A Grounded Theory Investigation of Thinking and Reasoning with Multiple
Representational Systems for Epistemological Change in Introductory Physics
Submitted by
Clark Henson Vangilder
A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology
Grand Canyon University
Phoenix, Arizona
February 23, 2016
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GRAND CANYON UNIVERSITY
A Grounded Theory Investigation of Thinking and Reasoning with Multiple
Representational Systems for Epistemological Change in Introductory Physics
I verify that my dissertation represents original research, is not falsified or plagiarized,
and that I have accurately reported, cited, and referenced all sources within this
manuscript in strict compliance with APA and Grand Canyon University (GCU)
guidelines. I also verify my dissertation complies with the approval(s) granted for this
research investigation by GCU Institutional Review Board (IRB).
__________________________________________February 8, 2016
Clark Henson Vangilder
Date
Abstract
Conceptual and epistemological change work in concert under the influence of
representational systems, and are employed by introductory physics (IP) students in the
thinking and reasoning that they demonstrate in various modelling and problem-solving
processes. A grounded theory design was used to qualitatively assess how students used
multiple representational systems (MRS) in their own thinking and reasoning along the
way to personal epistemological change. This study was framed by the work of Piaget and
other cognitive theorists and conducted in a college in Arizona; the sample size was 44.
The findings herein suggest that thinking and reasoning are distinct processes that handle
concepts and conceptual frameworks in different ways, and thus a new theory for the
conceptual framework of thinking and reasoning is proposed. Thinking is defined as the
ability to construct a concept, whereas reasoning is the ability to construct a conceptual
framework (build a model). A taxonomy of conceptual frameworks encompasses thinking
as a construct dependent on building a model, and relies on the interaction of at least four
different types of concepts during model construction. Thinking is synonymous with the
construction of conceptual frameworks, whereas reasoning is synonymous with the
coordination of concepts. A new definition for understanding as the ability to relate
conceptual frameworks (models) was also created as an extension of the core elements of
thinking and reasoning about the empirically familiar regularizes (laws) that are part of
Physics.
Keywords: thinking, reasoning, understanding, concept, conceptual framework,
personal epistemology, epistemological change, conceptual change, representational
system, introductory physics, model, modeling, physics.
vi
Dedication
This work is dedicated to my marvelous wife, Gia Nina Vangilder. Above all
others, she has sacrificed much during the journey to my Ph.D. Her unwavering love and
loyalty transcend the practical benefits of her proofreading assistance over the years, as
well as other logistical maneuverings pertaining to our family enduring the time
commitment that such an endeavor requires of me personally.
You are amazing Gia, and I love you more than mere words can describe!
Most importantly, I thank God Himself for putting my mind in a wonderful
universe so rich with things to explore.
vii
Acknowledgments
I am exceptionally pleased to have worked with the committee that has approved
this document—Dr. Racheal Stimpson (Chair), Dr. Pat D’Urso (Methodologist), and Dr.
Rob MacDuff (Content Expert). Each one of you has contributed to my success in your
own special way, and with your own particular talents.
I am blessed to have walked this path under your guidance.
Honorable mention is given Dr. Rob MacDuff, whose influence and collaboration
over the years is valuable beyond measure or words. Neither of us would be where we are
at without the partnership of theory and practice that has defined our collaboration for
more than a decade now. I am truly blessed to know you and work with you.
viii
Table of Contents
List of Tables ................................................................................................................... xiii
List of Figures .................................................................................................................. xiv
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study....................................................................................1
Introduction ....................................................................................................................1
Background of the Study ...............................................................................................3
Personal epistemology. .........................................................................................5
Representational Systems. ....................................................................................6
Problem Statement .........................................................................................................8
Purpose of the Study ......................................................................................................9
Research Questions and Phenomenon .........................................................................10
Qualitative Research Questions ...................................................................................11
Advancing Scientific Knowledge ................................................................................12
Significance of the Study .............................................................................................14
Rationale for Methodology ..........................................................................................16
Nature of the Research Design for the Study...............................................................17
Definition of Terms......................................................................................................19
Assumptions, Limitations, Delimitations ....................................................................20
Summary and Organization of the Remainder of the Study ........................................21
Chapter 2: Literature Review .............................................................................................23
Introduction to the Chapter and Background to the Problem ......................................23
Theoretical Foundations and Conceptual Framework .................................................29
Personal epistemology ........................................................................................29
ix
Thinking and reasoning.......................................................................................30
Building a conceptual model for this study ........................................................34
Representational systems ....................................................................................36
Self-efficacy, self-regulation, and journaling .....................................................38
Convergence of conceptual and theoretical foundations ....................................39
Review of the Literature ..............................................................................................40
A brief history of personal epistemology research .............................................40
A brief history of assessment on personal epistemology ....................................43
Connections between conceptual change and personal epistemology ................48
Conceptual change in introductory physics ........................................................51
Personal epistemologies and learning physics ....................................................55
Thinking and reasoning in introductory physics .................................................64
Study methodology .............................................................................................68
Study instruments and measures .........................................................................71
Summary ......................................................................................................................72
Chapter 3: Methodology ....................................................................................................76
Introduction ..................................................................................................................76
Statement of the Problem .............................................................................................77
Research Questions ......................................................................................................78
Research Methodology ................................................................................................80
Research Design...........................................................................................................81
Population and Sample Selection.................................................................................83
Instrumentation and Sources of Data ...........................................................................84
x
Classroom activities and assessment instrument ................................................86
Validity ........................................................................................................................91
Reliability.....................................................................................................................93
Data Collection and Management ................................................................................94
Data Analysis Procedures ............................................................................................97
Preparation of data ..............................................................................................97
Data analysis .......................................................................................................98
Ethical Considerations .................................................................................................99
Limitations and Delimitations....................................................................................100
Summary ....................................................................................................................101
Chapter 4: Data Analysis and Results ..............................................................................105
Introduction ................................................................................................................105
Descriptive Data.........................................................................................................106
Data Analysis Procedures ..........................................................................................109
Coding schemes ................................................................................................110
Triangulation of data .........................................................................................113
Results ........................................................................................................................116
PEP Analysis. ....................................................................................................116
Qualitative analysis. ..........................................................................................121
Analysis of the physics and reality activity journals.........................................135
Consideration of research questions with current results..................................136
Combined analysis of the remaining study activities........................................137
Other assessments. ............................................................................................143
xi
Summary ....................................................................................................................144
Chapter 5: Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations ............................................147
Introduction ................................................................................................................147
Summary of the Study ...............................................................................................149
Summary of Findings and Conclusion.......................................................................151
Research Question 1..........................................................................................152
Research Question 2..........................................................................................162
Definitions .........................................................................................................164
Predictions.........................................................................................................171
Suggestions for TRU Learning Theory use ......................................................171
Implications................................................................................................................172
Theoretical implications. ...................................................................................172
Practical implications ........................................................................................174
Future implications ...........................................................................................175
Strengths and weaknesses .................................................................................176
Recommendations ......................................................................................................177
Recommendations for future research. .............................................................177
Recommendations for future practice. ..............................................................178
References ........................................................................................................................181
Appendix A. Site Authorization Form .............................................................................203
Appendix B. Student Consent Form ................................................................................204
Appendix C. GCU D-50 IRB Approval to Conduct Research ........................................205
Appendix D. Psycho-Epistemological Profile (PEP).......................................................206
xii
Appendix E. What is Physics? What is Reality? Is Physics Reality? ..............................209
Appendix F. Numbers Do Not Add .................................................................................213
Appendix G. The Law of the Circle.................................................................................214
