journal of
peace
R
E S E A R C H
© 1999 Journal of Peace Research
vol. 36, no. 5, 1999, pp. 553–569
Sage Publications (London, Thousand
Oaks, CA and New Delhi)
[0022-3433 (199909) 36:5; 553–569; 009491]
‘Ours is the Way of God’: Religion, Identity, and
Intergroup Conflict*
JEFFREY R. SEUL
Harvard Law School
According to social identity theory, identity competition plays a central role in the inception and escalation of intergroup conflict, even when economic and political factors also are at play. Individual and
group identity competition is considered a byproduct of individuals’ efforts to satisfy basic human needs,
including various psychological needs. Religions often serve these psychological needs more comprehensively and potently than other repositories of cultural meaning that contribute to the construction
and maintenance of individual and group identities. Religions frequently supply cosmologies, moral
frameworks, institutions, rituals, traditions, and other identity-supporting content that answers to
individuals’ needs for psychological stability in the form of a predictable world, a sense of belonging, selfesteem, and even self-actualization. The peculiar ability of religion to serve the human identity impulse
thus may partially explain why intergroup conflict so frequently occurs along religious fault lines.
Introduction
Examples of violent conflict between religious groups – the Balkans, Sudan, East
Timor, and Sri Lanka, to name but a
few – spring readily to mind. This article
offers a partial explanation of the frequent
appearance of religion as the primary cultural marker distinguishing groups in conflict. The approach is interdisciplinary. In
the first major section, I provide a general
explanation of individual and group identity
* I thank Cynthia Chataway, Sue Cross, Fr. Thomas
Keating, OCSO, Herbert Kelman, David Little, Michael
Moffitt, Kathleen Pakos, Tim Seul, Thomas Hylland
Eriksen, and the anonymous JPR referees for their helpful
comments. Responsibility for the article, however, rests
entirely with the author. The author can be reached by
e-mail at jseul@law.harvard.edu. The quoted material in the
title is from a statement made by Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev,
President of the Chechnyan separatists (Specter, 1996).
dynamics, and their role in intergroup conflict, from the perspectives of social psychology and psychologically-informed
international relations theory. Subsequent
sections draw from the disciplines of religious studies and the sociology of religion to
demonstrate the ways in which religion powerfully serves individual and group identity
needs and to explain how this fact may
account for the frequent entanglement of
religion with intergroup conflict.
A Social–Psychological Perspective on
Identity and Identity Conflict
Psychologists and other social scientists
of diverse orientations have developed a
variety of theories regarding the development and functions of individual and group
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volume 36 / number 5 / september 1999
identity – that is, the more or less ‘enduring
aspects’ of a person’s or group’s self-definition (Kelman, 1998: 3). In particular,
much social psychological research sheds
light on the ways in which individuals’
efforts to establish and maintain secure identities can produce conflict between groups.
Individual Identity
‘Individual identity’, as I use it here, refers to
the relatively stable elements of an individual’s sense of self.
A Framework for Understanding Identity:
Why, What, and How
Within social psychology, it is common to
distinguish between individual and group
identity. The two levels of analysis are integrally and reciprocally related, with the purposes and processes of individual identity
formation influencing and informing those
of group identity formation, and vice versa.
I make use of this distinction for analytical
purposes, briefly exploring individual and
group identity by subjecting each to the
three simple interrogatives why, what, and
how. With respect to individual identity, I
ask:
Many theorists link the initial impulse to
construct a secure sense of self to the survival
instinct of the infant, as did Freud and Mead
(Bloom, 1990; Breakwell, 1986). As one
develops, and assuming one gains in confidence that physical needs will be met,
increasing energy is devoted to the satisfaction of the higher-order needs first systematically identified and discussed by Abraham
Maslow (1954/1970). These needs include
the need for psychological security in the
form of a predictable world, and the need for
love (or belonging), self-esteem, and selfactualization. Needs theory has become a
cornerstone of much theoretical and applied
work in the field of conflict resolution (see
Mitchell, 1990).
Individuals seek ‘continuity across time
and situation’ (Breakwell, 1986: 24) to
reduce uncertainty in social affairs (Stein,
1996), which contributes to psychological
stability. People generally wish to regard
themselves favorably (Eiser & Smith, 1972;
Goffman, 1963). Efforts to achieve a sense
of connection or belonging, self-esteem and
even self-actualization help people establish
and maintain positive, secure identities
(Bloom, 1990; Breakwell, 1986; Stein,
1996). Failure to establish or maintain a
relatively secure identity produces severe
psychological discomfort, or even a total
personality breakdown, which may be
experienced by the individual as a threat to
survival (Bloom, 1990).
•
•
•
Why do so many individuals strive to
develop and maintain a secure sense of
self ?
What is the content of an individual’s
identity?
How is individual identity constructed
and maintained?
Similarly, with respect to group identity, I
ask:
•
•
•
Why do so many groups strive to positively distinguish themselves from other
groups?
What is the content of a group’s identity?
How is a group’s identity constructed,
maintained, and transmitted among its
members?
This why, what, and how framework serves as
an organizing principle throughout my discussion of individual and group identity, on
the one hand, and the relationship between
religion, identity, and conflict, on the other.
•
•
Why do so many individuals strive to
develop and maintain a secure sense of
self ?
What is the content of an individual’s
identity?
Each of us carries the psychological equiv-
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Jeffrey R. Seul
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alent of an identity card. The contents of
these ‘identity cards’ define one’s identity at
a given point in time. The contents consist
of one’s values, motives, emotions, feelings,
attitudes, thoughts, goals, aspirations, and
the like, on the one hand, and one’s group
memberships, social influence, social interaction patterns, and roles, on the other
(Breakwell, 1986: 16).
Some of the contents of one’s identity
typically change over time as a result of
developmental dynamics and social influences. New experiences often challenge us to
reassess the relative valuations of the entries
on our identity cards and, indeed, to assess
whether particular content should be
retained at all. Individuals typically assign
positive or negative value to the elements of
their identities, and these valuations are
subject to revision (Breakwell, 1986).
Individual identity is ‘fluid, dynamic, and
responsive to its social context’ (Breakwell,
1986: 19).
While it may be true that ‘no component
[of individual identity] has a constant value’
(Breakwell, 1986: 19), it also is true that
individual identity typically is characterized
by a relatively high degree of temporal and
situational stability. Key elements of one’s
identity are likely to be retained over long
periods of time, and the relative values of
these particular elements often remain
reasonably stable even as new elements are
added and existing ones are abandoned or
devalued (Kelman, 1998). Naturally, some
of the content of one’s identity will be much
more highly valued than other content – it
will be nearer the individual’s core, to what
one considers oneself essentially to be. It
therefore will be much harder to dispose of
or subordinate to other elements in the
course of the ongoing evolution of one’s
identity.
•
How is individual identity constructed
and maintained?
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Individuals seek to achieve and maintain
positive social identities through various
types of social interaction. Kelman (1998)
conceives of the patterns of social interaction through which identities are constructed in terms of three different
processes of social influence: compliance,
identification, and internalization. Compliance occurs when an individual conforms to another’s expectations or
demands in order to secure favorable
regard or treatment, as when a child obeys
a parent, or an adult prisoner her captors,
to avoid punishment. Compliance behavior contributes to identity formation to
the extent that one progressively incorporates aspects of one’s compliance-induced
self-presentation into one’s self-concept.
Identification involves adoption of the
behavior of another person or a group
because association with that person or
group helps to satisfy the individual’s
need to establish a positive self-concept.
Through identification, individuals vicariously participate in others’ pre-established
identities, often ‘gain[ing] a sense of power
and status that, as individuals, they lack’
(Kelman, 1998: 13). The teenager who
joins a gang is one example of this
behavior. Finally, internalization occurs
when one aligns oneself with others and
adopts aspects of their behavior because it
is consistent with one’s own values; for
example, when an adult abandons his
parents’ political party affiliation for a new
affiliation that is more consistent with his
current opinions and commitments. Each
of these processes implies a more meaningful degree of agency than its predecessor. Where internalization occurs, one
does not align one’s own identity with that
of another person or group primarily
because doing so has instrumental value (as
is the case with both compliance and
identification), but because it flows naturally from one’s own value orientation.
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Group Identity
According to social identity theory, our
interpersonal relationships, particularly in
the context of the groups in which we participate, are central to the project of
achieving a secure and positively-valued
sense of self. Individuals seek a secure sense
of self by ‘striv[ing] to achieve or to maintain
positive social identity’ (Tajfel & Turner,
1986: 16).
A group is a self-defining collection of
individuals. Like an individual, a group can
be said to have an identity of its own. That
identity is borne and communicated by the
group’s members, but it cannot be thought
of as a composite of the members’ respective
individual identities, any more than an individual’s identity can be conceived of merely
as a composite of the identities of the various
groups to which one belongs.
•
Why do so many groups strive to positively distinguish themselves from other
groups?
