Capitalizing on
Mass Incarceration
U.S. Growth in Private Prisons
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This report was written by Kara Gotsch, Director of Strategic Initatives,
and Vinay Basti, intern, at The Sentencing Project, with consultation
from Nicole D. Porter, Director of Advocacy. It builds upon the research
and analysis of The Sentencing Project’s report, Too Good to be True:
Private Prisons in America, by Cody Mason.
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2 The Sentencing Project
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Overview
5
I. Trends in Privatization
7
II. Challenges of Private Prisons
10
III. Private Contractors and their Expanding Reach
12
IV. Recommendations
14
Appendix: State Profiles in Prison Privatization
16
Capitalizing on Mass Incarceration: U.S. Growth in Private Prisons 3
4 The Sentencing Project
OVERVIEW
The War on Drugs and harsher sentencing policies,
including mandatory minimum sentences, fueled a rapid
expansion in the nation’s prison population beginning
in the 1980s. The resulting burden on the public sector
led to the modern emergence of for-profit private prisons
in many states and at the federal level.
The United States has the world’s largest private prison
population. Of the 1.5 million people in state and federal
prisons in 2016, 8.5 percent, or 128,063, were incarcerated
in private prisons.1 Another 26,249 people -73 percent
of all people in immigration detention- were confined
in privately-run facilities on a daily basis during fiscal
year 2017.2
From 2000 to 2016 the number of people housed in
private prisons increased five times faster than the total
prison population. Over a similar timeframe, the
proportion of people detained in private immigration
facilities increased by 442 percent.
The federal government and 27 states utilized private
prisons operated by for-profit and non-profit entities
during 2016.3 New Mexico and Montana led the nation
in their reliance on private prisons with 43 percent and
39 percent of their prison populations, respectively,
Table 1. Population in U.S. Private Prisons and
Immigration Detention Centers
2000
2016
% change
2000-2016
1,381,892
1,505,400
9%
Total Private
87,369
128,063
47%
Federal Private
15,524
34,159
120%
State Private
71,845
94,164
31%
4,841
26,249
442%
Total Prison Population
*Private Immigrant Detention
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Prisoners Series (2000, 2016). Mason,
C. (2012). Dollars and Detainees: The Growth of For-Profit Detention. The
Sentencing Project. Data of average daily count obtained from Detention
Watch Network and the Center for Constitutional Rights.
*
Immigrant detention numbers are from 2002 and 2017 and are not included
in the total prison population numbers. The 2017 numbers exclude counts
from three facilities.
housed within them (See Table 2). Between 2000 and
2016, eight states – Arkansas, Kentucky, Maine,
Michigan, Nevada, North Dakota, Utah and Wisconsin
– eliminated their use of private prisons due to concerns
about safety and cost cutting.4 In 2016, Louisiana
changed the classification of its contracted beds and
reported its private prison population as zero for the
first time during this period. Alternatively, five states
– Alabama, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, South Carolina
and Vermont – began contracting with private prisons
between 2000 and 2016.
The federal government is the single largest user of
private prisons in the United States but has reduced its
population in private prisons in recent years. However,
in 2017 Attorney General Jeff Sessions withdrew an
Obama-era directive to phase out private prison
contracting because of concern for the federal
correctional system’s ability “to meet future needs.”5
This report provides a portrait of private prisons as a
component of the American corrections landscape and
assesses its impact on mass incarceration. Among its
most striking features is the broad variation found
across jurisdictions in reliance on private prisons. As
outlined in the state case studies examining the history
of prison privatization in Florida, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina and Texas (available in the appendix),
those corrections systems most committed to the
industry have faced controversy, including riots, deaths,
and allegations of improper financial influence from
for-profit prison companies.
Political influence has been instrumental in determining
the growth of for-profit private prisons and continues
today in various ways. If overall prison populations
continue the current trend of modest decline, the
privatization debate will likely intensify as opportunities
for the prison industry dry up and corrections companies
seek profit in other areas of criminal justice services
and immigration detention.
Capitalizing on Mass Incarceration: U.S. Growth in Private Prisons 5
KEY FINDINGS:
•
Of the total U.S. prison population, one in 12 people (128,063) was incarcerated
in private prisons in 2016; an increase of 47 percent since 2000.
•
26,249 people were also confined in privately-run immigration detention facilities
in fiscal year 2017; a 442 percent increase since 2002.
•
Federal prisons incarcerated the largest number of people in private prisons,
34,159, marking a 120 percent increase since 2000.
•
The largest private prison corporations, Core Civic and GEO Group, collectively
manage over half of the private prison contracts in the United States with combined
revenues of $3.5 billion as of 2015.
•
Companies often trim prison budgets by employing mostly non-union and lowskilled workers at lower salaries and offer limited benefits compared to staff at
publicly run institutions.
•
Cost savings claims associated with prison privatization are unfounded according
to decades of research.
6 The Sentencing Project
TRENDS IN PRIVATIZATION
Figure 1. Number of People Incarcerated in State and Federal Private Prisons, 2000-2016
State
100,000
80,000
60,000
Federal
40,000
20,000
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
0
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Prisoners Series.
STATE PRIVATE PRISON POPULATION TRENDS
Between 2000 and 2016, the number of people
incarcerated in private prison facilities increased 47
percent while the overall prison population increased
9 percent. The private prison population reached a peak
of 137,220 in 2012; it then declined to 126,272 in 2015,
before rising again in 2016 to 128,063.6
At the state level 27 states utilized private prison beds,
with contracts ranging from a low of 12 in South Carolina
to a high of 13,692 in Texas (See Table 2). Six states
have more than doubled the number of individuals in
private prisons since 2000. Arizona had the largest
increase, holding 479 percent more people in private
prisons in 2016 than in 2000, followed by Indiana (296
percent), Ohio (226 percent), Florida (211 percent),
Georgia (113 percent), and Tennessee (112 percent).
New Mexico had the highest proportion of its population
held privately in both 2000 and 2016, with respective
rates of 40 and 43 percent, followed closely by Montana
with a rate of 39 percent in 2016. Four additional states
incarcerated 20% or more of their prison population
privately: Oklahoma (27 percent), Tennessee (26
percent), Hawaii (25 percent), and Arizona (20 percent).
