THE
OXFORD
HANDBOOK
OF
THE WELFARE
STATE
rtive Research Centre
trative home for the
gsgemeinschaft (Gerred researchers from
pment.
rsecting dimensions:
ction and the courts;
Ire, or the facilitation
n the welfare dimenorne base for another
idimensional view of
Edited
by
FRANCIS
G. CASTLES
STEPHAN
LEIBFRIED
JANE LEWIS
HERBERT
OBINGER
and
CHRISTOPHER
PIERSON
OXFORD
UNIVERSITY
PRESS
40
CHAPTER
THE NORDIC
COUNTRIES
MIKKO
KAUTTO
INTRODUCTION
THE notion of a distinctive Nordic or Scandinavian welfare state was born long
before Esping-Andersen
(1990) advanced his general claim that advanced welfare
states cluster around qualitatively different regime types. In the early post-war
decades, at a time when Europe was divided by the Iron Curtain, the Scandinavian
countries, and in particular Sweden, were frequently mentioned-both
in domestic
and international policy debates-as
epitomizing a successful 'third-way' compromise between unregulated capitalism and state socialism. Within comparative welfare state research, the distinctive nature of Scandinavian
social policies came
increasingly into focus from the early 19805 as functionalist
convergence theory
was challenged by proponents of the power resources school (Korpi 1980; Stephens
1979) emphasizing the role of class politics as a driver of the institutional variation of
welfare states. Today, the idea of a Nordic model still serves as an important reference
category for comparative welfare state research and a yardstick for reflecting welfare
state change in the Nordic countries themselves,
Debates about the Nordic welfare model tend to involve at least three fundamentally
different sets of questions that are not always clearly distinguished: has the model ever
existed as an empirical reality (and what are its defining characteristics), are its features
and outcomes desirable, and, finally, does it still exist and can it survive?
In the analysis in Chapter 39, the existence of a distinctive Nordic type of welfare
state appears to be the least controversial of all the model attributions. But while it
THE
NORDIC
COUNTRIES
587
may appear that the case for the existence of a Nordic model is strong, there is no
consensus on the precise specification of the features that define the model. Traditionally the notion of a Nordic model simply (and somewhat vaguely) referred to an
active state, a large public sector, and a broadly conceived public responsibility for
the social welfare of citizens all within the framework of a market economy. But, as
we shall see, in more recent debates, a range of other more specific aspects and
attributes have been suggested as important, and even constitutive components of
the Nordic model.
As already suggested, the idea of a distinctive Nordic welfare state has always had
strong prescriptive overtones-most
often as an example (model) to be followed by
other countries, but also occasionally as a dystopia to be avoided. The appeal of the
model stems from its alleged ability to produce desirable social outcomes, while at
the same time maintaining economic competitiveness and full employment (Kangas
and Palme 2005; Lundberg et al. 2008). While it tends to be generally accepted that
the Nordic societies have been blessed with a range of beneficial social outcomessuch as a low degree of economic inequality, a relatively high degree of social
mobility, gender equality, etc.-criticism
of the model has mainly been focused on
issues of economic efficiency and sustainability. High levels of public expenditure,
the negative incentive effects of generous social protection, and above all high tax
rates have been criticized as economically unsustainable and-in
the long runincompatible with economic growth (e.g. Lindbeck 1997; Andersen et al. 2007).
The popularity of the Nordic model-in
academic as well as in policy oriented
debates-has varied over time in close correspondence with fluctuations in the relative
economic performance of the Nordic countries. It reached a climax in the 1980s as
Sweden, Norway, and Finland were able to maintain full employment while the rest of
Europe (including Denmark) continued to struggle with mass unemployment in the
wake of the first and second oil crises. However, when Sweden and Finland and (on a
smaller scale) Norway in the early 1990S themselves ran into severe macroeconomic
problems, fiscal deficits, and record-high unemployment rates, confidence in the
Nordic model faded, among both international and domestic observers. The concept
has regained some of its former popularity in the period from the late 1990Sonwards as
all the Nordic countries experienced a return to fuller levels of employment. Even
Denmark recovered from more than two decades of high unemployment combined
with chronic balance of payment deficits to become a celebrated top performer in
terms of macroeconomic stability and full employment.
In other words, the economic performance of the Nordic countries has once again
become impressive, and-as a result of this-political
and academic interest in the
Nordic model has recovered. The question is, however, if and to what extent the
model itself is still intact as an empirical reality in the Nordic countries.
In this chapter we concentrate on discussing the descriptive premises involved in
the notion of a distinctive Nordic welfare model. We ask in what sense the Nordic
welfare states constitute a distinctive type, and we discuss whether its core features
have remained stable in recent decades. Although it should be emphasized that the
existence of a Nordic model does not preclude the possibility of change over time in
588
MIKKO KAUTTO
response to new social, economic, and demographic conditions and challenges, we
shall argue that welfare state developments in the 1990S and 2000S have posed serious
questions concerning both the continuity and the coherence of the model.
COMMON
ROOTS
AND HISTORICAL
TRAJECTORIES
................................................................................................................
Certainly the concept of a Nordic 'model' is misleading if it is taken to suggest that
the Nordic welfare states were created according to a common preconceived masterplan. The features of the developed Scandinavian welfare states have a long history
and are the result of political bargaining, step-by-step reforms, and their imperfect
implementation.
They are, in other words, the result of processes of political evolution rather than intelligent design.
As elsewhere, early welfare state developments
in the Nordic countries were
related to industrialization,
and the associated series of social, demographic, and
political changes: urbanization and the birth of the working class, nation building,
and the break through of political democracy (c. Pierson 1991). In many respects, the
circumstances in which these developments occurred in Scandinavia marked them
out from the rest of Europe and comparative historical accounts have pointed
towards a specific Scandinavian route to the welfare state (see e.g. Baldwin 1990;
Alestalo and Kuhnle 1987; Esping-Andersen and Korpi 1987; see also the special issue
of the Scandinavian Journal of History 2001, vol. 26, no. 3; and Christiansen and
Markkola 2006).
First, there is the role of religion and more specifically changes in the division of
power between church and state as a result of the Reformation and conversion to
Lutheranism. The responsibility for poor relief was transferred from church to state,
and as centralized state power was weak, local civil authorities (municipalities) were
delegated the task of taking care of those who could not support themselves. This laid
the foundation for a strong role for local public authorities in the management of
welfare policies, in close cooperation with the central authority. In time, these responsibilities and powers came to be increasingly funded from taxation (Christiansen and
Markkola 2006).
Second, the pattern of land ownership in Scandinavia was distinctive, giving a
relatively strong and autonomous position to the peasant population. Family-run
small farms were the basic units of production. Due to the late onset of industrialization, farmers remained an important part of the population and a powerful political
force in their own right in contrast both to Britain, where the peasantry had long
been assimilated into the working class, and those other parts of Europe in which
feudal arrangements still prevailed. Independent farmers became one cornerstone of
the Scandinavian tri-polar class structure, together with the working and upper classes
(Alestalo and Kuhnle 1987). This distinctive class structure, and its consequences in
THE NORDIC
COUNTRIES
509
------terms of party organization and support, underlines the importance in Scandinavia of
building cross-class coalitions of political support for the welfare state project. It may
also suggest why ideas of citizenship and equal rights found support amongst both
farmers and workers, enabling cooperation and consensus. Social policy was not just a
'workers' question', but also included concern for the rural population, helping to pave
the way for universalistic solutions.
Third, there is the distinctive role of (leftist) politics which was the leitmotif both
of the classical power resources school and in Esping-Andersen's
regime theory. In
the 1930S social democratic parties came to power in all the three Scandinavian
countries (Sweden, Denmark, and Norway) in alliance with agrarian and or social
liberal parties, and they immediately implemented
important
reforms in social
protection
(most notably old-age pensions and unemployment
insurance) that
contrasted sharply with Bismarckian social insurance thinking and at the same
time departed from the existing tradition of discretionary
poor relief (Stjerne
2004). In the first decades after World War II the social democratic parties in Sweden
and Norway achieved an almost hegemonic position from which they were able to
effectively control the expansion of welfare policies-in
close cooperation with a
powerful trade union movement. Also in Denmark the social democratic party was
comparatively strong, but more dependent on collaboration with a liberal coalition
partner. In Finland and Iceland, however, social democratic parties were significantly
weaker and hence arguably less pivotal in the design and implementation
of welfare
reforms (Christiansen and Markkola 2006).
