US Welfare System versus Nordic Countries Political Essay

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1000-1250 words political essay. material and cretic rules on the attach. Plz use material reading as source.

Topic: Does the U.S. system of welfare stigmatize those who use it, as compared to welfare recipients in Nordic countries? Use Sherman and Kautto in your answer.

(approximately 1000-1250 words double-spaced with 12 point font, 1" margins and page numbers, exclusive of bibliography). You should focus on using class materials from lecture and the readings to prepare your answer, but outside research is permitted. Your answer should have a clear thesis at start, body of points that answers the various parts of the topic, and a conclusion at the end.

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THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE WELFARE STATE rtive Research Centre trative home for the gsgemeinschaft (Gerred researchers from pment. rsecting dimensions: ction and the courts; Ire, or the facilitation n the welfare dimenorne base for another idimensional view of Edited by FRANCIS G. CASTLES STEPHAN LEIBFRIED JANE LEWIS HERBERT OBINGER and CHRISTOPHER PIERSON OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 40 CHAPTER THE NORDIC COUNTRIES MIKKO KAUTTO INTRODUCTION THE notion of a distinctive Nordic or Scandinavian welfare state was born long before Esping-Andersen (1990) advanced his general claim that advanced welfare states cluster around qualitatively different regime types. In the early post-war decades, at a time when Europe was divided by the Iron Curtain, the Scandinavian countries, and in particular Sweden, were frequently mentioned-both in domestic and international policy debates-as epitomizing a successful 'third-way' compromise between unregulated capitalism and state socialism. Within comparative welfare state research, the distinctive nature of Scandinavian social policies came increasingly into focus from the early 19805 as functionalist convergence theory was challenged by proponents of the power resources school (Korpi 1980; Stephens 1979) emphasizing the role of class politics as a driver of the institutional variation of welfare states. Today, the idea of a Nordic model still serves as an important reference category for comparative welfare state research and a yardstick for reflecting welfare state change in the Nordic countries themselves, Debates about the Nordic welfare model tend to involve at least three fundamentally different sets of questions that are not always clearly distinguished: has the model ever existed as an empirical reality (and what are its defining characteristics), are its features and outcomes desirable, and, finally, does it still exist and can it survive? In the analysis in Chapter 39, the existence of a distinctive Nordic type of welfare state appears to be the least controversial of all the model attributions. But while it THE NORDIC COUNTRIES 587 may appear that the case for the existence of a Nordic model is strong, there is no consensus on the precise specification of the features that define the model. Traditionally the notion of a Nordic model simply (and somewhat vaguely) referred to an active state, a large public sector, and a broadly conceived public responsibility for the social welfare of citizens all within the framework of a market economy. But, as we shall see, in more recent debates, a range of other more specific aspects and attributes have been suggested as important, and even constitutive components of the Nordic model. As already suggested, the idea of a distinctive Nordic welfare state has always had strong prescriptive overtones-most often as an example (model) to be followed by other countries, but also occasionally as a dystopia to be avoided. The appeal of the model stems from its alleged ability to produce desirable social outcomes, while at the same time maintaining economic competitiveness and full employment (Kangas and Palme 2005; Lundberg et al. 2008). While it tends to be generally accepted that the Nordic societies have been blessed with a range of beneficial social outcomessuch as a low degree of economic inequality, a relatively high degree of social mobility, gender equality, etc.-criticism of the model has mainly been focused on issues of economic efficiency and sustainability. High levels of public expenditure, the negative incentive effects of generous social protection, and above all high tax rates have been criticized as economically unsustainable and-in the long runincompatible with economic growth (e.g. Lindbeck 1997; Andersen et al. 2007). The popularity of the Nordic model-in academic as well as in policy oriented debates-has varied over time in close correspondence with fluctuations in the relative economic performance of the Nordic countries. It reached a climax in the 1980s as Sweden, Norway, and Finland were able to maintain full employment while the rest of Europe (including Denmark) continued to struggle with mass unemployment in the wake of the first and second oil crises. However, when Sweden and Finland and (on a smaller scale) Norway in the early 1990S themselves ran into severe macroeconomic problems, fiscal deficits, and record-high unemployment rates, confidence in the Nordic model faded, among both international and domestic observers. The concept has regained some of its former popularity in the period from the late 1990Sonwards as all the Nordic countries experienced a return to fuller levels of employment. Even Denmark recovered from more than two decades of high unemployment combined with chronic balance of payment deficits to become a celebrated top performer in terms of macroeconomic stability and full employment. In other words, the economic performance of the Nordic countries has once again become impressive, and-as a result of this-political and academic interest in the Nordic model has recovered. The question is, however, if and to what extent the model itself is still intact as an empirical reality in the Nordic countries. In this chapter we concentrate on discussing the descriptive premises involved in the notion of a distinctive Nordic welfare model. We ask in what sense the Nordic welfare states constitute a distinctive type, and we discuss whether its core features have remained stable in recent decades. Although it should be emphasized that the existence of a Nordic model does not preclude the possibility of change over time in 588 MIKKO KAUTTO response to new social, economic, and demographic conditions and challenges, we shall argue that welfare state developments in the 1990S and 2000S have posed serious questions concerning both the continuity and the coherence of the model. COMMON ROOTS AND HISTORICAL TRAJECTORIES ................................................................................................................ Certainly the concept of a Nordic 'model' is misleading if it is taken to suggest that the Nordic welfare states were created according to a common preconceived masterplan. The features of the developed Scandinavian welfare states have a long history and are the result of political bargaining, step-by-step reforms, and their imperfect implementation. They are, in other words, the result of processes of political evolution rather than intelligent design. As elsewhere, early welfare state developments in the Nordic countries were related to industrialization, and the associated series of social, demographic, and political changes: urbanization and the birth of the working class, nation building, and the break through of political democracy (c. Pierson 1991). In many respects, the circumstances in which these developments occurred in Scandinavia marked them out from the rest of Europe and comparative historical accounts have pointed towards a specific Scandinavian route to the welfare state (see e.g. Baldwin 1990; Alestalo and Kuhnle 1987; Esping-Andersen and Korpi 1987; see also the special issue of the Scandinavian Journal of History 2001, vol. 26, no. 3; and Christiansen and Markkola 2006). First, there is the role of religion and more specifically changes in the division of power between church and state as a result of the Reformation and conversion to Lutheranism. The responsibility for poor relief was transferred from church to state, and as centralized state power was weak, local civil authorities (municipalities) were delegated the task of taking care of those who could not support themselves. This laid the foundation for a strong role for local public authorities in the management of welfare policies, in close cooperation with the central authority. In time, these responsibilities and powers came to be increasingly funded from taxation (Christiansen and Markkola 2006). Second, the pattern of land ownership in Scandinavia was distinctive, giving a relatively strong and autonomous position to the peasant population. Family-run small farms were the basic units of production. Due to the late onset of industrialization, farmers remained an important part of the population and a powerful political force in their own right in contrast both to Britain, where the peasantry had long been assimilated into the working class, and those other parts of Europe in which feudal arrangements still prevailed. Independent farmers became one cornerstone of the Scandinavian tri-polar class structure, together with the working and upper classes (Alestalo and Kuhnle 1987). This distinctive class structure, and its consequences in THE NORDIC COUNTRIES 509 ------terms of party organization and support, underlines the importance in Scandinavia of building cross-class coalitions of political support for the welfare state project. It may also suggest why ideas of citizenship and equal rights found support amongst both farmers and workers, enabling cooperation and consensus. Social policy was not just a 'workers' question', but also included concern for the rural population, helping to pave the way for universalistic solutions. Third, there is the distinctive role of (leftist) politics which was the leitmotif both of the