Political Ideology and Subjective Culture: Conceptualization and Empirical Assessment
Author(s): Lorand B. Szalay and Rita Mae Kelly
Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 76, No. 3 (Sep., 1982), pp. 585-602
Published by: American Political Science Association
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Political Ideology and SubjectiveCulture:
Conceptualizationand EmpiricalAssessment
LORAND B. SZALAY
Institute of Comparative Social and Cultural Studies
RITA MAE KELLY
Arizona State University
Ideology and subjective culture are examined as two systems of behavioral organization well known
for their hidden but frequently powerful influences on political choices and behavior. After a brief
sketch of a representational theory of behavioral organization, a research strategy based on inferences
drawn from the distribution of thousands of free word associations is described and illustrated with
results from several international studies. Findings on Slovenian images and frame of reference
demonstrate the effects of Marxist doctrines. Korean and American data illustrate differences that are
predominantly psychocultural. The analytic method outlined suggests new capabilities for studying
ideology and its influence on people's perceptions, their system of representation of the world, and
their organization of behavior. It may be used to assess predispositions to adopt democratic principles
and procedures. It might also be used to assess the influence of ideological doctrines and their degree
of integration with the cultural views andframe of reference. The most natural use will probably be in
research in the field of international understanding and communication.
In this paper we present a perceptual-representational theory of behavior and a methodology
for studying ideology and culture as two main
designs of behavioral organization. We also outline an assessment strategy, present findings that
provide support for the theory, and suggest a systematic way to explain ideology and culture and
their interrelationship.
The Study of Ideology and Culture
More is known theoretically about the linkage
between belief systems and behavior (see Jervis
1976) than is known about measuring such belief
systems. Although advances in psychologically
oriented political theories enable political scientists to make sophisticated theoretical statements
about the linkage of ideology and behavior, the
difficulties in measuring belief systems make the
statements ring hollow.
The attention given to ideologies stems largely
from their obvious potential to develop into potent political forces. This happens when a set of
political doctrines is adopted by a group of people, assumes a central position in their belief systems, and then becomes a guiding force behind
their actions. Whether or not this happens is by
no means accidental; it depends to a large extent
on how the ideological doctrines fit with the subjective culture of the people, that is, with their
dominant shared perceptions, beliefs, and motivations. These same psychocultural dispositions will
predicate how the doctrine, if accepted, may be
adopted and possibly changed.
The study of ideology and the study of culture
have too often been separated. Anthropologists
and cultural psychologists rarely address the
foreign-policy implications of their findings.
Political scientists are often unable to interrelate
their findings with what is known about the influence of cultural variations on political behavior
and communication. A review of the literature indicates two main trends in the empirical analysis
of belief systems: (1) social scientists, such as Almond and Verba (1963), popularized the concepts
of ideology and culture by adapting them to fit
assumptions of logical positivism, elitism,
methodological individualism, and pragmatism.
(2) At the same time, public opinion research
became a substitute for cultural analysis; collective public opinion scores were equated with empirical knowledge of a group's ideology.
We agree that explicit beliefs, at least in open
societies, are readily accessible to opinion surveys,
but in our judgment ideological belief systems and
culturally shared perceptions and motivations are
less amenable to direct survey questions. Other
scholars have also concluded that public opinion
research is inefficient or ineffective or both for
studying ideology and culture. For example,
Hanna (1978), Teune (1971), and Przeworski and
Teune (1970) noted the problems of nonequivalence in the meaning of "objective reality" and
time across cultures. Rokeach (1966/67) has
stated that opinions are localized in the "region of
the lips and do not seem to affect the mind and
heart, nor the feet and hands."
To interrelate ideology and culture empirically
585
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586
The American Political Science Review
with real-world problems we must be able to
assess their implicit and complex aspects as well as
their explicit and simple ones. To perform these
tasks, a conceptual framework is needed which
enables us to go beyond logical positivism,
methodological
individualism,
and survey
research. In addition, a methodology must exist
for conducting empirical analyses appropriate for
this framework. We believe that the perceptualrepresentational system provides this conceptual
framework and that Associative Group Analysis
provides the requisite methodology.
The Perceptual-Representational System
Vol. 76
interested in understanding and predicting human
behavior (Oatley 1979; Kaplan 1973; Tolman
1948). (3) A subjective selectivity. Perceptions are
highly subjective and selective and depend on a
combination of factors, among them the complexity and observability of the subject, its subjective importance, and the homogeneity of social influences.
Organizational Elements of the
Perceptual-Representational System
In its organized whole, the perceptual-representational system amounts to an inclusive, global
world view that is characteristic of a particular
people. This system is made up of interdependent,
representational units organized along several
parameters. (1) Hierarchy of priorities. Certain
representational units are highly salient, whereas
others have low salience or importance; for example, to some the image of God has high salience,
whereas to others it has low salience. (2) Relatedness or affinity. Certain representational units
cluster together into domains, have high affinity,
and share a great deal of meaning, indicating
strong views and beliefs. For example, religious
perceptions would form a domain representing
religion. (3) Affect loading. Our perceptions and
images are colored by feelings and evaluations.
We are strongly attracted to certain elements of
our environment and repulsed by others, and
these evaluations obviously influence subjective
representation.
Several scholars of diverse disciplines have concluded that neither animals nor human beings respond to isolated details but rather to a configuration of characteristics (Downs and Stea 1973,
Kaplan 1973, Boulding 1971, Tolman 1948). As
Kaplan (1973) observes, humans have developed a
unique capability to extract from the extensive
flow of information provided by the human
senses that relatively modest amount which can be
effectively stored and used for survival. From this
process of isolating and identifying essential characteristics emerges a selective system of perceptual
representation, sometimes called cognitive representation (Stea and Downs 1970), cognitive maps
(Tolman 1948), internal representations (Shepard
and Chipman 1970; Posner and Keele 1968), central representations (Reed 1969), maze ways
(Wallace 1956), representations (Oatley 1979),
and other such terms. In this representational system perceptions, i.e., the configurations of essen- Ideology and the
tial and dominant attributes of concepts, people, Perceptual-Representational Framework
issues, and events, constitute the basic foundation.