Capitalizing on Mass Incarceration: U.S. Growth in Private Prisons 7
Table 2. Incarceration in private prisons
Jurisdiction
Number of people, 2000
Number of people, 2016
Percent private, 2016
0
348
1.2
~
Alaska
1,383
551
12.4
-60.2
Arizona
1,430
8,285
19.6
479.4
Arkansas
1,540
0
0
-100
California
4,547
7,005
5.4
54.1
Colorado
Alabama
Percent change, 2000-2016
2,099
3,564
17.8
69.8
Connecticut
0
508
3.4
~
Delaware
0
0
0
District of Columbia
2,342
*
*
Florida
3,912
12,176
12.2
211.3
Georgia
3,746
7,973
14.9
112.8
Hawaii
1,187
1,405
25.1
18.4
Idaho
1,162
420
5.1
-63.9
Illinois
0
0
0
991
3,927
15.4
Iowa
0
0
0
Kansas
0
0
0
Kentucky
1,268
0
0
-100
Louisiana
3,068
0
0
-100
11
0
0
-100
127
25
0.1
-80.3
0
0
0
Indiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
449
0
0
Minnesota
0
0
0
Mississippi
3,230
3,078
16
Missouri
0
0
0
Montana
986
1,481
38.8
Nebraska
0
0
0
508
0
0
Nevada
New Hampshire
296.3
-100
-4.7
50.2
-100
0
0
0
New Jersey
2,498
2,720
13.7
8.9
New Mexico
2,155
3,040
43.1
41.1
0
0
0
North Carolina
330
30
0.1
North Dakota
96
0
0
-100
Ohio
1,918
6,259
12
226.3
Oklahoma
6,931
7,149
26.6
3.1
New York
-90.9
Oregon
0
0
0
Pennsylvania
0
680
1.4
Rhode Island
0
0
0
South Carolina
0
12
0.1
~
South Dakota
45
34
0.9
-24.4
3,510
7,433
26.4
111.8
13,985
13,692
8.4
-2.1
-100
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
~
208
0
0
0
264
15.2
1,571
1,576
4.2
Washington
0
0
0
West Virginia
0
0
0
4,337
0
0
-100
-2.2
Vermont
Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
0.3
275
269
11.3
Federal
15,524
34,159
18.1
120
Total
87,369
128,063
8.5
46.6
~ Use of private prisons implemented after 2000; *District of Columbia count incorporated in federal numbers
Sources: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prisoners Series (2000, 2016); interviews with North Dakota and Oregon corrections officials.
FEDERAL PRISON PRIVATIZATION
PRIVATE IMMIGRATION DETENTION
While both federal and state governments have
increasingly relied on privatization since 2000, the federal
prison system’s commitment to privatization grew more
dramatically. The number of federal prisoners held in
private prisons rose 120 percent from 15,524 in 2000 to
34,159 in 2016, while the number of state prisoners
incarcerated privately grew by 31 percent over the same
time period, from 71,845 to 94,164. Among those confined
under private contracts in the federal system, about 37%
are in halfway houses or are on home confinement.7
In 2002, approximately 4,800 Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) detainees were held in privately run
facilities.13 By 2017, that number had jumped to 26,249
people.14 This expansion of detention was influenced by
a shift in immigration policy enforcement.
A reduction in the overall federal prison population that
began in 2014 resulted from changes in sentencing policy
and influenced a modest decline in private prison use in
2016. The overall declines in the prison population helped
persuade President Obama’s Department of Justice to
phase out federal private for-profit prison contracts. The
move was bolstered by a report from the Department of
Justice’s Office of the Inspector General that outlined
safety issues in for-profit facilities. The report concluded
that private prisons had “more safety and security
incidents per capita than comparable BOP [Bureau of
Prisons] institutions,” in such areas as presence of
contraband, prison lockdowns, and inmate discipline.8
However, in February 2017, Attorney General Jeff Sessions
announced the reversal of this plan, indicating that the
Bureau of Prisons would continue to rely on these
facilities. Sessions stated that private prison companies
would assist in meeting “the future needs of the federal
correctional system.”9 This policy reversal was followed
by a directive to prosecutors to pursue the most serious
charges and toughest sentences in all federal cases.
These changes are projected to increase prison
admissions and sentence length, which is likely to
contribute to an expansion of private facility contracting.10
Indeed, in May 2017, the DOJ issued a new solicitation
to increase capacity by 1,600 beds in privately-run
Criminal Alien Requirement facilities intended for noncitizens charged with lower-level offenses, including drug
and immigration offenses.11 This was followed in January
2018 with a Bureau of Prisons memorandum to federal
prison officials outlining goals for increasing population
levels in private facilities and ordering officials to expedite
transfers of people deemed eligible for placement in
contract institutions.12
Beginning in 2009, Congress established a quota for
immigrant detention beds under appropriations law,
requiring that the Department of Homeland Security’s
(DHS) funding be linked to maintaining 33,400 immigration
detention beds a day even if there were not a sufficient
number of people in detention to fill them. By fiscal year
2013 the quota was raised to 34,000 beds.15 In 2014, a
major influx of migrants from Central America led to an
expansion of immigration detention under the Obama
Administration. Individuals fleeing violence in Honduras,
El Salvador and Guatemala crossed the Southern border
in search of asylum;16 many families were held in privatelyrun family detention centers. Incidents of assault, hunger
protests, and medical neglect were reported at these
facilities.
In one GEO Group facility in Colorado, thousands of
immigrant detainees were allegedly forced to work for
$1 a day. Nine of those detainees filed a lawsuit against
GEO Group claiming that they were paid for labor with
“chicken, potato chips, soda, or candy.”17 In Washington
State in 2017, the state’s Attorney General sued GEO
Group for allegations that immigrant detainees were
mandated to work for $1 a day. The Attorney General
argued that the state’s minimum wage was $11 an hour,
and that the detainees were being held under “civil
charges, not criminal charges,” meaning that that
minimum wage must be upheld.18, 19
According to ICE reports, arrests and detentions of
immigrants have increased more than 40 percent since
mid-2017. To accommodate the increases, President
Trump’s 2018 proposed budget to Congress asked for
$1.2 billion to add 15,000 more private prison beds for
immigration detention.20 In September 2017 ICE requested
that a new immigrant detention center be constructed
in South Texas, stating that it would need to hold
approximately 1,000 more migrants.21 This facility will
be operated by GEO Group, and is expected to open in
late 2018. GEO Group and Core Civic will reportedly be
pursuing additional contracts to meet the detention
demands of President Trump’s immigration policies.
Capitalizing on Mass Incarceration: U.S. Growth in Private Prisons 9
CHALLENGES OF PRIVATE PRISONS
ILLUSIVE COST SAVINGS
Prison privatization has prospered because of claims
that for-profit facilities are more cost efficient at
providing services than publicly-run institutions. The
evidence does not support this assertion.
In 1996, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO)
looked at four state-funded studies and one
commissioned by the federal government assessing
the cost benefits of private prisons. The outcomes
of the research varied, leading the authors to conclude
that “…these studies do not offer substantial evidence
that savings have occurred.”22 Similar conclusions
were reached in a 2009 meta-analysis by researchers
at the University of Utah that looked at eight cost
comparison studies resulting in vastly different
conclusions. The analysis led the researchers to
state, “…prison privatization provides neither a clear
advantage nor disadvantage compared to publicly
managed prisons” and that “…cost savings from
privatization are not guaranteed.”23
Many of these findings have been replicated in
individual states. In Ohio, state officials have
contended that private facilities regularly meet or
surpass the legal requirement of containing costs at
least five percent below a state-run equivalent.