classical power resources school and in Esping-Andersen's regime theory. In the 1930S social democratic parties came to power in all the three Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Denmark, and Norway) in alliance with agrarian and or social liberal parties, and they immediately implemented important reforms in social protection (most notably old-age pensions and unemployment insurance) that contrasted sharply with Bismarckian social insurance thinking and at the same time departed from the existing tradition of discretionary poor relief (Stjerne 2004). In the first decades after World War II the social democratic parties in Sweden and Norway achieved an almost hegemonic position from which they were able to effectively control the expansion of welfare policies-in close cooperation with a powerful trade union movement. Also in Denmark the social democratic party was comparatively strong, but more dependent on collaboration with a liberal coalition partner. In Finland and Iceland, however, social democratic parties were significantly weaker and hence arguably less pivotal in the design and implementation of welfare reforms (Christiansen and Markkola 2006). Fourth, it can be argued that the Nordic countries share social structures and cultural values that are particularly conducive to gender equality, and that women have had a uniquely important place in Scandinavian welfare state developments. Women achieved suffrage relative early in all the Nordic countries and the active role of female reformers may help explain why even early social policy legislation reflected the interests of women to an extent that distinguishes the Nordic countries from other advanced countries at the time (an emphasis on individual entitlements, the early introduction of transfers to single mothers, child allowances paid to the mother, etc.). Incorporating the role of ideas is a fifth candidate to include among the possible roots of Nordic distinctiveness. It has been argued that the Nordic societies are characterized by a particular passion for equality with cultural and historical roots (Graubart 1986). Recently a book edited by Kildal and Kuhnle (2005) has posed the question of whether it is the institutions or the moral commitments behind them that matter most. They argue that welfare programmes are essentially expressions of moral conceptions and values, in which ideas like 'universalism', 'public responsibility for welfare', and 'work for all' play an important role. More broadly, research based on World Value Surveys and European surveys also contributes to our understanding of what is distinctive about political and social policy attitudes in the Nordic region (e.g. Ervasti et al. 2008). The relative weight of these factors-the timing of changes, the distribution of powers and cleavages in society, and the form that new responses took-was, of 590 MIKKO KA UTTO course, different in the various Nordic countries. While we can highlight historical similarities and shared practices, it is probably only after 1945 that the Scandinavian countries-operating in favourable economic and demographic conditionsstarted to emerge as a group with relatively similar social policy designs with Sweden as the forerunner, and Norway, Finland, Denmark, and Iceland as followers or partial outliers. In summary, a number of structural factors point towards a common experience in the Scandinavian countries: reasonably similar structural conditions, parallels in political mobilization and class-based politics, the importance of public responsibility in the form of decision-making and administrative structures-at both central and local levels-and, rather later, a role for the social partners. Further, similarities between the countries favoured close contacts, diffusion of ideas, and mutual learning (see Petersen 2006). As a result, the Nordic countries bear some 'family resemblance', especially when viewed in a broader comparative framework (Castles 1993). CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NORDIC MODEL It has been said that the complexity of historical developments and causal dynamics require us to treat all cases as unique (e.g. Baldwin 1996). Adopting a critical tone towards typologies and regime analysis, Kasza (2002) argues that for various reasons-the cumulative nature of welfare policies, the diverse histories of policies in different welfare fields, the involvement of different sets of policy actors, variations in the policy-making process, and the influence of foreign models-national welfare systems fail to show the internal consistency that would be appropriate for the regime concept to have real explanatory power. Historical research has an eye for differences, and thus it is perhaps not surprising that the most recent historical reappraisal assessed the Nordic model as one with 'five exceptions' (Christiansen et al. 2006). It has also been argued that rather than a single uniform Nordic model, we have several Nordic models (Mjeset 1986), or different Nordic routes (for example, in relation to the development of pension schemes, Salminen 1993). Whereas historical studies and detailed intra-Nordic comparisons point to differences, social policy research has tended to focus upon similarities in institutional design. By the mid-198os, there was considerable evidence that the Nordic welfare states had developed a 'distinctive welfare state model' (see Erikson et al. 1987; Esping-Andersen and Korpi 1987; Esping-Andersen 1990; Kolberg 1991; Hansen et al. 1993). We have already referred to the role of the state and other structural factors as crucial for the Nordic model, but here we should also draw attention to the design of social insurance schemes, the role of services, and the functioning of the labour market. THE ---~- ...-~----~--------~~~~ NORDIC COUNTRIES 591 The extensive role of the state and the wide scope of public policies, most generally evidenced in Sweden's high levels of social spending, were already widely commented on in the 19505 and 1960s. As the focus of research shifted in the 19705 and 1980s to consider how the welfare state operates, the scope and role of public policies was, in fact, further underlined as the power mobilization school showed that left power was related to the expansion of legislated social rights. In relation to social security benefits, most social insurance schemes across Scandinavia also had an earnings-related component which applied universally to all workers. In contrast to other groups of countries, where either only flat-rate basic security or occupational schemes dominated and where coverage criteria and social security patterns were different, this made these schemes stand out as being uniquely 'encompassing' (e.g. Korpi 1980; Palme 1990; Kangas 1991). Palme (1999) has argued that by establishing a model of social protection, in which uniform basic benefits and services based on residence were combined with earnings-related social insurance programmes, the Nordic countries took a distinctive path. One of the aims in developing public solutions was to normalize the receipt of social security and to get away from the stigma associated with receiving public support. Cross-national comparisons of the institutional characteristics of welfare provision were offered as reasons why the Nordic welfare states achieved lower income inequality, lower poverty rates, smaller differences in standards of living, and more pronounced gender equality (e.g. Fritzell 2001). One way to pinpoint the uniqueness of the Nordic model is to focus upon its combination or configuration of welfare state characteristics. Korpi and Palme (1998) set out to account for what they call 'the paradox ofredistribution', arguing that social policies targeted at the poor turn out to be ineffective in abolishing poverty. Instead, their analysis shows that encompassing or inclusive welfare states achieve more equal income distribution and lower rates of poverty. These authors (2004) have further noted that the Nordic strategy of redistribution is constituted by generosity and broad coverage of transfers, combined with a strong emphasis on free or strongly subsidized service provision. Taken together, these necessitate higher social expenditure but also lead to a lower degree of income inequality. Abrahamson (1999b) argues similarly, that what matters in the Nordic case is not just the way that cash benefits have been designed, but the whole pattern of welfare provision (including services). The Nordic model can thus be seen as a combination or configuration of characteristics, some of which are not necessarily shared by all the Nordic countries. In both Esping-Andersen's regime typology (see the discussion in Chapter 39) and other research based on the power resource perspective, the emphasis was placed upon social insurance and cash benefits, in terms of their coverage, financing shares, and compensation rates. Assessing welfare state development in Scandinavia from women's perspective, Helga Hernes (1987) has pictured the Scandinavian welfare state as woman-friendly, giving women autonomy and allowing them the possibility of acting autonomously in politics, in the labour market, and as working mothers. VYhile the role of caring 592 MIKKO KA UTTO services is often-and rightly so-highlighted as beneficial for gender equality, the woman-friendliness of the Nordic welfare states is not just a result of an extensive provision of child and elder care services. It also stems from the early introduction of individual taxation and choices that define the rights to participation, social insurance, and services. Citizenship as a core entitlement principle, combined with individual rights and personal needs assessment in practice, have helped to reduce the dependence of women upon their spouses. The Scandinavian welfare states have developed into dual-earner societies, in contrast to Continental and Southern European countries, where female labour force participation is significantly lower and the male-breadwinner family still relatively prevalent. Kohl (1981) was one of the first scholars to point to