Political ideologies become a part of a people's
beliefs and constitute a more or less central sphere
Characteristics of the
in the broader belief system. Although the docPerceptual-RepresentationalSystem
trine itself is a topic for political theorists, its influence on people calls for an empirical study of
The perceptual-representational system has psychological variables such as beliefs (Rokeach
several especially important characteristics. (1) A 1960) and attitudes (Eysenck 1955).
multidimensional nature. Perceptions as mental
Speaking of ideology, our focus is not on the
representations include not only observable doctrine-on-paper, such as the Communist Manidimensions but also material, human, social, festo or Hitler's Mein Kampf, but on the influracial, political, and other dimensions used by ence of social and political doctrines in shaping
people to sort and organize experience (cf. Trian- and organizing the perceptual-representational
dis 1972; Miller 1967; Fishbein 1966; Allport system. As a psychological reality, political ideol1961; Osgood et al. 1957; Goodenough 1956). (2) ogy refers to the content of a belief system which
Immediacy. The compelling sense of reality con- has its origin in postulates or doctrines and gains
veyed by perceptions explains their power to by its system's characteristics a new and enhanced
orient, organize, and control human behavior. potential to influence human behavior in the
Since perceptions are experienced as reality, they political and social domains. Totalitarian ideolostubbornly resist modification and are accom- gies, such as communism, are not restricted in
panied by a feeling of self-evidence often leading their scope to the political domain but aim to
to intolerance of conflicting views. Thus, percep- mold the entire world view, that is, the entire reptions have immense information value for those resentational system, to conform with the inclu-
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1982
PoliticalIdeology and SubjectiveCulture
sive world view projected by the ideology.
Literature and experience indicate that starting
with single, more or less isolated, beliefs, political
ideologies can progressively expand their influences into larger segments of the system of perceptual representation (Bobrow, Chan, and Kringen
1979, 1977; Szalay, Kelly, and Moon 1972; Cantril
1961; Rokeach 1960; Eysenck 1955). First, ideology, as doctrine-on-paper, can determine a person's beliefs. The person who accepts the doctrine
(e.g., the superiority of communism over capitalism) develops beliefs that contain elements of the
communist ideology (e.g., communism eliminates exploitation; the Soviet Union is just, progressive, and humanistic.). Second, ideology influences the organization of beliefs, that is, the
structure of the representational system. The
more people accept an ideology, the more they
reorder their priorities around it and develop
tightly organized belief clusters that resist modification. Under strong ideological influence
people's beliefs become rigid, emotion-laden, and
polarized (e.g., everything about the USSR is
good; everything about the United States is bad);
they become closed to conflicting information
and experience.
An important dimension of ideological influence is the progression from the judgmental level
to the deeper representational level. At a judgmental level even people with strong beliefs are
aware that their views, for instance, about capitalism or freedom, do reflect some personal judgment and that other people may or may not agree
with them. At a representational level, people are
unaware of the subjectivity of their views and
assume that only their meaning (of capitalism or
freedom) represents reality and that it is universal.
Others who think differently are perceived as being uninformed or misinformed.
The linkage between ideological beliefs, belief
systems, and culturally shared perceptualrepresentational systems can be illuminated by
empirical research showing: (a) how ideological
influences can be traced by comparing the content
of doctrine with people's actual perceptions and
meanings; (b) how similarity and distance between
various culture groups can be measured in various
domains of life, including those of politics and international relations; and (c) how deep-rooted
cultural views and modern ideologies interact in
shaping people's views, their shared subjective
representation of the world, and their behavior.
Political Ideology and Subjective CultureTwo Systems in Interaction
In the case of ideology, the doctrine-on-paper
offers a concrete and useful reference point. In
the case of subjective culture, there are no univer-
587
sal blueprints, but there is extensive literature
dealing with various characteristics, life conditions, diet, customs, and religion of a particular
cultural group. Table 1 offers a brief comparison
of ideological belief systems and subjective
culture along a few characteristics that are relevant to understanding their relationship.
These parallel conceptualizations suggest
several important areas for study: (1) Assessment
of ideological belief systems in a selected segment
where agreement or disagreement with the doctrine can be examined; (2) assessment of culture as
a system of subjective representation in the context of political as well as broader cultural themes;
and (3) assessment of two key questions about the
relationship of ideology and culture in contexts
that are relevant to international relations: (a) To
what extent are different cultures compatible with
the various ideologies? and (b) What possibilities
exist to trace ideological influences from an early
stage of judgmental changes in opinions to progressed stages where ideology becomes thoroughly
integrated with the culture? As an examination of
the issue of continuity and change in Russian and
Soviet thought indicates (Simmons 1955), this
poses an intriguing theoretical as well as practical
question: Can the integration of ideology and
culture reach a point where the key doctrines are
viewed as representing plain and simple reality?
Associative Group Analysis:
A Methodology for Analyzing Belief Systems
and Subjective Cultures
The Associative Group Analysis (AGA)
method offers an inferential approach to political
belief systems and subjective culture. In its focus
on subjective meanings and images, AGA follows
a tradition earmarked by the investigations of
Charles Osgood, George Miller, Harry Triandis,
and other psychologists who, as Triandis (1968)
observes, rely in their analysis of culture on the
study of subjective and cultural meanings. AGA
relies on the analysis of hundreds of thousands of
free word associations. Its research strategy and
theoretical rationale have been elaborated by
Szalay and Deese (1978) and follow the pioneering
work of Deese (1965), Whorf (1956) and Noble
(1952). The units of this system are the subjective
meanings of words or themes. To emphasize that
words are not used here merely as units of language but that their subjective meanings serve as
units of representation as well, we frequently use
the label "theme."