Fourth, it can be argued that the Nordic countries share social structures and
cultural values that are particularly conducive to gender equality, and that women
have had a uniquely important place in Scandinavian welfare state developments.
Women achieved suffrage relative early in all the Nordic countries and the active
role of female reformers may help explain why even early social policy legislation
reflected the interests of women to an extent that distinguishes
the Nordic
countries from other advanced countries at the time (an emphasis on individual
entitlements, the early introduction of transfers to single mothers, child allowances
paid to the mother, etc.).
Incorporating the role of ideas is a fifth candidate to include among the possible
roots of Nordic distinctiveness. It has been argued that the Nordic societies are
characterized by a particular passion for equality with cultural and historical roots
(Graubart 1986). Recently a book edited by Kildal and Kuhnle (2005) has posed the
question of whether it is the institutions or the moral commitments behind them
that matter most. They argue that welfare programmes are essentially expressions of
moral conceptions and values, in which ideas like 'universalism', 'public responsibility for welfare', and 'work for all' play an important role. More broadly, research
based on World Value Surveys and European surveys also contributes to our understanding of what is distinctive about political and social policy attitudes in the Nordic
region (e.g. Ervasti et al. 2008).
The relative weight of these factors-the
timing of changes, the distribution of
powers and cleavages in society, and the form that new responses took-was,
of
590
MIKKO
KA UTTO
course, different in the various Nordic countries. While we can highlight historical
similarities and shared practices, it is probably only after 1945 that the Scandinavian
countries-operating
in favourable economic and demographic conditionsstarted to emerge as a group with relatively similar social policy designs with
Sweden as the forerunner, and Norway, Finland, Denmark, and Iceland as followers
or partial outliers.
In summary, a number of structural factors point towards a common experience
in the Scandinavian countries: reasonably similar structural conditions, parallels in
political mobilization and class-based politics, the importance of public responsibility in the form of decision-making and administrative structures-at
both
central and local levels-and,
rather later, a role for the social partners. Further,
similarities between the countries favoured close contacts, diffusion of ideas, and
mutual learning (see Petersen 2006). As a result, the Nordic countries bear some
'family resemblance', especially when viewed in a broader comparative framework
(Castles 1993).
CHARACTERISTICS
OF THE NORDIC
MODEL
It has been said that the complexity of historical developments and causal dynamics
require us to treat all cases as unique (e.g. Baldwin 1996). Adopting a critical tone
towards typologies and regime analysis, Kasza (2002) argues that for various reasons-the
cumulative nature of welfare policies, the diverse histories of policies in
different welfare fields, the involvement of different sets of policy actors, variations in
the policy-making process, and the influence of foreign models-national
welfare
systems fail to show the internal consistency that would be appropriate for the regime
concept to have real explanatory power. Historical research has an eye for differences,
and thus it is perhaps not surprising that the most recent historical reappraisal
assessed the Nordic model as one with 'five exceptions' (Christiansen et al. 2006).
It has also been argued that rather than a single uniform Nordic model, we have
several Nordic models (Mjeset 1986), or different Nordic routes (for example, in
relation to the development of pension schemes, Salminen 1993).
Whereas historical studies and detailed intra-Nordic comparisons point to
differences, social policy research has tended to focus upon similarities in institutional design. By the mid-198os, there was considerable evidence that the Nordic
welfare states had developed a 'distinctive welfare state model' (see Erikson et al.
1987; Esping-Andersen
and Korpi 1987; Esping-Andersen
1990; Kolberg 1991;
Hansen et al. 1993). We have already referred to the role of the state and other
structural factors as crucial for the Nordic model, but here we should also draw
attention to the design of social insurance schemes, the role of services, and the
functioning of the labour market.
THE
---~-
...-~----~--------~~~~
NORDIC
COUNTRIES
591
The extensive role of the state and the wide scope of public policies, most generally
evidenced in Sweden's high levels of social spending, were already widely commented
on in the 19505 and 1960s. As the focus of research shifted in the 19705 and 1980s
to consider how the welfare state operates, the scope and role of public policies
was, in fact, further underlined as the power mobilization school showed that left
power was related to the expansion of legislated social rights. In relation to social
security benefits, most social insurance schemes across Scandinavia also had an
earnings-related component which applied universally to all workers. In contrast to
other groups of countries, where either only flat-rate basic security or occupational
schemes dominated and where coverage criteria and social security patterns were
different, this made these schemes stand out as being uniquely 'encompassing' (e.g.
Korpi 1980; Palme 1990; Kangas 1991). Palme (1999) has argued that by establishing a
model of social protection, in which uniform basic benefits and services based on
residence were combined with earnings-related social insurance programmes, the
Nordic countries took a distinctive path.
One of the aims in developing public solutions was to normalize the receipt of
social security and to get away from the stigma associated with receiving public
support. Cross-national comparisons of the institutional characteristics of welfare
provision were offered as reasons why the Nordic welfare states achieved lower
income inequality, lower poverty rates, smaller differences in standards of living,
and more pronounced gender equality (e.g. Fritzell 2001).
One way to pinpoint the uniqueness of the Nordic model is to focus upon its
combination or configuration of welfare state characteristics. Korpi and Palme
(1998) set out to account for what they call 'the paradox ofredistribution',
arguing
that social policies targeted at the poor turn out to be ineffective in abolishing
poverty. Instead, their analysis shows that encompassing or inclusive welfare states
achieve more equal income distribution and lower rates of poverty. These authors
(2004) have further noted that the Nordic strategy of redistribution is constituted
by generosity and broad coverage of transfers, combined with a strong emphasis on
free or strongly subsidized service provision. Taken together, these necessitate
higher social expenditure but also lead to a lower degree of income inequality.
Abrahamson (1999b) argues similarly, that what matters in the Nordic case is not
just the way that cash benefits have been designed, but the whole pattern of welfare
provision (including services). The Nordic model can thus be seen as a combination or configuration of characteristics, some of which are not necessarily shared by
all the Nordic countries.
In both Esping-Andersen's regime typology (see the discussion in Chapter 39) and
other research based on the power resource perspective, the emphasis was placed
upon social insurance and cash benefits, in terms of their coverage, financing shares,
and compensation rates.
Assessing welfare state development in Scandinavia from women's perspective,
Helga Hernes (1987) has pictured the Scandinavian welfare state as woman-friendly,
giving women autonomy and allowing them the possibility of acting autonomously
in politics, in the labour market, and as working mothers. VYhile the role of caring
592
MIKKO
KA UTTO
services is often-and
rightly so-highlighted
as beneficial for gender equality, the
woman-friendliness of the Nordic welfare states is not just a result of an extensive
provision of child and elder care services. It also stems from the early introduction
of individual taxation and choices that define the rights to participation, social
insurance, and services. Citizenship as a core entitlement principle, combined with
individual rights and personal needs assessment in practice, have helped to reduce
the dependence of women upon their spouses. The Scandinavian welfare states have
developed into dual-earner societies, in contrast to Continental and Southern European countries, where female labour force participation is significantly lower and the
male-breadwinner family still relatively prevalent.
Kohl (1981) was one of the first scholars to point to the extent of the public
provision of services as a distinguishing characteristic of the Nordic countries in
expenditure-based comparisons. During the 1990S this insight has been deepened as
cross-national comparisons of service provision have become more prominent in
welfare research (Alber 1995; Anttonen and Sipila 1996; Lehto et al. 1999; Daly and
Lewis 2000; Kautto 2002). The most distinguishing feature of the Nordic welfare
states to emerge is the prevalence of local and publicly funded and produced health
and social service provision, aimed to cater for a wide variety of needs of the entire
population (Sipila 1997). The extraordinary powers of Nordic local authorities are
underlined in comparative research; taxation rights, broad responsibility, and legislated autonomy especially emerge as distinctive.