the extent of the public provision of services as a distinguishing characteristic of the Nordic countries in expenditure-based comparisons. During the 1990S this insight has been deepened as cross-national comparisons of service provision have become more prominent in welfare research (Alber 1995; Anttonen and Sipila 1996; Lehto et al. 1999; Daly and Lewis 2000; Kautto 2002). The most distinguishing feature of the Nordic welfare states to emerge is the prevalence of local and publicly funded and produced health and social service provision, aimed to cater for a wide variety of needs of the entire population (Sipila 1997). The extraordinary powers of Nordic local authorities are underlined in comparative research; taxation rights, broad responsibility, and legislated autonomy especially emerge as distinctive. Finally, we need to stress-with Scharpf (1991:89-97), who relies on Meidner and Hedborg (1984)-the close relation between social policy and employment policy, and the importance of a positive interplay between the unique nature of industrial relations (with high union density and coordinated wage bargaining) in the Nordic countries and welfare state development (see Christiansen and Markkola 2006 and Barth and Moene 2009). Importantly, the Nordic countries have always had high employment rates, both for men and women, and also among older workers. Nordic social policies were designed as trampolines that would allow the unemployed to 'bounce back', favouring risk taking and job change in dynamic labour markets through active labour market policies. Investments in social policy were seen as worthwhile provided they led to a higher level and more egalitarian distribution of welfare, and contributed to the maintenance of full employment and economic growth. Arguably the generosity of social policy in the Nordic fashion is only fiscally sustainable provided that a large proportion of the population is mobilized in the labour market and that reliance on income transfers is short-lived among the working age population This helps to explain why publicly financed activation measures, understood as an investment in people's skills and employability, have been so prominent in the Scandinavian context. Given this background, the notion of Scandinavian distinctiveness could hardly have been regarded as earth-shattering news when Esping-Andersen's Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism was published in 1990. Given also what was already known about the Scandinavian model, it was the identification of Esping-Andersen's other two regime types and the theoretical insights arising from these that struck the research THE NORDIC COUNTRIES 593 community and explain the continuing interest in welfare state typologies. For Scandinavian scholars at least, the corporatist-conservative and liberal regimes provided useful references for establishing what was distinctive about the Scandinavian policy package. THE NORDIC MODEL: AN EMPIRICAL REAPPRAISAL Esping-Andersen and other proponents of the power resource perspective have offered strong arguments for using institutional data to capture essential differences between modern welfare states. They have pointed out that many Continental welfare states resemble the Nordic ones in their high expenditure levels, but that policy design, coverage of schemes, and benefit rules in the two groups of nations are markedly different. Welfare regime analysis is based on the argument that it is the content of policies that matters more for outcomes than spending per se. Whilst this is true, we may note that the kind of social policy delivered in Nordic countries could hardly be achieved with low expenditure and that expenditure-based measures, if used in a sensitive manner (for instance, by disaggregating by type of programme: see Chapter 23), can be used as indicative measures. Table 40.1 summarizes our account and highlights diversity in key indicators with OECD data for 1990, when Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism was published. Levels of taxation, social policy spending, and public expenditure on welfare state services measured in proportion to GDP serve as proxies for the scope of the public sector. Gini coefficients measuring income inequality serve here as a relatively uncontested outcome indicator. The data are selected from two main OECD sources. Countries have been grouped according to the typology literature into what are seen as distinctive groups of nations. The Nordic countries are put at the top of the table to highlight their affinity on the selected indicators. Country rankings are intended to help the reader to judge each country's position in the OECD group, its proximity to other countries, and to assess intergroup similarity. As can be seen from Table 40.1, in 1990, evidence of a grouping of Nordic welfare states was reasonably clear. Certainly, Sweden was the flagship with Denmark as her nearest companion. In terms of taxation, Finland and Norway came very close, but in terms of social spending these two countries could just as well feature in the company of Continental welfare states. However, spending figures for health and caring services distinguished the Nordic group very clearly from other groups, although France and Canada were also big spenders in this area. Spending on cash benefits (total expenditure minus service expenditure) did not reveal substantial differences. The strongest similarity amongst the Nordic countries is demonstrated in respect of the Gini coefficient that ranked these four countries as having the most equal income distribution in the OECD group. The table also shows reasons for treating Iceland 594 M1KKOKAUTTO -_._----_.----------_._-----Table 40.1 -----.------~----.--.---.-.- --- ----- --- ----- Key OECD indicators Total tax revenue as % of GDpa 1990 Rank -- ---~-- of the role of the state in social policy (1990) Public social expenditure as Ofo of GDpb 1990 Rank Public expenditure for in-kind benefits as Ofo of GDpe 1990 Rank Distribution of household disposable income among indlviduals'' Mid- Rank 1980s Sweden Denmark Finland Norway Iceland 12.5 1 19.9 1 10.2 2 3 9.1 4 22.8 20.7 22.6 2 5 8 8.3 6 23.4 4 14.0 19 8.3 9.7 6 52.7 1 30.5 46.5 2 25.5 43.5 3 24.5 41.0 7 30.9 17 Nordic mean 42.9 France Netherlands Belgium Austria Germany Luxembourg Switzerland 42.0 5 42.9 4 42.0 Italy Spain Portugal Greece 37.8 32.5 27.7 23.4 21.7 25.3 24.4 3 6 8.8 5 6.7 10 6 8 25.0 4 6.7 10 23.7 7 6.3 13 34.8 35.7 14 22.5 9 7.6 8 13 21.9 10 5.8 16 26.0 22 13.5 21 4.8 21 9 19.9 13 6.5 12 16 20.0 12 5.6 17 20 13.7 20 4.0 23 22.8 23 18.6 14 4.5 United Kingdom Ireland 36.3 11 17.2 16 7.3 33.1 15 15.5 17 United States Canada Australia New Zealand 27.3 21 13.4 35.9 12 18.4 28.5 37.4 19 10 Japan Korea Mexico Turkey 29.1 OECD0 OEeD 27.6 23.4 9 23.6 6 24.7 7 30.6 36.7 13 22 33.6 16 9 28.6 11 5.2 19 33.1 15 22 5.3 18 33.8 17 15 9.8 3 12 14.1 21.8 18 11 6.0 6.0 14 14 28.7 31.2 18 11.2 23 20 18.9 25 3.0 26 5.0 1.7 26 17.3 26 3.6 25 2.9 20.0 24 7.6 24 2.3 39.6 33.9 8.9 (J 2 77.9 6.4 6.9 2.5 5 18 14 27.0 8 27.8 10 24 45.1 20 25 43.5 19 29.3 6.9 Notes: Indicates the share of a country's output that is collected by the government through taxes. Comprises cash benefits, direct 'in-kind' provision of goods and services, and tax breaks with social purposes. C Public expenditure other than cash benefit expenditures, i.e. public consumption of goods and services plus capital investment in care infrastructure; primarily expenditure for residential care, health services, child daycare and home-help services. d As measured by the Gini coefficients .. = not available 0 = average c = standard deviation a b Sources: OECD 2009i, 2008d. THE NORDIC COUNTRIES 595 with special care. In assessing Norway's apparently lower spending than other countries in the group, it should, however, be kept in mind that GDP figures include Norway's oil revenues and that these comparisons necessarily underestimate that country's welfare effort. Looking at the means and standard deviations in Table 40.1, it is clear that the Nordic countries stood out as a distinct group in all four dimensions covered in the table. Their average tax rate was 42.9 per cent, social spending 23-4 per cent, service spending 9.7 per cent and the Gini index 21.7. Moreover, if we relax our criteria and do not think it necessary to score high on all dimensions, but to score high on most dimensions, inter-group similarity and affinity to a Nordic ideal-type was even clearer. The countries closest to the Nordic group can be found among the conservative Continental welfare states, where the status of Switzerland or Italy is debatable, but where their alternative positioning would not greatly affect the big picture. In the light of the figures here, the United Kingdom and Ireland could as well be grouped with the English-speaking countries overseas as systematically low spenders displaying high degrees of inequality. As can also be seen from Table 40.1, other OECD countries were a world apart, as were former CEE-countries at the time of their newly gained sovereignty. A Nordic Model Forever? There is obviously no one year that could mark a turning point in changing these welfare state clusters or their trajectories. If there were such a year, 1990 could be a feasible candidate, given that this is around the time at which concern about the fate of the Nordic model began to be voiced. At that time the bi-polar world order that had reigned since 1945 collapsed, the Soviet Union ceased to exist, and Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries gained a new independence and embraced a form of the market economy. The notion of a Third Way between capitalism and communism lost its appeal. Moreover, as already mentioned, the early 1990S marked a period of economic, employment, and fiscal crisis for Sweden and Finland, which resulted in serious reassessment of the role of public policy. These countries were forced to carry out savings measures to balance public budgets, while Norway and Denmark for somewhat different reasons enjoyed economic good fortune particularly through the latter half