The AGA method focuses on the collective elements of psychological meanings as conveyed by
the shared responses of the cultural groups studied. All shared responses to a particular theme
are compiled into a group response list. These
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588
The AmericanPolitical Science Review
Vol. 76
Table 1. A Comparison of Political Ideology and Subjective Culture
Political Ideology
Subjective Culture
Psychological,
Behavioral Nature
A system of beliefs organized around a
set of abstract doctrines adopted and
used by people in their interpretation
of social and political issues, events,
and conditions.
A system of subjective representation composed of images and psychological meanings
shared by people of the same historical
background, similar life conditions, and
experiences.
Origin
A body of doctrines developed and
integrated by one or more political
philosophies which is usually critical
of existing social and political
conditions.
A spontaneous, natural product of the heritage of large ethnic or national collectives,
which gradually evolves in their effort to
understand and cope with problems of their
existence.
Selected Dominant
Characteristics
Explicit, often forcefully stated
opinions
Affect-laden, evaluative, and
polarized responses
Simplified solutions based frequently
on one-sided critical analysis of the
social situation
Implicit assumptions built into the system
of representation of the entire world
A subjective view of the world
Categorical conclusions supported by a
set of doctrines that reinforce each
other by an internal logic
Although the central assumptions are
explicit, the systemic influences are
subtle and hidden.
Centers on the social and political
domains
group response lists are usually highly groupspecific; they show the salient perceptual and
evaluative components characteristic of the
group's images and meanings of selected themes,
such as socialism.
Because these meaning units determine the content, and thereby the organization, of the group's
system of beliefs or subjective representation, the
Associative Group Analysis method focuses on
three major categories of information: (1) the
meaning composition of selected themes; (2) the
dominance of themes-that is, their relative position in a vertical dimension of priorities; and (3)
the relationship among themes as well as among
their natural clusters (domains)-that is, their patterns of affinities, which are fundamentally horizontal. Thus, the AGA method undertakes the
analysis of representational systems in terms of
their representational units as well as their horizontal and vertical organizational structure.
Sampling and Data Collection Procedure
A study in depth of ideological beliefs or representations requires the analysis of 50 to 100
themes. A study in depth of cultures requires 100
Starting from early childhood the system is
gradually built through accumulative
learning processes (socialization, enculturation) which progress outside people's
awareness
Subjectivity and selectivity of the system
promoted by the myriad subconscious
influences of the social environment
Both the central assumptions and the
systemic influences are implicit and
hidden
Encompasses all domains of life and
influences their relative importance as
well as their relationship
to 200 systematically selected dominant themes.
The AGA methodology enables more specific
hypotheses to be tested, but that'is not the intent
of this paper. To become truly informative, the
analysis has to be focused on issues and themes
that are dominant for the national or cultural
group under consideration. To insure the use of
culturally dominant domains and themes, it is a
common practice to organize a pretest based on a
small number of subjects (Szalay and Maday
1973).
Selection of respondents. Associative Group
Analysis, like every other research technique, can
be administered to samples organized along any
predetermined set of requirements. To follow the
usual survey-type of interest (e.g., What percentage of the population is for or against socialism or democracy?), the same criteria of representativeness need to be used in selecting samples as
are used in other research seeking similar generalizations. In most applications, including those in
this study, AGA was not used as a survey instrument; it is primarily a method of psychocultural
analysis aimed at assessing a people's subjective
representation of the universe as conveyed by
their priorities, perceptions, and meanings. The
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1982
PoliticalIdeologyand SubjectiveCulture
focus is not on how many Koreans are for or
against democracy, but rather how Koreans,
based on their common background and historic
experiences, are predisposed to understand
democracy in contrast to how Americans understand it.
This different focus must be recognized to
understand that the AGA approach is closer to
anthropological strategies that use methods of intensive assessment with small samples of culturally representative respondents rather than to
those that use relatively large samples carefully
organized to be statistically representative of large
national or cultural populations. Among the outstanding anthropologists who have elaborated on
the differences between survey research and cultural assessment, the late Margaret Mead (Mead
and Metreaux 1953) was particularly articulate in
stressing the need for intensive observation in
search of consistent overall patterns or relationships rather than of quantitative differences on
single isolated variables.
Our use of relatively small (N = 50 to 100)
samples of subjects with comparable backgrounds
(e.g., American students from Washington, D.C.,
and Korean students from Seoul, and of matching
sociodemographic composition (e.g., equal numbers of males and females, a comparable mixed
composition from diverse fields of study) follows
Mead's rationale, and our findings provide
empirical support to her reasoning as well. For instance, the data in Table 7 show that the variables
which are at the center of our interest, the intracultural differences (e.g., differences among students, workers, and farmers within the United
States or Korea) are almost negligible compared
to the sizeable differences found between these
two cultures as a whole.
Data collection. The Associative Group
Analysis (AGA) method elicits free verbal associations in a one-minute time frame in the native
language of the respondent by using selected
themes on separate cards as stimuli. Each response is scored to indicate the relative importance of this element of the theme's psychological
meaning. Scores consist of frequencies with fiftymember groups weighted by the order of occurrence. The weights assigned to responses beginning with the first in the sequence are: 6, 5, 4, 3, 3,
These weights have been em3, 3, 2, 2, 1, 1, ....
pirically derived from the differential stability of
rank-place assessed by the test-retest method in
previous investigations (Szalay and Brent 1967).
The several hundred responses of a group on a
given subject are compiled into a list, starting with
the most frequent responses and ending with
those given by only one person. These groupresponse lists offer an exhaustive inventory of the
mosaic elements of perceptions and evaluations
589
characteristic of the theme's psychological meaning for that group. The importance of each
response is demonstrated by its score value; a
higher score indicates a proportionately higher
salience. The listing is all-inclusive, since it is safe
to conclude that responses not given are not part
of the group's perception of the theme.