Appendix H. The Zeroth Laws of Motion .......................................................................215
Appendix I. End of Term Interview .................................................................................218
xiii
List of Tables
Table 1. Literature Review Search Pattern 1 ................................................................... 26
Table 2. Literature Review Search Pattern 2 ................................................................... 27
Table 3. Study Population Demographics ..................................................................... 107
Table 4. Interview Transcript Data ................................................................................ 109
Table 5. PEP Dimension Scores .................................................................................... 117
Table 6. Basic PEP Composite Descriptive Statistics ................................................... 117
Table 7. Basic PEP Dimension Descriptive Statistics ................................................... 118
Table 8. Primary PEP Dimension Changes ................................................................... 119
Table 9. Secondary PEP Dimension Changes ............................................................... 120
Table 10. Tertiary PEP Dimension Changes ................................................................. 120
Table 11. PEP Score Distributions Normality Tests...................................................... 121
Table 12. Overall Coding Results .................................................................................. 122
Table 13. Coding Results for the Elements of Thought (EoT) ...................................... 123
Table 14. Jaccard Indices for Distinction and EoT Code Comparison .......................... 125
Table 15. Examples of Concept Coordination ............................................................... 130
Table 16. Examples of Belief Development Claims About Thinking ........................... 139
Table 17. Examples of EoT Belief Development .......................................................... 140
Table 18. Examples of Belief Development .................................................................. 141
Table 19. Examples of Belief Development .................................................................. 143
Table 20. Force Concept Inventory (FCI) Results ......................................................... 144
Table 21. Mechanics Baseline Test (MBT) Results ...................................................... 144
Table 22. Cognitive Modeling Approach to Axiom Development................................ 167
xiv
List of Figures
Figure 1.The eight elements of thought. ........................................................................... 33
Figure 2. The eight elements of scientific thought. .......................................................... 34
Figure 3. Typiscal classroom activity life cycle. .............................................................. 86
Figure 4. Cluster analysis circle graph for EoT and distinctions. ................................... 124
Figure 5. Cluster analysis dendrogram. .......................................................................... 126
Figure 6. Distinctions and coordinations vs. EoT node matrix...................................... 128
Figure 7. Concepts and individual POV node matrix. .................................................... 129
Figure 8. Distinctions and coordinations vs. EoT node matrix....................................... 131
Figure 9. MSPR group discussions distinctions-coordinations EoT node matrix. ......... 132
Figure 10. MSPR journals distinctions-coordinations EoT node matrix. ....................... 132
Figure 11. MSPR math EoT node matrix. ...................................................................... 133
Figure 12. MSPR science EoT node matrix.................................................................... 134
Figure 13. MSPR physics EoT node matrix. .................................................................. 134
Figure 14. Distinctions vs. EoT node matrix. ................................................................. 135
Figure 15. Coordinations vs. EoT node matrix. .............................................................. 136
Figure 16. Belief development with TRU claims node matrix. ...................................... 138
Figure 17. Node matrix comparing beliefs with EoT. .................................................... 140
Figure 18. Node matrix comparing true claims with EoT. ............................................ 142
Figure 19. Cognitive Modeling Taxonomy of Conceptual Frameworks - Processes. ... 158
Figure 20. Cognitive Modeling Taxonomy of Conceptual Frameworks - Collections. . 165
Figure 21. CMTCF example 1: first zeroth law of motion. ............................................ 166
Figure 22. Vector diagrammatic model of the First Zeroth Law. ................................... 168
xv
Figure 23. Graphical model of the First Zeroth Law. ..................................................... 169
Figure 24. CMTCF Example 2: Second Zeroth Law of Motion..................................... 169
Figure 25. CMTCF example 3: Second Zeroth Law axiom. .......................................... 169
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1
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Introduction
The cumulative history of physics education research (PER) for the last 34 years
has led to a reform in science teaching that has fundamentally changed the nature of
physics instruction in many places around the world (Modeling Instruction Project, 2013;
ISLE, 2014). Historical developments in PER have highlighted the connection that exists
between conceptual change and the way that students come to learn (Hake, 2007;
Hestenes, 2010), the difficulties that impede their learning (Lising & Elby, 2005), the
connection between personal epistemology and learning physics (Brewe, Traxler, de la
Garza & Kramer, 2013; Ding, 2014; Zhang & Ding, 2013), and theoretical developments
that inform pedagogical reform (Hake, 1998; Hestenes, 2010). To date, little research has
been done exploring the particular mechanisms of general epistemological change
(Bendixen, 2012), with PER pioneers such as Redish (2013) suggesting the need for a
basis in psychological theory for how physics students think and believe when it comes to
learning and knowledge acquisition. There is still no definitive answer about general
epistemological change within the literature (Hofer, 2012; Hofer & Sinatra, 2010), and
many of the leading researchers have been studying that with the context of mathematics
and/or physics (see Hammer & Elby, 2012; Schommer-Aikins & Duell, 2013).
The central goal of this research was to determine how students encode meaning
through the deployment of multiple representational systems (MRS)—such as words,
symbols, diagrams, and graphs—in an effort towards thinking and reasoning their way
through epistemological change in an Introductory Physics (IP) classroom. Specifically,
this study positions MRS as tools for thinking and reasoning that are capable of
2
producing epistemological change. Among other things, the study sought to find the types
and numbers of MRS that are the most useful in producing epistemological change. Such
findings would then inform the PER community concerning the capacity that MRS have
for encoding meaning during the scientific thinking and reasoning process. Moreover, the
relative importance of personal epistemology in the process of conceptual change—either
as a barrier or a promoter—is the kind of information needed for continued progress in
the PER reform effort, as well as learning theory in general. The PER Community has a
number of peer-reviewed journals such as the American Journal of Physics (see Hake
1998, 2007; Lising & Elby, 2005; Redish 2013) and the Physical Review Special Topics Physics Education Research (see Bing & Redish, 2012; Bodin, 2012; Brewe, 2011; De
Cock, 2012; Ding, 2014), where much of the research is reported.
The multi-decade findings of both the PER community and the researchers
involved with personal epistemology, indicate a deep connection between learning
physics and beliefs about the world, as well as how those epistemic views correspond to
conceptual change. It is impossible to do Physics without the aid of conventional
representational systems such as natural language and mathematics; hence the inherent
capacity for those representational systems to influence both conceptual and epistemic
knowledge (Plotnitsky, 2012) is a legitimate point of inquiry that has gone largely
unnoticed. The usage of one or more representational systems should inform researchers
of what the students is thinking or reasoning about—specifically, the ontology, and
therefore the beliefs that such a learner has concerning what has been encoded by MRS.
Beliefs about reality and the correspondence to Physics are inextricably linked through
MRS.
3
According to Pintrich (2012), it is unclear at this time how representational
systems influence epistemological change when deployed in learning environments of
any type. Historically, the lessons learned from the advance of the learning sciences have
shown that personal choices in representational systems are critical to the metacognitive
strategies that lead to increased learning and knowledge transfer (Kafai, 2007) when
situated in learning environments that are collaborative and individually reflective against
the backdrop of prior knowledge (Bransford, Brown, Cocking, & National Research
Council, 1999). The central goal of this research was to determine how thinking and
reasoning with multiple representational systems (MRS)—such as diagrams, symbols,
and natural language—influences epistemological change within the setting of an IP
classroom. The study described herein positions adult community college students in a
learning environment rich with conceptual and representational tools, along with a set of
challenges to their prior knowledge and beliefs. This study answers a long-standing
deficit in the literature on epistemological change (Bendixen, 2012; Pintrich, 2012) by
providing a deeper understanding of the processes and mechanisms of epistemological
change as they pertain to context (domain of knowledge) and representational systems in
terms of the psychological constructs of thinking and reasoning. This chapter will setup
the background for the study research questions based on the current and historical
findings within the fields of personal epistemology research, and the multi-decade
findings of the PER community.
Background of the Study
The current state of research on personal epistemology is one of theoretical
competition (Hofer, 2012: Pintrich, 2012), concerning how learners situated within
4
different contexts, domains of inquiry, and developmental stages obtain epistemological
advancement, as well as whether or not to include the nature of learning alongside the
nature of knowledge and knowing in the definition of personal epistemology (Hammer &
Elby, 2012). The term epistemology deals with the origin, nature, and usage of
knowledge (Hofer, 2012), and thus epistemological change addresses how individual
beliefs are adjusted and for what reasons. Moreover, the field has not produced a clear
understanding of how those learners develop conceptual knowledge about the world with
respect to their personal beliefs about the world (Hofer, 2012). Conceptual change
research has not faired much better, and suffers from a punctuated view of conceptual
change that has been dominated by pre-post testing strategies rather than process studies
(diSessa, 2010). According to Hofer (2012), future research needs to find relations
between psychological constructs and epistemological frameworks in order to improve
methodology and terminology such that comparable studies can be conducted—thus
unifying the construct of personal epistemology within the fields of education and
developmental psychology. Bendixen (2012) suggested that little research on the
processes and mechanisms of epistemological change have been done, and echo the call
by Hofer and Pintrich (1997) for more qualitative studies examining the contextual
factors that can constrain or facilitate the process of personal epistemological theory
change. Moore (2012) cited the need for research addressing the debate over domaingeneral versus domain-specific epistemic cognition in terms of the features of learning
environments that influence learning and produce qualitative changes in the complexity
of student thinking.
5
Wiser and Smith (2010) described some of the deep connections that exist
between concept formation, ontology, and personal epistemology, within a framework of
metacognitive control that is central to modeling phenomena through both top-down and
bottom-up mental processes. These sorts of cognitive developments depend on the ability
to use representational systems that are rational (mathematics) and/or metaphorical
(natural language), within a methodological context that is empirical (measurement) in
nature. The student’s transition from holding a naïve theory—such as objects possess a
force property—to holding a more sophisticated or expert theory—that forces act on
objects (Hammer & Elby, 2012)—is by means of representational systems that serve in
part as epistemic resources for modeling real-world phenomena (Bing & Redish, 2012;
Moore et al., 2013). Moreover, it is the coupling of internal representations (mental
models) with the external representations that we call models, which is critical to the
reasoning process (Nersessian, 2010) and its assessment. These findings suggest an
intimate connection between personal epistemology and representational systems as they
function in concert with thinking, reasoning, and conceptual change; however, they do so
without specifying any particular tools. The central aim of this research is to describe
how MRS are used in the thinking and reasoning that accompanies epistemological
change.
Personal epistemology. Personal Epistemology (PE) has been an expanding field
of inquiry for at least 40 years, with a coalescence of a handful of models and theories
emerging in the late 1990s to early 2000s—such as process and developmental models,
and at least four different assessment instruments for judging the epistemic state of
learners at most any age (Herrón, 2010; Hofer & Pintrich, 2012). While the current
6
models and theories agree on the relationships to variables such as gender, prior
knowledge, beliefs about learning, and critical thinking (Herrón, 2010), it is not clear at
this time whether or not a unitary construct for personal epistemology applies in all
cases—suggesting a number of domain-specific (knowledge area such as science) gaps
that need further research.