Finally, we need to stress-with
Scharpf (1991:89-97), who relies on Meidner and
Hedborg (1984)-the close relation between social policy and employment policy,
and the importance of a positive interplay between the unique nature of industrial
relations (with high union density and coordinated wage bargaining) in the Nordic
countries and welfare state development (see Christiansen and Markkola 2006 and
Barth and Moene 2009). Importantly, the Nordic countries have always had high
employment rates, both for men and women, and also among older workers. Nordic
social policies were designed as trampolines that would allow the unemployed to
'bounce back', favouring risk taking and job change in dynamic labour markets
through active labour market policies. Investments in social policy were seen as
worthwhile provided they led to a higher level and more egalitarian distribution of
welfare, and contributed to the maintenance of full employment and economic
growth. Arguably the generosity of social policy in the Nordic fashion is only fiscally
sustainable provided that a large proportion of the population is mobilized in the
labour market and that reliance on income transfers is short-lived among the
working age population This helps to explain why publicly financed activation
measures, understood as an investment in people's skills and employability, have
been so prominent in the Scandinavian context.
Given this background, the notion of Scandinavian distinctiveness could hardly
have been regarded as earth-shattering news when Esping-Andersen's Three Worlds of
Welfare Capitalism was published in 1990. Given also what was already known about
the Scandinavian model, it was the identification of Esping-Andersen's other two
regime types and the theoretical insights arising from these that struck the research
THE
NORDIC
COUNTRIES
593
community
and explain the continuing interest in welfare state typologies. For
Scandinavian
scholars at least, the corporatist-conservative
and liberal regimes
provided useful references for establishing what was distinctive about the Scandinavian policy package.
THE NORDIC
MODEL:
AN
EMPIRICAL
REAPPRAISAL
Esping-Andersen
and other proponents
of the power resource perspective have
offered strong arguments for using institutional data to capture essential differences
between modern welfare states. They have pointed out that many Continental welfare
states resemble the Nordic ones in their high expenditure levels, but that policy
design, coverage of schemes, and benefit rules in the two groups of nations are
markedly different. Welfare regime analysis is based on the argument that it is the
content of policies that matters more for outcomes than spending per se. Whilst this
is true, we may note that the kind of social policy delivered in Nordic countries could
hardly be achieved with low expenditure and that expenditure-based
measures, if
used in a sensitive manner (for instance, by disaggregating by type of programme: see
Chapter 23), can be used as indicative measures.
Table 40.1 summarizes our account and highlights diversity in key indicators with
OECD data for 1990, when Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism was published. Levels
of taxation, social policy spending, and public expenditure on welfare state services
measured in proportion to GDP serve as proxies for the scope of the public sector.
Gini coefficients measuring income inequality serve here as a relatively uncontested
outcome indicator. The data are selected from two main OECD sources. Countries
have been grouped according to the typology literature into what are seen as distinctive
groups of nations. The Nordic countries are put at the top of the table to highlight their
affinity on the selected indicators. Country rankings are intended to help the reader to
judge each country's position in the OECD group, its proximity to other countries, and
to assess intergroup similarity.
As can be seen from Table 40.1, in 1990, evidence of a grouping of Nordic welfare
states was reasonably clear. Certainly, Sweden was the flagship with Denmark as her
nearest companion. In terms of taxation, Finland and Norway came very close, but in
terms of social spending these two countries could just as well feature in the company
of Continental welfare states. However, spending figures for health and caring
services distinguished the Nordic group very clearly from other groups, although
France and Canada were also big spenders in this area. Spending on cash benefits
(total expenditure minus service expenditure) did not reveal substantial differences.
The strongest similarity amongst the Nordic countries is demonstrated in respect of
the Gini coefficient that ranked these four countries as having the most equal income
distribution in the OECD group. The table also shows reasons for treating Iceland
594
M1KKOKAUTTO
-_._----_.----------_._-----Table 40.1
-----.------~----.--.---.-.- --- ----- --- -----
Key OECD indicators
Total tax
revenue as %
of GDpa
1990
Rank
--
---~--
of the role of the state in social policy (1990)
Public social
expenditure as
Ofo of GDpb
1990
Rank
Public
expenditure
for in-kind
benefits as Ofo
of GDpe
1990
Rank
Distribution of
household
disposable
income among
indlviduals''
Mid-
Rank
1980s
Sweden
Denmark
Finland
Norway
Iceland
12.5
1
19.9
1
10.2
2
3
9.1
4
22.8
20.7
22.6
2
5
8
8.3
6
23.4
4
14.0
19
8.3
9.7
6
52.7
1
30.5
46.5
2
25.5
43.5
3
24.5
41.0
7
30.9
17
Nordic mean
42.9
France
Netherlands
Belgium
Austria
Germany
Luxembourg
Switzerland
42.0
5
42.9
4
42.0
Italy
Spain
Portugal
Greece
37.8
32.5
27.7
23.4
21.7
25.3
24.4
3
6
8.8
5
6.7
10
6
8
25.0
4
6.7
10
23.7
7
6.3
13
34.8
35.7
14
22.5
9
7.6
8
13
21.9
10
5.8
16
26.0
22
13.5
21
4.8
21
9
19.9
13
6.5
12
16
20.0
12
5.6
17
20
13.7
20
4.0
23
22.8
23
18.6
14
4.5
United Kingdom
Ireland
36.3
11
17.2
16
7.3
33.1
15
15.5
17
United States
Canada
Australia
New Zealand
27.3
21
13.4
35.9
12
18.4
28.5
37.4
19
10
Japan
Korea
Mexico
Turkey
29.1
OECD0
OEeD
27.6
23.4
9
23.6
6
24.7
7
30.6
36.7
13
22
33.6
16
9
28.6
11
5.2
19
33.1
15
22
5.3
18
33.8
17
15
9.8
3
12
14.1
21.8
18
11
6.0
6.0
14
14
28.7
31.2
18
11.2
23
20
18.9
25
3.0
26
5.0
1.7
26
17.3
26
3.6
25
2.9
20.0
24
7.6
24
2.3
39.6
33.9
8.9
(J
2
77.9
6.4
6.9
2.5
5
18
14
27.0
8
27.8
10
24
45.1
20
25
43.5
19
29.3
6.9
Notes:
Indicates the share of a country's output that is collected by the government
through taxes.
Comprises cash benefits, direct 'in-kind' provision of goods and services, and tax breaks with social purposes.
C Public
expenditure
other than cash benefit expenditures,
i.e. public consumption
of goods and services plus
capital investment
in care infrastructure;
primarily expenditure
for residential care, health services, child daycare and home-help services.
d As measured
by the Gini coefficients
.. = not available
0 = average
c = standard
deviation
a
b
Sources:
OECD 2009i,
2008d.
THE
NORDIC
COUNTRIES
595
with special care. In assessing Norway's apparently lower spending than other
countries in the group, it should, however, be kept in mind that GDP figures include
Norway's oil revenues and that these comparisons necessarily underestimate that
country's welfare effort.
Looking at the means and standard deviations in Table 40.1, it is clear that the
Nordic countries stood out as a distinct group in all four dimensions covered in the
table. Their average tax rate was 42.9 per cent, social spending 23-4 per cent, service
spending 9.7 per cent and the Gini index 21.7. Moreover, if we relax our criteria and
do not think it necessary to score high on all dimensions, but to score high on most
dimensions, inter-group similarity and affinity to a Nordic ideal-type was even
clearer.
The countries closest to the Nordic group can be found among the conservative
Continental welfare states, where the status of Switzerland or Italy is debatable, but
where their alternative positioning would not greatly affect the big picture. In the
light of the figures here, the United Kingdom and Ireland could as well be grouped
with the English-speaking countries overseas as systematically low spenders displaying high degrees of inequality. As can also be seen from Table 40.1, other OECD
countries were a world apart, as were former CEE-countries at the time of their newly
gained sovereignty.
A Nordic Model Forever?
There is obviously no one year that could mark a turning point in changing these
welfare state clusters or their trajectories. If there were such a year, 1990 could be a
feasible candidate, given that this is around the time at which concern about the fate
of the Nordic model began to be voiced. At that time the bi-polar world order that
had reigned since 1945 collapsed, the Soviet Union ceased to exist, and Central and
Eastern European (CEE) countries gained a new independence and embraced a form
of the market economy. The notion of a Third Way between capitalism and communism lost its appeal. Moreover, as already mentioned, the early 1990S marked a period
of economic, employment, and fiscal crisis for Sweden and Finland, which resulted in
serious reassessment of the role of public policy. These countries were forced to carry
out savings measures to balance public budgets, while Norway and Denmark for
somewhat different reasons enjoyed economic good fortune particularly through the
latter half of the 1990S.
