CHAPTER 3
BUILDING AN EFFECTIVE
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION
This chapter describes the activities needed to build effective emergency management organizations,
beginning with the fundamentals of running a local emergency management agency. The most important
concept in this chapter is the development of a local emergency management committee (LEMC) that
establishes horizontal linkages among a local jurisdiction’s government agencies, NGOs, and private
sector organizations relevant to emergency management. In addition, an LEMC can provide vertical
linkages downward to households and businesses and upward to state and federal agencies.
Introduction
To build an effective emergency management organization, it is necessary to understand the
relationships among some of the stakeholders that are involved. As noted in Figure 2-1, local government
has downward vertical linkages with households and businesses, upward vertical linkages with state and
federal agencies, and horizontal linkages with social and economic influentials and hazards practitioners.
However, it also is important to understand the horizontal and vertical linkages within local government.
Specifically, local emergency management agencies (LEMAs) typically have horizontal linkages with
personnel in police, fire, emergency medical services, public works, and emergency
management/homeland security departments. At the municipal level, all of these departments report to
(i.e., have a vertical linkage with) their jurisdiction’s chief administrative officer (CAO), such as a mayor
or city manager, who has direct supervisory authority over them. The CAO is responsible for ensuring
these departments perform their assigned duties within the requirements of the law and accomplish these
functions within the time and funds allocated to them. Accordingly, the CAO has the authority to hire,
fire, allocate funds, and evaluate performance—a relationship represented in Figure 3-1 as a solid line.
However, the CAO typically is not an expert in public safety, emergency medicine, or emergency
management and, therefore, cannot provide these departments with guidance on how to perform their
missions most effectively. Thus, city and county agencies frequently have vertical linkages with
corresponding agencies at the state (and sometimes federal) level that provide technical, and sometimes
financial, assistance. Because agencies at higher (state and federal) levels of government lack the legal
authority to compel performance by the corresponding agencies at lower (county and city) levels, their
relationship is sometimes represented as a “dotted line” relationship in organizational charts (see Figure
3-1). In turn, the agencies at the state level report to the governor in a line relationship just as the
agencies at the local level report to their jurisdictions’ CAOs.
The relationships among agencies at the county level are somewhat more complex for
jurisdictions in which agency heads are directly elected by the voters rather than appointed by the local
CAO. County sheriffs, in particular, can be quite protective of their autonomy, so they can be
characterized as having just as much of a “dotted line” relationship with the Chair of the County Board of
Supervisors as with the state police.
Although it is not shown in Figure 3-1, the hierarchical relationship between the local and state
levels also extends to the federal level, with the corresponding agencies represented at each level. In
addition, however, emergency management organizations have two other “dotted line” relationships that
should be noted. First, local emergency managers often establish memoranda of agreement (MOA) with
peer agencies in neighboring jurisdictions to provide personnel and material support during emergencies.
Second, emergency management agencies have close relationships with Local Emergency Management
60
Committees (LEMCs), which is a generic term for formalized disaster planning networks that are used to
increase coordination among emergency-relevant agencies within a given community.
Figure 3-1. Relationships Among Local and State Agencies.
State
Governor
State
Highway Dept
State Emer.
Mgt. Agency
State Police
State
Fire Marshal
Chief Admin.
Officer
Local Public
Works
Local Emer.
Mgt. Agency
Local
Police
Local Fire
Dept
Some of these LEMCs are established by legal mandate, as is the case for those required by the
Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (also known as the Title III of the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986—SARA Title III) to inform and prepare their
communities for accidental releases of toxic chemicals. However, some emergency managers have
established similar organizations without a specific legal mandate—calling them disaster preparedness
committees, disaster planning committees, emergency management advisory committees, or some other
similar name (Daines, 1991; Drabek, 1987, 1990). Some of these LEMCs have assumed responsibility for
disaster recovery and hazard mitigation as well as preparedness and response, and some address all
hazards to which their community is exposed, not just accidental releases of toxic chemicals. Although
LEPCs established under SARA Title III are probably the most common of these emergency planning
organizations and LEPCs have been the subject of more research than any other type of formalized
planning network, the lessons learned from studies of LEPCs are likely to apply to all such organizations.
Consequently, we will use the more generally applicable acronym LEMC throughout the remainder of
this book.
The Local Emergency Management Agency
Similarly, the generic term we will use in this book to refer to the community agency that is
responsible for emergency management is the Local Emergency Management Agency (LEMA). In
practice, the LEMA might be known as the Office of Civil Defense, Emergency Management,
Emergency Services, Homeland Security, some combination of these names, or yet some other name.
Moreover, the LEMA might be a separate department, a section of another department, or an individual
attached to the chief administrative officer’s office. In many cities and counties, especially those with
small populations or limited hazard vulnerability, the LEMA is staffed by a single individual, whose title,
like the name of the LEMA, varies. Consequently, we will refer to this individual as the local emergency
manager. In larger jurisdictions—especially those that are exposed to major hazards—the local
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emergency manager is likely to have multiperson staff. The emergency manager almost always reports
directly to the jurisdiction’s CAO during emergencies, but frequently reports to the head of a major
agency such as police or fire during normal operations. Local emergency managers vary in their
employment status—full-time paid, part-time paid, or volunteer—again depending upon jurisdiction size
(and, thus, its financial resources) and hazard vulnerability. In the past, local emergency managers have
varied significantly in their training and experience, which frequently is associated with their
jurisdictions’ resources and vulnerability; those jurisdictions that can afford to pay more tend to attract
personnel with greater qualifications. Of course, this is not an invariant rule; there are many wellqualified and dedicated personnel in smaller jurisdictions.
The Job Description
A local emergency manager’s first task should be to understand the duties of his or her own
position as defined by a job description (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1983). To whom does
the incumbent (the person who serves as the local emergency manager) report, who reports to the
incumbent, what is the specific function of the position, what duties for the position are specifically listed
in the job description, and what are the specific qualifications (education, training, and experience) that
are listed in the job description? If there currently is no job description or the one that exists is outdated,
the emergency manager should draft a new job description and discuss it with her or his superior.
LEMA Staffing
Many LEMAs have administrative (clerk, secretary, or administrative assistant) or professional
(emergency management analyst) staff that are paid part- or full-time. Such personnel need to have job
descriptions specifying their titles, reporting lines, functions, duties, and qualifications. These personnel
support the LEMA by receiving and tracking correspondence, drafting plans and procedures, maintaining
databases, scheduling meetings, maintaining meeting minutes, and the like. In many cases, a LEMA’s
budget is too small to support enough paid staff to perform all of these activities. Consequently,
volunteers are enlisted by contacting community service organizations, clubs, Boy and Girl Scout troops,
and others. These volunteers can be a valuable source of assistance in achieving the LEMA’s goals by
performing tasks that are delegated by the local emergency manager. Indeed, some volunteers have
valuable skills (e.g., computing, radio communications) the emergency manager lacks.
Each of the LEMA staff members should be given a clear description of his or her duties. In
addition, most jurisdictions require paid staff to be provided with periodic (at least annual) performance
appraisals. These appraisals allow employees to assess their performance over the previous year and to
set training and performance objectives for the year to come. Although rarely mandatory, regularly
scheduled performance reviews for volunteers are valuable in guiding their development and enhancing
their performance effectiveness. A jurisdiction’s human resources department can provide valuable
guidance on its personnel policies.
LEMA Program Plan
Emergency managers need to develop program plans that systematically direct their efforts over
the course of the year. FEMA (1983, 1993) has advised emergency managers to set annual goals in each
of the major programmatic areas for which they are responsible—such as hazard and vulnerability
analysis, hazard mitigation, emergency preparedness, recovery preparedness, and community hazard
education. Once these goals have been set, the local emergency manager should assess the LEMA’s
ability to achieve these goals. This capability assessment is likely to identify satisfactory levels of
capability in some areas but not in others. The emergency manager should document the capability
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shortfall and devise a multiyear development plan to reduce that shortfall. The limited funds available for
emergency management make it a certainty that the shortfall cannot be eliminated within a single year, so
this is the reason why a multiyear (typically five year) development plan is needed. Despite its long
planning horizon, the multiyear development plan should identify specific annual milestones (measurable
objective indicators) to determine if progress is being made at a satisfactory rate.