Group identity is, in essence, a manifestation of the individual identity impulse. As
noted, individuals seek to satisfy their desire
for positive evaluation, in part, through their
participation in groups. In the process,
groups generate collective purposes and
goals, the achievement of which is important
to the maintenance of group identity and to
the group’s survival. In this limited sense we
could say that there also is a group-level
identity impulse – a collective motivation to
serve the purposes and goals on which the
members’ individual identities, and the survival of the group, depend.
•
What is the content of a group’s identity?
The group’s identity consists of the
members’ shared ‘conception of its enduring
characteristics and basic values, its strengths
and weaknesses, its hopes and fears, its reputation and conditions of existence, its institutions and traditions, its past history,
volume 36 / number 5 / september 1999
current purposes, and future prospects’
(Kelman, 1998: 16). The group’s institutions, traditions, and history often find
embodiment in writing or other material
forms which communicate and preserve the
group’s identity independently of the individuals that presently comprise the group.
As will be explained subsequently, this is
powerfully true with respect to most religious groups.
•
How is a group’s identity constructed,
maintained, and transmitted among its
members?
Various socialization and mobilization processes are the means by which this content is
transmitted to and internalized by group
members. These include group-specific variations of Kelman’s three processes of social
influence. Like individual identity, group
identity is fluid and dynamic. It ‘typically
represents a combination of historical realities and deliberate mobilization’ in response
to a current event or circumstance (Kelman,
1998: 17). Levels of involvement and emotional commitment may differ widely
among the group’s members.
Identity and Intergroup Conflict
Each group with which a given individual is
or is not associated is positively or negatively1 evaluated both by that individual and
by other individuals and groups. Whether
one regards one’s social identity positively
1
Much of the social identity theory literature suggests that
negative evaluation of others is inevitable if one is to
succeed in constructing and maintaining a positive
identity. Although negative evaluation of others is pervasive, I have difficulty accepting that it is inevitable, particularly with respect to the maintenance of a secure
identity among mature adults, and particularly if ‘negative’
connotes prejudice or condemnation, as opposed to mere
preference, the absence of a sense of affinity, or forms of
disapproval that respect the essential humanity of the individual or group which is evaluated negatively. Achieving a
sense of genuine distinctiveness is critical to the construction and maintenance of positive identity, but ‘distinctive’
need not be heavily value laden – at least not in the
extreme sense of good versus evil.
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depends, to a significant extent, upon how
favorably the group(s) with which one identifies compare to other groups. The process
of intergroup comparison produces a competitive dynamic in which groups attempt to
enhance their identities relative to other
groups. ‘The attempt to achieve a comparatively superior position for the in-group, on
the basis of valued dimensions, is the key
factor leading to discriminatory intergroup
behavior’ (Tajfel & Turner, 1986: 83).
When individuals do not regard their
social identity positively, they respond to the
resulting psychological discomfort with one
or more individual- or group-level strategies
to establish positive identity, depending
upon whether group members perceive
alternatives to the existing intergroup situation. Group members typically must
believe that their situation vis-a-vis another
group can be improved, or there will be no
group-level response to the situation (Taylor
& Moghaddam, 1994). Where alternatives
to the present situation are perceived by a
group’s members, a group-level response is
likely.2
The group will respond to its current,
inadequate social identity in one of several
ways, ranging from efforts to assimilate itself
into the relevant out-group, at one extreme,
to a direct challenge to the out-group, at the
other. The former strategy amounts to a
conscious relinquishment or, at a minimum,
dilution of group identity. However, each of
the other possible responses involves an
effort to enhance and strengthen group
identity.3 Attempts to enhance group status
2
Where cognitive alternatives to the current intergroup
situation are not perceived, individual-level responses to
the psychological discomfort associated with negatively
evaluated social identity will follow. Where possible, individuals may leave the group. Otherwise, intragroup comparison will intensify (Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994).
3 These responses include (a) threats or direct challenges
to the out-group or its members; (b) recasting the ingroup’s negatively evaluated characteristic in a positive
light (e.g. ‘Black is beautiful’); and (c) ‘creation and adoption of new dimensions for intergroup comparison’, such
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are likely when exit from a group is very difficult or impossible, as is the case when social
identity is based to any significant extent
upon persistent social constructions (e.g.
surrounding the color of one’s skin) or, for
many, when it involves religious convictions
and affiliations.
While relative deprivation is undoubtedly
a key factor in much intergroup conflict
(Stein, 1996), it appears that incompatible
interests in the form of an uneven distribution of material or social resources may
lead to intergroup conflict only where the
subordinate group views the dominant
group as relevant for purposes of social comparison and begins to develop a positive
identity in relation to it (Tajfel & Turner,
1986). Incompatible interests may be the
apparent cause of conflict in many cases, but
conflict arguably will not occur in the
absence of intergroup identity competition.
While there is no reason to believe that
intergroup differentiation inevitably leads to
conflict, Tajfel & Turner (1986: 23) consider it ‘plausible to hypothesize that, when
a group’s action for positive distinctiveness is
frustrated, impeded, or in any way actively
prevented by an out-group, this will
promote overt conflict and hostility between
the groups’, and that this may be so even in
the absence of incompatible group interests.
When intergroup comparison does
produce overt conflict, an escalatory
dynamic often is evident. Because individual
identity is partially dependent upon the
integrity of the in-group’s identity, threats to
the in-group are experienced as threats to
individual identity (Bloom, 1990).
Conversely, threats to the identity of individual group members often will be perceived as threats to the group as a whole.
Hence, group identity tends to intensify
as when ‘the “native peoples” of Canada … refer to their
ancient traditions and cultures, in comparison with which
the history of the “new Canada” might seem unimpressive’
(Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994: 84).
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during periods of crisis (Stein, 1996). The
conflict escalates as each new threat intensifies and agitates the identities of the target
group and its members, widening the gulf
between the groups (Worchel et al., 1993).
This escalatory dynamic, and the continually
increasing consolidation and intensification
of individual and group identities that it
produces, may partially explain the high
degree of intractability that seems to characterize so many conflicts.
Religion and Identity
Having examined the purposes that individual and group identity serve, their
content, and the processes by which they are
constructed and maintained, I now turn to
the relationship between religion and
identity. In all their multifarious expressions
and dimensions, the world’s religions answer
the individual’s need for a sense of locatedness – socially, sometimes geographically,
cosmologically, temporally, and metaphysically. Religious meaning systems define the
contours of the broadest possible range of
relationships – to self; to others near and
distant, friendly and unfriendly; to the nonhuman world; to the universe; and to God,
or that which one considers ultimately real
or true. No other repositories of cultural
meaning have historically offered so much in
response to the human need to develop a
secure identity. Consequently, religion often
is at the core of individual and group
identity.
•
Why does the identity impulse find
support in religion?
Hans Mol (1976) described the chief
function of religion as the stabilization of
individual and group identity. According to
Mol, religious traditions and institutions
resist constant change in the negotiation
of social meaning, thus affording individuals
and groups more secure anchors for
volume 36 / number 5 / september 1999
self-reference. Underlying and supporting
Mol’s theory of religion is his belief that a
‘differentiation/integration’ dynamic pervades human interaction (Mol, 1976: 3).4
Mol places religion squarely on the integration side of this dialectic.5 This is not to
say that religion always operates to impede
change within groups. There is, of course, an
inherent tension in the dialectic, and the fact
that identities partially founded on religion
are also fluid and dynamic is one product of
this tension.
While all religions contain resources
designed to facilitate the assimilation of new
identity content, or even to constitute substantially new identities (e.g. rites of passage
and conversion), religion in general tends to
promote the stabilization of individual and
group identity by favoring the preservation
of old content (in the form of doctrine,
ritual, moral frameworks, role expectations,
symbols, and the like), offering individuals a
basis for reconstructing their identities
within a stable or very slowly changing universe of shared meaning. New content typically is assimilated, and old content
significantly revised or reinterpreted, only
after cautious censorship. Even where
religion is placed in the service of a program designed to disrupt established identities – for example, Jesus’s radical program of
Jewish reform and renewal – this typically
occurs within the boundaries of an established discourse. His program no doubt was
appealing and accessible to many who followed him in large part because they understood it as the fulfillment of something that
was long familiar to them.
Religions help provide the predictability
and continuity that the individual needs to
maintain a sense of psychological stability.
4
Others writing on the role of religion in intergroup conflict also have discussed this dialectical relationship (see
Dunn, 1996).
5
Mol’s focus is intragroup relations; he does not consider
intergroup relations to any significant extent.
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Mol and numerous others have called attention to religion’s role in safeguarding order,
both social and cosmic (see Berger, 1967;
Juergensmeyer, 1993). Among the mechanisms by which religion sacralizes identity is
what Mol calls ‘objectification’, which is ‘the
tendency to sum up the variegated elements
of mundane existence in a transcendental
point of reference where they appear more
orderly, more consistent, and more timeless’
(Mol, 1976: 11). The objectification of religious order enables individuals and groups
to cope with change. ‘[T]emporal dislocations remain manageable’ so long as orderliness on a grand scale is assured (Mol, 1978:
180).
