Political Ideology and Subjective Culture: Conceptualization and Empirical Assessment Author(s): Lorand B. Szalay and Rita Mae Kelly Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 76, No. 3 (Sep., 1982), pp. 585-602 Published by: American Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1963733 . Accessed: 18/04/2014 13:26 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. . American Political Science Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The American Political Science Review. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 134.50.15.18 on Fri, 18 Apr 2014 13:26:27 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Political Ideology and SubjectiveCulture: Conceptualizationand EmpiricalAssessment LORAND B. SZALAY Institute of Comparative Social and Cultural Studies RITA MAE KELLY Arizona State University Ideology and subjective culture are examined as two systems of behavioral organization well known for their hidden but frequently powerful influences on political choices and behavior. After a brief sketch of a representational theory of behavioral organization, a research strategy based on inferences drawn from the distribution of thousands of free word associations is described and illustrated with results from several international studies. Findings on Slovenian images and frame of reference demonstrate the effects of Marxist doctrines. Korean and American data illustrate differences that are predominantly psychocultural. The analytic method outlined suggests new capabilities for studying ideology and its influence on people's perceptions, their system of representation of the world, and their organization of behavior. It may be used to assess predispositions to adopt democratic principles and procedures. It might also be used to assess the influence of ideological doctrines and their degree of integration with the cultural views andframe of reference. The most natural use will probably be in research in the field of international understanding and communication. In this paper we present a perceptual-representational theory of behavior and a methodology for studying ideology and culture as two main designs of behavioral organization. We also outline an assessment strategy, present findings that provide support for the theory, and suggest a systematic way to explain ideology and culture and their interrelationship. The Study of Ideology and Culture More is known theoretically about the linkage between belief systems and behavior (see Jervis 1976) than is known about measuring such belief systems. Although advances in psychologically oriented political theories enable political scientists to make sophisticated theoretical statements about the linkage of ideology and behavior, the difficulties in measuring belief systems make the statements ring hollow. The attention given to ideologies stems largely from their obvious potential to develop into potent political forces. This happens when a set of political doctrines is adopted by a group of people, assumes a central position in their belief systems, and then becomes a guiding force behind their actions. Whether or not this happens is by no means accidental; it depends to a large extent on how the ideological doctrines fit with the subjective culture of the people, that is, with their dominant shared perceptions, beliefs, and motivations. These same psychocultural dispositions will predicate how the doctrine, if accepted, may be adopted and possibly changed. The study of ideology and the study of culture have too often been separated. Anthropologists and cultural psychologists rarely address the foreign-policy implications of their findings. Political scientists are often unable to interrelate their findings with what is known about the influence of cultural variations on political behavior and communication. A review of the literature indicates two main trends in the empirical analysis of belief systems: (1) social scientists, such as Almond and Verba (1963), popularized the concepts of ideology and culture by adapting them to fit assumptions of logical positivism, elitism, methodological individualism, and pragmatism. (2) At the same time, public opinion research became a substitute for cultural analysis; collective public opinion scores were equated with empirical knowledge of a group's ideology. We agree that explicit beliefs, at least in open societies, are readily accessible to opinion surveys, but in our judgment ideological belief systems and culturally shared perceptions and motivations are less amenable to direct survey questions. Other scholars have also concluded that public opinion research is inefficient or ineffective or both for studying ideology and culture. For example, Hanna (1978), Teune (1971), and Przeworski and Teune (1970) noted the problems of nonequivalence in the meaning of "objective reality" and time across cultures. Rokeach (1966/67) has stated that opinions are localized in the "region of the lips and do not seem to affect the mind and heart, nor the feet and hands." To interrelate ideology and culture empirically 585 This content downloaded from 134.50.15.18 on Fri, 18 Apr 2014 13:26:27 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 586 The American Political Science Review with real-world problems we must be able to assess their implicit and complex aspects as well as their explicit and simple ones. To perform these tasks, a conceptual framework is needed which enables us to go beyond logical positivism, methodological individualism, and survey research. In addition, a methodology must exist for conducting empirical analyses appropriate for this framework. We believe that the perceptualrepresentational system provides this conceptual framework and that Associative Group Analysis provides the requisite methodology. The Perceptual-Representational System Vol. 76 interested in understanding and predicting human behavior (Oatley 1979; Kaplan 1973; Tolman 1948). (3) A subjective selectivity. Perceptions are highly subjective and selective and depend on a combination of factors, among them the complexity and observability of the subject, its subjective importance, and the homogeneity of social influences. Organizational Elements of the Perceptual-Representational System In its organized whole, the perceptual-representational system amounts to an inclusive, global world view that is characteristic of a particular people. This system is made up of interdependent, representational units organized along several parameters. (1) Hierarchy of priorities. Certain representational units are highly salient, whereas others have low salience or importance; for example, to some the image of God has high salience, whereas to others it has low salience. (2) Relatedness or affinity. Certain representational units cluster together into domains, have high affinity, and share a great deal of meaning, indicating strong views and beliefs. For example, religious perceptions would form a domain representing religion. (3) Affect loading. Our perceptions and images are colored by feelings and evaluations. We are strongly attracted to certain elements of our environment and repulsed by others, and these evaluations obviously influence subjective representation. Several scholars of diverse