LEMA Budget Preparation
An organization’s budget lists the categories of anticipated expenditures and the amount that has
been allocated to each category. The budget usually covers the jurisdiction’s fiscal year, which is a 12
month period that might or might not be the same as the calendar year (from January 1 to December 31).
The budget is a financial plan that identifies the amount of money that has been allocated to each of its
budget categories. Typical budget categories include routine continuing items such as staff salaries,
office space, office equipment (e.g., copiers, computers, fax machines), telephone (local and longdistance), travel, and materials and supplies (e.g., paper, toner). The budget should anticipate the need to
replace worn out or obsolete equipment or to purchase new equipment that will increase the LEMA’s
capabilities. The budget also should contain a contingency fund that addresses the costs of resources that
will be expended in a foreseeable emergency.
The challenge for the emergency manager is to ensure the expenses do not exceed the budgeted
amount. This is not difficult to do for the routine continuing items because, for example, staff salaries,
office space, and local telephone service are fixed and materials and supplies are quite predictable from
month to month. Repairs to office equipment can be unpredictable, but this can be managed by signing a
service contract that establishes a fixed fee for routine preventive and corrective maintenance. Longdistance telephone and travel for training are somewhat less predictable but are discretionary, so these
activities can be reduced if the expenses for other categories prove to be greater than expected.
The amount to set aside in the contingency fund for emergency response is more difficult to
estimate because the scope of an emergency (or even whether one occurs) is unpredictable. Nonetheless,
past agency records or discussions with emergency managers in neighboring jurisdictions can provide
some insight into the appropriate amount to request. When preparing a budget, it is essential to justify
each of the budget items. Once again, records of previous years’ expenses are useful guides, but it is
important to make adjustments for inflation (consult the jurisdiction’s budget office for guidance on the
amount they allow) as well as making adjustments for changes in the program plan. Has a new chemical
facility been opened? Are there new subdivisions that have been built in flood prone areas? As new needs
arise that cannot be addressed with the resources provided by previous budgets, the emergency manager
needs to request funding increases that will meet the new program requirements. The nature of these
needs is typically documented in a budget narrative that accompanies the budget request. The budget and
the accompanying narrative are submitted in written form and, in many cases, are presented orally as
well. In the latter case, the use of presentation graphics can be a valuable method of explaining how each
of the budget items contributes to the achievement of the program plan.
Whatever the amounts turn out to be for the budget categories, it is essential that the emergency
manager submit the new year’s budget in the format that is being used by his or her jurisdiction. The
local budget office will provide assistance in this area.
LEMA Funding Sources
The local emergency manager’s most obvious source of funding is the head of the department in
which the LEMA is administratively located or, if the LEMA is an independent agency, the jurisdiction’s
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CAO. It is important to recognize that other funding sources can provide valuable supplements as well.
The federal government has a range of programs that provide financial assistance to local government.
For example, Emergency Management Performance Grants require LEMAs to submit a statement of
work and budget that makes the local jurisdiction eligible for matching funds (i.e., a 50/50 cost sharing).
This program is administered through each state’s emergency management agency, which might impose
its own requirements for funding. For example, Texas requires a LEMA to have an emergency
management plan that meets a specified standard of quality and provides competitive awards based upon
the quality of recent planning, training, and exercising activities. Continued financial support is
contingent upon meeting performance and financial reporting requirements, as well as achieving the
annual objectives specified in the initial proposal.
Another example is the Hazardous Materials Assistance Program, which provides technical and
financial assistance through the states to support oil and hazardous materials emergency planning and
exercising. Applications are required to list the program objective, describe the means by which the
objective will be achieved (including a list of specific activities and their duration) and the expected
achievements of the project. LEMAs submit applications through their state emergency management
agencies for review by the corresponding FEMA regional offices.
There are also local sources that can be contacted for financial and in-kind assistance. Local
industrial facilities such as nuclear power plants and chemical facilities might be contacted for financial
contributions to defray the costs of emergency preparedness for their facilities. Truck and rail carriers
might be contacted for training assistance. Commercial businesses such as large retail outlets might be
able to provide in-kind contributions or make small financial contributions for community hazard
awareness programs.
LEMA Budget Management
As the fiscal year progresses, expenses are automatically incurred for some items such as
salaries, space, and local telephone use. Other expenses might require the emergency manager’s
authorization (and possibly countersignature by a higher authority). These include purchase orders for
equipment and supplies or travel vouchers for attendance at training courses or professional conferences.
These records are forwarded to the jurisdiction’s accounting office where they are entered and charged
against the appropriate accounts.
In many jurisdictions, local emergency managers receive monthly program accounting, which
refers to the recording of actual expenses and a comparison of these expenses to the corresponding
budget amounts. A budget statement lists budget categories in rows and indicates, in one column, how
much money was allocated to each category and, in another column, how much money has been spent to
date in that category. If the budget was based upon accurate projections, monthly variances (deviations of
actual expenditures from anticipated expenditures) will be small. If the monthly variances are large,
corrective action will need to be taken. Unforeseen expenditures attributable to a major emergency often
are the basis for a supplemental request to the LEMA’s parent department or directly to the CAO, but
foreseeable items such as replacement of broken equipment are likely to receive an unfavorable review.
Consequently, emergency managers must make mid-year adjustments in other categories. Unfortunately,
training and travel are the categories that are commonly cut in such situations—which can produce a
chronic training shortfall if budgeting problems are recurrent.
Senior elected and appointed officials typically require periodic (e.g., monthly or quarterly)
reports of progress on the program plan and budget. As is the case with the presentation of each year’s
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budget, presentation graphics can be a valuable method of explaining which milestones in the program
plan have been achieved and how this compares to the level of progress expected to date. In addition, the
emergency manager should explain what percentage of each budget line has been expended to date in
comparison to the percentage of the year that has elapsed. For example, the emergency manager should
find it easy to explain why 0% of the budget for computer replacement has been expended in the first
three months (25%) of the year. However, it probably would be more difficult to say why 40% of the
budget for salaries had been expended in that same period. In either case, the source of the variances and
the anticipated method of adjustment must be explained.
Determinants of Emergency Management Effectiveness
There has been a significant amount of research conducted over the past 30 years that identifies
many conditions influencing the effectiveness of LEMAs. This research will be described in greater
detail in the following pages, but it can be summarized by the model depicted in Figure 3-2. This figure
indicates that LEMA effectiveness—measured by such organizational outcomes as the quality,
timeliness, and cost of hazard adjustments adopted and implemented by the community—is the most
direct result of individual outcomes and the planning process. Outcomes for the individual members of
the LEMA and LEMC include job satisfaction, organizational commitment, individual effort and
attendance, and organizational citizenship behaviors. The planning process includes staffing/equipping,
organizational structuring, team climate development, situational analysis, and strategic choice.
In turn, the planning process is determined by the level of community support from officials,
news media, and the public. The planning process is also affected by hazard experience, as measured by
direct experience with disasters and by vicarious experiences that reveal potential impact of future
disasters. Hazard experience also appears to have an indirect effect on the planning process via its effects
on community support. It is important to recognize that even though the model as depicted in Figure 3-2
is static—that is, the arrows begin on the left and end on the right hand side of the figure—the actual
process is dynamic because success tends to be a self-amplifying process in which high levels of
individual and organizational outcomes produce increased levels of vicarious experience with disaster
demands (through emergency training, drills, and exercises), community support, better staffing and
organization, and more emergency planning resources.
Hazard Exposure/Community Vulnerability
Many studies have found the level of community hazard adjustment is increased by experiencing
disaster impact—especially catastrophic impacts. Frequent, recent, and severe impacts make the
community’s vulnerability to hazards easier to remember and more likely to stimulate action. In some
cases, this leads to the development of a disaster subculture in which community residents adopt
routinized patterns of disaster behavior (Wenger, 1978). When disasters are infrequent, long-removed in
time, or have had minimally disruptive impacts, hazard vulnerability is likely to elicit little attention from
households, organizations, or the community as a whole. However, the community’s exposure to
environmental hazards can be made salient by vicarious experience that is gained by reading or hearing
about other communities’ experiences with disasters. These can be gained through newspaper articles or
television accounts or, most powerfully, through first-person accounts—especially if they come from
peers (Lindell, 1994a). For example, a local fire chief is most likely to be influenced by other fire chiefs’
accounts of their experiences, a city manager is most likely to be influenced by another city manager, and
so on.
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Figure 3-2.
A Model of Local Emergency Management Effectiveness.