The content of physics is neither purely rational nor empirical, but also depends
on metaphorical representations—such as the term flow for energy transfer, light is a
particle/wave, and electrons tunneling through quantum spaces—in order to foster the
understanding of complex phenomena and their underlying theories (Brewe, 2011;
Lancor, 2012; Scherr, Close, McKagan, & Vokos, 2012; Scherr, Close, Close, & Vokos,
2012). One of the earliest attempts to measure personal epistemology was the Psychoepistemological Profile (PEP) (Royce & Mos, 1980), which measures personal
epistemology on three dimensions: Rational, Empirical, and Metaphorical, and is
therefore an ideal assessment tool for scientific domains of epistemology. The rational
dimension of PEP assumes that knowledge is obtained through reason and logic, whereas
the empirical dimension derives and justifies knowledge through direct observation. The
metaphorical dimension of PEP defines knowledge as derived intuitively with a view to
subsequent verification of its universality.
Representational Systems. Schemata theory (Anderson et al., 1977) suggested a
dynamic process of memory storage and retrieval in concert with the use of
representational systems lead to schemata, which serve as interpretive frameworks within
the process of epistemological advancement. Under the Modeling Instruction Theory for
Teaching Physics (Hestenes, 2010) students are taught to use a representational tool
7
known as a system schema that represents an abstraction of a given picture of some
physical situation. Specifically, this diagrammatic tool compels students to represent
various objects and interactions with regard to the system that governs them, and these
relationships are then productive for various aspects of the problem-solving event. One of
its capacities is as an error-checking device that validates (or invalidates) the equation
model of the same system—such as verifying the equation set adequately represents the
superposition of forces. Simply put, you can move forward with a solution (decision)
once you have verified that nothing was (a) left out of the model or (b) included
illegitimately. The use of multiple representational systems within an IE classroom force
the reconciliation of multiple schemata on singular and/or connected phenomena. This
sort of conceptual turbulence challenges the epistemic stance of the learner, and thereby
provides an opportunity to detect epistemological change as a function of MRS.
Hestenes (2010) deployed multiple types of representations for encoding structure
in terms of systemic (links among interacting parts), geometric (configurations and
locations), object (intrinsic properties), interaction (causal), and temporal (changes in the
system) as ways to model and categorize the observation that students of science make in
an effort to mimic the expert view. In these ways, MRS are instrumental for the modeling
the structure of physical phenomena (Plotnitsky, 2012; Scherr et al., 2012), and therefore
serve as evidence of what students believe the varied representational conventions of
mathematics and physics are capable of describing. The status as of MRS as elements of
epistemological change is the primary research question in this study.
8
Problem Statement
It was not known how (a) thinking and reasoning with MRS occurs, and (b) how
that sort of thinking and reasoning affects epistemological change in terms of
mechanisms and processes—whether cognitive, behavioral, or social—in an IP
classroom. Moreover, as shown in the review of the literature herein, it is not clear what
anyone means by the terms thinking and reasoning within any context. The use of
representational systems—such as symbols, diagrams, and narratives—is undoubtedly
central to the progress of science education by virtue of its ubiquitous deployment in the
realm of natural science itself (Plotnitsky, 2012; Scherr, Close, McKagan & Vokos,
2012). Given the cognitive filter that personal epistemology provides for the acquisition
and the application of knowledge (Schommer-Aikins, 2012), it seemed reasonable to
investigate the nature of epistemological change in concert with the thinking and
reasoning that occurs by means of the representational systems associated with a domain
of knowledge—such as IP. The importance of this study hinged on its ability to answer a
long-standing deficit in the literature on epistemological change (Bendixen, 2012;
Pintrich, 2012) by providing a deeper understanding of the processes and mechanisms of
epistemological change as they pertain to context (domain of knowledge) and
representational systems in terms of the psychological constructs of thinking and
reasoning. These findings better inform the Physics Education Research (PER)
community concerning the capacity that MRS have for encoding meaning during the
scientific thinking and reasoning process, while simultaneously clarifying what is meant
by those processes. Moreover, the relative importance of personal epistemology in the
process of conceptual change—either as a barrier or a promoter—is the kind of
9
information needed for continued progress in the PER reform effort, as well as learning
theory in general. The importance of advancing scientific thinking and reasoning,
conceptual change—in terms of epistemological change—lies in the clear evidence from
PER that conceptual change has a positive effect on achievement in terms of problemsolving skills (Coletta & Phillips, 2010; Coletta, Phillips & Steinert, 2007a; Hake, 2007).
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this qualitative grounded theory study was to determine how
representational systems deployed in an IP classroom correspond to epistemological
change in accordance with the ways that students therein think and reason, within a study
sample at Central Arizona College—located in Coolidge, Arizona. The collaborative and
writing-intensive nature of the IP curriculum at Central Arizona College lends itself well
to the research questions and methodology of this study. The use of representational
systems—such as symbols, diagrams, and natural language—is undoubtedly central to
the progress of science education by virtue of its ubiquitous deployment in the realm of
natural science itself (Plotnitsky, 2012; Scherr, Close, McKagan & Vokos, 2012). Given
the cognitive filter that personal epistemology provides for the acquisition and the
application of knowledge (Schommer-Aikins, 2012), it seemed reasonable to investigate
the nature of epistemological change in concert with the thinking and reasoning that
occurs by means of the representational systems associated with a domain of
knowledge—such as IP. The researcher identified the mechanisms of epistemological
change (Bendixen, 2012) as they correspond to thinking and reasoning with MRS. The
value of such knowledge to educational reform efforts is significant in terms of (a) the
10
specific mechanisms for epistemological change (Bendixen, 2012), and (b) the
psychological constructs that generate them (Hofer, 2012).
Ongoing PER reform efforts—such as the development of assessment instruments
and pedagogical change—will benefit tremendously from knowing the types and
frequencies of deployment for representational systems that are effective for producing
conceptual and epistemological change in IP. Furthermore, the relative frequency of use
coupled with personal stances about the usefulness of those representational systems will
provide the information needed to reform instruction in topics that tend to confuse
students during their learning trajectory.
Research Questions and Phenomenon
The goal of this qualitative grounded theory study was to determine the influence
that multiple representational systems (MRS) have on the thinking and reasoning of 2030 community college IP students at Central Arizona College with respect to their
conceptual frameworks and personal epistemology. Forty-four semi-structured interviews
based on instructional goals, survey response data, and student journal entries were
conducted at regular intervals during the study in order to obtain emergent themes
concerning how students think and reason about symbols and operations in mathematics,
as well as how they monitor their own thinking about the same. Journals and semistructured interviews—in the form of group Socratic dialogs—reveal the ways in which
students shift between representational systems (languages) in an effort to model
mathematical systems, while providing ample means for triangulating the data in parallel
with field notes and memos made by the author-researcher. Multiple electronic polls were
11
given throughout the treatment in order to capture opinions about thinking and reasoning,
knowledge acquisition and usage, as well as how concepts and beliefs change as a result.
As shown in the forthcoming review of the literature, thinking and reasoning are
poorly defined and often conflated (Evans, 2012; Evans & Over, 2013; Mulnix, 2012;
Nimon, 2013; Peters, 2007). Given the absence of consensus on the definitions of
thinking and reasoning within the research literature, the author proposed new definitions
for thinking and reasoning as a means for coding, counting, and classifying instances of
student thinking and reasoning with representational systems that were based on the
synthesis of a model for thinking put forward by Paul and Elder (2008). Thinking is
defined as the ability to construct a model, and reasoning is defined as the ability to relate
two or more models. A model is simply any representation of structure, and structure
refers to the way in which relations can be encoded (Hestenes, 2010). The following
research questions were crafted in such a manner as to encompass the gap in the literature
related to the process and mechanisms of epistemological change as they relate to the
psychological constructs of thinking and reasoning within the domain of IP, as well as the
features of Hofer’s epistemic cognition model (Hofer, 2004; Sinatra, Kienhues, & Hofer,
2014) involving the domain of knowledge, the contextual factors of the learning
environment, and how student reflection within the curriculum conveys towards
metacognitive monitoring.
Qualitative Research Questions
R1 :
How do IP students use representational systems in their thinking and
reasoning?
12
R2 :
How does the use of MRS in the thinking and reasoning of IP students
promote personal epistemological change?
In order to facilitate an investigation of these research questions, a series of
activities comprising the standard curriculum of IP students at a rural community college
will be studies. Beginning with group discussions, journals and surveys on the nature of
Physics and reality, students then begin to deploy new representational systems designed
to expose and refine conceptions of number and mathematical operations that are critical
to the language of Physics. These advances are then carried forward to an investigation of
motion that serves as the basis of the entire course. Exit interviews at the semesters end
reflected on all that was learned and how the conceptual and representational tools used
throughout the course influence thinking, reasoning, and personal epistemology.