disciplines have concluded that neither animals nor human beings respond to isolated details but rather to a configuration of characteristics (Downs and Stea 1973, Kaplan 1973, Boulding 1971, Tolman 1948). As Kaplan (1973) observes, humans have developed a unique capability to extract from the extensive flow of information provided by the human senses that relatively modest amount which can be effectively stored and used for survival. From this process of isolating and identifying essential characteristics emerges a selective system of perceptual representation, sometimes called cognitive representation (Stea and Downs 1970), cognitive maps (Tolman 1948), internal representations (Shepard and Chipman 1970; Posner and Keele 1968), central representations (Reed 1969), maze ways (Wallace 1956), representations (Oatley 1979), and other such terms. In this representational system perceptions, i.e., the configurations of essen- Ideology and the tial and dominant attributes of concepts, people, Perceptual-Representational Framework issues, and events, constitute the basic foundation. Political ideologies become a part of a people's beliefs and constitute a more or less central sphere Characteristics of the in the broader belief system. Although the docPerceptual-RepresentationalSystem trine itself is a topic for political theorists, its influence on people calls for an empirical study of The perceptual-representational system has psychological variables such as beliefs (Rokeach several especially important characteristics. (1) A 1960) and attitudes (Eysenck 1955). multidimensional nature. Perceptions as mental Speaking of ideology, our focus is not on the representations include not only observable doctrine-on-paper, such as the Communist Manidimensions but also material, human, social, festo or Hitler's Mein Kampf, but on the influracial, political, and other dimensions used by ence of social and political doctrines in shaping people to sort and organize experience (cf. Trian- and organizing the perceptual-representational dis 1972; Miller 1967; Fishbein 1966; Allport system. As a psychological reality, political ideol1961; Osgood et al. 1957; Goodenough 1956). (2) ogy refers to the content of a belief system which Immediacy. The compelling sense of reality con- has its origin in postulates or doctrines and gains veyed by perceptions explains their power to by its system's characteristics a new and enhanced orient, organize, and control human behavior. potential to influence human behavior in the Since perceptions are experienced as reality, they political and social domains. Totalitarian ideolostubbornly resist modification and are accom- gies, such as communism, are not restricted in panied by a feeling of self-evidence often leading their scope to the political domain but aim to to intolerance of conflicting views. Thus, percep- mold the entire world view, that is, the entire reptions have immense information value for those resentational system, to conform with the inclu- This content downloaded from 134.50.15.18 on Fri, 18 Apr 2014 13:26:27 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 1982 PoliticalIdeology and SubjectiveCulture sive world view projected by the ideology. Literature and experience indicate that starting with single, more or less isolated, beliefs, political ideologies can progressively expand their influences into larger segments of the system of perceptual representation (Bobrow, Chan, and Kringen 1979, 1977; Szalay, Kelly, and Moon 1972; Cantril 1961; Rokeach 1960; Eysenck 1955). First, ideology, as doctrine-on-paper, can determine a person's beliefs. The person who accepts the doctrine (e.g., the superiority of communism over capitalism) develops beliefs that contain elements of the communist ideology (e.g., communism eliminates exploitation; the Soviet Union is just, progressive, and humanistic.). Second, ideology influences the organization of beliefs, that is, the structure of the representational system. The more people accept an ideology, the more they reorder their priorities around it and develop tightly organized belief clusters that resist modification. Under strong ideological influence people's beliefs become rigid, emotion-laden, and polarized (e.g., everything about the USSR is good; everything about the United States is bad); they become closed to conflicting information and experience. An important dimension of ideological influence is the progression from the judgmental level to the deeper representational level. At a judgmental level even people with strong beliefs are aware that their views, for instance, about capitalism or freedom, do reflect some personal judgment and that other people may or may not agree with them. At a representational level, people are unaware of the subjectivity of their views and assume that only their meaning (of capitalism or freedom) represents reality and that it is universal. Others who think differently are perceived as being uninformed or misinformed. The linkage between ideological beliefs, belief systems, and culturally shared perceptualrepresentational systems can be illuminated by empirical research showing: (a) how ideological influences can be traced by comparing the content of doctrine with people's actual perceptions and meanings; (b) how similarity and distance between various culture groups can be measured in various domains of life, including those of politics and international relations; and (c) how deep-rooted cultural views and modern ideologies interact in shaping people's views, their shared subjective representation of the world, and their behavior. Political Ideology and Subjective CultureTwo Systems in Interaction In the case of ideology, the doctrine-on-paper offers a concrete and useful reference point. In the case of subjective culture, there are no univer- 587 sal blueprints, but there is extensive literature dealing with various characteristics, life conditions, diet, customs, and religion of a particular cultural group. Table 1 offers a brief comparison of ideological belief systems and subjective culture along a few characteristics that are relevant to understanding their relationship. These parallel conceptualizations suggest several important areas for study: (1) Assessment of ideological belief systems in a selected segment where agreement or disagreement with the doctrine can be examined; (2) assessment of culture as a system of subjective representation in the context of political as well as broader cultural themes; and (3) assessment of two key questions about the relationship of ideology and culture in contexts that are relevant to international relations: (a) To what extent are different cultures compatible with the various ideologies? and (b) What possibilities exist to trace ideological influences from an early stage of judgmental changes in opinions to progressed stages where ideology becomes thoroughly integrated with the culture? As an examination of the issue of continuity and change in Russian and Soviet thought indicates (Simmons 1955), this poses an intriguing theoretical as well as practical question: Can the integration of ideology and culture reach a point where the key doctrines are viewed as representing plain and simple reality? Associative Group Analysis: A Methodology