A TREATISE CONCERNING THE
PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
George Berkeley
Edited by David R. Wilkins
2002
NOTE ON THE TEXT
This edition is based on the edition of the Treatise concerning the principles of human
knowledge published by Jacob Tonson in 1734, and generally follows that edition in spelling,
capitalization and punctuation (though a small number of changes in punctuation have been
introduced where considered appropriate).
David R. Wilkins
Dublin, November 2002
iii
A
TREATISE
Concerning the
PRINCIPLES
OF
HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.
WHEREIN THE
Chief Causes of Error and Difficulty in the Sciences,
with the Grounds of Scepticism, Atheism, and
Irreligion are inquired into.
First Printed in the Year 1710.
To which are added
Three Dialogues
BETWEEN
Hylas and Philonous,
In Opposition to
SCEPTICKS and ATHEISTS.
First Printed in the Year 1713.
Both written by GEORGE BERKELEY, M. A.
Fellow of Trinity-College, Dublin.
LONDON : Printed for Jacob Tonson, 1734.
INTRODUCTION.
I. PHILOSOPHY being nothing else but the study of Wisdom and Truth, it may with
reason be expected, that those who have spent most Time and Pains in it should enjoy a
greater calm and serenity of Mind, a greater clearness and evidence of Knowledge, and be
less disturbed with Doubts and Difficulties than other Men. Yet so it is we see the Illiterate
Bulk of Mankind that walk the High-road of plain, common Sense, and are governed by
the Dictates of Nature, for the most part easy and undisturbed. To them nothing that’s
familiar appears unaccountable or difficult to comprehend. They complain not of any want
of Evidence in their Senses, and are out of all danger of becoming Sceptics. But no sooner
do we depart from Sense and Instinct to follow the Light of a Superior Principle, to reason,
meditate, and reflect on the Nature of Things, but a thousand Scruples spring up in our
Minds, concerning those Things which before we seemed fully to comprehend. Prejudices
and Errors of Sense do from all Parts discover themselves to our view; and endeavouring to
correct these by Reason we are insensibly drawn into uncouth Paradoxes, Difficulties, and
Inconsistencies, which multiply and grow upon us as we advance in Speculation; till at length,
having wander’d through many intricate Mazes, we find our selves just where we were, or,
which is worse, sit down in a forlorn Scepticism.
II. The cause of this is thought to be the Obscurity of things, or the natural Weakness
and Imperfection of our Understandings. It is said the Faculties we have are few, and those
designed by Nature for the Support and Comfort of Life, and not to penetrate into the inward
Essence and Constitution of Things. Besides, the Mind of Man being Finite, when it treats
of Things which partake of Infinity, it is not to be wondered at, if it run into Absurdities and
Contradictions; out of which it is impossible it should ever extricate it self, it being of the
nature of Infinite not to be comprehended by that which is Finite.
III. But perhaps we may be too partial to our selves in placing the Fault originally in our
Faculties, and not rather in the wrong use we make of them. It is a hard thing to suppose,
that right Deductions from true Principles should ever end in Consequences which cannot
be maintained or made consistent. We should believe that God has dealt more bountifully
with the Sons of Men, than to give them a strong desire for that Knowledge, which he had
placed quite out of their reach. This were not agreeable to the wonted, indulgent Methods of
Providence, which, whatever Appetites it may have implanted in the Creatures, doth usually
furnish them with such means as, if rightly made use of, will not fail to satisfy them. Upon
the whole, I am inclined to think that the far greater Part, if not all, of those Difficulties
which have hitherto amus’d Philosophers, and block’d up the way to Knowledge, are intirely
owing to our selves. That we have first rais’d a Dust, and then complain, we cannot see.
IV. My Purpose therefore is, to try if I can discover what those Principles are, which have
introduced all that Doubtfulness and Uncertainty, those Absurdities and Contradictions into
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the several Sects of Philosophy; insomuch that the Wisest Men have thought our Ignorance
incurable, conceiving it to arise from the natural dulness and limitation of our Faculties.
And surely it is a Work well deserving our Pains, to make a strict inquiry concerning the first
Principles of Humane Knowledge, to sift and examine them on all sides: especially since there
may be some Grounds to suspect that those Lets and Difficulties, which stay and embarass
the Mind in its search after Truth, do not spring from any Darkness and Intricacy in the
Objects, or natural Defect in the Understanding, so much as from false Principles which have
been insisted on, and might have been avoided.
V. How difficult and discouraging soever this Attempt may seem, when I consider how
many great and extraordinary Men have gone before me in the same Designs: Yet I am
not without some Hopes, upon the Consideration that the largest Views are not always the
Clearest, and that he who is Short-sighted will be obliged to draw the Object nearer, and
may, perhaps, by a close and narrow Survey discern that which had escaped far better Eyes.
VI. In order to prepare the Mind of the Reader for the easier conceiving what follows, it
is proper to premise somewhat, by way of Introduction, concerning the Nature and Abuse of
Language. But the unraveling this Matter leads me in some measure to anticipate my Design,
by taking notice of what seems to have had a chief part in rendering Speculation intricate
and perplexed, and to have occasioned innumerable Errors and Difficulties in almost all parts
of Knowledge. And that is the opinion that the Mind hath a power of framing Abstract Ideas
or Notions of Things. He who is not a perfect Stranger to the Writings and Disputes of
Philosophers, must needs acknowledge that no small part of them are spent about abstract
Ideas. These are in a more especial manner, thought to be the Object of those Sciences which
go by the name of Logic and Metaphysics, and of all that which passes under the Notion of
the most abstracted and sublime Learning, in all which one shall scarce find any Question
handled in such a manner, as does not suppose their Existence in the Mind, and that it is
well acquainted with them.
VII. It is agreed on all hands, that the Qualities or Modes of things do never really
exist each of them apart by it self, and separated from all others, but are mix’d, as it were,
and blended together, several in the same Object. But we are told, the Mind being able
to consider each Quality singly, or abstracted from those other Qualities with which it is
united, does by that means frame to it self abstract Ideas. For example, there is perceived
by Sight an Object extended, coloured, and moved: This mix’d or compound Idea the mind
resolving into its Simple, constituent Parts, and viewing each by it self, exclusive of the rest,
does frame the abstract Ideas of Extension, Colour, and Motion. Not that it is possible for
Colour or Motion to exist without Extension: but only that the Mind can frame to it self
by Abstraction the Idea of Colour exclusive of Extension, and of Motion exclusive of both
Colour and Extension.
VIII. Again, the Mind having observed that in the particular Extensions perceiv’d by
Sense, there is something common and alike in all, and some other things peculiar, as this
or that Figure or Magnitude, which distinguish them one from another; it considers apart or
singles out by it self that which is common, making thereof a most abstract Idea of Extension,
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which is neither Line, Surface, nor Solid, nor has any Figure or Magnitude but is an Idea
intirely prescinded from all these. So likewise the Mind by leaving out of the particular Colours
perceived by Sense, that which distinguishes them one from another, and retaining that only
which is common to all, makes an Idea of Colour in abstract which is neither Red, nor Blue,
nor White, nor any other determinate Colour. And in like manner by considering Motion
abstractedly not only from the Body moved, but likewise from the Figure it describes, and
all particular Directions and Velocities, the abstract Idea of Motion is framed; which equally
corresponds to all particular Motions whatsoever that may be perceived by Sense.
IX. And as the Mind frames to it self abstract Ideas of Qualities or Modes, so does it,
by the same precision or mental Separation, attain abstract Ideas of the more compounded
Beings, which include several coexistent Qualities. For example, the Mind having observed
that Peter, James, and John, resemble each other, in certain common Agreements of Shape
and other Qualities, leaves out of the complex or compounded Idea it has of Peter, James,
and any other particular Man, that which is peculiar to each, retaining only what is common
to all; and so makes an abstract Idea wherein all the particulars equally partake, abstracting
intirely from and cutting off all those Circumstances and Differences, which might determine
it to any particular Existence. And after this manner it is said we come by the abstract Idea
of Man or, if you please, Humanity, or Humane Nature; wherein it is true there is included
Colour, because there is no Man but has some Colour, but then it can be neither White, nor
Black, nor any particular Colour; because there is no one particular Colour wherein all Men
partake. So likewise there is included Stature, but then it is neither Tall Stature nor Low
Stature, nor yet Middle Stature, but something abstracted from all these. And so of the rest.
Moreover, there being a great variety of other Creatures that partake in some Parts, but not
all, of the complex Idea of Man, the Mind leaving out those Parts which are peculiar to Men,
and retaining those only which are common to all the living Creatures, frameth the Idea of
Animal, which abstracts not only from all particular Men, but also all Birds, Beasts, Fishes,
and Insects. The constituent Parts of the abstract Idea of Animal are Body, Life, Sense,
and Spontaneous Motion. By Body is meant, Body without any particular Shape or Figure,
there being no one Shape or Figure common to all Animals, without Covering, either of Hair,
or Feathers, or Scales, &c. nor yet Naked: Hair, Feathers, Scales, and Nakedness being the
distinguishing Properties of particular Animals, and for that reason left out of the Abstract
Idea. Upon the same account the spontaneous Motion must be neither Walking, nor Flying,
nor Creeping, it is nevertheless a Motion, but what that Motion is, it is not easy to conceive.
X. Whether others have this wonderful Faculty of Abstracting their Ideas, they best can
tell: For my self I find indeed I have a Faculty of imagining, or representing to myself the
Ideas of those particular things I have perceived and of variously compounding and dividing
them. I can imagine a Man with Two Heads or the upper parts of a Man joined to the
Body of a Horse. I can consider the Hand, the Eye, the Nose, each by it self abstracted or
separated from the rest of the Body. But then whatever Hand or Eye I imagine, it must have
some particular Shape and Colour. Likewise the Idea of Man that I frame to my self, must
be either of a White, or a Black, or a Tawny, a Straight, or a Crooked, a Tall, or a Low,
or a Middle-sized Man. I cannot by any effort of Thought conceive the abstract Idea above
described. And it is equally impossible for me to form the abstract Idea of Motion distinct
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from the Body moving, and which is neither Swift nor Slow, Curvilinear nor Rectilinear;
and the like may be said of all other abstract general Ideas whatsoever. To be plain, I own
my self able to abstract in one Sense, as when I consider some particular Parts or Qualities
separated from others, with which though they are united in some Object, yet, it is possible
they may really Exist without them. But I deny that I can abstract one from another, or
conceive separately, those Qualities which it is impossible should Exist so separated; or that I
can frame a General Notion by abstracting from Particulars in the manner aforesaid. Which
two last are the proper Acceptations of Abstraction. And there are Grounds to think most
Men will acknowledge themselves to be in my Case. The Generality of Men which are Simple
and Illiterate never pretend to abstract Notions. It is said they are difficult and not to be
attained without Pains and Study. We may therefore reasonably conclude that, if such there
be, they are confined only to the Learned.