Advancing Scientific Knowledge
As described in the forthcoming literature review, a lack of clarity exists in the
literature concerning the definitions of thinking and reasoning; however, there is an
abundance of claims that all sorts of thinking and reasoning underlie every advance in
human learning. In order to facilitate more efficient data collection, the author introduced
definitions of thinking and reasoning as follows. Thinking is defined as the ability to
construct a model. This definition is (a) flexible enough to encompass any
representational system, (b) straightforward enough to permit the kinds of frequency
distributions and classification schemes that enable direct measurement of this cognitive
behavior, and is (c) inspired by the work of PER pioneers cited herein, such as Hestenes,
Hake, Redish, and Mazur. The term model is simply any representation of structure
(Hestenes, 2010), and structure is a broader term—open to wide interpretation—
13
encompassing the way that interconnectedness between and within systems is articulated.
Furthermore, the term reasoning is defined herein as the ability to relate two or more
models; and therefore, coordinates the terms in a manner that lends consistency and
coherence to the measure of these cognitive behaviors by simply counting attempts.
Little research has been done exploring the particular mechanisms of
epistemological change along developmental trajectories or with respect to the
dimensions of personal epistemology (Bendixen, 2012; Hofer, 2012). Moreover, it was
not known how representational systems influence such change when deployed in
learning environments of any type (Pintrich, 2012). Personal epistemology is linked to
conceptual change (Bendixen, 2012; Hofer, 2012), and representational systems are
required for producing conceptual change (diSessa, 2010). The gap in the literature that
this study addresses is the lack of connections that exists between representational
systems, conceptual change, and epistemological change, and what processes and
mechanisms are productive for such change (Bendixen, 2012; Hofer, 2012; Pintrich,
2012). The persistent question of educational research is ‘what works best and why?’ and
it is the lived experience of learners situated in an IP classroom that should expose their
thoughts and beliefs concerning the representational tools that they use and/or struggle
with when encoding for meaning.
The PER literature speaks extensively to improving the thinking and/or reasoning
skills of students in introductory physics courses (Coletta & Phillips, 2010; Coletta et al.,
2007a; Hake, 2007), without ever providing or relying on a clear definition for thinking
or reasoning in general terms. Thinking and reasoning within the context of problem
solving is part of the functional relationship that exists between the personal
14
epistemology of students and their learning in general (Lising & Elby, 2005; SchommerAikins & Duell, 2013). The use of representational systems—such as symbols, graphs,
diagrams, and narratives—is undoubtedly central to the progress of science education by
virtue of its ubiquitous deployment in the realm of natural science itself. The evidence
cited herein shows a lack of clarity on the mechanisms of conceptual and epistemological
change as they correspond to (1) one another, and (2) towards problem-solving skills.
Moreover, it is not clear what sort of thinking and reasoning is being deployed in an
effort to produce those changes in a knowledge-domain requiring MRS (Plotnitsky,
2012). This study addressed all of these concerns at the focal point of epistemological
change, and thus answered the call for clarity and mechanistic description within the
literature.
Significance of the Study
The role of representational systems is believed to be a factor in promoting
conceptual and epistemological change in settings such as Introductory Physics
classrooms (Brewe et al., 2013), as well as learning in general (Lising & Elby, 2005;
Pintrich, 2012). This research sought to understand (1) what, if any, connection(s) exist
between thinking and reasoning with MRS and epistemological change—as prescribed in
the research questions, and then (2) begin to unravel the types and numbers of
representational systems that are effective for promoting those changes by specifying the
mechanisms (Bendixen, 2012) and processes (Hofer, 2012) found therein. The value of
such knowledge to educational reform efforts is significant, as it identified specific
mechanisms for epistemological change (Bendixen, 2012) in terms of the psychological
constructs that generate them (Hofer, 2012), as well as the epistemic resources for
15
conceptual formation (Bing & Redish, 2012; Wiser & Smith, 2010) and change
(Jonassen, Strobel, & Gottdenker, 2005) within learning environments designed for
epistemic change (Muis & Duffy, 2013).
The importance of epistemological change for this study is evident in its close
connection to the field of conceptual change (diSessa, 2010) and how they are
coordinated in PER through the use of representational systems (Brewe et al., 2013).
Moreover, epistemological change would be better understood in terms of the influence
of representational systems (Pintrich, 2012) and the incremental processes associated
with conceptual change (diSessa, 2010), while also contributing to the lack of theoretical
clarity that persists in defining each of these constructs (Hofer, 2012; Pintrich, 2012). A
secondary goal that is inextricably linked to the primary goal, is to clearly distinguish
thinking and reasoning from one another, and how MRS are used to encode the meaning
evident in those constructs. Such a discovery has the potential for providing a general
metric for the constructs of thinking and reasoning in any domain of knowledge with
respect to the representational systems that accompany it.
Personal epistemology has connections with multiple fields of psychology and
learning science including conceptual change (diSessa, 2010; Jonassen et al., 2005,
Nersessian, 2010), metacognition (Barzilai & Zohar, 2014; Bromme, Pieschl, & Stahl,
2010; Hofer, 2012; Hofer & Sinatra, 2010; Mason & Bromme, 2010; Muis, Kendeou &
Franco, 2011), self-regulated learning (Cassidy, 2011; Greene, Muis & Pieschl, 2010;
Muis & Franco, 2010), and self-efficacy through locus of control (Cifarelli, GoodsonEspy, & Jeong-Lim, 2010; Kennedy, 2010). Each of these constructs or cognitive
functions are communicated through representational systems that students presumably
16
think and reason about along their way to an understanding that shapes their set of
personal beliefs. Research that seeks to obtain a deeper understanding of the processes
and mechanisms associated with changes along any of those dimensions will have a
lasting impact on multiple areas of psychology and learning science in general.
The PER community has promoted, created, and uncovered a vast array of IE
methods that have surely improved learning outcomes in IP classrooms (Coletta &
Phillips, 2010; Coletta et al., 2007a; Hake, 1998; Hestenes, 2010)—and therefore some
sort of cognitive behavior. So while there is little doubt that some sort of thinking and/or
reasoning is going on while students are learning any topic, it is not clear in the literature
what the specific qualities of thinking and reasoning are when it comes to learning in IP.
Given the deep connections that exist between metacognition and epistemological
frameworks (Barzilai & Zohar, 2014), the effort to obtain the factors of epistemological
change in terms of the tools that are instrumental to that effect present a grand
opportunity to the teaching and learning enterprise.
Rationale for Methodology
A qualitative approach was used in this study. The foundations of qualitative
research rest on the inductive analysis that makes developing an understanding of the
phenomena from the viewpoint of the participants possible (Merriam, 2010) in a manner
that respects how the meaning is constructed in social settings (Yin, 2011) where the
researcher is the primary data collection instrument responsible for producing a richly
descriptive account of the outcomes (Merriam, 2010). Given the nature of the study on
personal epistemology—beliefs about knowledge and its acquisition—and how students
obtain advances in personal epistemology, qualitative methods lend themselves best to
17
the project described herein because they provide a richer description (Schommer-Aikins,
2012), of the lived experience of the study participants (Charmaz, 2006; Glaser &
Strauss, 2009). Moreover, given that the research design was grounded theory, the
necessity of qualitative methodology for data collection and analysis is properly
constrained within this methodology by virtue of its underlying logic and interpretive
framework (Charmaz, 2006).
Nature of the Research Design for the Study
A grounded theory approach (Charmaz, 2006) was used in designing this
qualitative study in order to produce a substantive theory capable of describing the
complex interactions that comprise the phenomena of thinking and reasoning with MRS,
and its influence on epistemological change within the context of a community college IP
classroom. Grounded theory is a qualitative design that allows a researcher to form an
abstract theory of processes or interactions that are grounded in the views of the
participants (Charmaz, 2006; Glaser & Strauss, 2009). Given the fact that personal
epistemology is entirely about personal beliefs and viewpoints, a grounded theory
exploration of the underlying mechanisms and processes of epistemological change is
entirely consistent with the research questions probing how students think and reason
their way towards epistemological change using MRS.
Approximately 30 students comprise the study population from which archived
data will be drawn at Central Arizona College—which is consistent with the 20-30 study
participants recommended for grounded theory research by Creswell (2013), and the 3050 participants suggested by Morse (2000). Charmaz (2006) suggested that 25 interviews
are sufficient for grounded theory designs on small projects. Given the current study is
18
using interviews, written journals, and electronic polls, a group of slightly more than 30
student participants should be more than adequate for obtaining the level of theoretical
saturation which is the ultimate criterion for sample size in grounded theory designs
(Corbin & Strauss, 2008). The archived data in this study will include numerous student
journals throughout the IP curriculum, group discussion transcripts, and miscellaneous
assessment results—such as Force Concept Inventory (FCI), and the Psychoepistemological Profile (PEP)—that are all part of the normal classroom experience of IP
students at Central Arizona College, which were selected purposively due to their
suitability for the study and amount of data available for the researcher. In order to
eliminate as much researcher bias as possible, archived data was used.
