Science
Week 14 Healthcare Response to H1N1 Paper

Question Description

I need someone to fix and edit the Plagiarism in my final paper


Final Paper/Case Study: The final paper is due by the last day (Sunday) of week 14. Each student will be required to write a 6‐9 page (approximately 3000 words) case study on a hospital/healthcare response to a crisis or disaster. The case study must include detailed analysis of the hospital/healthcare setting, the disaster/crisis, assessment of site/location capabilities, evaluation of response challenges and outcomes, and your proposed solutions to the identified challenges. Do NOT just regurgitate the event details, provide solutions and be persuasive. The final paper should demonstrate knowledge of the event and the critical thinking skills needed to respond and recover. Format should be APA in 12 Point Times Roman font; double spaced.

the topic is:

Healthcare response to H1N1


This is my final paper and the Plagiarism test below:

Unformatted Attachment Preview

Results of plagiarism analysis from 2019-04-17 04:17 UTC Healthcare Response to H1N1. doc Date: 2019-04-17 04:12 UTC  All sources 34  Internet sources 34 [0]  https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3168221/ 7.3% 29 matches [1]  https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Pet...n=publication_detail 6.2 % 24 matches [2]  https://www.researchgate.net/publication...ur_global_experience 6.0 % 22 matches [3]  https://www.researchgate.net/publication...y_seasonal_intensity 1.1 % 5 matches [4]  https://www.mja.com.au/system/files/issues/192_02_180110/kel11025_fm.pdf 0.9 % 4 matches [5]  https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pdf/professionals/hhspandemicinfluenzaplan.pdf 0.8 % 4 matches [6]  https://www.science.gov/topicpages/b/bedding.html 0.4% 3 matches [7]  https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3078993/ 0.6% 3 matches [8]  https://www.cdc.gov/MMWR/preview/MMWRhtml/ss5201a1.htm 0.8 % 3 matches [9]  https://www.mja.com.au/journal/2010/192/...y-seasonal-intensity 0.7% 3 matches [10]  https://archive.org/stream/govuscourtsca9briefs3390/govuscourtsca9briefs3390_djvu.txt 0.5% 2 matches [11]  https://www.pnas.org/content/108/3/1140 0.5% 2 matches [12]  https://www.researchgate.net/publication...ccine_adverse_events 0.6% 2 matches [13]  https://www.nvic.org/vaccines-and-diseases/HPV/vaccine-injury.aspx 0.6% 2 matches [14]  https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1615747/ 0.6% 2 matches [15]  www.pacifichealthsummit.org/downloads/Pa...a A H1N1 Vaccine.PDF 0.5% 3 matches [16]  https://articles.mercola.com/measles/precautions.aspx 0.6% 2 matches [17]  theoncologist.alphamedpress.org/content/17/1/125.full 0.5% 2 matches  1 documents with identical matches [19]  europepmc.org/articles/PMC4125604 0.4% 2 matches [20]  https://www.researchgate.net/publication...ic_influenza_vaccine 0.3% 2 matches [21]  https://www.academia.edu/17555985/Crying...to_a_future_pandemic 0.5% 2 matches [22]  https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3060889/ 0.4% 2 matches [23]  https://www.researchgate.net/publication...and_clinical_profile 0.4% 2 matches [24]  https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/7503351 0.4% 1 matches  1 documents with identical matches [26]  https://www.researchgate.net/publication...nsmission_in_Ferrets 0.2 % 1 matches 10.1 % [27]  https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21155062 0.3% 1 matches  1 documents with identical matches [29]  https://www.researchgate.net/publication...t_influenza_pandemic 0.3% 1 matches [30]  https://link.springer.com/article/10.2165/00002018-200225030-00001 0.4% 1 matches [31]  https://www.researchgate.net/publication...etween_2009_and_2012 0.2 % 1 matches [32]  https://www.researchgate.net/publication...e_of_influenza_virus 0.2 % 1 matches [33]  https://www.researchgate.net/publication...l_strain_circulation 0.2 % 1 matches [34]  https://www.researchgate.net/scientific-contributions/2135726640_Terri_B_Hyde 0.2 % 1 matches [35]  https://www.researchgate.net/scientific-contributions/2135727819_Anagha_Loharikar 0.2 % 1 matches [36]  https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3047569/ 0.2 % 1 matches 1 3 pages, 3300 words Plag Level : 10. 1 % selected / 10. 1 % overall 43 matches from 37 sources, of which 37 are online sources. Settings Data policy: Compare with web sources, Check against my documents Sensitivity: M edium Bibliography: Consider text Citation detection: R educe PlagLevel Whitelist: -- Healthcare Response to H1N1 Influenza commonly referred to as the flu is known for its financial and health effect. It happens in two epidemiological types; pandemics and epidemics. Yearly epidemics of regular flue bring about 3 to 5 million instances of severe sickness and global deaths of between 250,000 to 500,000 ("Influenza (Seasonal))," 2019). The economic effect incorporates impalpable expenses of suffering such as decreased life quality and loss, indirect costs like hindered profitability and absenteeism and direct expenses such as hospitalization and medicines. Flu pandemics are rarely contrasted with recurring flu, yet they are extensively dreaded public health crises since they