The early 1990S also marks a geopolitical watershed as Finland and Sweden
abandoned EFTA and started their path towards integration in the EU, unlike
Norway and Iceland which chose to stay out. Finland later adopted the euro as its
currency while Denmark and Sweden retained their national currencies, a factor
which inevitably further differentiated the mix of Nordic solutions. Moreover, global
competition was increasing: the European Single Market underlined free movement
in the EU, and deregulated capital sought lucrative investment opportunities, often
guided by cheaper labour costs. Globalization, neoliberal ideas about deregulation
596
MIK1'O
KA UTTO
and rnarketization,
and worries concerning competitiveness
made governments
more capital-friendly and affected relationships between the social partners.
In this context, a large joint Nordic research endeavour was mounted to study the
evolution of the model in the years since the 19805 (Kautto et al. 1999). A key
conclusion was that the Nordic countries still formed a distinct group of nations in
terms of welfare policies in the mid-iccos, Only limited convergence with the rest of
the OECD countries could be observed. The obvious potential for restructurincr o
coming from macroeconomic
as well as demographic and political pressures had
not led to fundamental changes in benefit or service provision. Most forms of cash
benefit had been reduced, especially in Sweden and Finland, but not to a dramatically
lower level in comparative terms. The existing safety net still offered universal
coverage in the mid-1990S. When it came to services all the known Nordic hallmarks
were still present: universalism, high quality, tax funding, and public provision.
Other studies have confirmed this lack of evidence of a major welfare backlash-be
it seen as 'retrenchment'
or 'dismantling'-in
the 1990$ (Kuhnle 2001; Nordlund
2003; Castles 2002b).
Further research considered the Nordic cases in a larger European comparison
(see Kautto et al. 2001; Kautto and Kvist 2002). Here the evidence for clustering was
less strong, and no straightforward answer to the question of Nordic distinctiveness
emerged from the findings. The Nordic countries as a group still tended to be
different from other groups of Western European countries on key dimensions of
policy and welfare. Taken together, there was more evidence for similarity than
dissimilarity. Although convergence did seem to be occurring in some areas of the
welfare state, overall developments tended to be characterized more by parallel
trends. Sometimes even outright divergence was apparent as the empirical studies
also demonstrated that a variety of policy responses to 'common pressures' existed.
(Kautto et al. 2001)
So while Nordic welfare states had changed, in a broader comparison these
changes were not of a kind to make scholars abandon the main lines of the regimes
thesis. This is also the message of research by Kangas (2004), who considered the
specificity of Nordic welfare in surveying state sickness i~s,.klJancebenefits in eighteen
OEeD countries. He showed that, while up until 1985 the Nordic programmes
guaranteed better benefits than corporatist schemes, the situation had now changed.
Nordic countries no longer provide higher compensation.
In this respect, the two
groups of countries have clearly converged, while simultaneously their distance from
the countries with basic security or targeted schemes has increased. However, he also
found that the Scandinavian schemes had largely preserved their universality, whereas the other country groupings had somewhat reduced their coverage. In another
study, Abrahamson
(2003) set out to evaluate whether recent major changes in
welfare provision had merely modified the Nordic model or whether there had
been convergence towards some kind of European social model. Abrahamson argued
that there were many first order changes (such as reduced levels of benefits), but that
a number of second and third order changes had also occurred; i.e. that the institutional setting and the objectives of the Nordic welfare states had, in certain respects,
THE
NORDIC
COUNTRIES
597
changed during the 1990S. His conclusion was that the Scandinavian welfare states were
undergoing a process of Europeanization, but were still distinct, if decreasingly so.
To sum up, comparative analysis through the 1990S and into the early 2000S
suggests that some sort of Nordic distinctiveness
remained. However, evidence
concerning even more recent change is more open to interpretation.
Part of this ongoing change may be captured by looking at the same aggregate
indicators we presented earlier (Table 40.1), but this time for 2005/6 (Table 40.2). The
first thing to note is that we do not detect any radical alteration in countries' relative
positions. Even after a decade and a half, past budgets continued to be good
predictors of the current year's expenditure. Secondly, inter-Nordic dispersion in
mid-2000 was somewhat more pronounced
than in 1990. Thirdly, the Nordic
countries also appeared less exceptional than in 1990. The redistributive budgets in
the Nordic countries showed striking continuity, with a Nordic average of 24.2 per
cent of GDP for social expenditure and 11.3 per cent for services, while OECD
averages as a whole had risen by close to three and two percentage points respectively.
On average, the Nordic countries had a slightly heavier tax rate in 2006, but a
somewhat less singular performance in respect of income distribution.
Some of the indicators might even suggest that it would be more accurate to speak
of a large cluster of Northern European countries rather than distinct Nordic and
Continental (or Southern) clusters of countries. The role of the state in France,
Belgium, and Austria appeared no less significant than in the Nordic countries.
Nordic similarity remained reasonably apparent in terms of taxation, yet here too
we encounter other countries with a similar profile. Moreover, while an emphasis
upon services was still common in Scandinavia, it was not an exclusively Nordic
phenomenon.
At the same time, the income inequality indicator revealed convergence. In fact, OECD data on income inequality show that inequality has grown
fastest in Finland and Sweden over the past ten years, although from a low initial
level. Overall, OECD means have risen and standard deviations have declined, while
Nordic averages have remained rather stable giving a much more mixed picture of
country differences and some grounds to speak of 'catch-up' convergence.
Farewell to Nordic Unity?
Clearly, two tables with crude indicators are not enough to justify bold generalizations about the fate of a regime. However, in the absence of a single systematic
study covering all the crucial elements, this data together with the review provided,
should give the reader a picture of change in the Nordic welfare states. But we also
have studies at the national level and they tend to point to more significant changes.
Palme et al. (2002) carried out a massive welfare commission analysis on welfare
trends in Sweden in the 1990S. This analysis was an overall stock-taking assessment of
changes in different welfare policies with extensive data on welfare outcomes for
different groups in the Swedish population. The analysis pointed to a number of
changes in the system and to unwelcome developments in welfare outcomes, including
Table 40.2
Key DECO indicators of the role of the state in social policy (2005/6)
Total tax
revenue as
0/0
of GDpa
2006
Rank
Public social
Public
expenditure as
0/0 of GDpb
expenditure
2005
Rank
29.4
Distribution
for
in-kind benefits
as % of GDpc
2005
Rank
of
household
disposable income
among
individuals''
2000
Rank
Sweden
50.1
Denmark
49.0
2
26.9
4
13.6
11.6
2
22.5
1
Finland
43.5
6
26.1
7
9.9
7
26.1
6
Norway
43.6
41.4
5
21.6
11
26.1
7
9
16.9
20
10.1
11.1
6
Iceland"
3
Nordic mean
45.5
France
44.5
4
29.2
2
10.8
4
27.3
10
Netherlands?
39.5
10
14
8.5
13
25.1
3
Belgium
3
6
9.1
10
Austria
44.8
41.9
20.9
26.4
8
27.2
3
8.2
15
25.2
4
Germany
35.7
15
26.7
5
9.9
7
27.7
11
24.2
24.3
77.3
2
24.8
Luxembourg
36.3
14
23.2
9
8.8
11
26.1
7
Switzerland
30.1
21
20.3
16
7.8
17
26.7
9
Italy
42.7
7
25.0
8
7.7
19
34.7
21
Spain
12
21.2
13
7.4
21
32.9
18
Portuqal'
36.7
35.4
16
23.1
10
35.6
22
Greece
27.4
23
20.5
15
7.1
22
34.5
20
United Kingdom
37.4
11
21.3
12
10.5
5
17
Ireland
31.7
19
16.7
21
7.7
19
32.6
30.4
United States
28.2
33.4
22
15.9
23
17
35.7
23
17
16.5
22
7.8
9.4
9
30.1
13
30.9
20
17.1
19
8.7
12
30.5
15
New Zealand
36.5
13
18.5
18
8.4
14
33.7
19
Japane,9
27.4
23
18.6
17
8.1
16
31.4
16
Korea
26.8
25
6.9
26
3.8
25
Canada
Australiae,g
14
Mexico
20.6
26
7.0
25
4.9
24
48.0
26
Turkey
32.5
18
13.7
24
5.6
23
43.9
25
Old DECD0
Old DECD a
36.5
7.4
20.6
8.7
30.9
5.9
2.1
6.2
Czech Republic
(1995);
36.7
19.5
7.8
26.0
Hungary (1995)9';
37.1
22.5
8.7
29.3
Poland (1996);
34.3
21.0
4.9
36.7
Notes:
Indicates the share of a country's output that is collected by the government through taxes.
b Comprisescash benefits, direct 'in-kind' provision of goods and services, and tax breaks with social purposes.