Grounded theory design was selected because of its capacity to capture in theory
the ‘how’ of structure and process within a social setting, versus a phenomenological
‘what’ of the events (Birks & Mills, 2011). The research questions proposed for this
study ask how MRS are used in the processes of thinking and reasoning within
epistemological change, and thus fall under the heading of grounded theory by virtue of
the research question itself—which seeks an answer to a how type of question. In order to
make the connection to epistemological change in these terms though, a certain amount
of discourse analysis is required. However, discourse analysis alone cannot answer the
‘how’ questions because such a design is methodologically constrained to the meaning
that is negotiated in the ‘what’ of language rather than the process of negotiating meaning
with language itself (Yin, 2011). Though phenomenology, discourse analysis, and
grounded theory come from different historical and philosophical traditions, the
boundaries between them are somewhat porous in terms of the methodology required for
19
a particular kind of research question (Yin, 2011), as well as the fact that the elements of
one type of question—such as a ‘how’ question—often entail elements of another type of
research question, such as the ‘what’ type (Starks & Trinidad, 2007).
Since the nature of this study’s research questions probe how students use MRS in
their thinking and reasoning for epistemological change, the importance of using
grounded theory as a tool for grounding the theory in the particular viewpoints of the
participants (Charmaz, 2006; Glaser & Strauss, 2009) further solidifies the primacy of
grounded theory over other designs—such as discourse analysis. Personal epistemology
obviously pertains to personal viewpoints, which must be expressed in language. The
language used by IP students is situated in social contexts constrained by the MRS that
are conventionally used within Physics—such as graphs, equation, pictures, and words
(Plotnitsky, 2012). In this case, the viewpoints that are the central focus of personal
epistemological change are developing within a context that can only be described using
a limited set of representational systems. The connection between the personal and social
aspects of the learning environment for this study, in parallel with the particular uses of
MRS (language), was far too intimate to ignore.
Definition of Terms
Conceptual change. In order to define conceptual change, one must first define a
concept. In general, it is the internal representation that learners construct for themselves
based on the external representations of others (Nersessian, 2010). Conceptual change is
measured on many levels from the taxonomic and semantic aspects of how symbols are
related to referents, as well as how those representations correspond to more complex
conceptual structures such as an event (Hestenes, 2010).
20
Multiple representational systems (MRS). The use of words, symbols, and
pictures to in order to communicate an idea or present a model is described as multiple
representations (Fyfe, McNeil, Son, & Goldstone, 2014; Harr et al., 2014), multiple
external representations (Fyfe et al, 2014; Wu & Puntambekar, 2012), and multiple
representational systems (Ainsworth, Bibby, & Wood, 2002) in the literature.
Personal epistemology. The psychological construct of personal epistemology is
used to describe how personal beliefs convey to what knowledge is, how it is obtained,
what it is used for, and how useful it is in any context (Hofer & Pintrich, 2012).
Assumptions, Limitations, Delimitations
The following assumptions are given with respect to this study.
1. It was assumed that survey participants in this study were not be deceptive
with their answers, and that the participants answered questions honestly and
to the best of their ability. The course and curriculum under study was the
regular curriculum for Physics students at Central Arizona College, and
therefore part of the normal experience that counts for a grade.
2. It is assumed that this study was an accurate representation of what is typical
in IE IP classrooms. The instructor (the author) has been trained in IE methods
for the last decade and has based his research on the best practices of the PER
community.
The following limitations/delimitations apply to this study. The generalizability of
the findings that emerge from this study are limited to the IE class of IP classrooms
typically studied by the PER community. According to Merriam (2010), generalizability
in qualitative research must be thought of differently than it is in quantitative designs.
External validity is the qualitative equivalent of generalizability, and is constrained by the
perception that users of the research have with regard to the transferability to another
context or domain of knowledge. The author makes no claims with regard to
generalizability in this study aside from the likelihood that this design could produce
21
similar results in other IE IP classrooms. This limitation is consistent with the theoretical
and pedagogical norms that persist in that category of instructional practice. One longterm goal of this dissertation is preparatory towards the development of a learning theory
requiring a great deal more than is typically contained in just one dissertation.
1. The student body was not randomly selected. This qualitative study depends
on purposive sampling of qualified students, which was obtained by
identifying students who meet the pre-requisites for taking physics for
university transfer purposes.
2. The study population was limited to two Physics courses at one community
college. The author-researcher has no other access to students.
Summary and Organization of the Remainder of the Study
Conceptual change and epistemological change are connected by the
representational systems used by learners when deploying them in contexts that require
modeling (Hestenes, 2010, Nersessian, 2010). Learning physics requires thinking and
reasoning within a context for problem solving where beliefs about the world are
regularly challenged (Lising & Elby, 2005). However, there is no clear definition of the
terms thinking and reasoning (Nimon, 2013; Peters, 2007) even though scores of types of
thinking are well attested within the literature—specifically with respect to this study:
scientific thinking and reasoning within the context of learning physics (Coletta et al.,
2007a, 2007b; Hake, 1998; Hestenes, 2010).
Chapter 2 presents a review of current and historical research on the connections
that exist between thinking, reasoning, representational systems, conceptual change and
epistemological change, as well as the theoretical foundations underlying the present
study. Chapter 3 describes the methodology and research design for a generic qualitative
design, and the data collection and analysis procedures for this investigation. Chapter 4
22
delivers the actual data analysis with written and graphic summaries of the results, which
lead into an interpretation and discussion of the results, as they relate to the existing body
of research related to the dissertation topic.
The timeline for completing this dissertation consists of three primary stages. In
stage one, the proposal is completed and approved by August 13, 2014—the end of
PSY955 Dissertation 1, and subsequently approved in PSY960 Dissertation 2. Data
collection begins immediately in PSY960 Dissertation 2 in conjunction with the start of
the courses being studied at Central Arizona College that begin on August 18th. The
analysis phase began subsequent to the approved Proposal in July 2015, and the data
analysis was completed during PSY969 Research Continuation 4. The remainder of the
dissertation was completed during PSY970 Research Continuation 5 in January 2016.
23
Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction to the Chapter and Background to the Problem
The basic premise of this research was that the use of MRS is the fundamental
feature of the kinds of thinking and reasoning that promote both conceptual and
epistemological change; however, this study was concerned with just the connections that
exist between thinking and reasoning with MRS and personal epistemological change.
Specifically, that the resources for conceptual change are contingent on the resources for
epistemic change, if not entirely the same. Moreover, the inherent need of
representational systems for communicating meaning is central to conceptual change as
well as the set of personal beliefs that accompany personal epistemology. The extent to
which epistemological change is connected to the deployment of MRS, is the central
research focus that is capable of better informing all PER initiatives concerning the
foundations of thinking and reasoning required for this sort of change.
The current state of research on the personal epistemology of learners situated
within different contexts, domains of inquiry, and developmental stages, has not
produced a clear understanding of how those learners (a) develop conceptual knowledge
about the world with respect to (b) their personal beliefs about the world as it (c) relates
to physics (Hofer, 2012). However, there is evidence showing that when the science
pedagogy matches the science practice, then students are more likely to obtain positive
conceptual change based on the features of instruction and curricular content upon which
student beliefs about the world are formed (Lee & Chin-Chung, 2012). Conceptual
change research has also failed to produce clear understanding of how learners develop
conceptual knowledge about the world, and suffers from a punctuated view of conceptual
24
change that has been dominated by pre-post testing strategies rather than process studies
(diSessa, 2010).
According to Hofer (2012), future research needs to find relations between
psychological constructs and epistemological frameworks. Bendixen (2012) suggested
that little research on the processes and mechanisms of epistemological change have been
done, and echo the call by Hofer and Pintrich (1997) for more qualitative studies
examining the contextual factors that can constrain or facilitate the process of personal
epistemological theory change. The general call for studies probing the connections that
exist between conceptual and epistemological change, as well as the processes and
mechanisms that are productive for those changes, is clearly warranted by these findings.
Moreover, the PER literature also includes studies into the connection between personal
epistemology and conceptual change in terms of representational systems (Brewe et al.,
2013; Lising & Elby, 2005), lending further warrant to the study proposed herein.
Though the particular research questions for this study were focused on epistemological
change, the findings cited thus far warrant a discussion of conceptual change in this
literature review.
Wiser and Smith (2010) describe some of the deep connections that exist between
concept formation, ontology, and personal epistemology, within a framework of
metacognitive control that is central to modeling phenomena through both top-down
(perceptions influenced by prior knowledge) and bottom-up (perceptions influenced by
new data) mental processes. These sorts of cognitive developments depend on the ability
to use representational systems that are rational (mathematics) and/or metaphorical
(natural language), within a methodological context that is empirical (measurement) in
25
nature. The student’s transition from naïve to expert theories is by means of
representational systems that serve in part as epistemic resources for modeling real-world
phenomena (Bing & Redish, 2012; Hestenes, 2010; Moore et al., 2013). Moreover, it is
the coupling of internal representations (mental models) with the external representations
that we call models, which is critical to the reasoning process and its assessment
(Nersessian, 2010). These findings suggest an intimate connection between personal
epistemology and representational systems as they function in concert with thinking,
reasoning, and conceptual change; however, they do so without specifying any particular
tools. The central aim of this research was to identify some of the most basic
representational tools that are instrumental for epistemological change.