involve substantial economic costs and grave social interruption. Flu pandemics are described by high rates of mortality and extreme sickness, and instances frequently influence high-risk groups as well as other individuals in the populace, counting youthful fit adults, who are less exposed to seasonal flu. The extreme effect of the earlier flu pandemics of the year 1918, 1957, and 1968 laid emphasis on the requirement for preparedness and the capacity of the public health (Azziz‐Baumgartner et al., 2009). Other pandemic dangers since 2000 included the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and the Avian Influenza A (H5N1) that was experienced in 2004 commencing in Southeast Asia and spread all over the world in 2005. These crises further emphasized the significance of public health reaction capacity and containment techniques. Even though its effect was milder than foreseen, the 2009 flu was the earliest of the 21st century. This paper will analyze the healthcare response to H1N1 and some of the lessons learned from our global experience. The World Health Organization (WHO), since its commencement in 1948, has recognized obligations regarding revising and developing approaches to control and contain both seasonal and pandemic flu through national programs and universal preparedness. Although pandemics are universal, the WHO urges countries to come up with their very own national flu programs using the organization's guidance for influenza control and containment and pandemic preparedness that incorporates a planning checklist covering necessary and sought-after components of how to prepare for a pandemic. In the 2009 flu pandemic, almost 100 nations utilized their national strategies to respond to the H1N1 crisis (Fineberg, 2014). The majority of the pandemic preparation up to date has concentrated on the possible risk of the H5N1 virus, frequently identified [5] as the bird flu that has circulated in Asia for a decade. The US Department of Health and [5] Human Services (HHS) has acquired 12.2 million courses of H5N1 pre-pandemic flu vaccine to facilitate the initial wave of a bird flu pandemic. Nevertheless, this pre-pandemic vaccine was not useful against the H1N1 influenza virus. The 2009 H1N1 outbreak ought to be lesson point on just how much volatile the influenza virus can be. It should also strengthen the need to put resources into innovative work with the goal we can adjust and respond to any influenza virus changes. During the outbreak of new H1N1 strain of flu in April 2009 in Mexico, it seemed to be linked with high rate mortality. Media houses helped raise concerns all over the world that it could be a repeat of the events related with 1918 to 1919 ‘Spanish flu' when a vast number of individuals died cause of influenza. This activated globally, pandemic policies intended to deal with anticipated new destructive flu strains like H5N1, the bird flu. Readily available vaccines and antiviral medications and the strategies that could best stop the spread of the virus were at the main subjects discussed as nations and their citizens inquired about the global impacts of the illness. The influenza virus was seen to spread all over the planet rapidly. Nevertheless, by May 2009, statistics from America demonstrated that its destructiveness was significantly not as much as that at first reported in Mexico (Louie et al., 2009). The case casualty rate was probably less than one in every 10,000 individuals who were infected. Conversely, there were some worries that during the winter that was approaching in that year the Southern Hemisphere could still encounter the virulence. In June 2009 when winter came, there were cases reported of influenza in southern Australia (Kelly, 2010). But, the rate of mortality was low and comparable to what was witnessed in Canada and America amid their spring. Records from numerous nations additionally demonstrated that the older individuals appeared to be somewhat protected from the virus apparently because of past diseases with other flu infections and hence they were immune. In any case, there were other groups of people that were increasingly vulnerable [0] to the virus. Generally, these were the same groups that were typically more at risk amid seasonal flu such as the people with heart and lung diseases. One shocking fact during the outbreak was that pregnant women were also at a much higher risk. They had a death and hospitalization rate of 3 to10 times more upper contrasted with other women in a similar age bracket. Whereas young adults and kids had very high infection rates, but their general danger of dying was low. By population, the individuals who were younger than 30 years with no risk factors, the possibility of dying amid the Australian winter epidemic was less than 1 for every million individuals, although an expansive extent of kids globally was infected (Jayaraman et al., 2011). The virus was likewise possibly widely spreading and a lot sooner than was thought to be in the first place. In Victoria, for instance, the spread was perhaps weeks before it being initially recognized likely during the period it was first identified in America. This was the same case with Mexico where the spread