParentStudent Reunification, Special Needs, and Relocation. 5. Two online FEMA courses: ICS 100 and IS-700. Both courses are available for free at FEMA’s Emergency Management Institute Web site. 6. Additional training will include drills, and tabletop and functional exercises. Drills will be conducted at least once per semester. Exercises will occur at least once per school year. 7. Records of the training provided including date(s), type of training, and participant roster will be maintained. Approved parent volunteers and community members will also be incorporated into larger training efforts. All School staff members are expected to develop personal and family emergency plans. Each family should anticipate that a staff member may be required to remain at school following a catastrophic event. Knowing that the family is prepared and can handle the situation will enable school staff to do their jobs more effectively. ANNEX A: AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES Authorities • • The Homeland Security Act of 2002, PL 107-296, enacted 11/25/02. The National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. 401 (as amended). • • • • • Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5121, et seq.). Executive Order 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, dated November 18, 1988, as amended. Executive Order 12472, Assignment of National Security and Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications Functions, dated April 3, 1984. Executive Order 12148, Federal Emergency Management, dated July 20, 1979, as amended. PDD 62, Combating Terrorism – Homeland Defense, dated May 22, 1998. References • • • • Title 44, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 2, Subpart A – Organization, Functions, and Delegations of Authority, dated October 1, 2002. Title 36, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 1236, Management of Vital Records, revised on May 16. 2001. HSPD 7, Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection (CIP), dated Dec 17, 2003. HSPD 8, National Preparedness, dated December 17, 2003. ANNEX B: ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS INFORMATION There are critical essential functions that government organizations must be able to perform, either continuously or without significant disruption, during and following a crisis, if required, in the assurance of COOP. Though it may not be necessary for every function to be performed during every emergency, procedures must be in place to enable each function to be performed regardless of the disruption that is occurring, or has occurred. Further, government organizations must ensure that its sub-organizational elements and regional offices and facilities, throughout the country, can support performance of their essential functions, as required. On January 4, 2005, the Homeland Security Council reviewed and approved eight National Essential Functions (NEFs) that must be performed by the Federal government during an emergency. National Essential Functions (NEFs) are functions that represent the overarching responsibilities of the Executive Branch to lead and sustain the country and will generally be the primary focus of the President. The following are the National Essential Functions: 1. Preserve our Constitutional Form of Government. 2. Provide visible leadership to the Nation 3. Defend the country against all enemies, foreign or domestic, and prevent and interdict future attacks. 4. Maintain and foster effective relationships with foreign nations. 5. Protect against threats to the homeland and bring to justice perpetrators of crimes or attacks against the nation, its citizens or interests. 6. Provide rapid and effective response to and recovery from the domestic consequences of an attack or other incident. 7. Protect and stabilize the nation’s economy and ensure confidence in financial systems. 8. Provide for critical Federal government services that address the national health, safety and welfare needs of the Nation The COOP MYSPMP should provide the guidance, objectives, performance measures, enabling tasks, and resources necessary for the school to accomplish its overall mission, and its priority and secondary mission essential functions. Penn Charter’s prioritized list of Critical Functions include, Critical Functions Facilities and Sanitation Administration Information Technologies Transportation First Aid Food Services Academics Human Resources/Admin Recovery Time 4 Hours 4 Hours 24 Hours 1 School Day 3 School Days 3 School Days 3 School Days 3 School Days The functions should also sustain for up to 30 days or until normal business activities can be resumed. Penn charter accomplishes this by, • • • Maintaining the safety of the school. Secure against threat/ hazard Identifying space and equipment, including computer equipment and software prior to the incident. • • • • • • • Reliable logistical support, services, and infrastructure systems. Consideration for health, safety, security, and emotional well-being of personnel. Interoperable communications for effective interaction. Capabilities to access and use vital records. Systems and configurations that are used in daily activities, such as food, water, sanitation, heaters, coolers etc. Emergency/back-up power capability Collaborate with law enforcements and local government ANNEX C: MAP OF THE SCHOOL JEM Continuity of Operations planning: Meeting the standard of care Robin J. Clark, JD Megan H. Timmins, JD ABSTRACT Recent disasters have increased the public’s awareness of the lack of emergency preparedness of