for Analyzing Belief Systems and Subjective Cultures The Associative Group Analysis (AGA) method offers an inferential approach to political belief systems and subjective culture. In its focus on subjective meanings and images, AGA follows a tradition earmarked by the investigations of Charles Osgood, George Miller, Harry Triandis, and other psychologists who, as Triandis (1968) observes, rely in their analysis of culture on the study of subjective and cultural meanings. AGA relies on the analysis of hundreds of thousands of free word associations. Its research strategy and theoretical rationale have been elaborated by Szalay and Deese (1978) and follow the pioneering work of Deese (1965), Whorf (1956) and Noble (1952). The units of this system are the subjective meanings of words or themes. To emphasize that words are not used here merely as units of language but that their subjective meanings serve as units of representation as well, we frequently use the label "theme." The AGA method focuses on the collective elements of psychological meanings as conveyed by the shared responses of the cultural groups studied. All shared responses to a particular theme are compiled into a group response list. These This content downloaded from 134.50.15.18 on Fri, 18 Apr 2014 13:26:27 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 588 The AmericanPolitical Science Review Vol. 76 Table 1. A Comparison of Political Ideology and Subjective Culture Political Ideology Subjective Culture Psychological, Behavioral Nature A system of beliefs organized around a set of abstract doctrines adopted and used by people in their interpretation of social and political issues, events, and conditions. A system of subjective representation composed of images and psychological meanings shared by people of the same historical background, similar life conditions, and experiences. Origin A body of doctrines developed and integrated by one or more political philosophies which is usually critical of existing social and political conditions. A spontaneous, natural product of the heritage of large ethnic or national collectives, which gradually evolves in their effort to understand and cope with problems of their existence. Selected Dominant Characteristics Explicit, often forcefully stated opinions Affect-laden, evaluative, and polarized responses Simplified solutions based frequently on one-sided critical analysis of the social situation Implicit assumptions built into the system of representation of the entire world A subjective view of the world Categorical conclusions supported by a set of doctrines that reinforce each other by an internal logic Although the central assumptions are explicit, the systemic influences are subtle and hidden. Centers on the social and political domains group response lists are usually highly groupspecific; they show the salient perceptual and evaluative components characteristic of the group's images and meanings of selected themes, such as socialism. Because these meaning units determine the content, and thereby the organization, of the group's system of beliefs or subjective representation, the Associative Group Analysis method focuses on three major categories of information: (1) the meaning composition of selected themes; (2) the dominance of themes-that is, their relative position in a vertical dimension of priorities; and (3) the relationship among themes as well as among their natural clusters (domains)-that is, their patterns of affinities, which are fundamentally horizontal. Thus, the AGA method undertakes the analysis of representational systems in terms of their representational units as well as their horizontal and vertical organizational structure. Sampling and Data Collection Procedure A study in depth of ideological beliefs or representations requires the analysis of 50 to 100 themes. A study in depth of cultures requires 100 Starting from early childhood the system is gradually built through accumulative learning processes (socialization, enculturation) which progress outside people's awareness Subjectivity and selectivity of the system promoted by the myriad subconscious influences of the social environment Both the central assumptions and the systemic influences are implicit and hidden Encompasses all domains of life and influences their relative importance as well as their relationship to 200 systematically selected dominant themes. The AGA methodology enables more specific hypotheses to be tested, but that'is not the intent of this paper. To become truly informative, the analysis has to be focused on issues and themes that are dominant for the national or cultural group under consideration. To insure the use of culturally dominant domains and themes, it is a common practice to organize a pretest based on a small number of subjects (Szalay and Maday 1973). Selection of respondents. Associative Group Analysis, like every other research technique, can be administered to samples organized along any predetermined set of requirements. To follow the usual survey-type of interest (e.g., What percentage of the population is for or against socialism or democracy?), the same criteria of representativeness need to be used in selecting samples as are used in other research seeking similar generalizations. In most applications, including those in this study, AGA was not used as a survey instrument; it is primarily a method of psychocultural analysis aimed at assessing a people's subjective representation of the universe as conveyed by their priorities, perceptions, and meanings. The This content downloaded from 134.50.15.18 on Fri, 18 Apr 2014 13:26:27 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 1982 PoliticalIdeologyand SubjectiveCulture focus is not on how many Koreans are for or against democracy, but rather how Koreans, based on their common background and historic experiences, are predisposed to understand democracy in contrast to how Americans understand it. This different focus must be recognized to understand that the AGA approach is closer to anthropological strategies that use methods of intensive assessment with small samples of culturally representative respondents rather than to those that use relatively large samples carefully organized to be statistically representative of large national or cultural populations. Among the outstanding anthropologists who have elaborated on the differences between survey research and cultural assessment, the late Margaret Mead (Mead and Metreaux 1953) was particularly articulate in stressing the need for intensive observation in search of consistent overall patterns or relationships rather than of quantitative differences on single isolated variables. Our use of relatively small (N = 50 to 100) samples of subjects with comparable backgrounds (e.g., American students from Washington, D.C., and Korean students from Seoul, and of matching sociodemographic composition (e.g., equal numbers of males and females, a comparable mixed composition from diverse fields of study) follows Mead's rationale, and our findings provide empirical support to her reasoning as well. For instance, the data in Table 7 show that the variables which are at the center of our interest, the intracultural differences (e.g., differences among