was six months before the findings from the research center were analyzed. With all the significant new pandemic flu strains such as swine flu, Hong Kong flu and Asian flu there were holdups before it is known that they were tackling a new strain of infection. This delayed diagnosis implied that containment attempts were challenging or to some extent unfeasible. The widespread of the disease happened for a long time before the acknowledgment that the strain that they were dealing with was new. A considerable number of individuals with the new virus had just a mild infection, and hence it was not identified until people started being admitted in hospital in huge amounts than expected. A huge number of individuals with a ‘new' disease has just very mild illness and hence goes unobserved until a huge number of individuals are admitted to hospital ordinarily with complexities like bacterial pneumonia. After huge numbers of people were admitted, it was then that they discovered that something strange was happening. Also, it is a daunting process of isolating a virus and acquiring results from the laboratories thus identifying a new infection takes time and it most likely is identified after it has spread widely. This makes any containment strategies challenging and also implies that immunizations dependent on modern egg-based innovation will never be accessible promptly. Attempts that were made to control the infection in regions where it [0] was not spreading seemed to fail for "swine flu" all over the globe. In Australia, when it became apparent that the containment attempts were not working, they developed a newly characterized plan ‘Protect phase,' which was later included to the past flu [0] containment strategies (Bishop, Murnane & Owen, 2009). This is suitably focused on the health resources around the individuals who were known to be at higher risk and hence more susceptible to complications as opposed to the whole populace. Comparative methodologies were then put into practice all over the world. One of the first nations to have a vaccine accessible for public use was Australia. However, the immunization because of readily available months after the pandemic had skyrocketed in October 2009. The present immunization technology was not able to deliver an adequate vaccine promisingly to protect the vast majority when a new type of [6] flu develops and circulates. This is an indication that there is a need for the development of new flu vaccines that are effective and safe and that provide protection for a long time [3] and against various strains that may develop. One vital problem, on which there is a need for a global agreement, is the trigger [6] point for characterizing a pandemic. This is because it has pandemic usually have a significant impact on how governments and health fractions distribute resources. It will likewise effectively affect how societies work; especially on the off chance that it incorporates shutting down workplaces and schools. The definition of a pandemic by the WHO needs to re-include an element that considers severity as, appropriately. If a pandemic is defined as only the circulation of a new strain of flu as was seen with the swine flu case, pandemics would be considered every time. Numerous past seasonal strains of flu were utilizing the present definition by the WHO could likewise have been characterized as ‘pandemic strains.' Except if the seriousness of the virus is much more dreadful than what was witnessed with the seasonal flu, it is improper to conjure pandemic strategies globally. Swine influenza brought about severe issues for hospitals all over the world and their Intensive Care Units (ICU). Nonetheless, one of the significant causes of this challenge was the interminable absence of space in clinics. In winter in various nations including Australia, most hospitals encounter ambulance bypass, bed block, and congestion. Around 4,900 individuals with swine influenza in Australia, for example, were admitted to medical clinics. It was for the most part short stays of 2 to 3 days. Australia, nevertheless, has over 8 million hospital admissions annually (Collignon, 2010). It is a worry that a rise in activity in the hospital of under 0.1% of annual bed days and admissions managed to strain such a colossal number of healthcare systems internationally severely. On the off chance that these healthcare systems had more winter capability such as availability of staffed beds especially in their ICUs, subsequently, a great deal of strain in the healthcare frameworks would have been evaded. It likewise demonstrates that if there is a significantly more harmful infection circulation that than swine flu, then the hospital structures would not have the capacity to deal with the crisis. The healthcare systems should discover other approaches to empower individuals to take care of themselves as well as their relatives other than depending on [0] the medical centers. For some individuals admitted to ICU, there were substantial delays in both diagnosing their sicknesses and acquiring the proper treatment. The significance of medications like the oseltamivir is as yet disputable. In any case, any individual infected was probably