However, a report by the nonpartisan Policy Matters
Ohio criticized the state’s measurements for
comparing privately operated prisons to hypothetical
public facilities, exaggerating overhead and staff
costs for public prisons, and failing to account for
the higher proportion of prisoners in public institutions
requiring expensive high-level security. Accounting
for these factors greatly reduced if not completely
diminished the purported advantages of private
prisons.24
10 The Sentencing Project
In Arizona, which also has cost-saving requirements
for private prisons, research conducted by the state’s
Department of Corrections in 2010 found that the
state had not saved money by contracting out
minimum security beds, and that more money is
actually spent on private medium security beds than
would be spent in a publicly operated institution.25
QUALITY AND SAFETY CONCERNS
Private prison companies face a challenge in reducing
costs and offering services necessary to maintaining
safety in prisons while also generating a profit for
shareholders. The primary approach to controlling
spending is by maintaining lower levels of staff
benefits and salary than publicly-run facilities. Labor
costs normally account for 60 to 70 percent of annual
operating budgets. Such savings, though, risk
compromising safety and security within prisons.
Corrections officers employed by private corporations
earn up to $23,850 less on average in annual salary
compared to the public sector.26 Oliver Hart, the 2016
winner of the Nobel Prize in economics, contends
that for-profit prison contracts lack sufficient
incentives for proper job training.27 Consequently,
there are higher employee turnover rates in private
prisons than in publicly operated facilities.
BOP’s former Director of Research, Gerry Gaes,
lamented: “You can begin to squeeze money out of
the system. Maybe you can squeeze a half a percent
out, who knows? But it’s not as if these systems are
overfunded to begin with. And at some point, you
start to lose quality. And because quality is very
difficult to measure in prisons, I’m just worried that
you’re getting in a race to the bottom.”28
These dynamics may contribute to safety problems
within prisons. Studies have found that assaults in
private prisons can occur at double the rate found
in public facilities. Researchers also find that public
facilities tend to be safer than their private
counterparts and that “privately operated prisons
appear to have systemic problems in maintaining
secure facilities.”29, 30
PROFITING FROM INCARCERATION
For-profit prison companies exist to make money,
and therefore the size and status of the country’s
criminal justice system is of upmost importance to
them. This connection was summed up in Corrections
Corporation of America’s (now-Core Civic) 2010
Annual Report:
Core Civic and GEO Group were involved with ALEC
at a time when it worked with members to draft model
legislation impacting sentencing policy and prison
privatization. These policies promoted mandatory
minimum sentences, three strikes laws, and truth-insentencing, all of which contribute to higher prison
populations. ALEC also helped draft legislation that
could increase the number of people held in
immigration detention facilities. While no longer a
member of ALEC, Core Civic and GEO face the bottom
line reality that a decline in incarceration is bad for
business.
Our growth is generally dependent upon our
ability to obtain new contracts to develop and
manage new correctional and detention
facilities. This possible growth depends on a
number of factors we cannot control, including
crime rates and sentencing patterns in various
jurisdictions and acceptance of privatization.
The demand for our facilities and services
could be adversely affected by the relaxation
of enforcement efforts, leniency in conviction
or parole standards and sentencing practices
or through the decriminalization of certain
activities that are currently proscribed by our
criminal laws.31
In order to overcome these challenges, private prison
companies at times have joined with lawmakers,
corporations, and interest groups to advocate for
privatization through the American Legislative
Exchange Council (ALEC). This organization is a
nonprofit membership association focused on
advancing “the Jeffersonian principles of free
markets, limited government, federalism, and
individual liberty.” This is pursued in part by advocating
for large-scale privatization of governmental
functions. Core Civic paid between $7,000 and
$25,000 per year as an association member before
leaving the organization in 2010. The company
contributed additional funds to sit on issue task
forces and sponsor events hosting legislators.32
Capitalizing on Mass Incarceration: U.S. Growth in Private Prisons 11
PRIVATE CONTRACTORS AND THEIR
EXPANDING REACH
When established in 1983, Corrections Corporation
of America pledged to build and operate prisons with
the same quality of service provided in publicly
operated prisons but at a lower cost. Core Civic and
its closest competitor, GEO Group, collectively
manage over half of the private corrections contracts
in the United States, with combined revenues of $3.5
billion in 2015. Core Civic maintains more than 80,000
beds in over 70 facilities, including prisons, immigrant
detention, and reentry centers. GEO Group operates
a similar number of facilities. Smaller companies,
including Management & Training Corporation, LCS
Correctional Services, and Emerald Corrections, also
hold multiple prison and detention contracts
throughout the United States.
In 2016, following the Department of Justice’s
announcement that it would phase out private prisons,
stock prices dropped 50 percent. Damon Hininger,
CEO of Corrections Corporation of America, announced
the company would change its name to Core Civic.
The new name sought to represent the firm’s changing
status as a provider of “largely corrections and
detention services” to a company that works on “a
wider range of government solutions.”33
In 2017 private prison stocks for Core Civic and GEO
Group more than doubled after the Department of
Justice, under Sessions’ leadership, announced that
it would be maintaining contracts with for-profit
prisons. While the firms’ stock prices have since
declined, in early 2018 they were substantially higher
than their 2016 low.
Private prison companies have contributed millions
to President Trump’s campaign and associated super
12 The Sentencing Project
PACs. Moreover, at least one prison company appears
to be acting in the personal financial interest of
President Trump. GEO Group changed the location
of its annual meeting from a resort in Boca Raton,
Florida to the Trump National Doral Golf Club in
Miami. This club is reported to be the “single biggest
contributor to Trump’s cash flow.”34
Private prison companies are seeking to expand their
influence with state governments as well. In Montana,
lawmakers are fiercely debating the merits of
accepting a cash payment of $35.7 million from Core
Civic for renewal of the state’s prison contract which
ends in 2019.35 The money had originally been set
aside to allow the state to purchase the private facility.
The state is facing a major budget shortfall and many
in the legislature are urging the governor to accept
the offer. Negotiations have stalled because of
complaints of comparatively low pay for corrections
officers compared to the state’s publicly-run prisons,
and restrictions on staff unionizing.
PRIVATE PRISON COMPANIES’ EXPANDED
PROGRAMMING
Since 2005, GEO Group and Core Civic have spent
$2.2 billion to acquire smaller companies in order to
branch out to new industries beyond incarceration.
For instance, in 2011, GEO Group acquired BI
Incorporated, an ankle bracelet monitoring company.
The companies also provide prison healthcare
services and have established residential reentry
centers.
Core Civic has embraced the community corrections
sector by investing $270 million in the acquisition of
half-way houses which are often used as a transition
point between prison and release. Core Civic has also
sought to reconfigure its public imagine as a supporter
of the movement against mass incarceration by
lobbying for policies “that reduce recidivism and
making campaign contributions to candidates who
endorse those policies.”36
GEO Group has also recently attempted to rebrand
its services. In 2017, GEO Group purchased the
Alabama Therapeutic Education Facility,37 a reentry
facility for the Alabama Department of Corrections
which set a two-year contract for up to $18.8 million.38
The facility expects to enroll up to 600 people and
provide training, drug treatment and resources for
reentry. The contract is an important foothold for
GEO in a state without private prisons. It also has a
contract in the state to oversee immigrants on
community supervision under ICE’s authority.39
Because these companies remain profit-making
entities, concerns about the quality of their public
safety services persist among critics who question
company investments in training, staffing levels and
programming.