of the 1990S. The early 1990S also marks a geopolitical watershed as Finland and Sweden abandoned EFTA and started their path towards integration in the EU, unlike Norway and Iceland which chose to stay out. Finland later adopted the euro as its currency while Denmark and Sweden retained their national currencies, a factor which inevitably further differentiated the mix of Nordic solutions. Moreover, global competition was increasing: the European Single Market underlined free movement in the EU, and deregulated capital sought lucrative investment opportunities, often guided by cheaper labour costs. Globalization, neoliberal ideas about deregulation 596 MIK1'O KA UTTO and rnarketization, and worries concerning competitiveness made governments more capital-friendly and affected relationships between the social partners. In this context, a large joint Nordic research endeavour was mounted to study the evolution of the model in the years since the 19805 (Kautto et al. 1999). A key conclusion was that the Nordic countries still formed a distinct group of nations in terms of welfare policies in the mid-iccos, Only limited convergence with the rest of the OECD countries could be observed. The obvious potential for restructurincr o coming from macroeconomic as well as demographic and political pressures had not led to fundamental changes in benefit or service provision. Most forms of cash benefit had been reduced, especially in Sweden and Finland, but not to a dramatically lower level in comparative terms. The existing safety net still offered universal coverage in the mid-1990S. When it came to services all the known Nordic hallmarks were still present: universalism, high quality, tax funding, and public provision. Other studies have confirmed this lack of evidence of a major welfare backlash-be it seen as 'retrenchment' or 'dismantling'-in the 1990$ (Kuhnle 2001; Nordlund 2003; Castles 2002b). Further research considered the Nordic cases in a larger European comparison (see Kautto et al. 2001; Kautto and Kvist 2002). Here the evidence for clustering was less strong, and no straightforward answer to the question of Nordic distinctiveness emerged from the findings. The Nordic countries as a group still tended to be different from other groups of Western European countries on key dimensions of policy and welfare. Taken together, there was more evidence for similarity than dissimilarity. Although convergence did seem to be occurring in some areas of the welfare state, overall developments tended to be characterized more by parallel trends. Sometimes even outright divergence was apparent as the empirical studies also demonstrated that a variety of policy responses to 'common pressures' existed. (Kautto et al. 2001) So while Nordic welfare states had changed, in a broader comparison these changes were not of a kind to make scholars abandon the main lines of the regimes thesis. This is also the message of research by Kangas (2004), who considered the specificity of Nordic welfare in surveying state sickness i~s,.klJancebenefits in eighteen OEeD countries. He showed that, while up until 1985 the Nordic programmes guaranteed better benefits than corporatist schemes, the situation had now changed. Nordic countries no longer provide higher compensation. In this respect, the two groups of countries have clearly converged, while simultaneously their distance from the countries with basic security or targeted schemes has increased. However, he also found that the Scandinavian schemes had largely preserved their universality, whereas the other country groupings had somewhat reduced their coverage. In another study, Abrahamson (2003) set out to evaluate whether recent major changes in welfare provision had merely modified the Nordic model or whether there had been convergence towards some kind of European social model. Abrahamson argued that there were many first order changes (such as reduced levels of benefits), but that a number of second and third order changes had also occurred; i.e. that the institutional setting and the objectives of the Nordic welfare states had, in certain respects, THE NORDIC COUNTRIES 597 changed during the 1990S. His conclusion was that the Scandinavian welfare states were undergoing a process of Europeanization, but were still distinct, if decreasingly so. To sum up, comparative analysis through the 1990S and into the early 2000S suggests that some sort of Nordic distinctiveness remained. However, evidence concerning even more recent change is more open to interpretation. Part of this ongoing change may be captured by looking at the same aggregate indicators we presented earlier (Table 40.1), but this time for 2005/6 (Table 40.2). The first thing to note is that we do not detect any radical alteration in countries' relative positions. Even after a decade and a half, past budgets continued to be good predictors of the current year's expenditure. Secondly, inter-Nordic dispersion in mid-2000 was somewhat more pronounced than in 1990. Thirdly, the Nordic countries also appeared less exceptional than in 1990. The redistributive budgets in the Nordic countries showed striking continuity, with a Nordic average of 24.2 per cent of GDP for social expenditure and 11.3 per cent for services, while OECD averages as a whole had risen by close to three and two percentage points respectively. On average, the Nordic countries had a slightly heavier tax rate in 2006, but a somewhat less singular performance in respect of income distribution. Some of the indicators might even suggest that it would be more accurate to speak of a large cluster of Northern European countries rather than distinct Nordic and Continental (or Southern) clusters of countries. The role of the state in France, Belgium, and Austria appeared no less significant than in the Nordic countries. Nordic similarity remained reasonably apparent in terms of taxation, yet here too we encounter other countries with a similar profile. Moreover, while an emphasis upon services was still common in Scandinavia, it was not an exclusively Nordic phenomenon. At the same time, the income inequality indicator revealed convergence. In fact, OECD data on income inequality show that inequality has grown fastest in Finland and Sweden over the past ten years, although from a low initial level. Overall, OECD means have risen and standard deviations have declined, while Nordic averages have remained rather stable giving a much more mixed picture of country differences and some grounds to speak of 'catch-up' convergence. Farewell to Nordic Unity? Clearly, two tables with crude indicators are not enough to justify bold generalizations about the fate of a regime. However, in the absence of a single systematic study covering all the crucial elements, this data together with the review provided, should give the reader a picture of change in the Nordic welfare states. But we also have studies at the national level and they tend to point to more significant changes. Palme et al. (2002) carried out a massive welfare commission analysis on welfare trends in Sweden in the 1990S. This analysis was an overall stock-taking assessment of changes in different welfare policies with extensive data on welfare outcomes for different groups in the Swedish population. The analysis pointed to a number of changes in the system and to unwelcome developments in welfare outcomes, including Table 40.2 Key DECO indicators of the role of the state in social policy (2005/6) Total tax revenue as 0/0 of GDpa 2006 Rank Public social Public expenditure as 0/0 of GDpb expenditure 2005 Rank 29.4 Distribution for in-kind benefits as % of GDpc 2005 Rank of household disposable income among individuals'' 2000 Rank Sweden 50.1 Denmark 49.0 2 26.9 4 13.6 11.6 2 22.5 1 Finland 43.5 6 26.1 7 9.9 7 26.1 6 Norway 43.6 41.4 5 21.6 11 26.1 7 9 16.9 20 10.1 11.1 6 Iceland" 3 Nordic mean 45.5 France 44.5 4 29.2 2 10.8 4 27.3 10 Netherlands? 39.5 10 14 8.5 13 25.1 3 Belgium 3 6 9.1 10 Austria 44.8 41.9 20.9 26.4 8 27.2 3 8.2 15 25.2 4 Germany 35.7 15 26.7 5 9.9 7 27.7 11 24.2 24.3 77.3 2 24.8 Luxembourg 36.3 14 23.2 9 8.8 11 26.1 7 Switzerland 30.1 21 20.3 16 7.8 17 26.7 9 Italy 42.7 7 25.0 8 7.7 19 34.7 21 Spain 12 21.2 13 7.4 21 32.9 18 Portuqal' 36.7 35.4 16 23.1 10 35.6 22 Greece 27.4 23 20.5 15 7.1 22 34.5 20 United Kingdom 37.4 11 21.3 12 10.5 5 17 Ireland 31.7 19 16.7 21 7.7 19 32.6 30.4 United States 28.2 33.4 22 15.9 23 17 35.7 23 17 16.5 22 7.8 9.4 9 30.1 13 30.9 20 17.1 19 8.7 12 30.5 15 New Zealand 36.5 13 18.5 18 8.4 14 33.7 19 Japane,9 27.4 23 18.6 17 8.1 16 31.4 16 Korea 26.8 25 6.9 26 3.8 25 Canada Australiae,g 14 Mexico 20.6 26 7.0 25 4.9 24 48.0 26 Turkey 32.5 18 13.7 24 5.6 23 43.9 25 Old DECD0 Old DECD a 36.5 7.4 20.6 8.7 30.9 5.9 2.1 6.2 Czech Republic (1995); 36.7 19.5 7.8 26.0 Hungary (1995)9'; 37.1 22.5 8.7 29.3 Poland (1996); 34.3 21.0 4.9 36.7 Notes: Indicates the share of a country's output that is collected by the government through taxes. b Comprisescash benefits, direct 'in-kind' provision of goods and services, and tax breaks with social purposes. C Public expenditure other than cash benefit expenditures, i.e. public consumption of goods and services plus capital investment in care infrastructure; primarily expenditure for residential care, health services, child day-care and home-help services. d As measured by the Gini coefficients. e Tax figures for Australia, Iceland,Japan, and Poland are from 2005. f Social expenditure for Portugal is from 2004. 