To learn more, please visit www.mhhe.com/lewickinegotiation
NEGOTIATION
Readings, Exercises and Cases
sixth edition
ROY J. LEWICKI
DAVID M. SAUNDERS
BRUCE BARRY
MD DALIM #1055996 11/05/09 CYAN MAG YELO BLK ORANGE
LEWICKI | SAUNDERS | BARRY
The authors have carefully organized Negotiation: Readings, Exercises and Cases 6e
to coordinate closely with their newly revised text, Negotiation 6e, as well as with the
shorter version of the text, Essentials of Negotiation 5e. All three texts in this series
can work together to create a comprehensive learning system.
NEGOTIATION
Examples of new readings, exercises, and cases include:
Balancing Act: How to Manage Negotiation Tensions
Negotiation Ethics
Four Strategies for Making Concessions
Become a Master Negotiator
Culture and Negotiation
Investigative Negotiation
Seven Strategies for Negotiating Success
Ridgecrest School Dispute
Bargaining Strategy in Major League Baseball
Readings, Exercises and Cases
Negotiation is a fundamental skill, not only for successful management, but also for
successful living. Negotiation: Readings, Exercises and Cases 6e takes an experiential
approach to this skill and explores the major concepts and theories of the psychology of
bargaining and negotiation, resulting in a text that reflects the very best and most recent
work on negotiation and the related topics of power, influence, and conflict management.
sixth
edition
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Page i
Negotiation
Readings, Exercises
and Cases
Sixth Edition
Roy J. Lewicki
The Ohio State University
David M. Saunders
Queen’s University
Bruce Barry
Vanderbilt University
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NEGOTIATION: READINGS, EXERCISES AND CASES, SIXTH EDITION
Published by McGraw-Hill, a business unit of The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1221 Avenue of the
Americas, New York, NY 10020. Copyright © 2010 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
Previous editions © 2007, 2003, and 1999. No part of this publication may be reproduced or distributed in any
form or by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without the prior written consent of The
McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., including, but not limited to, in any network or other electronic storage or
transmission, or broadcast for distance learning.
Some ancillaries, including electronic and print components, may not be available to customers outside the
United States.
This book is printed on acid-free paper.
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All credits appearing on page or at the end of the book are considered to be an extension of the copyright page.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Negotiation: readings, exercises, and cases / [edited by] Roy J. Lewicki, David M. Saunders,
Bruce Barry.—6th ed.
p. cm.
ISBN-13: 978-0-07-353031-4 (alk. paper)
ISBN-10: 0-07-243255-1
1. Negotiation in business. 2. Negotiation. 3. Negotiation—Case studies. I. Lewicki, Roy J.
II. Saunders, David M. III. Barry, Bruce, 1958–
HD58.6.N45 2009
658.4⬘052—dc22
2009039281
The Internet addresses listed in the text were accurate at the time of publication. The inclusion of a Web site
does not indicate an endorsement by the authors or McGraw-Hill, and McGraw-Hill does not guarantee the
accuracy of the information presented at these sites.
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Dedication
We dedicate this book to all negotiation, mediation, and dispute
resolution professionals who try to make the world a more
peaceful and prosperous place.
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About the Authors
Roy J.
Lewicki
is the Abramowitz Professor of Business Ethics, and Professor of Management and Human Resources at the Max. M. Fisher College of Business, The Ohio State University.
He has authored or edited 32 books, as well as numerous research articles. Professor
Lewicki has served as the President of the International Association of Conflict Management, was the founding editor of the Academy of Management Learning and Education, and received the Academy of Management’s Distinguished Educator Award for his
contributions to the field of teaching in negotiation and dispute resolution.
David M.
Saunders
is dean of Queen’s School of Business. Since joining Queen’s in 2003, he has led the internationalization of the school, launched two unique MBA programs and a suite of preexperience Masters programs, and strengthened Queen’s international network with the
addition of top business school partners in Europe, Asia, and South America.
Outside of Queen’s, David is the co-author of several articles on negotiation, conflict resolution, employee voice, and organizational justice. He sits on the board of the
China Europe International Business School (CEIBS) and the European Foundation for
Management Development, an international business school association.
Bruce
Barry
is Professor of Management and Sociology at Vanderbilt University. His research on negotiation, influence, power, and justice has appeared in numerous scholarly journals and
volumes. Professor Barry is a past President of the International Association for Conflict
Management (2002–2003), and a past chair of the Academy of Management Conflict
Management Division.
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Preface
People negotiate every day. During an average day, they may negotiate with
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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the boss, regarding an unexpected work assignment;
subordinates, regarding unexpected overtime;
a supplier, about a problem with raw materials inventory management;
a banker, over the terms of a business loan;
a government official, regarding the compliance with environmental regulations;
a real estate agent, over the lease on a new warehouse;
his/her spouse, over who will walk the dog;
his/her child, over who will walk the dog (still an issue after losing the previous
negotiation);
and the dog, once out, as to whether any “business” gets done.
In short, negotiation is a common, everyday activity that most people use to influence
others and to achieve personal objectives. In fact, negotiation is not only common, but
also essential to living an effective and satisfying life. We all need things—resources,
information, cooperation, and support from others. Others have those needs as well,
sometimes compatible with ours, sometimes not. Negotiation is a process by which we
attempt to influence others to help us achieve our needs while at the same time taking
their needs into account. It is a fundamental skill, not only for successful management
but also for successful living.
In 1985, Roy Lewicki and Joseph Litterer published the first edition of this book.
As they were preparing that volume, it was clear that the basic processes of negotiation
had received only selective attention in both the academic and practitioner literature.
Scholars of negotiation had generally restricted examination of these processes to basic
theory development and laboratory research in social psychology, to a few books written for managers, and to an examination of negotiation in complex settings such as
diplomacy and labor–management relations. Efforts to draw from the broader study of
techniques for influence and persuasion, to integrate this work into a broader understanding of negotiation, or to apply this work to a broad spectrum of conflict and negotiation settings were only beginning to occur.
In the past twenty-five years, this world has changed significantly. There are several
new practitioner organizations, such as the Society for Professionals in Dispute Resolution
and the Association for Conflict Resolution, and academic professional associations such
as the Conflict Management Division of the Academy of Management and the International Association for Conflict Management that have devoted themselves exclusively to
facilitating research and teaching in the fields of negotiation and conflict management.
There are several new journals (Negotiation Journal, Negotiation and Conflict Management Research, International Journal of Conflict Management, International Negotiation)
that focus exclusively on research in these fields. Finally, through the generosity of the
Hewlett Foundation, there are a number of university centers that have devoted themselves
to enhancing the quality of teaching, research, and service in the negotiation and conflict
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Preface
management fields. Many schools now have several courses in negotiation and conflict
management—in schools of business, law, public policy, psychology, social work, education, and natural resources. Development has occurred in the practitioner side as well.
Books, seminars, and training courses on negotiation and conflict management abound.
And, finally, mediation has become an extremely popular process as an alternative to litigation for handling divorce, community disputes, and land-use conflicts. In pragmatic
terms, all of this development means that as we assembled this sixth edition, we have
had a much richer and more diverse pool of resources from which to sample. The net
result for the student and instructor is a highly improved book of readings and exercises
that contains many new articles, cases, and exercises, which represent the very best and
most recent work on negotiation and the related topics of power, influence, and conflict
management.
A brief overview of this book is in order. The Readings portion of the book is ordered into seven sections: (1) Negotiation Fundamentals, (2) Negotiation Subprocesses,
(3) Negotiation Contexts, (4) Individual Differences, (5) Negotiation across Cultures,
(6) Resolving Differences, and (7) Summary. The next section of the book presents a collection of role-play exercises, cases, and self-assessment questionnaires that can be used
to teach about negotiation processes and subprocesses. Complete information about the
use or adaptation of these materials for several classroom formats is provided in our accompanying web-based Instructor’s Manual, which faculty members may obtain access
by contacting their local McGraw-Hill/Irwin representative, by calling (800) 634-3963 or
by visiting the McGraw-Hill Web site at www.mhhe.com/lewickinegotiation
For those readers familiar with the previous edition of this book, the most visible
changes in this edition are to the book’s content and organization, as follows:
•
•
The content of this edition is substantially new. About half of the readings are new
to this edition, and there are approximately ten new exercises and cases. Almost
all exercises and cases have been revised and updated.
These 7 sections parallel the 7 sections and 20 chapters of the completely revised
textbook, Negotiation, 6th edition, by Lewicki, Barry and Saunders, also published by McGraw-Hill/Irwin. The text and reader can be used together, or separately. A shorter version of the text, Essentials of Negotiation, 5th edition, by
Lewicki, Saunders and Barry, can also be used in conjunction with these readings
book (to be published in 2010). We encourage instructors to contact their local
McGraw-Hill/Irwin representative for an examination copy (call 800-634-3963,
or visit the Web site at www.mhhe.com/lewickinegotiation).
This book could not have been completed without the assistance of numerous people.
We especially thank
•
•
The many authors and publishers who granted us permission to use or adapt their
work for this book and whom we have recognized in conjunction with specific
exercises, cases, or articles.
The many negotiation instructors and trainers who inspired several of the
exercises in this book and who have given us excellent feedback on the
previous editions of this book.
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Preface
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The staff of McGraw-Hill/Irwin, especially our current editor, Laura Spell, and
our previous editors, John Weimeister, Ryan Blankenship, John Biernat, Kurt
Strand and Karen Johnson; Jane Beck, Allison Cleland and Trina Hauger, editorial
assistants who can solve almost any problem; Project Manager Robin Reed; and
Lori Bradshaw, tireless developmental editor who turns our confusing instructions
and tedious prose into eminently readable and usable volumes!