state and local governments. The attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001 highlighted failures in government agency coordination, while the anthrax attacks that followed and the more recent natural disasters of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 have deepened concerns that our government is unprepared for emergencies. Partially in response to the public’s concern, the federal government has encouraged Continuity of Operations (COOP) planning at the federal, state, and local government levels. Public attention, government engagement, and the promulgation of federal directives and guidance are leading to an increase in the standard of care for all public sector planning efforts, thus creating potential liabilities in the areas of COOP planning, testing, training, and maintenance. At this point, COOP planning is becoming the norm for state and local government agencies, and while the process of COOP planning may itself expose agencies to certain liabilities, there is also an increase in the potential liability for agencies that do not undertake COOP planning efforts. Further, it appears that the potential liability of agencies that do not engage in COOP planning far exceeds any liabilities incurred through the planning process. Key words: Continuity of Operations, legal, liability, standard of care, Federal Preparedness Circular 65 INTRODUCTION The attacks on the World Trade Center and the anthrax scare of 2001 incapacitated government offices nationwide and bred fear among the general public.1 Journal of Emergency Management Vol. 6, No. 5, September/October 2008 In 2005, the government’s failure to effectively evacuate or provide shelter for New Orleans residents during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita became an international embarrassment and a national tragedy.2 Historically, government liability for emergency planning and subsequent emergency response failures have been difficult to prove. However, the focus on emergency planning and response that has been spurred by recent disasters may be creating potential liabilities for government actors in the area of emergency planning, and particularly, Continuity of Operations (COOP) planning. BACKGROUND ON COOP COOP planning ensures the continuity of an agency’s essential functions across a wide range of emergencies and events.3 As such, COOP planning helps an organization function after a disaster, providing consistency of services to the public and minimizing the chaos that may follow a disaster. In addition, this planning serves as a tool in the maintenance of vital institutional records, infrastructure, and equipment. A COOP plan typically provides procedures for an organization to operate for a period of up to 14-30 days following an incident, working in conjunction with an organization’s existing emergency operating procedures. This differentiates COOP planning from emergency operating procedures, which only address the immediate aftermath of an incident, like evacuation, shelter-in-place, active shooter, and bomb threat procedures. A COOP plan bridges the gap between the immediate response to an event and the point at which an organization can resume normal functioning. It references emergency operating procedures but 17 focuses on identifying the resources and staff needed to continue its essential functions. Finally, although COOP plans differ among organizations, because they should be tailored to an organization’s specific needs, there are key elements that should be addressed in any COOP plan. These elements include planning assumptions and considerations, essential functions and personnel, orders of succession, vital records, systems and equipment, alternate facilities, communications, tests, training, and exercises.3 responsibilities.”‡ The directive designates the Secretary of Homeland Security “as the President’s lead agent for coordinating overall continuity operations and activities of executive departments and agencies.”6 However, while the Directive states that the Secretary “shall coordinate the development and implementation of continuity policy for executive departments and agencies,” it is not clear whether the Secretary or another government official may reprimand executive branch agencies who have failed to develop and implement the continuity policy.§ LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF COOP PLANNING Federal Federal agencies have been required to develop continuity plans for many years.4* President George W. Bush recently updated these requirements in the National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 51, issued in May 2007.5 Pursuant to NSPD 51, each federal agency head is required to “develop continuity plans in support of the National Essential Functions and the continuation of essential functions under all conditions”†; plan, program, and budget for continuity capabilities; plan, conduct, and support annual tests and training; and support other continuity requirements, “in accordance with the nature and characteristics of the agency’s national security roles and *The Executive Order, which appears to remain in force with respect to executive branch departments and agencies, requires agencies to have capabilities to meet essential defense and civilian needs in the event of a national security emergency. Section 202 of EO 12656 requires the head of each federal department and agency to “ensure the continuity of essential functions in any national security emergency by providing for succession to office and emergency delegation of authority