Capitalizing on Mass Incarceration: U.S. Growth in Private Prisons 13
RECOMMENDATIONS
The United States has experienced 40 years of
unprecedented growth in its prison population but
a recent stabilization and modest reduction in
incarceration has largely ended the prison building
boom and now provides an opportunity to reexamine
policies of prison privatization. The complications
of mass incarceration that include the fracturing of
low-income communities of color, the mistreatment
of incarcerated people and the subjugation of people
with criminal records cannot be wholly laid at the
feet of private prison corporations. Over several
decades, public institutions and lawmakers, with
public consent, implemented policies that led to
mass incarceration and the collateral consequences
that followed. But private prisons have capitalized
on the chaos of this policy approach and have
worked to sustain it.
Public corrections systems have been plagued by
poor conditions of confinement and mismanagement
that require significant reform. But the introduction
of profit incentives into the country’s incarceration
buildup crosses a troubling line that puts financial
gain above the public interest of safety and
rehabilitation, and with limited transparency. As a
result the worst elements of incarceration are
exacerbated by privatization.
Developing public awareness about the excesses
of the criminal justice system, coupled with the
recent nationwide declines in prison populations,
provides an opportunity to work towards creating
a more humane and restorative prison system that
one day will manage only a fraction of the people it
does today. With that objective in mind we propose
the following recommendations:
14 The Sentencing Project
ELIMINATE CONTRACTS WITH FOR-PROFIT
PRISON COMPANIES
Due to the numerous safety and transparency issues
associated with for-profit prisons, states and the
federal government should phase out their reliance
on these facilities through terminating contracts.
States such as North Carolina have demonstrated
that it is possible for governments to discontinue
their reliance on for-profit prisons. In other
jurisdictions where prison capacity may now be
exceeding demand due to overall declines in the
prison population, the political support for phasing
out private prisons should increase.
EXPAND TRANSPARENCY REQUIREMENTS
To the extent that jurisdictions continue to contract
with private prisons they should adopt policies
requiring greater transparency and openness to
public inquiry. Currently, the federal Freedom of
Information Act does not apply to private prisons,
and therefore there is no legal remedy if a private
prison refuses to disclose information about its
practices. U.S. Representative Sheila Jackson Lee
(D-TX) has introduced the Private Prison Information
Act to address this issue by requiring that the
Freedom of Information Act apply to private prisons.
Such laws would subject private prison companies
to the same level of scrutiny as government run
prison facilities.
END THE PRACTICE OF INCARCERATING
PEOPLE FAR FROM HOME
In contrast to public prisons, private prisons
frequently contract with state governments to
confine people out-of-state, with 10,500 people
housed this way as of 2013.40 States such as
Vermont—which has no private prisons—shipped
people out of state to avoid the cost of building
state-run prison facilities. For many years Hawaii
has flown prisoners thousands of miles to private
prisons in Arizona. Other states that have adopted
this practice include California and Idaho, which
rely on for-profit prisons in Colorado, Oklahoma, and
Mississippi. The practice negatively affects families
because it limits opportunities for visitation and
strains relationships which are critical to successful
reintegration after incarceration. In addition,
Vermont’s chief public defender recently noted that
it is “much more difficult to communicate with
clients” when they are held out of state. It is harder
to “meet the needs they might have, or even just to
address ongoing legal issues.”41
ELIMINATE THE FEDERAL BED QUOTA FOR
IMMIGRANT DETENTION
The Department of Homeland Security’s bed quota
for immigrant detention requires the agency to
maintain no less than 34,000 beds at any given time.
Because of this quota, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement expanded its contracts with private
prison companies to house federal immigrant
detainees. It provides an incentive to maintain
private prison contracts and keep immigration
detention beds full.
Capitalizing on Mass Incarceration: U.S. Growth in Private Prisons 15
APPENDIX - STATE PROFILES ON
PRISON PRIVATIZATION
The following five case studies—featuring Florida, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina and Texas—highlight
the significant variation in the use of private correctional
facilities across states over the last several decades.
The profiles offer historical context about state criminal
justice policies, and document the political culture,
perspectives and circumstances that influenced the
rise or fall of private prisons in each jurisdiction.
FLORIDA
In the early 1990s, Florida became the second state—
after Texas—to use private prisons. Proponents of
private prisons argued that they would increase the
quality of care by improving rehabilitation and reducing
recidivism rates. State officials stated that free market
incentives would significantly fix the inefficiencies in
the adult correctional system.42 However, by 2003, a
study by Florida State University concluded that Florida’s
Figure 2. Number of People Incarcerated in Private
Prisons in Florida
13,000
9,750
6,500
3,250
16 The Sentencing Project
2015
2016
2013
2014
2011
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Prisoners Series.
2012
2010
2009
2008
2007
2005
2006
2003
2004
2001
2002
2000
0
recidivism rates for private and public prison facilities
were similar.
There were three key phases to Florida’s private prison
build-up. From 2000 to 2004, Florida’s private prison
population saw modest growth. Then, from 2004 to
2010, the private prison population more than tripled.
In 2010, the population in private prisons began to
stabilize and even declined 2.5% between 2015 and
2016.
In 1993, the Florida state legislature passed Chapter
957, a statute that allowed for prison management to
be put in the hands of for-profit prison companies43 and
established the Corrections Privatization Committee,
a body that oversaw Florida’s contracts with private
corrections groups.44
The Committee subsequently engaged in a series of
ethics violations. In 2002, Mark Hodges, director of the
Committee, was fined $10,000 by the Florida Commission
on Ethics for earning $150,000 from his holdings in
prison consulting contracts in other states.45 Ken
Kopczynski, a policing analysist in Florida, notes that
Hodges owned thousands of shares in Core Civic. In
2006, another former director of the Committee, Alan
Duffee, pled guilty to embezzling $200,000 from a private
prisons maintenance fund.46 These violations by officials
in the Corrections Privatization Committee led to the
office being shut down by the state legislature in 2006.
Today, Florida has eight privately-run prison facilities.
The GEO Group has its headquarters in Boca Raton
and runs five of the facilities. In addition to adult
prisons, 95% of Florida’s juvenile facilities are
privately owned.47 In 2012, Governor Rick Scott and
the Florida State Senate narrowly failed to pass a bill
to privatize all adult correctional facilities.48
3,100
2,325
1,550
775
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2005
2006
0
2003
New Mexico’s corrections department may share
responsibility for the dangerous conditions at the private
prisons. The Department of Corrections’ custody
classification system made a number of assignment
errors by ignoring “known enemies” and “gang
affiliations” of prisoners when determining placement
in the private facilities.55 People who found themselves
in danger were denied reassignment.