Although there is significant diversity
among and within religions, most religions
provide their adherents with a world-view
that assures their place in a meaningful and
orderly universe, thereby partially satisfying
the individual’s need for psychological stability. This assurance often is afforded an
ultimacy that, particularly in traditions
which emphasize belief and dogma, is selfvalidating (and perhaps even regarded as
unassailable). Religious traditions often
provide ready answers when pluralism and
other forms of complexity threaten the
established order, and thus the identities of
individuals and groups (Abdullah, 1978).
The frequently non-relativistic nature of
these answers may help explain the worldwide resurgence of religion as a rallying
point for political mobilization (Shupe,
1990).
Religious communities and meaning
systems also frequently are a source of the
love (belonging) and affirmation (as a basis
for self-esteem) that individuals seek. They
also encourage self-actualization, and even
self-transcendence. While membership in
any group has the potential to support the
development of one’s ‘public self ’, religious
groups often are better equipped to address
the identity needs of the ‘private self ’. This
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may be especially true of theistic religions.6
Theistic traditions provide assurance of the
existence of an ultimately dependable other
that is capable of affirming one’s sense of self
when one’s fellows do not.
An Arabic proverb puts it succinctly:
‘Men forget, God remembers’. What men
forget, among other things, is their reciprocal
identifications in the game of playing
society … If [one] can assume that, at any
rate, God remembers, his tenuous self-identifications are given a foundation seemingly
secure from the shifting reactions of other
men. God then becomes the most reliable and
ultimately significant other (Berger, 1967:
37–38).
If one considers oneself to be in ‘right
relationship’ with God, one may feel assured
that one is loved, and that one is justified in
regarding oneself positively. One may see
oneself as being on a path toward self-actualization.
This private aspect of individual identity
may partially explain the ‘greater degree of
loyalty’ that religion seems to engender as
compared to the ‘purely political’ forms of
what Mark Juergensmeyer refers to as ‘ideologies of order’ ( Juergensmeyer, 1993). God,
as the focal point of private commitment,
becomes the hub that connects the various
spokes (members) of the wheel (group). The
commitment of the group’s members to one
another becomes an expression – and, in
times of crisis, perhaps even the litmus
test – of their commitment to God.
Religious groups often demand a high level
of commitment from their members, so that
it may be extremely difficult to shed one’s
religious identity once it is established. This
fact may contribute to the prevalence of religious conflict. As indicated above, efforts to
6
The role of identity in Buddhism arguably deserves
special consideration because of Buddhism’s nontheistic
orientation and its truly distinctive attitude toward the self.
Buddhists’ participation in conflict in the contemporary
world is mixed, however, as evidenced by the contrasting
cases of Tibet and Sri Lanka.
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enhance group status are likely when individuals have difficulty escaping the group.
While religion may speak more deeply to
the private self than other foci of identity,
this does not imply that it regards group
identity any less highly. Each of the world’s
major religious traditions sacralizes group
identity to an equal or even greater extent
than individual identity. The ecclesia or
Body of Christ (Christianity), the ummah
(Islam) and the sangha (Buddhism) are
notions central to their respective traditions.
Whether many or few, liberally or narrowly
construed, and strictly or minimally
enforced, each tradition has some means by
which it determines the boundaries of the
group. Doctrines of salvation and chosenness, for example, provide ready ingroup/out-group distinctions.
•
What types of content does religion
supply for the construction of identities?
David Little (1995) provides several
examples of the types of content that religions often supply for the construction of
individual and group identity. Little mentions or alludes to myths of common origin,
doctrines of chosenness and holy struggle,
claims of primacy with respect to values that
arise from a particular tradition’s worldview, actors who sanction individual and
group behavior with a sacred authority, and
memorials and rituals that commemorate
the sacrifices of group members.7 Much
additional identity-supporting content can
be identified and added to Little’s list.
The wide variety of religious doctrines
addressing every conceivable aspect of
human existence is one important addition.
Breakwell (1986) emphasizes the import7
Those features of a religious tradition that provide substance to – or referents for – individual and group identity
frequently also are the very processes by which identity is
maintained. A ritual such as group prayer, for example, is
a form of social interaction and influence that, by virtue of
both what is thought and said and communal enaction of
the ritual itself, is at once medium and message.
volume 36 / number 5 / september 1999
ance of belief systems to the construction
and maintenance of identity. Religious doctrines pertaining to the temporal ‘location’
and continuity of the self and the group
provide an interesting example of the role
belief systems can play in identity construction and the maintenance of psychological
stability. Little (1995) mentions myths of
common origin as one example of identitysupporting content that religions frequently
supply. These myths – for example, the creation account in Genesis – explain the
group’s beginnings in cosmological terms,
thereby providing the religious practitioner a
basis for locating oneself, as successor to the
group’s original members, in relation to the
origin of the universe and the beginning of
time. The same cosmologies that explain the
origin of the universe frequently explain its
present nature and order, thus locating the
individual and group in time present. Daily
and weekly prayers and rites, and seasonal
rituals and feasts, structure time and imbue
it with meaning. Finally, many conceptions
of salvation in the world’s religions project
individual and group identity stably and
securely into eternity. Where no doctrine of
otherworldly salvation exists, martyrdom
may provide access to a surrogate for individual salvation (Berger, 1967), anchoring
the individual’s identity to a group identity
that one expects to continue indefinitely.
This temporal dimension of religious
doctrine is one example of the often historically superior ability of religion to serve the
identity impulse. Myths of common origin,
periodic rites and feasts, religious cosmologies, and doctrines of salvation situate the
individual in relation to time eternal, from
the furthest past to the most distant future,
in terms both mundane and transcendent.
While other referents that contribute to
one’s identity (e.g. ancestry) may partially
address the human desire for temporal locatedness and continuity (as a contributor to
psychological stability), none answer this
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Jeffrey R. Seul
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desire as completely as many religions do.
Members of an ethnic group may share a
belief in their common origin, but other features of ethnicity, where they are separable
from religion, seldom locate individuals eternally. Religion frequently provides individuals a sense of seamless continuity between
past, present, and future.
Religious texts and oral material embody,
among other things, myths, lore, songs, and
prayers that contribute to identity construction in various ways. They are, in part,
repositories of community memory, often
providing individuals and groups a crossgenerational sense of belonging in time, as
well as a sense of belonging with others in
distant places. ‘[M]yth interprets reality’,
sacralizing identity through ‘recurrent narration’ (Mol, 1976: 14). Members of a
group assimilate the group’s narrative, which
becomes a feature of their individual identities.
Texts and oral tradition also communicate teachings, beliefs, and norms that have
clear socializing effects, promoting order
(which serves the need for psychological
stability) and enhancing the group’s sense of
specialness or purpose (which may serve the
needs for belonging, self-esteem, and selfactualization). Wherever texts and oral tradition are afforded revealed or inspired
status, their sacralizing potential is, for
many, enhanced. To the extent that
interpretation of texts and tradition is discouraged or restricted by virtue of their
sacred status and the existence of a religious
elite vested with primary or exclusive interpretive authority, they may provide non-relativistic and relatively self-validating and
unassailable principles of order around
which people construct their identities and
groups define their borders.
Perhaps no content is more important
than principles of order such as these – the
moral and institutional frameworks that
establish norms of interaction and assign and
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regulate roles within the group. In addition
to belief systems, which include such ethical
frameworks, Breakwell (1986) identifies role
prescriptions as another key factor in
identity formation and maintenance.
Religions readily supply such role prescriptions, ensuring that one’s identity in the
group is legitimated and affirmed, whether it
be celibate monk, mother, rabbi, or child.
The Hindu system of varnashramadharma,
which prescribes one’s responsibilities and
purposes (according to social status) at a
given stage of life, is perhaps the most
powerful example of a religious framework
of coordinated role orientations. Such
frameworks establish norms and expectations for behavior between and among
members of the group, often affording one’s
identity within the group a ‘quality of
suprapersonality’ by virtue of religious legitimations that conceive of the temporal order
in relation to the cosmic (Berger, 1967: 39).
Religions also provide moral and spiritual
exemplars in the form of saints and holy
people that embody the religion’s norms and
highest aspirations.
Specifically, religious norms arguably lay
greater claim upon individuals than norms
emanating from other sources. Durkheim
recognized the potential force of both types
of norms, but believed that fidelity to religious norms produces a person who is
‘stronger … It is as though he were raised
above the miseries of the world, because he
is raised above his condition as a mere man;
he believes that he is saved from evil, under
whatever form he may conceive this evil’
(Durkheim, 1912/1947: 416). This strength
increases group cohesion (Berger, 1973).
The special power of religious norms is thus
a further example of the frequent ability of
religion to respond to the identity impulse
more forcefully than many other repositories
of cultural meaning historically have
responded.