going to get significant advantages from its utilization; it is those with unknown hazard factors. Nonetheless, there were frequent delays in women who were pregnant of 9 days before those with perceived hazard risk factors got treatment after the beginning of their symptoms. The extensive media reporting counting government public statements caused extreme dread and frenzy in the world. This brought about Emergency Department specialists being weighed down with requests, at first for antiviral and after that for immunization. The impact of this was the individuals who were considerably more prone [0] to be in danger for this disease were regularly not ready to get the medications. The large group of individuals who do not have risk factors required merely to remain at home and naturally show signs of improvement mostly in 2 to 3 days and only look for medical assistance if they get symptoms to propose that they got a resulting complication like bacterial pneumonia. Given the unavoidable delays in creating flu immunizations, governments have to reconsider how successful mass vaccination is going to be just as its cost advantages. In the UK, for instance, swine influenza vaccines had little cost benefits. [0] This was mostly because the vaccine was only accessible after the epidemic had crested. [0] The other issue with mass populace vaccination programs was that the majority [0] of people with risk factors were the old people, and they were already immune. Research also postulated that no less than 33% of those aged between 18 and 65 had defensive [0] levels of antibodies and that 70% had recognizable antibodies (Greenberg et al., 2009). It was just kids with a large number of individuals who were not already immune before the winter of 2009. Conversely, given the prevailing rate of infection in kids, an expansive extent of kids are presently also immune. Hence, revealing an immunization campaign to a populace after the epidemic has increased and where nearly everyone was already [0] immune is probably not going ever to have a high ratio of cost-benefit. One perspective proposed in the UK, where more than £1billion was spent on immunizations, was that it [10] was possible that the vaccines only avoided 26 deaths in 2009 (Collignon, 2011). There might have been various additional small advantages for the following year, however, on the off chance that a massive percentage of the general public were already immune by mid-2010 it is difficult to perceive how the immunization program had an entirely excellent cost advantage. [2] By the beginning of most seasonal influenza immunization campaigns in October 2010, in the northern hemisphere and other parts of the world, there had been no [0] anticipated disastrous ‘second wave' with H1N1. The following winter of 2010 to 2011 likewise pursued a similar model as what had happened in the Southern Hemisphere. While swine flu was the dominant virus that circulated because of broad immunity mostly from past diseases, the number of individuals admitted and infected was significantly less than in the past winter. Following early prevalent infections, high levels of consequent immunity appear to be what happened after past pandemics in the previous [0] century. It is evident that systems ought to be set up to demonstrate in a progressively way how people do not see different side-effect reports from vaccines that have mutated [0] their composition from the past season. Passive surveillance is usually the primary method that flu vaccines are checked for safety in a populace after it is made public and [0] an adjustment in the formulation. Passive surveillance, nonetheless, often significantly underreports the number of [0] unfavorable incidences that may have happened (Rosenthal & Chen, 1995). An absence of active surveillance brought about the moderate acknowledgment of the issue with the H1N1 vaccine in America during the 1970s, when a greater danger of Guillain Barré [0] condition happened (Fineberg & Neustadt, 1978). This was additionally the situation in [0] Australia with febrile seizures. Even though 9 in 1,000 teens got febrile seizures in the wake of getting a CSL Biotherapies trivalent regular vaccine that contained a swine influenza antigen, there was a holdup in identifying the issue and measures to avert [1] further immunizations. There is a need for active imminent surveillance to be carried out through vaccine centers and general practices to identify any unpleasant side effects were happening in the first 3,000 to 4,000 individuals immunized with any vaccine, especially where the composition has been adjusted from the previous version utilized. Before releasing to the public any vaccines, the health care systems ought to make sure that the vaccine is both safe and effective and not merely depend on surrogate indicators. The levels of antibody frequently associate wrongly with protection and immunity. There is also a need for great active surveillance frameworks set up to distinguish side effects as well as poor effectiveness, predominantly because it is possible to identify those unexpected side effects. There is also a need for timelier and better statistic ...
Purchase answer to see full attachment