Figure 3. Number of People Incarcerated in Private
Prisons in New Mexico
2004
Opponents of New Mexico’s private prison system
immediately called for reform, but Gov. Johnson refused
to implement any shifts in practice at the Wackenhut
facilities. Calls for an independent study of the private
prison facilities were resisted and deemed
“unnecessary.”53 Johnson did threaten to transfer people
from the troubled facilities to state-run facilities if the
violence continued, but his warnings did not curb unrest
or assaults. Johnson’s corrections head, Rob Perry,
claimed the riots were “an attempt to discredit private
prisons.” Records of political contributions reveal that
in 1998 Wackenhut donated $9,330 to Johnson’s reelection campaign.54
2001
Beginning in 1998, New Mexico opened two private
prisons within two years, the Lea County Correctional
Facility and the Guadalupe Correctional Center, both
operated by Wackenhut Correctional Center (currently
known as GEO Group). Both facilities experienced violent
incidents within the first year of opening. By January
of 1999, 12 prisoners had been stabbed in Wackenhut
correctional facilities. By 2000, four prisoners and one
correctional officer had been killed.51 Riots protesting
Wackenhut’s poor management in the Guadalupe and
Lea County correctional facilities erupted and involved
over 100 prisoners.52
From 2000 to 2016 New Mexico witnessed steady
growth in its for-profit prisons, increasing the population
by 41%. Currently, GEO Group runs three private prisons
in New Mexico, while Core Civic and Management and
Training Corporation operate two facilities. In August
2017, Core Civic executives threatened to close its
Torrance Correctional Facility in Estancia unless there
was an expansion of at least 300 people in the local
private prison population.58 A company spokesman said
government officials had 60 days to increase the prison
population or the prison would close. Local news reports
feared that the prison closure would have detrimental
economic effects on the city of Estancia, including the
loss of 200 jobs for local residents.59 Core Civic ultimately
closed the Torrance Correctional Facility in September,
2017.60, 61
2002
New Mexico leads the nation in its dependence on
private prisons. The state incarcerated 43% of its prison
population in for-profit prisons as of 2016. It began the
contracts during the 1990s when former Governor Gary
Johnson proposed the privatization of all the state’s
prisons,49 claiming that they would provide “the same
goods and services at two-thirds the cost.”50 While the
legislature never approved the full conversion of the
state’s prison system to private hands, prison
corporations have contributed generously to political
leaders there to ensure the industry’s prominence in
the state.
New Mexico’s next governor, Bill Richardson, who served
from 2003-2011, maintained many of the Johnson-era
policies on private prisons. Richardson also received
significant campaign contributions from private prison
corporations, with GEO Group donating $42,750 to his
campaigns beginning in 2005.56 Overall, during the 2006
election cycle Richardson received more in campaign
contributions from private prison corporations than any
other official then running for state office in the United
States.57
2000
NEW MEXICO
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Prisoners Series.
Capitalizing on Mass Incarceration: U.S. Growth in Private Prisons 17
NEW YORK
New York has never adopted for-profit prisons. However,
in the 1990s, there was a massive expansion in New
York’s correctional population, resulting in speculation
that the state might contract with private facilities.62 In
response, the corrections officer union began a
campaign to lobby for a ban of for-profit prisons in the
state. Shortly thereafter, then-State Attorney General
Dennis Vacco issued an opinion that New York was
precluded from adopting for-profit facilities.63 Vacco’s
opinion set a major precedent for the state.
At the municipal level, New York City has engaged in a
debate about the city’s pension holdings in private
prison companies. In 2017, the city of New York divested
a total of $48 million in stocks and bonds from a range
of for-profit correctional companies, the first municipal
government in the country to do so.64
NORTH CAROLINA
North Carolina is one of a handful of states to close its
for-profit private prison facilities. In 1998, the state’s
corrections department set up a contract with Core
Civic to open two private prison facilities: the Palmico
Correctional Institution and the Mountain View
Correctional Institution.65 Both were medium-security
facilities that housed approximately 500 prisoners each,
and they were proposed to reduce costs for the state.
Figure 4. Number of People Incarcerated in Private
Prisons in North Carolina
400
300
However, by 2000, the corrections department found
that Core Civic’s facilities had produced “little costsavings” compared to state-run facilities. “It really felt
like a failure,” said Representative Paul McCrary.66 He
noted flaws in the state’s contract with Core Civic,
arguing that the company was “going to take some
shortcuts when they can.” Even though Core Civic was
slated to run these facilities until 2003, the corrections
department terminated the partnership early in October
2000.67
North Carolina currently has a few dozen individuals
housed in a non-profit facility called the Center for
Community Transition, which houses women who are
finishing their prison sentences. Aside from this
institution, the state relies on state-run prison facilities.
TEXAS
During the 1980s, the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice (TDCJ) experienced an overcrowding crisis.
Admissions to Texas prisons increased by 113 percent
from 1980 to 1986, and outpaced system capacity
increases by 52 percent.68 A federal court order stemming
from a prisoner lawsuit challenging conditions of
confinement created prison population caps for TDCJ.69
Facing court fines if they violated the capacity
restrictions, lawmakers were eager to find a new source
of prison beds.
In 1987, Texas legislators overwhelmingly passed
Senate Bill 251 to allow contracts with private prison
vendors to manage and construct private prison
facilities.70 As the prison population continued to expand
during the 1990s in response to the passage of tougher
penalties, the overcrowding problem persisted and
private prison growth increased.
By 2007, after an intensive lobbying effort by GEO Group,
the Texas legislature passed a bill that expanded the
number of people that private prisons could house at
their facilities. This bill was sponsored by Rep. Jerry
Madden, the head of the House Committee on
Corrections, who was a proponent of privately-run prison
facilities.71 Madden’s bill proposed raising the number
of private prison beds in the state by 1,000.72
200
100
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Prisoners Series.
18 The Sentencing Project
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2007
2008
2005
2006
2003
2004
2001
2002
2000
0
Coincidentally, that same year, Texas lawmakers
including Madden worked to avoid new prison
construction and its associated costs because of the
Figure 5. Number of People Incarcerated in Private
Prisons in Texas
21,000
15,750
10,500
5,250
2015
2016
2013
2014
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2003
2004
2001
2002
2000
0
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Prisoners Series.
state’s projected prison growth.73 At the same time, the
Texas legislature rejected a proposed open-record law
that would have increased transparency of private prison
companies.74
In 2008 with the private prison population at its peak
of 20,000 people, Texas lawmakers recognized that
TDCJ had overbuilt its prison capacity. Privately operated
county jails, which had been built with an expectation
of housing overflow from state facilities, had half their
beds empty by 2011.75 Crime and incarceration rates
were falling, which led many lawmakers to suggest that
TDCJ was spending too much on prison beds. Several
prisons have closed in Texas since 2011, including
private facilities.76 By 2016 the number of people in
private prisons dropped to 13,692.
Capitalizing on Mass Incarceration: U.S. Growth in Private Prisons 19
ENDNOTES
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
Carson, E.A. (2018). Prisoners in 2016. United States
Department of Justice: Bureau of Justice Statistics.
Retrieved from https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p16.
pdf.
Detention Watch Network & Center for Constitutional Rights.
Retrieved from https://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/
sites/default/files/DWN%20Spreadsheet%20Memo.pdf. Data
of average daily count obtained from Immigration and
Custom Enforcement and Removal Operations division by
Detention Watch Network and the Center for Constitutional
Rights as part of a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit. Count
excludes three privately run detention facilities for families
and women.