The main components of the group's subjective
meanings are identified by content analysis. For
instance, a panel of judges has grouped all the
responses obtained to capitalism into the ten main
clusters depicted in Figure 1. The scores for each
response were summed. To obtain the percentages, the total for each category was divided by
each group's total group (response) score (in
Figure 1, United States = 1,138; Slovenian =
985). Variations between countries in the psychological meanings of capitalism and other themes
can be clarified by this procedure.
In the following sections we present findings
that compare Americans and Slovenians to illustrate characteristics of systems in countries with
different ideologies. Comparisons of Americans
and Koreans are presented to illustrate predominantly cultural differences in perceptions and
motivations.
For the American-Slovenian comparison,
United States data were collected in 1969 from 25
male and 25 female students at the University of
Maryland at College Park. The Slovenian sample
had a similar composition and was tested at the
University of Ljubljana in Yugoslavia; the subjects were all from Slovenia, the most western of
Yugoslavia's six republics, which is now governed
under a Marxist-socialistic constitution. Slovenia,
part of Austria until 1918, still has a distinct sense
of national identity and its own language. The
Korean data were collected in 1969 from 150 male
inductees into the Korean army, at various military posts in South Korea; this sample was divided
into equal numbers of students, workers, and
farmers. A comparable set of American males
also being inducted into the American military in
1969 constituted the American sample.
Political Ideology,
an American-SlovenianComparison
A simple way to explore the influence exerted
by ideology on people's world view and belief system is to examine the extent to which their views
and beliefs contain elements of the doctrines. The
basic tenets of ideologies like Marxism are spelled
out in considerable detail in the writings of Marx,
Lenin, Stalin, and others and are readily
available.
Subjective meanings of key themes: capitalism
and communism. Figure 1 shows the Slovenian
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590
The AmericanPoliticalScienceReview
view of capitalism in comparison to the American. In Marxist-Communist ideology, capitalism
is the main target of negative criticism. The most
salient component in the Slovenian view of capitalism is negative characteristics, and exploitation
is their major criticism. This is in fundamental
agreement with the Marxist-Communist doctrine
that capitalism is a political system based on the
private ownership of the means of production
which leads to economic and social exploitation.
Slovenian references to war and imperialism in
this negative category reflect the doctrine that the
capital accumulated through exploitation
becomes the source of political power and a
foreign policy that is aggressive and expansionist;
Vol. 76
warbecomesan instrumentto widenits influence.
Also in this categorywerereferencesto inequality
and decay, which reflectbeliefs that capitalismis
unjust and doomed to failure. In contrast, the
American students showed substantially little
criticismof the capitalist system. Although the
Sloveniansview capitalismprimarilyin political,
ideologicalterms,to the Americanstudents,capitalism means primarilybusiness and money, a
nearlyexclusivefocus on economicand financial
considerations.Of the ten componentsof perceptions and evaluationsshownin the graph,most of
the Slovenianviews do tie in with official Marxist
doctrine.
Figure 2 reflects the Americanand Slovenian
CAPITALISM
NEGATIVECHARACTERISTICS
(US: 5%, S: 21 %)
ECONOMY,BUSINESS
(US: 24%, S: 2%)
MONEY,CAPITAL
ISMS
(US: 19%, S: 10%)
(US: 7%, S: 18%)
U.S.A., THEWEST
(US: 13%, S: 12%)
.......
_.....*:**
IDEOLOGUES
CAPITALISTS,
(US: 3 %, S:11%)
ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES,
VALUES
SOCIETY
GOVERNMENT,
\
(US: 11%, S:1%)
(US:11%,S: 12%)
MISCELLANEOUS
AFFLUENCE,POVERTY
(US: 2%, S: 3%)
(US: 5%, S: 10%)
**
TOTALSCORES
US = 1138
Slovenian = 985
O US Group
Slovenian
11111
Figure 1. Capitalism: Main Meaning Components
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Group
591
PoliticalIdeologyand SubjectiveCulture
1982
COMMUNISM
COUNTRIES
(US: 29%, S: 15%)
POSITIVECHARACTERISTICS
(US: 2%, S: 19%)
POLITICALISMS
COMMUNISS
FAMOUCOMMUNISTS
FAMOUS
1%)
(US: 13%, S:%
...
US: 14%, S: 18%)
NEGATIVE
CHARACTERISTICS
5:
*::::::TERIOLG
:
(US: 5%, 5: 4%)
REFERENCES
SYMBOLIC
(US: 6%,
4%)
MISCELLANEOUS
(US: 5%, 5: 4%)
TOTALSCORES
US = 1109
Slovenian = 853
5
.Slovenian
US Group
Group
Figure2. Communism:MainMeaningComponents
views of communism. It shows that the most
salient components of the Slovenian view involve
positive characteristics, political theory and
ideology, and systemic considerations focused on
the Communist party and organization. The positive characteristics that Slovenians attribute to
communism include equality, peace, justice, and
freedom. Slovenians apparently view communism
as the antithesis of capitalism. The contrast is
sharp, affect-laden, and encompasses, again, the
main dimensionsstressedby ideology: exploitation versusequality,war and imperialismversus
peace, politicaldivisionversusfreedom.Each of
the positive attributesSloveniansassociate with
communismis in contrastto the Americanviewof
communism,in whichoppression,war,take-over,
threat,poverty,and "bad" are salientattributes.
The Slovenian image of communism which
emergesfromthe students'responsesis so positive
that one may wonderwhethertheirlife conditions
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The AmericanPolitical Science Review
592
are really that ideal, or whether their responses are
really frank. These questions become particularly
legitimate in light of the rather widespread dissatisfaction of Eastern Europeans with what they
call Communist political control.