The relationship between the temporal
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order as socially constructed and the cosmic
order as understood by a particular tradition
or sect may have a significant bearing on
conflict between religious groups. ‘When the
socially defined reality has come to be identified with the ultimate reality of the universe,
then its denial takes on the quality of evil as
well as madness’ (Berger, 1967: 39). As is
evident in such places as the Sudan and
Afghanistan, religious groups sometimes
seek to establish a social order that comports
with their religious world-view. When religious world-views collide, so do groups’
competing social expectations. Secular political institutions that seek to mediate
among competing groups often are most
vehemently opposed by religious actors and
institutions. In times of social crisis, when
identities are most vulnerable, religious
norms and institutions may provide ready,
alternative frameworks for governance, or,
perhaps more commonly, support and justification for the non-clerical leaders and institutions which emerge to establish regimes in
the service of a religious group’s nationalistic
aspirations. The role of religious actors and
institutions in the onset and escalation of the
conflict in former Yugoslavia, for example, is
widely recognized (see Dunn 1996; Mojzes
1995).
These are but a few examples of the types
of content that religions contribute to the
construction of individual and group
identity. Religion often lies nearer to the
core of one’s identity, in part, because the
other elements of one’s identity typically do
not address the full range of human needs,
fears, and concerns as comprehensively or
powerfully as religion does.8
•
8
How is religious content transmitted
This seems particularly true for moderns living in
modern cultures. In tribal cultures, religion may be so
closely aligned with other features of one’s identity (e.g.
ancestry or clan membership) that it becomes difficult to
conceive of religion as somehow in competition with other
features of one’s identity.
volume 36 / number 5 / september 1999
among a group’s members and assimilated into their identities?
Kelman’s three processes of social influence – compliance, identification, and
internalization – can be seen at work in the
various rites, rituals, prayers and other forms
of interaction that provide individuals access
to religious content for the construction and
maintenance of their identities. Religious
education often is a vehicle or context
for compliance- and identification-related
identity formation. In some Quebec classrooms, for example, French Canadian children assimilate Roman Catholic identity
through a combination of rewards, punishment, and manipulation of the social bonds
between students and their teachers and
priests (Zylberberg & Shiose, 1991). Certain
rituals also arguably seek to shape identities
through bids for compliance and/or identification. The following is a description of a
ritual performed in an African Christian
church in Amsterdam:
When the prayers are concluded, that is when
Satan is believed to have been effectively
removed from this area, the pastor addresses
himself to the congregation. He will assure
them that the Lord has purified them and
warns the congregation against going into any
‘dark places’, where Satan is believed to be
active and where one can easily come under
the influence of satanic powers … [After
various prayers,] the congregation will submit
itself to God by stating that ‘I belong to you’,
and ask for his protection … Often the
session is ended with the Lord’s prayer and
what is called the ‘song of togetherness’,
Psalm 133, which is in praise of brotherly love
(Haar, 1995: 127).
Through this ritual, these churchgoers reaffirm their Christian identity, and their
belongingness to God and one another, in
hope that they and their loved ones will be
protected against satanic powers. They also
reinforce their identification with one
another through communal vocalization of a
‘song of togetherness’.
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Rites of passage are important examples
of religious socialization mechanisms that
contribute to individual identity construction and maintenance, ushering individuals
through transitions in status or role
(Davies 1994; van Gennep, 1975). Many
religions have established rites of passage
for every major age and role transition
throughout the life-span, from birth (or
sometimes before) to death (and sometimes beyond). Birth and naming
rituals – baptism in Christianity, for
example, or the recitation of the shahaa–dah
in a Muslim baby’s ears – begin to confer
upon a child a religious identity that will
affect its developing self-consciousness and
its future interactions with others. Coming
of age rituals, such as Judaism’s bar and
bat mitzvah and Sikhism’s pagri banna–n
(turban tying ceremony), invite youth to
begin conceiving of themselves as adults.
Marriage and ordination ceremonies help
people make the transition to new role
orientations. Together with adult rites of
confirmation or conversion – the Roman
Catholic Rite of Christian Initiation for
Adults, for example, or the typically
arduous rite of conversion to orthodox
Judaism – marriage and ordination may be
the best examples of rites of passage that
invite internalization of a new or reconstituted identity. Finally, the great variety of
rituals surrounding death, while obviously
intended to effect the deceased person’s
transition away from earthly life, inform
the identities of those who survive by
reaffirming life’s meaning and their
tradition’s views regarding the ultimate
nature and destiny of the self (Holm &
Bowker, 1994).
Religion and Intergroup Conflict
Not all expressions of religious identity
inevitably lead to religious conflict. Within
many religious traditions there are trajecto-
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ries that encourage adherents to resist
violent forms of conflict. The pacifism of
the historic peace churches (Quakers,
Mennonites, and Brethren) is well known,
and Buddhism and Hinduism each contain
teachings about nonviolence. There is
much religious content that can support
the development of individual and group
identities around principles of nonviolence
(see Little, 1996; Smith-Christopher,
1998).
And yet, these traditions of nonviolence,
which tend to promote tolerance of other
religious perspectives, often exist against the
backdrop of social and material realities that
reinforce the need for group cohesion.
Despite laboratory evidence that identity
dynamics alone are capable of generating
intergroup conflict, group needs for material
and social resources typically also play a role.
Thus, a religious group facing difficult social
or material realities is likely to emphasize
those elements within its tradition which
group members perceive to be most capable
of promoting group cohesion and of mobilizing group members toward the improvement of the group’s condition. Not
surprisingly, the elements of a tradition that
are emphasized by a struggling group often
provide implicit justification for the use of
violent force.
Whether or not identity dynamics are
capable of producing intergroup conflict
apart from incompatible group interests,
much social-psychological research strongly
suggests that resource scarcity alone is insufficient to ignite such conflict. Identity competition very likely is a necessary condition
to the eruption of intergroup conflict. The
powerful ability of religion to serve the
identity-related needs of individuals and
groups and the special role identity
dynamics play in the production and escalation of intergroup conflict together may help
explain why so many conflicts occur along
religious fault lines.
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Two Counter-Arguments Anticipated:
Ethnicity and Secularism
Before concluding, I wish to anticipate and
briefly respond to two potential counterarguments to my thesis. The first concerns
the relationship between ethnicity, religion,
and nationalism, and the second addresses
the problem of secularism.
Ethnicity, Religion, and Nationalism
The issue that must be addressed with
respect to ethnicity is whether it, rather than
religion, is the principal identification
fueling intergroup identity conflict which
has a visible religious component. This is the
position taken, for example, by Gurr (1993:
317), who finds religion to be ‘at best a contributing factor in communal conflict and
seldom the root cause’. Citing as examples
militant Shi’i Muslims in Iraq and Lebanon,
he notes that their political goals include
‘rights and recognition, and not propagation
of their faith’ (Gurr, 1993: 317).
I believe Gurr has made a mistake that is
common among those who comment on the
relationship between religion and conflict.
Most observers seem to assume that, in order
to be properly characterized as ‘religious’,
the combatants’ motives must be religious
conversion or a desire to establish the superiority of one’s own tradition over that of
others. While the right to self-governance on
terms consistent with one’s religious convictions often is a central objective of groups in
such conflicts, I do not believe most combatants intend to produce massive conversions or establish the metaphysical
superiority of one religion over another. The
superiority of their tradition already is
assumed by the combatants and, for most,
the persistence of that belief will not depend
upon the outcome of the conflict.
If this is the case, then use of the term
‘religious conflict’ is misleading to the extent
it implies that religion somehow is the cause
volume 36 / number 5 / september 1999
of a conflict. Conflicts between religious
groups typically are caused by the same
material factors and social dynamics that
incite and fuel conflict between ethnic,
racial, and other identity groups. The presence or absence of effective political structures and capable, conciliatory leaders;
relative resource distribution; the degree of
international attention and involvement;
and many other political and economic
factors typically have a significant bearing on
the emergence (or non-emergence) and
course of identity conflicts. Religion is not
the cause of ‘religious conflict’; rather, for
many, it still provides the most secure basis
for maintenance of a positively regarded
social identity, and it frequently supplies the
fault line along which intergroup identity
and resource competition occurs. Nonetheless, when conflict involving one or more
religious groups does occur, the combatants
may be emboldened by a sense of religiously
defined identity and purpose, and their traditions may provide a fund of symbolic,
moral, institutional, and other resources that
can be used to mobilize the group and legitimate its cause.
I find myself in essential agreement with
Walker Connor’s views on the relationship
between national sentiment and religion as
they pertain to intergroup conflict, despite
his assertion that ‘the well-springs of
national identity are more profound than are
those associated with religion …’ (Connor,
1994: 107). But, for Connor, the nation is
simply ‘a self-differentiating ethnic group’
(Connor, 1994: 42). Nationhood requires ‘a
popularly held awareness of belief that one’s
own group is unique in a most vital sense. In
the absence of such a popularly held conviction, there is only an ethnic group’ (Connor,
1994: 42). An ethnic group, then, is a group
that shares some common trait that is visible
to others, but not made a focal point for
social organization by those who possess it.