Our families, who continue to provide us with the time, inspiration, opportunities
for continued learning about effective negotiation, and the personal support
required to finish this project.
Roy J. Lewicki
David M. Saunders
Bruce Barry
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Section Three The Nature of Negotiation
Contents
Section 1
Negotiation Fundamentals
Section 3
Negotiation Contexts
1.1
3.1
Three Approaches to Resolving Disputes:
Interests, Rights, and Power 1
1.2 Selecting a Strategy 14
1.3 Balancing Act: How to Manage Negotiation
Tensions 30
1.4 The Negotiation Checklist 34
1.5 Effective Negotiating Techniques: From
Selecting Strategies to Side-Stepping Impasses
and Assumptions 48
1.6 Closing Your Business Negotiations 65
1.7 Defusing the Exploding Offer: The Farpoint
Gambit 72
1.8 Implementing a Collaborative Strategy 80
1.9 Solve Joint Problems to Create and Claim
Value 97
1.10 Even at Megastores, Hagglers Find No Price Is
Set in Stone 112
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.8
3.9
3.10
3.11
3.12
Section 2
Negotiation Subprocesses
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7
2.8
2.9
2.10
2.11
2.12
2.13
viii
Negotiating Rationally: The Power and Impact
of the Negotiator’s Frame 115
Managers and Their Not-So Rational
Decisions 125
When Your Thoughts Work Against You 135
Untapped Power: Emotions in Negotiation 139
Staying with No 147
Risks of E-Mail 152
Where Does Power Come From? 159
Harnessing the Science of Persuasion 168
The Six Channels of Persuasion 177
Negotiating with Liars 183
Negotiation Ethics 193
Three Schools of Bargaining Ethics 198
A Painful Close 204
3.13
Staying in the Game or Changing It: An
Analysis of Moves and Turns in
Negotiation 211
The Soft Sell 225
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Tribe 228
The Fine Art of Making Concessions 240
The High Cost of Low Trust 244
Consequences of Principal and Agent 248
The Tension between Principals and Agents 256
When a Contract Isn’t Enough: How to
Be Sure Your Agent Gets You the Best
Deal 267
This Is Not a Game: Top Sports Agents Share
Their Negotiating Secrets 272
The New Boss 277
Can’t Beat Them? Then Join a
Coalition 291
Building and Maintaining Coalitions and
Allegiances throughout Negotiations 294
The Surprising Benefits of Conflict in
Negotiating Teams 298
Section 4
Individual Differences
4.1
4.2
4.3
Women Don’t Ask 301
Become a Master Negotiator 309
Should You Be a Negotiator? 317
Section 5
Negotiation across Cultures
5.1
5.2
5.3
Culture and Negotiation 321
Intercultural Negotiation in International
Business 339
American Strengths and Weaknesses 358
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Contents
Section 6
Resolving Differences
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
6.6
6.7
Doing Things Collaboratively: Realizing the
Advantage or Succumbing to Inertia? 363
Taking Steps toward “Getting to Yes” at Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of Florida 377
Taking the Stress Out of Stressful
Conversations 382
Renegotiating Existing Agreements: How to
Deal with “Life Struggling against Form” 391
Negotiating with Disordered People 409
When and How to Use Third-Party Help 417
Investigative Negotiation 435
Section 7
Summary
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
Best Practices in Negotiation 443
Getting Past Yes: Negotiating as if
Implementation Mattered 453
Seven Strategies for Negotiating Success:
Some Fancy Footwork for the Salary Pas de
Deux 466
Six Habits of Merely Effective Negotiators 472
13. Island Cruise 508
14. Salary Negotiations 513
15. Job Offer Negotiation: Joe Tech
and Robust Routers 514
16. The Employee Exit Interview 519
17. Live8 520
18. Ridgecrest School Dispute 521
19. Bestbooks/Paige Turner 528
20. Strategic Moves and Turns 529
21. Elmwood Hospital Dispute 531
22. The Power Game 534
23. Coalition Bargaining 535
24. The Connecticut Valley School 538
25. Bakery–Florist–Grocery 541
26. The New House Negotiation 542
27. The Buena Vista Condo 544
28. Eurotechnologies, Inc. 545
29. Third-Party Conflict Resolution 552
30. AuraCall Inc. 557
31. 500 English Sentences 558
32. Sick Leave 559
33. Alpha–Beta 560
34. Galactica SUV 562
35. Bacchus Winery 563
36. Collecting Nos 564
37. A Team in Trouble 566
Exercises
1. The Subjective Value
Inventory (SVI) 483
2. Pemberton’s Dilemma 486
3. The Commons Dilemma 489
4. The Used Car 490
5. Knight Engines/Excalibur Engine
Parts 492
6. GTechnica—AccelMedia 493
7. Toyonda 494
8. Planning for Negotiations 495
9. The Pakistani Prunes 498
10. Universal Computer Company 499
11. Twin Lakes Mining Company 502
12. City of Tamarack 505
Cases
1. Capital Mortgage Insurance
Corporation (A) 567
2. Pacific Oil Company (A) 582
3. Negotiating on Thin Ice: The 2004–2005 NHL
Dispute (A) 610
4. Collective Bargaining at Magic
Carpet Airlines: A Union
Perspective (A) 629
5. Bargaining Strategy in Major League
Baseball 638
6. Midwestern::Contemporary Art 649
7. 500 English Sentences 656
8. Sick Leave 666
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Contents
Questionnaires
1. The Personal Bargaining
Inventory 677
2. The SINS II Scale 680
3. Six Channels of Persuasion
Survey 682
4. The Trust Scale 686
5. Communication Competence
Scale 691
6. The Cultural Intelligence Scale 693
Appendix
1. Negotiating on Thin Ice: The 2004–2005 NHL
Dispute (B) 695
Title Index 699
Name Index 701
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Page 1
SECTION
1
Negotiation Fundamentals
Reading 1.1
Three Approaches to Resolving Disputes: Interests,
Rights, and Power
William L. Ury
Jeanne M. Brett
Stephen B. Goldberg
It started with a pair of stolen boots. Miners usually leave their work clothes in baskets that
they hoist to the ceiling of the bathhouse between work shifts. One night a miner discovered
that his boots were gone.1 He couldn’t work without boots. Angry, he went to the shift boss
and complained, “Goddammit, someone stole my boots! It ain’t fair! Why should I lose a
shift’s pay and the price of a pair of boots because the company can’t protect the property?”
“Hard luck!” the shift boss responded. “The company isn’t responsible for personal
property left on company premises. Read the mine regulations!”
The miner grumbled to himself, “I’ll show them! If I can’t work this shift, neither
will anyone else!” He convinced a few buddies to walk out with him and, in union
solidarity, all the others followed.
The superintendent of the mine told us later that he had replaced stolen boots for
miners and that the shift boss should have done the same. “If the shift boss had said to
the miner, ‘I’ll buy you a new pair and loan you some meanwhile,’ we wouldn’t have
had a strike.” The superintendent believed that his way of resolving the dispute was better than the shift boss’s or the miner’s. Was he right and, if so, why? In what ways are
some dispute resolution procedures better than others?
In this reading, we discuss three ways to resolve a dispute: reconciling the interests
of the parties, determining who is right, and determining who is more powerful. We
analyze the costs of disputing in terms of transaction costs, satisfaction with outcomes,
effect on the relationship, and recurrence of disputes. We argue that, in general, reconciling interests costs less and yields more satisfactory results than determining who is
right, which in turn costs less and satisfies more than determining who is more powerful. The goal of dispute systems design, therefore, is a system in which most disputes are
resolved by reconciling interests.
Source: “Three Approaches to Resolving Disputes: Interests, Rights, and Power,” from Getting Disputes
Resolved, by William L. Ury, Jeanne M. Brett, and Stephen B. Goldberg, 1988, pp. 3–19. New York:
Jossey-Bass, Inc., a subsidiary of John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Used with permission.
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Section One Negotiation Fundamentals
Three Ways to Resolve Disputes
The Boots Dispute Dissected
A dispute begins when one person (or organization) makes a claim or demand on another who rejects it.2 The claim may arise from a perceived injury or from a need or
aspiration.3 When the miner complained to the shift boss about the stolen boots, he was
making a claim that the company should take responsibility and remedy his perceived
injury. The shift boss’s rejection of the claim turned it into a dispute. To resolve a dispute means to turn opposed positions—the claim and its rejection—into a single outcome.4 The resolution of the boots dispute might have been a negotiated agreement, an
arbitrator’s ruling, or a decision by the miner to drop his claim or by the company to
grant it.
In a dispute, people have certain interests at stake. Moreover, certain relevant standards or rights exist as guideposts toward a fair outcome. In addition, a certain balance
of power exists between the parties. Interests, rights, and power then are three basic
elements of any dispute. In resolving a dispute, the parties may choose to focus their
attention on one or more of these basic factors. They may seek to (1) reconcile their
underlying interests, (2) determine who is right, and/or (3) determine who is more
powerful.
When he pressed his claim that the company should do something about his
stolen boots, the miner focused on rights—“Why should I lose a shift’s pay and the
price of a pair of boots because the company can’t protect the property?” When the
shift boss responded by referring to mine regulations, he followed the miner’s lead
and continued to focus on who was right. The miner, frustrated in his attempt to
win what he saw as justice, provoked a walkout—changing the focus to power. “I’ll
show them!” In other words, he would show the company how much power he and
his fellow coal miners had—how dependent the company was on them for the
production of coal.