The solution to this puzzle becomes apparent
only by extending the analysis to additional ideas
such as socialism and Marxism (Szalay and Pecjak
1979). The answer is that Slovenians do not look
at their own system as communism but as socialism. Although they are positive about communism as the means to Utopia, they show considerable signs of criticism about their socialist
reality.
In general, the findings suggest that ideology is
more effective in shaping the meanings of abstract
notions like communism and capitalism, but less
effective in influencing views that involve more
direct and concrete experiences and observations,
such as the Slovenians' perception of their president, Marshal Tito, or government.
An interesting insight offered by this inferential
assessment is that these perceptions of specific
issues like capitalism and communism are not
isolated; they represent interdependent mosaic
elements of a broader world view. This interrelatedness of elements provides valuable opportunities for reconstructing larger domains of the
belief system.
Dominant beliefs and perceptions across
themes. The analysis of the American and Slovenian reactions to a number of ideological themes
demonstrates that the two groups studied show
considerable consistency in their perceptions and
evaluations. Despite the apparent dangers of oversimplification, some of the major trends of interpretation are presented in Table 2.
It is a general trend that for the American
group, all four isms-communism,
Marxism,
Vol. 76
socialism, and capitalism-largely connote concrete, political systems;for the Slovenians,these
labels refer more to abstracttheoreticalsystems.
Exceptfor communism,the Americansstresseconomic factorsmore, whereasthe Sloveniansstress
the social and societal aspects more. Slovenian
referencesto society, classes, workers, and the
proletariatare consistentlyhigherin numberthan
American references. Similarly, social values,
especiallyequality, receive consistentlymore attention among Americans.
The Americangroupconsistentlyrefersmoreto
governmentand uses political isms primarilyto
refer to politicalorganizationsand governmental
characteristics.The Sloveniangroup stressesthe
role of the state and the role of certain social
strata, especiallyworkers.
With respect to communism, Marxism, and
capitalism,the Americanand Sloveniangroups
show conflicting trends in their evaluations.On
socialismboth groupsshow positiveand negative
elementsof evaluationswherebythe positiveoutweigh the negativeattitudes. Communismis the
most positivefor the Slovenianand most negative
for the American group. On capitalism the
Americandistinctlynegativeevaluationsare outweighed by the positive, whereasthe Slovenian
evaluationis intenselynegative.
Dominant trends of perceptions across domains. An analysisof dominantperceptionsand
evaluationsacross three domains-political isms
(I), political institutions(II), and politicalvalues
(III)-demonstrates severalinterestinggeneralizable differencesbetweenthe Americanand Slovenian politicaland ideologicalframesof reference
(Table 3).
1. Political process, political ideology. The
Americanemphasison politicalprocessrelatesto
the Westernprinciplesof participationand choice
Table 2. Common Trends of Interpretation in the Domain of Ideology
by Slovenian (S) and American (U.S.) Subjects
Trends of interpretation
Focus on systems, countries
Focus on theory, ideology
Greater emphasis on economic
references (money)
Greater emphasis on social references
(society)
More weight on government
More weight on state
More negative evaluation
More positive evaluation
Most representative person-U.S.
Most representative person-S
Most representative country-U.S.
Most representative country-S
Communism
Marxism
Socialism
Capitalism
U.S.
S
U.S.
S
U.S.
S
U.S.
S
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
S
U.S.
S
U.S.
S
Marx
Marx
USSR
Yugoslavia
S
U.S.
S
S
U.S.
S
S
U.S.
Nixon
Marx
U.S.
U.S.
S
U.S.
S
U.S.
S
Marx
Lenin
USSR
USSR
S
Marx
Tito
USSR
Yugoslavia
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Table 3. US.-Slovenian Main Trends of Interpretation across Domains
U.S. Emphasis
Domain*
Slovenian Emphasis
Domain
1. Political process/elections/campaigns
2. People/government/country
3. Civil rights/free speech/individual
freedom/individual ideals
4. Identification with Western
democracy
5. Economic references
6. Love/happiness/safety/security
I, III
I, II, III
1. Politics/ideology/theory/isms
2. Society/nation/state
3. Social rights/group ideals/brotherhood/
equality/national freedom
4. Identification with socialism,
communism
I, II, III
I, III
I, II, III
6. Joy/beauty/health
III
I, II, III
I, II, III
I, II, III
III
I, II, III
* I Political Isms
II Political Institutions
III Political Values
as well as to the Anglo-Saxon pragmatism that
emphasizes process and outcome over principles.
The Slovenian trend shows a strong ideological
orientation in line with the Marxist-Leninist emphasis on theory and ideology. The Slovenian
belief system also shows a considerable amount of
similarity with specific themes of MarxismLeninism, such as the image of decaying capitalism and the ideal image of communism.
2. Political institutions. The American emphasis on the relationship of the people and government is in agreement with the ideology of
Western democracies. The American focus on
country is probably a result of the historical tradition of immigration and settlement of peoples
from different nations and of the process of forming a new country, which for quite a while was not
a nation.
3. Political rights, ideals. The weight and consistency with which the American group refers to
civil rights-the rights of the individual to be free
in movement, choice, and expression-reflect the
American philosophy of individualism and freedom. The most popular American ideals are individualistic.
The weight and consistency of Slovenian references to social rights, group ideals, equality, and
brotherhood reflect a collectivistic orientation;
these concepts have their roots in the collectivism
of Marxist-Leninist theory as well as in the agricultural ethnic traditions. In the social-political
realm, however, the Marxist-Leninist influences
seem more influential and decisive. This impression is reinforced by the Slovenian group's use of
such ideological terms as class struggle and exploitation.
