Summarize "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge" by Gettier and provide counterexamples

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Question Description

These are the instructions posted by my professor:

Hello class,

Instructions: Write a 1 page essay that accomplishes the following:

1. Summarize the essay clearly identifying the conclusion and the premises.

2. Provide "Gettier" counterexample(s) (conjunctive and disjunctive).

This means that you have to construct an argument that has a false premise and a true conclusion. This argument is valid. However, it's not sound. "Knowledge" is derived from arguments that are valid and sound.

Furthermore, I will give you some supplemental material he talked about in class to help you write the paper.

Please be concise in this essay, use 12 font Times New Roman, and MLA to cite sources

The format of the essay should be 6 paragraphs as follows:

A simple Intro, Explanation of Gettier's argument, Explanation of Plato's argument, A conjunctive counterexample, A Disjunctive example, and a simple conclusion

He also gave us what to write for the Gettier paragraph in simple terms, please elaborate on this and use the last paragraph on the first page that starts with "I shall begin by noting" to draw the 2 premises for Gettier's argument:

Gettier argues that Plato's theory of justified true belief does not guarantee knowledge.


Thank you and let me know if you have questions please! Make sure to look through the attached files below :)

Summarize "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge" by Gettier and provide counterexamples
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Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Author(s): Edmund L. Gettier Reviewed work(s): Source: Analysis, Vol. 23, No. 6 (Jun., 1963), pp. 121-123 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Committee Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3326922 . Accessed: 14/08/2012 02:37 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. . Oxford University Press and The Analysis Committee are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Analysis. http://www.jstor.org ANALYSIS 23.6 JUNE 1963 IS JUSTIFIEDTRUE BELIEFKNOWLEDGE? By EDMUND L. GETTIER ARIOUS attemptshave been madein recentyearsto statenecessary and sufficientconditionsfor someone'sknowing a given proposition. The attempts have often been such that they can be stated in a form similarto the following:' IFF (a) S knows that P (i) P is true, (ii) S believes that P, and (iii) S is justifiedin believing that P. For example, Chisholm has held that the following gives the necessary and sufficientconditions for knowledge:2 IFF (i) S acceptsP, (b) S knows that P (ii) S has adequateevidence for P, and P is true. (iii) Ayer has statedthe necessaryand sufficientconditionsfor knowledge as follows : V (c) S knows that P IFF (i) P is true, (ii) S is sure that P is true, and (iii) S has the right to be sure that P is true. I shall argue that (a) is false in that the conditions stated thereindo not constitute a siftcient condition for the truth of the proposition that S knows that P. The same argument will show that (b) and (c) fail if 'has adequateevidence for' or 'has the right to be sure that' is substituted for 'is justifiedin believing that' throughout. I shall begin by noting two points. First, in that sense of' justified' in which S's being justifiedin believing P is a necessarycondition of S's knowing that P, it is possible for a person to be justifiedin believing a proposition that is in fact false. Secondly, for any proposition P, if S is justifiedin believing P, and P entails Q, and S deduces Qfrom P and acceptsQ as a resultof this deduction,then S is justifiedin believing Q. Keeping these two points in mind, I shall now present two cases 1 Plato seems to be considering some such definition at Theaetetus201, and perhaps accepting one at Meno98. 2 Roderick M. Chisholm, Perceiving:a PhilosophicalStudy,Cornell University Press (Ithaca, New York, 1957), p. 16. Macmillan (London, 1956), p. 34. 