Carson, E.A. (2018). See note 1.
Louisiana is also newly included among states without
private prisons but the change results from the state’s
reclassification of these institutions as “local facilities.”
Sessions, J.B. (2017, February 21). Rescission of
Memorandum on Use of Private Prisons. Office of the
Attorney General. Retrieved from https://www.bop.gov/
resources/news/pdfs/20170224_doj_memo.pdf.
Carson, E.A. (2018). See note 1.
Carson, E.A. (2018). See note 1.
Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice
(2016). Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Monitoring
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reports/2016/e1606.pdf
Sessions, J.B. (2017, February 21). See note 5.
Meyersohn, N. (2017, May 19). Justice Department Seeks
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Meyersohn, N. (2017, May 19). See note 10.
Lara, F. (2018, January 24). Increasing Population Levels in
Private Contract Facilities. U.S. Department of Justice,
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edit/012518privateprisons.pdf.
Mason, C. (2012, July 19). Dollars and Detainees: The Growth of
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Detention Watch Network & Center for Constitutional Rights.
See note 2.
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Pauly, M. (2017, September 20). Washington Just Sued a
Giant Private Prison Company for Paying Immigrant Workers
$1 Per Day. Mother Jones. Retrieved from http://www.
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20 The Sentencing Project
18 Rosenberg, M. (2017, September 20). Washington State Sues
Over $1/day Wages Paid to Immigrant Detainees. Reuters.
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19 Associated Press. (2017, June 22). Working for $1 a Day:
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20 Montoya, N. (2018, May 29). California, Out of Space, Sending
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21 Michels, P. (2017, September 28). ICE Issues Plan to Detain
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22 Sloane, D., Alexander, D., Stolz, B., Rabinowitz, B., Williams, P.,
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23 Lundahl, B., Kunz, C., Brownell, C., Harris, N., & Van Vleet, R.
(2009). Prison Privatization: A Meta-Analysis of Cost
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24 Paynter, B. (2011). Cells for Sale: Understand Prison Costs &
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26 CorrectionalOfficerEdu.org (n.d.). Corrections Officer Salary.
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27 Mumford, M., Schanzenbach, D., & Nunn, R. (2016). The
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28 Paynter, B. (2011). See note 24.
29 Camp, S. & Gaes, G.(2001). Growth and Quality of U.S. Private
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30 Lundahl, B., Kunz, C., Brownell, C., Harris, N., & Van Vleet, R.
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31 Corrections Corporation of America. (2010). 2010 annual
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32 Ortega, B. (2011, September 4). Arizona Prison Businesses
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36 Takei, C. (2017, November 7). Private Prison Giant Core Civic
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38 Cason, M. (2017, July 12) Alabama Prison System Renewing
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prisons_corporat.html.
40 Cohen, D. (2015, October 29). Minnesotans Say “No Thanks”
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41 Associated Press. (2017, November 1). Lawyers: Out-Of-State
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articles/2017-11-01/lawyers-out-of-state-prison-limitinginmate-communication.
42 Associated Press. (2017, November 1). See note 41; Gaes, G.
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43 Private Corrections Institute. (2012). Correctional Privatization
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prison%20history%202012.pdf.
44 Kopczynski, K., Director of Research, Florida Police
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45 Associated Press. (2002, February 11). Commission Finds
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46 Kopczynski, K. (2017). See note 44.
47 Francilus, J. (2012, October 15). Florida to Completely
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florida-privatize-juvenile-detention_n_1967464.html.
48 Francilus, J. (2012, October 15). See note 47.
49 Talvi, S. (2006, September 04). Follow the Prison Money Trail.
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50 Talvi, S. (2006, September 04). See note 49.
51 Reutter, D. (2007, August 15). Prison Privatization Launders
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52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
Reutter, D. (2007, August 15). See note 51.
Talvi, S. (2006, September 04). See note 49.
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Haywood, P. (2017, July 25). See note 58.
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events/detail/right-on-crime-celebrates-10-years-of-criminaljustice-reform-in-texas.
N. (2009, July 27). Texas Watchdog Looks at the Big Bad
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(2017). Personal Interview.
Capitalizing on Mass Incarceration: U.S. Growth in Private Prisons 21
Capitalizing on Mass Incarceration:
U.S. Growth in Private Prisons
Kara Gotsch and Vinay Basti
August 2018
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Private Prisons in the United States (updated 2018)
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Too Good to be True: Private Prisons in America (2012)
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DECARCERATION
STRATEGIES
How 5 States Achieved Substantial
Prison Population Reductions
For more information, contact:
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Copyright © 2018 by The Sentencing
Project. Reproduction of this
document in full or in part, and in
print or electronic format, only by
permission of The Sentencing Project.
This report was written by Dennis Schrantz, Stephen T. DeBor, and Marc
Mauer. Schrantz is a corrections consultant and the former deputy
director of the Michigan Department of Corrections. DeBor was the
senior policy executive in charge of research, planning and automated
data systems for the Michigan Department of Corrections until his
retirement 36 years after joining the agency. Mauer is the Executive
Director of The Sentencing Project.
We thank the many policymakers and practitioners in the five states
examined in this report for their willingness to engage in extensive
discussions regarding the complex factors contributing to prison
population reduction.
The Sentencing Project is a national non-profit organization engaged
in research and advocacy on criminal justice issues. Our work is
supported by many individual donors and contributions from the
following:
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2 The Sentencing Project
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive Summary
5
I. Connecticut
9
II. Michigan
17
III. Mississippi
25
IV. Rhode Island
33
V. South Carolina
41
Decarceration Strategies: How 5 States Achieved Substantial Prison Population Reductions 3
4 The Sentencing Project
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
From 1980 until its peak in 2009, the total federal and
state prison population of the United States climbed
from about 330,000 to more than 1.6 million - a nearly
400% increase - while the total general population of
the country grew by only 36%, and the crime rate fell by
42%.1 The catalyst of this prison expansion was policy
changes that prioritized “getting tough” on crime.
The national prison population began a gradual descent
after 2009, lessening by nearly 113,000 (6%) from 2009
through 2016. Several factors contributed to this decline:
ongoing decreases in crime rates leading to fewer felony
convictions; scaling back “war on drugs” policies;
increased interest in evidence-based approaches to
sentencing and reentry; and growing concerns about
the fiscal cost of corrections and its impact on other
state priorities. The state of California alone was
responsible for 36% of the overall population decline,
a function of a 2011 U.S. Supreme Court ruling declaring
its overcrowded prison system to be unconstitutional
and subsequent legislative responses to reduce the
use of state incarceration.