C
Public expenditure other than cash benefit expenditures, i.e. public consumption of goods and services plus capital
investment in care infrastructure; primarily expenditure for residential care, health services, child day-care and
home-help services.
d As measured by the Gini coefficients.
e Tax figures for Australia, Iceland,Japan, and Poland are from 2005.
f Social expenditure for Portugal is from 2004.
9 Health expenditure for Australia, Hungary, and Japan are from 2004. Forthe Netherlands,the figure is from 2002.
h The OECDaverage is from 2005 and refers to the countries listed above.
i Data for countries joining the OECDafter 1990 are included in the final rows of the table, but no rankings are
provided, since this would limit direct comparability between Tables40.1 and 40.2. Theyear of DECDmembershipis
given after each new member.
.. = not available, 0=average, a=standard deviation
a
Sources:
DECO2009i, 2008d.
THE
NORDIC
COUNTRIES
599
--------
a rise in disadvantage, income inequality, poverty-risk, and increasing differences in
levels ofliving. In the 1990S, single mothers, people born outside Sweden, families with
children, and the young experienced more hardships than other groups and differences
in incomes and living conditions had increased. Privatization of services and marketoriented management practices were also a new Swedish reality. The conclusion was
that the Swedish welfare state was at a crossroads at the beginning of the twenty-first
century.
Many of the social policy researchers who have analysed the development of the
Finnish welfare state through the 1990S not only found changes in the system's
characteristics, but also detected an ideological shift that can be seen in the revision
of goals and changes in policy content (for references, see Kautto 2003). It is argued
that Finland has grown away from a Nordic normative tradition with an emphasis on
social rights, equity, and state responsibility. Several studies suggest that a real
ideological shift occurred amongst policymakers in the early 19905, with some
arguing that Finland had taken a step towards more liberal policies, while others
suggest that some of the changes point towards a conservative model.
Assessments are less gloomy for Denmark. Greve (2004) has examined the question of whether or not Denmark is still a universal welfare state. The initial basis for
his assessment was a comparative-based analysis of the Nordic countries in respect of
key welfare state parameters. The second element of his analysis was a case-based
study of core areas of the Danish welfare state-pensions,
unemployment,
and early
retirement benefit-to
assess the distinctiveness of the Danish model. Greve concluded that the Danish model is more mixed today than it used to be, but that it
continues to be distinctive in areas such as equality, full employment, spending on
social security, and active labour market policy. Kvist (2003) in turn has underlined
how Danish development in the 1990S was relatively favourable in contrast with a
much poorer performance in the 1970S and 1980s. Activation, obligations, and
targeting of benefits were part and parcel of Danish reforms, and local authorities
were given even more say in activation measures and organizing services. Employment and the economy developed favourably, and close to the turn of the century,
Denmark had encompassing welfare policies, progress in most aspects, with low
unemployment
and without significant increases in inequality.
In Norway, too, welfare state development seems more mixed. Here, welfare state
reforms have put an increased emphasis on the responsibility to work. Obligations to
work and qualifying conditions for unemployment benefits have been amended. On
the other hand, the welfare state has been strengthened in other areas, especially in
the area of family policy. In the health and social care sector, a focus on efficiency and
market solutions has led to reforms inspired by New Public Management, but the
primacy of public sector provision has not been challenged in any significant way.
According to Botten et al. (2003) and Delvik et al. (2007), the welfare state in Norway
'seems to be largely intact', although reform processes are complex and ambiguous.
As these short summaries show, Nordic welfare states do change, and they change in
somewhat different directions. New policy lines have been adopted while some of the
nlrl nnps have heen abandoned or transformed.
Moreover, core ideas of policies are
600
MIKKO
KA UTTO
shifting and being debated: Nordic universalism is being reconsidered and notions and
practices of citizenship as a set of social duties as well as rights feature more prominently in policy rhetoric and agendas (Hvinden and Johansson 2007). Also, the
introduction of new mechanisms may have wide-ranging effects and the underlying
goals may have undergone a more radical transformation.
For instance, the pension
reforms that have been carried out in all Nordic countries will have far-reaching
consequences in the future (see www.reassess.no for information
on an ongoing
collaborative research effort involving researchers from all the five Nordic countries
to take stock of the Nordic Model).
CONCLUSION
At the most general level, the Nordic model can be understood in terms of broad,
tax-financed public responsibility and legislated, collective, and universalistic solutions that respect employment interests yet aim at welfare and equity goals. The
global interest in the Nordic model is best explained by Scandinavian countries' long
record of good economic as well as social performance.
This chapter has argued that the concept of the 'Nordic model' can be and has
been understood in different ways. Historical studies have pointed to similarities that
may explain the emergence of welfare state institutions, but have also highlighted
differences between Nordic countries. Sociologically oriented comparative research
in turn has stressed underlying similarities, at least in the 1970S and 1980s, when
Nordic exceptionalism was demonstrated
in high welfare state spending and the
design of social rights. In regime theorizing, these similarities were extended to
encapsulate causal factors, welfare state institutions and their interplay with other
social institutions, and also their outcomes. Differences from other regimes highlighted reasons to be interested in Nordic policies. The model arguably appeared to
be fairly robust in the early 1990S, despite the fact that new winds of change were
already blowing at that time.
More recent comparative research and national studies have called into question
the uniformity of the Nordic countries and their continued path-dependence.
Welfare state adjustment in the 1990S and 2000S along a number of the dimensions
central to regime analysis show a degree of dilution of the Nordic distinctiveness that
featured in earlier cross-national comparisons. Seen from afar, the Nordic welfare
states still look rather similar, as suggested, for example, by their continuing good
performance in cross-national economic and social indicator lists. However, a closer
examination of reforms and institutional developments in the individual countries of
the region suggests that Nordic distinctiveness is by no means as self-evident or as
straightforward as it was two decades ago.
Those Who Work, Those Who Don't
Poverty, Morality, and
Family in Rural America
Jennifer Sherman
I
University of Minnesota Press
Minneapolis
London
54
The Place I Found
forces that created the situation. Theirs is a story of survival and adaptation in a place that was written off as unimportant, an acceptable
casualty in a war between environmental interests and extractive industries. They rely heavily on cultural and moral discourses to help
them survive its aftermath. As the following chapters will demonstrate,
their beliefs in their own moral superiority allow them to defend their
decisions to stay there and to make sense of their lives in their new
context, bereft of many of the benefits that originally drew their fami-
2
Workers and Welfare:
Poverty, Coping Strategies,
and Substance Abuse
lies to Golden Valley.
Living with Poverty, Past and Present
As you drive south into Golden Valley on the narrow and winding
Highway7, the landscape unfolds majestically as you glide down off of
GoldMountain. The sharp, bare mountaintops give way to forests that
framethe road, which then recede into the open fields and flat land of
Golden Valley. The highway gradually straightens for the brief respite
that Golden Valley provides from its otherwise nonstop hairpin turns.
As you approach the valley floor, houses and homesteads appear. Some
arelavish ranches, with large houses set back from the road amid acres
of meadows. Others are dilapidated shacks surrounded by their own
private garbage dumps. It is the gorgeous thousand-acre ranches that
catchthe attention, with cattle or deer grazing in wide pastures at dawn
anddusk. The small, poorly kept-up houses often go unnoticed, somehowinvisible and easy to ignore despite their closer proximity to the
road.The eye has a hard time taking in their abstractionist array of tar
paperroofs, boarded-up windows, broken appliances, old vehicles whose
usefulparts have long ago been scavenged, and garbage spilling out of
bags into the yards.
