Urban Agriculture, Food Justice and Building Healthy Communities Discussion

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Please do the reading and write 1 paragraph on each those three questions:

1. Lewis, Ford and Pratsch (2017, ch. 9 in V&B) argue that food justice requires attention to racism –that, in the case of Detroit, racism has to be uprooted in order to realize food justice. Explain. Discuss the evidence they cite.

Reading: https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/j.ctt20q2404.13.p...

2. Ventura (2017, ch. 8 in V&B) and many others highlight the importance of soil when it comes to urban agriculture, food justice and building healthy communities. Explain. What’s all the fuss about soil, why now?

Reading: https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/j.ctt20q2404.12.p...

3. What are the 5 As of Food Security as spelled out by Ventura and Bailkey (2017, pp. 21-23 in V&B). How do these authors connect community food security and food system change?

Reading : https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/j.ctt20q2404.5.pd...


Please do the reading and write 2 paragraphs on each questions, Both of questions need to use two reading that I send:

  1. Fairfax et al. (2012, ch. 2) underscore the importance of “Framing Alternative Food.” Along similar lines, Allen, Cooley and Sims (2017, ch. 13 in V&B) argue that we need to reframe institutional power in order to bring about social and food justice. Drawing upon both of these publications, explain what is meant by “framing” alternative food and why this matters from a food justice advocacy standpoint. Weave into your essay the idea of “narrative ownership as a power shifting strategy.”
  1. Food systems are composed of, give shape to, and impact: (a) social, economic, political and cultural systems, together with (b) ecosystems, soil, water and earth’s climate. Explain how the prospect of increasing food justice in the world depends on addressing both sides of this coin: the social and ecological. Be sure to pinpoint some way the social and ecological interact. Give an example that seems hopeful (i.e., evidence suggests it may be a connection/relationship that can be amplified in ways that improve food justice and the environment).

Please use the simple language of those questions. Do not use any fancy words and only use the references I gives. Thanks