9 Health expenditure for Australia, Hungary, and Japan are from 2004. Forthe Netherlands,the figure is from 2002. h The OECDaverage is from 2005 and refers to the countries listed above. i Data for countries joining the OECDafter 1990 are included in the final rows of the table, but no rankings are provided, since this would limit direct comparability between Tables40.1 and 40.2. Theyear of DECDmembershipis given after each new member. .. = not available, 0=average, a=standard deviation a Sources: DECO2009i, 2008d. THE NORDIC COUNTRIES 599 -------- a rise in disadvantage, income inequality, poverty-risk, and increasing differences in levels ofliving. In the 1990S, single mothers, people born outside Sweden, families with children, and the young experienced more hardships than other groups and differences in incomes and living conditions had increased. Privatization of services and marketoriented management practices were also a new Swedish reality. The conclusion was that the Swedish welfare state was at a crossroads at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Many of the social policy researchers who have analysed the development of the Finnish welfare state through the 1990S not only found changes in the system's characteristics, but also detected an ideological shift that can be seen in the revision of goals and changes in policy content (for references, see Kautto 2003). It is argued that Finland has grown away from a Nordic normative tradition with an emphasis on social rights, equity, and state responsibility. Several studies suggest that a real ideological shift occurred amongst policymakers in the early 19905, with some arguing that Finland had taken a step towards more liberal policies, while others suggest that some of the changes point towards a conservative model. Assessments are less gloomy for Denmark. Greve (2004) has examined the question of whether or not Denmark is still a universal welfare state. The initial basis for his assessment was a comparative-based analysis of the Nordic countries in respect of key welfare state parameters. The second element of his analysis was a case-based study of core areas of the Danish welfare state-pensions, unemployment, and early retirement benefit-to assess the distinctiveness of the Danish model. Greve concluded that the Danish model is more mixed today than it used to be, but that it continues to be distinctive in areas such as equality, full employment, spending on social security, and active labour market policy. Kvist (2003) in turn has underlined how Danish development in the 1990S was relatively favourable in contrast with a much poorer performance in the 1970S and 1980s. Activation, obligations, and targeting of benefits were part and parcel of Danish reforms, and local authorities were given even more say in activation measures and organizing services. Employment and the economy developed favourably, and close to the turn of the century, Denmark had encompassing welfare policies, progress in most aspects, with low unemployment and without significant increases in inequality. In Norway, too, welfare state development seems more mixed. Here, welfare state reforms have put an increased emphasis on the responsibility to work. Obligations to work and qualifying conditions for unemployment benefits have been amended. On the other hand, the welfare state has been strengthened in other areas, especially in the area of family policy. In the health and social care sector, a focus on efficiency and market solutions has led to reforms inspired by New Public Management, but the primacy of public sector provision has not been challenged in any significant way. According to Botten et al. (2003) and Delvik et al. (2007), the welfare state in Norway 'seems to be largely intact', although reform processes are complex and ambiguous. As these short summaries show, Nordic welfare states do change, and they change in somewhat different directions. New policy lines have been adopted while some of the nlrl nnps have heen abandoned or transformed. Moreover, core ideas of policies are 600 MIKKO KA UTTO shifting and being debated: Nordic universalism is being reconsidered and notions and practices of citizenship as a set of social duties as well as rights feature more prominently in policy rhetoric and agendas (Hvinden and Johansson 2007). Also, the introduction of new mechanisms may have wide-ranging effects and the underlying goals may have undergone a more radical transformation. For instance, the pension reforms that have been carried out in all Nordic countries will have far-reaching consequences in the future (see www.reassess.no for information on an ongoing collaborative research effort involving researchers from all the five Nordic countries to take stock of the Nordic Model). CONCLUSION At the most general level, the Nordic model can be understood in terms of broad, tax-financed public responsibility and legislated, collective, and universalistic solutions that respect employment interests yet aim at welfare and equity goals. The global interest in the Nordic model is best explained by Scandinavian countries' long record of good economic as well as social performance. This chapter has argued that the concept of the 'Nordic model' can be and has been understood in different ways. Historical studies have pointed to similarities that may explain the emergence of welfare state institutions, but have also highlighted differences between Nordic countries. Sociologically oriented comparative research in turn has stressed underlying similarities, at least in the 1970S and 1980s, when Nordic exceptionalism was demonstrated in high welfare state spending and the design of social rights. In regime theorizing, these similarities were extended to encapsulate causal factors, welfare state institutions and their interplay with other social institutions, and also their outcomes. Differences from other regimes highlighted reasons to be interested in Nordic policies. The model arguably appeared to be fairly robust in the early 1990S, despite the fact that new winds of change were already blowing at that time. More recent comparative research and national studies have called into question the uniformity of the Nordic countries and their continued path-dependence. Welfare state adjustment in the 1990S and 2000S along a number of the dimensions central to regime analysis show a degree of dilution of the Nordic distinctiveness that featured in earlier cross-national comparisons. Seen from afar, the Nordic welfare states still look rather similar, as suggested, for example, by their continuing good performance in cross-national economic and social indicator lists. However, a closer examination of reforms and institutional developments in the individual countries of the region suggests that Nordic distinctiveness is by no means as self-evident or as straightforward as it was two decades ago. Those Who Work, Those Who Don't Poverty, Morality, and Family in Rural America Jennifer Sherman I University of Minnesota Press Minneapolis London 54 The Place I Found forces that created the situation. Theirs is a story of survival and adaptation in a place that was written off as unimportant, an acceptable casualty in a war between environmental interests and extractive industries. They rely heavily on cultural and moral discourses to help them survive its aftermath. As the following chapters will demonstrate, their beliefs in their own moral superiority allow them to defend their decisions to stay there and to make sense of their lives in their new context, bereft of many of the benefits that originally drew their fami- 2 Workers and Welfare: Poverty, Coping Strategies, and Substance Abuse lies to Golden Valley. Living with Poverty, Past and Present As you drive south into Golden Valley on the narrow and winding Highway7, the landscape unfolds majestically as you glide down off of GoldMountain. The sharp, bare mountaintops give way to forests that framethe road, which then recede into the open fields and flat land of Golden Valley. The highway gradually straightens for the brief respite that Golden Valley provides from its otherwise nonstop hairpin turns. As you approach the valley floor, houses and homesteads appear. Some arelavish ranches, with large houses set back from the road amid acres of meadows. Others are dilapidated shacks surrounded by their own private garbage dumps. It is the gorgeous thousand-acre ranches that catchthe attention, with cattle or deer grazing in wide pastures at dawn anddusk. The small, poorly kept-up houses often go unnoticed, somehowinvisible and easy to ignore despite their closer proximity to the road.The eye has a hard time taking in their abstractionist array of tar paperroofs, boarded-up windows, broken appliances, old vehicles whose usefulparts have long ago been scavenged, and garbage spilling out of bags into the yards. 55 Workers and Welfare Workers and Welfare 56 It is easier for a newcomer to focus on Golden Valley's beauty than its chaos. Its residents, however, are well aware of the more run-down homes. Comments such as "1 wish people took a little more care of their places" often expressed one of the ways in which they felt the community had deteriorated in recent years. When asked to pinpoint when exactly these changes had occurred, however, most people admitted that junker cars and refrigerators in the front yard had always been ubiquitous parts of the landscape in Golden Valley, as they are throughout much of rural America.' The following exchange occurred between Bud and Emily Richards, a married couple in their 40s, as they discussed the way the community had changed over their lifetimes: Yousee a lot of stuff running down. Just-there's not that much money coming into this town, you know. It's hard to ... EMILY: Not a lot of pride in their places and things ... BUD: That's bad, yeah.... But most of those that are real bad have been here forever and they would'a been here if the mill would'a closed or not. 57 time before poverty was commonplace in Golden Valley. The main thing that has changed since the closing of the woods and mill is the proportion of the population who do not work, particularly the proportion of men who are not working. The shacks with the poorly maintained yards have always existed, but now there appear to be more of them. As 48-year-old Eric McCloud explained: In the '70s, it was a booming town, but welfare hit it. But both sawmills wererunning and everything was cool. The sawmill kind of kept that all mellowed out. And you had two factions, three factions: Youhad a fewretirees, you had the workers, you had the welfare. So then when the mill left, it became, I feel, retirement and welfare, but more welfare than