Hazard exposure/
vulnerability
Experience
Hazard analyses
Extra-community resources
Professional
associations
Govt. agencies
Regional and national
resources
Community support
Officials
News media
Public
Planning process
Planning activities
Team climate
Situational analysis
Strategic choices
Individual outcomes
Job satisfaction
Organizational
commitment
Effort/attendance
Organizational outcomes
Product quality
Product timeliness
Product cost
Community resources
Staff
Budget
Staffing/organization
Staffing levels
Organizational structure
Technology
Hazard exposure can also be affected by salient cues such as the daily sight of the cooling towers
of a nuclear power plant, the intricate maze of piping at a petrochemical plant, or the placards on railcars
and trucks passing through town. Information from hazard and vulnerability analyses can also have an
effect on the community, but this pallid statistical information is likely to have less of an effect than the
vivid first-person accounts described above (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). As will be discussed in the next
chapter, Risk Perception and Communication, the psychological impact of hazard/vulnerability analyses
can be increased by linking data on hazard exposure to likely personal consequences.
The importance of hazard exposure and vulnerability for emergency management is well
supported by research. For example, Caplow, Bahr, and Chadwick (1984) found emergency management
network effectiveness to be greater in communities with recent disaster experience or, for those without
recent experience, if there was consensus about the most salient hazard. Moreover, Adams, Burns, and
Handwerk (1994) found that one-third of inactive LEMCs in a nationwide survey blamed lack of hazard
vulnerability for their lack of progress. This accusation is likely to have some validity because Kartez and
Lindell (1990) found that a greater degree of experience with disaster demands such as issuing
evacuation orders, searching for mutual aid resources and responding to mass casualties is associated
with organizational outcomes such as an increase in the number of good emergency preparedness
practices (e.g., establishing citizen emergency information hotlines, establishing equipment rate and use
agreements with contractors). Specifically, they found cities that were high in experience adopted 1.5
more preparedness practices than those that were low in experience. Similarly, Lindell and Meier (1994)
and Lindell and Whitney (1995) found a previous history of evacuations was positively related to
emergency planning effectiveness. Moreover, Lindell, et al. (1996) also found that a recent history of
emergencies—as well as the number of hazardous facilities—both had modest but statistically significant
positive correlations with LEMC effectiveness.
Community Support
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Community support from senior elected and appointed officials, the news media, and the public
is important because it affects the resources that are allocated to the LEMA and the LEMC. As noted
earlier, many researchers have systematically documented what numerous emergency managers have
personally experienced—emergency management is a low priority for the local elected and appointed
officials who control budgets and staffing allocations (Labadie, 1984; Sutphen & Bott, 1990). As Kartez
and Lindell (1990, p.13) quoted one police chief,
My number one priority is getting the uniforms out in response to calls. The public
judges me on that performance, not whether I’m planning for an earthquake that may
never happen. If left alone, disaster planning would get even less attention from my
office. It requires that the executive clearly make this a priority.
The importance of community support for emergency management is supported by research.
Adams and his colleagues (1994) found that two-thirds of the inactive LEMCs blamed community
indifference and more than one-third blamed lack of funding for their lack of achievement. Other studies
found community support (official resolutions, media coverage, and community group actions) was
positively related to emergency planning effectiveness (Lindell & Meier, 1994; Lindell & Whitney,
1995; Lindell, et al, 1996). For example, community information requests, media coverage, local support,
and the backing of local officials all were strongly and significantly correlated with LEMC effectiveness.
Community Resources
Differences among jurisdictions in the effectiveness of their LEMAs and LEMCs can be
attributed partially to variation in their communities’ resources. Kartez (1992) found inconsistent
evidence for effects of jurisdictional size, wealth, growth rate, employment, minority concentration, and
industry concentration on compliance with SARA Title III mandates. However, Adams, et al. (1994)
reported compliance was significantly correlated with jurisdiction size, median household income, and
percent of urban population, The conflict between these two studies probably is attributable to the fact
that Adams found the strongest effects in the smallest, poorest, and most rural jurisdictions, which were
underrepresented in one of Kartez’s (1992) samples, and altogether absent from his other sample.
Nonetheless, the community support variables had stronger correlations with LEMC effectiveness than
did any of the community resources variables. Lindell, et al. (1996) reported that jurisdictions’
populations, budgets, police staffing, and fire staffing have statistically significant, but small, influences
on LEMC effectiveness
Extra-community Resources
Lindell and Meier (1994) found that emergency planning resources obtained from outside the
community (guidance manuals, training courses, and computer resources) were positively related to
emergency planning effectiveness. Lindell and Whitney’s (1995) study replicated many of these findings,
but also found that emergency planning effectiveness was correlated most highly with membership in a
statewide LEPC Association, and with state emergency planning resources. Later, Lindell, et al. (1996)
reported access to such emergency planning materials as computer software, federal agency technical
reports, state emergency planning agency technical support, and Chemical Manufacturers Association
materials had a statistically significant and moderately large correlation with LEMC effectiveness. Also,
frequency of external contact with federal regional offices, state agencies, and other LEMCs was strongly
related to success. Technical materials provided through vertical diffusion by federal agencies (DOT,
EPA, and FEMA) also have a positive impact on LEMC effectiveness, as does horizontal diffusion of
emergency preparedness practices and resources obtained from private industry and neighboring
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jurisdictions. These resources can provide vicarious experience with disaster demands and demonstrate
the effectiveness of specific innovations including plans, procedures and equipment (Kartez & Lindell,
1987).
Staffing and Organization
A number of studies have substantiated the impact of an LEMC’s staffing and organization on its
effectiveness. For example, the International City Management Association (1981) identified a number of
characteristics of effective emergency management organizations. These included defined roles for
elected officials, a clear internal hierarchy, good interpersonal relationships, commitment to planning as a
continuing activity, member and citizen motivation for involvement, coordination among participating
agencies, and public/private cooperation.
Caplow, et al. (1984) found emergency management network effectiveness was greater in
communities with recent disaster experience or, for those without recent experience, if there was
consensus about the most salient hazard. The more effective networks had members with more
experience and a wider range of local contacts, had written plans and were familiar with them, had
personal experience in managing routine natural hazards such as floods, and were more familiar with the
policies and procedures of emergency-relevant state and federal agencies.
Similarly, Lindell and Meier (1994) found the number of members, number of hours worked by
paid staff, number of agencies represented on the LEMC, and organization into subcommittees were all
positively related to emergency planning effectiveness. Lindell and Whitney (1995) found LEMC
staffing and structure lacked a significant correlation with LEMC effectiveness, but was correlated with
organizational climate, which did have a very strong impact on LEMC effectiveness. Lindell, et al.
(1996) also found the total number of members and—more importantly—the average number of
members attending meetings were significant. There also was a significant correlation between
effectiveness and the number of agencies and organizations represented on the LEMC. Representation by
elected officials and by citizens’ groups was the most important, whereas having representatives from the
news media was least important for overall emergency planning effectiveness. Establishment of an
organizational structure through subcommittees was significant, probably because this allows members to
focus on specific tasks and thus avoid feeling overwhelmed by all the work that needs to be done.
Planning Process
The emergency planning process consists of five principal functions: planning activities, team
climate development, situational analysis, resource acquisition, and strategic choice.
Planning activities. Kartez and Lindell (1990) found superior planning practices involving key
personnel from diverse departments in a participative and consensus-oriented process of horizontal
integration—exemplified by such activities as interdepartmental task forces, interdepartmental training,
and after-action critiques—had an even greater effect on the adoption of good emergency preparedness
practices than did disaster experience. Specifically, cities that had a better planning process adopted 2.5
more preparedness practices than those that had a poorer planning process. Interestingly, as Table 3-1
indicates, planning activities such as interdepartmental training, reviews with senior officials, and
establishment of interdepartmental task forces had especially strong effects on the adoption of good
emergency preparedness practices. By contrast, more routine activities such as procedure updates, plan
updates, and reviews of mutual aid agreements had small effects.
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Table 3-1.
Effects of Planning Activities on Good Emergency Preparedness Practices.