The Physics Education Research (PER) community has claimed significant gains
in student thinking and reasoning (Coletta & Phillips, 2010; Coletta et al., 2007a; Hake,
2007) through conceptual change (Hake, 1998), without ever defining what is meant by
the terms thinking and reasoning. As shown in the forthcoming review of the literature,
thinking and reasoning are poorly defined and often conflated (Mulnix, 2012; Nimon,
2013; Peters, 2007). In order to facilitate more efficient data collection, the author
introduced definitions of thinking and reasoning as follows. Thinking is defined as the
ability to construct a model. This definition is (1) flexible enough to encompass any
representational system, (2) straightforward enough to permit the kinds of frequency
distributions and classification schemes that enable direct measurement of this cognitive
behavior, and is (3) inspired by the work of PER pioneers cited herein, such as Hestenes,
Hake, Redish, and Mazur. The term model is simply any representation of structure
(Hestenes, 2010), and structure is a broader term—open to wide interpretation—
26
encompassing the way that interconnectedness between and within systems is articulated.
Furthermore, the term reasoning is defined herein as the ability to relate two or more
models; and therefore, coordinates the terms in a manner that lends consistency and
coherence to the measure of these cognitive behaviors by simply counting attempts.
Though the reform movement as studied in the PER literature has obtained
notable success (Coletta et al., 2007a, 2007b; Hake, 1998), one question that emerges
from the gaps in this body of literature, as well as the persistent conflation of the terms
thinking and reasoning that are common to both the literature and the discourse of math
and science education research (Glevey, 2006), is what exactly do we mean by thinking
and reasoning?
The search terms “definition of thinking” OR “thinking is defined” in scholarly
journals whose names include psycholog* OR cogn* OR educ* yielded only 118 peerreviewed articles from 1963 to 2014 in EBSCO Academic Search Complete (EBSCO),
and 47 articles from 1991 – 2014 in ProQuest—as illustrated below in Table 1.
Table 1
Literature Review Search Pattern 1
Date Range
1963 - 2014
Type of thinking
Critical
Other
Hits in EBSCO
27
91
Hits in ProQuest
—
—
1991 - 2014
Critical
Other
—
—
23
24
These initial search results indicate dominance on the field of research by critical
thinking that has remained stable over the years since 1963, yet waning in recent years. In
both databases, the table entry for “other” is predominantly filled with n = 1 tallies, while
the remainder are n = 2. In other words, somewhere between one-half and three-quarters
27
of published research on thinking is scattered among scores of types of thinking distinct
from critical thinking, or types of thinking such as schizophrenic thinking, that are not
applicable to this study. Table 2 below illustrates a more recent tally for the search terms
given above.
Table 2
Literature Review Search Pattern 2
Date Range
2004 - 2014
Type of thinking
Critical
Other
Hits in EBSCO
16
70
Hits in ProQuest
5
15
2009 - 2014
Critical
Other
8
31
3
8
Applying the same search criteria for a definition of reasoning yielded only 31
articles in EBSCO for the years 1981 – 2014, and 6 articles in ProQuest for the years
1996 – 2014. Restricting the years to 2004 – 2014 produced on 4 ProQuest and 21
EBSCO articles, whereas a 2009 – 2014 search obtained only 3 ProQuest and 9 EBSCO
articles. Changing the search constraints in both databases to just the term “thinking”
produced 946 EBSCO and 652 ProQuest articles for the years 2004 – 2014. This means
that at best, roughly 9% of all research making claims about thinking in the last 10 years
operated with a clear definition of the term. An identical search for the term “reasoning”
produced 601 EBSCO and 152 ProQuest articles—indicating that approximately 3% of
research articles in the last 10 years made claims about reasoning without the aid of a
basic definition.
This review of the literature was structured in terms of how the theories and the
histories of conceptual and epistemological change correspond to the progress of learning
in general, and physics in particular. Though the study was particularly focused on
28
epistemological change, thinking and reasoning within the context of IP has been
historically concerned with conceptual change. However, a great deal of research in
personal epistemology has occurred within IP classrooms; hence the need to give
attention to both conceptual and epistemological change in this literature review.
Additionally, the constructs of thinking and reasoning were considered in general
psychological terms as well as the particulars of Physics education. Self-regulated
learning, self-efficacy, metacognition, and student journaling converge on the
aforementioned theoretical aspects of this study in terms of conceptual and
epistemological change, as well as classroom management and the curriculum used by
the study sample.
The foundations of this study were both theoretical and conceptual, consisting of
the constructs of personal epistemology, thinking and reasoning, and representational
systems—as well as the connections that exist between them and conceptual change,
metacognition, self-efficacy, self-regulated learning, and locus of control. Though the
study was focused on personal epistemology, the entailments listed herein are given
treatment in this chapter in accord with how they influence the study and research
questions. Personal epistemology, thinking and reasoning, and representational systems
were the central focus of the two research questions that are given in the so-named
subsections of the section titled theoretical and conceptual foundations. Metacognition,
self-efficacy, self-regulated learning, and locus of control were factors of the study
environment by virtue of research demonstrating that particular pedagogical and
curricular interventions—such as journaling—convey to changes in these same
constructs, and are covered in the subsection titled self-efficacy, self-regulation, and
29
journaling. In this way, they served as conceptual foundations for the study in terms of
what to expect in the data analysis phase.
The literature review section of chapter two builds on the theoretical and
conceptual foundations as they apply first to epistemological and conceptual change in
general, and second to how thinking and reasoning within the context of IP conveys to
personal epistemological change within that domain, and perhaps in general. This section
begins with brief histories of personal epistemology research and the attempts to assess
this construct, followed by a discussion of how personal epistemology and conceptual
change intersect as fields of research. The remainder of the literature review consists of
subsections addressing conceptual change in IP, personal epistemology in IP, and
thinking and reasoning in IP classroom settings.
Theoretical Foundations and Conceptual Framework
Personal epistemology. Piaget’s cognitive developmental process of
equilibration (Piaget, 1970) is—from a historical perspective—central to the theoretical
underpinnings of what personal epistemology researchers call epistemological
advancement (Bendixen, 2012). Hofer (2004) suggested the concept of epistemic
metacognition as a way to understand how students shift beliefs through reflection, while
epistemic beliefs also constrain and/or advance conceptual change.
In either case, the domain of knowledge and the educational context determine the
direction and magnitude of such transitions in personal epistemology, as well as its
overall advancement for the student. Scientific reasoning is naturally recursive by virtue
of the fact that empirical investigations challenge the models and hypotheses put forward
by scientists—thus forcing the type of declarative metacognition (Hofer & Sinatra, 2010)
30
that influences personal beliefs. IE physics classrooms attempt to simulate the behavior
of a scientific community by virtue of a discourse that is based on inquiry, collaboration,
and consensus building (Bruun & Brewe, 2013; Hestenes, 2010; Irving & Sayre, 2014).
Moreover, the very nature of an IE physics classroom relies on leveraging
representational systems in order to produce a change in beliefs about the real world
through conceptual change. However, in practice, conceptual change interventions differ
from epistemological change interventions by virtue of the fact that conceptual change
instruction seeks to merely confront and change existing beliefs, whereas epistemological
change instruction seeks to influence how beliefs direct learning and the enactment of
epistemology in the classroom (Ding, 2014). Epistemic recursion is therefore a key factor
in scientific advance, and is one way to understand Hofer’s conceptual model of
epistemic metacognition—which served as the conceptual framework of this study.
Thinking and reasoning. In the new paradigm for the psychology of reasoning,
probability rather than logic, is the rational basis for understanding all human inference
(Pfeifer, 2013). Moreover, thinking and reasoning are coupled through the new paradigm
in dual-process theories by virtue of the fact that Type 2 (reflective process) thinking is
defined as enabling “us to reason by supposition, engaging in hypothetical thinking and
mental simulation decoupled from some of our actual beliefs” (Evans & Over, 2013),
whereas Type 1 intuitive thinking is fast and automatic concerning the feeling of
confidence that accompany answers or decisions (Evans, 2012). Common definitions of
the term thinking refer to particular cognitive processes such as transformations of mental
representations (Holyoak & Morrison; 2012; Sinatra & Chinn, 2011), or even cognition
as a general process (Nimon, 2013), whereas reasoning has become synonymous with
31
cognitive processing in general (Evans, 2012) via memory and reasoning for decision
making in social habitats (Rai, 2012). Mulnix (2012, p. 477) conflates the terms thinking
and reasoning by stating, “Critical thinking is the same as thinking rationally or reasoning
well.” Such definitions are clearly circular, and therefore do nothing in the effort to
clarify what is meant by the psychological construct, much less the neuropsychological
reality in terms of neurons and various regions of the brain.
Piaget operationalized the construct of thinking in terms of developmental stages,
whereas more modern cognitivists adopted an information-theoretic approach based on
brain waves, and connectionist notions of neural systems (Peters, 2007). Vygotsky
defined it simply as dialog (Fernyhough, 2011). In describing the conceptions of
philosophers such as Hegel, Heidegger, Kant, and Wittgenstein, Peters (2007) listed
thinking as representation, opinion-making, scientific problem-solving, revealing what is
concealed, and concept-making—thereby covering most of psychology in the broadest
sense of the term, while giving little by way of specific mechanisms.
These assertions made within the literature suggested a need for greater clarity in
defining both thinking and reasoning before any progress can be made in measuring these
constructs. However, according to Elder and Paul (2007b), all thinking consists of the
following eight elements: the generation of purpose(s), raising questions, using
information, utilization of concepts, inference-making, assumption-making, it generates
implications, and embodies a point of view. Elder and Paul affirm the common treatment
of thinking and reasoning as virtually synonymous terms in their assertion that “whenever
we think, we reason” (Elder & Paul, 2007b, “All Humans Use Their Thinking”, para. 2).
