MORAL DECISION MAKING: A PRACTICAL APPROACH
Theoretical controversies permeate the subject of ethics, and as we have seen,
philosophers have proposed rival ways of understanding right and wrong. These
philosophical differences of perspective, emphasis, and theory are significant and can
have profound practical consequences. This chapter has surveyed some of these issues,
but obviously it cannot settle all of the questions that divide moral philosophers.
Fortunately, however, many problems of business and organizational ethics can be
intelligently discussed and even resolved by people whose fundamental moral theories
differ (or who have not yet worked out their own moral ideas in some systematic way).
This section discusses some important points to keep in mind when analyzing and
discussing business ethics and offers, as a kind of model, one possible procedure for
making moral decisions.
In the abstract, it might seem impossible for people to reach agreement on
controversial ethical issues, given that ethical theories differ so much and that people
themselves place moral value on different things. Yet in practice moral problems are
rarely so intractable that open-minded and thoughtful people cannot, by discussing
matters calmly, rationally, and thoroughly, make significant progress toward resolving
them. Chapter 1 stressed that moral judgments should be logical, should be based on
facts, and should appeal to sound moral principles. Bearing this in mind can often help,
especially when various people are discussing an issue and proposing rival answers.
First, in any moral discussion, make sure that the participants agree about the
relevant facts. Often moral disputes hinge not on matters of moral principle but on
differing assessments of what the facts of the situation are, what alternatives are open,
or what the probable results of different courses of action will be. For instance, the
directors of an international firm might acrimoniously dispute the moral permissibility
of a new overseas investment. The conflict might appear to involve some fundamental
clash of moral principles and perspectives when, in fact, it is the result of some
underlying disagreement about the likely effects of the proposed investment on the lives
of the local population. Until this factual disagreement is acknowledged and dealt with,
little is apt to be resolved.
Second, once there is general agreement on factual matters, try to spell out the
moral principles to which different people are, at least implicitly, appealing. Seeking to
determine these principles will often help people clarify their own thinking enough to
reach a solution. Sometimes they will agree on what moral principles are relevant and
yet disagree over how to balance them. Identifying this discrepancy can be helpful.
Bear in mind, too, that skepticism is in order when someone’s moral stance on an issue
appears to rest simply on a hunch or an intuition and cannot be related to some more
general moral principle. As moral decision makers, we are seeking not only an answer
to a moral issue but an answer that can be publicly defended, and the public defense of
a moral judgment usually requires an appeal to general principle. By analogy, judges
do not hand down judgments based simply on what strikes them as fair in a particular
case. They must relate their decisions to general legal principles or statutes.
A reluctance to defend our moral decisions in public is almost always a warning
sign. If we are unwilling to account for our actions publicly, chances are that we are
doing something we cannot really justify morally. In addition, Kant’s point that we must
be willing to universalize our moral judgments is relevant here. We cannot sincerely
endorse a principle if we are not willing to see it applied generally. Unfortunately, we
occasionally do make judgments—for example, that Alfred’s being late to work is a
satisfactory reason for firing him—that rest on a principle we would be unwilling to
apply to our own situations; hence the moral relevance of the familiar question: “How
would you like it if . . . ?” Looking at an issue from the other person’s point of view
can cure moral myopia.
OBLIGATIONS, EFFECTS, IDEALS
As a practical basis for discussing moral issues in organizations, it is useful to try
to approach those issues in a way that is acceptable to individuals with differing moral
viewpoints. We want to avoid presupposing the truth of one particular theoretical
perspective. By emphasizing factors that are relevant to various theories, both
consequentialist and nonconsequentialist, we can find some common ground on which
moral decision making can proceed. Moral dialogue can thus take place in an objective
and analytical way, even if the participants do not fully agree on all philosophical issues.
What factors or considerations, then, seem important from most ethical
perspectives? Following Professor V. R. Ruggiero, we can identify three shared
concerns. The first is with obligations, that is, with the specific duties or moral
responsibilities that we have in a given situation. Every significant human action—
personal and professional—arises in the context of human relationships. These
relationships, the roles we have assumed, and the expectations created by our previous
actions can be the source of particular duties and rights. In addition, we are obligated
to respect people’s human rights. Obligations bind us. In their presence, morality
requires us, at least prima facie, to do certain things and to avoid doing others. Even
utilitarians can agree with this.
A second concern common to most ethical systems is with the effects of our actions.
When reflecting on a possible course of action, one needs to take into account its likely
results. Although nonconsequentialists maintain that things other than consequences or
results can affect the rightness or wrongness of actions, few if any of them would ignore
consequences entirely. Almost all nonconsequentialist theories place some moral
weight on the results of our actions. Practically speaking, this means that in making a
moral decision, we must identify all the interested parties and how they would be
affected by the different courses of action open to us.
The third consideration relevant to most ethical perspectives is the impact of our
actions on important ideals. An ideal is some morally significant goal, virtue, or notion
of excellence worth striving for. Clearly, different cultures impart different ideals and,
equally important, different ways of pursuing them. Our culture respects virtues such
as generosity, courage, compassion, and loyalty, as well as more abstract ideals such as
peace, justice, and equality. In addition to these moral ideals, there are institutional or
organizational ideals: efficiency, product quality, customer service, and so forth. Does
a particular act serve or violate these ideals? Both consequentialists and
nonconsequentialists can agree that this is an important consideration in determining
the moral quality of actions.
In isolating these three concerns common to almost all ethical systems—
obligations, effects, and ideals—Ruggiero provided a kind of practical synthesis of
consequentialist and nonconsequentialist thought that seems appropriate for our
purposes. A useful approach to moral questions in an organizational context will
therefore reflect these considerations: the obligations that derive from organizational
relationships or are affected by organizational conduct, the ideals at stake, and the
effects or consequences of alter- native courses of action. Any action that honors
obligations while respecting ideals and benefiting people can be presumed to be moral.
An action that does not pass scrutiny in these respects will be morally suspect.
This view leads to what is essentially a two-step procedure for evaluating actions and
making moral choices.
The first step is to identify the important considerations involved: obligations,
effects, and ideals. Accordingly, we should ask if any basic obligations are involved. If
so, what are they and who has them? Who is affected by the action and how? How do
these effects compare with those of the alternatives open to us? What ideals does the
action respect or promote? What ideals does it neglect or thwart?
The second step is to decide which of these considerations deserves emphasis.
Sometimes the issue may be largely a matter of obligations; other times, some ideal
may predominate; still other times, consideration of effects may be the overriding
concern.
If two or more obligations conflict, it is obvious that we should choose the stronger
one, and when two or more ideals conflict, or when ideals conflict with obligations, we
should obviously honor the more important one. Similarly, when rival actions have
different results, we should prefer the action that produces the greater good or the lesser
harm. But in real-world situations, deciding these matters is often difficult, and there is
no easy way of balancing obligations, effects, and ideals when these considerations pull
in different directions. The fact is that we have no sure procedure for making such
comparative determinations, which involve assessing worth and assigning relative
priorities to our assessments. In large part, the chapters that follow attempt to sort out
the values and principles embedded in the tangled web of frequently subtle, ill-defined
problems we meet in business and organizational life. It is hoped that examining these
issues will help you (1) identify the obligations, effects, and ideals involved in specific
moral issues and (2) decide where the emphasis should lie among the competing
considerations.
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