Largest difference
Smallest difference
Interdepartmental training
Reviews with senior officials
Interdepartmental task force
Community disaster assistance council
After action critiques
Exercises
Vulnerability analyses
Meetings with TV/radio managers
Procedure updates
Plan updates
Review mutual aid agreements with neighboring cities
Source: Adapted from Kartez and Lindell (1990)
Characteristics of meetings are important influences on organizational effectiveness. These
include meeting frequency, formalizing member orientation, formalizing meetings through regular
scheduling, advance circulation of written agendas, keeping written minutes, and formalizing overall
activities by setting and monitoring progress toward annual goals(Lindell & Meier, 1994; Lindell, et al.,
1996). These results indicate the effectiveness of an LEMC and its subcommittees can be increased if
they conduct frequent meetings that help them to maintain steady progress and this will work if these
meetings are regularly scheduled far enough in advance for members to avoid conflicts with their own
calendars. If possible, LEMC meetings should be scheduled monthly on the same day of the week and
time of day. The agenda for each meeting should be distributed in advance and written minutes should be
kept of each meeting.
These findings are consistent with more recent research, which shows effectiveness in disaster
response is significantly determined by agencies breadth of prior coordination and the depth (both
frequency and intensity) of prior contact (Drabek, 2003). In addition, these findings are consistent with
research conducted by Gillespie and his colleagues (Gillespie & Colignon, 1993; Gillespie, Colignon,
Banerjee, Murty, & Rogge, 1993; Gillespie & Streeter, 1987). Specifically, these researchers documented
a need to facilitate effective relations between organizations with full-time staff members and
organizations with part-time staff and volunteers by scheduling meetings at times convenient for all staff
(full-time, part-time, and voluntary). Such meetings should concentrate on common interests and be
guided by agendas. Failure to meet these suggestions usually results in termination by neglect, not by
direct confrontation over disparate values.
Organizational climate development. Lindell and Whitney (1995) found emergency planning
effectiveness was greatest in LEMCs that had positive organizational climates, which can be defined as
“distinctive patterns of collective beliefs that are communicated to new group members through the
socialization process and are further developed through members’ interaction with their physical and
social environments” (Lindell & Brandt, 2000, p. 331). Organizational climate presumably affects LEMC
effectiveness because it influences the degree to which members’ motivation is aroused, maintained, and
directed toward group goals (Lindell & Whitney, 1995).
Lindell and Brandt (2000) found that three dimensions of leadership climate (leader initiating
structure, leader consideration, and leader communication), four dimensions of team climate (team
coordination, team cohesion, team task orientation, and team pride), and one dimension of role climate
(role clarity, but not role conflict or role overload) were strongly related to each other and can be defined
as climate quality. Organizational climate is important because it is positively related to important
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individual outcomes such as job satisfaction, organizational commitment, attendance, effort, turnover
intentions, and organizational citizenship behaviors (performance beyond minimal requirements), as well
as organizational outcomes such as product quality, timeliness, and cost. These latter variables were
measured in the research studies by LEMC chair ratings and State Emergency Response Commission
staff ratings of the organization’s performance.
Climate quality is consistently related to support from elected officials—especially external
guidance and recognition. Climate quality is also positively related to the organization of LEMCs into
subcommittees, meeting formalization, and meeting frequency. However, climate quality is unrelated to
LEMC size, which suggests that increasing the number of members can increase the range of knowledge
and skills on the LEMC without impairing group performance.
The research findings indicate that LEMC leaders can establish a positive leadership climate
within the organization by being clear about what tasks are to be performed, as well as recognizing
individual members’ strengths and weaknesses and being supportive of their needs. These two aspects of
leader behavior, which are known as leader initiating structure and leader consideration, respectively,
have long been recognized by organizational researchers (Stogdill, 1963). The importance of these
dimensions in facilitating organizational effectiveness has been recently confirmed in LEMCs (Lindell &
Brandt, 2000; Lindell & Whitney, 1995; Whitney & Lindell, 2000).
In addition to a positive leadership climate, it also is important to foster a positive team climate.
Specifically, team members must focus on the tasks to be performed rather than spending all of their time
socializing (team task orientation). In addition, they must share information and coordinate individual
efforts (team coordination). When these occur, members tend to trust each other and feel that they are
included in all activities (cohesion), as well as believe their LEMC is one of the best (team pride).
Moreover, LEMC leaders need to promote a positive role climate within the organization. Team
members must understand what tasks are to be performed and how to perform them, which avoids the
stress caused by role ambiguity. Leaders and members must agree on what tasks are to be performed,
which avoids the stress caused by role conflict. Finally, members must have enough time to perform the
tasks for which they are responsible, which avoids the stress caused by role overload (James & Sells,
1981; Jones & James, 1979).
LEMC effectiveness is also enhanced when there is a positive job climate, which arises when
members have enough independence to do their work however they choose as long as they deliver a
quality product on time and within the resources available (personal autonomy). They also should be
allowed to perform a “whole” piece of work that provides a meaningful contribution to the group product
(task identity). Finally, members should be allowed to perform tasks that exercise a variety of significant
skills (skill variety).
The LEMC will function more effectively when it has a positive reward climate, which is
characterized by members having opportunities to perform new and challenging tasks (member
challenge), opportunities to work with other people (social contacts), and are told that other people
appreciate their work (social recognition). When the leadership, team, role, job, and reward components
of organizational climate are positive, there are positive outcomes at the individual and organizational
levels. Specifically, there is higher member job satisfaction, attendance, effort, and citizenship behavior
(working beyond minimum standards) and lower turnover intentions and actual turnover. These positive
outcomes at the individual level also produce positive consequences at the organizational level in terms
70
of greater organizational stability (due to decreased turnover) and greater productivity (due to greater
effort).
Situational analysis. Although this is recognized as an important issue in the strategic
management of organizations (Thompson & Strickland, 1996), there appears to have been little or no
research on the degree to which situational analysis contributes to the effectiveness of LEMAs and
LEMCs. Important components of situational analysis include hazard exposure analysis, physical
vulnerability analysis, social vulnerability analysis, evaluation of hazard adjustments, and capability
analysis. As Chapter 5 will describe more fully, hazard exposure analysis identifies the natural and
technological hazards to which the community is exposed and assesses the specific locations that would
be affected by different intensities of impact (e.g., 50- and 100-year flood plains, areas prone to
liquefaction from earthquakes); such analyses are frequently documented by maps of geographical risk
areas. Physical vulnerability analysis assesses the community’s structures (residential, commercial, and
industrial buildings) and infrastructure (fuel, electric power, water, sewer, telecommunications, and
transportation) in terms of their ability to withstand the environmental forces predicted by the hazard
exposure analyses. By contrast, social vulnerability analysis assesses the community’s demographic
segments and economic sectors to identify differences in hazard exposure, occupancy of physically
vulnerable structures, utilization of physically vulnerable infrastructure, and limited resources
(psychological, social, economic, and political) for recovering from disaster impact.
The systematic evaluation of hazard adjustments examines alternative hazard adjustments
(hazard mitigation, disaster preparedness, emergency response, and disaster recovery) to assess their
ability to avoid hazard impacts such as casualties and damage, to limit these impacts when disaster
strikes, and to recovery rapidly after disaster. The evaluation of hazard adjustments also examines their
resource requirements in terms of the time, effort, money, and organizational cooperation needed to
adopt and implement them. The final component of situational analysis, capability assessment,
determines whether households, businesses, government agencies, and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) have the capacity (i.e., resources) and commitment (i.e., motivation) needed to adopt the
available hazard adjustments.
Resource acquisition. Resource acquisition refers to obtaining emergency planning staff,
equipment, and information of many different types from a variety of sources. The principal source of
emergency planning staff is the LEMA but, as will be discussed below, there are other local government
agencies, private sector organizations, and NGOs that can be drawn upon to staff the LEMC. Similarly,
the major type of emergency planning equipment—the microcomputer—is usually available at the
LEMA but the types of high speed/high storage capacity computers needed for conducting hazard and
vulnerability analyses are more frequently located and used in the Land Use Planning Department where
Geographical Information Systems (GISs) are routinely used (Lindell, Sanderson & Hwang, 2002). The
types of information include data about hazards and population segments at risk, as well as procedures
for hazard/vulnerability analysis. Communities can obtain hazard data by accessing Web sites maintained
by federal agencies such as the FEMA, USGS, and National Weather Service, as well as state hazard
analysis web sites (Hwang, Sanderson & Lindell, 2002) or, for technological hazards, local industry (for
fixed-site hazards) and rail or truck carriers (for transportation hazards). In addition, these organizations
provide computer software, planning guidance manuals, and training courses that explain how to assess
community vulnerability (e.g., FEMA’s HAZUS).