XI. I proceed to examine what can be alledged in defence of the Doctrine of Abstraction,
and try if I can discover what it is that inclines the Men of Speculation to embrace an Opinion,
so remote from common Sense as that seems to be. There has been a late deservedly Esteemed
Philosopher, who, no doubt, has given it very much Countenance by seeming to think the
having abstract general Ideas is what puts the widest difference in point of Understanding
betwixt Man and Beast. “The having of general Ideas” (saith he) “is that which puts a perfect
distinction betwixt Man and Brutes, and is an Excellency which the Faculties of Brutes do
by no means attain unto. For it is evident we observe no Footsteps in them of making use of
general Signs for universal Ideas; from which we have reason to imagine that they have not
the Faculty of abstracting or making general Ideas, since they have no use of Words or any
other general Signs.” And a little after. “Therefore, I think, we may suppose that it is in
this that the Species of Brutes are discriminated from Men, and ’tis that proper difference
wherein they are wholly separated, and which at last widens to so wide a Distance. For if
they have any Ideas at all, and are not bare Machines (as some would have them) we cannot
deny them to have some Reason. It seems as evident to me that they do some of them in
certain Instances reason as that they have Sense, but it is only in particular Ideas, just as
they receive them from their Senses. They are the best of them tied up within those narrow
Bounds, and have not (as I think) the Faculty to enlarge them by any kind of Abstraction.”
Essay on Hum. Underst. B. 2. C. 11. Sect. 10 and 11. I readily agree with this Learned
Author, that the Faculties of Brutes can by no means attain to Abstraction. But then if this
be made the distinguishing property of that sort of Animals, I fear a great many of those
that pass for Men must be reckoned into their number. The reason that is here assigned
why we have no Grounds to think Brutes have Abstract general Ideas, is that we observe
in them no use of Words or any other general Signs; which is built on this Supposition, to
wit, that the making use of Words, implies the having general Ideas. From which it follows,
that Men who use Language are able to Abstract or Generalize their Ideas. That this is the
Sense and Arguing of the Author will further appear by his answering the Question he in
another place puts. “Since all things that exist are only Particulars, how come we by general
Terms?” His Answer is, “Words become general by being made the Signs of general Ideas.”
Essay on Hum. Underst. B. 3. C. 3 Sect. 6. But it seems that a Word becomes general by
being made the Sign, not of an abstract general Idea but, of several particular Ideas, any
one of which it indifferently suggests to the Mind. For Example, When it is said the change
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of Motion is proportional to the impressed force, or that whatever has Extension is divisible;
these Propositions are to be understood of Motion and Extension in general, and nevertheless
it will not follow that they suggest to my Thoughts an Idea of Motion without a Body moved,
or any determinate Direction and Velocity, or that I must conceive an abstract general Idea
of Extension, which is neither Line, Surface nor Solid, neither Great nor Small, Black, White,
nor Red, nor of any other determinate Colour. It is only implied that whatever Motion I
consider, whether it be Swift or Slow, Perpendicular, Horizontal or Oblique, or in whatever
Object, the Axiom concerning it holds equally true. As does the other of every particular
Extension, it matters not whether Line, Surface or Solid, whether of this or that Magnitude
or Figure.
XII. By observing how Ideas become general, we may the better judge how Words are
made so. And here it is to be noted that I do not deny absolutely there are general Ideas, but
only that there are any abstract general Ideas: For in the Passages above quoted, wherein
there is mention of general Ideas, it is always supposed that they are formed by Abstraction,
after the manner set forth in Sect. VIII and IX. Now if we will annex a meaning to our Words,
and speak only of what we can conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge, that an Idea, which
considered in it self is particular, becomes general, by being made to represent or stand for
all other particular Ideas of the same sort. To make this plain by an Example, suppose a
Geometrician is demonstrating the Method, of cutting a Line in two equal Parts. He draws,
for Instance, a Black Line of an Inch in Length, this which in it self is a particular Line is
nevertheless with regard to its signification General, since as it is there used, it represents all
particular Lines whatsoever; so that what is demonstrated of it, is demonstrated of all Lines,
or, in other Words, of a Line in General. And as that particular Line becomes General, by
being made a Sign, so the name Line which taken absolutely is particular, by being a Sign is
made General. And as the former owes its Generality, not to its being the Sign of an abstract
or general Line, but of all particular right Lines that may possibly exist, so the latter must be
thought to derive its Generality from the same Cause, namely, the various particular Lines
which it indifferently denotes.
XIII. To give the Reader a yet clearer View of the Nature of abstract Ideas, and the
Uses they are thought necessary to, I shall add one more Passage out of the Essay on Human
Understanding, which is as follows. “Abstract Ideas are not so obvious or easy to Children or
the yet unexercised Mind as particular ones. If they seem so to grown Men, it is only because
by constant and familiar Use they are made so. For when we nicely reflect upon them, we
shall find that general Ideas are Fictions and Contrivances of the Mind, that carry Difficulty
with them, and do not so easily offer themselves, as we are apt to imagine. For Example,
Does it not require some Pains and Skill to form the general Idea of a Triangle (which is
yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive and difficult) for it must be neither Oblique
nor Rectangle, neither Equilateral, Equicrural, nor Scalenon, but all and none of these at
once? In effect, it is something imperfect that cannot exist, an Idea wherein some Parts of
several different and inconsistent Ideas are put together. It is true the Mind in this imperfect
State has need of such Ideas, and makes all the haste to them it can, for the conveniency
of Communication and Enlargement of Knowledge, to both which it is naturally very much
inclined. But yet one has reason to suspect such Ideas are Marks of our Imperfection. At
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least this is enough to shew that the most abstract and general Ideas are not those that the
Mind is first and most easily acquainted with, nor such as its earliest Knowledge is conversant
about.” B. 4. C. 7. Sect. 9. If any Man has the Faculty of framing in his Mind such an
Idea of a Triangle as is here described, it is in vain to pretend to dispute him out of it, nor
would I go about it. All I desire is, that the Reader would fully and certainly inform himself
whether he has such an Idea or no. And this, methinks, can be no hard Task for anyone to
perform. What more easy than for anyone to look a little into his own Thoughts, and there
try whether he has, or can attain to have, an Idea that shall correspond with the description
that is here given of the general Idea of a Triangle, which is, neither Oblique, nor Rectangle,
Equilateral, Equicrural, nor Scalenon, but all and none of these at once?
XIV. Much is here said of the Difficulty that abstract Ideas carry with them, and the
Pains and Skill requisite to the forming them. And it is on all Hands agreed that there is
need of great Toil and Labour of the Mind, to emancipate our Thoughts from particular
Objects, and raise them to those sublime Speculations that are conversant about abstract
Ideas. From all which the natural Consequence should seem to be, that so difficult a thing
as the forming abstract Ideas was not necessary for Communication, which is so easy and
familiar to all sorts of Men. But we are told, if they seem obvious and easy to grown Men,
It is only because by constant and familiar use they are made so. Now I would fain know at
what time it is, Men are imployed in surmounting that Difficulty, and furnishing themselves
with those necessary helps for Discourse. It cannot be when they are grown up, for then it
seems they are not conscious of any such Pains-taking; it remains therefore to be the business
of their Childhood. And surely, the great and multiplied Labour of framing abstract Notions,
will be found a hard Task for that tender Age. Is it not a hard thing to imagine, that a couple
of Children cannot prate together, of their Sugar-plumbs and Rattles and the rest of their
little Trinkets, till they have first tacked together numberless Inconsistencies, and so framed
in their Minds abstract general Ideas, and annexed them to every common Name they make
use of?
XV. Nor do I think them a whit more needful for the Enlargement of Knowledge than for
Communication. It is I know a Point much insisted on, that all Knowledge and Demonstration
are about universal Notions, to which I fully agree: But then it doth not appear to me that
those Notions are formed by Abstraction in the manner premised; Universality, so far as I can
comprehend, not consisting in the absolute, positive Nature or Conception of any thing, but
in the relation it bears to the Particulars signified or represented by it: By virtue whereof it is
that Things, Names, or Notions, being in their own Nature Particular, are rendered Universal.
Thus when I demonstrate any Proposition concerning Triangles, it is to be supposed that I
have in view the universal Idea of a Triangle; which ought not to be understood as if I could
frame an Idea of a Triangle which was neither Equilateral nor Scalenon nor Equicrural. But
only that the particular Triangle I consider, whether of this or that sort it matters not, doth
equally stand for and represent all Rectilinear Triangles whatsoever, and is in that sense
Universal. All which seems very Plain and not to include any Difficulty in it.
XVI. But here it will be demanded, how we can know any Proposition to be true of
all particular Triangles, except we have first seen it demonstrated of the abstract Idea of
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a Triangle which equally agrees to all? For because a Property may be demonstrated to
agree to some one particular Triangle, it will not thence follow that it equally belongs to
any other Triangle, which in all respects is not the same with it. For Example, Having
demonstrated that the three Angles of an Isosceles Rectangular Triangle are equal to two
right Ones, I cannot therefore conclude this Affection agrees to all other Triangles, which
have neither a right Angle, nor two equal Sides. It seems therefore that, to be certain this
Proposition is universally true, we must either make a particular Demonstration for every
particular Triangle, which is impossible, or once for all demonstrate it of the abstract Idea of
a Triangle, in which all the Particulars do indifferently partake, and by which they are all
equally represented. To which I answer, that though the Idea I have in view whilst I make
the Demonstration, be, for instance, that of an Isosceles Rectangular Triangle, whose Sides
are of a determinate Length, I may nevertheless be certain it extends to all other Rectilinear
Triangles, of what Sort or Bigness soever. And that, because neither the right Angle, nor the
Equality, nor determinate Length of the Sides, are at all concerned in the Demonstration. It
is true, the Diagram I have in view includes all these Particulars, but then there is not the
least mention made of them in the Proof of the Proposition. It is not said, the three Angles
are equal to two right Ones, because one of them is a right Angle, or because the Sides
comprehending it are of the same Length. Which sufficiently shews that the right Angle
might have been Oblique, and the Sides unequal, and for all that the Demonstration have
held good. And for this reason it is, that I conclude that to be true of any Obliquangular or
Scalenon, which I had demonstrated of a particular Right-angled, Equicrural Triangle; and
not because I demonstrated the Proposition of the abstract Idea of a Triangle. And here
it must be acknowledged that a Man may consider a Figure merely as triangular, without
attending to the particular Qualities of the Angles, or relations of the Sides. So far he may
abstract: But this will never prove, that he can frame an abstract general inconsistent Idea
of a Triangle. In like manner we may consider Peter so far forth as Man, or so far forth as
Animal, without framing the forementioned abstract Idea, either of Man or of Animal, in as
much as all that is perceived is not considered.