students, workers, and farmers within the United States or Korea) are almost negligible compared to the sizeable differences found between these two cultures as a whole. Data collection. The Associative Group Analysis (AGA) method elicits free verbal associations in a one-minute time frame in the native language of the respondent by using selected themes on separate cards as stimuli. Each response is scored to indicate the relative importance of this element of the theme's psychological meaning. Scores consist of frequencies with fiftymember groups weighted by the order of occurrence. The weights assigned to responses beginning with the first in the sequence are: 6, 5, 4, 3, 3, These weights have been em3, 3, 2, 2, 1, 1, .... pirically derived from the differential stability of rank-place assessed by the test-retest method in previous investigations (Szalay and Brent 1967). The several hundred responses of a group on a given subject are compiled into a list, starting with the most frequent responses and ending with those given by only one person. These groupresponse lists offer an exhaustive inventory of the mosaic elements of perceptions and evaluations 589 characteristic of the theme's psychological meaning for that group. The importance of each response is demonstrated by its score value; a higher score indicates a proportionately higher salience. The listing is all-inclusive, since it is safe to conclude that responses not given are not part of the group's perception of the theme. The main components of the group's subjective meanings are identified by content analysis. For instance, a panel of judges has grouped all the responses obtained to capitalism into the ten main clusters depicted in Figure 1. The scores for each response were summed. To obtain the percentages, the total for each category was divided by each group's total group (response) score (in Figure 1, United States = 1,138; Slovenian = 985). Variations between countries in the psychological meanings of capitalism and other themes can be clarified by this procedure. In the following sections we present findings that compare Americans and Slovenians to illustrate characteristics of systems in countries with different ideologies. Comparisons of Americans and Koreans are presented to illustrate predominantly cultural differences in perceptions and motivations. For the American-Slovenian comparison, United States data were collected in 1969 from 25 male and 25 female students at the University of Maryland at College Park. The Slovenian sample had a similar composition and was tested at the University of Ljubljana in Yugoslavia; the subjects were all from Slovenia, the most western of Yugoslavia's six republics, which is now governed under a Marxist-socialistic constitution. Slovenia, part of Austria until 1918, still has a distinct sense of national identity and its own language. The Korean data were collected in 1969 from 150 male inductees into the Korean army, at various military posts in South Korea; this sample was divided into equal numbers of students, workers, and farmers. A comparable set of American males also being inducted into the American military in 1969 constituted the American sample. Political Ideology, an American-SlovenianComparison A simple way to explore the influence exerted by ideology on people's world view and belief system is to examine the extent to which their views and beliefs contain elements of the doctrines. The basic tenets of ideologies like Marxism are spelled out in considerable detail in the writings of Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and others and are readily available. Subjective meanings of key themes: capitalism and communism. Figure 1 shows the Slovenian This content downloaded from 134.50.15.18 on Fri, 18 Apr 2014 13:26:27 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 590 The AmericanPoliticalScienceReview view of capitalism in comparison to the American. In Marxist-Communist ideology, capitalism is the main target of negative criticism. The most salient component in the Slovenian view of capitalism is negative characteristics, and exploitation is their major criticism. This is in fundamental agreement with the Marxist-Communist doctrine that capitalism is a political system based on the private ownership of the means of production which leads to economic and social exploitation. Slovenian references to war and imperialism in this negative category reflect the doctrine that the capital accumulated through exploitation becomes the source of political power and a foreign policy that is aggressive and expansionist; Vol. 76 warbecomesan instrumentto widenits influence. Also in this categorywerereferencesto inequality and decay, which reflectbeliefs that capitalismis unjust and doomed to failure. In contrast, the American students showed substantially little criticismof the capitalist system. Although the Sloveniansview capitalismprimarilyin political, ideologicalterms,to the Americanstudents,capitalism means primarilybusiness and money, a nearlyexclusivefocus on economicand financial considerations.Of the ten componentsof perceptions and evaluationsshownin the graph,most of the Slovenianviews do tie in with official Marxist doctrine. Figure 2 reflects the Americanand Slovenian CAPITALISM NEGATIVECHARACTERISTICS (US: 5%, S: 21 %) ECONOMY,BUSINESS (US: 24%, S: 2%) MONEY,CAPITAL ISMS (US: 19%, S: 10%) (US: 7%, S: 18%) U.S.A., THEWEST (US: 13%, S: 12%) ....... _.....*:** IDEOLOGUES CAPITALISTS, (US: 3 %, S:11%) ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES, VALUES SOCIETY GOVERNMENT, \ (US: 11%, S:1%) (US:11%,S: 12%) MISCELLANEOUS AFFLUENCE,POVERTY (US: 2%, S: 3%) (US: 5%, S: 10%) ** TOTALSCORES US = 1138 Slovenian = 985 O US Group Slovenian 11111 Figure 1. Capitalism: Main Meaning Components This content downloaded from 134.50.15.18 on Fri, 18 Apr 2014 13:26:27 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Group 591 PoliticalIdeologyand SubjectiveCulture 1982 COMMUNISM COUNTRIES (US: 29%, S: 15%) POSITIVECHARACTERISTICS (US: 2%, S: 19%) POLITICALISMS COMMUNISS FAMOUCOMMUNISTS FAMOUS 1%) (US: 13%, S:% ... US: 14%, S: 18%) NEGATIVE CHARACTERISTICS 5: *::::::TERIOLG : (US: 5%, 5: 4%) REFERENCES SYMBOLIC (US: 6%, 4%) MISCELLANEOUS (US: 5%, 5: 4%) TOTALSCORES US = 1109 Slovenian = 853 5 .Slovenian US Group Group Figure2. Communism:MainMeaningComponents views of communism. It shows that the most salient components of the Slovenian view involve positive characteristics, political theory and ideology, and systemic considerations focused on the Communist party and organization. The positive characteristics that Slovenians attribute to communism include equality, peace, justice, and freedom. Slovenians apparently view communism as the antithesis of capitalism. The contrast is sharp, affect-laden, and encompasses, again, the main dimensionsstressedby ideology: exploitation versusequality,war and imperialismversus peace, politicaldivisionversusfreedom.Each of the positive attributesSloveniansassociate with communismis in contrastto the Americanviewof communism,in whichoppression,war,take-over, threat,poverty,and "bad" are salientattributes. The Slovenian image of communism which emergesfromthe students'responsesis so positive that one may wonderwhethertheirlife