The mine superintendent thought the focus should have been on interests. The
miner had an interest in boots and a shift’s pay, and the company had an interest in the
miner working his assigned shift. Although rights were involved (there was a question
of fairness) and power was involved (the miner had the power to cause a strike), the superintendent’s emphasis was on each side’s interests. He would have approached the
stolen boots situation as a joint problem that the company could help solve.
Reconciling Interests
Interests are needs, desires, concerns, fears—the things one cares about or wants. They
underlie people’s positions—the tangible items they say they want. A husband and wife
quarrel about whether to spend money for a new car. The husband’s underlying interest
may not be the money or the car but the desire to impress his friends; the wife’s interest
may be transportation. The director of sales for an electronics company gets into a dispute with the director of manufacturing over the number of TV models to produce. The
director of sales wants to produce more models. Her interest is in selling TV sets; more
models mean more choice for consumers and hence increased sales. The director of
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Three Approaches to Resolving Disputes: Interests, Rights, and Power
3
manufacturing wants to produce fewer models. His interest is in decreasing manufacturing costs; more models mean higher costs.
Reconciling such interests is not easy. It involves probing for deep-seated concerns, devising creative solutions, and making trade-offs and concessions where interests are opposed.5 The most common procedure for doing this is negotiation, the act of
back-and-forth communication intended to reach agreement. (A procedure is a pattern
of interactive behavior directed toward resolving a dispute.) Another interests-based
procedure is mediation, in which a third party assists the disputants in reaching
agreement.
By no means do all negotiations (or mediations) focus on reconciling interests.
Some negotiations focus on determining who is right, such as when two lawyers argue
about whose case has the greater merit. Other negotiations focus on determining
who is more powerful, such as when quarreling neighbors or nations exchange threats
and counterthreats. Often negotiations involve a mix of all three—some attempts to
satisfy interests, some discussion of rights, and some references to relative power.
Negotiations that focus primarily on interests we call “interests-based,” in contrast to
“rights-based” and “power-based” negotiations. Another term for interests-based negotiation is problem-solving negotiation, so called because it involves treating a dispute
as a mutual problem to be solved by the parties.
Before disputants can effectively begin the process of reconciling interests, they
may need to vent their emotions. Rarely are emotions absent from disputes. Emotions
often generate disputes, and disputes, in turn, often generate emotions. Frustration underlay the miner’s initial outburst to the shift boss; anger at the shift boss’s response
spurred him to provoke the strike.
Expressing underlying emotions can be instrumental in negotiating a resolution.
Particularly in interpersonal disputes, hostility may diminish significantly if the aggrieved party vents her anger, resentment, and frustration in front of the blamed party,
and the blamed party acknowledges the validity of such emotions or, going one step further, offers an apology.6 With hostility reduced, resolving the dispute on the basis of
interests becomes easier. Expressions of emotion have a special place in certain kinds
of interests-based negotiation and mediation.
Determining Who Is Right
Another way to resolve disputes is to rely on some independent standard with perceived
legitimacy or fairness to determine who is right. As a shorthand for such independent
standards, we use the term rights. Some rights are formalized in law or contract. Other
rights are socially accepted standards of behavior, such as reciprocity, precedent, equality, and seniority.7 In the boots dispute, for example, while the miner had no contractual
right to new boots, he felt that standards of fairness called for the company to replace
personal property stolen from its premises.
Rights are rarely clear. There are often different—and sometimes contradictory—
standards that apply. Reaching agreement on rights, where the outcome will determine
who gets what, can often be exceedingly difficult, frequently leading the parties to
turn to a third party to determine who is right. The prototypical rights procedure is
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Section One Negotiation Fundamentals
adjudication, in which disputants present evidence and arguments to a neutral third party
who has the power to hand down a binding decision. (In mediation, by contrast, the third
party does not have the power to decide the dispute.) Public adjudication is provided by
courts and administrative agencies. Private adjudication is provided by arbitrators.8
Determining Who Is More Powerful
A third way to resolve a dispute is on the basis of power. We define power, somewhat
narrowly, as the ability to coerce someone to do something he would not otherwise do.
Exercising power typically means imposing costs on the other side or threatening to do
so. In striking, the miners exercised power by imposing economic costs on the company.
The exercise of power takes two common forms: acts of aggression, such as sabotage or
physical attack, and withholding the benefits that derive from a relationship, as when
employees withhold their labor in a strike.
In relationships of mutual dependence, such as between labor and management or
within an organization or a family, the questions of who is more powerful turns on who
is less dependent on the other.9 If a company needs the employees’ work more than employees need the company’s pay, the company is more dependent and hence less powerful. How dependent one is turns on how satisfactory the alternatives are for satisfying
one’s interests. The better the alternative, the less dependent one is. If it is easier for the
company to replace striking employees than it is for striking employees to find new jobs,
the company is less dependent and thereby more powerful. In addition to strikes, power
procedures include behaviors that range from insults and ridicule to beatings and warfare. All have in common the intent to coerce the other side to settle on terms more satisfactory to the wielder of power. Power procedures are of two types: power-based
negotiation, typified by an exchange of threats, and power contests, in which the parties
take actions to determine who will prevail.
Determining who is the more powerful party without a decisive and potentially destructive power contest is difficult because power is ultimately a matter of perceptions.
Despite objective indicators of power, such as financial resources, parties’ perceptions
of their own and each other’s power often do not coincide. Moreover, each side’s perception of the other’s power may fail to take into account the possibility that the other
will invest greater resources in the contest than expected out of fear that a change in the
perceived distribution of power will affect the outcomes of future disputes.
Interrelationship among Interests, Rights, and Power
The relationship among interests, rights, and power can be pictured as a circle within a
circle within a circle (as in Figure 1). The innermost circle represents interests; the middle, rights; and the outer, power. The reconciliation of interests takes place within the
context of the parties’ rights and power. The likely outcome of a dispute if taken to court
or to a strike, for instance, helps define the bargaining range within which a resolution
can be found. Similarly, the determination of rights takes place within the context of
power. One party, for instance, may win a judgment in court, but unless the judgment
can be enforced, the dispute will continue. Thus, in the process of resolving a dispute,
the focus may shift from interests to rights to power and back again.
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FIGURE 1 | Interrelationships among Interests, Rights, and Power
Interests
Rights
Power
Lumping It and Avoidance
Not all disputes end with a resolution. Often one or more parties simply decide to withdraw from the dispute. Withdrawal takes two forms. One party may decide to “lump it,”
dropping her claim or giving in to the other’s claim because she believes pursuing the
dispute is not in her interest, or because she concludes she does not have the power to
resolve it to her satisfaction. The miner would have been lumping his claim if he had
said to himself, “I strongly disagree with management’s decision not to reimburse me
for my boots, but I’m not going to do anything about it.” A second form of withdrawal
is avoidance. One party (or both) may decide to withdraw from the relationship, or at
least to curtail it significantly.10 Examples of avoidance include quitting the organization, divorce, leaving the neighborhood, and staying out of the other person’s way.
Both avoidance and lumping it may occur in conjunction with particular dispute
resolution procedures. Many power contests involve threatening avoidance—such as
threatening divorce—or actually engaging in it temporarily to impose costs on the
other side—such as in a strike or breaking off of diplomatic relations. Many power
contests end with the loser lumping her claim or her objection to the other’s claim.
Others end with the loser engaging in avoidance: leaving or keeping her distance from
the winner. Similarly, much negotiation ends with one side deciding to lump it instead
of pursuing the claim. Or, rather than take a dispute to court or engage in coercive
actions, one party (or both) may decide to break off the relationship altogether. This
is common in social contexts where the disputant perceives satisfactory alternatives
to the relationship.
Lumping it and avoidance may also occur before a claim has been made, thus forestalling a dispute. Faced with the problem of stolen boots, the miner might have decided
to lump it and not make a claim for the boots. More drastically, in a fit of exasperation,
he might have walked off the job and never returned.
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Which Approach Is “Best”?
When the miner superintendent described the boots dispute to us, he expressed a preference for how to resolve disputes. In our language, he was saying that on the whole it
was better to try to reconcile interests than to focus on who was right or who was more
powerful. But what does “better” mean? And in what sense, if any, was he correct in
believing that focusing attention on interests is better?
What “Better” Means: Four Possible Criteria
The different approaches to the resolution of disputes—interests, rights, and power—
generate different costs and benefits. We focus on four criteria in comparing them:
transaction costs, satisfaction with outcomes, effect on the relationship, and recurrence
of disputes.11
Transaction Costs For the mine superintendent, “better” meant resolving disputes
without strikes. More generally, he wanted to minimize the costs of disputing—what
may be called the transaction costs. The most obvious costs of striking were economic.
The management payroll and the overhead costs had to be met while the mine stood
idle. Sometimes strikes led to violence and the destruction of company property. The
miners, too, incurred costs—lost wages. Then there were the lost opportunities for the
company: a series of strikes could lead to the loss of a valuable sales contract. In a family argument, the costs would include the frustrating hours spent disputing, the frayed
nerves and tension headaches, and the missed opportunities to do more enjoyable or useful tasks. All dispute resolution procedures carry transaction costs: the time, money, and
emotional energy expended in disputing; the resources consumed and destroyed; and the
opportunities lost.12
Satisfaction with Outcomes Another way to evaluate different approaches to dispute
resolution is by the parties’ mutual satisfaction with the result. The outcome of the strike
could not have been wholly satisfactory to the miner—he did not receive new boots—
but he did succeed in venting his frustration and taking his revenge. A disputant’s satisfaction depends largely on how much the resolution fulfills the interests that led her to
make or reject the claim in the first place. Satisfaction may also depend on whether the
disputant believes that the resolution is fair. Even if an agreement does not wholly fulfill her interests, a disputant may draw some satisfaction from the resolution’s fairness.