55
Workers and Welfare
Workers and Welfare
56
It is easier for a newcomer to focus on Golden Valley's beauty than
its chaos. Its residents, however, are well aware of the more run-down
homes. Comments such as "1 wish people took a little more care of
their places" often expressed one of the ways in which they felt the
community had deteriorated in recent years. When asked to pinpoint
when exactly these changes had occurred, however, most people admitted that junker cars and refrigerators in the front yard had always
been ubiquitous parts of the landscape in Golden Valley, as they are
throughout much of rural America.' The following exchange occurred
between Bud and Emily Richards, a married couple in their 40s, as they
discussed the way the community had changed over their lifetimes:
Yousee a lot of stuff running down. Just-there's not that much
money coming into this town, you know. It's hard to ...
EMILY: Not a lot of pride in their places and things ...
BUD: That's bad, yeah.... But most of those that are real bad have been
here forever and they would'a been here if the mill would'a closed
or not.
57
time before poverty was commonplace in Golden Valley. The main
thing that has changed since the closing of the woods and mill is the
proportion of the population who do not work, particularly the proportion of men who are not working. The shacks with the poorly maintained yards have always existed, but now there appear to be more of
them. As 48-year-old Eric McCloud explained:
In the '70s, it was a booming town, but welfare hit it. But both sawmills
wererunning and everything was cool. The sawmill kind of kept that
all mellowed out. And you had two factions, three factions: Youhad a
fewretirees, you had the workers, you had the welfare. So then when
the mill left, it became, I feel, retirement and welfare, but more welfare
than retirement. So yeah, I'd say we went through big changes here.
BUD:
The closing of the woods and sawmills certainly have exacerbated
unemployment and its effects in Golden Valley. However, poverty is
not new to the valley, which has always had its share of people who
lived marginally. A young woman named Christy declined to do an interview with me because she thought that 1 was interested only in hearing
about how the mill closing had had an impact on people. She explained
to me that her family hadn't been affected by it at all, because her parents had never worked. She had grown up in a remote cabin on an unpaved road that was inaccessible to vehicles at certain times of year and
had lived without running water or electricity for most of her childhood. She said that she had grown up in an intergenerational welfare
family and that she had broken the cycle by being the first one to get a
job. It appeared from her description that there had always been two
kinds of people in Golden Valley: those who worked and those who did
not. It was also clear that she felt shame because her father was one
who did not.
Yet Christy's story was not anomalous in Golden Valley. Many of my
subjects grew up with fathers who were only marginally attached to the
paid workforce, often because they had either chosen a subsistence
lifestyle or had sustained debilitating injuries while working. Whether
or not their fathers had worked, none of my respondents could recall a
Jeanie Mayer, a 45-year-old woman who spent most of her life in Golden
Valley, was one of many residents who made observations similar to
Eric's:
I know that there's familieshere that haven't worked in three or four
generations. They brag about the fact that, you know, they've never
workeda day in their lives. Welfare.
So there are jJeople here on welfare who have been here for a long time?
Yeah,yeah. There's cyclic, generation after generation of welfare people
that don't want to work.Or they just work a little bit here or a little bit
there, but for the most part they don't contribute .... So that's to me
the biggestchange that we've had that I don't like.
Because there's more of that than there used to be?
I think so.
Eric and Jeanie's comments, like Christy's refusal, suggest a strong social disgrace around unemployment and welfare receipt. Unemployed
poverty has long been unacceptable in Golden Valley and is commonly
blamed for most of the obvious problems in the community. Although
as shown in chapter 1 welfare receipt has not actually increased, the
perception of welfare as a problem and the stigma around its receipt has.
Working poverty, however, has historically had a different social
interpretation. Like welfare receipt and unemployed poverty, working
poverty has been a fact of life in Golden Valley for generations. A job
alone has never been a guarantee of wealth here. Whether they were
fromworking families or not, few of my subjects grew up in any kind of
affluenceand most recalled poverty being a part of their daily struggle to
58
Workers and Welfare
some degree. Many subjects grew up with a working father whose salary
barely kept the family afloat, and lacking electricity and telephones
was as common for them as it was for those whose fathers didn't work.
Women in the workforce were less common then than they are now and
were particularly uncommon among the more stably married families.
Without a second earner, even a mill salary afforded only the barest of
middle-class lifestyles, as average annual earnings in the manufacturing
sector were less than $17,000 in 1990, just about $3,000 over the poverty
line for a family of four at the time.r A mill salary was considered a respectable one since it generally paid enough for a man to support his
family and eventually own a home, even if it took years to reach this
kind of comfort level. This did not mean that the family had any
money to spare, though, and most residents recalled clothes, toys, and
store-bought food being in short supply. As Eric McCloud recalled it,
"When I was growing up, this was a community of poor working people.
They were poor, and some of them stayed poor, and some of them saved
every penny they made and ended up with a fairly nice retirement."
The key to respectability was thus not necessarily wealth, but rather
having a male earner who provided as much as he could through hard
work. As long as someone in the family was working for the money,
there was little shame in living on meager wages then or now, and subsistence activities were highly valued as part of the culture of Golden
Valley. Almost everyone I met who grew up there remembered subsistence activities being a part of everyday life to some degree, whether it
was hunting and fishing to help supply the family's dietary needs or cutting and chopping their own wood for heat in the winter. Many people
believed then (and now) that it spoils children to give them too many
things for free and that boys in particular should work for their luxury
items from a young age. Often the local environment supplied what
salaries could not for the enterprising man and his family. Most men,
as well as a lot of women, grew up helping provide for the family in
nonmonetary ways from a young age. Forty-five-year-old Grace Prader
remembers her childhood as being filled with subsistence work and triesto
raise her sons to emulate the demanding work ethic of her own youth:
Growing up I always had goats, and we had fair animals and stuff like
that. We had a huge garden. There was five kids. And on a schoolteacher and a custodian salary we had to have the garden and the
animals for freezer and table. And I can remember other kids going,
Workers and Welfare
59
"I don't know what I'm gonna do after school today, I'm so bored." I
was like, "Shit, I wish I had time to get bored," you know? And so as
a result, there's a lot of kids who are still that way, but my boys, I try
to keep them pretty busy.
.
Thirty-year-old Rod Mitchell recalled a similarly tough childhood,
although with a bit more anger than Grace. His family moved from
the San Francisco Bay Area to Riverbend when he was 9 years old. His
stepfather, whom he described as "old school," sold firewood for a living
and expected his sons to pitch in whenever they weren't at schoo\. As
Rod recollected,
It was an interestin' life growing up here because, I mean, we had to
work for it. It's hard to make a living in this place. So basically I've
been working since I was 9 years old. I kinda liked it when I was a kid.
But I do have my resentments. Just the upbringing, the hard life.
Because you had to work?
Yeah, the work. A normal kid of 8 shouldn't have to go out and bust his
tail after school and be working weekends. I just feel I grew up way too
early. But you know, it helped me out, 'cause my work ethics are excellent.
I mean, I think I've only drawn unemployment once in seventeen
years. I mean, I've never gone more than a week without a job.
Like Grace, Rod found a feeling of respectability in the hard work demanded by poverty despite the sacrifices it required of him. I discovered
the same sentiment among most respondents, for whom chores and responsibilities were simply part of the Golden Valley lifestyle during
their childhoods and were vital in the purveyance of strong work
ethics. The culture of Golden Valley was built around the value of hard
labor for its own sake, with survival and masculine pride often being its
only rewards. Poverty per se was not looked down upon, but rather
poverty in the absence of work. It is this kind of poverty, the poverty of
those deemed lazy and unproductive, that is symbolized for many by
houses and yards that are in poor repair.' A man with a decent work
ethic, whether or not he is poor, is expected to keep up the appearance
of respectability.