A nation is self-conscious and self-defining
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in a way that an ethnic group is not
(Connor, 1994: 103). Connor sees ancestry
as the most common and powerful trait unifying national groups.9
Connor attributes nationalism to the
identity impulse described above, which he
refers to as ‘the “us–them” syndrome’
(Connor, 1994: 46). And while he rightly
eschews facile efforts to attribute group conflict to religious or other cultural differences,
rather than attributing it directly to the
‘us–them’ dynamic which is its psychological cause, in doing so he provides
support for an important element of the
argument I have advanced. According to
Connor, belief in the kinship and uniqueness of one’s group is the essence of the
‘nation, and tangible characteristics such as
religion and language are significant to the
nation only to the degree to which they contribute to this notion or sense of the group’s
self-identity and uniqueness’ (Connor,
1994: 104). Connor’s argument suggests
that any single cultural marker, including
religion, may serve as the referent for construction of national identity. While he certainly recognizes the complexity of national
groups and the possibility of multiple identifications and markers, he also demonstrates
that the ‘psychological essence’ of intergroup
differentiation – the ‘us–them’ dynamic
– often expresses itself through conflict along
a single cultural fault line. I believe that
religion supplies that fault line so frequently
because vast numbers of people experience it
as speaking more deeply to the identity
impulse which underlies Connor’s ‘us–them
syndrome’ than do other potential focal
points for group identity, including
ancestry.
If, as Anderson (1991) suggests, the
nationalist phenomenon is attributable in
part to the loss of meaning many experienced as imperialism and religion began to
9
Keller (1991) discusses the saliency of factors other than
ancestral ties in the construction of group identity.
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lose their hegemonic force, then we might
expect nationalist movements informed and
buttressed by religion to be especially effective antidotes to that loss. While religion is
no longer a hegemonic force in many cultures and regions, it nonetheless remains a
potent force, as I hope the preceding discussion has demonstrated. If nationalist
movements provide meaning and a context
for identity development generally, a
nationalist movement linked to religion
may, for many, offer greater meaning and a
richer context for identity development.
With careful study, it should be possible
to identify the types of cases in which the
primary fault line between groups in conflict
is likely to be religious (as opposed to ancestral, linguistic, etc.). One probable case is
where distinctions between competing
groups based on ancestry and other markers
are very difficult to identify, as in former
Yugoslavia. There, religion is the only cultural marker that reliably distinguishes
Bosnian Muslims from their Serb and Croat
counterparts. Another case may be the
apparent opposite, involving the accommodation of such differences within competing
groups. Religion sometimes is able to unite
peoples of diverse tribal and linguistic origin,
as do Islam and Hinduism in India, for
example. In both cases, religion serves a
similar function, sometimes providing a
basis for self-identification and group differentiation that transcends other markers.
Religion has a protean quality: it can
divide groups that otherwise are culturally
similar, as in the case of former Yugoslavia;
it can align fairly neatly with ancestral and
linguistic markers, as it does, for example, in
Northern Ireland; or it can serve as the basis
for differentiation among groups that are
similarly diverse, as it does in the case of
Indian Hindus and Muslims. When considered in light of other factors – for
example, the depth of commitment that
religion often inspires and its capacity to
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speak to the individual’s deepest existential
concerns in a way that other repositories of
cultural meaning typically cannot – this
protean quality may help explain the frequent appearance of religion as the primary
identity marker distinguishing groups in
conflict. Whereas other common features of
ethnicity (language, ancestry, social constructions surrounding skin color, etc.) frequently fail to provide clear bases for the
establishment of group boundaries, religious
self-identification as a basis for delineation of
group boundaries can be comparatively
straightforward.
I am not suggesting, however, that
religion always will prove to be the most
salient and powerful force in intergroup
identity competition among individuals
whose identities are influenced by religion.
That proposition would be contrary to
much observable fact. Ethnic differences
sometimes overcome a common religious
loyalty – as they have among Hutus and
Tutsis, for example, or Basques and
Castilians. And, as already noted, national
groups sometimes form in spite of religious
differences. Nonetheless, the frequent entanglement of religion with conflict suggests
both that religion remains a powerful source
of individual and group identity and that, at
least among those engaged in conflict
between religious groups, religious justifications supporting violence have tended to
hold greater sway than norms which oppose
it.
Secularism
A second potential argument in opposition
to my own involves the issue of secularism.
Does group differentiation along religious
lines require a high degree of commitment
to the tenets of the religion with which one
is identified? Can conflict occur along religious lines where members of religious
groups have become well-accustomed to life
in multinational (including multireligious)
volume 36 / number 5 / september 1999
states governed by secular institutions? The
questions are closely related, but they highlight different features of the problem that
contemporary secularism presents: the issue
of relative psychological commitment to the
religion with which one is identified, on the
one hand, and the relationship between
religion and modernity, on the other. My
answers to these questions suggest that
religion can serve as the primary marker
dividing groups in conflict whether the
groups’ religious identities are lightly or
firmly held.
In response to the first question, it can
perhaps be said with some confidence that
strong commitment ‘delineates identity
more clearly’ (Mol, 1976: 219). Mobilization of religious groups for political
action may be easier when commitment runs
deep (Swidler & Mojzes, 1990). Nonetheless, it is not difficult to find examples of
highly secularized religious groups engaged
in conflict, many members of which adhere
loosely – or not at all – to the tenets of the
religions with which they are identified.
Bosnian Muslims, for example, are perhaps
the most highly secularized Muslims in the
world.
Even lightly held affiliations may be sufficient for competitive, intergroup differentiation (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). And, as
Connor explains, a group’s sense of ‘us’ in
relation to ‘them’ is more important than
the particular cultural marker that distinguishes the groups. Particularly when
members of the relevant out-group(s) have a
strong commitment to their own tradition,
competitive pressure may cause the in-group
to cohere more tightly around its own
religiously-defined identity (if not the
religion’s belief system). This arguably
occurred within the Bosnian Muslim community as the conflict in former Yugoslavia
intensified. Although Bosnian Muslim
leader Alija Izetbegović apparently did less
to foment militant religious sentiment
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Jeffrey R. Seul
R E L I G I O N , I D E N T I T Y,
among his community than his Serb and
Croat counterparts, he nonetheless was successful in ‘champion[ing] the homogenization of a Muslim ethnoreligious identity’
(Mojzes, 1995: 142). His Party for Democratic Action was clearly identified with
Islam. While processes of secularization tend
to result in the development of multiple
identity affiliations among a society’s
members, there is no guarantee that latent
religious affiliations and sentiments will not
arise as the focal point of group cohesion
within secularized societies in times of social
stress.
As for the second question – that is,
whether conflict can occur along religious
lines where members of religious groups
have become well-accustomed to life in
multinational states governed by secular
institutions – a quick survey of current conflicts would provide numerous examples of
religious violence within the borders of
modern states. How is it that militant bids
for dominance by religious groups persist in
the face of modern political, military, and
economic institutions designed to mediate
among competing groups? Many have
observed that increasing modernization
often leads to a widespread sense of social
anomie that results from diluted or stripped
identities (see Berger, 1967; Mol, 1976).
Bruce Lawrence (1995) attributes the worldwide resurgence of religious fundamentalism
to reactions against modernism, with its
emphasis on social and technological
progress; empiricism and science; pluralistic,
secular state structures; and capitalism.
While some expressions of fundamentalism
embrace aspects of the modernist
program – as Lawrence points out, fundamentalists the world over ‘talk by telephone,
drive cars, and fly in airplanes’ (Lawrence,
1995: xiv) – each finds other aspects to
protest about. While Lawrence sees fundamentalists as ultimately losing out to the
forces of modernism, the fact that many
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regions of the world have only recently
begun in earnest the transition from premodern to modern states of existence, suggests that the fundamentalist phenomenon
about which he writes may persist for some
time to come.
Conclusion
Religion frequently serves the identity
impulse more powerfully and comprehensively than other repositories of cultural
meaning can or do. Because religion provides such powerful support to individuals
and groups as they endeavor to establish and
maintain secure identities, it is not surprising that much intergroup identity competition occurs between religious groups.
The peculiar ability of religion to support
the development of individual and group
identity is the hidden logic of the link
between religion and intergroup conflict.
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JEFFREY R. SEUL, b. 1962; JD (University
of Colorado, 1988); MTS (Harvard
University, 1997); Lecturer on Law and
Climenko Fellow, Harvard Law School;
Senior Associate, Program on International
Conflict Analysis and Resolution, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard
University. Current research interests: religious persecution, human rights, moral conflict, the role of law in conflict prevention and
resolution.
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569
INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS AND GROUP PROCESSES
Reducing Intergroup Prejudice and Conflict Using the Media:
A Field Experiment in Rwanda
Elizabeth Levy Paluck
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
Harvard University
Can the media reduce intergroup prejudice and conflict? Despite the high stakes of this question,
understanding of the mass media’s role in shaping prejudiced beliefs, norms, and behavior is limited. A
yearlong field experiment in Rwanda tested the impact of a radio soap opera featuring messages about
reducing intergroup prejudice, violence, and trauma in 2 fictional Rwandan communities. Compared with
a control group who listened to a health radio soap opera, listeners’ perceptions of social norms and their
behaviors changed with respect to intermarriage, open dissent, trust, empathy, cooperation, and trauma
healing. However, the radio program did little to change listeners’ personal beliefs. Group discussion and
emotion were implicated in the process of media influence. Taken together, the results point to an
integrated model of behavioral prejudice and conflict reduction that prioritizes the communication of
social norms over changes in personal beliefs.