XVII. It were an endless, as well as an useless Thing, to trace the Schoolmen, those
great Masters of Abstraction, through all the manifold inextricable Labyrinths of Error and
Dispute, which their Doctrine of abstract Natures and Notions seems to have led them into.
What Bickerings and Controversies, and what a learned Dust have been raised about those
Matters, and what mighty Advantage hath been from thence derived to Mankind, are things
at this Day too clearly known to need being insisted on. And it had been well if the ill
Effects of that Doctrine were confined to those only who make the most avowed Profession
of it. When Men consider the great Pains, Industry and Parts, that have for so many Ages
been laid out on the Cultivation and Advancement of the Sciences, and that notwithstanding
all this, the far greater Part of them remain full of Darkness and Uncertainty, and Disputes
that are like never to have an end, and even those that are thought to be supported by
the most clear and cogent Demonstrations, contain in them Paradoxes which are perfectly
irreconcilable to the Understandings of Men, and that taking all together, a small Portion of
them doth supply any real Benefit to Mankind, otherwise than by being an innocent Diversion
and Amusement: I say, the Consideration of all this is apt to throw them into a Despondency,
and perfect Contempt of all Study. But this may perhaps cease, upon a view of the false
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Principles that have obtained in the World, amongst all which there is none, methinks, hath
a more wide Influence over the Thoughts of Speculative Men, than this of abstract general
Ideas.
XVIII. I come now to consider the Source of this prevailing Notion, and that seems to
me to be Language. And surely nothing of less extent than Reason it self could have been the
Source of an Opinion so universally received. The truth of this appears as from other Reasons,
so also from the plain Confession of the ablest Patrons of abstract Ideas, who acknowledge
that they are made in order to naming; from which it is a clear Consequence, that if there
had been no such thing as Speech or Universal Signs, there never had been any thought of
Abstraction. See B. 3. C. 6. Sect. 39. and elsewhere of the Essay on Human Understanding.
Let us therefore examine the manner wherein Words have contributed to the Origin of that
Mistake. First then, ’Tis thought that every Name hath, or ought to have, one only precise
and settled Signification, which inclines Men to think there are certain abstract, determinate
Ideas, which constitute the true and only immediate Signification of each general Name. And
that it is by the mediation of these abstract Ideas, that a general Name comes to signify
any particular Thing. Whereas, in truth, there is no such thing as one precise and definite
Signification annexed to any general Name, they all signifying indifferently a great number
of particular Ideas. All which doth evidently follow from what has been already said, and
will clearly appear to anyone by a little Reflexion. To this it will be objected, that every
Name that has a Definition, is thereby restrained to one certain Signification. For Example,
a Triangle is defined to be a plain Surface comprehended by three right Lines; by which that
Name is limited to denote one certain Idea and no other. To which I answer, that in the
Definition it is not said whether the Surface be Great or Small, Black or White, nor whether
the Sides are Long or Short, Equal or Unequal, nor with what Angles they are inclined to
each other; in all which there may be great Variety, and consequently there is no one settled
Idea which limits the Signification of the word Triangle. ’Tis one thing for to keep a Name
constantly to the same Definition, and another to make it stand every where for the same
Idea: the one is necessary, the other useless and impracticable.
XIX. But to give a farther Account how Words came to produce the Doctrine of abstract
Ideas, it must be observed that it is a received Opinion, that Language has no other End but
the communicating our Ideas, and that every significant Name stands for an Idea. This being
so, and it being withal certain, that Names, which yet are not thought altogether insignificant,
do not always mark out particular conceivable Ideas, it is straightway concluded that they
stand for abstract Notions. That there are many Names in use amongst Speculative Men,
which do not always suggest to others determinate particular Ideas, is what no Body will
deny. And a little Attention will discover, that it is not necessary (even in the strictest
Reasonings) significant Names which stand for Ideas should, every time they are used, excite
in the Understanding the Ideas they are made to stand for: In Reading and Discoursing,
Names being for the most part used as Letters are in Algebra, in which though a particular
quantity be marked by each Letter, yet to proceed right it is not requisite that in every step
each Letter suggest to your Thoughts, that particular quantity it was appointed to stand for.
XX. Besides, the communicating of Ideas marked by Words is not the chief and only
end of Language, as is commonly supposed. There are other Ends, as the raising of some
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Passion, the exciting to, or deterring from an Action, the putting the Mind in some particular
Disposition; to which the former is in many Cases barely subservient, and sometimes intirely
omitted, when these can be obtained without it, as I think doth not unfrequently happen
in the familiar use of Language. I intreat the Reader to reflect with himself, and see if it
doth not often happen either in Hearing or Reading a Discourse, that the Passions of Fear,
Love, Hatred, Admiration, Disdain, and the like, arise immediately in his Mind upon the
Perception of certain Words, without any Ideas coming between. At first, indeed, the Words
might have occasioned Ideas that were fit to produce those Emotions; but, if I mistake not, it
will be found that when Language is once grown familiar, the hearing of the Sounds or Sight
of the Characters is oft immediately attended with those Passions, which at first were wont
to be produced by the intervention of Ideas, that are now quite omitted. May we not, for
Example, be affected with the promise of a good Thing, though we have not an Idea of what
it is? Or is not the being threatned with Danger sufficient to excite a Dread, though we think
not of any particular Evil likely to befal us, nor yet frame to our selves an Idea of Danger
in Abstract? If any one shall join ever so little Reflexion of his own to what has been said,
I believe it will evidently appear to him, that general Names are often used in the propriety
of Language without the Speaker’s designing them for Marks of Ideas in his own, which he
would have them raise in the Mind of the Hearer. Even proper Names themselves do not
seem always spoken, with a Design to bring into our view the Ideas of those Individuals that
are supposed to be marked by them. For Example, when a Schoolman tells me Aristotle
hath said it, all I conceive he means by it, is to dispose me to embrace his Opinion with the
Deference and Submission which Custom has annexed to that Name. And this effect may be
so instantly produced in the Minds of those who are accustomed to resign their Judgment to
the Authority of that Philosopher, as it is impossible any Idea either of his Person, Writings,
or Reputation should go before. Innumerable Examples of this kind may be given, but why
should I insist on those things, which every one’s Experience will, I doubt not, plentifully
suggest unto him?
XXI. We have, I think, shewn the Impossibility of abstract Ideas. We have considered
what has been said for them by their ablest Patrons; and endeavored to shew they are of
no Use for those Ends, to which they are thought necessary. And lastly, we have traced
them to the Source from whence they flow, which appears to be Language. It cannot be
denied that Words are of excellent Use, in that by their means all that Stock of Knowledge
which has been purchased by the joint Labours of inquisitive Men in all Ages and Nations,
may be drawn into the view and made the possession of one single Person. But at the same
time it must be owned that most parts of Knowledge have been strangely perplexed and
darkened by the abuse of Words, and general ways of Speech wherein they are delivered.
Since therefore Words are so apt to impose on the Understanding, whatever Ideas I consider,
I shall endeavour to take them bare and naked into my View, keeping out of my Thoughts,
so far as I am able, those Names which long and constant Use hath so strictly united with
them; from which I may expect to derive the following Advantages.
XXII. First, I shall be sure to get clear of all Controversies purely Verbal; the springing
up of which Weeds in almost all the Sciences has been a main Hindrance to the Growth of
true and sound Knowledge. Secondly, this seems to be a sure way to extricate my self out of
9
that fine and subtile Net of abstract Ideas, which has so miserably perplexed and entangled
the Minds of Men, and that with this peculiar Circumstance, that by how much the finer and
more curious was the Wit of any Man, by so much the deeper was he like to be ensnared,
and faster held therein. Thirdly, so long as I confine my Thoughts to my own Ideas divested
of Words, I do not see how I can easily be mistaken. The Objects I consider, I clearly and
adequately know. I cannot be deceived in thinking I have an Idea which I have not. It is not
possible for me to imagine, that any of my own Ideas are alike or unlike, that are not truly so.
To discern the Agreements or Disagreements there are between my Ideas, to see what Ideas
are included in any compound Idea, and what not, there is nothing more requisite, than an
attentive Perception of what passes in my own Understanding.
XXIII. But the attainment of all these Advantages doth presuppose an intire Deliverance
from the Deception of Words, which I dare hardly promise my self; so difficult a thing it is to
dissolve an Union so early begun, and confirmed by so long a Habit as that betwixt Words
and Ideas. Which Difficulty seems to have been very much increased by the Doctrine of
Abstraction. For so long as Men thought abstract Ideas were annexed to their Words, it
doth not seem strange that they should use Words for Ideas: It being found an impracticable
thing to lay aside the Word, and retain the abstract Idea in the Mind, which in it self was
perfectly inconceivable. This seems to me the principal Cause, why those Men who have so
emphatically recommended to others, the laying aside all use of Words in their Meditations,
and contemplating their bare Ideas, have yet failed to perform it themselves. Of late many
have been very sensible of the absurd Opinions and insignificant Disputes, which grow out of
the abuse of Words. And in order to remedy these Evils they advise well, that we attend to
the Ideas signified, and draw off our Attention from the Words which signify them. But how
good soever this Advice may be, they have given others, it is plain they could not have a
due regard to it themselves, so long as they thought the only immediate use of Words was to
signify Ideas, and that the immediate Signification of every general Name was a determinate,
abstract Idea.