conditions This content downloaded from 134.50.15.18 on Fri, 18 Apr 2014 13:26:27 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The AmericanPolitical Science Review 592 are really that ideal, or whether their responses are really frank. These questions become particularly legitimate in light of the rather widespread dissatisfaction of Eastern Europeans with what they call Communist political control. The solution to this puzzle becomes apparent only by extending the analysis to additional ideas such as socialism and Marxism (Szalay and Pecjak 1979). The answer is that Slovenians do not look at their own system as communism but as socialism. Although they are positive about communism as the means to Utopia, they show considerable signs of criticism about their socialist reality. In general, the findings suggest that ideology is more effective in shaping the meanings of abstract notions like communism and capitalism, but less effective in influencing views that involve more direct and concrete experiences and observations, such as the Slovenians' perception of their president, Marshal Tito, or government. An interesting insight offered by this inferential assessment is that these perceptions of specific issues like capitalism and communism are not isolated; they represent interdependent mosaic elements of a broader world view. This interrelatedness of elements provides valuable opportunities for reconstructing larger domains of the belief system. Dominant beliefs and perceptions across themes. The analysis of the American and Slovenian reactions to a number of ideological themes demonstrates that the two groups studied show considerable consistency in their perceptions and evaluations. Despite the apparent dangers of oversimplification, some of the major trends of interpretation are presented in Table 2. It is a general trend that for the American group, all four isms-communism, Marxism, Vol. 76 socialism, and capitalism-largely connote concrete, political systems;for the Slovenians,these labels refer more to abstracttheoreticalsystems. Exceptfor communism,the Americansstresseconomic factorsmore, whereasthe Sloveniansstress the social and societal aspects more. Slovenian referencesto society, classes, workers, and the proletariatare consistentlyhigherin numberthan American references. Similarly, social values, especiallyequality, receive consistentlymore attention among Americans. The Americangroupconsistentlyrefersmoreto governmentand uses political isms primarilyto refer to politicalorganizationsand governmental characteristics.The Sloveniangroup stressesthe role of the state and the role of certain social strata, especiallyworkers. With respect to communism, Marxism, and capitalism,the Americanand Sloveniangroups show conflicting trends in their evaluations.On socialismboth groupsshow positiveand negative elementsof evaluationswherebythe positiveoutweigh the negativeattitudes. Communismis the most positivefor the Slovenianand most negative for the American group. On capitalism the Americandistinctlynegativeevaluationsare outweighed by the positive, whereasthe Slovenian evaluationis intenselynegative. Dominant trends of perceptions across domains. An analysisof dominantperceptionsand evaluationsacross three domains-political isms (I), political institutions(II), and politicalvalues (III)-demonstrates severalinterestinggeneralizable differencesbetweenthe Americanand Slovenian politicaland ideologicalframesof reference (Table 3). 1. Political process, political ideology. The Americanemphasison politicalprocessrelatesto the Westernprinciplesof participationand choice Table 2. Common Trends of Interpretation in the Domain of Ideology by Slovenian (S) and American (U.S.) Subjects Trends of interpretation Focus on systems, countries Focus on theory, ideology Greater emphasis on economic references (money) Greater emphasis on social references (society) More weight on government More weight on state More negative evaluation More positive evaluation Most representative person-U.S. Most representative person-S Most representative country-U.S. Most representative country-S Communism Marxism Socialism Capitalism U.S. S U.S. S U.S. S U.S. S U.S. U.S. U.S. S U.S. S U.S. S Marx Marx USSR Yugoslavia S U.S. S S U.S. S S U.S. Nixon Marx U.S. U.S. S U.S. S U.S. S Marx Lenin USSR USSR S Marx Tito USSR Yugoslavia This content downloaded from 134.50.15.18 on Fri, 18 Apr 2014 13:26:27 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 593 PoliticalIdeologyand SubjectiveCulture 1982 Table 3. US.-Slovenian Main Trends of Interpretation across Domains U.S. Emphasis Domain* Slovenian Emphasis Domain 1. Political process/elections/campaigns 2. People/government/country 3. Civil rights/free speech/individual freedom/individual ideals 4. Identification with Western democracy 5. Economic references 6. Love/happiness/safety/security I, III I, II, III 1. Politics/ideology/theory/isms 2. Society/nation/state 3. Social rights/group ideals/brotherhood/ equality/national freedom 4. Identification with socialism, communism I, II, III I, III I, II, III 6. Joy/beauty/health III I, II, III I, II, III I, II, III III I, II, III * I Political Isms II Political Institutions III Political Values as well as to the Anglo-Saxon pragmatism that emphasizes process and outcome over principles. The Slovenian trend shows a strong ideological orientation in line with the Marxist-Leninist emphasis on theory and ideology. The Slovenian belief system also shows a considerable amount of similarity with specific themes of MarxismLeninism, such as the image of decaying capitalism and the ideal image of communism. 2. Political institutions. The American emphasis on the relationship of the people and government is in agreement with the ideology of Western democracies. The American focus on country is probably a result of the historical tradition of immigration and settlement of peoples from different nations and of the process of forming a new country, which for quite a while was not a nation. 3. Political rights, ideals. The weight and consistency with which the American group refers to civil rights-the rights of the individual to be free in movement, choice, and expression-reflect the American philosophy of individualism and freedom. The most popular American ideals are individualistic. The weight and consistency of Slovenian references to social rights, group ideals, equality, and brotherhood reflect a collectivistic orientation; these concepts have their roots in the collectivism of Marxist-Leninist theory as well as in the agricultural ethnic traditions. In the social-political realm, however, the Marxist-Leninist influences seem more influential and decisive. This impression is reinforced by the Slovenian group's use of such ideological terms as class struggle and exploitation. 4. Political isms, systems. The Americans' identification with Western democracy is a clear expression of preference, a product of political principles as well as of tradition, culture, and lifestyle. Similarly, the Slovenian identification with socialism and communism emerges as a clear case of ideological commitment which stresses solidarity and which is also likely to have historical foundations. 