retirement. So yeah, I'd say we went through big changes here. BUD: The closing of the woods and sawmills certainly have exacerbated unemployment and its effects in Golden Valley. However, poverty is not new to the valley, which has always had its share of people who lived marginally. A young woman named Christy declined to do an interview with me because she thought that 1 was interested only in hearing about how the mill closing had had an impact on people. She explained to me that her family hadn't been affected by it at all, because her parents had never worked. She had grown up in a remote cabin on an unpaved road that was inaccessible to vehicles at certain times of year and had lived without running water or electricity for most of her childhood. She said that she had grown up in an intergenerational welfare family and that she had broken the cycle by being the first one to get a job. It appeared from her description that there had always been two kinds of people in Golden Valley: those who worked and those who did not. It was also clear that she felt shame because her father was one who did not. Yet Christy's story was not anomalous in Golden Valley. Many of my subjects grew up with fathers who were only marginally attached to the paid workforce, often because they had either chosen a subsistence lifestyle or had sustained debilitating injuries while working. Whether or not their fathers had worked, none of my respondents could recall a Jeanie Mayer, a 45-year-old woman who spent most of her life in Golden Valley, was one of many residents who made observations similar to Eric's: I know that there's familieshere that haven't worked in three or four generations. They brag about the fact that, you know, they've never workeda day in their lives. Welfare. So there are jJeople here on welfare who have been here for a long time? Yeah,yeah. There's cyclic, generation after generation of welfare people that don't want to work.Or they just work a little bit here or a little bit there, but for the most part they don't contribute .... So that's to me the biggestchange that we've had that I don't like. Because there's more of that than there used to be? I think so. Eric and Jeanie's comments, like Christy's refusal, suggest a strong social disgrace around unemployment and welfare receipt. Unemployed poverty has long been unacceptable in Golden Valley and is commonly blamed for most of the obvious problems in the community. Although as shown in chapter 1 welfare receipt has not actually increased, the perception of welfare as a problem and the stigma around its receipt has. Working poverty, however, has historically had a different social interpretation. Like welfare receipt and unemployed poverty, working poverty has been a fact of life in Golden Valley for generations. A job alone has never been a guarantee of wealth here. Whether they were fromworking families or not, few of my subjects grew up in any kind of affluenceand most recalled poverty being a part of their daily struggle to 58 Workers and Welfare some degree. Many subjects grew up with a working father whose salary barely kept the family afloat, and lacking electricity and telephones was as common for them as it was for those whose fathers didn't work. Women in the workforce were less common then than they are now and were particularly uncommon among the more stably married families. Without a second earner, even a mill salary afforded only the barest of middle-class lifestyles, as average annual earnings in the manufacturing sector were less than $17,000 in 1990, just about $3,000 over the poverty line for a family of four at the time.r A mill salary was considered a respectable one since it generally paid enough for a man to support his family and eventually own a home, even if it took years to reach this kind of comfort level. This did not mean that the family had any money to spare, though, and most residents recalled clothes, toys, and store-bought food being in short supply. As Eric McCloud recalled it, "When I was growing up, this was a community of poor working people. They were poor, and some of them stayed poor, and some of them saved every penny they made and ended up with a fairly nice retirement." The key to respectability was thus not necessarily wealth, but rather having a male earner who provided as much as he could through hard work. As long as someone in the family was working for the money, there was little shame in living on meager wages then or now, and subsistence activities were highly valued as part of the culture of Golden Valley. Almost everyone I met who grew up there remembered subsistence activities being a part of everyday life to some degree, whether it was hunting and fishing to help supply the family's dietary needs or cutting and chopping their own wood for heat in the winter. Many people believed then (and now) that it spoils children to give them too many things for free and that boys in particular should work for their luxury items from a young age. Often the local environment supplied what salaries could not for the enterprising man and his family. Most men, as well as a lot of women, grew up helping provide for the family in nonmonetary ways from a young age. Forty-five-year-old Grace Prader remembers her childhood as being filled with subsistence work and triesto raise her sons to emulate the demanding work ethic of her own youth: Growing up I always had goats, and we had fair animals and stuff like that. We had a huge garden. There was five kids. And on a schoolteacher and a custodian salary we had to have the garden and the animals for freezer and table. And I can remember other kids going, Workers and Welfare 59 "I don't know what I'm gonna do after school today, I'm so bored." I was like, "Shit, I wish I had time to get bored," you know? And so as a result, there's a lot of kids who are still that way, but my boys, I try to keep them pretty busy. . Thirty-year-old Rod Mitchell recalled a similarly tough childhood, although with a bit more anger than Grace. His family moved from the San Francisco Bay Area to Riverbend when he was 9 years old. His stepfather, whom he described as "old school," sold firewood for a living and expected his sons to pitch in whenever they weren't at schoo\. As Rod recollected, It was an interestin' life growing up here because, I mean, we had to work for it. It's hard to make a living in this place. So basically I've been working since I was 9 years old. I kinda liked it when I was a kid. But I do have my resentments. Just the upbringing, the hard life. Because you had to work? Yeah, the work. A normal kid of 8 shouldn't have to go out and bust his tail after school and be working weekends. I just feel I grew up way too early. But you know, it helped me out, 'cause my work ethics are excellent. I mean, I think I've only drawn unemployment once in seventeen years. I mean, I've never gone more than a week without a job. Like Grace, Rod found a feeling of respectability in the hard work demanded by poverty despite the sacrifices it required of him. I discovered the same sentiment among most respondents, for whom chores and responsibilities were simply part of the Golden Valley lifestyle during their childhoods and were vital in the purveyance of strong work ethics. The culture of Golden Valley was built around the value of hard labor for its own sake, with survival and masculine pride often being its only rewards. Poverty per se was not looked down upon, but rather poverty in the absence of work. It is this kind of poverty, the poverty of those deemed lazy and unproductive, that is symbolized for many by houses and yards that are in poor repair.' A man with a decent work ethic, whether or not he is poor, is expected to keep up the appearance of respectability. Thus, the difference between the past and the present is not simply the existence of poverty. The main distinction between then and now appears to be the gendered nature of work and breadwinning. In my sample, 41 percent of all respondents had grown up with a mother who Workers and Welfare Workers and Welfare worked at least part-time. However, of the women in my sample who were either married or parents, 83 percent were working. The ability of the male breadwinner to support the family, rather than the average standard of living, is in many ways what separates the present from the past. During the forest industry's heyday, a solid lower-middle-class lifestyle was more commonly achievable without a working wife, particularly if the couple had hardworking children to help with the family's survival. Today, it is much harder for families in Golden Valley to achieve this same lifestyle without the addition of a working woman, and as discussed in chapter 1, women's workforce participation is on the rise. Meanwhile, unemployment and lack of workforce participation have become much more common for men over the decade. Given the cultural context, this presents a difficult challenge for the men of Golden Valley. Not only must they fight for material survival, but they must also fight harder than before just to retain respectability within the community. It is not easy for men to manifest their work ethics in the absence of work, and for many it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish themselves from the ranks of the intergenerational welfare families whom they were taught to scorn. It is thus not surprising that poverty has become more visible to those who live in Golden Valley. Among its most commonly cited personifications are the people waiting impatiently at the post office on the first day of the month for their welfare checks to appear in their mailboxes. Another is the state of disrepair and disregard of many of the valley's homes. While neither of these phenomena were unknown to previous generations in Golden Valley, they have apparently become harder for its current population to ignore. Thus the run-down houses that visitors can easily overlook have become for residents the most salient symbols of their beloved I think about those things that were instilled in us very young, that made us-you know, strong work ethics-those things that I look around now and I'm like, whoa, I don't think they have it. Or they're not being modeled to work. Or unfortunately some teachers and I will talk about these kids that'll look at you and be like, "I don't need to work. I'm just gonna collect a check when I get out of school." And they are dead serious. That is their goal, and that is what they'll do. And that is so sad, but those are the models that they have. I had highly motivated working parents that were like, gung ho, you know, were always doing something, always. 