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MIT Press Chapter Title: California Agriculture and Conventional Food Book Title: California Cuisine and Just Food Book Author(s): Sally K. Fairfax, Louise Nelson Dyble, Greig Tor Guthey, Lauren Gwin, Monica Moore, Jennifer Sokolove, Matthew Gerhart and Jennifer Kao Published by: MIT Press. (2012) Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt5hhm2k.9 JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms MIT Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to California Cuisine and Just Food This content downloaded from 132.239.241.68 on Thu, 21 Feb 2019 05:36:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 3 California Agriculture and Conventional Food Why alternative food? Alternative to what? This chapter describes the conventional side of the food system. The basic story is broadly familiar, and we do not reiterate the abundant literature.1 Instead we focus on background relevant to our arguments about alternative food. Because we define alternative as sustainable, healthy, and just, we need to suggest how conventional food, that is, the food most people eat every day, became unsustainable, unjust, and unhealthy. Because justice has been central in the district over the past decade and is likely to remain so, we emphasize connections between the evolving conventional food system and the struggle for civil and human rights in California and U.S. history. We begin by arguing, not without precedent, that the way of producing food that is conventional across the United States, and indeed much of the rest of the world today, originated in California. Many of the state’s characteristic patterns—specialty crops, large landholdings, and exploited labor—were in clear view during the mission period (late 1760s to mid-1830s). Subsequently, investment following the Gold Rush (1848–1855), construction of the railroads, and significant government subsidies facilitated the creation and distribution of California fruits and vegetables around the world. With such a heavily capitalized and statesupported agriculture, the Jeffersonian vision of hardy, independent yeomen farmers did not apply in California. We then take a selective look at the complicated period from World War I to the early 1950s. The standard Depression-era narrative reasonably focuses on government action, which we regard as critical in creating an increasingly integrated national food system based on the California model. But in some key areas, Congress acted by not acting or by exempting agriculture from regulation; at a time when it was This content downloaded from 132.239.241.68 on Thu, 21 Feb 2019 05:36:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 36 Chapter 3 effectively managing commodity markets, for example, Congress did not extend basic protections to agricultural workers. That reinforced and spread nationwide the exploitative elements of the California approach to labor. Changes in the private sector starting in the 1930s were probably as important as government programs (and inaction) in shaping and nationalizing the conventional model. The growth in grocery stores and supermarkets was a major factor driving consolidation and nationalization of the food system. Californians’ beloved automobiles filled suburban parking lots with grocery shoppers who led Americans’ rush toward new kinds of ever more processed and convenient food. Finally, we point to the public health and environmental threats of the “get big or get out” period. Up to the 1950s, it is easy to see the injustices in the food system and many increasingly unsustainable elements, but we have found little evidence that food was reliably bad or bad for you.2 After World War II, cheap oil and chemical pesticides intensified every aspect of the system, degrading food quality in the process. We present the “green revolution” as a tragic misnomer: there is little about it that was green as we now use that term. The green revolution underwrote the round of federal policies in the 1970s that were intended to drive small family farmers off their land. Those hardy yeomen, on whom our core agricultural myths rest, were almost as clearly victims of the system as were the workers in the fields. From the Missions to World War I The Emergence of the Conventional Model in California Analysts of every political stripe and priority note California’s remarkable natural resources. Carey McWilliams, for example, wrote in the 1930s that the state’s agriculture reflects its “amazing range of environmental factors . . . California has the highest peaks, the lowest valleys, the driest desert, and some of the rainiest sections of the United States.”3 The Sierra mountains, which trace the state’s eastern border, and a number of mountain ranges running parallel to the Pacific coast, create hundreds of soil types and microclimates. These mountains encircle the Central Valley, which is the heart of agriculture in California. Extending north nearly to Oregon and south beyond Bakersfield, the valley includes an exceptionally fertile band of farmland and pasture that produces This content downloaded from 132.239.241.68 on Thu, 21 Feb 2019 05:36:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms California Agriculture and Conventional Food 37 Figure 3.1 California Agricultural Land. California’s diverse microclimates have enabled production of an equally diverse array of crops. The state’s principal agricultural region, the Central Valley, is formed by the Sierra Nevada and coastal mountains. An extensive irrigation system brings water south and west to the state’s agricultural lands. Source: California Department of Conservation Farmland Mapping and Monitoring Program. This content downloaded from 132.239.241.68 on Thu, 21 Feb 2019 05:36:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 38 Chapter 3 amazingly huge array of crops. Boosters and land speculators, past and present, have trumpeted California’s incredible ecological and agricultural diversity:4 The state accounts for nearly the entire U.S. production of walnuts, almonds, nectarines, olives, dates, figs, pomegranates, and persimmons. It leads the nation in the production of vegetables, including lettuce, tomatoes, broccoli, celery, cauliflower, carrots, lima beans, and spinach, and also of apricots, grapes, lemons, strawberries, plums and prunes, peaches, cantaloupes, avocados, and honeydew melons. It is the nation’s leading producer of hay and the second leading producer of cotton. California is also the second ranking state in the production of rice, oranges, tangerines, grapefruit, apples, pears, sweet corn, and asparagus.5 However, McWilliams also noted that California’s natural bounty only “set the table for everything else to follow,” and that human overlay has been decisive. The most impressive intervention has addressed the major flaw in the state’s magnificent environment: water is not where the inhabitants have wished it to be. Economic, political, and cultural institutions have allowed Californians to reorganize the environment, building a vast infrastructure to produce and distribute food, and the reorganization of the waterscape has been particularly intense. Native Americans moved water to meet their modest needs.6 The Spanish built aqueducts to bring water to the missions.7 However, federal and state governments worked far more extensively and expensively to move water from north to south, across state lines and westward from the Colorado River. Both farms and people followed water, ending the Bay Area’s brief role as the state’s major agricultural producer.8 Although growth in San Francisco and its suburbs required one of the more deeply contested water diversions in the nation’s history, Yosemite National Park’s Hetch Hetchy dam, the Bay Area’s generally low soil quality never justified importing water for row crops.9 Innovative Californians reorganized more than the waterscape. Agriculture was at the heart of Spanish California, and the mission period inscribed three critical patterns that shape the organization of California’s agriculture even today.10 First, the missions encouraged the accumulation of vast stretches of land by single owners, establishing a pattern that continued under the Spanish, Mexican, and U.S. land grant systems. Although small producers have always played a role in the state’s agricultural economy, large holdings have been the political and economic drivers and have accounted for most of the output. Second, Franciscan This content downloaded from 132.239.241.68 on Thu, 21 Feb 2019 05:36:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms California Agriculture and Conventional Food 39 priests relied on the same exploitation of racially distinct labor that continues today. Franciscans “converted” Indians, who became agricultural laborers, and Mexican and subsequent American landowners enslaved them. Similar race-based practices persisted even as the origins and identities of California growers and workers changed over time. Third, the Franciscans imported livestock and wheat that seeded the ranches of both the Californios and the Americans who succeeded them. They planted many of the European fruits, vegetables, grapes, and olives that became the backbone of the state’s diverse horticulture. Financing “Factories in the Field” Mission-era landholding, labor, and cropping patterns were in place when the Gold Rush both created demand for food and provided capital for developing the industry. Initially a market in basics like wheat and beef boomed. The expanding population pushed local game species to extinction in the 1850s and the cost of driving meat from Arizona and New Mexico raised prices as much as thirty-fold.11 Combined with the disposition of Spanish, Indian, and public domain lands this enabled the large-scale, fantastically profitable bonanza ranching that dominated California agriculture after the Gold Rush. The ranches grew to supply not only the miners but also national and international wheat, beef, and mutton markets. Many institutions and individuals, financiers, railroads, banks, and both successful and disappointed miners, fueled that first rush of capitalintensive agriculture. New mining fortunes as well as East Coast and European banks provided investment capital, abetted by an increasingly sophisticated and more integrated regional financial system.12 As San Francisco became the first financial center in the western United States, agriculture became one of the most attractive sectors for investment. California farms in 1850 averaged about 4,465 acres compared to a U.S. average of about 202.5 acres. Although the enormous holdings amassed by California’s land barons, including the Henry Miller and Charles Lux empire, did not last and the differential declined, the state’s farms remained above the U.S. average until the 1980s. In the 1870s, investment in more intensive and scientific practices began to shift the California industry away from beef and wheat toward labor- and capital-intensive specialty crops such as wine This content downloaded from 132.239.241.68 on Thu, 21 Feb 2019 05:36:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 40 Chapter 3 grapes, citrus, vegetables, and nuts.13 Many large holdings were subdivided and sold, but large holdings did not disappear. Indeed, in many areas and for extensive uses in particular, land consolidation continued. Although the dominance of vast, monopolistic agricultural holdings waned, its large scale remains one of the distinguishing characteristics of conventional California agriculture.14 While the banks were critical to the development of large-scale, intensive California agriculture, railroads played an important and unexpectedly varied role. Following the hurried completion of the transcontinental railroad in 1869, improved distribution systems shaped the state’s aspirations. California’s enormous wheat farms supplied national and international markets for more than thirty years. One-third of the state’s grain flowed into Liverpool or Hong Kong at wheat’s nineteenth-century peak.15 Closer to home, rails provided quick access to urban markets around the country for the state’s growing bounty of fresh fruits and vegetables. Nonetheless, railroad agents also consciously created their own customers; they actively promoted immigration, lent capital, sold land, and funded irrigation and infrastructure. Railroad promoters invested in large and small operations alike, contributing to the development of communities as well as to massive agricultural enterprises. The Requirement for Cheap Labor When land is made expensive by anticipation of profits based on cheap labor, the cost of labor has to remain low if land is to maintain its value or, better yet, appreciate.16 Certainly both land speculation and the prospects for large-scale production drove California’s steadily ascending land prices, but the state’s commitment to maintaining cheap agricultural labor was at least as critical. Prior to statehood, California growers accustomed to the slavery that had sustained mission agriculture flirted with joining the Confederacy. After California was admitted to the Union as a free soil state, the legislature explicitly invited continuing enslavement of Indians. The 1850 Act for the Government and Protection of Indians allowed whites to “obtain