XXIV. But these being known to be Mistakes, a Man may with greater Ease prevent his
being imposed on by Words. He that knows he has no other than particular Ideas, will not
puzzle himself in vain to find out and conceive the abstract Idea, annexed to any Name. And
he that knows Names do not always stand for Ideas, will spare himself the labour of looking
for Ideas, where there are none to be had. It were therefore to be wished that every one would
use his utmost Endeavours, to obtain a clear View of the Ideas he would consider, separating
from them all that dress and incumbrance of Words which so much contribute to blind the
Judgment and divide the Attention. In vain do we extend our View into the Heavens, and
pry into the Entrails of the Earth, in vain do we consult the Writings of learned Men, and
trace the dark Footsteps of Antiquity; we need only draw the Curtain of Words, to behold
the fairest Tree of Knowledge, whose Fruit is excellent, and within the reach of our Hand.
XXV. Unless we take care to clear the first Principles of Knowledge, from the embarras
and delusion of Words, we may make infinite Reasonings upon them to no purpose; we may
draw Consequences from Consequences, and be never the wiser. The farther we go, we shall
only lose our selves the more irrecoverably, and be the deeper entangled in Difficulties and
10
Mistakes. Whoever therefore designs to read the following Sheets, I intreat him to make my
Words the Occasion of his own Thinking, and endeavour to attain the same Train of Thoughts
in Reading, that I had in writing them. By this means it will be easy for him to discover the
Truth or Falsity of what I say. He will be out of all danger of being deceived by my Words,
and I do not see how he can be led into an Error by considering his own naked, undisguised
Ideas.
11
OF THE
PRINCIPLES
OF
Humane Knowledge.
PART I.
I. It is evident to any one who takes a Survey of the Objects of Humane Knowledge,
that they are either Ideas actually imprinted on the Senses, or else such as are perceived
by attending to the Passions and Operations of the Mind, or lastly Ideas formed by help
of Memory and Imagination, either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those
originally perceived in the aforesaid ways. By Sight I have the Ideas of Light and Colours
with their several Degrees and Variations. By Touch I perceive, for Example, Hard and Soft,
Heat and Cold, Motion and Resistance, and of all these more and less either as to Quantity
or Degree. Smelling furnishes me with Odors; the Palate with Tastes, and Hearing conveys
Sounds to the Mind in all their variety of Tone and Composition. And as several of these
are observed to accompany each other, they come to be marked by one Name, and so to
be reputed as one Thing. Thus, for Example, a certain Colour, Taste, Smell, Figure and
Consistence having been observed to go together, are accounted one distinct Thing, signified
by the Name Apple. Other collections of Ideas constitute a Stone, a Tree, a Book, and the
like sensible Things; which, as they are pleasing or disagreeable, excite the Passions of Love,
Hatred, Joy, Grief, and so forth.
II. But besides all that endless variety of Ideas or Objects of Knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or perceives them, and exercises divers Operations, as Willing,
Imagining, Remembering about them. This perceiving, active Being is what I call Mind,
Spirit, Soul or my Self. By which Words I do not denote any one of my Ideas, but a thing
intirely distinct from them, wherein they exist, or, which is the same thing, whereby they are
perceived; for the Existence of an Idea consists in being perceived.
III. That neither our Thoughts, nor Passions, nor Ideas formed by the Imagination, exist
without the Mind, is what every Body will allow. And it seems no less evident that the
various Sensations or Ideas imprinted on the Sense, however blended or combined together
(that is, whatever Objects they compose) cannot exist otherwise than in a Mind perceiving
them. I think an intuitive Knowledge may be obtained of this, by any one that shall attend
to what is meant by the Term Exist when applied to sensible Things. The Table I write on,
I say, exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my Study I should say it existed,
meaning thereby that if I was in my Study I might perceive it, or that some other Spirit
12
actually does perceive it. There was an Odor, that is, it was smelled; There was a Sound,
that is to say, it was heard; a Colour or Figure, and it was perceived by Sight or Touch. This
is all that I can understand by these and the like Expressions. For as to what is said of the
absolute Existence of unthinking Things without any relation to their being perceived, that
seems perfectly unintelligible. Their Esse is Percipi, nor is it possible they should have any
Existence, out of the Minds or thinking Things which perceive them.
IV. It is indeed an Opinion strangely prevailing amongst Men, that Houses, Mountains,
Rivers, and in a word all sensible Objects have an Existence Natural or Real, distinct from
their being perceived by the Understanding. But with how great an Assurance and Acquiescence soever this Principle may be entertained in the World; yet whoever shall find in his
Heart to call it in Question, may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest Contradiction. For what are the forementioned Objects but the things we perceive by Sense, and
what do we perceive besides our own Ideas or Sensations; and is it not plainly repugnant that
any one of these or any Combination of them should exist unperceived?
V. If we thoroughly examine this Tenet, it will, perhaps, be found at Bottom to depend
on the Doctrine of Abstract Ideas. For can there be a nicer Strain of Abstraction than to
distinguish the Existence of sensible Objects from their being perceived, so as to conceive
them Existing unperceived? Light and Colours, Heat and Cold, Extension and Figures, in
a word the Things we see and feel, what are they but so many Sensations, Notions, Ideas
or Impressions on the Sense; and is it possible to separate, even in thought, any of these
from Perception? For my part I might as easily divide a Thing from it Self. I may indeed
divide in my Thoughts or conceive apart from each other those Things which, perhaps, I
never perceived by Sense so divided. Thus I imagine the Trunk of a Humane Body without
the Limbs, or conceive the Smell of a Rose without thinking on the Rose it self. So far I will
not deny I can abstract, if that may properly be called Abstraction, which extends only to the
conceiving separately such Objects, as it is possible may really exist or be actually perceived
asunder. But my conceiving or imagining Power does not extend beyond the possibility of
real Existence or Perception. Hence as it is impossible for me to see or feel any Thing without
an actual Sensation of that Thing, so is it impossible for me to conceive in my Thoughts any
sensible Thing or Object distinct from the Sensation or Perception of it.
VI. Some Truths there are so near and obvious to the Mind, that a Man need only open
his Eyes to see them. Such I take this Important one to be, to wit, that all the Choir of Heaven
and Furniture of the Earth, in a word all those Bodies which compose the mighty Frame of
the World, have not any Subsistence without a Mind, that their Being is to be perceived
or known; that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not
exist in my Mind or that of any other created Spirit, they must either have no Existence
at all, or else subsist in the Mind of some eternal Spirit: It being perfectly unintelligible
and involving all the Absurdity of Abstraction, to attribute to any single part of them an
Existence independent of a Spirit. To be convinced of which, the Reader need only reflect and
try to separate in his own Thoughts the being of a sensible thing from its being perceived.
VII. From what has been said, it follows, there is not any other Substance than Spirit, or
that which perceives. But for the fuller proof of this Point, let it be considered, the sensible
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Qualities are Colour, Figure, Motion, Smell, Taste, and such like, that is, the Ideas perceived
by Sense. Now for an Idea to exist in an unperceiving Thing, is a manifest Contradiction; for
to have an Idea is all one as to perceive: that therefore wherein Colour, Figure, and the like
Qualities exist, must perceive them; hence it is clear there can be no unthinking Substance
or Substratum of those Ideas.
VIII. But say you, though the Ideas themselves do not exist without the Mind, yet
there may be Things like them whereof they are Copies or Resemblances, which Things exist
without the Mind, in an unthinking Substance. I answer, an Idea can be like nothing but
an Idea; a Colour or Figure can be like nothing but another Colour or Figure. If we look
but ever so little into our Thoughts, we shall find it impossible for us to conceive a Likeness
except only between our Ideas. Again, I ask whether those supposed Originals or external
Things, of which our Ideas are the Pictures or Representations, be themselves perceivable or
no? If they are, then they are Ideas, and we have gained our Point; but if you say they are
not, I appeal to any one whether it be Sense, to assert a Colour is like something which is
invisible; Hard or Soft, like something which is Intangible; and so of the rest.
IX. Some there are who make a Distinction betwixt Primary and Secondary Qualities:
By the former, they mean Extension, Figure, Motion, Rest, Solidity or Impenetrability and
Number: By the latter they denote all other sensible Qualities, as Colours, Sounds, Tastes,
and so forth. The Ideas we have of these they acknowledge not to be the Resemblances of
any thing existing without the Mind or unperceived; but they will have our Ideas of the
primary Qualities to be Patterns or Images of Things which exist without the Mind, in an
unthinking Substance which they call Matter. By Matter therefore we are to understand
an inert, senseless Substance, in which Extension, Figure, and Motion, do actually subsist.
But it is evident from what we have already shewn, that Extension, Figure and Motion are
only Ideas existing in the Mind, and that an Idea can be like nothing but another Idea, and
that consequently neither They nor their Archetypes can exist in an unperceiving Substance.
Hence it is plain, that that the very Notion of what is called Matter or Corporeal Substance,
involves a Contradiction in it.
X. They who assert that Figure, Motion, and the rest of the Primary or Original Qualities
do exist without the Mind, in unthinking Substances, do at the same time acknowledge that
Colours, Sounds, Heat, Cold, and suchlike secondary Qualities, do not, which they tell us are
Sensations existing in the Mind alone, that depend on and are occasioned by the different
Size, Texture and Motion of the minute Particles of Matter. This they take for an undoubted
Truth, which they can demonstrate beyond all Exception. Now if it be certain, that those
original Qualities are inseparably united with the other sensible Qualities, and not, even in
Thought, capable of being abstracted from them, it plainly follows that they exist only in
the Mind. But I desire any one to reflect and try, whether he can by any Abstraction of
Thought, conceive the Extension and Motion of a Body, without all other sensible Qualities.
For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my power to frame an Idea of a Body
extended and moved, but I must withal give it some Colour or other sensible Quality which is
acknowledged to exist only in the Mind. In short, Extension, Figure, and Motion, abstracted
from all other Qualities, are inconceivable. Where therefore the other sensible Qualities are,
there must these be also, to wit, in the Mind and no where else.
14
XI. Again, Great and Small, Swift and Slow, are allowed to exist no where without the
Mind, being intirely relative, and changing as the Frame or Position of the Organs of Sense
varies. The Extension therefore which exists without the Mind, is neither great nor small,
the Motion neither swift nor slow, that is, they are nothing at all. But, say you, they are
Extension in general, and Motion in general: Thus we see how much the Tenet of extended,
moveable Substances existing without the Mind, depends on that strange Doctrine of abstract
Ideas. And here I cannot but remark, how nearly the Vague and indeterminate Description
of Matter or corporeal Substance, which the Modern Philosophers are run into by their own
Principles, resembles that antiquated and so much ridiculed Notion of Materia prima, to be
met with in Aristotle and his Followers. Without Extension Solidity cannot be conceived;
since therefore it has been shewn that Extension exists not in an unthinking Substance, the
same must also be true of Solidity.