3 A. J. Ayer, The Problemof Knowledge, 121 122 ANALYSIS in which the conditions stated in (a) are true for some proposition, though it is at the same time false that the person in question knows that proposition. CaseI: Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certainjob. And suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following conjunctive proposition: (d) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket. Smith's evidence for (d) might be that the president of the company assured him that Jones would in the end be selected, and that he, Smith, had counted the coins in Jones's pocket ten minutes ago. Proposition(d) entails: (e) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. Let us supposethat Smith sees the entailmentfrom (d) to (e), and accepts (e) on the grounds of (d), for which he has strong evidence. In this case, Smith is clearlyjustifiedin believing that (e) is true. But imagine, further,that unknown to Smith, he himself, not Jones, will get the job. And, also, unknown to Smith, he himself has ten coins in his pocket. Proposition (e) is then true, though proposition (d), from which Smith inferred(e), is false. In our example,then, all of the following are true: (i) (e) is true, (ii) Smith believes that (e) is true, and (iii) Smith is justifiedin believing that (e) is true. But it is equallyclear that Smith does not knowthat (e) is true; for (e) is true in virtue of the number of coins in Smith's pocket, while Smith does not know how many coins are in Smith'spocket, and bases his belief in (e) on a count of the coins in Jones's pocket, whom he falsely believes to be the man who will get the job. CaseII: Let us suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following proposition: (f) Jones owns a Ford. Smith'sevidence might be that Jones has at all times in the past within Smith's memory owned a car, and always a Ford, and that Jones has just offered Smith a ride while driving a Ford. Let us imagine, now, that Smith has another friend, Brown, of whose whereabouts he is totally ignorant. Smith selects three place-namesquite at random, and constructs the following three propositions: (g) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston; CIRCULARITY AND INDUCTION 123 (h) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona; (i) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk. Each of these propositionsis entailedby (f). Imaginethat Smithrealizes the entailmentof each of these propositions he has constructedby (f), and proceeds to accept (g), (h), and (i) on the basis of (f). Smith has correctlyinferred(g), (h), and (i) from a proposition for which he has strong evidence. Smith is therefore completely justified in believing each of these three propositions. Smith, of course, has no idea where Brown is. But imagine now that two further conditions hold. First, Jones does notown a Ford, but is at presentdrivinga rentedcar.And secondly, by the sheerest coincidence,and entirely unknown to Smith, the place mentionedin proposition(h) happensreallyto be the placewhereBrown is. If these two conditions hold then Smith does not know that (h) is true, even though (i) (h) is true, (ii) Smith does believe that (h) is true, and (iii) Smith is justifiedin believing that (h) is true. These two examplesshow that definition(a) does not state a suffiient condition for someone's knowing a given proposition. The same cases, with appropriatechanges, will suffice to show that neither definition (b) nor definition(c) do so either. WayneState University CIRCULARITYAND INDUCTION By PETER ACHINSTEIN 1. DECENTLY' I suggested why an argument proposed by Max Black, which attempts to support an inductive rule by citing its past success,suffersfrom circularity.The inductiverule under discussionis this: R: To argue from Mostinstances of As examinedundera widevarietyof havebeenB to (probably)ThenextA to beencountered conditions willbe B. The argumentin favour of the rule is as follows: (a): In most instancesof the use of R in argumentswith truepremisses examinedin a wide variety of conditions, R has been successful. Hence(probably): In the next instanceto be encounteredof use of R in an argument with a true premiss,R will be successful. I" The Circularityof a Self-Supporting Inductive Argument ", ANALYSIS,22.6 (June 1962). “Is  Jus'fied  True  Belief  Knowledge?”     Edmund  Ge;er   Before  we  can  ‘unpack’  the  argument  posed  by  Ge;er  in  “Is   Jus'fied  True  Belief  Knowledge,”  we  must  understand  the   following:     What  is  epistemology?   Who  is  Plato,  Chisholm,  and  Ayer?   What  is  JTB  (Jus'fied  True  Belief)?   What  is  meant  by  necessary  condi'ons?   What  is  meant  by  sufficient  condi'ons?   What  is  jus'fica'on?   What  is  meant  by  entailment?   What  is  epistemology?   