Satisfaction depends not only on the perceived fairness of the resolution, but also on
the perceived fairness of the dispute resolution procedure. Judgments about fairness turn
on several factors: how much opportunity a disputant had to express himself; whether he
had control over accepting or rejecting the settlement; how much he was able to participate in shaping the settlement; and whether he believes that the third party, if there was
one, acted fairly.13
Effect on the Relationship A third criterion is the long-term effect on the parties’ relationship. The approach taken to resolve a dispute may affect the parties’ ability to work
together on a day-to-day basis. Constant quarrels with threats of divorce may seriously
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weaken a marriage. In contrast, marital counseling in which the disputing partners learn
to focus on interests in order to resolve disputes may strengthen a marriage.
Recurrence The final criterion is whether a particular approach produces durable resolutions. The simplest form of recurrence is when a resolution fails to stick. For example, a dispute between father and teenage son over curfew appears resolved but breaks
out again and again. A subtler form of recurrence takes place when a resolution is
reached in a particular dispute, but the resolution fails to prevent the same dispute from
arising between one of the disputants and someone else, or conceivably between two
different parties in the same community. For instance, a man guilty of sexually harassing an employee reaches an agreement with his victim that is satisfactory to her, but he
continues to harass other women employees. Or he stops, but other men continue to
harass women employees in the same organization.
The Relationship among the Four Criteria These four different criteria are interrelated. Dissatisfaction with outcomes may produce strain on the relationship, which contributes to the recurrence of disputes, which in turn increases transaction costs. Because
the different costs typically increase and decrease together, it is convenient to refer to all
four together as the costs of disputing. When we refer to a particular approach as highcost or low-cost, we mean not just transaction costs but also dissatisfaction with
outcomes, strain on the relationship, and recurrence of disputes.
Sometimes one cost can be reduced only by increasing another, particularly in the
short term. If father and son sit down to discuss their conflicting interests concerning
curfew, the short-term transaction costs in terms of time and energy may be high. Still,
these costs may be more than offset by the benefits of a successful negotiation—an
improved relationship and the cessation of curfew violations.
Which Approach Is Least Costly?
Now that we have defined “better” in terms of the four types of costs, the question remains whether the mine superintendent was right in supposing that focusing on interests
is better. A second question is also important: when an interests-based approach fails, is
it less costly to focus on rights or on power?
Interests versus Rights or Power A focus on interests can resolve the problem underlying the dispute more effectively than can a focus on rights or power. An example is
a grievance filed against a mine foreman for doing work that contractually only a miner
is authorized to do. Often the real problem is something else—a miner who feels unfairly assigned to an unpleasant task may file a grievance only to strike back at his foreman. Clearly, focusing on what the contract says about foremen working will not deal
with this underlying problem. Nor will striking to protest foremen working. But if the
foreman and miner can negotiate about the miner’s future work tasks, the dispute may
be resolved to the satisfaction of both.
Just as an interests-based approach can help uncover hidden problems, it can help the
parties identify which issues are of greater concern to one than to the other. By trading off
issues of lesser concern for those of greater concern, both parties can gain from the
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resolution of the dispute.14 Consider, for example, a union and employer negotiating over
two issues: additional vacation time and flexibility of work assignments. Although the
union does not like the idea of assignment flexibility, its clear priority is additional vacation. Although the employer does not like the idea of additional vacation, he cares more
about gaining flexibility in assigning work. An agreement that gives the union the vacation
days it seeks and the employer the flexibility in making work assignments would likely be
satisfactory to both. Such joint gain is more likely to be realized if the parties focus on each
side’s interests. Focusing on who is right, as in litigation, or on who is more powerful, as in
a strike, usually leaves at least one party perceiving itself as the loser.
Reconciling interests thus tends to generate a higher level of mutual satisfaction
with outcomes than determining rights or power.15 If the parties are more satisfied, their
relationship benefits and the dispute is less likely to recur. Determining who is right or
who is more powerful, with the emphasis on winning and losing, typically makes the relationship more adversarial and strained. Moreover, the loser frequently does not give
up, but appeals to a higher court or plots revenge. To be sure, reconciling interests can
sometimes take a long time, especially when there are many parties to the dispute. Generally, however, these costs pale in comparison with the transaction costs of rights and
power contests such as trials, hostile corporate takeovers, or wars.
In sum, focusing on interests, compared to focusing on rights or power, tends to
produce higher satisfaction with outcomes, better working relationships, and less recurrence, and may also incur lower transaction costs. As a rough generalization, then, an
interests approach is less costly than a rights or power approach.
Rights versus Power Although determining who is right or who is more powerful can
strain the relationship, deferring to a fair standard usually takes less of a toll than giving
in to a threat. In a dispute between a father and teenager over curfew, a discussion of
independent standards such as the curfews of other teenagers is likely to strain the
relationship less than an exchange of threats.
Determining rights or power frequently becomes a contest—a competition among
the parties to determine who will prevail. They may compete with words to persuade a
third-party decision maker of the merits of their case, as in adjudication; or they may
compete with actions intended to show the other who is more powerful, as in a proxy
fight. Rights contests differ from power contests chiefly in their transaction costs. A
power contest typically costs more in resources consumed and opportunities lost. Strikes
cost more than arbitration. Violence costs more than litigation. The high transaction
costs stem not only from the efforts invested in the fight but also from the destruction of
each side’s resources. Destroying the opposition may be the very object of a power contest. Moreover, power contests often create new injuries and new disputes along with
anger, distrust, and a desire for revenge. Power contests, then, typically damage the
relationship more and lead to greater recurrence of disputes than do rights contests.
In general, a rights approach is less costly than a power approach.
Proposition
To sum up, we argue that, in general, reconciling interests is less costly than determining
who is right, which in turn is less costly than determining who is more powerful. This
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proposition does not mean that focusing on interests is invariably better than focusing on
rights and power, but simply means that it tends to result in lower transaction costs, greater
satisfaction with outcomes, less strain on the relationship, and less recurrence of disputes.
Focusing on Interests Is Not Enough
Despite these general advantages, resolving all disputes by reconciling interests alone is
neither possible nor desirable. It is useful to consider why.
When Determining Rights or Power Is Necessary
In some instances, interests-based negotiation cannot occur unless rights or power procedures are first employed to bring a recalcitrant party to the negotiating table. An environmental group, for example, may file a lawsuit against a developer to bring about a
negotiation. A community group may organize a demonstration on the steps of the town
hall to get the mayor to discuss its interests in improving garbage collection service.
In other disputes, the parties cannot reach agreement on the basis of interests because their perceptions of who is right or who is more powerful are so different that they
cannot establish a range in which to negotiate. A rights procedure may be needed to clarify the rights boundary within which a negotiated resolution can be sought. If a discharged employee and her employer (as well as their lawyers) have very different
estimations about whether a court would award damages to the employee, it will be difficult for them to negotiate a settlement. Nonbinding arbitration may clarify the parties’
rights and allow them to negotiate a resolution.
Just as uncertainty about the rights of the parties will sometimes make negotiation
difficult, so too will uncertainty about their relative power. When one party in an ongoing relationship wants to demonstrate that the balance of power has shifted in its favor,
it may find that only a power contest will adequately make the point. It is a truism
among labor relations practitioners that a conflict-ridden union–management relationship often settles down after a lengthy strike. The strike reduces uncertainty about the
relative power of the parties that had made each party unwilling to concede. Such longterm benefits sometimes justify the high transaction costs of a power contest.
In some disputes, the interests are so opposed that agreement is not possible.
Focusing on interests cannot resolve a dispute between a right-to-life group and an
abortion clinic over whether the clinic will continue to exist. Resolution will likely be
possible only through a rights contest, such as a trial, or a power contest, such as a
demonstration or a legislative battle.
When Are Rights or Power Procedures Desirable?
Although reconciling interests is generally less costly than determining rights, only
adjudication can authoritatively resolve questions of public importance. If the 1954
Supreme Court case, Brown v. Board of Education (347 U.S. 483), outlawing racial
segregation in public schools, had been resolved by negotiation rather than by adjudication, the immediate result might have been the same—the black plaintiff would have
attended an all-white Topeka, Kansas, public school. The societal impact, however,
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would have been far less significant. As it was, Brown laid the groundwork for the elimination of racial segregation in all of American public life. In at least some cases, then,
rights-based court procedures are preferable, from a societal perspective, to resolution
through interests-based negotiation.16
Some people assert that a powerful party is ill-advised to focus on interests when
dealing regularly with a weaker party. But even if one party is more powerful, the costs
of imposing one’s will can be high. Threats must be backed up with actions from time
to time. The weaker party may fail to fully comply with a resolution based on power,
thus requiring the more powerful party to engage in expensive policing. The weaker
party may also take revenge—in small ways, perhaps, but nonetheless a nuisance. And
revenge may be quite costly to the more powerful if the power balance ever shifts, as it
can quite unexpectedly, or if the weaker party’s cooperation is ever needed in another
domain. Thus, for a more powerful party, a focus on interests, within the bounds set by
power, may be more desirable than would appear at first glance.