XII. That Number is intirely the Creature of the Mind, even though the other Qualities
be allowed to exist without, will be evident to whoever considers, that the same thing bears
a different Denomination of Number, as the Mind views it with different respects. Thus,
the same Extension is One or Three or Thirty Six, according as the Mind considers it with
reference to a Yard, a Foot, or an Inch. Number is so visibly relative, and dependent on Mens
Understanding, that it is strange to think how any one should give it an absolute Existence
without the Mind. We say one Book, one Page, one Line; all these are equally Unites, though
some contain several of the others. And in each Instance it is plain, the Unite relates to some
particular Combination of Ideas arbitrarily put together by the Mind.
XIII. Unity I know some will have to be a simple or uncompounded Idea, accompanying
all other Ideas into the Mind. That I have any such Idea answering the Word Unity, I do
not find; and if I had, methinks I could not miss finding it; on the contrary it should be the
most familiar to my Understanding, since it is said to accompany all other Ideas, and to be
perceived by all the ways of Sensation and Reflexion. To say no more, it is an abstract Idea.
XIV. I shall farther add, that after the same manner, as modern Philosophers prove
certain sensible Qualities to have no Existence in Matter, or without the Mind, the same
thing may be likewise proved of all other sensible Qualities whatsoever. Thus, for Instance,
it is said that Heat and Cold are Affections only of the Mind, and not at all Patterns of
real Beings, existing in the corporeal Substances which excite them, for that the same Body
which appears Cold to one Hand, seems Warm to another. Now why may we not as well argue
that Figure and Extension are not Patterns or Resemblances of Qualities existing in Matter,
because to the same Eye at different Stations, or Eyes of a different Texture at the same
Station, they appear various, and cannot therefore be the Images of any thing settled and
determinate without the Mind? Again, It is proved that Sweetness is not really in the sapid
Thing, because the thing remaining unaltered the Sweetness is changed into Bitter, as in case
of a Fever or otherwise vitiated Palate. Is it not as reasonable to say, that Motion is not
without the Mind, since if the Succession of Ideas in the Mind become swifter, the Motion,
it is acknowledged, shall appear slower without any Alteration in any external Object?
XV. In short, let any one consider those Arguments, which are thought manifestly to
prove that Colours and Tastes exist only in the Mind, and he shall find they may with equal
15
force, be brought to prove the same thing of Extension, Figure, and Motion. Though it must
be confessed this Method of arguing doth not so much prove that there is no Extension or
Colour in an outward Object, as that we do not know by Sense which is the true Extension or
Colour of the Object. But the Arguments foregoing plainly shew it to be impossible that any
Colour or Extension at all, or other sensible Quality whatsoever, should exist in an unthinking
Subject without the Mind, or in truth, that there should be any such thing as an outward
Object.
XVI. But let us examine a little the received Opinion. It is said Extension is a Mode or
Accident of Matter, and that Matter is the Substratum that supports it. Now I desire that
you would explain what is meant by Matter’s supporting Extension: Say you, I have no Idea
of Matter, and therefore cannot explain it. I answer, though you have no positive, yet if you
have any meaning at all, you must at least have a relative Idea of Matter; though you know
not what it is, yet you must be supposed to know what Relation it bears to Accidents, and
what is meant by its supporting them. It is evident Support cannot here be taken in its usual
or literal Sense, as when we say that Pillars support a Building: In what Sense therefore must
it be taken?
XVII. If we inquire into what the most accurate Philosophers declare themselves to mean
by Material Substance; we shall find them acknowledge, they have no other meaning annexed
to those Sounds, but the Idea of Being in general, together with the relative Notion of its
supporting Accidents. The general Idea of Being appeareth to me the most abstract and
incomprehensible of all other; and as for its supporting Accidents, this, as we have just now
observed, cannot be understood in the common Sense of those Words; it must therefore be
taken in some other Sense, but what that is they do not explain. So that when I consider
the two Parts or Branches which make the signification of the Words Material Substance, I
am convinced there is no distinct meaning annexed to them. But why should we trouble our
selves any farther, in discussing this Material Substratum or Support of Figure and Motion,
and other sensible Qualities? Does it not suppose they have an Existence without the Mind?
And is not this a direct Repugnancy, and altogether inconceivable?
XVIII. But though it were possible that solid, figured, moveable Substances may exist
without the Mind, corresponding to the Ideas we have of Bodies, yet how is it possible for us
to know this? Either we must know it by Sense, or by Reason. As for our Senses, by them
we have the Knowledge only of our Sensations, Ideas, or those things that are immediately
perceived by Sense, call them what you will: But they do not inform us that things exist
without the Mind, or unperceived, like to those which are perceived. This the Materialists
themselves acknowledge. It remains therefore that if we have any Knowledge at all of external
Things, it must be by Reason, inferring their Existence from what is immediately perceived
by Sense. But what reason can induce us to believe the Existence of Bodies without the Mind,
from what we perceive, since the very Patrons of Matter themselves do not pretend, there is
any necessary Connexion betwixt them and our Ideas? I say it is granted on all hands (and
what happens in Dreams, Phrensies, and the like, puts it beyond dispute) that it is possible
we might be affected with all the Ideas we have now, though no Bodies existed without,
resembling them. Hence it is evident the Supposition of external Bodies is not necessary for
16
the producing our Ideas: Since it is granted they are produced sometimes, and might possibly
be produced always in the same Order we see them in at present, without their Concurrence.
XIX. But though we might possibly have all our Sensations without them, yet perhaps it
may be thought easier to conceive and explain the manner of their Production, by supposing
external Bodies in their likeness rather than otherwise; and so it might be at least probable
there are such things as Bodies that excite their Ideas in our Minds. But neither can this be
said; for though we give the Materialists their external Bodies, they by their own confession
are never the nearer knowing how our Ideas are produced: Since they own themselves unable
to comprehend in what manner Body can act upon Spirit, or how it is possible it should
imprint any Idea in the Mind. Hence it is evident the Production of Ideas or Sensations in
our Minds, can be no reason why we should suppose Matter or corporeal Substances, since
that is acknowledged to remain equally inexplicable with, or without this Supposition. If
therefore it were possible for Bodies to exist without the Mind, yet to hold they do so, must
needs be a very precarious Opinion; since it is to suppose, without any reason at all, that God
has created innumerable Beings that are intirely useless, and serve to no manner of purpose.
XX. In short, if there were external Bodies, it is impossible we should ever come to know
it; and if there were not, we might have the very same Reasons to think there were that we have
now. Suppose, what no one can deny possible, an Intelligence, without the help of external
Bodies, to be affected with the same train of Sensations or Ideas that you are, imprinted in
the same order and with like vividness in his Mind. I ask whether that Intelligence hath not
all the Reason to believe the Existence of corporeal Substances, represented by his Ideas, and
exciting them in his Mind, that you can possibly have for believing the same thing? Of this
there can be no Question; which one Consideration is enough to make any reasonable Person
suspect the strength of whatever Arguments be may think himself to have, for the Existence
of Bodies without the Mind.
XXI. Were it necessary to add any farther Proof against the Existence of Matter, after
what has been said, I could instance several of those Errors and Difficulties (not to mention
Impieties) which have sprung from that Tenet. It has occasioned numberless Controversies
and Disputes in Philosophy, and not a few of far greater moment in Religion. But I shall not
enter into the detail of them in this Place, as well because I think, Arguments à Posteriori
are unnecessary for confirming what has been, if I mistake not, sufficiently demonstrated à
Priori, as because I shall hereafter find occasion to say somewhat of them.
XXII. I am afraid I have given cause to think me needlesly prolix in handling this
Subject. For to what purpose is it to dilate on that which may be demonstrated with the
utmost Evidence in a Line or two, to any one that is capable of the least Reflexion? It is
but looking into your own Thoughts, and so trying whether you can conceive it possible for a
Sound, or Figure, or Motion, or Colour, to exist without the Mind, or unperceived. This easy
Trial may make you see, that what you contend for, is a downright Contradiction. Insomuch
that I am content to put the whole upon this Issue; if you can but conceive it possible for
one extended moveable Substance, or in general, for any one Idea or any thing like an Idea,
to exist otherwise than in a Mind perceiving it, I shall readily give up the Cause: And as for
17
all that compages of external Bodies which you contend for, I shall grant you its Existence,
though you cannot either give me any Reason why you believe it exists, or assign any use to
it when it is supposed to exist. I say, the bare possibility of your Opinion’s being true, shall
pass for an Argument that it is so.
XXIII. But say you, surely there is nothing easier than to imagine Trees, for instance, in
a Park, or Books existing in a Closet, and no Body by to perceive them. I answer, you may
so, there is no difficulty in it: But what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your
Mind certain Ideas which you call Books and Trees, and the same time omitting to frame the
Idea of any one that may perceive them? But do not you your self perceive or think of them
all the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpose: It only shews you have the Power
of imagining or forming Ideas in your Mind; but it doth not shew that you can conceive it
possible, the Objects of your Thought may exist without the Mind: To make out this, it is
necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest
Repugnancy. When we do our utmost to conceive the Existence of external Bodies, we are
all the while only contemplating our own Ideas. But the Mind taking no notice of it self, is
deluded to think it can and doth conceive Bodies existing unthought of or without the Mind;
though at the same time they are apprehended by or exist in it self. A little Attention will
discover to any one the Truth and Evidence of what is here said, and make it unnecessary to
insist on any other Proofs against the Existence of material Substance.
XXIV. It is very obvious, upon the least Inquiry into our own Thoughts, to know whether
it be possible for us to understand what is meant, by the absolute Existence of sensible Objects
in themselves, or without the Mind. To me it is evident those Words mark out either a direct
Contradiction, or else nothing at all. And to convince others of this, I know no readier or
fairer way, than to intreat they would calmly attend to their own Thoughts: And if by this
Attention, the Emptiness or Repugnancy of those Expressions does appear, surely nothing
more is requisite for their Conviction. It is on this therefore that I insist, to wit, that the
absolute Existence of unthinking Things are Words without a Meaning, or which include a
Contradiction. This is what I repeat and inculcate, and earnestly recommend to the attentive
Thoughts of the Reader.