Epistemology  is  the  study  of  knowledge.  Epistemologists   concern  themselves  with  a  number  of  tasks,  which  we  might  sort   into  two  categories.        First,  we  must  determine  the  nature  of  knowledge;  that  is,    what  does  it  mean  to  say  that  someone  knows,  or  fails  to    know,  something?        Second,  we  must  determine  the  extent  of  human    knowledge;  that  is,  how  much  do  we,  or  can  we,  know?      (h?p://www.iep.utm.edu/epistemo/)     Who  is  Plato,  Chisholm,  and  Ayer?   Plato  is  one  of  the  world's  best  known  and  most  widely  read  and  studied   philosophers.  He  was  the  student  of  Socrates  and  the  teacher  of  Aristotle,  and  he   wrote  in  the  middle  of  the  fourth  century  B.C.E.  in  ancient  Greece.  Though  influenced   primarily  by  Socrates,  to  the  extent  that  Socrates  is  usually  the  main  character  in  many   of  Plato's  wriMngs,  he  was  also  influenced  by  Heraclitus,  Parmenides,  and  the   Pythagoreans.    h?p://www.iep.utm.edu/plato/     Roderick  Milton  Chisholm  (1916  –  1999)  is  widely  regarded  as  one  of  the  most   creaMve,  producMve,  and  influenMal  American  philosophers  of  the  20th  Century.   Chisholm  worked  in  epistemology,  metaphysics,  ethics,  philosophy  of  language,   philosophy  of  mind,  and  other  areas.  h?p://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chisholm/     Sir  A.  J.  Ayer,  in  full  Sir  Alfred  Jules  Ayer  (1910  –  1989)  was  BriMsh  philosopher  and   educator  and  a  leading  representaMve  of  logical  posi'vism  through  his  widely  read   work  Language,  Truth,  and  Logic  (1936).  Although  Ayer’s  views  changed  considerably   aWer  the  1930s,  becoming  more  moderate  and  increasingly  subtle,  he  remained  loyal   to  empiricism,  convinced  that  all  knowledge  of  the  world  derives  from  sense   experience  and  that  nothing  in  experience  jusMfies  a  belief  in  God  or  in  any  other   extravagant  metaphysical  enMty.   h?p://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/46462/Sir-­‐AJ-­‐Ayer       What  are  necessary  and  sufficient  condi'ons?     A  necessary  condiMon  for  some  state  of  affairs  P  is  a  condiMon  that  must  be   saMsfied  in  order  for  P  to  obtain.  For  example,  what  are  the  necessary   condiMons  P  that  must  be  saMsfied  in  order  for  some  student  S  to  pass  a   course  at  some  college  or  university?  The  student  must:        (1)  submit  assignments  in  a  'mely  manner      (2)  take  all  of  the  exams  and  quizzes       This  means  that  if  the  student  S  does  not  submit  the  assignments  in  a  Mmely   manner  and  take  all  of  the  exams  and  quizzes,  student  S  will  not  pass  the   class.       What  are  necessary  and  sufficient  condi'ons?  (Contd.)   A  sufficient  condiMon  for  some  state  of  affairs  P  is  a  condiMon  that,  if   saMsfied,  guarantees  that  P  obtains.  For  example,  what  are  the  sufficient   condiMons  P  that  must  be  saMsfied  to  guarantee  some  student  S  will  pass  a   course  at  some  college  or  university?  The  student  must:        (1)  get  a  passing  grade  on  all  assignments      (2)  pass  all  exams  and  quizzes     This  means  that  if  the  student  S  gets  a  passing  grade  on  all  assignments  and   passes  all  exams  and  quizzes,  this  will  guarantee  that  student  S  will  pass  the   class.           What  is  jus'fica'on?     Loosely  speaking,  jus'fica'on  is  the  reason  why  someone  (properly)  holds  the  belief,   the  explanaMon  as  to  why  the  belief  is  a  true  one,  or  an  account  of  how  one  knows   what  one  know.   h?ps://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/ Theory_of_jusMficaMon.html     Accidental  truth,  accidental  jusMficaMon,  or  “luck”  are  considered  as  jusMficaMon.       What  is  entailment?     Entailment  means  that  if  P  entails  Q,  then  where  P  is  true,  Q  is  true;  and  Q  is  the   logical  consequence  of  P.  For  example,  the  proposiMon  ‘Joe  has  a  car  and  John  has  a   new  job’  entails  the  proposiMon  ‘Joe  has  a  car’.  This  means  that  ‘Joe  has  a  car’  is  the   logical  consequence  of  ‘Joe  has  a  car  and  John  has  a  new  job’.  