control of Indian children” and to purchase at auction Indians who had been “found strolling, loitering where alcohol was sold, begging, or leading a profligate course of life.” Clarification of the statute a decade This content downloaded from 132.239.241.68 on Thu, 21 Feb 2019 05:36:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms California Agriculture and Conventional Food 41 later allowed white owners to “retain the service of Indians until 40 years of age for men and 35 years of age for women.” In May 1862, the Daily Alta California reported on the common practice of Indian stealing: Here, it is well known there are a number of men in this county, who have for years made it their profession to captor [sic] and sell Indians, the price ranging from $30 to $150, according to quality. . . . It is even asserted that there are men engaged in it who do not hesitate, when they find a rancheria well stocked with young Indians, to murder in cold blood all the old ones, in order that they may safely possess themselves of all the offspring. This affords a key to the history of border Indian troubles.17 Yet slavery was not optimal for most California growers. Expanding the fruit and vegetable industries depended on cheap seasonal labor, and of course it is not profitable to feed or house workers when they are not needed. Hence, California growers have long preferred laborers who are not in a position to demand or require housing or other support during off seasons. When they do need workers, however, growers need a surplus in order to keep wages down.18 Easily exploited, typically racially distinct immigrant and migrant labor has filled that niche throughout California’s history and has enabled specialty crop growers to expand their markets even as land values continued to rise. Ensuring a sufficient influx of workers to keep wages down while maintaining enough anti-immigrant pressure to prevent them from gaining citizenship or rights has been a difficult balance for California growers, and they have not always succeeded. Aspiring white homesteaders viewed the growers’ large landholdings as a barrier to homesteading. Understanding that cheap “coolie labor” was essential to maintaining those holdings, they drove the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which the growers quite rationally opposed. This first law restricting immigration to the United States prohibited Chinese already in the country from becoming citizens and suspended further immigration from China.19 Ironically, the Exclusion Act also created a brief period of labor scarcity in which Chinese workers already in the state were able to demand higher wages.20 After the Exclusion Act passed, the growers still needed labor. Land reform and sustained upheaval following the restoration of imperial rule in Japan in 1867–1868 encouraged Japanese farmers to migrate and become California’s next low-cost labor pool.21 Unlike the Chinese, the Japanese arrived as families, intending to stay, and until racial prejudice This content downloaded from 132.239.241.68 on Thu, 21 Feb 2019 05:36:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 42 Chapter 3 forced otherwise, they did not confine themselves to residential ghettos. That did not sit well with San Franciscans, who established “Oriental Schools” for Japanese children when they rebuilt after the 1906 earthquake.22 The Japanese government protested discrimination against its citizens to little effect, but California agricultural labor issues attracted national public attention following the 1913 wheatland riot. When twice as many workers as were needed showed up for jobs picking hops, promised wages were slashed and living conditions at the site became unbearable. Workers organizing to confront the situation were attacked by police and the melee led to four deaths and numerous injuries. Although the riot was blamed on the Industrial Workers of the World, the subsequent outcry prompted California to establish the State Commission on Immigration and Housing to set standards for labor camps and sanitation for fieldworkers. But support for the commission soon withered, and labor issues once again dropped out of sight. Although the plight of agricultural labor in California has caused episodic national scandals, the issue has been easily forgotten or deflected in occasional attacks on immigrants reminiscent of the row over the Chinese Exclusion Act. When McWilliams wrote his classic Factories in the Field in the 1930s, farm labor issues in California had already “been lost sight of and rediscovered time and again.”23 Government Subsidies for “Scientific” Farming Free land and free soil debates about slavery complicated federal land disposition programs until after the South seceded and left Congress in 1862.24 With the opposition missing, prodevelopment forces in Congress previously stymied by sectional rivalries quickly adopted three statutes that were critical to the evolution of the conventional model of agriculture. First, the Homestead Act promised 160 acres to any current or prospective citizen, man or woman, who would settle and build a house. A second bill authorized the formation of the Department of Agriculture, whose programs would help the new settlers succeed as farmers. The Morrill Act then granted public domain land to each state to establish “agricultural and mechanical” or “land grant” colleges. In the early twentieth century, the Newlands Act of 1903, opened the way for federal subsidies to irrigation. This content downloaded from 132.239.241.68 on Thu, 21 Feb 2019 05:36:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms California Agriculture and Conventional Food 43 Federal support for agriculture was at least nominally intended to encourage smallholders and family farmers, but the programs were easily adapted to meet the needs of California’s increasingly powerful large growers. The Homestead Act aimed to support family farming, but the democratic intent generally failed: in California and elsewhere virtually all government land distribution programs were manipulated to facilitate enormous corporate and private holdings.25 Similarly, the government intended that the land grant colleges and the Department of Agriculture would support smallholders and rural communities. But both acts put the nation on a path to “scientific farming,” which was easily turned to the advantage of the largest producers. George Perkins Marsh’s Man and Nature (1864) described Americans’ love affair with science, but that passion began earlier among agriculturalists, inspired by Justus von Liebig’s discoveries about plant nutrition in the 1840s. The German chemist identified nitrogen, potassium, and phosphorus (the NPK in fertilizers) as essential to plant growth. Over the next century, his discoveries underwrote both input-intensive agriculture and a global fertilizer industry. A growing army of land grant college graduates and researchers encouraged not only fertilizer use but also crop specialization and mechanization.26 The experience and expertise of previous millennia, particularly regarding soil management, was derided as outdated, irrational, or superstitious tradition.27 California agribusiness prospered in close relationship to the land grant college system, particularly after Congress added cooperative extension, a state-supported network of specialists who “extended” university research to increase productivity on the nation’s farms.28 Inevitably perhaps, benefits from the enormous federal and state agricultural research and education investments have concentrated on well-organized and powerful agricultural interests, which were best positioned to provide important political support in return for technical and intellectual subsidies.29 Similar to the enthusiasm for scientific farming, a commitment to efficiency underwrote efforts to engineer natural resources to suit California agriculture, especially water. The 1903 Newlands Act established the Bureau of Reclamation to relocate, store, and distribute water in the arid lands of the West. As with the Homestead Act, Newlands Act drafters attempted to limit the acreage that could be irrigated with federally This content downloaded from 132.239.241.68 on Thu, 21 Feb 2019 05:36:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 44 Chapter 3 “developed” water to family farms no larger than 160 acres. While the water resources did not have a large impact in California until the midtwentieth century, federal agents had already learned to deflect program benefits to large growers, the bureau’s most powerful constituency. Congress finally excised the ineffectual 160-acre limitation from federal statutes in 1982.30 Specialty Crop Science and Shifting Scale Whereas water looms large in the recent history of California agriculture, federal investment in plant breeding was initially more important in shaping patterns of production in the state. During the Victorian era, programs promoted plant breeding and a vision of a “gigantic horticultural garden.”31 An astounding array of fruit, nut, and vegetable cultivars rapidly expanded the mission era suite of specialty crops. As transportation improved, particularly after the first cooled-car shipment of California fruit arrived in New York in 1889, orchards of peaches, pears, and apricots replaced wheat as California’s most important agricultural products.32 That same year, a Southern Pacific agent predicted that California would become “the orchard for the whole world.”33 By 1900, fruit was the state’s leading industrial product, and by 1920, California growers produced nearly half of the fruits and nuts consumed in the United States.34 Although small producers and truck farmers surrounded major cities and remained an important feature of California agriculture at least until the end of World War II,35 most of California’s specialty crop production has taken place on large holdings.36 The Cooperatives Growers’ cooperatives solidified growers’ political advantages beginning in the early twentieth century. American farmers were “virtually unorganized as a professional group” prior to the Civil War. Of course, they did not need to be: they were the dominant segment of the population and powerful in every state and region.37 The structure of the national government, a bicameral legislature that apportioned senators by state and not by population, reflected and protected rural interests. However, as the federal government expanded in scope and scale, agriculture organized to support public agencies and programs that would support them.38 This content downloaded from 132.239.241.68 on Thu, 21 Feb 2019 05:36:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms California Agriculture and Conventional Food 45 Changing Expectations about Food Quality: Seasonality and Aesthetics As refrigerated transport carried California fruits, vegetables, and meats just about anywhere, growers’ marketing cooperatives—not to be confused with Grange-style organizations of buyers—invested in national advertising and branding of agricultural products that linked California fruit and vegetables to luxury, beauty, and pleasure.39 Colorful labels distinguished each grower’s fruit boxes, even as the fruit itself became an increasingly standardized commodity (figure 3.3). In the process, the marketing cooperatives redefined the way consumers thought about food: as the refrigerated boxcars improved the appearance and freshness of California products in eastern markets, food quality came to be measured by the way produce looked after shipping.40 And because California could provide items that could not be grown in winter months in the rest of the country, the notion of seasonality in food consumption began to erode. As they “took charge of the commodity chain,” as Walker styles it, cooperatives became less benign than their name might suggest.41 Unlike a buyers’ cooperative, a cooperative marketing organization must control free riders that might benefit from co-op programs without conforming to quality control and marketing requirements or paying dues. The state soon became intertwined with the marketing cooperatives to such a degree that it blurred distinctions between public and private.42 For example, in 1917 the state legislature discovered “vital public interests” in marketing the co-ops’ products and enacted the growers’ own quality requirements into state law. A state-level Enforcement Branch of the U.S. Department of Agriculture soon began backing up the cooperatives’ rules, reinforcing their influence.43 Local farmers no longer served local markets, and co-op rules about shipping and packaging ultimately led to legislation that made direct sales from farmers to consumers illegal.44 The marketing cooperatives also needed political help because they were constrained by the 1890 Sherman Anti-Trust Act, which forbid collusion among producers “in restraint of trade.” But the peculiar form of cooperative adopted by the growers was specifically designed to restrain trade. Sun-Maid soon ran afoul of federal antitrust law. Federal response established an important new pattern for conventional agribusiness: first the Supreme Court and then Congress, in the 1922 CapperVolsted Act, exempted agricultural co-ops from antitrust rules.45 Co-ops This content downloaded from 132.239.241.68 on Thu, 21 Feb 2019 