71
Strategic choice. Organizational scientists generally agree there is no single best way to organize
and this proposition has been supported by Drabek’s (1987, 1990) findings of significant variation in the
strategies and structures utilized by individual emergency managers. Some successful emergency
managers enthusiastically endorse strategies that are explicitly rejected by other equally successful
managers. Further support for the contingency principle of organization is provided by Mulford,
Klonglan, and Kopachevsky’s (1973) finding that strategy adoption was dependent upon contextual
conditions in the community. Nonetheless, the available research indicates there are some structures and
strategies that are likely to significantly improve the success of all LEMCs regardless of context—and
especially without significant expense. Although this might seem surprising, it is consistent with previous
studies showing that external constraints can be circumvented to some extent by a superior planning
process that enhances horizontal linkages among agencies within a jurisdiction and with adjacent
jurisdictions, downward vertical linkages to households and businesses, and upward vertical linkages to
state and federal agencies (Kartez & Lindell, 1987, 1990). Indeed, it is precisely the purpose of an LEMC
to establish this planning process.
As Drabek (1987, 1990, 2003) has observed, disaster researchers have long been interested in the
intergovernmental structures and interpersonal strategies adopted by emergency managers. For example,
a multiyear research project conducted at Iowa State University found that communities in which local
Civil Defense Directors had developed systemic linkages among local groups tended to be the most
effective in achieving community preparedness (Klonglan, Beal, Bohlen, & Schafer, 1967). These
findings were elaborated by Mulford, Klonglan, and Tweed (1973), who noted the importance of local
emergency managers’ horizontal linkages with their colleagues in similar organizations throughout their
states, and also their vertical linkages with local elected officials.
Mulford, et al. (1973) identified six strategies used by effective emergency managers. These
include a resource building strategy, which emphasizes the acquisition of human, technical, and capital
resources needed for effective agency performance, and an emergency resource strategy, defined by
securing the participation of emergency-relevant organizations in emergency planning and response. The
elite representation strategy involves the placement of members of the focal organization (in this case,
the LEMA) in positions or situations where it is possible to interact with influential members of other
emergency-relevant organizations, and the constituency strategy consists of the establishment of a
symbiotic relationship between two organizations whereby both benefit from cooperation. The
cooptation strategy consists of absorbing key personnel, especially those from other organizations, into
the focal organization’s formal structure as directors or advisors, while the audience strategy focuses
upon educating community organizations and the public at large about the importance of community
emergency preparedness. Mulford, Klonglan, and Kopachevsky (1973) noted strategy adoption was
contingent upon environmental (jurisdictional size), organizational (funding level) and personal (Civil
Defense Director training) characteristics. Some particularly important areas on which
interorganizational coordination has focused include increased involvement of private organizations,
local public services, elected officials and community leaders, and greater efforts to acquire external
funding. (Klonglan, Mulford & Hay, 1973).
Research conducted at the Disaster Research Center during the same time period found disaster
planning requires emergency response organizations to recognize the ways in which community-wide
disasters differ from routine emergencies that can be handled by a single agency (Dynes, Quarantelli, &
Kreps, 1972). In addition, they encouraged local disaster planners to foster significant predisaster
72
relationships among organizations that must respond to a disaster (Anderson, 1969b). Dynes and
Quarantelli (1975) described differences in interorganizational orientation in terms of nine models
including the maintenance (acquiring and maintaining human, material, and financial resources), disaster
expert (developing knowledge and skill about hazard agents such as hurricanes and hazardous materials),
and abstract planner (construction of contingency plans derived from generic planning principles)
models. Other models include the military (developing a well-defined hierarchical organization),
administrative staff (developing managerial knowledge and skill), and disaster simulation (focusing on
the rehearsal of disaster plans through drills and exercises) models. Finally, there are the derived political
power (acting as the representative of the jurisdiction’s CAO), interpersonal broker (establishing
contacts among emergency-relevant organizations), and community educator (overcoming community
indifference through hazard awareness programs) models.
Table 3-2 summarizes the research on emergency managers’ strategies in the following way. The
first category of strategies is defined by LEMA organizational development, which involves the military
and administrative staff models to address the development of clear roles and lines of authority, while the
abstract planner model emphasizes the development of coordinated emergency response plans, and the
disaster simulation model supports the importance of emergency exercises to test the organizational
forms that have been developed. Another strategy involves the resource building strategy and the
maintenance model to ensure the acquisition of resources—such as personnel, facilities (e.g., normal
office space and emergency response facilities such as EOCs), equipment, materials and supplies, and
especially money from local government funding— that will positively affect LEMA effectiveness.
Moreover, analysis of the physical environment encompasses the disaster expert model, according to
which success will be influenced by interagency coordination in the assessment hazard vulnerability and
community resources. Finally, Table 3-2 makes it clear that most of the strategies emphasize
management of the social environment. According to the researchers at Iowa State University and the
Disaster Research Center, development of an LEMC is facilitated by securing the legitimacy from the
CAO (derived political power model), establishing the collaboration among emergency-relevant
organizations (emergency resource strategy and interpersonal broker model), and placing LEMA staff in
positions to influence important others (the constituency, elite representation, and cooptation strategies).
Finally, influence is magnified by engaging in outreach to community groups and news media (the
audience strategy and community educator model).
Table 3-2.
Emergency Management Development Strategies.
Strategy Type
Iowa State University
Organizational development
Resource acquisition
Physical environment analysis and
management
Social environment analysis and
management
Resource building
Emergency resource
Elite representation
Constituency
Cooptation
Audience
73
Disaster Research Center
Administrative staff
Military
Abstract planner
Disaster simulation
Maintenance
Disaster expert
Derived political power
Interpersonal broker
Community educator
More recent studies have examined these ideas in further detail by studying the ways in which
local emergency managers implement these strategies. Drabek (1987, 1990) integrated the findings of
previous disaster researchers with theoretical principles derived from the broader organizational literature
(e.g., Pennings, 1981; Osborne & Plastrik, 1998) to identify strategies and structures used by successful
managers. Similarly, Gillespie and his colleagues (Gillespie & Colignon, 1993; Gillespie, et al., 1993;
Gillespie & Streeter, 1987) conducted an intensive study of a single disaster preparedness network that
had not coalesced into a formally designated LEMC. In addition, Lindell and his colleagues (Lindell,
1994b; Lindell & Brandt, 2000; Lindell & Meier, 1994; Lindell & Whitney, 1995; Lindell, et al., 1996a,
1996b; Whitney & Lindell, 2000) reported a series of studies conducted on nearly 300 LEMCs in three
Midwestern states.
Drabek (1987, 1990) found the most effective of the local emergency managers he interviewed
emphasized the development of constituency support by actively trying to increase the resource base of
all local agencies—not just their own. To do this, they relied on committees and joint ventures to involve
other community organizations. Consistent with the organizational development strategy, some of them
attempted to manage conflict over controversial issues before they got out of control. In particular, they
achieved more consensus with other community agencies on the mission of the LEMA. In a variation on
the disaster expert strategy, some of them brought in outside experts.
Drabek found that local emergency managers’ reliance on these strategies varied with community
size. Successful directors in small communities used them less frequently than successful directors in
large communities but more frequently than unsuccessful directors in either small or large communities.
Successful directors had more frequent contacts and more formalized interagency agreements such as
MOAs. Although all successful emergency managers gave considerable emphasis to coordination with
other emergency-relevant agencies, they tended to give less emphasis to local businesses and (except in
the smallest communities) to elected officials.
In the studies conducted by Gillespie and his colleagues (Gillespie & Colignon, 1993; Gillespie,
et al., 1993; Gillespie & Streeter, 1987), the researchers found a large proportion of the organizations
relevant to disaster response were not linked to the preparedness network—which indicates some
deficiencies in the local emergency managers’ strategies for social environment analysis and
management. Gillespie and his colleagues expanded the utility of the research on social management
strategies by noting interorganizational linkages consist of informal contacts, verbal agreements, and
written agreements. In addition, they emphasized that the existence (or even the frequency) of
interorganizational contacts does not measure the importance of the relationship (i.e., that needed
information, services, or resources have been established or transferred). This argument points to a
logical connection between social environment analysis/management and resource acquisition. That is,
the low priority given to local emergency management often makes it impossible for LEMAs to purchase
needed resources outright. Consequently, local emergency managers must build capacity by collaborating
with other organizations that do have those resources or that have the influence to obtain the funding that
will allow them to make those purchases.