in accordance with applicable law; safekeeping of essential resources, facilities, and records; and establishment of emergency operating capabilities.” Other directives and legislation include the following: The National Security Act of 1947, July 26, 1947, as amended; EO 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, November 18, 1988, as amended; EO 12472, Assignment of National Security and Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications Functions, April 3, 1984; EO 12148, Federal Emergency Management, July 20, 1979, as amended; Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 67, Enduring Constitutional Government and Continuity of Government Operations, October 21, 1998; PDD 62, Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas, May 22, 1998; PDD 63, Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), May 22, 1998; FPC 60, Continuity of the Executive Branch of the Federal Government at the Headquarters Level During National Security Emergencies, November 20,1990; 41 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 101-2, Occupant Emergency Program, revised as of July 1, 1998; 36 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 1236, Management of Vital Records, revised as of July 1, 1998; FPC 65 Authorities and References (July 26, 1999). † Section 19(b) of Ref. 5. 18 States Although federal continuity directives are purely guidance for state, local, territorial and tribal governments, states may create mandatory continuity planning laws or regulations on their own. For example, in Maryland, the Maryland Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) Act provides that the “Governor may issue orders, rules, and regulations necessary or desirable to . . . prepare and revise, as necessary, a comprehensive plan and program for the emergency management operations of this State; integrate the plan and program of this State with the emergency management operations plans of the federal government and other states; and coordinate the preparation of plans and programs for emergency management operations by the political subdivisions.”7 Thus, if the Governor deems it necessary or desirable, he may order state agencies to prepare COOP plans. Further, in recent years, Maryland has made it mandatory for various types of human service facilities to prepare COOP plans through specific statutes.8 Many states have laws similar to Maryland’s, but state requirements vary across the country. Virginia has made COOP planning mandatory for executive branch agencies and requires that plans are updated and submitted to the Virginia Department of Emergency Management by April 1st of each year.9 Florida has required agency heads to take responsibility for COOP planning for their agencies and promulgated guidance for them through its Division of ‡ Section 7 of Ref. 5. Section 6 of Ref. 5. § Journal of Emergency Management Vol. 6, No. 5, September/October 2008 Emergency Management.10 Because state requirements vary, it is important to research a jurisdiction’s specific requirements and guidance before embarking on a COOP planning process. Knowing a specific jurisdiction’s laws and regulations before beginning planning will not only help to determine whether an agency is required to have a COOP plan but also determine the governance structure for COOP planning in the state. A survey of old and new legislation will reveal whether COOP requirements and guidelines in a state emanate from the Governor, the Adjutant General, or another state office. For example, a state may have recently passed legislation in response to the threat of pandemic flu, following the federal guidelines set forth in the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA).11 In Maryland, the Catastrophic Health Emergencies Act, passed in response to the MSEHPA, grants the Secretary the power to “require healthcare facilities to develop . . . contingency plans” addressing stockpiling of supplies, staff training, “treatment and decontamination protocols,” coordination of care with other facilities, and anything else the Secretary deems necessary to “assist in the early detection and treatment of an individual exposed to a deadly agent.”12 As discussed previously, in reference to the federal government, laws regarding continuity planning may have been in place for many years, so it is prudent to conduct a thorough search of and old and new legislation, regulations, and orders. employees.13** According to case law, government negligence is hard to prove unless the government has created an expectation of service.14†† Moreover, the government action that is considered discretionary is often completely immune to suits.13‡‡ Although the definition of “discretionary functions” has been the source of much litigation, it has been accepted that it protects the government from suits based on high-level policy decisions by government actors, and it may be so expansive as to create immunity from suit based on regulatory actions of agencies.15 However, as COOP planning becomes considered an integral part of many government agencies’ missions, failure to provide a service that is normally provided, because of a lack of a COOP plan, may be considered negligence on the part of the government agency. Although there are not yet many cases addressing COOP planning liability specifically, as described later, the issues surrounding COOP planning will likely be resolved within the basic legal framework of government negligence. The threat of liability is a concern for many emergency planners. To assess this threat, planners should