XXV. All our Ideas, Sensations, or the things which we perceive, by whatsoever Names
they may be distinguished, are visibly inactive, there is nothing of Power or Agency included
in them. So that one Idea or Object of Thought cannot produce, or make any Alteration
in another. To be satisfied of the Truth of this, there is nothing else requisite but a bare
Observation of our Ideas. For since they and every part of them exist only in the Mind, it
follows that there is nothing in them but what is perceived. But whoever shall attend to his
Ideas, whether of Sense or Reflexion, will not perceive in them any Power or Activity; there
is therefore no such thing contained in them. A little Attention will discover to us that the
very Being of an Idea implies Passiveness and Inertness in it, insomuch that it is impossible
for an Idea to do any thing, or, strictly speaking, to be the Cause of any thing: Neither can
it be the Resemblance or Pattern of any active Being, as is evident from Sect. 8. Whence it
plainly follows that Extension, Figure and Motion, cannot be the Cause of our Sensations. To
say therefore, that these are the effects of Powers resulting from the Configuration, Number,
Motion, and Size of Corpuscles, must certainly be false.
18
XXVI. We perceive a continual Succession of Ideas, some are anew excited, others are
changed or totally disappear. There is therefore some Cause of these Ideas whereon they
depend, and which produces and changes them. That this Cause cannot be any Quality or
Idea or Combination of Ideas, is clear from the preceding Section. It must therefore be a
Substance; but it has been shewn that there is no corporeal or material Substance: It remains
therefore that the Cause of Ideas is an incorporeal active Substance or Spirit.
XXVII. A Spirit is one simple, undivided, active Being: as it perceives Ideas, it is called
the Understanding, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them, it is called the Will.
Hence there can be no Idea formed of a Soul or Spirit: For all Ideas whatever, being Passive
and Inert, vide Sect. 25. they cannot represent unto us, by way of Image or Likeness, that
which acts. A little Attention will make it plain to any one, that to have an Idea which
shall be like that active Principle of Motion and Change of Ideas, is absolutely impossible.
Such is the Nature of Spirit or that which acts, that it cannot be of it self perceived, but
only by the Effects which it produceth. If any Man shall doubt of the Truth of what is
here delivered, let him but reflect and try if he can frame the Idea of any Power or active
Being; and whether he hath Ideas of two principal Powers, marked by the Names Will and
Understanding, distinct from each other as well as from a third Idea of Substance or Being in
general, with a relative Notion of its supporting or being the Subject of the aforesaid Powers,
which is signified by the Name Soul or Spirit. This is what some hold; but so far as I can
see, the Words Will, Soul, Spirit, do not stand for different Ideas, or in truth, for any Idea at
all, but for something which is very different from Ideas, and which being an Agent cannot
be like unto, or represented by, any Idea whatsoever. Though it must be owned at the same
time, that we have some Notion of Soul, Spirit, and the Operations of the Mind, such as
Willing, Loving, Hating, in as much as we know or understand the meaning of those Words.
XXVIII. I find I can excite Ideas in my Mind at pleasure, and vary and shift the Scene
as oft as I think fit. It is no more than Willing, and straightway this or that Idea arises in my
Fancy: And by the same Power it is obliterated, and makes way for another. This making and
unmaking of Ideas doth very properly denominate the Mind active. Thus much is certain,
and grounded on Experience: But when we think of unthinking Agents, or of exciting Ideas
exclusive of Volition, we only amuse our selves with Words.
XXIX. But whatever Power I may have over my own Thoughts, I find the Ideas actually
perceived by Sense have not a like Dependence on my Will. When in broad Day-light I open
my Eyes, it is not in my Power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what
particular Objects shall present themselves to my View; and so likewise as to the Hearing and
other Senses, the Ideas imprinted on them are not Creatures of my Will. There is therefore
some other Will or Spirit that produces them.
XXX. The Ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of the Imagination; they have likewise a Steddiness, Order, and Coherence, and are not excited at random,
as those which are the effects of Humane Wills often are, but in a regular Train or Series,
the admirable Connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the Wisdom and Benevolence of its
Author. Now the set Rules or established Methods, wherein the Mind we depend on excites
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in us the Ideas of Sense, are called the Laws of Nature: And these we learn by Experience,
which teaches us that such and such Ideas are attended with such and such other Ideas, in
the ordinary course of Things.
XXXI. This gives us a sort of Foresight, which enables us to regulate our Actions for the
benefit of Life. And without this we should be eternally at a loss: We could not know how
to act any thing that might procure us the least Pleasure, or remove the least Pain of Sense.
That Food nourishes, Sleep refreshes, and Fire warms us; that to sow in the Seed-time is the
way to reap in the Harvest, and, in general, that to obtain such or such Ends, such or such
Means are conducive, all this we know, not by discovering any necessary Connexion between
our Ideas, but only by the Observation of the settled Laws of Nature, without which we
should be all in Uncertainty and Confusion, and a grown Man no more know how to manage
himself in the Affairs of Life, than an Infant just born.
XXXII. And yet this consistent uniform working, which so evidently displays the Goodness and Wisdom of that governing Spirit whose Will constitutes the Laws of Nature, is so
far from leading our Thoughts to him, that it rather sends them a wandering after second
Causes. For when we perceive certain Ideas of Sense constantly followed by other Ideas, and
we know this is not of our own doing, we forthwith attribute Power and Agency to the Ideas
themselves, and make one the Cause of another, than which nothing can be more absurd
and unintelligible. Thus, for Example, having observed that when we perceive by Sight a
certain round luminous Figure, we at the same time perceive by Touch the Idea or Sensation
called Heat, we do from thence conclude the Sun to be the cause of Heat. And in like manner
perceiving the Motion and Collision of Bodies to be attended with Sound, we are inclined to
think the latter an effect of the former.
XXXIII. The Ideas imprinted on the Senses by the Author of Nature are called real
Things: And those excited in the Imagination being less regular, vivid and constant, are
more properly termed Ideas, or Images of Things, which they copy and represent. But then
our Sensations, be they never so vivid and distinct, are nevertheless Ideas, that is, they exist
in the Mind, or are perceived by it, as truly as the Ideas of its own framing. The Ideas
of Sense are allowed to have more reality in them, that is, to be more strong, orderly, and
coherent than the Creatures of the Mind; but this is no Argument that they exist without
the Mind. They are also less dependent on the Spirit, or thinking Substance which perceives
them, in that they are excited by the Will of another and more powerful Spirit: yet still they
are Ideas, and certainly no Idea, whether faint or strong, can exist otherwise than in a Mind
perceiving it.
XXXIV. Before we proceed any farther, it is necessary to spend some Time in answering
Objections which may probably be made against the Principles hitherto laid down. In doing
of which, if I seem too prolix to those of quick Apprehensions, I hope it may be pardoned, since
all Men do not equally apprehend things of this Nature; and I am willing to be understood by
every one. First then, it will be objected that by the foregoing Principles, all that is real and
substantial in Nature is banished out of the World: And instead thereof a chimerical Scheme
of Ideas takes place. All things that exist, exist only in the Mind, that is, they are purely
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notional. What therefore becomes of the Sun, Moon, and Stars? What must we think of
Houses, Rivers, Mountains, Trees, Stones; nay, even of our own Bodies? Are all these but so
many Chimeras and Illusions on the Fancy? To all which, and whatever else of the same sort
may be objected, I answer, that by the Principles premised, we are not deprived of any one
thing in Nature. Whatever we see, feel, hear, or any wise conceive or understand, remains as
secure as ever, and is as real as ever. There is a rerum natura, and the Distinction between
Realities and Chimeras retains its full force. This is evident from Sect. 29, 30, and 33, where
we have shewn what is meant by real Things in opposition to Chimeras, or Ideas of our own
framing; but then they both equally exist in the Mind, and in that Sense they are alike Ideas.
XXXV. I do not argue against the Existence of any one thing that we can apprehend,
either by Sense or Reflexion. That the things I see with mine Eyes and touch with my Hands
do exist, really exist, I make not the least Question. The only thing whose Existence we deny,
is that which Philosophers call Matter or corporeal Substance. And in doing of this, there
is no Damage done to the rest of Mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it. The Atheist
indeed will want the Colour of an empty Name to support his Impiety; and the Philosophers
may possibly find, they have lost a great Handle for Trifling and Disputation.
XXXVI. If any Man thinks this detracts from the Existence or Reality of Things, he is
very far from understanding what hath been premised in the plainest Terms I could think
of. Take here an Abstract of what has been said. There are spiritual Substances, Minds, or
humane Souls, which will or excite Ideas in themselves at pleasure: but these are faint, weak,
and unsteady in respect of others they perceive by Sense, which being impressed upon them
according to certain Rules or Laws of Nature, speak themselves the Effects of a Mind more
powerful and wise than humane Spirits. These latter are said to have more Reality in them
than the former: By which is meant that they are more affecting, orderly, and distinct, and
that they are not Fictions of the Mind perceiving them. And in this Sense, the Sun that I see
by Day is the real Sun, and that which I imagine by Night is the Idea of the former. In the
Sense here given of Reality, it is evident that every Vegetable, Star, Mineral, and in general
each part of the Mundane System, is as much a real Being by our Principles as by any other.
Whether others mean any thing by the Term Reality different from what I do, I intreat them
to look into their own Thoughts and see.
XXXVII. It will be urged that thus much at least is true, to wit, that we take away
all corporeal Substances. To this my Answer is, That if the word Substance be taken in the
vulgar Sense, for a Combination of sensible Qualities, such as Extension, Solidity, Weight, and
the like; This we cannot be accused of taking away. But if it be taken in a philosophic Sense,
for the support of Accidents or Qualities without the Mind: Then indeed I acknowledge that
we take it away, if one may be said to take away that which never had any Existence, not
even in the Imagination.
XXXVIII. But, say you, it sounds very harsh to say we eat and drink Ideas, and are
clothed with Ideas. I acknowledge it does so, the word Idea not being used in common
Discourse to signify the several Combinations of sensible Qualities, which are called Things:
and it is certain that any Expression which varies from the familiar Use of Language, will seem
21
harsh and ridiculous. But this doth not concern the Truth of the Proposition, which in other
Words is no more than to say, we are fed and clothed with those Things which we perceive
immediately by our Senses. The Hardness or Softness, the Colour, Taste, Warmth, Figure,
and such like Qualities, which combined together constitute the several sorts of Victuals and
Apparel, have been shewn to exist only in the Mind that perceives them; and this is all that
is meant by calling them Ideas; which Word, if it was as ordinarily used as Thing, would
sound no harsher nor more ridiculous than it. I am not for disputing about the Propriety,
but the Truth of the Expression. If therefore you agree with me that we eat and drink, and
are clad with the immediate Objects of Sense which cannot exist unperceived or without the
Mind: I shall readily grant it is more proper or conformable to Custom, that they should be
called Things rather than Ideas.