60 community's decline. This decline is not simply material in nature for most of them, however; it also is a decline in what they perceive as the moral value of hard work. Just as it is harder for the unemployed to manifest their own work ethics, they are also assumed to be unable to pass these values onto their children. A telling example comes from Dawn Bartlett, a 30-yearold teacher at Golden Valley Elementary School, who expressed what she saw as the major difference between her childhood and the experience of the children who are her students: 61 Dawn herself had grown up in poverty, miles from town in a house without either electricity or running water. Her parents were "highly motivated" to work in unpaid subsistence activities that nonetheless ensured the family's survival and provided their most basic needs. When she remembered this past, she did not recall feelings of shame or guilt; instead she remembered learning strong work ethics and survival skillsthat strengthened her as a person and would sustain her regardless of what life threw into her path. This provided for her a sharp contrast with what she saw as today's growing problem of poverty in the absence of a proper work ethic. Dawn, like most of my respondents, felt that the community's biggest problem was not so much an increase in poverty as it was the increase in malaise and hopelessness that seemed to have accompanied the loss of the male jobs. Whether this increase in negative values is real or perceived is difficult to quantify, but its importance to sociallife translates into pressure on the poor to prove that they are not deadbeats, particularly if they hope to find work in Golden Valley. As this chapter will explore in detail, Golden Valley's small size and tightknit community structure mean that no one is anonymous, and reputations and collective opinions can have a serious impact on people's social lives and labor market experiences. Copingwith Rural Poverty All the things I do for recreation either gain you money or help you not spend money. Hunting and fishing is meat coming in; gold mining and gemstone mining are money coming in. And money's pretty bad, but it's just part of living here. You have to understand that it swings in seasons. Winter is really, really bad, and you kind of go hungry sometimes. And then summer you put in a garden, which is essential, Workers and Welfare 62 virtually. And things go better in the summer and fall, and then in winter it goes back. (Kenny Blake, 25-year-old gas station clerk and cohabitating father of one) Moral Cal)ital and Survival There are a number of ways in which the experience of rural poverty is distinctly different from that of urban, inner-city poverty. Most notably, several of the options available for surviving poverty are unique to the rural setting. While on the one hand certain types of paid informalsector work may be harder to find in a rural area than an urban one, on the other hand there are many more options for unpaid subsistence work to help sustain people in lieu of cash. The urban setting, with its ever-expanding underground economy, includes not only illegal work such as drug dealing and prostitution, but also a growing sector of work that is "basically licit but takes place outside the regulatory apparatus covering zoning, taxes, health and safety, minimum wage laws, and other types of standards.l" This semilegal work includes everything from magazine vending to larger scale informal-sector work such as sweatshops, which may be permanent and full-time, albeit also unregulated and poorly paid. Dohan describes this type of informal work as "otherwise legal economic activities that took place outside the purview of government regulation," versus illicit work, "which produced and distributed goods and services that were themselves illegal."5 His research looks in depth at two urban Latino communities in which the bulk of income comes from illegal work, illicit work, and welfare. While the possibility of "under the table" paid work exists in rural areas as well, in Golden Valley it is on a much smaller scale and generally consists of short-term and/or part-time jobs such as child care', yard maintenance, fuel gathering, and temporary construction work. Consistent informal work opportunities like day labor are virtually unknown in Golden Valley, although a limited number of informal construction and maintenance jobs do emerge there from time to time. Similarly, the opportunities for informal vending such as flea markers'' are scarce in Golden Valley, which lacks a permanent informal market of this kind. Occasionally individuals attempt to sell odd junk in a vacant lot in town, but this does not occur regularly and thus does not approach anything like a steady income or livelihood. The illegal economy is also underdeveloped in Golden Valley as compared to large urban settings. Workers and Welfare 63 There is little petty theft there, and I may have been one of the only people in the entire valley who regularly locked the doors to my house and car. While some illegal drug production and dealing (particularly marijuana and methampheramines) does exist there, it is on a much smaller scale, and in 2003 it was mainly the realm of outsiders and social pariahs. On the other hand, many people engage in significant amounts of subsistence work in Golden Valley, most of which is unheard of in urban settings. The bulk of this type of work is unpaid and heavily focused on self-provisioning in the forms of hunting, fishing, fuel gathering, growing gardens, and raising livestock. For many people these activities are simultaneously hobbies that they enjoy and serious work that is vital for their family's survival. Growing up in poverty or near-poverty conditions in Golden Valley helped prepare most of my respondents for the possibility of surviving it as adults. While few had hoped to be poor adults, most were grateful for the kinds of survival skills and abilities that their hard upbringings had provided them. Although most would happily become less reliant on these skills if they were to become unnecessarvthey were appreciative of the security they felt in knowing they could survive on very low incomes. Scholars of poverty in both the urban and rural setting have described the various ways in which the poor make do.? In urban settings these coping strategies range from those that are consistent with mainstream cultural norms to those that explicitly resist the mainstream." Researchers who study urban drug dealers find that their behaviors and coping strategies are often based within a "backlash" culture that disdains white mainstream values in favor of street toughness and focuses on the perceived financial rewards of illegal activities such as the drug trade." Economically, these strategies may be sensible, promising potentially higher earnings than most low-skill jobs in the legal workforce. The existence of the resistance culture allows individuals to preserve self-esteem and social standing while pursuing economic gain through ethically and legally questionable means. In urban communities, heterogeneity in cultures, values, and activities allows for competing options for surviving poverty while retaining dignity. Social microclimates can influence which strategies are chosen and which are seen as inaccessible or irrational. 10 For some, the frequency and proximity of illegal activities allows them to be viewed as morally 64 appropriate. For others, morality 11 sition to illegal pursuits. moral standards often they are unable to achieve success mainstream workers tended strategies found to choose over more these activities Duneier'" the connection studies suggest, able to choose optimization.U in which 18 less plentiful.!" ily influenced The and alternative by local cultural a preference for informal provisioning nities.2Z coping Furthermore, activities self-sufficiency, even when sume.23 Additionally, common among Within survival, this means it is generally the literature these culturally through gests that small rural communities is also much maximization hold is often norms.i" and cul- true in rural more pervasive such as illegal activities are tend to be heav- which less diverse often dictate many forms of community-level Although This "moral capital" themselves in the absence of individuals' including moral worth how much they do in illegal activities. A person's just his or her reputation, lower moral worth increasingly charity. non-work-related Thus, moral capital can be and charity ties and social support.P behaviors such as drug and alcohol heavily, a large component individual and family-level how- are often rare jobs, as well as to capital in the form of job opportunities or social capital in the form of community also contribute Valley, moral of moral capital coping strategies. abuse comes from Such strategies carry with hunting, like in the urban ghetto, in more cohesive and stable communities Golden Valley, residents "may be able to exercise Such culturally woodcutting, will often choose local cultural only those ideals such as back on what they con- are relatively appropriate use is less and often carries and poverty understudied-" adaptations as are are encour- and sanction.F Wilson sug- are more cohesive than many urban and chapter most urban researchers capital. as having denied access to the community's traded for economic and that moral consider- and trade in rural commu- the urban poor/" than involvement to more than or even are used by so- In Golden among capital.32 Perceptions moral status