In other words, thinking is merely a stage of reasoning in the model put forward by Elder
32
and Paul. Reasoning is then defined as a sense-making and conclusion-making process
conducted by the mind, based on reasons—implying an “ability to engage in a set of
interrelated intellectual processes” (Elder & Paul, 2007b, “All Humans Use Their
Thinking”, para. 5), such as the eight elements of thinking already given herein. One
distinguishing factor of thinking relative to reasoning in the model offered by Elder and
Paul, is that thinking is what agents do when making sense of the world, whereas
reasoning is how agents are able to come to decisions about the elements of their thought.
In an attempt to explain how the human mind learns, Elder and Paul (2007a)
define thinking in even more general terms as the process by which we take control of the
mind in an effort to figure things out. Moreover, these thoughts influence our feelings,
and thus the way that we interpret and come to believe various things—in other words,
thinking informs our viewpoints. Given the consistency of this model with the general
scope of personal epistemology, the models and definitions for thinking and reasoning by
Elder and Paul described herein, will serve as a conceptual foundation for what is meant
in this study by constructs of thinking and/or reasoning.
The model put forward by Elder and Paul (2007b) contains 35 dimensions of
critical thought consisting of 9 affective dimensions, and 26 cognitive dimensions broken
into 17 macro-abilities, and 9 micro-skills. Point of view, questioning, assumption
making, and using information are four of the eight elements of thought that also appear
within the cognitive dimension macro-abilities. Of the remaining four elements of
thought, only inference making appears in cognitive dimension micro-skills set. No other
elements of thought are clearly listed within the 35 dimensions, although each of the key
33
terms are—for example, the exploration of implications is listed as a cognitive microskill, but the ability to generate implications is specified in the eight elements of thought.
Figure 1.The eight elements of thought.
All thought, according to Paul and Elder (2008) consists of eight unique elements that are
situated within particular context.
Mulnix (2012) affirms the equivalence of thinking and reasoning that Elder and
Paul (2007a) assert, whereas Evans (2012) places thinking at the heart of decisionmaking and reasoning, as Elder and Paul suggest—in particular, that the process of
thinking generates the reasons that the process of reasoning then bases its conclusions on.
Holyoak and Morrison (2012, p. 1) define thinking as “the systematic transformation of
mental representations of knowledge to characterize actual or possible states of the world,
often in service of goals,” which is essentially goal-directed modeling as defined herein.
These convergences in definitions for the constructs of thinking and reasoning suggest a
recent emergence of coherence in the field that is useful for the purposes of this study.
34
Figure 2. The eight elements of scientific thought.
The general elements of thought remain unchanged when applied in a particular
context—such as natural science.
1
Building a conceptual model for this study. The transition from general thought
to scientific thought is in the specificity of context (Paul & Elder, 2008). In an effort to
distinguish thinking from reasoning, the author proposed the following definitions of
thinking and reasoning as conceptual bases for coding evidence of the same throughout
this study. Thinking is hereby defined as the ability to construct a model—which is one
of the items within the elements scientific of thought given by Paul and Elder, called
concepts. This definition is (1) flexible enough to encompass any representational
system, (2) straightforward enough to permit the kinds of frequency distributions and
classification schemes that enable direct measurement of this cognitive behavior, and is
(3) inspired by the work of PER pioneers cited herein, such as Hestenes, Hake, Redish,
1
From The Miniature Guide for Students and Faculty to Scientific Thinking (Kindle section title Why
Scientific Thinking?), by L Elder and R. Paul, 2008, Copyright 2008 by the Foundation for Critical
Thinking... Reprinted with permission.
35
and Mazur. The term model is simply any representation of structure (Hestenes, 2010),
and structure is a broader term—open to wide interpretation—encompassing the way that
interconnectedness between and within systems is articulated. Furthermore, the term
reasoning is defined herein as the ability to relate two or more models; and therefore,
coordinates the terms in a manner that lends consistency and coherence to the measure of
these cognitive behaviors by simply counting attempts. This definition for reasoning is
consistent with two of the elements of scientific thought suggested by Paul and Elder:
scientific implications and consequences, and scientific point of view.
In the model for scientific thought shown in Figure 2 above, axioms are part of
the assumption that are made rather than the result of any process, whereas in Physics,
axioms are used in order to generate new ones, as well as being part of fundamental
assumptions. Moreover, there are implications and consequences associated with axiom
development—also an element of scientific thought—that must be accounted for. The
right-hand side of Figure 2 is largely empirical in nature, whereas the left-hand side is
rational. To the degree that reasons are generated by thinking about scientific information
in the form of data and observations, and if decisions about the interrelatedness of those
reasons are what comprise reasoning, then the model for scientific thought put forward by
Paul and Elder (2008), already has natural divisions for the constructs of thinking and
reasoning as defined herein by the author. Given that the authors definitions are primarily
for high-level coding that is consistent with the practice of physics in an IP classroom, the
fine-grained distinction put forward in the model by Paul and Elder served as additional
theoretical codes used in the data analysis.
36
Language is the primary means by which human beings encode for meaning. The
academic setting of an Introductory Physics (IP) classroom requires an array of
languages—or what this study calls multiple representational systems (MRS). Words,
symbols, graphs, and diagrams encode various kinds of meaning depending on the
context of student inquiry. The following section addresses this topic with a view to how
encoding for meaning with MRS corresponds to thinking and reasoning.
Representational systems. Representational tools and systems have the capacity
to encode information (Fekete, 2010), promote conceptual change (Johri & Lohani, 2011;
Johri & Olds, 2011), as well as direct inquiry (Moore et al., 2013), scaffold learning
(Eitel et al., 2013), and facilitate the process of knowledge construction (Kolloffel,
Eysink, & Jong, 2011). Fekete (2010) suggested that representations are simply the
realization that there exists an isomorphism (one-to-one relationship) between the
conceptual/perceptual domain, and the activity space where representation occurs.
Activity spaces are technically defined as “spatiotemporal events produced by dynamical
systems” (Fekete, 2010, p. 69), and neural systems in the human brain mimic those
dynamical systems to some degree. The dynamical systems approach is conceptually
equivalent to using most any marker, or token, to describe one thing in terms of
another—which is the general practice of Physics (Plotnitsky, 2012; Wu & Puntambekar,
2012).
Hestenes (2010) deployed multiple types of representations for encoding structure
in terms of systemic (links among interacting parts), geometric (configurations and
locations), object (intrinsic properties), interaction (causal), and temporal (changes in the
system) as ways to model and categorize the observation that students of science make in
37
an effort to mimic the expert view. In these ways, MRS are instrumental for modeling the
structure of physical phenomena, and therefore serve as evidence of what students
believe the varied representational conventions of mathematics and physics are capable
of describing. Their status as mechanisms of epistemological change is the primary
research question at hand.
Waldrip and Prain (2012) have qualitatively tested an intervention that relies
heavily on representational systems in an effort to promote scientific reasoning as a
cognitive activity that involves thinking by means of constructing representations, and
subsequently judging them for their efficacy—which under the model for scientific
thought proposed by Paul and Elder (2008), is both thinking by representation, and
reasoning through judgment of those thoughts. The results they obtained indicate that an
interactive environment where observed phenomena are tested and re-tested, represented
and re-represented, and evaluated through group collaborations that give opportunities to
defend and judge hypotheses, positively influences student confidence and engagement.
The distinction that Fekete (2010) offers in terms of how representations relate to their
encodings is part of the conceptual basis for thinking and reasoning as defined by Paul
and Elder (2008), and described in learning environments by Waldrip and Prain (2012).
Moreover, the features of models in Physics—such as systemic, geometric, object,
interaction, and temporal (Hestenes, 2010)—serve as very particular and fine-grained
conceptual distinctions to be coded for in the qualitative analysis of student artifacts in
this study.
Prior knowledge influences the top-down thinking and reasoning that students
bring to learning habitats where new information found therein is designed to promote
38
bottom-up forms of thinking and reasoning for conceptual, and potentially
epistemological change. However, as shown in the next section, epistemic beliefs are
strong motivators for and against self-regulated learning. In other words, certain beliefs
either promote or stifle the types of thinking and reasoning that are required for learning.
Self-efficacy, self-regulation, and journaling. The epistemic beliefs that
students have concerning the development of scientific knowledge directly influence the
acquisition of that knowledge, and therefore the achievement that shepherd self-concept
and self-efficacy when learning in the scientific domain (Mason, Boscolo, Tornatora, &
Ronconi, 2012; Sawtelle, Brewe, Goertzen, & Kramer, 2012). Cassidy (2011) points out
the fact that academic control is one factor within the complex of self-regulated learning
that competes with a student’s self-evaluation—such as the belief that learning is
dependent on the amount of struggle involved with academic endeavors and inborn traits
such as intelligence (Koksal & Yaman, 2012). Achievement gaps narrow in classrooms
where extensive reading and writing are organic to an engaging experience that
contributes to enhanced motivation, self-efficacy, and locus of control—which are
essential components of active learning and achievement in academic settings (Kennedy,
2010). Moreover, the likelihood that a student will deploy any particular representational
medium—journal or otherwise—depends on factors such as motivation, goal orientation,
self-regulation, and general interest in the domain of knowledge relevant to the setting
(Bodin & Winberg, 2012; Kennedy, 2010). Therefore, providing students with an
opportunity to defend their strategies through discussion and written journals is helpful in
promoting the kinds of self-advocacy that catalyzes self-regulated learning (Cifarelli,
Goodson-Espy, & Jeong-Lim, 2010; Muis & Duffy, 2013). Furthermore, metacognitive
39
monitoring, self-efficacy, and self-regulated learning are optimized when the
epistemological domain of a learner and the epistemology of the domain focus are
matched—such as a rationalist in a mathematics setting (Muis & Franco, 2010).