05:36:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 46 Chapter 3 Early Cooperatives: The Rochdale Society and the Grange Most historians trace cooperatives to a British organization, the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers. The group was founded in 1844 as a buying club intended to lower food prices for members by purchasing in bulk. As the society developed, it promulgated principles for forming a co-op, and the idea spread rapidly.a The cooperative became important in U.S. agriculture when the Grange, formally known as the National Grange of the Order of Patrons of Husbandry, was established in 1867. The organizers sent representatives to England very early in its history to study the Rochdale principles.b The Grange was designed to organize farm families to work together toward economic well-being and political power (figure 3.2). Its motto delineates its approach: “In essentials, unity; in nonessentials, liberty; in all things, charity.” By the turn of the twentieth century, the Grange had over 1 million members in rural communities across the country. It was a major social and political force in agriculture during the post-1870s build-out of California horticulture, supporting isolated farm families with social events and buying clubs. During the development of national mail order firms, the Grange made a mutually beneficial buying agreement with the newly established Montgomery Ward: the retailer gave Grange members discounts in return for special access to its members.c Although the Grange has lost traction as a political representative for farmers, the cooperative form remains important in the Bay Area food story and some food justice activists have returned to those roots in the past several years, as we shall discuss in chapter 8. a. Thompson (1994) and Curl (2009). b. The Grange gained traction during the financial reversals of the 1870s and began lobbying for regulation of railroad and grain storage prices. It also pressed successfully for the 1887 Hatch Act and later for rural mail delivery and, still later, rural electrification. The poster is available through the Library of Congress Web site: http://www.loc.gov/pictures/resource/ ppmsca.02956/ (accessed February 2012). c. Frederick (1997). This content downloaded from 132.239.241.68 on Thu, 21 Feb 2019 05:36:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms California Agriculture and Conventional Food Figure 3.2 “Gift for the Grangers,” Cincinnati: J. Hale Powers & Co., [1873]. This content downloaded from 132.239.241.68 on Thu, 21 Feb 2019 05:36:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 47 48 Chapter 3 Figure 3.3 As commodities became standardized, growers created distinctive labels that have become a minor art form. Joe Green Estate was located in Cortland, where available packers, wives of German farmers, were white. But the effort to promote the product with reference to that fact reflects the racism that has always characterized California’s approach to farm labor. Source: From the collection of James A. Dahlberg. not only adopted political and legal tactics to promote their interests and enforce their rules. They also used violence; the Sun-Maid raisin cooperative, for example, was notorious for its violent efforts to control free riders.46 Antitrust exemptions for marketing cooperatives may mark the zenith of growers’ power in the conventional system. Key elements of the mission era pattern—large landholdings on which exploited, brownskinned laborers produced an astounding array of introduced specialty crops—had been institutionalized and capitalized. They had also been backed up by federal support for scientific research and enforced by both federal and state rules regarding cooperatives’ packing, shipping, and marketing practices. However, those victories contributed to a crisis of This content downloaded from 132.239.241.68 on Thu, 21 Feb 2019 05:36:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms California Agriculture and Conventional Food 49 overproduction that devastated farm prices and incomes in the 1920s, and the growers’ power within the system declined thereafter. Depression Era: A California Model for a National Food System The crises of the Great Depression brought enormous change to the U.S. economy,47 but the farm sector had been collapsing for a decade before the 1929 stock market crash on Black Friday. Mechanization had put farmers into debt, and resulting overproduction had caused commodity prices and farm income to fall dramatically. Droughts throughout the nation in the early 1930s exacerbated the crisis. The number of farms and farmers had been falling slightly since the 1790s as the nation urbanized; but after a brief uptick following World War I, small farmers were shaken out in droves. (See figure 3.4.) To stabilize farm prices and incomes, President Herbert Hoover urged passage of the 1929 Agricultural Marketing Act. Rapidly expanding federal participation in the agricultural market added force to a wave of consolidation that shifted the entire nation toward a model of capitalintensive agriculture, based on patterns that had long defined California agriculture. Although Depression-era narratives appropriately emphasized government action, it was government inaction regarding labor that spread that particularly odious part of the model. In addition, the rise and consolidation of a national food distribution sector played a major, arguably decisive, role in the consolidation of a national food system. Some have suggested that because of California’s focus on specialty crops rather than the commodity grains that were the focus of New Deal policy, the state was relatively unaffected by those federal programs.48 But that is not entirely accurate. We focus on three durable consequences. First, programs to help the hungry were intertwined with and subservient to price supports for agribusiness. Thus, California’s poor participate in basically the same food aid and school food programs that distribute surplus foods to the needy elsewhere in the nation. Second, dust bowl migrants flooding the state eroded the position of Mexican laborers and focused grower attention on the threat of unions and Communists. Finally, major changes in retail and distribution turned in part on the car culture and physical infrastructure that developed first in California. A This content downloaded from 132.239.241.68 on Thu, 21 Feb 2019 05:36:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 50 Chapter 3 Farms and Average Acres per Farm in the United States and California, 1900–2007 7 6 Acres per U.S. Farm (hundred acres) 5 4 Acres per Ca. Farm (hundred acres) 3 2 U.S. Farms (millions) 1 Ca. Farms (100,000) 2007 2002 1997 1992 1987 1982 1978 1974 1969 1964 1959 1950 1945 1940 1935 1930 1925 1920 1910 1900 0 Figure 3.4 Farms and average acres per farm in the United States and California, 1900– 2007. The data confirm a dramatic decline in the number of farms in the United States since the mid-1930s—the California model of large landholdings going national—and a corresponding increase in the size of the average U.S. farm at the same time. In California, the swings are less dramatic but a slight uptick in the number of farms since the 1970s and a corresponding but larger decline in the size of farms may signal the impact of the Williamson Act and the backto-the-landers. Adapted from Hoppe and Banker, 2005, 6; U.S. Census of Agriculture, various years. Note: Western states include Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, Washington, Oregon, and California; later, Alaska and Hawaii were added. U.S. Agricultural Census data disagree on the average farm size of western states after 1900. For this figure, 1954 census data are used from 1900 to 1954, and 1969 census data are used from 1959 to 1974. Figures from the 2002 Census are not comparable to data from previous years. See Sumner et al. (2004). This content downloaded from 132.239.241.68 on Thu, 21 Feb 2019 05:36:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms California Agriculture and Conventional Food 51 growing consumer movement blew hot and cold about the increasingly dominant retail operations that grew from the margins of agribusiness to take control of the food system. In spite of the enormous diversity and complexity of the government’s market interventions, the basic logic was simple: When farmers began to produce too much and prices began to fall, the government would pay farmers to leave some land fallow. When prices threatened to go too high, the payments would end [in theory anyway] and the land would go back into cultivation. . . . The government would also buy excess grain from farmers and store it. In lean years—say, when drought struck—the government would release some of that stored grain, mitigating sudden price hikes.49 Food Aid in the Depression Most of what Americans today encounter as school lunch, food stamps, and federal food and nutrition programs was developed during the financial crises of the 1930s.50 Those roots have caused continuing problems and controversy in part because the Depression-era programs were specifically not designed or intended to support the needy, but to support agribusiness by distributing surplus commodities that were lowering prices. The poor were allowed to take up the surplus, but no more.51 The programs reflect Americans’ philosophical ambivalence regarding the poor. Helping the poor has long been regarded as a religious duty.52 That changed slightly in England following Henry VIII’s first divorce and the dismantling of Catholicism. The Elizabethan Poor Laws reallocated the responsibility to local governments. Although who was obligated to do what for whom has shifted over the centuries, the obligations have been fairly consistently structured to be both minimal and socially stigmatizing, and often they benefit those providing the aid. In Elizabethan England, the law distinguished between “sturdy beggars” and “worthy” poor,” with the goal of punishing the former while helping the latter, at least a little. Over centuries of war, migration, urbanization, and the rise of industrial capitalism, the need for such aid intensified and altered the details of government programs. But the basic goal of providing minimal support for the worthy poor survived. Utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham summarized justifications for limiting assistance to the barest survival: to discourage laziness and dependence; relief, he said, should be “an object of wholesome horror.”53 British colonists brought those ideas to the United States. Although some jurisdictions provided This content downloaded from 132.239.241.68 on Thu, 21 Feb 2019 05:36:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 52 Chapter 3 relatively better care for insane, blind, and deaf people and for children, the fundamental policy goal—preventing destabilizing and unsightly starvation without creating dependence or rewarding the unworthy poor—remained.54 Where government efforts proved inadequate, families and churches took up some of the shortfall. When policymakers realized during the Depression that the hungry could absorb agricultural overproduction, the caveat remained: they could take up the excess but no more.55 The 1933 Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act authorized the secretary of agriculture to purchase “price-depressing surpluses” and distribute the acquired commodities to the needy. The distribution was explicitly not allowed to compete with “normal market transactions,” and it was to be discontinued if it appeared to conflict with the legislation’s primary goal of supporting agriculture.56 The Food Stamp Program, initiated in 1939, was similarly constrained. Only after people on relief had spent “an amount of money representing estimated normal food expenditures” could they use stamps to buy food “determined by the Department to be surplus.” The program was not at all designed to ensure that Depression victims gained access to an appropriate mix and amount of food.57 The relationship between food aid and surplus distribution continues to confound school lunch programs and most related food programs. Agricultural Labor during the Depression: Government Inaction But what the government did not do at all has continued as an even more obvious injustice. The dust bowl that decimated the Midwest briefly changed the complexion of California field labor: displaced “Okies” and “Arkies” arrived, providing a new source of cheap labor and tremendous political risk for the growers. With white laborers and families in California’s fields and Congress legislating basic rights for workers throughout the industrial economy, the time should have been right to confront the exploitative labor practices at the heart of the state’s agriculture.58 With growing militancy nationwide, labor leaders recognized the opportunity to organize the state’s agricultural sector. Strikes and walkouts by agricultural workers, many of them spontaneous, gained momentum as conditions and wages deteriorated. Organizers came from across the political spectrum, including Communist “agitators” who organized This content downloaded from 132.239.241.68 on Thu, 21 Feb 2019 05:36:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms California Agriculture and Conventional Food 53 the