5. Economy. The fairly consistent American emphasis on economic variables seems strongly founded in cultural values, in past and present life conditions, and in its relationship to capitalism. 6. Personal values. The American emphasis on such personal values as happiness and security probably has its main roots in the cultural milieu and life conditions. Similarly, the Slovenian values of brotherhood, health, joy, and beauty are primarily culturally or traditionally determined; moreover, some of them, like brotherhood, may also be reinforced by the dominant political ideology. This type of information-e.g., that Slovenians maintain a high regard for the ideals of communism but are quite critical about certain realities associated with socialism-is little known yet obviously consequential. If our communications aiming at Slovenians address political subjects such as democracy by emphasizing process (elections, campaigning, voting) along our own salient priorities, they are likely to elicit less attention and recognition than if we would emphasize ideals and principles of democracy, such as equality and justice, which have high salience to Slovenians. Inferences on Subjective Culture, an American-Korean Comparison The identification of ideological influences can be conveniently focused on a few key ideological themes such as communism. In the case of ideology, familiarity with the doctrine (e.g., Marxism) makes it possible to decide on a priori grounds what to study (e.g., Does the image of capitalism actually include exploitation?). The comparative study of two subjective cultures is a much broader task. In the case of culture there is nothing like a doctrinal blueprint to use for comparison. This content downloaded from 134.50.15.18 on Fri, 18 Apr 2014 13:26:27 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 594 The American Political Science Review From a broad international perspective, Korea is aligned with the United States in terms of general political orientation and ideologies; yet even in the political realm, we know there are some obvious differences between Koreans and Americans that are more cultural than ideological. In order to be really informative, a rather extensive analysis of the two systems of subjective representations is required. The results of our American-Korean culture analysis filled two sizable volumes, and there is danger that a brief summary of it here may not be sufficient to convey the depth of the findings. Nonetheless, the Vol. 76 following analysis of democracy and politics provides an illustration of the insights that can be obtained through this process. Subjective meanings of key themes: democracy and politics. As Figure 3 shows, Koreans closely *agree with Americans in identifying democracy with freedom and liberty. They also perceive their own country as a leading example of democracy. Koreans and Americans have apparently quite different ideas, however, on what democracy actually is. To Americans democracy is most saliently a process involving the competition of political parties-campaigning, voting, elections, filling im- DEMOCRACY ELECTIONS, ELECTED OFFICES _w (US: 28%, K: 2%) FREEDOM, LIBERTY (US: 23%, K: 21 %) RIGHTS, IDEALS PEOPLE PARTICIPATION (US: 11%, K: 6%) CONSTITUTION, REPUBLIC (US: 6%, K: 4%) .. ........... .... OWN COUNTRY, SPECIFIC NATIONS (US: 18% GOOD (US: 3%, K: K:I21% 1 %) X w DOCTRINES, ISMS (US: 1%, K: 11 %) MISCELLANU MISCELLANEOUS ALLIANCE, INTERNATIONAL (US: 2%, K: 2%) RELATIONS (US: 2%/ K: 8%) TOTAL SCORES US = 2118 Korean = 2184 5 US Group Korean Group Figure3. Democracy:MainMeaningComponents This content downloaded from 134.50.15.18 on Fri, 18 Apr 2014 13:26:27 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 1982 595 PoliticalIdeologyand SubjectiveCulture POLITICS PRESIDENT,LEGISLATION, ADMINISTRATION (US: 22%, K: 20%) DOCTRINE,IDEOLOGY (US: 6%, K: 19%) ELECTION,CAMPAIGN (US: 20%, K: 4%) NATION,SOCIETY (US: 6%, K: 12%) CORRUPTION, MALFUNCTION (US: 11%, K: 12%) PARTIES,PARTY SYSTEM (US: 12%, K: 5%) DIPLOMACY,WAR, PEACE (US: 9%, K: 3%) MISCELLANEOUS (US: 8%, K: 4%) PEOPLE, LEADERSHIP (US: 2%, K: 11 %) DEVELOPMENT, IMPROVEMENT, ECONOMY (US: 2%, K: 10%) TOTALSCORES US = 748 Korean = 1019 E USGroup Korean Group Figure 4. Politics: Main Meaning Components portant offices-in other words, a process that provides for people to express their free choices. Americans emphasize the need for and the importance of active participation. To Koreans, democracy represents high ideals and a system committed to their pursuit. Although some ideals, like happiness and human rights, are directly relevant to the personal interests and life of the individual, others, like peace and equality, refer predominanantly to broad social and national concerns. These Korean collective concerns become apparent in the context of democracy and in the close relationships Koreans see between democracy and political doctrines such as capitalism and communism. They are also reflected by the Koreans' tendency to view democracy as a principle or ideal forming the foundation of international alliances of free nations as opposed to the Communist powers. Both the American and the Korean meanings of politics correspond to their respective meanings of democracy and show cultural variations. Americans stress the political process of campaigning and elections, elected officials, and institutions This content downloaded from 134.50.15.18 on Fri, 18 Apr 2014 13:26:27 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 596 The American Political Science Review like the government and the legislatures as well as the Democratic and Republican parties. The Koreans stress ideals and doctrines, such as democracy and communism, and emphasize the role of the president. To the Koreans, politics constitutes a concern with broad national issues, shown by their references to nation and society and their close identification of politics with national economic and development problems. Dominant trends across domains of political relevance. The observed differences are not isolated bits of information but reflect some broader trends in perceptions and dominant priorities. The Korean disposition to perceive democracy and politics in close relationship to some high ideals and principles rather than to institutionalized procedures for expressing the people's will or free choice was consistently observed in their reactions to government, president, and government officials as well as in the context of such themes as elections, revolution, and factionalism (Szalay et al. 1971, ch. 5, 6). Moreover, the Koreans' tendency to emphasize doctrines and ideology is clearly reflected by their subjective views of such themes as capitalism, communism, and socialism (Szalay et al. 1971, ch. 4). The Koreans' views of democracy and politics as important national concerns become clearer by examining the nationalistic nature of the broader Korean frame of reference, as is reflected in such themes as nation, national interest, national prestige, and patriotism (Szalay et al. 1971, ch. 7). Finally, the Korean tendency to see in democracy and politics issues of broad international consequences rather than problems of party politics ties in closely with their view of the world as divided into two opposing blocs: the free and democratic versus the