The aforementioned findings served as a broad conceptual and theoretical
foundation for this study by virtue of the fact that data collection and pedagogy within the
study environment match the general features described therein. Journaling and
collaboration are the central features of the classroom environment where thinking and
reasoning with MRS is being deployed. Muis and Franco (2010) linked metacognitive
monitoring, self-efficacy, self-regulated learning, and epistemology in ways that are
consistent with Hofer’s epistemic metacognition model (Hofer, 2004)—which also
served the overarching conceptual framework for this study. The connections that exist
between metacognition, epistemology, and self-regulated learning (Barzilai & Zohar,
2014; Greene, Muis, & Pieschl, 2010) are relatively new in the literature (Hofer &
Sinatra, 2010), but nonetheless warranted attention in this study given their connections
to the primary data collection method of student journals.
Convergence of conceptual and theoretical foundations. The expression of
epistemic beliefs is typically expressed in the form of language. Within the field of
Physics—and thus an IP classroom—MRS serve as the languages by which a learner is
able to encode for meaning, and therefore transmit in writing or in narratives their own
epistemic stance. Thinking and reasoning are unavoidable cognitive activities for both
conceptual and epistemological change, and are necessarily metaphorical, empirical, and
rational in the context of Physics. The efficacy of journal activities to generate selfefficacy and self-regulated learning through metacognitive monitoring (Muis & Franco,
40
2010), while simultaneously affording the author-researcher a corpus of student artifacts
employing MRS, provides an equally fertile source of data for analysis of student
thinking and reasoning. In these ways, the model for scientific thought (Elder & Paul,
2007b) corresponds with the advance of self-efficacy and self-regulation that is consistent
with epistemic change in scientific domains of knowledge (Mason et al., 2012; Muis &
Duffy, 2013; Sawtelle et al., 2012). Moreover, the use of journals and interviews provides
ample opportunity for the kinds of student reflection that reveal the connections between
conceptual and epistemological change through what Hofer (2004) described as epistemic
metacognition.
Review of the Literature
A brief history of personal epistemology research. Personal Epistemology (PE)
has been an expanding field of inquiry for at least 40 years, with the coalescence of a
handful of models and theories emerging in the late 1990’s to early 2000’s—such as
process and developmental models (Bendixen, 2012), and at least four different
assessment instruments for judging the epistemic state of learners at most any age (Hofer
& Pintrich, 2012). Student beliefs about knowledge are multidimensional and
multilayered, such that the nature of knowledge itself can be described along the
dimensions of certainty and simplicity, whereas the dimensions source of knowledge and
its justification describe the nature of knowing (Hofer & Pintrich, 2012; Mason, Boldrin,
& Ariasi, 2010). Epistemological beliefs are simply beliefs about what knowledge is and
how it is obtained (Richter & Schmid, 2010), and are a form of declarative metacognitive
knowledge (Hofer, 2004). Richter and Schmid (2010) distinguish epistemological
metacognition from psychological metacognition in terms of their differing content—
41
where psychological metacognition refers to mechanisms of memory and learning, and
epistemological metacognition refers to the process by which knowledge is qualified.
Multiple lines of research into personal epistemology in student populations
indicates that fine-grained cognitive resources better explain the formation of beliefs
about learning than do developmental stages, or belief-systems (Hofer & Pintrich, 2012).
Naïve epistemologies are proposed to precede sophisticated ones developmentally—such
that the natural progression of knowledge as facts justified by authority (naïve) is
transformed into a more complex and nuanced network of ideas (sophisticated) that are
understood socially and contingently, and subsequently result in higher achievement
(Bromme et al., 2010). However, Bråten and Strømsø (2005) found that naïve
epistemology produces better results when the topic at hand is unfamiliar and complex—
thus compelling the epistemological framework to rely on authority—whereas a more
sophisticated epistemology relying on knowledge as a more personal and subjective
construction is more likely to misconstrue the textual evidence under analysis.
Sophisticated epistemologies as the means by which learning is positively influenced is
contingent on the context of the task and the level of expertise that task participants
possess (Hammer & Elby, 2012). Both context and skill place particular kinds of
demands on the deployment of representational systems in accordance with the epistemic
beliefs that students possess with respect to the capacity of those systems to encode
meaning.
Developmental models such as the epistemological reflection model (Baxter
Magolda, 2012) offer a constructivist viewpoint for understanding the mechanism(s) for
epistemological change, whereas process-model theorists consider more fine-grained
42
cognitive resources than developmental stages or beliefs (Bendixen, 2012) as a means for
explaining epistemological advance. Finer-grained resources include particular views
about knowledge in general, acquisition of said knowledge, the kinds of and interrelations
of knowledge types, and the sources of that knowledge. Bendixen and Feucht (2010)
offer an integrative model that attempts to capture the clear findings of both the
developmental and cognitive branches of the field, by framing the mechanism of change
as having three distinct components: epistemic doubt, epistemic volition, and resolution
strategies. Epistemic doubt (cognitive dissonance related to beliefs) and epistemic
volition (the will to change) work in concert towards epistemological advance (Rule &
Bendixen, 2010). Resolution strategies are simply reflective, socially interactive,
retrospections by which a person analyzes the implications of personal belief (Baxter
Magolda, 2012; Bendixen, 2012).
Domain-general and domain-specific epistemologies are distinct factors that
influence learning (Lee & Chin-Chung, 2012; Schommer-Aikins & Duell, 2013). In a
study involving 701 college students in the United States, researchers used path analysis
to determine that domain-general beliefs have an indirect effect on performance, whereas
domain-specific (mathematics) beliefs have both direct and indirect effect on
mathematical problem solving. The beliefs that are formed within the context of a
particular domain influence thinking and reasoning more dramatically than do domaingeneral beliefs that apply to all situations. For example, the belief that the average person
learns quickly or not at all was strongly correlated with a weak mathematical background
due to choices influenced by the belief that mathematics is not useful or accessible.
Moreover, the opposite was also found to be true—that a belief that mathematics takes
43
time to learn and is useful is consistent with the practice of taking more mathematics
courses and devoting the diligence to them that accompanies successful skill
development (Schommer-Aikins & Duell, 2013).
While few researchers in the field of personal epistemology doubt the reality of
development stages for epistemological advance, the evidence of domain-specific
processes and environments is the primary reason that the majority of attention has
shifted to the mechanisms of epistemological change in terms of psychological
constructs—such as thinking and reasoning (Hofer & Pintrich, 2012). Strategies for
resolving epistemic doubt (Bendixen & Feucht, 2010) and the implications of and on
personal beliefs (Bendixen, 2012) are metacognitive and epistemological in nature
(Barzilai & Zohar, 2014; Hofer, 2004; Richter & Schmid, 2010), and require some level
of social interaction and individual analysis, as well as a positive affective backdrop from
which motivation leads to concentration and control in problem-solving settings (Bodin
& Winberg, 2012; Muis & Duffy, 2013). With respect to this study, the context of
epistemological advance is scientific, and therefore the thinking and reasoning is as well
(Paul & Elder, 2008).
A brief history of assessment on personal epistemology. One of the earliest
attempts to psychometrically measure personal epistemology was the Psychoepistemological Profile (PEP), which measures the construct on three dimensions:
Rational, Empirical, and Metaphorical (Royce & Mos, 1980). The rational dimension of
PEP assumes that knowledge is obtained through reason and logic, whereas the empirical
dimension derives and justifies knowledge through direct observation. The metaphorical
dimension of PEP sees knowledge as derived intuitively with a view to subsequent
44
verification of its universality. The PEP instrument has demonstrated concurrent validity
based on examination of group scores and their correspondence to the underlying theory
(Royce & Mos, 1980). For example, biologists and chemists were typically strongest on
the empirical dimension of PEP, whereas persons situated in the performing arts were
more metaphorical in nature—just as mathematicians tend to be more rational than any of
the other two PEP dimensions. Furthermore, the construct validity of the PEP has
obtained moderate to moderately high correlations at the p = 0.05 level for the MyersBriggs Personality Test, and the MMPI (Royce & Mos, 1980).
Royce and Mos (1980) also reported positive correlations for each item on the
PEP with the total score in its dimension. Split-half reliability coefficients on two forms
of the PEP indicate satisfactory homogeneity with correlations of r = .75, .85, and .76
corresponding to the rational, metaphoric, and empirical dimensions, respectively, for a
sample of n = 142 students on form V of the test given in 1970, versus correlations of r =
.77, .88, and .77 for a sample of n = 95 students on ...
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