Of course, organizations are more likely to collaborate with the LEMA if there are compelling
reasons for them to do so. Consistent with this notion, Gillespie and his colleagues found
interorganizational linkages were initiated by awareness of potential disaster demands and by recognized
needs for avoiding gaps in services or duplication of effort. Other reasons for collaboration included
ensuring timely access to information, services, or resources; development of internal organizational
74
response capability; and development of political influence to enhance organizational autonomy,
security, and prestige.
Gillespie and his colleagues also found interorganizational linkages are developed through active
and personable individuals, but pre-existing personal and professional contacts are important, as well as
routine interagency and interjurisdictional meetings, drills, and exercises. However, these linkages are
impeded by geographical distance, lack of funds, lack of staff, incompatible professional perspectives
and terminology, lack of trust in an organization or its representative, overconfidence in one’s own
capability, and unequal rewards and costs of participation for those in different organizations.
Individual Outcomes
As noted earlier, individual outcomes include job satisfaction, organizational commitment,
attachment behaviors (effort, attendance, and continued membership), and organizational citizenship
behaviors. Some of these variables were studied by Whitney and Lindell (2000), who noted that research
on motivational factors involved in staffing voluntary community organizations suggests people
participate in these organizations when they perceive social and environmental problems within a
community to which they are attached and find organizations they expect to be successful in mitigating
these problems (Chavis & Wandersman, 1990; Florin & Wandersman, 1984). Such studies have found
that participation in community groups is significantly related to three types of benefits (personal, social,
and purposive) and their corresponding costs (Prestby, et al., 1990). Moreover, members’ sense of
individual and collective self-efficacy, and thus their motivation to participate, is enhanced when these
organizations are empowered by successfully influencing actions taken by the community.
Other research has found that people often join and remain in a voluntary organization because
they are attracted to its activities, and that volunteers are more likely than paid workers to have high
intrinsic satisfaction (Pearce, 1983). These findings indicate volunteers’ experiences may differ from
those of their compensated counterparts and suggests it is important to examine members’ organizational
commitment. Porter, Steers, Mowday, and Boulian defined this construct as “the strength of an
individual’s identification with and involvement in a particular organization” (1974, p. 604) and
characterized it as including: a) strong belief in, and acceptance of, the organization’s goals and values,
b) willingness to exert considerable effort on behalf of the organization, and c) strong desire to maintain
organizational membership. Meyer and Allen (1984) noted research on organizational commitment has
examined two different types of commitment: affective and continuance. Affective commitment, which is
seen in terms of an emotional orientation to the organization, is likely to be expressed in high levels of
employee performance (Meyer, et al., 1989). By contrast, continuance commitment is conceptualized as
an accumulation of “side bets”, which are anything of value individuals have invested in an organization
that would be lost if they were to leave. Continuance commitment motivates employees to remain in the
job but fails to elicit performance beyond minimum requirements. Organizational commitment is
important in understanding LEMC effectiveness because it has been found to predict a variety of
participation behaviors. In an analysis of over 200 articles pertaining to organizational commitment,
Mathieu and Zajac (1990) concluded that organizational commitment has a weak but positive correlation
with attendance, but it has very strong negative correlations with two turnover-related intentions: to
search for job alternatives and to leave one’s job.
Whitney and Lindell (2000) discovered LEMC members’ attachment behaviors (attendance,
effort, and continued membership in the organization) were positively related to their affective
commitment but not their continuance commitment. In turn, affective commitment was significantly
75
influenced by effective LEMC leadership (the ability to structure team tasks, communicate clearly, and
show consideration for team members) and the LEMC members’ job related self-efficacy (perceptions of
their own competence) and role clarity (clear sense of direction in which to allocate one’s efforts). Other
factors affecting commitment included members’ identification with an LEMC’s goals (perceived hazard
vulnerability and perceived effectiveness of emergency planning) and perceived opportunity for reward
(public recognition and personal skill development). The negative findings regarding continuance
commitment do not mean that this variable is altogether irrelevant because the study assessed members’
commitment to the LEMC (which lacks the tangible rewards used to secure compliance commitment),
not to their normal jobs (which can provide such rewards). Based on the research reviewed by Mathieu
and Zajac (1990), one should expect compliance commitment to significantly predict performance on
these other jobs.
Organizational Outcomes
Organizational outcomes such as the quality, timeliness, and cost of plans and procedures are the
most direct results of individual outcomes and the planning process but there also are intermediate results
that are indicative of organizational effectiveness. These include the production of hazard and
vulnerability analyses, public information briefings, brochures, and Web sites.
Lindell and Whitney (1995) and Lindell and Meier (1994) examined different indexes of LEMC
effectiveness—chair judgments of effectiveness on six planning activities and submission of completed
plans to the State Emergency Response Commission—and found these were significantly correlated, but
nonetheless distinct. Later, Lindell, et al. (1996) examined LEMC effectiveness in terms of four criteria:
chairs’ judgments of their LEMC’s quality of performance on 13 emergency planning activities, the
percentage of vulnerable zones computed, the number of talks given by the LEMC to community groups,
and whether the LEMC had conducted an emergency exercise. This study also found the level of LEMC
performance varied significantly from one activity to another. Specifically, LEMCs were generally
effective in collecting and filing hazard data, inventorying local emergency response resources, acquiring
emergency communications equipment, and developing training for local emergency responders. By
contrast, LEMCs were relatively ineffective in developing protective action guides, analyzing air
infiltration rates for local structures, analyzing evacuation times for vulnerable areas, and promoting
community toxic chemical hazard awareness.
There are significant correlations between organizational and individual outcomes (Lindell &
Brandt, 2000). This suggests increasing members’ job satisfaction, effort, attendance, and citizenship
behaviors and reducing their turnover intentions will improve the organization’s performance. In
addition, organizational outcomes had significant correlations with external contextual variables (such as
community resources, emergency experience, and elected official support) and internal structural
variables (such as LEMC size, subcommittee structure, meeting formalization, meeting frequency, role
formalization, and computer technology). Finally, the organizational outcomes had significant
correlations with organizational climate variables (such as leader, team, role, job, and reward
characteristics). All of these correlations identify ways in which emergency managers can work with
LEMC members to improve organizational performance. In particular, emergency managers’ knowledge
of these relationships can serve as a basis for expert power in persuading other LEMC members to
change the conditions within the organization.
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LEMC Activities
The previous section has described the factors that influence emergency planning effectiveness
and later chapters will provide recommendations for the content of Emergency Operations Plans,
Recovery Operations Plans, and Hazard Mitigation Plans as described by sources such as the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (1996b), Foster (1980), Daines (1991), Lindell and Perry (1992), and
Schwab, et al. (1998). However, there is an important intermediate step that needs to be addresses—the
process of plan development as it has been recommended by Daines (1991), Federal Emergency
Management Agency (1996b), and Schwab, et al. (1998).
The development of an emergency plan is a multistage process that encompasses nine steps.
First, the local emergency manager establishes a preliminary planning schedule. Second, the CAO
publishes a planning directive. Third, the local emergency manager facilitates the organization of the
LEMC. Fourth, the local emergency manager works with LEMC members to assess disaster demands and
capabilities. This leads to a designation of the organizations responsible for each component of the
Emergency Operations Plan, Recovery Operations Plan, and Hazard Mitigation Plan and finalization of
the schedule for plan completion. Fifth, LEMC members write the components of these plans. Sixth,
LEMC members evaluate and revise the draft plans. Seventh, the local emergency manager distributes
the draft plans to collaborating organizations and other jurisdictions for community review. Last, after
the collaborating organizations and other jurisdictions have commented on the draft plans, the LEMC
revises them and publishes them in final form. Each of these steps is addressed in more detail below.
Establish a Preliminary Planning Schedule
Table 3-3 shows an example of how the emergency manager should identify the principal tasks to
be performed and the expected amount of time required to perform them. An experienced emergency
manager will be able to generate accurate time estimates, but the LEMC members will need to review
and approve them at a later date to confirm that the deadline for publication of the final plans is feasible.
Table 3-3.