Keywords: media, prejudice, conflict, field experiment, social norms
Supplemental materials: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0011989.supp
Lewin, 1952), early psychological research explored how the
media could play a role in fomenting (Doob, 1935; Lasswell,
1928) and reducing (Cooper & Jahoda, 1947; Flowerman, 1949;
Peterson & Thurstone, 1933) prejudice and conflict. This research
began the work of identifying important theoretical issues, but
eventually psychologists drifted away from the study of media
effects.
The research presented here is an attempt to fill gaps in both
literatures. The setting for this study is the Central African country
of Rwanda, where radio played a key role in a war and genocide
that resulted in the deaths of more than 10% of the population and
75% of the Tutsi ethnic minority population over the course of 3
months in 1994. This study reports the results of a randomized
field experiment conducted with the nongovernmental organization LaBenevolencija, which 10 years after the genocide produced
a yearlong “education entertainment” radio soap opera designed to
promote reconciliation in Rwanda.
I test three questions within this experiment: Do the mass media
have the capacity to affect (a) personal beliefs (here, regarding the
soap opera’s messages about prejudice, violence, and trauma), (b)
perceptions of social norms (depicted by fictional soap opera
characters), and (c) behavior (open communication and cooperation)? Typically these different components of prejudice and conflict are studied separately and to the exclusion of factors prominent in real-world environments like emotion and peer discussion.
I use real-world evidence to suggest what a more integrated theory
of prejudice reduction might look like—specifically, one that is
based on an understanding of the functional interdependence of
For nearly a century, psychological research has tackled the
societal problems of prejudice and intergroup conflict. Few topics
have attracted a greater range of theoretical perspectives (Banaji,
2001b; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Hovland & Sears, 1940; Sears
& Henry, 2005; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).
Although this literature has generated some promising theoretical
and empirical leads, scholars do not currently have a clear answer
to the question, “What interventions have been shown to reduce
prejudice and conflict in real-world settings?” (Paluck & Green, in
press).
Understanding of the mass media’s role in shaping beliefs and
behaviors, especially prejudiced beliefs and behaviors, is even
more limited. Spurred by widespread use of propaganda in the first
and second world wars (Hovland, Lumsdaine, & Sheffield, 1949;
The National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship and the Institute
for Social and Policy Studies provided support for this research. Donald P.
Green and Albert Nzamukwereka were central to the conception and
completion of this project. I received important feedback from many
colleagues, in particular John Dovidio, Izzat Jarudi, David Sears, Scott
Straus, Eric Luis Uhlmann, and Virgile Uzabumugabo. For their outstanding support, I thank Pamela LaMonaca, my research team in Rwanda, and
the organization LaBenevolencija. The National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship and the Institute for Social and Policy Studies supported
me during this research.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Elizabeth
Levy Paluck, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1727 Cambridge Street, Cambridge, MA 02138. E-mail:
epaluck@wcfia.harvard.edu
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2009, Vol. 96, No. 3, 574 –587
© 2009 American Psychological Association 0022-3514/09/$12.00
DOI: 10.1037/a0011989
574
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PREJUDICE, CONFLICT, AND MEDIA
prejudiced beliefs, norms, and behaviors. Such a theoretical advance would have significant practical ramifications—most importantly, it could point interventions toward those factors most
reliably related to prejudiced behavior.
I address these theoretical issues with evidence from the first
randomized field experiment of its kind to measure the impact of
mass media on prejudice and conflict. Although the social psychological study of intergroup relations in Africa is not novel
(Brewer & Campbell, 1976), Rwanda also tests the reach of
psychological theories of prejudice, which are often used to discuss but are seldom tested in situations of extreme intergroup
conflict and its aftermath (but see Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004).
As media outlets proliferate in all corners of the globe, finding
out whether the media can contribute to the reduction of the
world’s prejudice and conflict falls under the longstanding call to
“make psychology matter” (Campbell, 1969; G. Miller, 1969;
Zimbardo, 2004). Moreover, I argue that rigorous research based
in real-world settings will spark new theoretical developments on
intergroup relations. The overall objective of this article is to
progress toward these two goals.
Prejudice, Conflict, and Media: Theory and Evidence
In 1935, the father of modern psychological prejudice research,
Gordon Allport, published The Psychology of Radio (Cantril &
Allport, 1935), which explored among other things how people
draw on stereotypes when listening to voices on the radio. Today,
the joint agenda of media, prejudice, and conflict belongs to
practitioners: on the one hand, those who use media to incite
prejudice and conflict (including Rwanda’s radio station RTLM
[Radio Télévision Libre des Milles Collines], which encouraged
anti-Tutsi discrimination and violence in 1994) and on the other,
those who use media to reduce prejudice and conflict.
Each year governments and organizations around the world pour
millions of dollars into antiprejudice public service announcements, print and internet publications, and television and radio
programs (Howard, Rolt, van de Veen, & Verhoeven, 2003;
Paluck, 2007b; Spurk, 2001). This includes children’s programs
like Sesame Street (Brenick et al., in press; Graves, 1999); antiprejudice television commercials (e.g., http://themoreyouknow.com/Anti_Prejudice); billboards and bus posters (e.g., Horovitz,
1993; Vrij & Smith, 1999); information and advocacy Web sites
(e.g., http://www.splcenter.org); and television, film, and radio
dramas (e.g., Abdalla & Torrey, 1999; Ball-Rokeach, Grube, &
Rokeach, 1981). Education entertainment is a genre of media used
globally for social change campaigns, including antiprejudice and
conflict reduction campaigns (Rosin, 2006; Singhal, Cody, Rogers,
& Sabido, 2004). It weaves educational messages (e.g., about
nonviolence or intergroup cooperation) into an entertaining radio
or television show, typically a soap opera.
Theoretical Rationales
Those interested in media campaigns against prejudice find a
bewildering array of theories at their disposal—theories of beliefs,
norms, emotions, behaviors, and more. For the most part, these are
distinct theoretical traditions that do not consider more than a few
components of prejudice at a time (e.g., beliefs and behaviors),
holding all other factors constant. As a result, those who design
575
interventions often target as many aspects of prejudice as possible
(a strategy implied by some general models of behavior, which
specify but do not rank in importance a long list of behavioral
antecedents; see Ajzen, 2001, pp. 42– 47).
A model that specifies the functional interdependence of social
psychological components of prejudice and conflict would improve theoretical understanding as well as practical intervention.
Understanding the relationships among prejudiced beliefs, norms,
and behaviors would enable such a model to identify which component(s) of prejudice should be targeted under various circumstances and to predict the extent to which a change in one might
influence change in the others. For example, if perceived norms
change, how does this affect beliefs and behaviors? The theoretical
literature is still far away from such a systemic understanding, but
with an eye toward this goal, I review various perspectives on
prejudice and conflict reduction, both in general and with respect
to the media.
Early scholarship on prejudice identified beliefs (defined as
understandings of self and environment; Bem, 1970) as important
components of prejudice (Allport, 1954, p. 13), and this remains
one of social psychology’s most active areas of inquiry (e.g.,
Devine, 1989; Jost & Burgess, 2000). Although some psychologists claim that beliefs are extremely resistant to change (Bem,
1970), theories of media persuasion claim that beliefs are influenced by media cultures and programs (Ball-Rokeach et al., 1981;
Hovland et al., 1949; McClosky & Zaller, 1984). Social cognition
scholars claim that an individual’s explicit beliefs about a group of
people might change but that societal stereotypes about groups
endure (Devine & Elliot, 1995) and seep into individuals’ unconscious, where their operation is routinized and automatic (Banaji,
2001a; Dovidio et al., 1997).
Some psychologists theorize that social norms (socially shared
definitions of the way people do behave or should behave; D. T.
Miller, Monin, & Prentice, 2000) have powerful effects on prejudice and conflict (Crandall & Stangor, 2005; Sherif, 1936). Others
argue that under normative pressure people will veil rather than
transform negative affect toward outgroups (Katz & Hass, 1988;
McConahay, 1986). Media theories propose that mass communication is very successful at conveying what other people are doing
or thinking (i.e., a descriptive norm; Mutz, 1998; NoelleNeumann, 1973), although the focus theory of norms predicts that
the media are most influential when broadcasting prescriptive
(should behave) norms (Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991; Kallgren, Reno, & Cialdini, 2000; also Bandura, 1986, 2004). Media
might communicate normative messages directly, or audiences
may infer norms from the behavior of real or fictional media
personalities (who often elicit the same responses as do actual
peers; Rubin & Perse, 1987; Shapiro & Chock, 2003).
Perspectives on the emotional and communicative aspects of
prejudice and conflict have reemerged since the height of psychology’s cognitive revolution, particularly regarding empathy and
discussion (Mendelberg, 2002; Stephan & Finlay, 1999). The fact
that empathy—the experience of emotion congruent with another
person’s situation—is linked with decreased prejudice (Batson et
al., 1997; Schecter & Salomon, 2005) is notable because media
programs can inspire empathy with real and fictional characters
(Zillman, 2006). Intergroup relations theories might predict that
empathy for individual media characters would generalize to the
character’s real-world group (see Andersen, Downey, & Tyler,
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576
PALUCK
2005; Pettigrew, 1998), perhaps because audiences experience the
program as vicarious contact with a member of that group (Cameron & Rutland, 2006).