contributes of similar As Wilson in the introduction But as previous themselves activities.v into a form of symbolic or do not work and their others them varying degrees of social acceptance. cutting social support between economic ever. Those who are perceived poor individu- found that public assistance activities the ways in which and economically. through and work ethic. that looks at informal work activities As discussed worth has evolved unacceptable 1, Golden areas, both ethnically have noted, even in the solutions their community, the community to their problems, reinforced hypothesizes, like but the widely held mores of by economic and social resources that keep stable, strongly pressure them to refrain from such activ- those who do not adhere communities. to them He explains are common of the community definitions of appropriate for shaming."35 of deserving being deemed "undeserving" behaviors, versus undeserving range from shame exclusion from many parts of social and economic My findings from Golden among factors in the commonalIn Golden results in the establishment and inappropriate into judgments controlling that "the stronger ity of values, the greater the possibilities ley the cohesion homogeneity, un- a range of illegal or ity."34Sayer suggests that values and the shame they can engender tight-knit aged and enforced Valley drug deal- self-esteem stigma.e'' rural subsistence communities.t'' with the rural poor than with it a powerful over either as gardening, families ations often constrain are often based on their coping behaviors, by barter struggling cial groups to distinguish above of low social and argues that moral criteria some individ- culture that are consistent themselves higher status.I'' Sayer similarly populations, work and self-provisioning.r! activities status to locate can allow those of significant economic survival strategies and fishing are often supplemented morality Gowari'" and morality and gender to Lamont, may arise based on and moral norrns.i? "self-respect." greater lifestyles In rural communities, According economic social distinctions factors such as behavioral allows the poor to create distinctions economic American coping absence of clear class differences, noneconomic ones because in the urban setting between Edin and accepted same does not necessarily mainstream and hegemonic appropriate American despite and low-wage but illegal work activities they provided to mainstream als are often areas, lucrative informal because As these diverse mothers the most legal and morally found that, even among homeless ing or panhandling Thus, when in the urban setting maximization. single them with greater uals chose less profitable tural poor self-worth terms.F over economic that in oppo- to mainstream to maintain in economic economically provided adherence many individuals morality Lein+' and Newman!" to be constructed argues, allows individuals the lure of illegal opportunities, prioritize continues As Lamont 65 Workers and Welfare Workers and Welfare which Val- of clear translate poor. Consequences of and self-loathing to life there. Valley suggest that the small size, cultural and lack of anonymity in a small rural community together Workers and Welfare 66 can create greater social pressure on the poor to be culturally acceptable according to the existing standards. For those whose coping strategies are not morally adequate according to local norms, the result is often community-level censure that further affects their quality of life and chances for eventually escaping poverty. On the other hand, as discussed above, those who have higher moral capital generally have more access to both social and economic capital. In this way the rural setting differs substantially from the urban, which allows for a greater range of survival strategies that are acceptable within separate subcultural spheres." This constriction of acceptable possibilities with regard to economic survival has numerous consequences for Golden Valley's poor, including that many choose to exclude themselves from most of the nation's formal poverty-alleviation programs. Coping Strategies Those who either lack jobs or whose incomes are inadequate must choose between several available survival options in Golden Valley. By far the most popular and respected of strategies are those related to subsistence food provision. These include hunting and fishing as well as growing sizable gardens and raising livestock. The first two options are almost universally practiced as cherished pastimes by Golden Valley's men, whether or not they rely on them for sustenance. Hunting and fishing are important and pervasive parts of Golden Valley's culture and cited by almost everyone of the male respondents as their favorite hobbies and main reasons for remaining there. They represent a man's first line of defense against economic problems as well as his tie to the land and to historic forms of the male provider role. Being the most highly valued of the local subsistence options, they are also the best way for a poor man to contribute nonmonetarily to his family's basic needs with little loss of respectability. They are practiced legally as well as illegally by people who cannot afford the proper licensing or who cannot limit themselves to the short designated hunting seasons. As the son of a game warden explained, enforcement sometimes ignores those infractions committed by people in need: Wintertime's hard for everybody, and things can be overlooked that make children's lives better. ... When people don't have money for food, there's lots and lots of food just runnin' around the woods. And when you're truly broke, it's something that has to be done. Workers and Welfare 67 For the truly poor, however, hunting and fishing are nonetheless insufficient to meet all of their daily needs. Thus, among those who are strugglingfinancially, subsistence activities are generally combined with several other possible coping strategies, whose social interpretations coverthe spectrum from acceptability to contempt (see Figure 1). Having women enter the workforce, either in addition to or in lieu of men, has alwaysbeen one option among Golden Valley's poor, and it is becoming more and more commonplace and socially acceptable since the mill closure. In addition, particularly for younger couples, family support alsoplays an important role in keeping struggling individuals and families afloat. Although few people's parents have significant amounts of money to lend, a number of struggling young couples mentioned relying on family support with some frequency when their own resources were stretched too tight. Poor families in Golden Valley often create networks of support similar to those found in urban communities.V relying on one another for money, child care, and temporary housing. While receiving help from family members is not the same as working oneself, it does nonetheless keep one tied to the community's work ethic. Family help implies that someone in the family or extended family is a worker, and thus social capital in the form of family ties can also contribute to moral capital. Also generally accepted and often used are the opportunities that Golden Valley offers for living rent-tree or for very low rent. This strategyis generally available only to those with long histories and/or social ties in the valley, although occasionally newcomers like me manage to find such situations through networking. Many people have inherited their parents' or grandparents' properties and occupy them. For other financially strapped families, there is the curious but common custom of"caretaking." Caretaking generally implies little to no rent on a property that the tenants are allowed to inhabit in return for providing basic maintenance on it. My own living situation was considered a caretaking position, as the rent was well below market rates. The custom of allowing struggling families to caretake properties is one of the less openly acknowledged ways in which Golden Valley's more prosperous community members take care of its less fortunate. It is becoming increasinglymore common since the mill closure as men who want to stay securely employed and make higher salaries generally have needed to moveelsewhere to find better jobs. While many mill workers originally Workers and Welfare Workers and Welfare 68 least moral capital most moral capital ...'
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Running head: US WELFARE SYSTEM VERSUS NORDIC COUNTRIES

US Welfare System versus Nordic Countries
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US WELFARE SYSTEM VERSUS NORDIC COUNTRIES

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US Welfare System versus Nordic Countries
Introduction
Welfare programs are aimed at assisting the people within an economy who are unable to
support themselves for various reasons. The US has several welfare systems in operation just as
there are in Nordic countries. Nordic countries refer to the countries and regions surrounding
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. Both the Nordic and the US use different
welfare models that offer various varying advantages. Through a comparison of the two welfare
models, we shall see that the US welfare model stigmatizes its users as compared to the Nordic
model.
Discussion
The Nordic model has been of great interest to many economists and other groups. In the
1980s, the Nordic model was able to sustain 100% employment whereas other countries in
Europe and the US itself were struggling with mass unemployment (Kautto, 2012). This Nordic
model has largely been successful due to several factors as compared to the US welfare system.
To begin with, the Nordic countries draw their spending for social welfare on a risk-sharing basis
by dividing the resources among themselves. This model makes the raising of resources easier
and cheaper for Nordic countries. As a result, the welfare system in Nordic countries is much
more robust as compared to the US welfare system.
The robust welfare system in Nordic countri...


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