militant Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union (CAWIU). In 1933, wages in California fields reached a nadir, and the general atmosphere of union militancy took hold. CAWIU launched a statewide organizing drive that resulted in twenty-four separate strikes and contributed to at least thirteen more throughout the state. While some of these actions achieved slight wage increases or other concessions, growers’ responses were generally brutal: dissenting farmworkers were harassed, beaten, and jailed. The most famous confrontation occurred in Salinas in 1933, when white packing workers temporarily defied growers’ traditional, race-based divide-and-conquer strategy. Allying with Filipino field laborers, they demanded union recognition and better conditions. Growers negotiated with the white workers but refused to talk to the Filipinos. Instead, with help from local police, they burned their camps, beat their leaders, and imported scabs. When white workers abandoned their temporary solidarity and looked the other way, they were rewarded with a two-year union contract. Once the growers regained the upper hand, they refused to renew the contract; instead they dismissed protesting workers and brought in more docile replacements. The conflict inspired a new organization, the Associated Farmers of California, to fight unionization and Communist agitation.59 In the years that followed, more moderate reformers insisted that if employers offered year-round jobs with decent wages, more white Californians would happily seek employment in the fields. That hypothesis has never been tested.60 Although Congress was willing to intervene in many aspects of the agricultural economy, it could not reach consensus about labor. The 1930s was a particularly virulent period in U.S. labor history, and California growers echoed leaders in other industries, depicting desperate, largely nonideological workers as a Communist threat. Congress divided, with House members tending to emphasize the Communist elements and favoring restricting workers’ rights, while most senators favored including agricultural laborers in the growing suite of rights then being granted to all nonagricultural workers. Through the Grange, the Farm Bureau, and other organizations, California growers lobbied to exempt agricultural labor from worker protection laws, social security, and similar programs then being legislated. Their argument turned on what is called agricultural exceptionalism: This content downloaded from 132.239.241.68 on Thu, 21 Feb 2019 05:36:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 54 Chapter 3 because of seasonal and weather fluctuations, farmers cannot easily speed up or slow production in response to market factors. Therefore, the growers argued, they required exceptional treatment from governments, including price supports, low interest loans, and exemption from certain taxes and regulations. One of their foremost concerns was labor regulations and immigration law, and they, in alliance with agricultural interests nationwide, demanded special exemptions and policies for agriculture. The growers won many of these concessions, and many of the new protections and rights granted to American workers during the 1930s and 1940s were explicitly denied to those working in the fields.61 The Bracero Program As World War II created labor shortages, California growers were again left with the problem of locating low-wage and easily manipulated seasonal workers. A slight alteration in immigration policy provided the answer. The Roosevelt administration worked with the Mexican government to design the bracero program (from the Spanish brazo, or arm), to admit what are now referred to as guest workers. Although Mexican officials tried, as had the Japanese before them, to establish standards to protect the migrants, they fared no better. The program also authorized the U.S. Department of Labor to return the guest workers to their home country after a specified period.62 In 1954 the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service launched Operation Wetback to return workers without proper documentation (along with numerous U.S.-born Mexican Americans) to Mexico, many of whom returned again and again to labor in California fields. Singer and songwriter Woody Guthrie lamented the nameless victims of a plane crash carrying unneeded workers home. Folk singer and House UnAmerican Activities Committee target Pete Seeger popularized Guthrie’s work, which became a staple in the rising folk and protest repertoire:63 Is this the best way we can grow our big orchards? Is this the best way we can grow our good fruit? To fall like dry leaves to rot on my topsoil And be called by no name except “deportees”?64 We will encounter alternative approaches to agricultural labor markets in chapters 7 and 8, but the basic pattern remains. California growers This content downloaded from 132.239.241.68 on Thu, 21 Feb 2019 05:36:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms California Agriculture and Conventional Food 55 have long invested energy and resources not in employees but in politicians who will ensure that national immigration policy meets their exacting requirements. Martin summarizes the strategy with a neat analogy between labor policy and agricultural water management: If water is cheap, farmers flood fields with water; if water is expensive, farmers may invest in drip irrigation systems. The analogy to recruitment and retention [of labor] is clear: farmers more often work collectively to flood the labor market with workers, usually by getting border gates opened or left ajar, instead of recruiting and retaining the best farm workers for their operation.65 Chain Stores, Grocery Stores, and Self-Service Supermarkets In spite of the growers’ significant and durable Depression-era victory, they were losing traction as a power center in the conventional food system. A revolution in food distribution—transportation, processing, and retailing—that continues today began to develop after the Civil War. Specialty shops and mobile retail—butchers, greengrocers, bakeries, peddlers, and milkmen—were the heart of most U.S. food distribution through the mid-twentieth century (figure 3.5 a, b, c, and d). That changed rapidly after World War II. Railroads and cooperatives catalyzed the initial shift, and the marketing cooperatives soon joined sanitation and public health advocates to create a cleaner, more controlled food distribution system. San Francisco’s arrangement was typical, if accelerated by natural disaster. After the 1906 earthquake, food distribution was limited to the city’s wholesale produce market, where it could be effectively inspected and regulated.66 By the end of World War I, fewer than one hundred wholesalers controlled the supply of agricultural products to stores and restaurants throughout the city. Indeed, the San Francisco district handled the fresh food supply from Santa Clara to Sonoma. Wholesalers distributed California’s standardized commodities among small specialty retailers—greengrocers, bakers, and butchers.67 The chain store groceries that rose to prominence in the 1920s, including the Great American Tea Company, began a revolution that changed all that. Large and rapidly consolidating grocery store chains took advantage of agricultural overproduction to squeeze producers on price. The introduction of self-service around World War I intensified the shift: mass selling of standardized, prepackaged commodities in retail outlets This content downloaded from 132.239.241.68 on Thu, 21 Feb 2019 05:36:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms a b Figure 3.5 Specialists including peddlers, greengrocers, and butchers were central to food distribution through the mid-twentieth century. (a) Chinese vegetable peddler in Oakland, c. 1890. Source: Moses Chase Album, Joseph R. Knowland Collection, Oakland Public Library; (b) San Francisco green grocer during World War II (photograph by Dorothea Lange, War Years North Beach (Italian Sector)) Source: The Dorothea Lange Collection, Oakland Museum of California, City of Oakland, gift of Paul S. Taylor; (c) Richmond, California butcher shop, 1914. Source: Richmond Local History Photograph Collection, Richmond Public Library; (d) Farmer selling melons and peaches at a farmers’ market in Albany, California, in 1945. Source: Courtesy of the Albany Library Historical Collection. This content downloaded from 132.239.241.68 on Thu, 21 Feb 2019 05:36:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms c d Figure 3.5 (continued) This content downloaded from 132.239.241.68 on Thu, 21 Feb 2019 05:36:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 58 Chapter 3 From the Great American Tea Company to the A&P The Great American Tea Company began in New York City just before the Civil War as a purveyor of fine teas in the butcher and baker specialty shop tradition of food distribution. But as the United States developed a national economy, its founder began buying teas directly from China, eliminating diverse middlemen, and organized merchants across the nation into “clubs” to sell the high-quality product at a low price.d When the transcontinental railroad opened, the clubs became a string of “grocery stores,” and the renamed Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company became an early grocery store, selling diverse condiments and household items as well.e Additional outlets made the A&P a chain store that benefited from economies of scale and central management. Significantly, it also offered a limited selection of predictable, uniform products and set prices. Chain stores were also a new sort of buyer, well suited to the large-scale, marketing co-op-based marketing that was emerging in California. The A&P eliminated standard service features of retail selling—credit sales, home deliveries, purchase stamps, and premiums—and offered instead a reliable, pleasant, and anonymous experience for shoppers. Its “cash-and-carry” service was efficient, cheap, and immensely popular.f At its peak in 1930, A&P operated at 15,137 sites. At midcentury, it began to lose market share to discount superstores and was purchased by a German retailer in 1979. The company filed for bankruptcy in 2010. d. W. Walsh (1986). e. In a parallel universe, similar changes were coming to the meat industry: Gustavus Swift used the railroads to revolutionize meat distribution, bypassing the local butchers who had long dominated the market. f. W. Walsh (1986). was designed for high volume and minimal staffing. In 1920, chain stores accounted for about 4 percent of retail food sales in the United States. By 1935, the four top chain operations did 25 percent of all American retail, and consolidation had just begun.68 Food distribution and retail operations, increasingly national in scope, soon entered the processing and distribution businesses and began offering their own brands of basic commodities, a virtual death knell for milkmen and vegetable peddlers who sold local products along an established route. Butchers were similarly displaced as chain buyers demanded not sides of beef or pork, but rather precut and wrapped portions of meat.69 (See figure 3.5.) This content downloaded from 132.239.241.68 on Thu, 21 Feb 2019 05:36:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms California Agriculture and Conventional Food 59 Supermarkets, Parking Lots, and a New Breed of Consumers The model that A&P started led to one adopted throughout the country by imitators, including Kroger and Piggly Wiggly. But the center of innovation in food retail soon shifted to California, where automobiles, lowdensity development, and a rapidly expanding highway system were beginning to reshape the scale, form, and location of food distribution. The immense modern supermarket, occupying huge warehouses surrounded by even bigger parking lots, could attract shoppers from miles around with an immense array of low-cost products. This model was especially suited to the automobile-oriented culture and environment of midcentury California.70 Vons of Los Angeles and Safeway of Oakland provide a window into this expanding and ultimately revolutionary breed of retail (see figure 3.6 a and b). Like A&P, Vons started small, with a single warehouse-style operation, where the emphasis was on volume and efficiency, rather than service or décor, in Los Angeles. As it began adding new locations, Vons leased space at the front of each store to independent specialty vendors. But they did not last long as part of the model. And as the industry continued to consolidate, the Oakland-based Safeway chain acquired Vons. Safeway had also started small, when Sam Seelig opened one location in Los Angeles in 1915. As he began adding new sites, Seelig soon lost control of the business and merged with the Skaggs chain of Idaho. A confusing series of acquisitions and mergers designed in the mid-1920s by Merrill Lynch founder Charles Merrill combined numerous chains in the western states under the Safeway name with Skaggs at the helm. Two decades after its founding, Safeway was the second largest chain in the nation, having transformed its acquisitions from grocery stores into a new breed of retail: supermarkets.71 The modern self-service supermarket took economies of scale to a new level, emphasizing high volume