Final Answer

Hello fam✋ . Please find attached the fixed paper

Outline
1. Editing and fixing plagiarism in a final paper


1
Healthcare Response to H1N1

Student’s Name
Course Name and Number
Instructor’s Name
Date Submitted

2
Influenza commonly referred to as the flu is known for its financial and health
effect. It happens in two epidemiological types; pandemics and epidemics. Yearly
epidemics of regular flue bring about 3 to 5 million instances of severe sickness and
global deaths of between 250,000 to 500,000 ("Influenza (Seasonal))," 2019). The
economic effect incorporates impalpable expenses of suffering such as decreased life
quality and loss, indirect costs like hindered profitability and absenteeism and direct
expenses such as hospitalization and medicines. Flu pandemics are rarely contrasted with
recurring flu, yet they are extensively dreaded public health crises since they involve
substantial economic costs and grave social interruption. Flu pandemics are described by
high rates of mortality and extreme sickness, and instances frequently influence high-risk
groups as well as other individuals in the populace, counting youthful fit adults, who are
less exposed to seasonal flu.
The extreme effect of the earlier flu pandemics of the year 1918, 1957, and 1968
laid emphasis on the requirement for preparedness and the capacity of the public health
(Azziz‐Baumgartner et al., 2009). Other pandemic dangers since 2000 included the 2003
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and the Avian Influenza A (H5N1) that was
experienced in 2004 commencing in Southeast Asia and spread all over the world in
2005. These crises further emphasized the significance of public health reaction capacity
and containment techniques. Even though its effect was milder than foreseen, the 2009
flu was the earliest of the 21st century. This paper will analyze the healthcare response to
H1N1 and some of the lessons learned from our global experience.
The World Health Organization (WHO), since its commencement in 1948, has
recognized obligations regarding revising and developing approaches to control and

3
contain both seasonal and pandemic flu through national programs and universal
preparedness. Although pandemics are universal, the WHO urges countries to come up
with their very own national flu programs using the organization's guidance for influenza
control and containment and pandemic preparedness that incorporates a planning
checklist covering necessary and sought-after components of how to prepare for a
pandemic. In the 2009 flu pandemic, almost 100 nations utilized their national strategies
to respond to the H1N1 crisis (Fineberg, 2014). The majority of the pandemic preparation
up to date has concentrated on the possible risk of the H5N1 virus, frequently identified
as the bird flu that has circulated in Asia for a decade. The Department of Health in the
US, as well as the Human Services (HHS), has obtained 12.2 million strains of H5N1
pre-epidemic vaccine for flu to ease the preliminary bird flu endemic.
Nevertheless, this pre-pandemic vaccine was not useful against the H1N1
influenza virus. The 2009 H1N1 outbreak ought to be lesson point on just how much
volatile the influenza virus can be. It should also strengthen the need to put resources into
innovative work with the goal we can adjust and respond to any influenza virus changes.

During the outbreak of new H1N1 strain of flu in 2009 April in Mexico, it seemed
to be linked with increased rate transience. Media houses assisted in raising concerns all
over the world that it could be a repeat of the events related with 1918 to 1919 ‘Spanish
flu' when a vast number of individuals died cause of influenza. This activated globally,
pandemic policies intended to deal with anticipated new destructive flu strains like
H5N1, the bird flu. Readily available vaccines and antiviral medications and the

4
strategies that could best stop the spread of the virus were at the main subjects discussed
as nations and their citizens inquired about the global impacts of the illness.

The

influenza virus was seen to spread all over the planet rapidly. Nevertheless, by May 2009,
statistics from America demonstrated that its destructiveness was significantly not as
much as that at first reported in Mexico (Louie et al., 2009). The case casualty rate was
probably less than o...

DrWiseman (1342)
University of Virginia

Anonymous
Solid work, thanks.

Anonymous
The tutor was great. I’m satisfied with the service.

Anonymous
Goes above and beyond expectations !

Studypool
4.7
Trustpilot
4.5
Sitejabber
4.4
Similar Questions
Related Tags

Brown University





1271 Tutors

California Institute of Technology




2131 Tutors

Carnegie Mellon University




982 Tutors

Columbia University





1256 Tutors

Dartmouth University





2113 Tutors

Emory University





2279 Tutors

Harvard University





599 Tutors

Massachusetts Institute of Technology



2319 Tutors

New York University





1645 Tutors

Notre Dam University





1911 Tutors

Oklahoma University





2122 Tutors

Pennsylvania State University





932 Tutors

Princeton University





1211 Tutors

Stanford University





983 Tutors

University of California





1282 Tutors

Oxford University





123 Tutors

Yale University





2325 Tutors