Despite the decline, the overall pace of change is quite
modest. A recent analysis documents that at the rate
of change from 2009 to 2016 it will take 75 years to
reduce the prison population by half. And while 42 states
have experienced declines from their peak prison
populations, 20 of these declines are less than 5%, while
8 states are still experiencing rising populations.2
To aid policymakers and criminal justice officials in
achieving substantial prison population reductions, this
report examines the experience of five states –
Connecticut, Michigan, Mississippi, Rhode Island, and
South Carolina – that have achieved prison population
reductions of 14-25%. This produced a cumulative total
of 23,646 fewer people in prison with no adverse effects
on public safety. (While a handful of other states have
also experienced significant population reductions –
including California, New York, and New Jersey – these
have been examined in other publications, and so are
not addressed here.3
The five states highlighted in this report are
geographically and politically diverse and have all
enacted a range of shifts in policy and practice to
produce these outcomes. All five were engaged in the
Justice Reinvestment Initiative process, spearheaded
by the Pew Charitable Trusts and the Council on State
Governments, which was designed to work with
stakeholders to respond to the driving forces of prison
expansion in each state and to develop strategies for
change in policy and practice.
This report seeks to inform stakeholders in other states
of the range of policy options available to them for
significantly reducing their prison population. While we
provide some assessment of the political environment
which contributed to these changes, we do not go into
great detail in this area since stakeholders will need to
make their own determinations of strategy based on
the particularities of their state. We note, though, that
the leaders of reform varied among states, and emerged
among governors, legislators, criminal justice officials,
and advocacy organizations, often benefiting from
media coverage and editorial support.
The prison population reductions in these five states
were achieved through data-driven policy reforms that
pursued bipartisan consensus. Changes were advanced
in the areas of risk and needs assessment, community
supervision, alternatives to incarceration, sentencing
and sanctions, prison release mechanisms, prisoner
reentry and community reintegration.
Five key strategies and practices that were employed
in these states are summarized below, followed by
extensive reviews for each of the five states.
Decarceration Strategies: How 5 States Achieved Substantial Prison Population Reductions 5
FIVE KEY STRATEGIES AND PRACTICES THAT REDUCED PRISON POPULATIONS
1. Measures to Get Justice Reforms Underway and Maintain Momentum
•
High-profile leadership, bipartisanship and inter-branch collaboration (all 5 states).
•
Leveraging outside technical assistance and research findings on evidence-based practices (all 5 states).
•
Community engagement as a foundation of successful reentry and community reintegration (CT, MI, RI).
•
Pilots or staged implementation as innovation incubators (CT, MI).
2. Decreased Prison Admissions via Fewer New Prison Commitments
•
Crime reduction helped in all 5 states – but reduced crime is no guarantee of less imprisonment.
•
Reductions in criminal penalties or adjusting penalties according to seriousness (all 5 states).
•
Elimination of various mandatory minimum sentences, sometimes retroactively (CT, MI, RI, SC).
•
Creation or expansion of specialty courts and/or other alternatives to incarceration (CT, MI, MS, SC).
•
Modifications of responses to at-risk youth to disrupt school-to-prison pipeline (CT, SC).
3. Decreased Prison Admissions via Reduced Incarceration for Failure on Community Supervision
•
Implementation of graduated intermediate sanctions for non-criminal violations (CT, MI, MS, SC).
•
Engagement with community service providers and employers before release from prison (CT, MI, RI).
•
State and local collaboration regarding case management and supervision (CT, MI, RI).
•
Greater focus on intermediate outcomes (CT, MI, RI).
•
Imposition of shorter terms of community supervision (MS, RI, SC).
4. Increased Prison Releases via Increasing the Feasibility and/or Efficiency Of Release
•
Incorporation of dynamic risk and needs assessment into justice processes (all 5 states).
•
Inclusion of releasing authorities in planning/implementation (CT, MI, RI, SC).
•
Expanded initiatives to overcome barriers to the feasibility of release (CT, MI, RI, SC).
•
Conditional release approval earlier in the process before eligibility for release (CT, MI, RI).
•
Feedback to releasing authorities regarding outcomes to build trust in reentry (CT, MI, RI).
•
Centralized reentry planning, trained specialists, and a goal of release at first opportunity (CT, MI, MS).
•
Simplified and/or expedited release processing especially when backlogs in processing (CT, MI, RI).
5. Increased Prison Releases via Requiring Less Time Served Before Eligibility for Release
•
Allowance or expansion of sentence credits through a variety of measures (CT, MS, RI, SC).
•
Reduction of criminal penalties even though still prison-bound (CT, MI, SC).
•
Modifications to sentence enhancements for aggravating factors (MS, SC).
•
Reductions in time served prior to eligibility for repeat paroles after revocation (MI, MS).
6 The Sentencing Project
LESSONS LEARNED
Even with the population reductions achieved in these
states, they continue to have prison populations that
average more than three times those of 1980. Most of
these jurisdictions expect to make additional gains
based on current trends and justice reforms, but much
of the changes enacted to date are experiencing
diminishing returns and the next layer of effort will be
even more challenging.
•
It is critical to target specific goals such as reduction
of racial disparity: Explicit attention and goal setting
must be focused on problems meant to be impacted
by justice reform, as evidenced by only modest
progress in these states on alleviating racial disparity
(and primarily as a by-product of the reforms rather
than because of directly addressing the problem).
A couple of the states are now targeting the lessening
of racial disparity as a new goal.
•
The promise of Justice Reinvestment needs to be
re-examined and augmented with other achievable
and significant goals: The original concept of Justice
Reinvestment referred to the goal of routing back
into distressed communities the savings generated
by closing prisons to address the precursors to
crime and help neighborhoods recover from overuse
of incarceration by financing housing, health care,
education, and jobs. While most of these states
have been successful in transferring resources
within the justice system from prisons to community
supervision, the goal of achieving broader
redistribution of resources remains.
•
Broad reforms require additional focus on issues
beyond prison population reduction: Overcoming
barriers to enable sustained or deeper prison
population reductions include the need for:
To advance decarceration further these and other
jurisdictions will need to heed six lessons that we’ve
learned from the states that have been successful in
achieving effective and sustainable prison population
reduction reforms:
•
•
Adequate funding is critical to achieving reforms:
Acquiring supplemental funding for implementation
was a commonly reported obstacle to compliance
with statutory requirements enacted in the state
reforms. Mandates without sufficient dollars for
implementation inevitably meant that some reforms
were delayed, failed to achieve the full benefits, or
were never implemented.
Projected cost savings are difficult to achieve and
actual savings are often overstated: Projections of
the anticipated impact of reforms were occasionally
off-the-mark. This was especially true of forecasts
regarding expected cost savings, in part because
of either faulty assumptions or overly optimistic
projections of the benefits, but also because of
offsetting cost increases in other areas that were
either missed or unanticipated when calculating
presumed impact – such as escalating prison health
care costs.
•
Post-incarceration employment solutions – still
a struggling metric critical to reentry success.
•
Release and reentry solutions for more serious
or higher risk cases – typically excluded from
reforms.
•
Adequate community funding solutions – a poor
stepchild compared to state-level reforms.
•
Rigorous monitoring and evaluation of justice
reform implementation to propel change.