Sample Preliminary Planning Schedule
Time (months)
Organize the LEMC
Assign responsibility for plan components
Assess response requirements and capabilities
Finalize planning schedule
Write plan components
Evaluate/revise the draft plan
Obtain community review
Revise/publish the final plan
0
2
4
6
[--]
[-----]
[-----]
[--]
[-----------------------]
8
10
12
[---------]
[--------]
[----------]
Disseminate a Planning Directive
Local emergency managers coordinate rather than direct the efforts of other agencies, so they
need some power base other than rewards and punishments to elicit cooperation. As noted in Chapter 2,
French and Raven (1958; Raven, 1965) contend there are four bases of power in addition to reward and
coercive power that can be used in organizations. These other bases of power are information, expert,
referent, and legitimate power. Quite obviously, reward and coercive power refer to the ability to provide
incentives for compliance and punishments for lack of compliance. Information power refers to
specialized knowledge of the state of the social or physical environment, whereas expert power refers to
77
specialized knowledge about the dynamics of the social or physical environment (and, thus an ability to
predict—and perhaps control—elements of those environments). Referent power refers to influence that
is determined by another’s liking or admiration for an individual and legitimate power is conferred when
people believe that an individual has the right to expect compliance with his or her requests.
Publication of a planning directive signed by the CAO confers legitimate power upon a local
emergency manager by indicating that specific areas of authority have been delegated. This planning
directive should be a written document that formalizes the CAO’s specific expectations about the
emergency planning process. Thus, the planning directive should contain three sections, the first of which
should state the purpose of the planning process, the legal authority under which it is being conducted,
and the specific objectives that the planning process is expected to achieve. Second, the planning
directive should describe the concept of the planning process, including a general description of the
LEMC organization, the organizations that are expected to participate in plan development, and the local
emergency manager’s authority as the CAO’s representative in this area. Last, the planning directive
should address the procedure for plan approval and the anticipated deadline for publication of the final
plan. Even though the planning directive is signed by the CAO, it is often drafted by the emergency
manager.
Organize the LEMC
The emergency manager should request a representative from each of the governmental agencies,
NGOs, and private sector organizations that have been designated in the planning directive as having
significant emergency response capabilities or hazard vulnerabilities. The enumeration of all relevant
organizations in the planning directive is especially important because public safety agencies such as
police and fire are likely to participate in any event, but other local organizations are likely to participate
only if directed by the CAO (Kartez & Lindell, 1990). A typical list of such organizations can be found
in Table 3-4.
Table 3-4.
Organizations Typically Participating in LEMCs.
Fire
Police
Emergency medical services
Public works
Land use planning
Building construction
Chief Administrative Officer’s office
Public health
Local elected officials
Local utilities (gas, electric power, telephone)
Red Cross
Hospitals
Nursing homes
Schools
News media
Environmental groups
Local industry
Labor unions
Members of these organizations should work part-time (a few hours a month) for the LEMC
while continuing their jobs in their normal organizations. Once the LEMC has been established, the
emergency manager should work with the members to select officers such as a Chair, Vice-Chair,
Information Coordinator, and subcommittee chairs. As with other organizations, the Chair presides over
meetings and represents the organization to senior elected and appointed government officials, the heads
of private sector organizations within the jurisdiction, the news media, and the public. In addition, the
LEMC Chair represents the LEMC to other jurisdictions and to state and federal agencies. The ViceChair performs these duties when the Chair is absent, but the Vice-Chair’s primary role is to take a more
active role in the management of the internal affairs of the LEMC. The Secretary serves in a role that is
78
not a clerical position but is instead responsible for ensuring meetings are scheduled and written minutes
of the meeting are recorded. In addition, the Secretary is the principal point of contact for information
about hazards and vulnerability, the planning process, and planning products. The Information
Coordinator might even be the person who is responsible for monitoring the LEMC’s budget.
LEMCs tend to be more effective when members are assigned to specific activities rather than
having everyone contribute to all tasks. Thus all LEMCs should have subcommittees, but each one
should determine for itself what is the most appropriate division of labor for its own situation. Most
communities are likely to find it useful to have a Hazard/Vulnerability Analysis committee; a Planning,
Training, and Exercising committee; a Recovery and Mitigation committee; a Public Education and
Outreach committee; and an Executive committee.
The Hazard/Vulnerability Analysis committee is responsible for identifying the hazards to which
the community is exposed and the vulnerability of residential, commercial, and industrial structures and
infrastructure (fuel, electric power, water, sewer, telecommunications, and transportation) to these
hazards. In addition, the Hazard/Vulnerability Analysis committee should also identify any secondary
hazards that could be caused by a primary disaster impact. These secondary hazards would include, for
example, earthquake-initiated hazardous materials releases from chemical facilities and earthquakeinitiated dam failures that cause flooding in low-lying areas. The Hazard/Vulnerability Analysis
committee also should identify the locations of facilities such as schools, hospitals, nursing homes, and
jails whose populations are vulnerable because of the limited mobility of their resident populations, as
well as the locations of other facilities with vulnerable non-resident populations. A sample of such
facilities is listed in Table 6-1.
The initial task of the Planning, Training, and Exercising committee is to write the Emergency
Operations Plan (EOP). This committee should also coordinate the identification of facilities and
equipment that are needed for disaster response. A major focus here will be on a jurisdictional
emergency operations center (EOC). In addition, the Planning, Training, and Exercising committee
should develop a training program to enhance emergency responders’ capabilities. The Planning,
Training, and Exercising committee only needs to develop training materials for disaster-related tasks
that are not performed during normal operations or routine emergencies (both of which are addressed in
departmental training). That is, they must develop training that provides an overview of disaster response
and also enhances skills required for tasks that are infrequently performed, difficult, and critical to the
success of the emergency response organization. They can either develop the necessary training materials
for themselves or obtain them from other sources. Finally, the Planning, Training, and Exercising
committee must test the implementability of the plan through drills and exercises. To accomplish these
tasks, the Planning, Training, and Exercising committee should recruit representatives from the primary
emergency response and public health agencies.
The Recovery and Mitigation committee has the responsibility for developing a preimpact
recovery plan that will facilitate a rapid restoration of the community to normal functioning after disaster.
Recovery planning is often erroneously thought of as an activity that can be postponed until after a
disaster strikes, but practitioners have argued that there are many recovery tasks that can (and should) be
addressed during preimpact planning (Schwab, et al., 1998) and this contention has been supported by
recent research (Wu & Lindell, 2004). In addition, the Recovery and Mitigation committee is responsible
for identifying mitigation projects that will reduce the community’s vulnerability to environmental
hazards. Some mitigation projects can probably be implemented before a disaster occurs, but others will
79
need to be planned for implementation in conjunction with disaster recovery. To accomplish these
functions, the Recovery and Mitigation committee should have representatives from public works,
community development, land use planning, and building construction agencies.
The Public Education and Outreach committee is responsible for risk communication with the
news media and the public. Thus, its members should summarize the findings of the
Hazard/Vulnerability Analysis committee that identify the community’s principal hazards and its most
vulnerable locations and demographic groups. The Public Education and Outreach committee should also
develop a description of the activities of the Planning, Training and Exercising committee and an
explanation of how these will provide a capability for prompt and effective emergency response to the
community’s hazards. Finally, the Public Education and Outreach committee should describe the
activities of the Recovery and Mitigation Committee and an explanation of how these will provide a
capability for prompt and effective emergency recovery from a disaster. Public Education and Outreach
committee members should use this information about the community’s hazards and the hazard
adjustments (preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation) that will protect the community to
construct nontechnical summaries that can be understood by households and businesses throughout the
community. The Public Education and Outreach committee should develop slides or other graphic
presentations to support talks to community groups, as well as brochures to be distributed to households
and businesses.
The Executive committee is responsible for ensuring the LEMC sets specific, achievable
objectives each year and accomplishes those objectives through an efficient expenditure of resources.
Accordingly, the Executive committee will consist of the LEMC’s principal officers—Chair, Vice-Chair,
Secretary, and subcommittee chairs. In addition to planning, organizing, directing, and monitoring the
internal activities of the LEMC, the Executive committee needs to obtain the resources—especially the
funds—to support the LEMC’s activities. Although most of the work of the LEMC is performed by
personnel who are already being paid through their primary work organizations, there often are additional
expenses for acquiring computer hardware and software, training materials, and travel for outside
training. In addition, there are likely to be expenses for producing and printing public education
brochures and other such materials. Sometimes government agencies or private organizations
participating in the LEMC are willing to pay for some of these expenses from their budgets, but many
times other sources of revenue such as filing fees from hazardous materials facilities are needed.