and low price during the Depression. But by the 1950s, the convenience it offered was equally compelling. Supermarkets were a major driver in the rise of food processing, promoting fast and easily prepared foods for busy shoppers. Supermarkets were also instrumental in promoting frozen foods in the 1950s, which were cheap, durable, and completely impervious to seasonality.72 Spacious and well lit, supermarkets often featured tall, eye-catching displays of (sanitary) canned goods emphasizing the mantra, “Pile it high, sell it low.”73 This content downloaded from 132.239.241.68 on Thu, 21 Feb 2019 05:36:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Figure 3.6 California-based Safeway spearheaded the shift to the automobile-oriented supermarket as the basis of food distribution after World War II. (top) A San Francisco storefront c. 1936. (bottom) A supermarket in the Marina district, 1959. Source: San Francisco History Center, San Francisco Public Library. This content downloaded from 132.239.241.68 on Thu, 21 Feb 2019 05:36:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms California Agriculture and Conventional Food 61 Supermarket chains grew dramatically and gained enormous power in the decades following World War II. By the 1970s, a handful of major regional supermarket chains dominated as both purchasers of food and food retailers.74 Equally profound, the self-service operations encouraged Americans to regard themselves as consumers. Packaging, branding, and marketing became important components of food choice, and the freedom to consume entered as a critical subtext of a transformed marketplace.75 Car Culture and Processed Foods New Deal efforts to employ the jobless in road-building projects subsidized expansion of motor, as opposed to railroad, transport. The intersection of supermarket and highway was supported by yet another regulatory exemption for agriculture. Farmers had been among the first and most enthusiastic mechanizers. They began to load their own vehicles to transport their own products in the 1920s, and farmers lobbied to protect their own participation in food transport as New Deal legislators considered regulation of the expanding trucking industry. The 1935 Motor Carrier Act went well beyond that, granting agriculture broad exemptions from trucking regulation and labor law for products in transit.76 The act helped lift the Teamsters Union into power, but trucking of agricultural products proceeded outside New Deal rules that stabilized wages and costs.77 Independent food system truckers were not helped by their political success. In spite of a mystique of freedom and free enterprise, their reality was quite grim. Owner-operator truckers took on enormous risk and committed themselves to pursuing unpredictable, low-wage work. The conditions were reinforced by an antiunion ethos embedded in growing consumer advocacy. Postwar Agricultural Intensification In the generally prosperous decades following World War II, consolidation, intensification, and integration of the food system proceeded as if on, and then actually on, steroids. Small farms continued to disappear as government programs penalized family operators who did not “get big or get out.” Small producers turned to contract farming, and This content downloaded from 132.239.241.68 on Thu, 21 Feb 2019 05:36:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 62 Chapter 3 popular demand for processed foods and fast foods turned meat and potatoes into the burger and fries, and then this “all American meal,” into a health hazard. Food quality plummeted as producers adopted high-tech farming practices designed to produce larger quantities of commodities, and processors and fast food came to the center of the American diet. Food and Cars Yet another burst of road building during the Eisenhower administration intensified Americans’ preoccupation with automobiles. Because transportation is the second-largest expense in agricultural production, maintaining low-cost transportation became a core priority in the postwar industrial food system. Agribusiness and rural interests allied with big trucking firms to promote the Highway Trust Fund. Established in 1956, it allocated gas tax receipts to subsidize the National Defense Highway System, a comprehensive interstate highway system.78 Mobility along highways also allowed firms to relocate operations such as meatpacking and processing away from centers of union power toward less unionfriendly operations in the South and West.79 The roads also encouraged food retailers to create destinations for motorists and contributed to a new, and ultimately destructive, diet: fast food. Especially popular in California, the auto-oriented food culture underwrote the emergence of the drive-in.80 Stands selling prepared food had long been ubiquitous but seasonal. Nonetheless, in southern California, where “it felt like summer all year long . . . a whole new industry was born.” The idea “combined girls, cars, and late-night food.” But Anaheim burger vendors Richard and Maurice McDonald went a step further. They adapted the basic theme of supermarket success to create fast food. They replaced curb service with their Speedee Service System that promised potential franchise owners: “No Carhops—No Waitresses—No Dishwashers—No Bus Boys—The McDonald’s System is Self-Service.”81 When Ray Kroc bought out the McDonald brothers, the modern fast food approach to integrated food production, sourcing, processing, and distribution was born.82 Currently more than half the ground beef consumed in the United States is eaten away from home, mostly in restaurants, and the nation’s puny vegetable consumption consists primarily of chips, fries, and catsup.83 This content downloaded from 132.239.241.68 on Thu, 21 Feb 2019 05:36:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms California Agriculture and Conventional Food 63 The Population Bomb and the Green Revolution Amazingly, Depression-era crop subsidies designed to respond to massive overproduction were soon defended and justified by scarcities. First wartime shortages and then postwar Malthusian horror stories drove continuation of the subsidies. After Pearl Harbor, rationing focused attention on limits: FDR revived World War I price controls and curtailed the sale of meat, butter, and other consumer goods. Victory gardens sprouted across the nation. The scarcities did not last, but their shadow hung over agricultural policy throughout the developed world, driving further intensification and ever more destructive overproduction even while the subsidies continued. The skewed incentives did not go wholly unnoticed: President Truman’s secretary of agriculture Charles F. Brannan proposed a plan that would have ended price supports and allowed the market to set prices for perishable agricultural commodities. Brannan also proposed focusing on the disappearance of small farmers by limiting government aid to producers at or near the average U.S. family farm size.84 The plan was extensively debated in Congress but soundly defeated. Farm policy rhetoric continued to exploit Americans’ longstanding love affair with small family farms, even as government programs ultimately benefited increasingly larger and more integrated food conglomerates.85 Paul Ehrlich’s 1968 blockbuster, The Population Bomb, predicted overpopulation leading to global disaster and provided intellectual and political cover for further intensification and subsidies. The scarcity analysis has been familiar ever since Thomas Malthus argued that unchecked population would rapidly outpace food supplies and lead to mass suffering and starvation. Ehrlich’s analysis added the fledgling environmental movement’s concerns to the familiar Malthusian mix, emphasizing the fragile earth, and an era of limits, resource degradation, and disease that not even the wealthy could escape. Ehrlich’s polemic was broadly discussed and deeply polarizing, attracting criticism for its racist overtones and for stirring up anti-immigration sentiment.86 However, the dispute provided cover for an avalanche of technological innovation in the food system that soon drowned out basic facts about overproduction. Without regard for the fact that the farm crises of the previous several decades had been caused by overproduction, the green revolution resulted This content downloaded from 132.239.241.68 on Thu, 21 Feb 2019 05:36:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 64 Chapter 3 Cattle Production after World War II California’s bonanza beef industry was displaced by specialty crops in the nineteenth century, but cattle returned to the region after World War II in massive feeding facilities. One of the nation’s first confined animal feeding operations (CAFO) was designed by a former Safeway supermarket executive who sensed opportunity in the demand for backyard steaks and the fast food hamburgers. Located in Bakersfield, California, the operation fed up to 50,000 animals at a time using rigidly controlled grain-based “rations.” Beef marbled with streaks of fat soon defined quality for suburbanizing Americans enjoying cookouts. Grain surpluses resulting from a combination of favorable growing conditions, high-yielding new hybrid varieties, and federal subsidies underwrote the shift to CAFOs along with an influx of investment encouraged by federal tax incentives. Tax breaks encouraged thousands of wealthy Americans, including cowboy-actor John Wayne, to join clubs (actually limited partnerships) “that bought livestock, placed them in feedlots, and then sold them for club members.”g The CAFOs led to changes in meat processing. Both Armor and Swift abandoned their Chicago stockyards in the 1950s and relocated in rural, usually union-free areas, where they could get tax breaks to build a new generation of packing plants. As transportation fully shifted from rail to truck, huge slaughter plants were built near the new feedlots throughout rural America. By the early 1960s, roughly 40 percent of the cattle slaughtered in the United States were finished in highly automated, western “beef factories.”h Consolidation continued, and by the twentieth-century’s end, four companies controlled more than 80 percent of meat processing. g. Hamilton (2008). h. See Greenberg (1970) and Skaggs (1986). Hoy (1978) describes farming to create tax losses as a perennial problem. from several decades of government and private research into increasing crop yields. Scientists developed strains of rice that were particularly responsive to fertilizers.87 Simultaneously chemical firms discovered ways to produce large amounts of inexpensive fertilizer from fossil fuels. Soon they also figured out that steroids would speed animal growth. And they used antibiotics prophylactically to control the diseases that arose in the crowded concentrated animal feeding operations that were developed for dairy and beef cattle in California and spread rapidly across the nation. Although the environmental and public health consequences of these shifts raised early alarms, the dominant response was initially as euphoric as Americans’ embrace of scientific farming a century earlier. The input This content downloaded from 132.239.241.68 on Thu, 21 Feb 2019 05:36:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms California Agriculture and Conventional Food 65 and capital-intensive approach to agriculture was exported along with still troubling U.S. surpluses to the Third World, where the alleged population bomb was looming.88 Input Suppliers The growing reliance on chemical fertilizers and pesticides added yet another set of politically powerful and increasingly concentrated corporate players to the food system roster: the companies that produced the inputs. Their continuing importance was baked into the technology: as target pests became resistant to one set of chemicals, industry developed another set to maintain yields.89 Similarly, as pesticides and fertilizers displaced natural soil fertility and killed beneficial insects, soil bacteria, and, increasingly, pollinators, new and improved technological fixes were required. In the post–World War II United States, important scientific discoveries in low-tech and low-cost biological pest control were overtaken and eventually largely displaced by increasing reliance on chemical pesticides. Technological advances displaced a century and a half of cumulative farmer efforts to adapt Old World crops and practices to a new continent. Farmers’ skill sets shifted from understanding natural processes to managing chemical inputs.90 Get Big or Get Out: Cheap Food and Food Dumping In the 1970s, the long-standing federal commitment to overproduction intensified, specifically embracing not small family farmers but increasing scale and intensity, which were glossed as on-farm efficiency.91 The priorities of Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz (1971–1976) were shaped by major shifts in the global economy. In 1975, the United States experienced a positive trade balance for the last time. At a point when fundamental, continuing problems of import and export ratios became a major problem for the nation, agriculture attracted attention because it was the only sector in which the United States generated an actual trade surplus. But to remain a dominant player in the world market, Butz insisted that the