Low-Cost Ways to Determine Rights and Power
Because focusing on rights and power plays an important role in effective dispute resolution, differentiating rights and power procedures on the basis of costs is useful. We
distinguish three types of rights and power procedures: negotiation, low-cost contests,
and high-cost contests. Rights-based negotiation is typically less costly than a rights
contest such as court or arbitration. Similarly, power-based negotiation, marked by
threats, typically costs less than a power contest in which those threats are carried out.
Different kinds of contests incur different costs. If arbitration dispenses with procedures typical of a court trial (extensive discovery, procedural motions, and lengthy
briefs), it can be much cheaper than going to court. In a fight, shouting is less costly
than physical assault. A strike in which workers refuse only overtime work is less
costly than a full strike.
The Goal: An Interests-Oriented Dispute Resolution System
Not all disputes can be—or should be—resolved by reconciling interests. Rights and
power procedures can sometimes accomplish what interests-based procedures cannot.
The problem is that rights and power procedures are often used where they are not necessary. A procedure that should be the last resort too often becomes the first resort. The
goal, then, is a dispute resolution system that looks like the pyramid on the right in
Figure 2: most disputes are resolved through reconciling interests, some through determining who is right, and the fewest through determining who is more powerful. By
contrast, a distressed dispute resolution system would look like the inverted pyramid on
the left in Figure 2. Comparatively few disputes are resolved through reconciling
interests, while many are resolved through determining rights and power. The
challenge for the systems designer is to turn the pyramid right side up by designing a
system that promotes the reconciling of interests but also provides low-cost ways to
determine rights or power for those disputes that cannot or should not be resolved by
focusing on interests alone.
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Three Approaches to Resolving Disputes: Interests, Rights, and Power
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FIGURE 2 | Moving from a Distressed to an Effective Dispute Resolution System
Power
Power
Rights
Interests
Rights
Interests
Distressed System
Effective System
Endnotes
1.
In order to steer between the Scylla of sexist language and the Charybdis of awkward
writing, we have chosen to alternate the use of masculine and feminine pronouns.
2.
This definition is taken from W. L. F. Felstiner, R. L. Abel, and A. Sarat, “The Emergence
and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming.” Law and Society Review
15 (1980–81), pp. 631–54. The article contains an interesting discussion of disputes and
how they emerge.
3.
See W. L. F. Felstiner, R. L. Abel, and A. Sarat, “The Emergence and Transformation
of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming.”
4.
In speaking of resolving disputes, rather than processing, managing, or handling disputes,
we do not suggest that resolution will necessarily bring an end to the fundamental conflict
underlying the dispute. Nor do we mean that a dispute once resolved will stay resolved.
Indeed, one of our criteria for contrasting approaches to dispute resolution is the frequency
with which disputes recur after they appear to have been resolved. See S. E. Merry, “Disputing Without Culture,” Harvard Law Review 100 (1987), pp. 2057–73; A. Sarat, “The
‘New Formalism’ in Disputing and Dispute Processing,” Law and Society Review 21
(1988), pp. 695–715.
5. For an extensive discussion of interests-based negotiation, see R. Fisher and W. L. Ury,
Getting to Yes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981). See also D. A. Lax and J. K. Sebenius,
The Manager as a Negotiator (New York: Free Press, 1986).
6. S. B. Goldberg and F. E. A. Sander, “Saying You’re Sorry,” Negotiation Journal 3 (1987),
pp. 221–24.
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7. We recognize that in defining rights to include both legal entitlements and generally accepted standards of fairness, we are stretching that term beyond its commonly understood
meaning. Our reason for doing so is that a procedure that uses either legal entitlements or
generally accepted standards of fairness as a basis for dispute resolution will focus on the
disputants’ entitlements under normative standards, rather than on their underlying interests. This is true of adjudication, which deals with legal rights; it is equally true of rightsbased negotiation, which may deal with either legal rights or generally accepted standards.
Since, as we shall show, procedures that focus on normative standards are more costly than
those that focus on interests, and since our central concern is with cutting costs as well as
realizing benefits, we find it useful to cluster together legal rights and other normative
standards, as well as procedures based on either.
8. A court procedure may determine not only who is right but also who is more powerful,
since behind a court decision lies the coercive power of the state. Legal rights have power
behind them. Still, we consider adjudication a rights procedure, since its overt focus is determining who is right, not who is more powerful. Even though rights, particularly legal
rights, do provide power, a procedure that focuses on rights as a means of dispute resolution is less costly than a procedure that focuses on power. A rights-based contest, such as
adjudication, which focuses on which disputant ought to prevail under normative standards,
will be less costly than a power-based strike, boycott, or war, which focuses on which disputant can hurt the other more. Similarly, a negotiation that focuses on normative criteria
for dispute resolution will be less costly than a negotiation that focuses on the disputants’
relative capacity to injure each other. Hence, from our cost perspective, it is appropriate to
distinguish procedures that focus on rights from those that focus on power.
9. R. M. Emerson, “Power-Dependence Relations,” American Sociological Review 27 (1962),
pp. 31–41.
10. A. O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Declines in Firms, Organizations,
and States (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970). Exit corresponds with
avoidance, loyalty with lumping it. Voice, as we shall discuss later, is most likely to be realized in interests-based procedures such as problem-solving negotiation and mediation.
11. A fifth evaluative criterion is procedural justice, which is perceived satisfaction with the
fairness of a dispute resolution procedure. Research has shown that disputants prefer thirdparty procedures that provide opportunities for outcome control and voice. See E. A. Lind
and T. R. Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice (New York: Plenum, 1988);
and J. M. Brett, “Commentary on Procedural Justice Papers,” in R. J. Lewicki, B. H. Sheppard, and M. H. Bazerman (eds.), Research on Negotiations in Organizations (Greenwich,
CT: JAI Press, 1986), pp. 81–90.
We do not include procedural justice as a separate evaluation criterion for two reasons.
First, unlike transaction costs, satisfaction with outcome, effect on the relationship, and recurrence, procedural justice is meaningful only at the level of a single procedure for a single dispute. It neither generalizes across the multiple procedures that may be used in the
resolution of a single dispute nor generalizes across disputes to construct a systems-level
cost. The other costs will do both. For example, it is possible to measure the disputants’ satisfaction with the outcome of a dispute, regardless of how many different procedures were
used to resolve that dispute. Likewise, it is possible to measure satisfaction with outcomes
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in a system that handles many disputes by asking many disputants about their feelings.
Second, while procedural justice and distributive justice (satisfaction with fairness of
outcomes) are distinct concepts, they are typically highly correlated. See E. A. Lind and
T. R. Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice (New York: Plenum, 1988).
12. O. E. Williamson, “Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations,” Journal of Law and Economics 22 (1979), pp. 233–61; and J. M. Brett and J. K.
Rognes, “Intergroup Relations in Organizations,” in P. S. Goodman and Associates,
Designing Effective Work Groups (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1986), pp. 202–36.
13. For a summary of the evidence of a relationship between procedural and distributive
justice—that is, satisfaction with process and with outcome—see E. A. Lind and T. R.
Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice (New York: Plenum, 1988). Lind and
Tyler also summarize the evidence showing a relationship between voice and satisfaction
with the process. For evidence of the effect of participation in shaping the ultimate resolution beyond simply being able to accept or reject a third party’s advice, see J. M. Brett and
D. L. Shapiro, “Procedural Justice: A Test of Competing Theories and Implications for
Managerial Decision Making,” unpublished manuscript.
14. D. A. Lax and J. K. Sebenius, The Manager as Negotiator.
15. The empirical research supporting this statement compares mediation to arbitration or
adjudication. Claimants prefer mediation to arbitration in a variety of settings: labormanagement (J. M. Brett and S. B. Goldberg, “Grievance Mediation in the Coal Industry:
A Field Experiment,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 37 (1983), pp. 49–69), small
claims disputes (C. A. McEwen and R. J. Maiman, “Small Claims Mediation in Maine:
An Empirical Assessment,” Maine Law Review 33 (1981), pp. 237–68), and divorce
(J. Pearson, “An Evaluation of Alternatives to Court Adjudication,” Justice System Journal 7
(1982), pp. 420–44).
16. Some commentators argue that court procedures are always preferable to a negotiated settlement when issues of public importance are involved in a dispute (see, for example,
O. M. Fiss, “Against Settlement,” Yale Law Journal 93 (1984), pp. 1073–90), and all agree
that disputants should not be pressured into the settlement of such disputes. The extent to
which parties should be encouraged to resolve disputes affecting a public interest is, however, not at all clear. See H. T. Edwards, “Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or
Anathema?” Harvard Law Review 99 (1986), pp. 668–84.
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Reading 1.2
Selecting a Strategy
Roy J. Lewicki
Alexander Hiam
Karen W. Olander
After you have analyzed your own position and that of the other party and have looked
at the contextual issues of the negotiation, you are ready to select a strategy to use in negotiating with the other party. This lengthy preparation allows you to negotiate strategically, adopting a style and plan that are best suited to the situation. As we have noted
before, most people skip this preparation; as a result, they negotiate blind. The right
strategy greatly improves your odds of a successful outcome.
In this chapter, we will look at five basic strategies that can be used for negotiation.
Each strategy applies to a particular set of circumstances and has its own advantages and
disadvantages. If you have done your homework, you will be well prepared for selecting
the appropriate strategy or combination of strategies for a particular negotiation situation.