XXXIX. If it be demanded why I make use of the word Idea, and do not rather in
compliance with Custom call them Things, I answer, I do it for two Reasons: First, because
the Term Thing, in contradistinction to Idea, is generally supposed to denote somewhat
existing without the Mind: Secondly, because Thing hath a more comprehensive Signification
than Idea, including Spirits or thinking Things as well as Ideas. Since therefore the Objects
of Sense exist only in the Mind, and are withal thoughtless and inactive, I chose to mark
them by the word Idea, which implies those Properties.
XL. But say what we can, some one perhaps may be apt to reply, he will still believe his
Senses, and never suffer any Arguments, how plausible soever, to prevail over the Certainty
of them. Be it so, assert the Evidence of Sense as high as you please, we are willing to do
the same. That what I see, hear and feel doth exist, that is to say, is perceived by me, I no
more doubt than I do of my own Being. But I do not see how the Testimony of Sense can
be alledged, as a proof for the Existence of any thing, which is not perceived by Sense. We
are not for having any Man turn Sceptic, and disbelieve his Senses; on the contrary we give
them all the Stress and Assurance imaginable; nor are there any Principles more opposite to
Scepticism, than those we have laid down, as shall be hereafter clearly shewn.
XLI. Secondly, it will be objected that there is a great difference betwixt real Fire, for
Instance, and the Idea of Fire, betwixt dreaming or imagining ones self burnt, and actually
being so: This and the like may be urged in opposition to our Tenets. To all which the
Answer is evident from what hath been already said, and I shall only add in this place, that
if real Fire be very different from the Idea of Fire, so also is the real Pain that it occasions,
very different from the Idea of the same Pain: and yet no Body will pretend that real Pain
either is, or can possibly be, in an unperceiving Thing or without the Mind, any more than
its Idea.
XLII. Thirdly, It will be objected that we see Things actually without or at distance
from us, and which consequently do not exist in the Mind, it being absurd that those Things
which are seen at the distance of several Miles, should be as near to us as our own Thoughts.
In answer to this, I desire it may be considered, that in a Dream we do oft perceive Things as
existing at a great distance off, and yet for all that, those Things are acknowledged to have
their Existence only in the Mind.
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XLIII. But for the fuller clearing of this Point, it may be worth while to consider, how
it is that we perceive Distance and Things placed at a Distance by Sight. For that we should
in truth see external Space, and Bodies actually existing in it, some nearer, others farther
off, seems to carry with it some Opposition to what hath been said, of their existing no
where without the Mind. The Consideration of this Difficulty it was, that gave birth to
my Essay towards a new Theory of Vision, which was published not long since. Wherein
it is shewn that Distance or Outness is neither immediately of it self perceived by Sight,
nor yet apprehended or judged of by Lines and Angles, or any thing that hath a necessary
Connexion with it: But that it is only suggested to our Thoughts, by certain visible Ideas
and Sensations attending Vision, which in their own Nature have no manner of Similitude or
Relation, either with Distance, or Things placed at a Distance. But by a Connexion taught
us by Experience, they come to signify and suggest them to us, after the same manner that
Words of any Language suggest the Ideas they are made to stand for. Insomuch that a Man
born blind, and afterwards made to see, would not, at first Sight, think the Things he saw,
to be without his Mind, or at any Distance from him. See Sect. 41. of the forementioned
Treatise.
XLIV. The Ideas of Sight and Touch make two Species, intirely distinct and heterogeneous. The former are Marks and Prognostics of the latter. That the proper Objects of Sight
neither exist without the Mind, nor are the Images of external Things, was shewn even in that
Treatise. Though throughout the same, the contrary be supposed true of tangible Objects:
Not that to suppose that vulgar Error, was necessary for establishing the Notion therein laid
down; but because it was beside my Purpose to examine and refute it in a Discourse concerning Vision. So that in strict Truth the Ideas of Sight, when we apprehend by them Distance
and Things placed at a Distance, do not suggest or mark out to us Things actually existing
at a Distance, but only admonish us what Ideas of Touch will be imprinted in our Minds at
such and such distances of Time, and in consequence of such or such Actions. It is, I say,
evident from what has been said in the foregoing Parts of this Treatise, and in Sect. 147, and
elsewhere of the Essay concerning Vision, that visible Ideas are the Language whereby the
governing Spirit, on whom we depend, informs us what tangible Ideas he is about to imprint
upon us, in case we excite this or that Motion in our own Bodies. But for a fuller Information
in this Point, I refer to the Essay it self.
XLV. Fourthly, It will be objected that from the foregoing Principles it follows, Things
are every moment annihilated and created anew. The Objects of Sense exist only when they
are perceived: The Trees therefore are in the Garden, or the Chairs in the Parlour, no longer
than while there is some body by to perceive them. Upon shutting my Eyes all the Furniture
in the Room is reduced to nothing, and barely upon opening them it is again created. In
answer to all which, I refer the Reader to what has been said in Sect. 3, 4, &c. and desire he
will consider whether he means any thing by the actual Existence of an Idea, distinct from
its being perceived. For my part, after the nicest Inquiry I could make, I am not able to
discover that any thing else is meant by those Words. And I once more intreat the Reader
to sound his own Thoughts, and not suffer himself to be imposed on by Words. If he can
conceive it possible either for his Ideas or their Archetypes to exist without being perceived,
then I give up the Cause: But if he cannot, he will acknowledge it is unreasonable for him to
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stand up in defence of he knows not what, and pretend to charge on me as an Absurdity, the
not assenting to those Propositions which at Bottom have no meaning in them.
XLVI. It will not be amiss to observe, how far the received Principles of Philosophy are
themselves chargeable with those pretended Absurdities. It is thought strangely absurd that
upon closing my Eyelids, all the visible Objects round me should be reduced to nothing; and
yet is not this what Philosophers commonly acknowledge, when they agree on all hands, that
Light and Colours, which alone are the proper and immediate Objects of Sight, are mere
Sensations that exist no longer than they are perceived? Again, it may to some perhaps
seem very incredible, that things should be every moment creating, yet this very Notion is
commonly taught in the Schools. For the Schoolmen, though they acknowledge the Existence
of Matter, and that the whole mundane Fabrick is framed out of it, are nevertheless of Opinion
that it cannot subsist without the Divine Conservation, which by them is expounded to be a
continual Creation.
XLVII. Farther, a little Thought will discover to us, that though we allow the Existence
of Matter or Corporeal Substance, yet it will unavoidably follow from the Principles which
are now generally admitted, that the particular Bodies of what kind soever, do none of
them exist whilst they are not perceived. For it is evident from Sect. XI. and the following
Sections, that the Matter Philosophers contend for, is an incomprehensible Somewhat which
hath none of those particular Qualities, whereby the Bodies falling under our Senses are
distinguished one from another. But to make this more plain, it must be remarked, that
the infinite Divisibility of Matter is now universally allowed, at least by the most approved
and considerable Philosophers, who on the received Principles demonstrate it beyond all
Exception. Hence it follows, that there is an infinite Number of Parts in each Particle of
Matter, which are not perceived by Sense. The Reason therefore, that any particular Body
seems to be of a finite Magnitude, or exhibits only a finite Number of Parts to Sense, is,
not because it contains no more, since in itself it contains an infinite Number of Parts, but
because the Sense is not acute enough to discern them. In proportion therefore as the Sense
is rendered more acute, it perceives a greater Number of Parts in the Object, that is, the
Object appears greater, and its Figure varies, those Parts in its Extremities which were
before unperceivable, appearing now to bound it in very different Lines and Angles from
those perceived by an obtuser Sense. And at length, after various Changes of Size and Shape,
when the Sense becomes infinitely acute, the Body shall seem infinite. During all which there
is no Alteration in the Body, but only in the Sense. Each Body therefore considered in it self,
is infinitely extended, and consequently void of all Shape or Figure. From which it follows,
that though we should grant the Existence of Matter to be ever so certain, yet it is withal as
certain, the Materialists themselves are by their own Principles forced to acknowledge, that
neither the particular Bodies perceived by Sense, nor any thing like them exists without the
Mind. Matter, I say, and each Particle thereof is according to them infinite and shapeless,
and it is the Mind that frames all that variety of Bodies which compose the visible World,
any one whereof does not exist longer than it is perceived.
XLVIII. If we consider it, the Objection proposed in Sect. 45. will not be found reasonably
charged on the Principles we have premised, so as in truth to make any Objection at all against
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our Notions. For though we hold indeed the Objects of Sense to be nothing else but Ideas
which cannot exist unperceived; yet we may not hence conclude they have no Existence except
only while they are perceived by us, since there may be some other Spirit that perceives them,
though we do not. Wherever Bodies are said to have no Existence without the Mind, I would
not be understood to mean this or that particular Mind, but all Minds whatsoever. It does
not therefore follow from the foregoing Principles, that Bodies are annihilated and created
every moment, or exist not at all during the Intervals between our Perception of them.
XLIX. Fifthly, It may perhaps be objected, that if Extension and Figure exist only in
the Mind, it follows that the Mind is extended and figured; since Extension is a Mode or
Attribute, which (to speak with the Schools) is predicated of the Subject in which it exists. I
answer, Those Qualities are in the Mind only as they are perceived by it, that is, not by way
of Mode or Attribute, but only by way of Idea; and it no more follows, that the Soul or Mind
is extended because Extension exists in it alone, than it does that it is red or blue, because
those Colours are on all hands acknowledged to exist in it, and no where else. As to what
Philosophers say of Subject and Mode, that seems very groundless and unintelligible. For
Instance, in this Proposition, a Die is hard, extended, and square, they will have it that the
Word Die denotes a Subject or Substance, distinct from the Hardness, Extension and Figure,
which are predicated of it, and in which they exist. This I cannot comprehend: To me a Die
seems to be nothing distinct from those things which are termed its Modes or Accidents. And
to say a Die is hard, extended and square, is not to attribute those Qualities to a Subject
distinct from and supporting them, but only an Explication of the meaning of the Word Die.