United States would have to accelerate the trend toward a smaller number of large, least-cost operators.92 Bad weather in 1972 produced poor harvests all over the world, and Butz seemed briefly like a genius. Policymakers urged farmers to “plant from fencerow to This content downloaded from 132.239.241.68 on Thu, 21 Feb 2019 05:36:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 66 Chapter 3 fencerow.”93 Farmers responded enthusiastically, going deep into debt in order to “get big.” The Butz era precipitated enormous environmental destruction that required exempting agribusiness from yet another round of fundamental regulatory reform in the United States: the national movement to limit and internalize the environmental costs of production. During the “environmental decade,” Congress made “a nearly unbroken series of decisions to exclude farms and farming from the burdens of federal environmental law,” creating “a vast ‘anti-law’ of farms and the environment.” Many states followed suit.94 For example, although the Clean Water Act (CWA) “prohibits the ‘discharge of any pollutant by any person,’ . . . this prohibition is riddled with important exemptions for farms.” The CWA’s definition of pollutant includes “agricultural waste discharged into water,” but outside the definitions section, the statute puts agricultural discharges “largely beyond regulatory reach.”95 Regulating the pollution generated by CAFOs has, for example, proven near impossible.96 Because CAFOs are defined legally as farms, not factories, they are exempt from many relevant air and water pollution regulations and actually qualify for government subsidies to deal with agricultural waste.97 The economic conditions of the 1970s were particularly difficult for small farmers, many of whom turned to contracting as a strategy for bare survival. They agreed to supply specific manufacturers or retailers, particularly fast food restaurants and still-consolidating grocery stores, with product grown to strict specifications in exchange for a guaranteed price. Most of the risks remained with the farmers, who invested heavily in intensification required by the processors and retailers who increasingly controlled on-farm practices. Integrated buyers would provide the seed, chicks or piglets, strict protocols for managing their growth, and specifications for the finished product. As integrated global corporations offered lower and lower prices to the heavily leveraged suppliers, justice for farmers became a heightened concern for many family farm advocates.98 Conclusion Walker urges us to admire the genius of California and, by extension, American agribusiness, before we evaluate or criticize it.99 The system is a product of two and a half centuries of enterprise, insight, organizing and political action, consumption, and very hard work. California This content downloaded from 132.239.241.68 on Thu, 21 Feb 2019 05:36:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms California Agriculture and Conventional Food 67 growers seized the opportunities in railroad construction to create products and marketing mechanisms that allowed them to dominate global food production. They redefined how we grow food, sell food, and indeed what we consider to be food. The growers were soon overpowered, however, by a sequence of equally innovative distributors, marketers, processors, contractors, and input providers who have dominated and redefined the conventional food system. While admiring the genius, we also note that the same choices have given us increasingly unsafe food, underpaid and undignified jobs for disenfranchised and easily exploited migrants, and environmental devastation. For most of the twentieth century, the image of the independent homesteader and family farmer sustained and concealed political and economic power sufficient to avoid basic regulatory constraints on the exploitation of labor, externalize enormous environmental and public health consequences, devour oil in diverse forms, and create many rather tasteless, nutritionally deficient, foodlike substances. Clearly there is nothing inevitable about the conventional agricultural system. It is the product of conscious choices, sustained effort, risk taking, and public and private investment. The basic model for this system began to take shape as the earliest Europeans settled in California. It was underwritten by the enormous resources circulating in the state after the Gold Rush and during the capitalist penetration of the U.S. West. When overproduction encouraged by that trajectory brought the system to its knees, the federal government intervened in the market to support prices, effectively enabling another round of consolidation and intensification that made the overproduction problem worse still. The system was further encouraged by the war economy and then by the adaptation of chemical weapons to the production of food. Although it threatens human and environmental health, most clearly where the two intersect, the conventional food system is not about to collapse under its own weight. It would make things easier for reformers if we could believe that people just began to notice and protest the public health, social, and environmental costs of our food system, but that is not the case. Since late in the nineteenth century, soil scientists, nutritionists, and public health professionals have joined consumers, workers’ advocates, and social reformers in demonstrating the system’s increasingly negative consequences and offering more promising alternatives. The efforts of those early reformers are treated in the next chapter. This content downloaded from 132.239.241.68 on Thu, 21 Feb 2019 05:36:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms This content downloaded from 132.239.241.68 on Thu, 21 Feb 2019 05:36:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA BERKELEY • DAVIS • IRVINE • LOS ANGELES • MERCED • RIVERSIDE • SAN DIEGO • SAN FRANCISCO SANTA BARBARA • SANTA CRUZ “Our goal is audacious, and it is far-reaching. It is our intent to do everything in our power to put the world on a pathway to feed itself in ways that are nutritious and sustainable.” — UC President Janet Napolitano Background and Rationale By virtue of their charge to lead the nation in agricultural innovation, land-grant institutions have a unique ability and responsibility to tackle the global food challenge. How will we sustainably and nutritiously feed a world population expected to reach 8 billion by 2025? The University of California (UC) has committed to helping the world achieve zero hunger by aligning its resources in a system-wide effort called the UC Global Food Initiative - GFI. It is a bold goal, but one that is vital to the world’s future. We believe that the model developed at UC may provide an organizational model for other educational institutions. Learn more about the Global Food Initiative by viewing this brief video. Overview UC President Janet Napolitano launched the University of California Global Food Initiative on July 1, 2014. The initiative emerged from widespread interest in the food system at the ten UC campuses, UC’s Agriculture and Natural Resource Division and the Lawrence Berkeley National Labs. Read the GFI announcement here. The GFI is harnessing UC’s resources to address what is perhaps the most critical issue of our time: How to sustainably and nutritiously feed a world population expected to reach 8 billion by 2025. The initiative aligns the university’s research, outreach and operational efforts in a sustained and organized way to develop, demonstrate and export solutions for food security, health and sustainability throughout California, the United States and the world. Read a one-page overview of the GFI here. The GFI already involves thousands of faculty, students, staff and alumni. It draws on UC’s leadership in agriculture, medicine, climate science, public policy, social science, biological science, humanities, arts and law, among other disciplines. It builds on work UC already is doing…from breeding new crop varieties (part of its land-grant mission) and improving nutrition to modeling climate change and sharing knowledge that is increasing literacy in food, agriculture and science. The GFI is breaking down the silos that often exist between disciplines and campuses, and is enabling us to focus our collective efforts to do more. Goals The GFI has four basic goals in support of the overarching vision of putting us on a pathway to sustainably and nutritiously feeding a growing population and achieving zero hunger in the world. An University of California Global Food Initiative underlying principle has been to closely and authentically examine the institution’s own practices. The specific goals of the GFI are to: • • • • Work together across the UC system to create solutions that improve food security, health and sustainability throughout California, the U.S. and the world; Identify best practices to address food needs and create toolkits to share locally and globally; Use the latest UC research to help communities access healthy, sustainable food; and Apply UC expertise to shape and drive food policy discussions. The GFI works beyond UC by partnering with nonprofits, government agencies and others to translate UC’s cutting edge research into policies and programs that help communities in California and around the world eat more sustainably and nutritiously. We have an international fellows program that is facilitating the exchange of information and technology. The GFI is also driving operational improvements across the UC system aimed at using UC’s collective buying power and dining practices to implement best practices for healthy and sustainable campus communities. Governance The Global Food Initiative involves all 10 UC campuses, UC’s Division of Agriculture and Natural Resources (ANR), Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory and the UC Office of the President (UCOP). The work is guided by a system wide steering committee appointed by UC President Janet Napolitano, the chancellors and the vice president of ANR. Interdisciplinary working groups and subcommittees focus on projects; these groups include representatives from the campuses, ANR, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory and UCOP. Topics and Working Groups The GFI currently organizes its work under five key topic areas that cover a broad spectrum of food system issues. They include: • • • • • Food production; Access and security; Sourcing; Education and communication; and Policy and public impact. More than 20 system-wide subcommittees and campus-based task forces are working on numerous vital projects under these five areas of inquiry: curriculum, operations, policy, research, and service. Teams consist of students, staff, faculty and partners from outside the University. Below is a brief description of each area of inquiry, including the research questions, project examples and some success stories. Links to reports and other resources developed by the project teams are included. • Curriculum o Research Questions: How do we teach students about food and agricultural systems, and communicate that information with the public? Global Food Initiative curriculum University of California Global Food Initiative subcommittees are helping prepare the next generation of science communicators, enhance experiential learning opportunities, increase food literacy, catalog existing food-related courses and develop new online introduction courses to food-related issues.1 o Project Examples: CLEAR science communication2; experiential learning3; food literacy4; online food courses; UC system wide course catalog listing of food-related courses. o Success Story: The Experiential Learning Subcommittee developed a report highlighting the best practices, lessons learned and case studies of experiential learning opportunities at UC, along with “living” online directories of those courses and programs. 1 • Operations o Research Questions: How do we improve our operations so that we increase access to nutritious and sustainable food? Global Food Initiative operations subcommittees are working to ensure food security among UC students, facilitate small growers’ ability to do business with UC, increase procurement of sustainable food, enhance the availability of healthy choices in campus vending machines, and reduce waste in both residential and retail dining. o Project Examples: Food security and access on UC campuses (student hunger)5; procurement: improving the ability of small farmers to sell to the UC system; vending machine policy; and zero waste policies.6 o Success Story: A subcommittee composed of members of the UC Merced and UC Santa Barbara committees identified the best practices from their campus dining services in purchasing sustainable local produce from small growers. This information has been shared throughout the UC system.7 • Policy o Research Questions: How do we raise awareness about food issues, help inform food policy and elevate food policy as a priority? Global Food Initiative policy The UC GFI has produced a one-page resource and information sheet on school and community outreach. The CLEAR Project – Communication, Literacy & Education for Agricultural Research - is composed of a group of young scientists at the University of California, Berkeley who want to find better ways to communicate science at the forefront of discovery. The project is co-led by ANR specialist (also Berkeley faculty member) Peggy Lemaux and Dawn Chiniquy, a postdoctoral researcher at the Lawrence Berkeley National Labs. The goal of CLEAR is to communicate factbased information grounded in scientific evidence to feed the growing world population, address the new demands of the changing climate, and decrease our environmental footprint. 