Note that we say combination of strategies. Most negotiations involve a mixture of issues,
and each may be best handled with a different strategy. There is usually no single “best”
strategy. Variations in the positions of the parties and the context of the negotiation will
affect each negotiation differently. And as negotiations continue over time, each side will
make adjustments that may call for shifts or changes of strategy by the other side.
Key Factors That Determine the Types of Strategies
The five basic types of negotiating strategies depend on your combination of preferences
for two basic concerns: the relationship with the other negotiator and the outcome of the
negotiation itself. The strength or importance of each of these two concerns, and their
relative priority, should direct the selection of the optimal negotiation strategy. The other
party may select a strategy in a similar manner. If they do not, you will want to give serious consideration as to whether you should share this strategic negotiating model with
them. Your chances of a good outcome are often better if both parties agree to play
by the same rules. The interaction of the two parties’ choices will further influence the
negotiation process that actually occurs, and this will have dramatic impact on the
outcomes. We will now describe each of these concerns.
Relationship Concerns
First, how important is your past and future relationship with the other party? How have
the two of you gotten along in the past, and how important is it for the two of you to get
along, work together, and like each other in the future? Perhaps it is very important. Perhaps it does not matter at all. Perhaps it is somewhere between these extremes. If maintaining a good relationship with the other party is important to you, then you should
Source: “Selecting a Strategy,” from Think Before You Speak, by Roy J. Lewicki, Alexander Hiam, and
Karen W. Olander, 1996, pp. 54–75. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Used with permission.
14
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negotiate differently than if the relationship is unimportant, or if it is unlikely that you
can repair the relationship.
The importance of the relationship between the two parties will be affected by a
number of factors: (1) whether there is a relationship at all; (2) whether that relationship
is generally positive or negative (whether the two of you have gotten along well or
poorly in the past); (3) whether a future relationship is desirable; (4) the length of the relationship and its history, if one exists; (5) the level of and commitment to the relationship; (6) the degree of interdependence in the relationship; and (7) the amount and
extent of free, open communication between the parties.
For example, if you are negotiating the purchase of a new car, you may never have
met the salesperson before and may not expect to have a continuing relationship. Therefore, your relationship concerns are low. However, if your business uses a fleet of cars
and you expect to work with this person on deals in the future, your relationship concerns are high, and this will affect negotiations. Or if you are buying the car from your
neighbor, and want to continue to have a good relationship with that person, you may
negotiate differently than if you are buying it from a stranger.
In the case of a party with whom you have an ongoing relationship, it may be
congenial, or it may be antagonistic if earlier negotiations have been hostile. If it is a
congenial relationship, you may wish to keep it that way, and avoid escalating emotions.
If the relationship has a history of hostility, you may prefer not to negotiate, or you may
want to lower the emotional level in the negotiations. This is important if you expect the
relationship to continue in the future.
Outcome Concerns
The second factor affecting negotiating strategy is the importance of the outcome of the
negotiation. How important is it for you to achieve a good outcome in this negotiation?
Do you need to win on all points to gain the advantage? Or is the outcome of only moderate importance? Or does the outcome not really matter in this negotiation? For example, let us return to the car-buying example. If you are buying a car from a dealer, price
may be the most important factor, and you may have absolutely no interest at all in the
relationship. If you are buying the car from your neighbor, and you want to keep a good
relationship with your neighbor, then you might not press as hard to get a good price. Finally, if you are buying the car from your mother simply so that she doesn’t have to
worry about it any more, you probably are most concerned about the relationship and
care very little about the outcome.
Most of the planning and preparation described in the earlier chapters have focused on
the outcome. Hence we will not say much more about outcome concerns here. The important message in this chapter, however, is that the priority of each of the two negotiating concerns, relationship and outcome, will direct the strategy you choose to use for a particular
negotiation. The relationship may be your top priority, especially if there is a relationship
history and you want to maintain the relationship. In contrast, in many other negotiations,
the outcome is the most important factor, as in the example of buying a car. Or relationship
and outcome may both be important. This will require working together with the other party
in some fashion to effect a result. If the relationship concerns have a strong influence on the
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FIGURE 1 | Negotiation Strategies
High
Accommodating
Lose to win
Collaborative
Win–win
Compromise
Split the difference
Importance of
Relationship
Avoiding
Lose–lose
Competitive
Win at all cost
Win–lose
Low
Low
Importance of
Outcome
High
matter at hand, and you decide to emphasize them over the outcome, then you will select a
different strategy than you would select where the outcome is more important.
If we show the relationship and outcome concerns on a graph, with high and low priorities for each represented, it looks like Figure 1. The vertical axis represents your
degree of concern for the relationship, and the horizontal axis represents your degree of
concern for the outcome. When we look at the various quadrants created by different
levels of concern for relationship and outcome, five distinctly different strategies emerge:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Avoiding (lose–lose): This strategy is shown in the lower left of the diagram. In
this strategy, the priorities for both the relationship and the outcome are low. Neither aspect of the negotiation is important enough for you to pursue the conflict
further. You implement this strategy by withdrawing from active negotiation, or
by avoiding negotiation entirely.
Accommodating (lose to win): This strategy is represented in the upper left of the
diagram, where the importance of the relationship is high and the importance of
the outcome is low. In this situation, you “back off” your concern for the outcome
to preserve the relationship; you intentionally “lose” on the outcome dimension in
order to “win” on the relationship dimension.
Competitive (win–lose): The lower right of the diagram represents high concern
for the outcome and low concern for the relationship. You use this strategy if
you want to win at all cost, and have no concern about the future state of the
relationship.
Collaborative (win–win):1 The upper right part of the diagram defines a strategy
where there is a high priority for both the relationship and the outcome. In this
strategy, the parties attempt to maximize their outcomes while preserving or
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5.
17
enhancing the relationship. This result is most likely when both parties can find a
resolution that meets the needs of each.
Compromising (split the difference): In the middle is an area we will call a compromising, or “satisficing,” strategy. It represents a combination approach that
is used in a variety of situations. For example, it is often used when the parties
cannot achieve good collaboration, but still want to achieve some outcomes
and/or preserve the relationship. Thus, for example, if the parties cannot achieve
good collaboration but do not want to pursue the outcome and abandon the concern for the relationship (or vice versa), then a compromising strategy can be
effective. It is also often used when the parties are under time pressure and need
to come to a resolution quickly. Each party will give in somewhat to find a
common ground.
These brief descriptions are ideal or “pure” negotiating situations where there may
be only one issue at stake. In contrast, most real-life negotiation situations are frequently
complex, and thus are often best addressed by using a mix of strategies. Remember, too,
that the other party will be formulating a negotiating strategy. You will find your analysis of the other party helpful when you are selecting the appropriate strategy for a particular situation, because you may want to adjust your strategy choice based on what
you expect the other to do. If the parties are able to agree on one strategy, negotiations
will be easier. In real-life situations, however, each party may start with a different
strategy.
We now look at the five basic negotiating strategies in detail. Although you may be
inclined to use one particular strategy, it is a good idea to study the components of each
strategy carefully. In this way, you can be prepared for the other party’s moves, if they
use a different strategy than you anticipated.
Avoiding Strategy (Lose–Lose)
The avoiding strategy is used infrequently, but has merit in certain situations. Our nickname of this strategy is actually a misnomer, since an active choice of an avoiding strategy is not necessarily a “loss” on either the relationship or the outcome. However, since
we tend to refer to the more active pursuits of relationship and outcomes as “winning,”
we will call the avoiding strategy a “loss” in terms of the outcome and the relationship.
Why would one choose an avoiding strategy? Because negotiations can be costly
(in time, money, and relationships) and there are many cases where negotiators would
have been better off to drop the matter entirely! The person employing an avoiding strategy basically sees negotiation as a waste of time—or not worth pursuing. This person
may feel that his or her needs can be met without negotiating. In addition, this person
may decide that the outcome has very low value and that the relationship is not important enough to develop through the negotiation. As a result, the party reasons that neither the relationship nor the outcome is sufficiently important (at least compared with
the costs) and so takes no action or simply refuses to negotiate.
If the “avoider” refuses to negotiate when the other party wants to, this may have a
negative effect on the relationship. Even when the outcome is unimportant, many people
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will prefer to avoid angering the other party. A more moderate method of avoidance may
be to not raise any objections to the proceedings, or simply to not show up. If the other
party insists on negotiations, and it is important to preserve the relationship, then you
might switch to an accommodating strategy.
The avoiding strategy also is a possibility when a party can pursue a very strong
alternative outcome. If a strong alternative is available, the person may choose not to
negotiate. For example, if you are looking at two different houses to buy, and both meet
your needs, you may choose not to negotiate with one seller because you feel the price
is too high and the person is inflexible. So you simply select your alternative and pursue
an avoiding strategy in the first negotiation.
Alternatives can provide you with bargaining power in other situations, as we will
see. If you have no alternatives, or only weak ones, you may also choose not to negotiate. We will discuss alternatives in more depth later in this chapter.
Accommodating Strategy (Lose to Win)
An accommodating strategy is used when the relationship is more important than the
outcome of the negotiation. The person using this strategy may prefer to primarily concentrate on building or strengthening a relationship. Since other people are usually
happy when we give them what they want, we may simply choose to avoid focusing on
the outcome and give it to the other side, thus making them happy. A second reason is
that we may want something else in the future. Since many social relationships are built
on rather informal expectations and rules of exchange,2 giving something away now
may create the expectation that they need to give us what we want later on. So we give
them their preferences now to obtain a better future outcome. A short-term loss is exchanged for a long-term gain.