4. Political isms, systems. The Americans'
identification with Western democracy is a clear
expression of preference, a product of political
principles as well as of tradition, culture, and lifestyle. Similarly, the Slovenian identification with
socialism and communism emerges as a clear case
of ideological commitment which stresses solidarity and which is also likely to have historical
foundations.
5. Economy. The fairly consistent American
emphasis on economic variables seems strongly
founded in cultural values, in past and present life
conditions, and in its relationship to capitalism.
6. Personal values. The American emphasis on
such personal values as happiness and security
probably has its main roots in the cultural milieu
and life conditions. Similarly, the Slovenian
values of brotherhood, health, joy, and beauty
are primarily culturally or traditionally determined; moreover, some of them, like brotherhood, may also be reinforced by the dominant
political ideology.
This type of information-e.g., that Slovenians
maintain a high regard for the ideals of communism but are quite critical about certain realities associated with socialism-is little known yet
obviously consequential. If our communications
aiming at Slovenians address political subjects
such as democracy by emphasizing process (elections, campaigning, voting) along our own salient
priorities, they are likely to elicit less attention and
recognition than if we would emphasize ideals and
principles of democracy, such as equality and
justice, which have high salience to Slovenians.
Inferences on Subjective Culture,
an American-Korean Comparison
The identification of ideological influences can
be conveniently focused on a few key ideological
themes such as communism. In the case of ideology, familiarity with the doctrine (e.g., Marxism)
makes it possible to decide on a priori grounds
what to study (e.g., Does the image of capitalism
actually include exploitation?). The comparative
study of two subjective cultures is a much broader
task. In the case of culture there is nothing like a
doctrinal blueprint to use for comparison.
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594
The American Political Science Review
From a broad international perspective, Korea
is aligned with the United States in terms of
general political orientation and ideologies; yet
even in the political realm, we know there are
some obvious differences between Koreans and
Americans that are more cultural than ideological. In order to be really informative, a rather extensive analysis of the two systems of subjective
representations is required. The results of our
American-Korean culture analysis filled two
sizable volumes, and there is danger that a brief
summary of it here may not be sufficient to convey the depth of the findings. Nonetheless, the
Vol. 76
following analysis of democracy and politics provides an illustration of the insights that can be obtained through this process.
Subjective meanings of key themes: democracy
and politics. As Figure 3 shows, Koreans closely
*agree with Americans in identifying democracy
with freedom and liberty. They also perceive their
own country as a leading example of democracy.
Koreans and Americans have apparently quite different ideas, however, on what democracy actually is. To Americans democracy is most saliently a
process involving the competition of political parties-campaigning, voting, elections, filling im-
DEMOCRACY
ELECTIONS, ELECTED
OFFICES
_w
(US: 28%, K: 2%)
FREEDOM, LIBERTY
(US: 23%, K: 21 %)
RIGHTS, IDEALS
PEOPLE PARTICIPATION
(US: 11%, K: 6%)
CONSTITUTION, REPUBLIC
(US: 6%, K: 4%)
..
........... .... OWN COUNTRY,
SPECIFIC NATIONS
(US: 18%
GOOD
(US: 3%, K: K:I21%
1 %)
X
w
DOCTRINES, ISMS
(US: 1%, K: 11 %)
MISCELLANU
MISCELLANEOUS
ALLIANCE, INTERNATIONAL
(US: 2%, K: 2%)
RELATIONS
(US: 2%/ K: 8%)
TOTAL SCORES
US = 2118
Korean = 2184
5
US Group
Korean Group
Figure3. Democracy:MainMeaningComponents
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1982
595
PoliticalIdeologyand SubjectiveCulture
POLITICS
PRESIDENT,LEGISLATION,
ADMINISTRATION
(US: 22%, K: 20%)
DOCTRINE,IDEOLOGY
(US: 6%, K: 19%)
ELECTION,CAMPAIGN
(US: 20%, K: 4%)
NATION,SOCIETY
(US: 6%, K: 12%)
CORRUPTION,
MALFUNCTION
(US: 11%, K: 12%)
PARTIES,PARTY
SYSTEM
(US: 12%, K: 5%)
DIPLOMACY,WAR, PEACE
(US: 9%, K: 3%)
MISCELLANEOUS
(US: 8%, K: 4%)
PEOPLE, LEADERSHIP
(US: 2%, K: 11 %)
DEVELOPMENT,
IMPROVEMENT,
ECONOMY
(US: 2%, K: 10%)
TOTALSCORES
US = 748
Korean = 1019
E
USGroup
Korean Group
Figure 4. Politics: Main Meaning Components
portant offices-in other words, a process that
provides for people to express their free choices.
Americans emphasize the need for and the importance of active participation. To Koreans, democracy represents high ideals and a system committed to their pursuit. Although some ideals, like
happiness and human rights, are directly relevant
to the personal interests and life of the individual,
others, like peace and equality, refer predominanantly to broad social and national concerns.
These Korean collective concerns become apparent in the context of democracy and in the
close relationships Koreans see between democracy and political doctrines such as capitalism and
communism. They are also reflected by the
Koreans' tendency to view democracy as a principle or ideal forming the foundation of international alliances of free nations as opposed to
the Communist powers.
Both the American and the Korean meanings of
politics correspond to their respective meanings of
democracy and show cultural variations. Americans stress the political process of campaigning
and elections, elected officials, and institutions
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596
The American Political Science Review
like the government and the legislatures as well as
the Democratic and Republican parties. The
Koreans stress ideals and doctrines, such as
democracy and communism, and emphasize the
role of the president. To the Koreans, politics
constitutes a concern with broad national issues,
shown by their references to nation and society
and their close identification of politics with national economic and development problems.
Dominant trends across domains of political
relevance. The observed differences are not isolated bits of information but reflect some broader
trends in perceptions and dominant priorities.