consider the applicable statutes and case law of their jurisdiction, as discussed earlier. However, planners must also consider the appropriate standard of care that must be exercised throughout the COOP planning process, despite one’s jurisdiction. In the context of COOP planning, the standard of care is driven by federal directives and guidelines. Although these directives and guidelines are not mandatory for state and local agencies, they serve as the benchmark for appropriate standards of care for all public sector planning LEGAL ISSUES: STANDARD OF CARE One reason why it is vital to understand the legal framework of COOP planning is that a failure to follow this framework may contribute to potential liability. Although state and local agencies enjoy certain protections through the doctrine of sovereign immunity,¶ federal and state tort claims acts carve out areas in which these agencies may be held liable for, among other things, negligence of their ¶ Alexander Hamilton described sovereign immunity in The Federalist No. 81 when he wrote, “It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent,” June 28, 1788. Journal of Emergency Management Vol. 6, No. 5, September/October 2008 **The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) provides a small exception to its immunity to suits by stating that “when the federal government may be sued for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. S 1346(b)(1). Most states have enacted similar laws that limit state sovereign immunity. †† Restatement (Second) of Torts §323 (1965) (one who undertakes to render services to another may in some circumstances be held liable for doing so in a negligent fashion). ‡‡ 28 USCA §2680 (a), that creates an exception from liability for, “[a]ny claim based . . . upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.” 19 efforts.§§ In light of this legal framework and the legal concerns many planners face, we will address some of the liability issues that may arise during the COOP process: specifically, meeting standards of care in having, developing, and testing a COOP plan. nance may also be the source of negligence or other types of claims. Thus, in the future, failures to continue to provide service that result in harm to the public may form the basis of a suit in negligence pointing to the inadequacy of an agency’s COOP plan. MEETING THE STANDARD OF CARE: HAVING A COOP PLAN MEETING THE STANDARD OF CARE: The public impression of the need for emergency planning in the public sector has been changing, based in part on recent tragedies that highlighted a lack of preparedness resulting in harm to many, and particularly to vulnerable populations. Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in the US Gulf Coast, several suits were filed against hospitals and medical care facilities whose failures to continue care for or evacuate their customers resulted in injury or, in some cases, death. One such suit revolved around a failure to continue service during an electrical outage, causing the death of a patient reliant on a ventilator.16 A COOP plan may have allowed the care givers to ensure that their patients continued to receive services that they needed, whether through arranging for a back-up power source, use of an alternate site, or temporary devolution of their care responsibilities to another organization. Although these suits were not ultimately successful in establishing liability, portions of the courts’ opinions in the cases indicate that the courts will begin to carve out some legal territory for such claims in the future.16(p228)¶ ¶ One commentator wrote that, though the facts may not have been favorable to a finding of liability in past cases, it appears from the holdings in recent cases that “there is considerable likelihood that a failure to evacuate may, in some cases, be considered malpractice if the decision is based in part on an actual assessment of a patient’s individual medical condition.”¶ ¶ If true, this may be a harbinger that failures to continue to provide service, because of a lack of COOP planning, training, testing and mainte- §§ Both the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sponsor free programs for state and local government emergency planners on how to write COOP plans according to federal standards. One such program, Preparing the States, Implementing Continuity of Operations Planning, is administered by the authors’ employer, the University of Maryland Center for Health and Homeland Security. ¶¶ Section 7, Elements of a Viable COOP Capability. 20 DEVELOPING A COOP PLAN Federal directives provide guidelines for COOP planning, outlining topics that must be covered by a COOP plan, standards for training personnel to use the plan, and for testing and maintaining a plan. Federal Preparedness Circular (FPC) 65 states that a viable COOP plan should:  “delineate essential functions and activities;  outline a decision process for determining appropriate actions in implementing COOP plans and procedures;  establish a roster of fully equipped and trained emergency personnel with the authority to perform essential functions and activities;  include procedures for employee advisories, alerts, and COOP plan activation, with instructions for relocation to predesignated facilities, with and without warning, during duty and nonduty hours;  provide for personnel accountability throughout the duration of the emergency;  provide for attaining operational capability within 12 hours; and  establish reliable processes and procedures to acquire resources necessary to continue essential functions and sustain operations for up to 30 days.”