Communist nations. This Korean view emerges with additional specificity from their images of the United States, USSR, South Korea, North Korea, and Americans (Szalay et al. 1971, ch. 8, 9) as well as from their meanings of such international issues as U.S. aid, military assistance, Vietnam involvement, and the Manila Conference (Szalay et al. 1973, ch. 6). Dominant trends inferred from affinity structure. Another way to gain insights into broad trends characteristic of the American and Korean subjective representations of the universe is through analysis of the affinity structure. How people relate things-e.g., politics to economics or progress-is highly characteristic of their way of thinking, of their world view. When one says that a particular political ideology dominates the thinking and cultural behavioral patterns of a group, one is, in effect, asserting that a large portion of that group's beliefs cluster around and Vol. 76 perhaps are determined by some more universalistic, abstract political concepts and beliefs. The AGA index of interword affinity (IIA) measures the relationship of one theme (A) to another (B) for a particular group. It is based upon the relative weight of responses in common for the two themes. The formula for the affinity of theme A to B is: Score for direct elicitation HIA = AandB + (A->B),0 Total score for themeA X (A->B) Table 4 provides an illustration of the affinity structure within and between two sets of themes, one involving political issues and the other economic issues. As a general trend, Koreans see these domains as more closely clustered around political issues, which reflects cultural priorities as well. (Findings on average dominance scores show a distinctly higher Korean priority placed on politics than found for the United States.) To meet the orientation of the readers of this journal, we have concentrated our presentation predominantly on political subjects. However, since the attention given to the political domain varies and in the analysis of subjective culture receives only a fraction of interest (5 to 15 percent), we also include here another matrix of affinity indices, this one dealing with the domains of food and economic conditions. It is used to show the organization of the system of subjective representation in areas that are apolitical. The indices of the matrix in Table 5 reflect several trends. The largest difference is in the across-the-board affinity of rice to all foodrelated and economic themes for the Koreans, a not-unexpected finding given the concentration on rice in the Korean diet. Another difference is the consistently higher relationship for Koreans between hunger and all economic issues. Although results drawn from the affinity matrices are rarely explicit to the point desirable from the angle of cultural understanding, they do offer some structural insights into the organization of the culturally characteristic system of subjective representation. Relative cultural priority or dominance of themes and domains. The number of responses given by a group of persons for a particular stimulus theme is an established measure of relative meaningfulness (Noble 1952). For a given individual, greater meaningfulness of a theme indicates that it has a greater subjective importance, more dominance in an individual's belief system. This measure of dominance is expressed by the total group score of responses elicited by a particular theme. This total score varies greatly Score for responsesin commonto This content downloaded from 134.50.15.18 on Fri, 18 Apr 2014 13:26:27 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 597 Political Ideology and Subjective Culture 1982 -n r~~- 0 C14 as W "q %O ! C4o"4 Wq 310 S n? neq 00P-4 Nd W4ON om r- -n 0 qN HO .S ]~~~~~~~~~~~~~~e e- G) a~'e 0- E^? o - 000 me t 0000^^>V~ ^* u) 00000 r00 tn CD "D mC%00 -lW- uue OW tn0 0 -- M r- ~ M 0 - c W ON0 '",O00 con 3 ,- Q Cf) Q )O .- k . O O .- tn aqo o m - C1) C 4 e L; Ul C1 a' Q 0 v0 O nr q W 000 Voe ", O H W .4 N o 0 o 000N q W -C O .n mm OcftnmtOW4" e00 m r 00W r 00C4" m 0 O 4 U H This content downloaded from 134.50.15.18 on Fri, 18 Apr 2014 13:26:27 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 598 The AmericanPoliticalScienceReview Vol. 76 Ttn 1t~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~t ~~ ~ ==1 ~~~~~NO 'IO 00% 0~~~~~~~~~~~~C tn 10~~~~t > en1 Mn tC~~~~~~~~~~~ - e~~~0e~~~-~~~ ?~~~~~1 C? CA & 41M% G s . - o Q -2 0 S O~~~i00e ON'IO rlt??Q t--O rqM oo00 ;oN Er m>mIt W) W) O- ro OO C '- 0 (t 00It dC o00 cro o o N00 n oo 00 oo0o N CbFO ~~~~tO~O~~f) Lf) k X>? /00 tO O 0 c-f c- oo %O 4QO bo e me C0 An00 NX W^4 N Wt 0 N0 Ctrf0~0 o0 ON 0 00Oe 00 0 o M rON ON0 -o n 0 0 o oN "d d"4 d-t O CNT -4 _4N C 0o00 c R N tn 00 N dO O d /) O CD o This content downloaded from 134.50.15.18 on Fri, 18 Apr 2014 13:26:27 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 1982 PoliticalIdeologyand SubjectiveCulture 599 Table 6. Ranking of Selected Domains Based Upon the Mean Dominance Scores for American and Korean Groups Domain Family Education Ethics/Moral Economic International Political United States Mean Score Rank Korea Mean Score Rank 2150 2197 1748 1899 1923 1899 2 1 6 4 3 5 2038 1888 1551 1863 1657 1934 1 3 6 4 5 2 *Each average domain score is based upon the responses to sixteen stimulus themes. across different themes and cultures and provides a sensitive measure of group- or culture-specific meaningfulness or dominance of a particular theme and, by extension, of particular beliefs (Szalay et al. 1971; Szalay and Brent 1967). Table 6 presents an overview of the average dominance scores of the American and Korean subjects to sixteen stimulus themes within each of the six domains listed. A domain is the general substantive area into which the specific themes can be grouped. The dominance scores demonstrate that the American group stresses education and the family substantially more than the international one. The dominance scores thus provide insights into the more salient (vertical) dimensions of belief systems and permits direct cross-national comparisons of this dimension. Ideology and Culture from Psychological, Behavioral Perspectives The Slovenian examples illustrate a way of identifying and tracing ideological influences on belief systems. Although some of the findings follow expectations, e.g., the impact of Marxism-Leninism, they also show how doctrines mix with cultural dispositions and life conditions in ways that previously were not identifiable. That Slovenians have much more positive views about communism than socialism is one of those local twists that few non-Slovenians would anticipate. The Korean case is more complicated. We used Korea as an example of a different culture, but the findings also indicate that the Koreans' subjective representation of the universe contains distinct ideological influences as well. It would be wrong to overlook these influences simply because they do not come from the Marxist doctrine but from our own ideology. Although Marxist doctrines are clearly articulated and represent a classical example of the doctrinal foundation behind political belief systems, our more pragmatic and pluralistic ideals about democracy provide the foundation for an ideology as well. At this point, we ask, does the