Thus, the difference between the past and the present is not simply
the existence of poverty. The main distinction between then and now
appears to be the gendered nature of work and breadwinning. In my
sample, 41 percent of all respondents had grown up with a mother who
Workers and Welfare
Workers and Welfare
worked at least part-time. However, of the women in my sample who
were either married or parents, 83 percent were working. The ability of
the male breadwinner to support the family, rather than the average
standard of living, is in many ways what separates the present from the
past. During the forest industry's heyday, a solid lower-middle-class lifestyle was more commonly achievable without a working wife, particularly if the couple had hardworking children to help with the family's
survival.
Today, it is much harder for families in Golden Valley to achieve
this same lifestyle without the addition of a working woman, and as discussed in chapter 1, women's workforce participation is on the rise.
Meanwhile, unemployment and lack of workforce participation have
become much more common for men over the decade. Given the cultural context, this presents a difficult challenge for the men of Golden
Valley. Not only must they fight for material survival, but they must
also fight harder than before just to retain respectability within the
community. It is not easy for men to manifest their work ethics in the
absence of work, and for many it is becoming increasingly difficult to
distinguish themselves from the ranks of the intergenerational welfare
families whom they were taught to scorn. It is thus not surprising that
poverty has become more visible to those who live in Golden Valley.
Among its most commonly cited personifications are the people waiting impatiently at the post office on the first day of the month for their
welfare checks to appear in their mailboxes. Another is the state of
disrepair and disregard of many of the valley's homes. While neither of
these phenomena were unknown to previous generations in Golden
Valley, they have apparently become harder for its current population
to ignore. Thus the run-down houses that visitors can easily overlook
have become for residents the most salient symbols of their beloved
I think about those things that were instilled in us very young, that
made us-you know, strong work ethics-those
things that I look
around now and I'm like, whoa, I don't think they have it. Or they're
not being modeled to work. Or unfortunately some teachers and I will
talk about these kids that'll look at you and be like, "I don't need to
work. I'm just gonna collect a check when I get out of school." And
they are dead serious. That is their goal, and that is what they'll do.
And that is so sad, but those are the models that they have. I had
highly motivated working parents that were like, gung ho, you know,
were always doing something, always.
60
community's decline.
This decline is not simply material in nature for most of them, however; it also is a decline in what they perceive as the moral value of
hard work. Just as it is harder for the unemployed to manifest their own
work ethics, they are also assumed to be unable to pass these values onto
their children. A telling example comes from Dawn Bartlett, a 30-yearold teacher at Golden Valley Elementary School, who expressed what
she saw as the major difference between her childhood and the experience of the children who are her students:
61
Dawn herself had grown up in poverty, miles from town in a house
without either electricity or running water. Her parents were "highly
motivated" to work in unpaid subsistence activities that nonetheless
ensured the family's survival and provided their most basic needs.
When she remembered this past, she did not recall feelings of shame or
guilt; instead she remembered learning strong work ethics and survival
skillsthat strengthened her as a person and would sustain her regardless
of what life threw into her path. This provided for her a sharp contrast
with what she saw as today's growing problem of poverty in the absence
of a proper work ethic. Dawn, like most of my respondents, felt that the
community's biggest problem was not so much an increase in poverty as
it was the increase in malaise and hopelessness that seemed to have accompanied the loss of the male jobs. Whether this increase in negative
values is real or perceived is difficult to quantify, but its importance to
sociallife translates into pressure on the poor to prove that they are not
deadbeats, particularly if they hope to find work in Golden Valley. As
this chapter will explore in detail, Golden Valley's small size and tightknit community structure mean that no one is anonymous, and reputations and collective opinions can have a serious impact on people's
social lives and labor market experiences.
Copingwith Rural Poverty
All the things I do for recreation either gain you money or help you not
spend money. Hunting and fishing is meat coming in; gold mining and
gemstone mining are money coming in. And money's pretty bad, but
it's just part of living here. You have to understand that it swings in
seasons. Winter is really, really bad, and you kind of go hungry sometimes. And then summer you put in a garden, which is essential,
Workers and Welfare
62
virtually. And things go better in the summer and fall, and then in
winter it goes back. (Kenny Blake, 25-year-old gas station clerk and
cohabitating father of one)
Moral Cal)ital and Survival
There are a number of ways in which the experience of rural poverty is
distinctly different from that of urban, inner-city poverty. Most notably,
several of the options available for surviving poverty are unique to the
rural setting. While on the one hand certain types of paid informalsector work may be harder to find in a rural area than an urban one, on
the other hand there are many more options for unpaid subsistence
work to help sustain people in lieu of cash. The urban setting, with its
ever-expanding underground economy, includes not only illegal work
such as drug dealing and prostitution, but also a growing sector of work
that is "basically licit but takes place outside the regulatory apparatus
covering zoning, taxes, health and safety, minimum wage laws, and
other types of standards.l" This semilegal work includes everything
from magazine vending to larger scale informal-sector work such as
sweatshops, which may be permanent and full-time, albeit also unregulated and poorly paid. Dohan describes this type of informal work as
"otherwise legal economic activities that took place outside the purview
of government regulation," versus illicit work, "which produced and
distributed goods and services that were themselves illegal."5 His research looks in depth at two urban Latino communities in which the
bulk of income comes from illegal work, illicit work, and welfare.
While the possibility of "under the table" paid work exists in rural
areas as well, in Golden Valley it is on a much smaller scale and generally consists of short-term and/or part-time jobs such as child care', yard
maintenance, fuel gathering, and temporary construction work. Consistent informal work opportunities like day labor are virtually unknown
in Golden Valley, although a limited number of informal construction
and maintenance jobs do emerge there from time to time. Similarly, the
opportunities for informal vending such as flea markers'' are scarce in
Golden Valley, which lacks a permanent informal market of this kind.
Occasionally individuals attempt to sell odd junk in a vacant lot in
town, but this does not occur regularly and thus does not approach anything like a steady income or livelihood. The illegal economy is also
underdeveloped in Golden Valley as compared to large urban settings.
Workers and Welfare
63
There is little petty theft there, and I may have been one of the only
people in the entire valley who regularly locked the doors to my house
and car. While some illegal drug production and dealing (particularly
marijuana and methampheramines)
does exist there, it is on a much
smaller scale, and in 2003 it was mainly the realm of outsiders and social pariahs.
On the other hand, many people engage in significant amounts of
subsistence work in Golden Valley, most of which is unheard of in urban
settings. The bulk of this type of work is unpaid and heavily focused on
self-provisioning in the forms of hunting, fishing, fuel gathering, growing gardens, and raising livestock. For many people these activities are
simultaneously hobbies that they enjoy and serious work that is vital
for their family's survival. Growing up in poverty or near-poverty conditions in Golden Valley helped prepare most of my respondents for the
possibility of surviving it as adults. While few had hoped to be poor
adults, most were grateful for the kinds of survival skills and abilities
that their hard upbringings had provided them. Although most would
happily become less reliant on these skills if they were to become unnecessarvthey were appreciative of the security they felt in knowing
they could survive on very low incomes.
Scholars of poverty in both the urban and rural setting have described the various ways in which the poor make do.? In urban settings
these coping strategies range from those that are consistent with mainstream cultural norms to those that explicitly resist the mainstream."
Researchers who study urban drug dealers find that their behaviors and
coping strategies are often based within a "backlash" culture that disdains white mainstream values in favor of street toughness and focuses
on the perceived financial rewards of illegal activities such as the drug
trade." Economically, these strategies may be sensible, promising potentially higher earnings than most low-skill jobs in the legal workforce.
The existence of the resistance culture allows individuals to preserve
self-esteem and social standing while pursuing economic gain through
ethically and legally questionable means.
In urban communities, heterogeneity in cultures, values, and activities allows for competing options for surviving poverty while retaining
dignity. Social microclimates can influence which strategies are chosen
and which are seen as inaccessible or irrational. 10 For some, the frequency
and proximity of illegal activities allows them to be viewed as morally
64
appropriate.
For others, morality
11
sition
to illegal pursuits.
moral
standards
often
they are unable
to achieve
success
mainstream
workers
tended
strategies
found
to choose
over more
these activities
Duneier'"
the connection
studies
suggest,
able to choose
optimization.U
in which
18
less plentiful.!"
ily influenced
The
and alternative
by local cultural
a preference
for informal
provisioning
nities.2Z
coping
Furthermore,
activities
self-sufficiency,
even when
sume.23 Additionally,
common
among
Within
survival,
this means
it is generally
the literature
these culturally
through
gests that small rural communities
is also much
maximization
hold
is often
norms.i"
and cul-
true in rural
more pervasive
such as illegal
activities
are
tend to be heav-
which
less diverse
often dictate
many forms of community-level
Although
This "moral capital"
themselves
in the absence
of individuals'
including
moral worth
how much they do
in illegal activities.