Group discussion has been linked to positive outcomes like
cooperation, political tolerance, and more inclusive group identities (Mendelberg, 2002; Mutz, 2006). However, small group research also cautions that discussion can simply exaggerate a
group’s initial attitudes, prejudiced or tolerant (Moscovici &
Zavalloni, 1969; Myers & Bishop, 1970). In general accounts of
media influence, Lazarsfeld and others have argued that personal
discussions about media messages are the necessary link for converting personal opinions (Bandura, 2001; Katz & Lazarsfeld,
1955; Rojas et al., 2005).
The relationships among these various components of prejudice
and with prejudiced behavior are often subject to contentious
theoretical debates. Although many investigators find the link
between beliefs and behaviors to be unreliable (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2007; Wicker, 1969), a large literature
on implicit stereotypes shows that behaviors consistent with those
beliefs can be subtly activated (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996;
Kawakami, Young, & Dovidio, 2002). A rich theoretical tradition
on prejudice, conformity, and social consensus suggests that both
prescriptive and descriptive social norms powerfully predict behavior (Allport, 1954; Asch, 1958; Cialdini et al., 1991; Crandall
& Stangor, 2005; Sherif, 1936). Individuals may value knowledge
of a social norm more than their own personal beliefs (Kuran,
1995; Miller et al., 2000; Stangor, Sechrist, & Jost, 2001; Van
Boven, 2000) but not, others argue, in the common case when
individuals overestimate the number of people who share their
beliefs (Monin & Norton, 2003; Ross, Greene, & House, 1977).
Emotion and social interaction are infrequently integrated into
these theoretical perspectives (cf. Smith, 1993).
Evidence
Unfortunately, the existing evidence on media influence and
prejudice reduction cannot adjudicate among these various theoretical perspectives. W. G. McGuire’s (1986) “The Myth of Massive Media Impact” critique applies well: Field studies suffer from
(a) poor measures of exposure to the media program, (b) poor
measures of outcomes, and (c) no clear identification of a causal
relationship between media program and outcomes. Laboratory
experiments, in contrast, measure short-term effects of simplified
and often fictitious media communications in an artificial environment. The artificiality of media laboratory studies is concerning,
given empirical evidence that real-world conditions associated
with media consumption play a nontrivial role in its impact: for
example, simultaneous activities that impact the persuasiveness of,
memory for, and interest in a communication (Janis, Kaye, &
Kirschner, 1965); real or imagined social company that affects
emotional and behavioral reactions (Ruiz-Belda, Fernandez-Dols,
Carrera, & Barchard, 2003); peer discussions that can eliminate
media framing effects (Druckman & Nelson, 2003); and repetition
and sustained exposure that lead to boredom and annoyance (W. J.
McGuire, 1985, p. 274) or to loyalty and emotional attachment
(Zajonc, 1968). In the entire literature, only 10 field experiments
have been conducted on media’s impact on prejudice—all involving television programs played in classroom settings for North
American children.
In response, this research departs from common practice. I test
whether the media can reduce prejudice and conflict in a challenging real-world setting. In doing so, I take a grounded approach to
theory building by measuring media impact on different components of prejudice and conflict. I argue that without empirically
identifying the functional interdependence of these components,
prejudice reduction theories will remain fragmented and one step
removed from practical application. That is to say, should prejudice reduction efforts target beliefs, norms, or behavior (and under
which circumstances)? Is change in one likely to spark change in
another? How are factors like empathy and discussion implicated
in prejudice reduction? Progress on this complex issue will stagnate without rigorous field research to restart the discussion.
The Present Research: Radio in Rwanda
Radio is the most important form of mass media in Rwanda,
where, like most of the developing world, people gather to listen to
the radio in groups (Bourgault, 1995; Hendy, 2000). Rwanda is
slightly smaller than the state of Maryland; at the time of data
collection in 2004 –2005, it was home to 8.4 million people (approximately 84% of whom identify ethnically as Hutu, 15% as
Tutsi, and 1% as Twa) and was ranked among the least developed
countries in the world at 158 of 177 (United Nations Development
Program, 2004).
Anti-Tutsi discrimination and violence that erupted in 1959
during the colonially sponsored Hutu Revolution widened small
fissures in Rwandan society. Historically, Hutus and Tutsis lived
side by side, spoke the same language, worshiped together, and
intermarried. Ethnic identity was often contested and reconstructed
by individuals who faked ethnic identity cards (first issued by
colonial authorities) or who had physical features that enabled
them to pass as a member of the other ethnic group. However, in
the 1990s, as the country fell into economic crisis, political factionalism, and civil war, ethnic groupings crystallized into organizing categories of Rwandan politics and, to a certain extent,
ordinary social life. Extremist Hutu politicians lumped Tutsi civilians together with Tutsi rebels threatening the country’s peace and
encouraged anti-Tutsi sentiment using tools of policy, law, and
media (Des Forges, 1999; Mamdani, 2001; Newbury, 1988;
Straus, 2006).
The case for the radio’s culpability in Rwanda’s 1994 genocide
is well documented (e.g., Broadcasting Genocide, 1996; Chrétien,
Dupaquier, Kabanda, Ngarambe, & Reporters Sans Frontières,
1995; Li, 2004; Straus, 2007; Thompson, 2007). RTLM was
launched in 1993 as a talk radio station and progressively worked
in anti-Tutsi jokes and commentary until it was considered an arm
of the extremist Hutu government. In a landmark case, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda convicted the radio station’s founders for crimes of genocide, arguing that radio “set the
stage” for genocide (Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, &
Ngeze, 2003, p. 29).
Today, Rwandans face a monumental crisis of trust in their
communities, as survivors, returned refugees, and accused killers
are obliged to live side by side in their old communities. Rwandans
on all sides harbor resentment, are affected differently by the new
Tutsi government regime, and have poor access to psychological
treatment for trauma (Stover & Weinstein, 2004). Moreover, open
discussion of ethnicity or of Rwandan history that strays from the
PREJUDICE, CONFLICT, AND MEDIA
official government version is effectively prohibited (Longman &
Rutagengwa, 2004).
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Rwandan Reconciliation Radio: New Dawn
Musekeweya (moo-say-kay-way-ah), or New Dawn, is an education entertainment radio soap opera designed to address the
mistrust, lack of communication and interaction, and trauma left
by the genocide. The show’s fictional story of two Rwandan
communities parallels the history of cohabitation and conflict
between Tutsis and Hutus, with each community representing one
ethnic group (direct mention of ethnicity would be censored).
Tensions arise from a land shortage, government favors granted to
one community and not the other; intercommunity relations crumble, and the more prosperous community is attacked. The result is
casualties, traumatization, and refugees—a situation paralleling,
without directly referring to, the lead up to and aftermath of the
1994 genocide. However, some characters band together across
community lines, communicate with one another, and speak out
against the powerful leaders who advocate violence (LaBenevolencija, 2004).
Educational messages. The program’s Rwandan scriptwriters
weave into the storyline educational messages that are aimed at
influencing listeners’ beliefs about the roots and prevention of
prejudice and violence and the symptoms of trauma and paths to
healing (Staub, Pearlman, Weiss, & Hoek, 2007). These messages
teach that the roots of prejudice and violence are located in the
frustration of basic psychological needs (e.g., for security, a positive identity, and belongingness) and that violence is the accumulation of a number of factors, including a lack of critical thinking,
of open dissent, of active bystanders, and of meaningful intergroup
connections (Staub, 2006). Messages about trauma emphasize that
its symptoms can be understood, trauma is not “madness,” and
traumatized people can heal by talking with confidantes (Pearlman, 2001). The program’s characters deliver these messages
didactically to other characters—for example, a wise man who
talks to community leaders about the sources of violence and a
healer who teaches a traumatized character about her symptoms.
Depiction of social norms. By portraying the characters as
typical, realistic Rwandans, the show is also positioned to change
perceptions of social norms—that is, to demonstrate to listeners
what their peers do (descriptive norms) and should do (prescriptive
norms) in situations that many real Rwandans face. The characters
use popular proverbs and traditional songs and follow the routines
of rural life (92% of Rwandans live in rural areas). Their key
behaviors are revealed as they wrestle with problems known to all
Rwandans, such as cross-group friendships, overbearing leaders,
poverty, and memories of violence. For instance, scriptwriters
portray positive behaviors through two Romeo-and-Juliet-like
characters—a boy and a girl from different communities who
pursue their love in the face of community disapproval. Instead of
succumbing to a tragic end, the pair start a youth coalition for
peace and cooperation, in defiance of the warmongering authorities.
Study Hypotheses
I do not test the validity of the program’s messages, but rather
the two strategies of influence— one aimed at changing beliefs and
577
the other at changing perceived social norms—and the program’s
impact on its ultimate goal of changed behavior.