¶ ¶ However, FPC 65, like most federal circulars, is a brief document that does not provide great detail Journal of Emergency Management Vol. 6, No. 5, September/October 2008 regarding the fulfilling of these main components.3 As such, organizations aiming to comply with federal guidelines still have a fair amount of latitude in developing the contents of their COOP plan. Given this latitude, questions of “how” and “how much” often arise while planning. For example, federal guidance states that, an organization’s COOP plan should provide for “alert and notification” of its personnel.3 The way that alert and notification should take place is not specified. Must an agency purchase new public announcement system, satellite phones or text alert software in order to meet the standard? It is not always clear. In a court of law, the federal guidelines would be considered in determining whether an organization has fulfilled its obligations to citizens through its emergency planning. In addition, financial restrictions, as well as whether an organization should have known to plan for a particular disaster affecting its capabilities would be considered. The types of preparations that other agencies in its state or locality had made as well as other agencies of its type may come into the analysis as comparables. Overall, the possible success of a suit against a government agency based on not meeting the standards of care and best practices of other agencies would depend on a strong showing of inadequacy of emergency preparations accounting for many variables. The lack of precedent for similar cases and the discretion implied by broad federal guidelines would likely make it difficult for a plaintiff to prove an agency’s liability for negligence at this time. MEETING THE STANDARD OF CARE: TESTING THE COOP PLAN Once an institution has written a COOP plan, it must be tested to ensure that it is a viable plan and that the institution’s decision makers and personnel have had a chance to exercise, or at least discuss, their specific duties during COOP activation. COOP plans are typically tested through a variety of exercises, including tabletops and full-scale exercises. While testing its plan, an agency must take care to exercise its plan responsibly, especially if a full-scale exercise is being used. Not only will a responsible exercise produce better results for the institution while improving confidence and investment in the plan, but it will Journal of Emergency Management Vol. 6, No. 5, September/October 2008 also help avoid unnecessary expenditures and potential lawsuits. Negligent testing of a COOP plan is one way in which an agency may open the door to potential lawsuits. Imagine a scenario where an armed gunman bursts into a classroom, orders the professor to close the door and forces students to line up against a wall while threatening to shoot. Such was the scene when officials at the Elizabeth State University in North Carolina were testing their ability to respond to an active shooter threat.17 Although the intent behind the drill was commendable, its execution resulted in undue fear and confusion on the part of students and faculty. Failure to give a reasonable amount of notice to exercise participants, in this case, students and faculty, prior to carrying out a full-scale exercise may be construed as negligent, thus exposing an agency to liability. To avoid liability, an exercise coordinator should provide a reasonable amount of notice to exercise participants. According to the Elizabeth State officials, students, staff, and faculty were notified via e-mail and text messages that a drill would take place sometime over a period of 5 days. The notification explicitly stated: “This is a test. ECSU is holding a test drill where an armed intruder will enter a room in Moore Hall and be detained by campus police.”17 However, in this case, the professor and many of the students in the targeted classroom stated that they had not received the e-mail or text message notification. Fortunately for the University, no one suffered serious harm from the drill and no lawsuit was filed. If something had gone wrong in that drill because of the lack of appropriate notice or the manner in which the exercise was conducted, the University may have been facing a lawsuit alleging negligence. In a negligence action, the plaintiff, possibly a student or professor, must show that (1) the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant breached the duty by a negligent act or omission; (3) the defendant’s breach was the actual and proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury; and (4) the plaintiff suffered injury or damages.18 Assuming one could satisfy the other prongs of a negligence claim, establishing duty, causation, and damages, it is the second prong—that 21 the defendant breached their duty by a negligent act or omission—that becomes a concern during the planning and execution of an exercise. In the case of the Elizabeth State, it could be argued that the University negligently failed to act by not giving enough warning to the students and faculty, or negligently acted in choosing to execute the drill during a real class rather than a mock setting. Best practices while testing a plan include beginning all exercise communications with the verbal or written notice—“this is a test.” Although test coordinators often worry that increased notice can decrease the effectiveness of the test, ie, resu...
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