A person's
just his or her reputation,
lower moral worth
increasingly
charity.
non-work-related
Thus,
moral
capital
can be
and charity
ties and social support.P
behaviors
such as drug and alcohol
heavily, a large component
individual and family-level
how-
are often
rare jobs, as well as to
capital in the form of job opportunities
or social capital in the form of community
also contribute
Valley, moral
of moral capital
coping strategies.
abuse
comes from
Such strategies
carry with
hunting,
like in the urban ghetto,
in more cohesive
and stable communities
Golden Valley, residents
"may be able to exercise
Such culturally
woodcutting,
will often
choose
local cultural
only those
ideals such as
back on what they con-
are relatively
appropriate
use is less
and often carries
and poverty
understudied-"
adaptations
as are
are encour-
and sanction.F Wilson sug-
are more cohesive
than many urban
and chapter
most urban
researchers
capital.
as having
denied access to the community's
traded for economic
and that moral consider-
and trade in rural commu-
the urban poor/"
than
involvement
to more than
or even
are used by so-
In Golden
among
capital.32 Perceptions
moral status contributes
of similar
As Wilson
in the introduction
But as previous
themselves
activities.v
into a form of symbolic
or do not work and their
others
them varying degrees of social acceptance.
cutting
social support
between
economic
ever. Those who are perceived
poor individu-
found that public assistance
activities
the ways in which
and economically.
through
and work ethic.
that looks at informal work activities
As discussed
worth has evolved
unacceptable
1, Golden
areas, both ethnically
have noted,
even in the
solutions
their community,
the community
to their problems,
reinforced
hypothesizes,
like
but the widely held mores of
by economic
and social resources
that keep
stable, strongly pressure them to refrain from such activ-
those who do not adhere
communities.
to them
He explains
are common
of the community
definitions of appropriate
for shaming."35
of deserving
being deemed
"undeserving"
behaviors,
versus undeserving
range
from shame
exclusion from many parts of social and economic
My findings from Golden
among
factors
in
the commonalIn Golden
results in the establishment
and inappropriate
into judgments
controlling
that "the stronger
ity of values, the greater the possibilities
ley the cohesion
homogeneity,
un-
a range of illegal or
ity."34Sayer suggests that values and the shame they can engender
tight-knit
aged and enforced
Valley
drug deal-
self-esteem
stigma.e''
rural subsistence
communities.t''
with
the rural poor than
with it a powerful
over either
as gardening,
families
ations often constrain
are often based on their coping behaviors,
by barter
struggling
cial groups to distinguish
above
of low social and
argues that moral criteria
some individ-
culture
that are consistent
themselves
higher status.I'' Sayer similarly
populations,
work and self-provisioning.r!
activities
status to locate
can allow those
of significant economic
survival strategies
and fishing are often supplemented
morality
Gowari'" and
morality
and gender
to Lamont,
may arise based on
and moral norrns.i?
"self-respect."
greater
lifestyles
In rural communities,
According
economic
social distinctions
factors such as behavioral
allows the poor to create distinctions
economic
American
coping
absence of clear class differences,
noneconomic
ones because
in the urban setting
between
Edin and
accepted
same does not necessarily
mainstream
and hegemonic
appropriate
American
despite
and low-wage
but illegal
work activities
they provided
to mainstream
als are often
areas,
lucrative
informal
because
As these diverse
mothers
the most legal and morally
found that, even among homeless
ing or panhandling
Thus,
when
in the urban setting
maximization.
single
them with greater
uals chose less profitable
tural
poor
self-worth
terms.F
over economic
that
in oppo-
to mainstream
to maintain
in economic
economically
provided
adherence
many individuals
morality
Lein+' and Newman!"
to be constructed
argues,
allows individuals
the lure of illegal opportunities,
prioritize
continues
As Lamont
65
Workers and Welfare
Workers and Welfare
which
Val-
of clear
translate
poor. Consequences
of
and self-loathing
to
life there.
Valley suggest that the small size, cultural
and lack of anonymity
in a small rural community
together
Workers and Welfare
66
can create greater social pressure on the poor to be culturally acceptable
according to the existing standards. For those whose coping strategies
are not morally adequate according to local norms, the result is often
community-level censure that further affects their quality of life and
chances for eventually escaping poverty. On the other hand, as discussed
above, those who have higher moral capital generally have more access
to both social and economic capital. In this way the rural setting differs
substantially from the urban, which allows for a greater range of survival strategies that are acceptable within separate subcultural spheres."
This constriction of acceptable possibilities with regard to economic
survival has numerous consequences for Golden Valley's poor, including that many choose to exclude themselves from most of the nation's
formal poverty-alleviation
programs.
Coping Strategies
Those who either lack jobs or whose incomes are inadequate must
choose between several available survival options in Golden Valley. By
far the most popular and respected of strategies are those related to subsistence food provision. These include hunting and fishing as well as
growing sizable gardens and raising livestock. The first two options are
almost universally practiced as cherished pastimes by Golden Valley's
men, whether or not they rely on them for sustenance. Hunting and
fishing are important and pervasive parts of Golden Valley's culture
and cited by almost everyone of the male respondents as their favorite
hobbies and main reasons for remaining there. They represent a man's
first line of defense against economic problems as well as his tie to the
land and to historic forms of the male provider role. Being the most
highly valued of the local subsistence options, they are also the best
way for a poor man to contribute nonmonetarily to his family's basic
needs with little loss of respectability. They are practiced legally as well
as illegally by people who cannot afford the proper licensing or who
cannot limit themselves to the short designated hunting seasons. As
the son of a game warden explained, enforcement sometimes ignores
those infractions committed by people in need:
Wintertime's hard for everybody, and things can be overlooked that
make children's lives better. ... When people don't have money for
food, there's lots and lots of food just runnin' around the woods. And
when you're truly broke, it's something that has to be done.
Workers and Welfare
67
For the truly poor, however, hunting and fishing are nonetheless insufficient to meet all of their daily needs. Thus, among those who are
strugglingfinancially, subsistence activities are generally combined with
several other possible coping strategies, whose social interpretations
coverthe spectrum from acceptability to contempt (see Figure 1). Having
women enter the workforce, either in addition to or in lieu of men, has
alwaysbeen one option among Golden Valley's poor, and it is becoming more and more commonplace and socially acceptable since the mill
closure. In addition, particularly for younger couples, family support
alsoplays an important role in keeping struggling individuals and families afloat. Although few people's parents have significant amounts of
money to lend, a number of struggling young couples mentioned relying on family support with some frequency when their own resources
were stretched too tight. Poor families in Golden Valley often create
networks of support similar to those found in urban communities.V relying on one another for money, child care, and temporary housing. While
receiving help from family members is not the same as working oneself,
it does nonetheless keep one tied to the community's work ethic. Family
help implies that someone in the family or extended family is a worker,
and thus social capital in the form of family ties can also contribute to
moral capital.
Also generally accepted and often used are the opportunities that
Golden Valley offers for living rent-tree or for very low rent. This strategyis generally available only to those with long histories and/or social
ties in the valley, although occasionally newcomers like me manage to
find such situations through networking. Many people have inherited
their parents' or grandparents' properties and occupy them. For other
financially strapped families, there is the curious but common custom
of"caretaking." Caretaking generally implies little to no rent on a property
that the tenants are allowed to inhabit in return for providing basic
maintenance on it. My own living situation was considered a caretaking position, as the rent was well below market rates. The custom of
allowing struggling families to caretake properties is one of the less
openly acknowledged ways in which Golden Valley's more prosperous
community members take care of its less fortunate. It is becoming increasinglymore common since the mill closure as men who want to stay
securely employed and make higher salaries generally have needed to
moveelsewhere to find better jobs. While many mill workers originally
Workers and Welfare
Workers and Welfare
68
least
moral capital
most
moral capital
...'
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