For example, in a manager–employee relationship, the employee may want to establish a good relationship with the boss now to have a good evaluation, a raise, or a better position in the future. The employee may choose an accommodating strategy and not
push for a salary increase now, at her three-month review, if it is expected that this will
put her in a better position for a raise at the six-month review.
The accommodating strategy may be used to encourage a more interdependent relationship, to increase support and assistance from the other, or even to cool off hostile
feelings if there is tension in the relationship. If the relationship is ongoing, then it may
be particularly appropriate to “back down” now, to keep communication lines open and
not pressure the opponent to give in on something that they do not want to discuss. In
most cases, this strategy is short term—it is expected that accommodation now will create a better opportunity to achieve outcome goals in the future. For example, a manager
might not urge an employee to take on an extra task right now if the employee is overloaded with projects and the manager can find another person to complete the task,
especially if the manager knows that a big project is coming next week, and everyone
is going to have to put in overtime.
In a long-term negotiation or over a series of negotiations, it may happen that one
side constantly gives in. This precedent may be noted by the other side and seen as
accommodating behavior (which it is). It should not be construed as an invitation to the
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other party to be competitive. But sometimes it is. If this happens to you, the other party
will begin to compete and take advantage of your guard being down. You will need to
learn how to use damage control and reconnection strategies to overcome these
problems.
The accommodating strategy is not usually considered a formal strategy in negotiation. Many negotiation books do not even mention accommodation as a viable strategy;
however, most of these books also are based on “high outcome concern” strategies
(competing or collaborating) and spend less time on specific strategies to improve or
strengthen the relationship. There are two important times to consider an accommodating strategy: first, if the outcome is not very important to you, or pursuing the outcome
is likely to create too much tension and animosity, and second, if your primary objective
is to improve the relationship. In addition, you might decide to switch to an accommodating strategy during negotiations, particularly when they reach a point where you no
longer wish to press for a resolution.
Competitive Strategy (Win to Lose)
When many people think of negotiation and bargaining, this is the strategy they think of.
The competitive strategy is used frequently, so it is important to understand how it
works, even if you do not plan to use it yourself.
In a competitive strategy, the outcome of the negotiation is more important than
the relationship. Because the outcomes (resources, gains, profits, etc.) are seen as finite and limited in amount or size, the person engaging in a competitive strategy wants
to get as much of those outcomes as possible. (We will use the term competition to denote the person using the competitive strategy.) We call this strategy win to lose because it is likely that while competitors may gain on the outcome, they strain and
endanger the relationship between the parties. The thinking and goals in this strategy
are short term: to maximize the magnitude of the outcome right now, and to not care
about either the long-term consequences of this strategy or the relationship. The relationship with the other party does not matter, for one of several reasons: (1) this may
be a one-time negotiation with no future relationship, (2) the future relationship may
not be important, (3) the relationship exists, but was poor to begin with, or (4) the
other party may have a reputation for hard bargaining or dishonesty, and this strategy
is adopted for defensive reasons. At any rate, this strategy is undertaken with the assumption that the future relationship with the other party is unimportant, but the specific outcome is important.
The competitive strategy tends to emphasize the differences between the parties,
promoting a “we/they” attitude. Thus the relationship during negotiation in a competitive situation will be characterized by lack of trust and even by conflict. This contrasts
with the collaborative strategy in which differences are minimized and similarities
emphasized.
The goal in the competitive strategy is to get the other party to give in, and thus to
satisfy the competitor’s needs now. It is based on the “I win, you lose” concept. The
competitor will do anything to accomplish the objectives and obtain as much of the pie
as possible. This can include a variety of behaviors, including hardball tactics.
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Critical Factors in a Competitive Strategy
A Well-Defined Bargaining Range In a competitive strategy, each side has a bargaining range, which consists of a starting point, a target, and an ending point or walkaway.
Bargaining occurs because the line bargaining range for each party is different. During
bargaining, you attempt to bring the two ranges into overlap so that each party is satisfied.
The starting point is announced or inferred as the negotiations begin. Starting
points will be different for the two parties. In new car negotiations, for example, the
buyer will have a lower starting point, the seller, a higher one. Usually the buyer makes
gradual concessions upward, while the seller will make gradual concessions downward,
with the expectation that the two will be able to meet somewhere in the middle. In labor
negotiations, labor is usually expected to ask “high” and management to offer “low,”
again with the expectation that concessions on each side will result in finding a meeting
ground.
Both parties will have a walkaway point, which is the cutoff point, beyond which
they will not go. The walkaway point of the other party is usually not known, and is not
stated. In fact, they will actively try to keep you from learning their walkaway point, because if you knew it, you would offer them something slightly above it and expect that
they would agree! If talks break off because this point has been reached, then you may
surmise that the walkaway point of the other party was probably close to, or at, the last
offer that the other side made. If this point is not reached, and the parties agree to a
resolution, this point may never be known. In future chapters, we will explore ways of
discovering competitors’ walkaway points and learn how to turn this knowledge into
better outcomes.
As long as the bargaining range for one party in some way overlaps with that of the
other party, then there is room for bargaining. (By overlap, we mean that the most the
buyer is willing to offer is above the least the seller is willing to accept.) If the ranges do
not overlap (and this may not be known at the beginning of the negotiations), then there
may be no successful negotiation. The parties will need to decide whether to adjust their
bargaining ranges, or to end negotiations.
A Good Alternative An alternative or BATNA3 (best alternative to a negotiated
agreement) is an option that can be pursued if the current negotiation fails. It is an outcome outside the scope of the negotiation with this other party, and can be pursued if it
appears more attractive than any potential outcome from this negotiation. Alternatives
are good to have because they can be weighed against the value of any particular outcome from this negotiation, to decide which is most advantageous. Not only is an alternative an evaluative tool, it is also a power tool that can be introduced into negotiations
in the manner of “I have this alternative that is equally good and costs less. Can you
improve on what I will get if I pursue my alternative?”
Alternatives interact with walkaway points to influence the choices you make. For
example, say you currently make $25,000 in your job and you are job hunting. You decide that you want to find a job making at least $30,000. What do you do if you find a job
you like, but it pays only $28,000? Do you take it or not? If there are no other such jobs
available (no alternatives) because the economy is sluggish, then you might take the
$28,000 job. However, if many alternative jobs are available for the taking, then you may
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hold out for a higher salary. On the other hand, suppose you lose your $25,000 job and
you are offered $24,000 for another similar job. Will you take it? Perhaps under these
circumstances, you will be more likely to do so. In any negotiation, it is wise to be wellinformed of your alternatives and, wherever possible, to use them to your advantage.
Tactics The competitive strategy is also characterized by a number of tactics
calculated to enhance the competitor’s position and place the other party at a
disadvantage. These include behavioral tactics such as bluffing, being aggressive, and
threatening, which can give the competitor power over the other party. While these
tactics work sometimes, they also have the problem that they can potentially backfire on
the person using them, so they must be employed carefully.
Results and Drawbacks of Using a Competitive Strategy
The competitive strategy can be successful, in spite of being one-sided. People using
this strategy usually come away from a negotiation with the belief that they obtained the
best that they could.
Negotiations that rely on a competitive strategy can be costly and time-consuming,
especially if each party holds out for all its demands. Much time is spent researching,
pressuring, and “psyching out” the other party. Further time is consumed making moves
and countermoves, trying to figure out what the other party will do. Competitive strategies are often compared with strategies used in chess, military warfare, and other tactical,
competitive battles. The time spent in these activities is very different from alternative
uses of that time; for example, in the collaborative model, this same time could be spent
on mutual exploration of issues, sharing of information, and an attempt to find mutually
acceptable solutions.
Time and goodwill may also be lost if the competitor anticipates that the other party
will be competitive and prepares a competitive strategy. If the other party had not intended to be competitive, they may switch strategies when they discover that you have
decided to be competitive, thus escalating emotions and increasing conflict. Not only do
you lose time, but you may have alienated the other party, hurt the relationship, and
toughened them so that they are now willing to give you far less than they might have on
the outcome dimension.
A major problem with the competitive strategy is that it is frequently used by inexperienced or untrained negotiators who believe that competition is the only viable strategy.
They may be missing opportunities by automatically selecting the competitive strategy. It
is important to select a strategy only after thorough investigation of the issues, an understanding of what strategy the other party is likely to pursue, and some clear decisions about
the relative importance of the outcomes and the relationship with the other party.
Likewise, it is possible to underestimate the other parties in a competitive situation.
Remember that they, too, have adopted the mission to win at all costs. When using a competitive strategy, we tend to underestimate the strength, wisdom, planning, and
effectiveness of the other party and assume that even though they are preparing to be
competitive too, we can beat them at their game! If you do not pay close attention to their
behavioral and verbal clues, you may set yourself up for manipulation by the other party.
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Finally, we need to beware of something called the self-fulfilling prophecy. A selffulfilling prophecy is something we believe so strongly that we actually make it come
true. It often happens in negotiation when one party expects the other to behave in a
particular way, and as a result, actually makes the party behave that way. This tends to
come true if the other party is using the competitive strategy because they think you are.
Anticipating that the other is going to be competitive, we prepare to be competitive
ourselves. The cues we give off in this preparation—our language, tone of voice,
gestures, and behaviors—let the other party believe that we intend to be competitive. So
they behave competitively, which only assures us that our initial assumptions were right.