L. Sixthly, You will say there have been a great many things explained by Matter and
Motion: Take away these, and you destroy the whole Corpuscular Philosophy, and undermine
those mechanical Principles which have been applied with so much Success to account for
the Phænomena. In short, whatever Advances have been made, either by ancient or modern
Philosophers, in the study of Nature, do all proceed on the Supposition, that Corporeal
Substance or Matter doth really exist. To this I answer, that there is not any one Phænomenon
explained on that Supposition, which may not as well be explained without it, as might
easily be made appear by an Induction of Particulars. To explain the Phænomena, is all
one as to shew, why upon such and such Occasions we are affected with such and such
Ideas. But how Matter should operate on a Spirit, or produce any Idea in it, is what no
Philosopher will pretend to explain. It is therefore evident, there can be no use of Matter in
Natural Philosophy. Besides, they who attempt to account for Things, do it not by Corporeal
Substance, but by Figure, Motion, and other Qualities, which are in truth no more than mere
Ideas, and therefore cannot be the Cause of any thing, as hath been already shewn. See
Sect. 25.
LI. Seventhly, It will upon this be demanded whether it does not seem absurd to take
away natural Causes, and ascribe every thing to the immediate Operation of Spirits? We
must no longer say upon these Principles that Fire heats, or Water cools, but that a Spirit
heats, and so forth. Would not a Man be deservedly laught at, who should talk after this
manner? I answer, he would so; in such things we ought to think with the Learned, and speak
with the Vulgar. They who to Demonstration are convinced of the truth of the Copernican
25
System, do nevertheless say the Sun rises, the Sun sets, or comes to the Meridian: And if they
affected a contrary Stile in common talk, it would without doubt appear very ridiculous. A
little Reflexion on what is here said will make it manifest, that the common use of Language
would receive no manner of Alteration or Disturbance from the Admission of our Tenets.
LII. In the ordinary Affairs of Life, any Phrases may be retained, so long as they excite
in us proper Sentiments, or Dispositions to act in such a manner as is necessary for our
well-being, how false soever they may be, if taken in a strict and speculative Sense. Nay
this is unavoidable, since Propriety being regulated by Custom, Language is suited to the
received Opinions, which are not always the truest. Hence it is impossible, even in the most
rigid philosophic Reasonings, so far to alter the Bent and Genius of the Tongue we speak,
as never to give a handle for Cavillers to pretend Difficulties and Inconsistencies. But a fair
and ingenuous Reader will collect the Sense, from the Scope and Tenor and Connexion of
a Discourse, making allowances for those inaccurate Modes of Speech, which use has made
inevitable.
LIII. As to the Opinion that there are no Corporeal Causes, this has been heretofore
maintained by some of the Schoolmen, as it is of late by others among the modern Philosophers, who though they allow Matter to exist, yet will have God alone to be the immediate
efficient Cause of all things. These Men saw, that amongst all the Objects of Sense, there
was none which had any Power or Activity included in it, and that by Consequence this
was likewise true of whatever Bodies they supposed to exist without the Mind, like unto the
immediate Objects of Sense. But then, that they should suppose an innumerable Multitude
of created Beings, which they acknowledge are not capable of producing any one Effect in
Nature, and which therefore are made to no manner of purpose, since God might have done
every thing as well without them; this I say, though we should allow it possible, must yet be
a very unaccountable and extravagant Supposition.
LIV. In the eighth place, The universal concurrent Assent of Mankind may be thought
by some, an invincible Argument in behalf of Matter, or the Existence of external things.
Must we suppose the whole World to be mistaken? And if so, what Cause can be assigned
of so widespread and predominant an Error? I answer, First, That upon a narrow Inquiry, it
will not perhaps be found, so many as is imagined do really believe the Existence of Matter or
Things without the Mind. Strictly speaking, to believe that which involves a Contradiction,
or has no meaning in it, is impossible: And whether the foregoing Expressions are not of
that sort, I refer it to the impartial Examination of the Reader. In one sense indeed, Men
may be said to believe that Matter exists, that is, they act as if the immediate Cause of their
Sensations, which affects them every moment and is so nearly present to them, were some
senseless unthinking Being. But that they should clearly apprehend any Meaning marked by
those Words, and form thereof a settled speculative Opinion, is what I am not able to conceive.
This is not the only Instance wherein Men impose upon themselves, by imagining they believe
those Propositions they have often heard, though at bottom they have no meaning in them.
LV. But secondly, Though we should grant a Notion to be ever so universally and stedfastly adhered to, yet this is but a weak Argument of its Truth, to whoever considers what
26
a vast number of Prejudices and false Opinions are every where embraced with the utmost
Tenaciousness, by the unreflecting (which are the far greater) Part of Mankind. There was
a time when the Antipodes and Motion of the Earth were looked upon as monstrous Absurdities, even by Men of Learning: And if it be considered what a small proportion they bear
to the rest of Mankind, we shall find that at this Day, those Notions have gained but a very
inconsiderable footing in the World.
LVI. But it is demanded, that we assign a Cause of this Prejudice, and account for
its obtaining in the World. To this I answer, That Men knowing they perceived several
Ideas, whereof they themselves were not the Authors, as not being excited from within,
nor depending on the Operation of their Wills, this made them maintain, those Ideas or
Objects of Perception had an Existence independent of, and without the Mind, without ever
dreaming that a Contradiction was involved in those Words. But Philosophers having plainly
seen, that the immediate Objects of Perception do not exist without the Mind, they in some
degree corrected the mistake of the Vulgar, but at the same time run into another which
seems no less absurd, to wit, that there are certain Objects really existing without the Mind,
or having a Subsistence distinct from being perceived, of which our Ideas are only Images or
Resemblances, imprinted by those Objects on the Mind. And this Notion of the Philosophers
owes its Origin to the same Cause with the former, namely, their being conscious that they
were not the Authors of their own Sensations, which they evidently knew were imprinted
from without, and which therefore must have some Cause, distinct from the Minds on which
they are imprinted.
LVII. But why they should suppose the Ideas of Sense to be excited in us by things in
their likeness, and not rather have recourse to Spirit which alone can act, may be accounted
for, First, because they were not aware of the Repugnancy there is, as well in supposing things
like unto our Ideas existing without, as in attributing to them Power or Activity. Secondly,
because the supreme Spirit which excites those Ideas in our Minds, is not marked out and
limited to our view by any particular finite Collection of sensible Ideas, as humane Agents
are by their Size, Complexion, Limbs, and Motions. And thirdly, because his Operations are
regular and uniform. Whenever the Course of Nature is interrupted by a Miracle, Men are
ready to own the Presence of a superior Agent. But when we see things go on in the ordinary
Course, they do not excite in us any Reflexion; their Order and Concatenation, though it
be an Argument of the greatest Wisdom, Power, and Goodness in their Creator, is yet so
constant and familiar to us, that we do not think them the immediate Effects of a Free Spirit:
especially since Inconstancy and Mutability in acting, though it be an Imperfection, is looked
on as a mark of Freedom.
LVIII. Tenthly, It will be objected, that the Notions we advance, are inconsistent with
several sound Truths in Philosophy and Mathematicks. For Example, The Motion of the
Earth is now universally admitted by Astronomers, as a Truth grounded on the clearest and
most convincing Reasons; but on the foregoing Principles, there can be no such thing. For
Motion being only an Idea, it follows that if it be not perceived, it exists not; but the Motion
of the Earth is not perceived by Sense. I answer, That Tenet, if rightly understood, will be
found to agree with the Principles we have premised: For the Question, whether the Earth
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moves or no, amounts in reality to no more than this, to wit, whether we have reason to
conclude from what hath been observed by Astronomers, that if we were placed in such and
such Circumstances, and such or such a Position and Distance, both from the Earth and Sun,
we should perceive the former to move among the Choir of the Planets, and appearing in all
respects like one of them: And this, by the established Rules of Nature, which we have no
reason to mistrust, is reasonably collected from the Phænomena.
LIX. We may, from the Experience we have had of the Train and Succession of Ideas
in our Minds, often make, I will not say uncertain Conjectures, but sure and well-grounded
Predictions, concerning the Ideas we shall be affected with, pursuant to a great Train of
Actions, and be enabled to pass a right Judgment of what would have appeared to us, in
case we were placed in Circumstances very different from those we are in at present. Herein
consists the Knowledge of Nature, which may preserve its Use and Certainty very consistently
with what hath been said. It will be easy to apply this to whatever Objections of the like
sort may be drawn from the Magnitude of the Stars, or any other Discoveries in Astronomy
or Nature.
LX. In the eleventh place, It will be demanded to what purpose serves that curious
Organization of Plants, and the admirable Mechanism in the Parts of Animals; might not
Vegetables grow, and shoot forth Leaves and Blossoms, and Animals perform all their Motions, as well without as with all that variety of internal Parts so elegantly contrived and
put together, which being Ideas have nothing powerful or operative in them, nor have any
necessary Connexion with the Effects ascribed to them? If it be a Spirit that immediately
produces every Effect by a Fiat, or Act of his Will, we must think all that is fine and artificial
in the Works, whether of Man or Nature, to be made in vain. By this Doctrine, though an
Artist hath made the Spring and Wheels, and every Movement of a Watch, and adjusted
them in such a manner as he knew would produce the Motions he designed; yet he must
think all this done to no purpose, and that it is an Intelligence which directs the Index, and
points to the Hour of the Day. If so, why may not the Intelligence do it, without his being
at the pains of making the Movements, and putting them together? Why does not an empty
Case serve as well as another? And how comes it to pass, that whenever there is any Fault
in the going of a Watch, there is some corresponding Disorder to be found in the Movements,
which being mended by a skilful Hand, all is right again? The like may be said of all the
Clockwork of Nature, great part whereof is so wonderfully fine and subtile, as scarce to be
discerned by the best Microscope. In short, it will be asked, how upon our Principles any
tolerable Account can be given, or any final Cause assigned of an innumerable multitude of
Bodies and Machines framed with the most exquisite Art, which in the common Philosophy
have very apposite uses assigned them, and serve to explain abundance of Phænomena.
LXI. To all which I answer, First, That though there were some Difficulties relating to
the Administration of Providence, and the uses by it assigned to the several parts of Nature,
which I could not solve by the foregoing Principles, yet this Objection could be of small
weight against the Truth and Certainty of those things which may be proved à priori, with
the utmost Evidence. Secondly, But neither are the received Princip...
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