A critical step in the process of organizing the LEMC is to conduct a planning orientation so the
members of the LEMC will develop a common understanding of the process. In preparation for the
planning orientation, local emergency managers should anticipate two very important obstacles to
emergency planning (Daines, 1991). First, they should recognize that planning agencies lack emergency
response experience. Second, they should be aware that emergency response agencies often lack disaster
planning experience because they tend to rely on standard operating procedures and improvisation for
minor emergencies. In addition, few—if any—LEMC members are likely to be aware of the planning
resources available from state and federal agencies, as well as from other sources. Thus, the local
emergency manager should introduce LEMC members to the basic tenets of the state’s Emergency
Operations Plan, Disaster Recovery Plan, and Hazard Mitigation Plan, as well as provide copies of the
state’s planning guidance in each of these areas. Similarly, the emergency manager should introduce
LEMC members to the basic tenets of the National Response Plan, as well FEMA response, recovery,
and mitigation programs and planning guidance.
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Assess Response Requirements and Capabilities
Before beginning to write the EOP, Recovery Operations Plan, or Hazard Mitigation Plan,
LEMC members need to identify the functions that need to be performed in a community-wide
emergency. Information about the likely impact locations as well as the impact scope (area affected) and
intensity will be produced by the hazard/vulnerability analyses. These analyses will also identify the
residential, commercial, and industrial activities in the exposed locations, as well as locations that could
produce secondary hazards (e.g., dam failures or chemical releases) or that have especially vulnerable
populations (e.g., schools, hospital, nursing homes, jails).
In addition, this assessment of response requirements needs to address the likely responses of
households and businesses in disaster. As will be discussed in Chapter 8, there are widespread
misconceptions—frequently labeled disaster myths—about the ways in which people respond to
disasters. Though there is some small kernel of truth in these beliefs, the incidence of individually and
socially maladaptive behavior is substantially exaggerated. According to Dynes (1972), households and
businesses are the foundation of community emergency response and these organizations respond
•
•
•
•
In their normal forms to perform their normal tasks (existing organizations),
In their normal forms to perform new tasks (extending organizations),
In new forms to perform their normal tasks (expanding organizations), or
In new forms to perform new tasks (emerging organizations).
In addition, community organizations link to form emergent multiorganizational networks
(EMONs, Drabek, et al., 1981). Thus, the mission of the LEMC can be conceived as one of developing a
planned multiorganizational network that can be adapted as needed to the demands of each incident
involving emergency response and disaster recovery.
In addition, representatives of the different agencies may have misconceptions about the
capabilities of other agencies within their jurisdiction or of agencies at other levels (e.g., state and
federal) of government. Consequently, the emergency manager needs to assist the LEMC in addressing
these issues systematically so plans will be based upon realistic assumptions about what needs to be done
and who will be able to do it (Dynes, et al., 1972).
Write Plan Components
As the previous discussion indicates, there will be three plans, the EOP, the Recovery Operations
Plan, and the Hazard Mitigation Plan The emergency manager should work with the cognizant
committees (especially the Planning, Training, and Exercising Committee and the Recovery and
Mitigation Committee) to ensure they have the appropriate persons to draft the components (basic plan,
annexes, and appendixes) of each plan. In addition, the emergency manager should provide guidance
regarding the structure and content of the plans, as well as resources that committee members can use as
they write the plan components. The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (1996b) Guide for AllHazard Emergency Operations Planning is a useful source for the EOP (see also National Response
Team, 1987, for hazardous materials planning and US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1980, for
nuclear emergency planning) and Schwab, et al. (1998) provide guidance for the development of the
Recovery Operations Plan, especially the integration of hazard mitigation into disaster recovery.
In most cases, the emergency manager will draft the basic plan and the representatives of each
organization will draft the annexes that pertain to their agencies. For example, the police will draft the
EOP annex on law enforcement, whereas the land use planning department should write the Recovery
Operations Plan annex on temporary housing. Each of the relevant committees—especially the Planning,
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Training and Exercising Committee and the Recovery and Mitigation Committee, and the LEMC as a
whole—should set performance goals collaboratively to ensure that all members are committed to them.
These goals should be challenging enough to motivate high levels of performance and should be specific
enough that people can determine whether they are making progress in achieving the goals. Goal
achievement should be formally evaluated regularly to determine if the planning schedule is being met
and achievements should be discussed annually with the jurisdiction’s CAO.
Evaluate/Revise the Draft Plans
The emergency manager should ensure that all draft plans—the EOP, the Recovery Operations
Plan, the Hazard Mitigation Plan, and relevant sections of the community’s comprehensive plan that
contain sections affecting hazard mitigation—are reviewed by other committees within the LEMC to
identify potential conflicts between agency task allocations and their resource capabilities, or conflicts
between the provisions of one plan and another.
Obtain Community Review
Once the draft plans have been reviewed within the LEMC, the local emergency manager should
release them for wider review throughout the community. Working in coordination with the Public
Education and Outreach committee, the emergency manager should make copies available at libraries and
other public facilities throughout the community so households and businesses can examine them in
detail. Of course, it is essential that people be notified that the draft plans are available for review and
comment. Thus, the Public Education and Outreach committee should make a major effort to meet with
neighborhood groups (e.g., community councils, Parent-Teacher Associations) and service organizations
(e.g., Rotary, Kiwanis, Chamber of Commerce) to summarize the hazard/vulnerability analysis process
and its results, as well as the planning process and the general provisions of the draft plans for
preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. People should be given an adequate amount of time to
review the plans and provide comments. In addition, the emergency manager should ensure that at least
one public meeting is held at which individuals and organizations from throughout the community can
provide oral comments concerning the draft plans. Such comments should be transcribed and retained in
the LEMC’s archives.
Revise/Publish the Final Plans
The local emergency manager should ensure that all input from the community review is
forwarded to the appropriate committees so they can address any identified problems in the final versions
of the EOP, the Recovery Operations Plan, and the Hazard Mitigation Plan. Wherever possible, it is
useful to provide a document to accompany each final plan that categorizes the comments received and
explains how they were incorporated into the plan or, if that is not possible, explains why specific
comments could not be addressed. Once all changes have been made in the plan, it should be submitted
to the CAO or local governing body for their approval. At this point, final approval is usually indicated
by a page containing the signatures of the jurisdiction’s senior authorities. Copies of the final plans and
accompanying documents should be forwarded to all government agencies and other participating
organizations (e.g., American Red Cross) having designated roles in the plans. Additional copies of the
final plans and accompanying documents should be deposited in the same locations as the draft plans so
these documents will accessible to households and businesses throughout the jurisdiction.
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Case Study: Emergency Management in Smith Hill
Gillespie, et al. (1993) examined the emergency preparedness in Smith Hill (a pseudonym), a St.
Louis suburb with a population less than 10,000. The city had a very small tax base and, thus, a very
small budget. Elected officials gave low priority to emergency management, so the city did not allocate
enough funding to emergency management to qualify for state matching funds. Moreover, the city did not
attend the meetings of other interorganizational networks such as the Municipal League, the Disaster
Resource Council, and the Regional Emergency Planning Council. When the researchers contacted the
city to obtain information about its emergency management program, they were initially directed to the
city building commissioner. After arriving for an interview with him, they were redirected to the chief of
police and ultimately interviewed a group of six municipal officials—all of whom were assigned
emergency management responsibilities as collateral duties. The city had an EOP developed from FEMA
guidance, but the organization chart was hand drawn and had not been updated for years. Questioning by
the researchers revealed the chart bore no resemblance to the roles the interviewees expected to perform
in a disaster. Indeed, the person responsible for city streets was expected to fill most of the positions in
the emergency response organization, the police chief was expected to fill two more positions, and the
rest were not assigned to any specific individuals. The Smith Hill emergency management organization,
such as it was, had direct links only to a fire protection district, its municipal police department, the
county medical examiner, and a nearby regional hospital (whose name was identified only after an
extended discussion among the interviewees). The Smith Hill emergency management organization had
only two structurally unique organizations to connect it (indirectly) to the regional emergency
management network and only after extensive probing of the interviewees were they able to name any
other organizations that should be added to their contact list. The Smith Hill EOP contained no formal
mutual aid agreements, even though the interviewees expected to be able to borrow equipment from
neighboring jurisdictions in a disaster.
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