The Korean disposition to perceive democracy
and politics in close relationship to some high
ideals and principles rather than to institutionalized procedures for expressing the people's will
or free choice was consistently observed in their
reactions to government, president, and government officials as well as in the context of such
themes as elections, revolution, and factionalism
(Szalay et al. 1971, ch. 5, 6). Moreover, the
Koreans' tendency to emphasize doctrines and
ideology is clearly reflected by their subjective
views of such themes as capitalism, communism,
and socialism (Szalay et al. 1971, ch. 4). The
Koreans' views of democracy and politics as important national concerns become clearer by
examining the nationalistic nature of the broader
Korean frame of reference, as is reflected in such
themes as nation, national interest, national
prestige, and patriotism (Szalay et al. 1971, ch.
7).
Finally, the Korean tendency to see in democracy and politics issues of broad international
consequences rather than problems of party politics ties in closely with their view of the world as
divided into two opposing blocs: the free and
democratic versus the Communist nations. This
Korean view emerges with additional specificity
from their images of the United States, USSR,
South Korea, North Korea, and Americans
(Szalay et al. 1971, ch. 8, 9) as well as from
their meanings of such international issues as U.S.
aid, military assistance, Vietnam involvement,
and the Manila Conference (Szalay et al. 1973,
ch. 6).
Dominant trends inferred from affinity structure. Another way to gain insights into broad
trends characteristic of the American and Korean
subjective representations of the universe is
through analysis of the affinity structure. How
people relate things-e.g., politics to economics
or progress-is highly characteristic of their way
of thinking, of their world view. When one says
that a particular political ideology dominates the
thinking and cultural behavioral patterns of a
group, one is, in effect, asserting that a large portion of that group's beliefs cluster around and
Vol. 76
perhaps are determined by some more universalistic, abstract political concepts and beliefs.
The AGA index of interword affinity (IIA) measures the relationship of one theme (A) to another
(B) for a particular group. It is based upon the
relative weight of responses in common for the
two themes. The formula for the affinity of
theme A to B is:
Score for
direct
elicitation
HIA = AandB +
(A->B),0
Total score for themeA X
(A->B)
Table 4 provides an illustration of the affinity
structure within and between two sets of themes,
one involving political issues and the other economic issues. As a general trend, Koreans see
these domains as more closely clustered around
political issues, which reflects cultural priorities as
well. (Findings on average dominance scores show
a distinctly higher Korean priority placed on politics than found for the United States.)
To meet the orientation of the readers of this
journal, we have concentrated our presentation
predominantly on political subjects. However,
since the attention given to the political domain
varies and in the analysis of subjective culture
receives only a fraction of interest (5 to 15 percent), we also include here another matrix of affinity indices, this one dealing with the domains of
food and economic conditions. It is used to show
the organization of the system of subjective representation in areas that are apolitical.
The indices of the matrix in Table 5 reflect
several trends. The largest difference is in the
across-the-board affinity of rice to all foodrelated and economic themes for the Koreans, a
not-unexpected finding given the concentration
on rice in the Korean diet. Another difference is
the consistently higher relationship for Koreans
between hunger and all economic issues. Although results drawn from the affinity matrices
are rarely explicit to the point desirable from the
angle of cultural understanding, they do offer
some structural insights into the organization of
the culturally characteristic system of subjective
representation.
Relative cultural priority or dominance of
themes and domains. The number of responses
given by a group of persons for a particular
stimulus theme is an established measure of relative meaningfulness (Noble 1952). For a given individual, greater meaningfulness of a theme indicates that it has a greater subjective importance,
more dominance in an individual's belief system.
This measure of dominance is expressed by the
total group score of responses elicited by a particular theme. This total score varies greatly
Score for
responsesin
commonto
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597
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1982
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PoliticalIdeologyand SubjectiveCulture
599
Table 6. Ranking of Selected Domains Based Upon the Mean Dominance Scores
for American and Korean Groups
Domain
Family
Education
Ethics/Moral
Economic
International
Political
United States
Mean Score
Rank
Korea
Mean Score
Rank
2150
2197
1748
1899
1923
1899
2
1
6
4
3
5
2038
1888
1551
1863
1657
1934
1
3
6
4
5
2
*Each average domain score is based upon the responses to sixteen stimulus themes.
across different themes and cultures and provides
a sensitive measure of group- or culture-specific
meaningfulness or dominance of a particular
theme and, by extension, of particular beliefs
(Szalay et al. 1971; Szalay and Brent 1967).
Table 6 presents an overview of the average
dominance scores of the American and Korean
subjects to sixteen stimulus themes within each of
the six domains listed. A domain is the general
substantive area into which the specific themes
can be grouped. The dominance scores demonstrate that the American group stresses education
and the family substantially more than the international one. The dominance scores thus provide
insights into the more salient (vertical) dimensions
of belief systems and permits direct cross-national
comparisons of this dimension.
Ideology and Culture from
Psychological, Behavioral Perspectives
The Slovenian examples illustrate a way of
identifying and tracing ideological influences on
belief systems. Although some of the findings
follow expectations, e.g., the impact of
Marxism-Leninism, they also show how doctrines mix with cultural dispositions and life conditions in ways that previously were not identifiable. That Slovenians have much more positive
views about communism than socialism is one of
those local twists that few non-Slovenians would
anticipate.
The Korean case is more complicated. We used
Korea as an example of a different culture, but the
findings also indicate that the Koreans' subjective
representation of the universe contains distinct
ideological influences as well. It would be wrong
to overlook these influences simply because they
do not come from the Marxist doctrine but from
our own ideology. Although Marxist doctrines are
clearly articulated and represent a classical example of the doctrinal foundation behind political
belief systems, our more pragmatic and pluralistic
ideals about democracy provide the foundation
for an ideology as well. At this point, we ask, does
the Korean subjective culture show similarities
with the American? If it does, we can then explore
to what extent the similarities are political in
nature.