Korean subjective culture show similarities with the American? If it does, we can then explore to what extent the similarities are political in nature. The political influences may be traced by charting the psychocultural distance between Americans and Koreans. Psychocultural distance is measured by the dissimilarity of representational units (Szalay and Bryson 1973). The more Koreans and Americans agree in their perceptions and evaluations of dominant themes, anything from politics to entertainment, the less is their psychocultural distance. In the context of the AGA method, psychocultural distance is measured by the Pearson r correlation coefficient calculated between the distribution of responses from two groups to the same stimulus themes. This coefficient shows the extent to which the groups give similar responses. A high coefficient means that the high-frequency responses produced by one group are also highfrequency responses for the other group; similarly, the low-frequency responses produced by one group will generally be the same as those produced by the other group. A low correlation means that the responses are substantively different and the response scores in one group for a stimulus word are high whereas in the other they are low. The lower the coefficients, the greater is the psychocultural distance between the groups compared. The reliability of this coefficient of psychocultural distance was tested by comparing two groups obtained by randomly dividing a larger group in half. The coefficients produced in a sample of themes were then averaged, and the comparison of the two groups on 26 themes resulted in a correlation of .73. In an earlier comparison, an r of .82 was calculated over 40 themes. (For more details, see Szalay and Bryson 1974). Table 7 presents the coefficients of psychocultural distance obtained in our comparative analysis of American and Korean students, work- This content downloaded from 134.50.15.18 on Fri, 18 Apr 2014 13:26:27 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The AmericanPoliticalScienceReview 600 Vol. 76 Table 7. Overall Psychocultural Distance Between American and Korean Groups Comparison Groups Coefficient of similarity Between U.S. and Korea students workers farmers .18 .07 .01 United States only students and workers students and farmers workers and farmers .62 .63 .77 Korea only students and workers students and farmers workers and farmers .67 .63 .74 Note. Means were calculated across 50 themes. ers, and farmers. To provide a broad reference base for the comparisons between the U.S. and Korea, we have included findings that show the distances among these subgroups within the United States and Korea. The similarity means shown in Table 7 were calculated across 50 themes. Compared to the relatively high similarities between the subgroups within each country, the similarities between Korea and the United States are small. They are slightly larger for students, but practically negligible for the lesseducated groups. An examination of two clusters of themes that are fundamentally political in nature (countries and isms, Table 8) demonstrates that there is less psychocultural distance between students in the United States and Korea than between the American and Korean farmers and workers. This finding suggests that formal training in political doctrines and knowledge might be counteracting basic subjective cultural disparities between the two countries. Within the limits of the above examples, the findings show generally large and consistent differences between the views of our American and Slovenian groups and the American and Korean cultural samples. The underlying perceptions and motivations demonstrate deep cultural trends as well as ideological influences that seem to be of more recent origin; these factors merge into a contemporary view or subjective representation of the universe that is characteristic of the groups studied. There are some ambiguities in the findings with regard to the ideological versus cultural origin of certain views. For instance, is the consistent American emphasis on the political process, elections, voting, and campaigning part of a universalistic democratic ideology, or is it a manifestation of a highly practical, action-oriented culture? Is the Slovenian emphasis on social, collectivistic value considerations the result of a modern collectivistic ideology or of a communityoriented tradition? Table8. PsychoculturalDistancesbetween Koreansand Americans in Two PoliticallyRelevantDomains Domainsand themes SimilaritiesBetweenAmericanand KoreanGroups Farmers Workers Students Countries South Vietnam Viet Cong USSR Red China .42 .31 .48 .68 .28 .24 .56 .28 .33 .25 .53 .36 Isms Communism Capitalism Socialism Democracy .13 .41 .35 .60 -.06 .13 -.35 .59 -.15 .05 -.28 .50 This content downloaded from 134.50.15.18 on Fri, 18 Apr 2014 13:26:27 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 1982 PoliticalIdeologyand SubjectiveCulture Conclusion The findingspresentedhereillustratea new approachto the study of ideologyand culture.This approachoffers a means of promotinga better understandingof the psychoculturalfoundations of politicalbehaviorand the role of politicaldoctrinesin organizingbeliefsystemsand influencing politicaldecisions.The processby whichpolitical doctrinesbecome integratedinto the cultureand systemof subjectiverepresentationis an intriguing as well as practicaltopic for furtherinvestigation. Along the main thrust of the present approach,therearenumerousquestionsof considerabletheoreticaland practicalinterest:To whatextent are particularpopulations predisposedto adopt democracyin our Westernparticipatory, process-orientedinterpretation?What are the effects of varioustotalitarianideologieson particular populations?To what extenthave the populations integratedelementsof such ideologiesinto theirviewor representationof the universe?What are the mechanismsof such integration?How do they serve politicalcontrol? How do they correlate with conformity, compliance, and various other relevant manifestations of political behavior?Whetheran ideologythrivesor fails in a particularcountryclearlydepends,amongother things, on the psychoculturalpredispositionsand experiencesof its people. While the psychological meaning of the theme (a word standingfor an issue or subject) servesas the unit of analysis,the AGA approach opensup new opportunitiesfor empiricalresearch in fields criticalto internationalrelationsand interculturalunderstanding.Although major additionalanalysesarevitallyneededto implementthe buildingof communicationbridges,there is evidence,suchas that presentedin this article,which indicatesthat differencesin psychologicalmeanings can be systematicallyidentified and measured. The greaterthe precisionwith which differencesin meaningcan be measured,the better are our chancesto overcomesuch differencesand to improvethe effectivenessof communication. We hope that the conceptualframeworkof the perceptualrepresentationand the applicationsof AssociativeGroupAnalysiswill stimulatefurther researchand help to improveunderstandingand internationalcommunicationbetweenpeoplewith different ideological beliefs and cultural backgrounds. References Allport, F. 1961. 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