Influence personal beliefs. The explicit goal of the radio program was to promote understanding of and belief in its messages,
similar to a public education campaign (Staub et al., 2007). Thus,
the first hypothesis is that the program will change listeners’
beliefs with respect to program messages about prejudice, violence, and trauma.
Influence perceived norms. By portraying people and situations found in listeners’ own lives, the reconciliation program
should influence listeners’ perceptions of descriptive norms regarding how Rwandans do behave and prescriptive norms regarding how Rwandans should behave in situations related to prejudice, conflict, and trauma.
Influence behavior. The third hypothesis is that behavior will
change in the direction encouraged by the program—that people
will be more willing to speak and even dissent about sensitive
topics (e.g., community relationships and trauma) and to cooperate
with one another, even across group lines. This behavioral change
may be observed in conjunction with belief change, norm change,
or neither of the two.
Empathy and discussion. Because neither empathy nor discussion was experimentally manipulated in the present study, documenting emotional and conversational reactions to the radio program can point to possible processes of change for future
investigation. The literature reviewed above might predict that
emotional and empathic reactions to radio characters and discussion will amplify media effects, although the predictions for discussion are less clear.
Method
The study was designed to identify the causal impact of the
radio program in the most naturalistic manner possible, within a
stratified sample of the population, and along theoretically meaningful outcomes (beliefs, norms, and behaviors) and possible processes of change (emotion and discussion), using various measurement tools.
Sampling Listeners and Communities
Because Rwandans typically listen to the radio in groups, I used
a group-randomized design in which communities were randomly
assigned to the treatment (the reconciliation radio program) or
control condition (a different radio soap opera about health). The
communities were sampled from categories representing salient
political, regional, and ethnic breakdowns of present-day Rwanda:
eight general population communities from four different regions,
two genocide-survivor communities and two Twa communities
(see Appendix A in the online supplementary material).
I randomly assigned communities from each category to listen
to the reconciliation or health program using a matched randomization procedure. Each community was first matched to the most
similar community from the same category (general population,
survivor, or Twa) according to a number of observable characteristics, such as gender ratio, quality of dwellings, and education
level. Then, one community in each pair was randomly assigned to
the reconciliation program and the other to the health program.
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PALUCK
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This stratification of sites helped to balance and minimize observable differences between the communities ex ante.
Finally, I randomly selected 40 adults from official lists of all
individuals living in each selected community, balancing for sex,
age (half aged 18 –30 years, half above 30 years), and family (no
more than one person from an immediate family). Four Rwandan
research assistants who represented Hutu and Tutsi ethnic backgrounds visited each community with me and located these individuals to explain the study. Our purpose—“to understand Rwandans’ opinions about radio programs produced by the organization
(LaBenevolencija)”—was defined broadly to avoid creating particular expectations.
Pretest
When an individual agreed to participate, the researcher obtained informed consent and posed a series of demographic questions and questions about radio listening habits and experiences of
the genocide. The total participant sample (N ⫽ 480) ranged from
age 18 to 87 years (M ⫽ 38.5). Seventy-nine percent of participants were farmers; 73% of men and 63% of women had some
primary schooling. Catholics made up 64% of the sample, followed by Protestants (14%). Only 53% of participants actually
owned a radio; 83% of those without a radio reported listening in
groups with family and neighbors.
Ninety-nine percent of the participants were in Rwanda at the
start of the genocide, and approximately 50% were displaced by
the violence for a time of 1 week to a few years. Sixty-nine percent
of the sample claimed one or more relatives were killed in 1994.
Twenty-eight percent of the general population participants had a
relative in prison, compared with 7% of survivor and 57% of Twa
participants. As expected, random assignment balanced covariates
between the reconciliation and health program groups on all measured characteristics (see Appendix B in the online supplementary
material).
Experimental Procedure
Over the course of 1 year, the same Rwandan research assistants
visited each community to play that month’s four 20-min episodes
on a portable stereo for the group. Although research assistants
were aware of the program differences, they were blind to specific
research hypotheses. Participants gathered in their respective community spaces as they do for nonresearch occasions to listen to the
radio. Control groups listened to an education entertainment radio
soap opera that aims to change beliefs, norms, and behaviors about
reproductive health and AIDS: Urunana (Hand in Hand; hereafter
“health program”). Thus, program content was the only difference
between the two conditions—the listening protocol and outcome
measurements were the same.
The monthly field visits guaranteed that participants listened to
the program but preserved the most natural environment possible.
Research assistants who visited every month sat and listened with
the group as part of what was designed to be a casual community
gathering. The group shared customary local drinks (purchased by
the research team), and research assistants never provoked or
guided discussion.
Research assistants filled out observation sheets (see Appendix
C in the online supplementary material) after they left the site to
record attendance and rate the groups’ levels of observable enthusiasm, attentiveness, confusion, emotional expressions, and
amount and type of discussion during and after the program. They
recorded how often participants discussed program themes like
intergroup prejudice, violence, or trauma.
Keeping the Control Group Untreated
I took extra steps to ensure the control group remained untreated
by the reconciliation program, which was broadcast nationally
during the evaluation period. I asked the health program groups to
refrain from listening to the reconciliation program for 1 year; as
an incentive to comply, I promised a portable stereo and 14
cassette tapes containing the year’s worth of reconciliation program episodes at the end of the year (also promised to the reconciliation groups). Thus, health participants understood their promise as a postponement and not a sacrifice.
There are several reasons to believe that health participants did
not listen to the reconciliation program. There was no existing
loyalty to the program because it was new, and there were three
alternative programs on other stations during Musekeweya’s
broadcast. When research assistants made casual comments to
health participants about the reconciliation program halfway
through the year, participants indicated that they were not listening. Doubtless some health participants did listen to the reconciliation program one or more times. However, if significant numbers
of participants crossed over, findings would underestimate the true
effect of the reconciliation program, pointing toward a false negative (Type II) error rather than a more troubling Type I false
positive error. The true unbiased difference between the reconciliation and health groups would be larger, making my analyses a
conservative estimate of program impact.
Data Collection
At the end of 1 year, a team of 15 Rwandan researchers
accompanied the regular research assistants and myself to each
community for 3 days. We conducted individual interviews, focus
groups, and behavioral observation with all 40 participants.
Individual interviews. Researchers read each participant a series of statements, and participants specified how much they
agreed or disagreed with each statement by pointing to one of four
progressively larger circles printed on a large index card; the
smallest circle represented disagree strongly and the largest agree
strongly.
Nine statements measured participants’ beliefs with respect to
the program’s educational messages, and six statements measured
perceptions of descriptive (“that is the way things are”) and prescriptive (“that is the way things should be”) norms portrayed in
the program (see Table 1). Questions about the health program
tested the discriminant validity of the intervention, specifically
whether the pattern of treatment effects reversed in favor of the
control group on questions about health. Researchers measured
participants’ empathy for other Rwandans with four statements
probing whether participants “imagine the thoughts or feelings of”
Rwandan prisoners, genocide survivors, poor people, and political
leaders.
Focus groups. Participants organized into single-sex groups of
10 discussed four topics: intermarriage, violence prevention,
PREJUDICE, CONFLICT, AND MEDIA
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Table 1
Interview Items Regarding Personal Beliefs and Perceptions of Social Norms
Category
Item
Personal belief
Mass violence grows out of a series of small acts like spreading rumors and stealing
Mass violence comes about suddenly*
If I stand by while others commit evil actions, I am also responsible
When people marry each other from different regions, religions, or “ethnicities,” this
contributes to the peace
Traumatized people are “crazy”*
Perpetrators of violence can also be traumatized
Recovery from trauma is possible
A pregnant woman who has AIDS can be given a chance to have a healthy baby
(Health)
You can safely share something with someone who has AIDS (Health)
I advise my children (or the ones I will have in the future) that they should only
marry people from the same regional, religious, or ethnic group as our own*
It is naive to trust*
There is mistrust in my community
If we disagree with something that someone is doing or saying, we should keep quiet*
For the sake of my mental health, I should never talk about the experiences that have
caused me great pain and suffering*
It’s necessary that every woman who is pregnant goes to the health center to be tested
(Health)
Social norm
Note. Social norms include both descriptive and prescriptive norms. Asterisks signify items that are reverse
coded.
trauma, and trust. As with the individual interviews, the goal was
to assess personal beliefs and perceptions of social norms. Researchers also repeated questions from the individual interviews in
the focus group to test whether individuals would voice the same
opinions in front of their peers as they did privately.
Behavioral observation. Researchers recorded group deliberations about how to share and supply batteries for the portable
stereo and set of 14 cassette tapes of the radio program presented
to each community at the end of the data collection. Given the
monetary and entertainment value of a portable stereo, this discussion was of great significance to the participants. The measure
also captured spontaneous behavior that participants believed to be
“off the record”—their discussions took place during the goodbye
party when the research team gathered with the participants to
share drinks and socialize.
To launch the discussion, one research assistant presented the
stereo to the group and suggested that because they were all
present they could decide how to share and supply it with batteries
before parting ways. Two researchers sat discreetly in the back of
the group and record...
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