3 The Experiential Learning Subcommittee published this report – “Learning from the Ground Up: Experiential Learning in Food and Agriculture Systems at the University of California” – in February 2016. Kate Kaplan, UC Berkeley Food Institute; GFI Student Fellow Damian Parr, UC Santa Cruz; Jennifer Sowerwine, UC ANR and UC Berkeley; Lori Ann Thrupp, UC Berkeley Food Institute; and Mark Van Horn, UC Davis Agricultural Sustainability Institute and Student Farm wrote the report. 4 Read this UC Food Observer blog post for one academic’s observations about the importance of GFI’s food literacy efforts. 5 The GFI has produced a one-page resource sheet that provides resources and information to help campuses address food security and nutrition in their campus communities. 6 This one-page resource sheet provides resources and information to make campuses healthier through operations. 7 A report was produced by the Best Practices Subcommittee on Facilitating Small Growers’ Ability to Do Business With UC. 2 University of California Global Food Initiative subcommittees have created a clearinghouse and calendar of food-related activities at UC, launched two lecture series (on food equity and on healthy students/campuses/communities), collected policy success stories, and are mobilizing law schools to address food equity and ethics.8 o Project Examples: Food law policy clinic; food equity lecture series; translating research into policy. o Success Story: Helping academics leverage food and agricultural research to inform public policy: publication, case studies, and workshop.9 8 • Research o Research Questions: How do we raise awareness about UC’s food-related research and explore new frontiers in food and agriculture? Global Food Initiative research subcommittees are working to survey UC students about food security, catalog UC research in sustainable agriculture, share success stories in fisheries and international food issues, explore the impact of climate change on agriculture, and examine urban agriculture’s potential to reduce food disparities. o Project Examples: Data mining: Current and future impact of changing climate conditions on California agriculture productivity and sustainability; food security (hunger); food from the sea (maritime/fisheries sustainability); urban agriculture and food disparities, etc. o Success Story: A team of researchers from UC San Diego, UCLA and UC Berkeley is examining urban agriculture and food disparities. In the first phase of the project, they created an initial geo-database using publicly available archives on food and foodrelated health indicators at the census tract and county level. They are currently developing three case studies on food access and opportunities around urban agriculture (Richmond Urban Tilth); food education and food security (West Oakland Middle School Center for Ecoliteracy, Oakland Unified School District); and community-run greenhouses in Bayview, San Francisco working with Literacy for Environmental Justice). Additionally, the team is examining the nexus of food, climate and water. They have led community workshops, focusing on soil ecology and illustrating basic components of ecosystems, the types and roles of soil fauna, and their functions in creating healthy food plants and environments. • Service o Research Questions: How do we improve nutrition at K-12 schools, expand farmers markets and increase student engagement in food issues? Global Food Initiative service subcommittees are working to help establish farmers markets on campuses, expand local food production, maximize the use of campus dining meals, develop healthy and A subcommittee produced a report – “Food Equity, Social Justice, and the Role of Law Schools: A Call to Action.” It explores the opportunity for law schools within UC and across the country to more visibly and holistically address food system injustices. 9 The GFI Policy Subcommittee issued a report entitled “Linking Food and Agriculture Research to Policy.” The report was compiled by Ann Thrupp, PhD (UC Berkeley Food Institute); Nina F. Ichikawa, MA (UC Berkeley Food Institute); Josette Lewis, PhD (UC Davis World Food Center); Laura Schmidt, PhD, MSW, MPH (UC San Francisco) and GFI student assistant Pallavi Sherikar. The Policy Subcommittee pivoted off the report and convened a workshop for more than seventy food, agriculture, and public health researchers and university staff. This workshop showcased successful research-topolicy cases, included keynote speeches from California State Senator Bill Monning and U.S. Congressman Mark DeSaulnier, and brought in university government relations experts to equip researchers to engage effectively with policy. University of California Global Food Initiative sustainable dining options for K-12 students, and involve students in fellowship programs. o Project Examples: Edible campuses; farmers markets; K-12 dining; student fellowships (UC campus and international fellowships); SWIPES for meals10; etc. o Success Stories: The Swipes program allows students to donate excess dollars on their meal plan to fight hunger. It began at UCLA and has expanded nationwide. A UC team created a guide detailing how to start a campus swipes program. Reports and toolkits from these areas are available on a Best Practices portal page on the GFI website. Mentoring, Fellowships and Awards Programs Students and young people are vital to solving global food challenges. Through a range of awards and fellowship opportunities (both domestic and international), the UC GFI seeks to mentor and support the next generation of food and agriculture leaders. 30 Under 30 Awards The inaugural 30 Under 30 Award winners were announced on June 14, 2016. The awards recognize individuals – both inside and outside the UC system - under the age of thirty who have made significant contributions to a wide array of food-related fields, including food production, food access and security, food sourcing, food education and community, and food policy and public impact. The 30 Under 30 Awards provide a unique and important opportunity to acknowledge student activism and early career work. Global Food Initiative Fellows In 2014, 54 UC students were awarded UC Global Food Initiative fellowships. The $2,500 fellowships to undergraduate and graduate students have funded projects that address issues ranging from community gardens and food pantries to urban agriculture and food waste. The students have also had opportunities to convene. While the bulk of the Fellowships came from the GFI fund, some campuses augmented and supported additional fellowships through matching and private donations. Learn about the Fellows here. UC-USAID Fellows UC and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have partnered to expand a fellowship program that addresses pressing agricultural development challenges around the globe. Graduate student fellows spend two to six months helping partner organizations solve scientific, technological, organizational and business challenges. USAID’s Global Development Lab launched this program last year with six universities, including UC Berkeley and UC Davis. The UC Global Food Initiative is co-sponsoring fellowships to help expand the program at UC Berkeley and to help UC Davis to extend its program to include fellowships at UC Riverside and UC Santa Cruz. Learn more here. Communications Strategies 10 This publication – “Swipe Out Hunger: A Guide to Creating Your Campus Sustainable Meal Sharing and Recovery Program” – was produced by the GFI Swipes for Meals Subcommittee. University of California Global Food Initiative There has been explosive growth in the attention being paid to food and agricultural issues by any number of audiences, including the general public. Food is a leveler: everyone eats and everyone is a stakeholder. Food issues transcend borders and bring into play the environment, human health, social justice, politics, public policy, national security and more. A lesson learned from the GFI has been that there is a unique opportunity for land-grant institutions to take a lead in communicating about the important issues surrounding the food system. It is a rich content environment for communicators. The GFI initiative also provides an opportunity to communicate science information to a range of audiences. With research indicating a widening gap between what scientists know about critical foodrelated issues and what the public believes, there has never been a more important time to increase science literacy. The GFI team has developed a range of communications tools and strategies to capitalize on this interest and to provide a public service through education. GFI Landing Page and Portal A GFI landing page and portal facilitates communications around the initiative, for both internal and external audiences. The landing page enables site visitors to quickly delve into the GFI’s work through links to news stories, research, programs, people, multimedia pieces and more. There is also an events calendar that communicates the vast array of opportunities for the public to engage with UC on the initiative. The landing page connects to each UC campus, UC ANR, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory and UCOP. The UC Food Observer As part of the GFI, UC launched the UC Food Observer (UCFO) in January 2015. UCFO is a unique flagship communications and public service project that provides curated news/original content through a blog, website and linked social platforms (such as Twitter and Facebook). UCFO highlights important news about the broad topic of food and agriculture and adds value to the varied discussions occurring about how to sustainably and nutritiously feed the world. The intention of the brand is not to serve primarily as a channel for UC news, but rather to provide a platform that gathers and convenes conversations. The brand provides a balanced perspective on complex issues, to educate, connect and provide a public service. Another important goal for UCFO is to increase literacy around important topics in food and agriculture (and science literacy in general). The content is produced and curated by a Cooperative Extension academic, who enjoys editorial freedom. To date, more than 715 blog posts have been produced, there are nearly 7,000 Twitter followers, a growing presence on Facebook, and growing presence on Instagram and Pinterest. Audiences include the general public, educators, academics, legislators and media. A podcast and video content will be added in Fall 2016. The fast growth of the UCFO brand affirms the broad public interest in the food system. “California Matters” Video Series with Mark Bittman UC partnered with former New York Times journalist and celebrity chef Mark Bittman to produce a 10-part video series called “California Matters,” which focuses on highlighting a range of complex food and agricultural topics impacting California and the world. The videos feature UC researchers whose work is compelling. For example, one video shares the work of a UC ANR researcher who studies the cultural and ethnic dimensions of food security among Hmong farmers in California’s University of California Global Food Initiative Central Valley. The public has received the videos with enthusiasm. The videos range in length from 3 to 5 minutes. Access the video series here. Student-Produced Videos The Experiential Learning Subcommittee commissioned the development of a series of studentproduced videos. One video explores composting at the UC Berkeley campus, another shares information about a pepper-breeding project at UC Davis, and yet another discusses food insecurity at the UC Riverside campus. There are ten videos in total; view them here. Contact Information Gale Sheean-Remotto, PMP Program Manager, UC Global Food Initiative Program Management Office University of California Office of the President 1111 Franklin Street, 7327F, Oakland, CA 94607 Tel. 510.987.9837
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Running head: FOOD JUSTICE

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Food Justice
Student’s Name
Institution

FOOD JUSTICE

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Food Justice

Question One
Food justice is about production of food through systems and activities considered just to
different communities. Framing is especially a necessity in achieving food justice since it would
contribute to success in addressing food insecurity issues. Framing alternative food would
include a change from the conventional food production, in which there is much injustice and
adherence to a model that is wholly based on capitalism and towards one which focuses on social
welfare and justice (Fairfax et al., 2012). In particular, as long as the capitalists control the food
production process, governments, and large ranch owners, th...


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