The political influences may be traced by charting the psychocultural distance between Americans and Koreans. Psychocultural distance is
measured by the dissimilarity of representational
units (Szalay and Bryson 1973). The more
Koreans and Americans agree in their perceptions
and evaluations of dominant themes, anything
from politics to entertainment, the less is their
psychocultural distance.
In the context of the AGA method, psychocultural distance is measured by the Pearson r correlation coefficient calculated between the distribution of responses from two groups to the
same stimulus themes. This coefficient shows the
extent to which the groups give similar responses.
A high coefficient means that the high-frequency
responses produced by one group are also highfrequency responses for the other group; similarly, the low-frequency responses produced by
one group will generally be the same as those produced by the other group. A low correlation
means that the responses are substantively different and the response scores in one group for a
stimulus word are high whereas in the other they
are low. The lower the coefficients, the greater is
the psychocultural distance between the groups
compared.
The reliability of this coefficient of psychocultural distance was tested by comparing two
groups obtained by randomly dividing a larger
group in half. The coefficients produced in a sample of themes were then averaged, and the comparison of the two groups on 26 themes resulted in
a correlation of .73. In an earlier comparison, an r
of .82 was calculated over 40 themes. (For more
details, see Szalay and Bryson 1974).
Table 7 presents the coefficients of psychocultural distance obtained in our comparative
analysis of American and Korean students, work-
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The AmericanPoliticalScienceReview
600
Vol. 76
Table 7. Overall Psychocultural Distance Between American and Korean Groups
Comparison
Groups
Coefficient of
similarity
Between U.S. and Korea
students
workers
farmers
.18
.07
.01
United States only
students and workers
students and farmers
workers and farmers
.62
.63
.77
Korea only
students and workers
students and farmers
workers and farmers
.67
.63
.74
Note. Means were calculated across 50 themes.
ers, and farmers. To provide a broad reference
base for the comparisons between the U.S. and
Korea, we have included findings that show the
distances among these subgroups within the
United States and Korea. The similarity means
shown in Table 7 were calculated across 50
themes. Compared to the relatively high similarities between the subgroups within each country,
the similarities between Korea and the United
States are small. They are slightly larger for students, but practically negligible for the lesseducated groups.
An examination of two clusters of themes that
are fundamentally political in nature (countries
and isms, Table 8) demonstrates that there is less
psychocultural distance between students in the
United States and Korea than between the American and Korean farmers and workers. This finding suggests that formal training in political doctrines and knowledge might be counteracting
basic subjective cultural disparities between the
two countries.
Within the limits of the above examples, the
findings show generally large and consistent differences between the views of our American and
Slovenian groups and the American and Korean
cultural samples. The underlying perceptions and
motivations demonstrate deep cultural trends as
well as ideological influences that seem to be of
more recent origin; these factors merge into a contemporary view or subjective representation of the
universe that is characteristic of the groups studied. There are some ambiguities in the findings
with regard to the ideological versus cultural
origin of certain views. For instance, is the consistent American emphasis on the political process,
elections, voting, and campaigning part of a universalistic democratic ideology, or is it a manifestation of a highly practical, action-oriented
culture? Is the Slovenian emphasis on social, collectivistic value considerations the result of a
modern collectivistic ideology or of a communityoriented tradition?
Table8. PsychoculturalDistancesbetween Koreansand Americans
in Two PoliticallyRelevantDomains
Domainsand themes
SimilaritiesBetweenAmericanand KoreanGroups
Farmers
Workers
Students
Countries
South Vietnam
Viet Cong
USSR
Red China
.42
.31
.48
.68
.28
.24
.56
.28
.33
.25
.53
.36
Isms
Communism
Capitalism
Socialism
Democracy
.13
.41
.35
.60
-.06
.13
-.35
.59
-.15
.05
-.28
.50
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1982
PoliticalIdeologyand SubjectiveCulture
Conclusion
The findingspresentedhereillustratea new approachto the study of ideologyand culture.This
approachoffers a means of promotinga better
understandingof the psychoculturalfoundations
of politicalbehaviorand the role of politicaldoctrinesin organizingbeliefsystemsand influencing
politicaldecisions.The processby whichpolitical
doctrinesbecome integratedinto the cultureand
systemof subjectiverepresentationis an intriguing as well as practicaltopic for furtherinvestigation. Along the main thrust of the present approach,therearenumerousquestionsof considerabletheoreticaland practicalinterest:To whatextent are particularpopulations predisposedto
adopt democracyin our Westernparticipatory,
process-orientedinterpretation?What are the effects of varioustotalitarianideologieson particular populations?To what extenthave the populations integratedelementsof such ideologiesinto
theirviewor representationof the universe?What
are the mechanismsof such integration?How do
they serve politicalcontrol? How do they correlate with conformity, compliance, and various
other relevant manifestations of political
behavior?Whetheran ideologythrivesor fails in
a particularcountryclearlydepends,amongother
things, on the psychoculturalpredispositionsand
experiencesof its people.
While the psychological meaning of the
theme (a word standingfor an issue or subject)
servesas the unit of analysis,the AGA approach
opensup new opportunitiesfor empiricalresearch
in fields criticalto internationalrelationsand interculturalunderstanding.Although major additionalanalysesarevitallyneededto implementthe
buildingof communicationbridges,there is evidence,suchas that presentedin this article,which
indicatesthat differencesin psychologicalmeanings can be systematicallyidentified and measured. The greaterthe precisionwith which differencesin meaningcan be measured,the better
are our chancesto overcomesuch differencesand
to improvethe effectivenessof communication.
We hope that the conceptualframeworkof the
perceptualrepresentationand the applicationsof
AssociativeGroupAnalysiswill stimulatefurther
researchand help to improveunderstandingand
internationalcommunicationbetweenpeoplewith
different ideological beliefs and cultural backgrounds.
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