Similarly,  the   proposiMon  ‘Mary  is  a  student’  entails  the  proposiMon  ‘Mary  is  a  student  or  Molly  is  a   teacher’…       Ge;er’s  Argument     Premise  1:  ‘S  being  jus'fied  in  believing  that  P’  is  a  necessary  condiMon  for  ‘S                knows  P’  though  it  is  possible  for  S  to  jusMfied  in  believing  a                                proposiMon  that  is  false.     Premise  2:  S  is  jusMfied  in  believing  in  proposiMon  Q  that  is  entailed  in                                                  (or  a  logical  consequence  consequence  of)    proposiMon  P,  which  S              believes  to  be  true.     Conclusion:  JTB  (JusMfied  True  Belief)  does  not  necessarily  fulfill  the  sufficient                  condiMons  that  guarantee  the  truth  of  the  proposiMon  that  S                          knows  P.         Ge;er  Counterexample  I   Proposi'on  :  Jones  is  the  man  who  will  get  the  job,  and  Jones  has  ten  coins                                      in  his  pocket.                           Conclusion:  The  man  who  will  get  the  job  has  ten  coins  in  his  pocket.     Analysis:                        1.  Smith  gets  the  job.                      2.  Smith,  unknown  to  him,  also  has  ten  coins  in  his  pocket.                                      3.  The  conclusion  is  true  but  it  was  derived  from  a  false  premise.                                      4.  The  proposi'on  is  a  conjunc'on  and  the  first  conjunct                                                  (Jones  is  the  man  who  will  get  the  job)  is  false.  Therefore,                                                  the  conjunc'on/premise  is  false.                                        5.  All  of  the  condi'ons  of  JTB  were  sa'sfied,  but  it  didn’t  guarantee                                                that  ‘S  knows  P’.                                          6.  Smith  does  not  know  that  the  conclusion  because  he  did  not  know                                                  how  many  coins  were  in  his  pocket.  He  based  his  belief  on  how                          many  coins  Jones  had  in  his  pocket,  “whom  he  falsely  believes  to  be  the                                                  man  will  get  the  job.”                                   Counterexample  1   d:  Jones  is  the  man  who  will  get  the  job,  and  Jones  (the  man  who  will  get              the  job)  has  ten  coins  in  his  pocket.                   e:  The  man  who  will  get  the  job  has  ten  coins  in  his  pocket.     a:    Jones  is  the  man  who  will  get  the  job.     b:    Jones  has  ten  coins  in  his  pocket.                  a  &  b        False   ∴b        True           Ge;er  Counterexample  II   Premise:  Jones  owns  a  Ford.     (Each  of  the  following  proposi'ons  is  entailed  by  the  proposi'on:  Jones  owns  a  Ford.   Therefore,  Smith  is  jus'fied  in  believing  that  all  of  the  following  proposi'ons  are  true     based  on  his  belief  that  ‘Jones  owns  a  Ford’.     Conclusion:  (a)  Either  Jones  owns  a  Ford,  or  Brown  is  in  Boston;                               ...
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ProfJamesmiller
School: Rice University

Hi, I have completed the paper. Please find attached. It has been nice working with you.

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Justified True Belief
Edmund Gettier, a philosopher in an essay named “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge”
presents an argument that the theory of plate on knowledge, Justified True Belief commonly
known as JTB is basically not true. Edmund Getter believes that this theory is not true because it
does not guarantee knowledge. The following part of this paper shows a brief summary of
justified true belief, an argument by the philosopher Edmund Getter and two Counterexamples
that cement Gettier's argument.
The Greek philosopher Plato presents an argument that an individual has specific
knowledge of a given matter if a set of three conditions are first satisfied. The first condition that
needs to be satisfied is the proposition, or in other words the specific thing that is claimed to be
known is true, the second most factors that need to be satisfied is the individual believes that the
specific proposal...

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Anonymous
Good stuff. Would use again.

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