The Collaborative Strategy (Win–Win)
A collaborative strategy is one in which both parties consider the relationship and the
outcome to be equally important. This strategy is also referred to as cooperative or
win–win.4 In a collaborative strategy, the parties to the negotiation either begin with
compatible goals or are willing to search for ways to pursue their goals so that both can
gain. This is in sharp contrast to the competitive strategy, in which the parties believe
their goals are mutually exclusive, and only one side can win. The relationship between
the parties is very likely an ongoing one, with some established history of give-and-take,
so that the parties trust each other and know that they can work together. In addition,
collaborative strategies are often initiated when the parties know that they want to establish long-term goals for particular outcomes and for the relationship. For example,
many local governments are finding that they simply cannot sustain the operating costs
of the past, especially in view of the voters’ unwillingness to accept higher taxes. Knowing that city budgets have to be cut, departments need to work collaboratively, with each
department taking a cut, and try to find creative ways to help each other stay in the black
or at least minimize the red.
To make this strategy work, both parties to the negotiation must be willing to use
the collaborative strategy; if only one side employs it, and the other uses a different one,
the chances are that both parties cannot achieve both an optimal outcome and preserve
or enhance their working relationship. A collaborative strategy is particularly appropriate within an organization, when two parties have common ground, or in situations
where two parties have the same customers, same clients, same suppliers, or same
service personnel. In any of these cases, the parties have or want to establish a working
relationship, and to keep it working smoothly.
For a collaborative strategy to work, there must be a high degree of trust, openness,
and cooperation. The parties look for common needs and goals and engage in mutually
supportive behavior to obtain them. Both parties realize that they are interdependent and
that their cooperative effort can solve the problems and meet the needs of both sides.
In collaboration, communication between parties is open and accurate. This contrasts greatly with the competitive strategy, in which the negotiators have a high level
of distrust and guard information carefully to prevent the other side from obtaining
the advantage.
The parties in a collaborative endeavor have support from their constituencies. The
constituencies trust the parties to find common ground and support them in doing so.
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Doing so may mean not achieving absolutely everything the constituency wanted on
the substantive issues, and the constituency has to accept this as valid. In contrast, in the
competitive strategy, the constituencies usually push the negotiator to get everything he
or she can, regardless of the future of the relationship.
Collaborating parties respect deadlines and are willing to renegotiate the time frame
if necessary to achieve their goals. Contrast this with the competitive strategy, where
time is used as an obstacle or as a power ploy to accomplish one’s own ends.
The collaborative strategy is hard work, but the results can be rewarding. It takes
extra time and creativity to build trust and to find win–win solutions. But the outcome
and relationship results are usually better for both parties.
Keys to Successful Collaboration
The collaborative strategy has traditionally been underutilized, because most people do
not understand the fine points of the strategy and because it is less familiar than the competitive strategy. Many negotiations are based on the competitive model, which is the
way most people view negotiation—as a competitive situation where one is better off
being suspicious of the other, and the fundamental object is to get all the goodies.
Of key importance in a collaborative strategy is commitment. Both parties need to
be committed to (1) understanding the other party’s needs and objectives; (2) providing
a free flow of information, both ways; and (3) finding the best solution(s) to meet the
needs of both sides.5
Understanding the other party’s goals and needs is critical to the collaborative
strategy. We suggested that this is important in competitive strategy as well, but for very
different reasons. In a competitive strategy, you may know or think you know what the
other party wants; but your objective in learning this is to facilitate your own strategy
development, and also to strategize how to beat the other side by doing better than them
or denying them what they want to achieve. In a collaborative strategy, your objective is
to understand their goals and needs so that you can work with them to achieve their
goals as well as your own. Good collaboration frequently requires not only understanding their stated objectives, but their underlying needs—why they want what they want.
In the collaborative strategy, both parties must be willing to ask questions and listen
carefully to the answers, to learn about the other’s needs.
Second, to provide a free flow of information, both parties must be willing to volunteer information. The information has to be as accurate and as comprehensive as possible. Both sides need to understand the issues, the problems, the priorities, and the
goals of the other. They need to fully understand the important context factors in the negotiation. Compare this with the competitive strategy, in which information is closely
guarded, or, if shared, often distorted.
Finally, having listened closely to each other, the parties can then work toward
achieving mutual goals that will satisfy both parties. To do this, the parties will need to
minimize their differences and emphasize their similarities. They will need to focus on
the issues and work at keeping personalities out of the discussions. Collaborative goals
differ from competitive goals. In competition, the goal is obtaining the largest share of
the pie, at any cost, without giving away any information or conceding on any issue. In
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collaboration, each party must be willing to redefine its perspective in light of the collaboration, knowing that the whole can be greater than the sum of the parts. In this light,
having a strong knowledge of the problem area is a definite advantage. While a lack of
information can be overcome, starting out with the knowledge is definitely an asset.
To achieve success, each party from the beginning must send signals to the other
that will help build trust between and among those negotiating.
Obstacles to the Collaborative Strategy
Both parties to a negotiation must be willing to collaborate if this strategy is to be successful. It will be difficult, if not impossible, to employ collaborative strategy under the
following circumstances:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
One party does not see the situation as having the potential for collaboration.
One party is motivated only to accomplish its own ends.
One party has historically been competitive; this behavior may be hard to change.
One party expects the other to be competitive and prepares for negotiation based
on this expectation.
One party wants to be competitive and rationalizes this behavior.
One party may be accountable to a constituency that prefers the competitive strategy.
One party is not willing to take the time to search for collaborative items.
The negotiation or bargaining mix may include both competitive and collaborative
issues. (Sometimes, the two parties can collaborate on collaborative issues and compete on competitive issues. Our experience, however, is that competitive processes
tend to drive out collaborative processes, making collaboration harder to achieve.)
Most of the foregoing obstacles reflect a conflict between the parties’ preferences
for strategy. It may be possible to get the other party to take a different stance if it appears to be desirable in light of the information. Communication is of major importance
when you are trying to establish a collaborative relationship.
Compromising Strategy
Ultimately, most negotiating situations are mixed; some bargaining elements are competitive in nature, and others can be approached collaboratively. There are times when
the relationship is only somewhat important, and the outcomes are only somewhat
important. This is where the fifth strategy comes in.
The compromising strategy may be thought of as an “adequate for most occasions” approach to negotiation. In this strategy, each side will have to modify its
priorities for the relationship and for the preferred outcome(s). In both cases, the
parties are making a decision that compromising is preferred because, on the one
hand, both parties gain something (an advantage over accommodation or competition), both parties gain something (as opposed to nothing—an advantage over avoiding), and yet compromising does not require all the intentional effort required for
collaboration. For example, if a manufacturing facility has a mandate to contain
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costs, the union and the factory representatives (whose relationship is usually competitive) will want to find an acceptable way to achieve this. The union will want to
avoid layoffs. The company may propose a wage freeze. So the two parties may
agree on a small wage increase offset by a decrease of the labor pool by attrition
rather than layoffs; this is a compromise.
While negotiators usually don’t start off planning a compromise (particularly if a
competitive or collaborative strategy is possible), compromising is often seen as an
acceptable “second choice.” There are three major reasons to choose a compromising
strategy (particularly as a “default” alternative to other strategies):
1.
2.
3.
A true collaborative strategy does not seem to be possible. One or both parties
don’t believe that true win–win can be achieved because it is simply too complex
or too difficult. Or the relationship may already be too strained for the parties to
work together in a manner that fosters and supports good collaboration.
The parties are short of time or other critical resources necessary to get to collaboration. Compromising is usually quick and efficient. While it may be suboptimal
on the quality of the outcomes achieved, the trade-off between achieving a great
outcome and the time required to do it may force one to pick time over quality.
Both parties gain something (or don’t lose anything) on both dimensions. As
opposed to pursuing a competitive strategy (and maximizing outcomes at the
expense of the relationship) or an accommodating strategy (and sacrificing
outcomes for the relationship), compromising assures some gain on both the
outcome and relationship dimensions.
When to Choose Which Strategy
Now that we have reviewed the five basic strategies, we come to an important part of
this chapter: how to decide which strategy you should use for a negotiation. There are
two key factors to consider:
1.
2.
How important is the outcome to be gained from this negotiation?
How important is the past, present, and future relationship with the opponent? The
following paragraphs describe ways to decide about these two questions and other
factors to consider in answering them.
Situation
Look at the situation and try to figure out which strategy might be best in those circumstances. Do I care a lot about the outcomes in this situation? If I do, am I willing to sacrifice my relationship with the other person? Or, conversely, is the relationship so
important that I am unwilling to endanger it by pursuing the outcome? Alternatively,
consider the conditions under which each strategy is most effective (see Figure 1 on
page 16). Which of these conditions apply to the present situation?
Remember that each strategy has both advantages and disadvantages. One strategy
is more or less appropriate depending on the type of conflict and the situation.
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Preferences
Analyze your personal preferences for the various strategies. You will probably be more
successful using a strategy that feels comfortable. Research has shown that people in
conflict have distinct preferences for employing certain strategies in conflict situations.6
These preferences lead individuals to develop distinct styles with which they approach
many situations. Based on past experience and history, some people have strong biases
toward being competitive, collaborative, compromising, accommodating, or avoiding in
conflict situations. The stronger your preference for a particular conflict management
strategy (style), the more often you will choose it, the more “biased” you become in seeing it as an advantageous strategy, and the more likely you will be to see that strategy
(style) as appropriate in a variety of situations. Thus, if you normally respond to conflict
(and negotiation) situations...
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