Prison Population Reductions in the Five States
Peak Prison Population
Peak Year
Population
Prison Population
Year-End 2016
Connecticut
2007
19,438
Michigan
2006
Mississippi
State
Reduction in Prison Population
Decrease
% Change
14,532
-4,096
-25.2%
51,454
41,122
-10,332
-20.1%
2008
22,831
18,833
-3,998
-17.5%
Rhode Island
2008
4,045
3,103
-942
-23.3%
South Carolina
2008
24,326
20,858
-3,468
-14.3%
Decarceration Strategies: How 5 States Achieved Substantial Prison Population Reductions 7
•
Enhancing penalties for violent offenses reduces
the impact of sentencing reforms: Policymakers in
some states have enacted harsher penalties for
violent offenses as part of a reform “package” that
includes reduced penalties for non-violent offenses.
This is a problematic strategy for two reasons: 1)
it inherently reduces the potential decarceration
impact of sentencing reform; and, 2) research has
documented that enhancing already harsh sentences
adds little crime deterrent effect and produces
diminishing returns for incapacitation effects.
Policymakers around the country have much to learn
from the population reduction successes of the five
states documented in this report, as well as others that
have achieved double-digit reductions in recent years.
While crime rates have declined in all states during the
period examined in this report, many states have only
experienced a modest decline in prison populations
and some are still experiencing growing populations.
This reinforces the finding that just as prison populations
rose during the 1980s and 1990s due to policy choices,
so too can they decline as policymakers adopt targeted
goals and strategies.
1.
2.
3.
The national crime rate declined consistently throughout the 37-year period, except for a gradual uptick of 17% between 1985 and 1991 (during which
the rate remained lower than in 1980).
Nazgol Ghandnoosh, (March 2018). Can We Wait 75 Years to Cut the Prison Population in Half? The Sentencing Project: https://www.
sentencingproject.org/publications/can-wait-75-years-cut-prison-population-half/
The handful of other states that have also experienced similar reductions since their peak populations includes: California, Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii,
Indiana, New Jersey, New York, Massachusetts, and Vermont. Examples of the research and media attention that some of the larger states have
already received include the following:
•
Fewer prisoners, less crime: A tale of three states: https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Fewer-Prisoners-LessCrime-A-Tale-of-Three-States.pdf
•
California, New York & New Jersey crime rates and prisoners plunge: https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2016/aug/4/california-new-yorknew-jersey-crime-rates-prisoners-plunge/
•
How three states are beating the prison population boom: http://maltajusticeinitiative.org/how-three-states-are-beating-the-prison-populationboom/
•
The mass incarceration problem in America: https://news.vice.com/article/the-mass-incarceration-problem-in-america
•
Overcrowding and overuse of imprisonment in the United States: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/RuleOfLaw/OverIncarceration/ACLU.
pdf
8 The Sentencing Project
CONNECTICUT
25% PRISON POPULATION REDUCTION FROM 2007-2016
KEY PRISON POPULATION TRENDS SINCE 2007
•
Prison population: -25% through calendar 2016 to 14,532 from 19,438 in 2007.
•
Index crime rate: -27% through 2016 – including both violent and property crime rates – pushing
overall crime in Connecticut to a 50-year low.1
•
Arrests: -32% through 2016.2
•
New prison commitments: -27% through 2016.
•
Returns to prison: -55% through 2016 across all community release violator return types.3
•
Downsizing: Closure of 3 correctional facilities, a juvenile detention center, and housing units in 3
other facilities.
•
Cost savings: $39.8 million per year estimated savings generated by closed facilities and units.4
BACKGROUND
Since 1980, increases in Connecticut’s prison population5
resulted in overcrowding and contributed to the state’s
growing budget crisis. Beginning in 1999, Connecticut’s
Department of Corrections transferred hundreds of
people to prisons in Virginia, including a “supermax”
where two men died over 18 months. The transfers
resulted in a lawsuit from the American Civil Liberties
Union, protests back home from family members, a
critical report from the Connecticut Commission on
Human Rights and Opportunities, and an investigation
of mental health conditions at the facility by the
Connecticut Office of Protection and Advocacy for
Persons with Disabilities. In 2001, under pressure, the
state announced it would stop transfers to the supermax
prison but continue to house people in another Virginia
facility.
In 2004, Connecticut, which has a unified system with
all forms of supervision, detention, and incarceration
under state authority, took a different approach. It
became the first state in the nation to pass bipartisan
legislation through the Justice Reinvestment Initiative
(JRI), developed by the Council of State Governments
and the Pew Charitable Trusts/Center for the States to
help states stabilize their corrections population and
reduce expenditures. The JRI in Connecticut resulted
in a reform package, the “Act Concerning Prison
Overcrowding,” which increased prison releases, reduced
probation and parole technical violator admissions to
prison, and reduced overall lengths of stay. Some of
the savings were expected to be reallocated into reentry
programs and community supervision. The legislative
package was projected to end prison population growth
and even reduce the prison population by up to 2,000
over time.6 By year-end 2005, the prison population had
indeed decreased by 3% (-594) and Connecticut had
stopped sending prisoners out of state.
Decarceration Strategies: How 5 States Achieved Substantial Prison Population Reductions 9
However, an 8% resurgence in the prison population
(+1,510) occurred from 2006-2007, driven by public
reaction to a high-profile case involving the murder of
three family members during a home invasion committed
by two persons on parole supervision. The state
responded with a ban on parole for individuals with
violent histories, and other stringent measures, such
as classification of home invasion as a violent crime,
and expanded penalties for repeat offenses.7
A 351% increase in the Connecticut prison population
from 1980 to 2007 resulted in a record high population.
The related costs of increased incarceration served as
a catalyst for change as the state embarked on an
unprecedented era of justice reform.
The efforts led to successful legislative and executive
actions that contributed directly to reducing crime,
lowering the prison population, and decreasing costs.
Continuing leadership by Governor Dannel P. Malloy
helped maintain and reinforce the state’s results. In
2015, the Governor initiated Connecticut’s “Second
Chance Society” (a collection of both innovative reentry
strategies and bipartisan legislative reforms), which
has boosted the momentum for change.8 The
Commissioner of Corrections, Scott Semple, praised
the governor’s efforts:
Governor Malloy has expended enormous political
capital on corrections reform and he’s made it a
hallmark of his administration… trying to bring the
culture along and giving the Department of Correction
the opportunity to implement change… and he has
even pushed many colleagues in other states regarding
the Second Chance Society concepts.9
JUSTICE REFORM LEADERSHIP
Connecticut’s executive branch took important steps
in 2006 and 2007 to analyze and improve the state’s
criminal justice system. A Criminal Justice Policy and
Planning Division was created within the Governor’s
Office of Policy and Management and a Connecticut
Sentencing and Parole Review Task Force was formed.
These initiatives built on sustained advocacy for drug
policy and criminal justice reform by Community
Partners in Action, the Drug Policy Alliance, and other
key groups in the state.
Connecticut’s organizational efforts at comprehensive
planning, combined with the advocacy of the state’s
top leadership, have produced a broad array of ongoing
initiatives that with steadily declining crime rates have
reduced the prison population nearly every year since
2007.
Connecticut Prison Population, 2003-2016
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
Source: Online State Data
10 The Sentencing Project
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
0
HOW CONNECTICUT REDUCED THE SIZE OF ITS PRISON POPULATION
Over the past 10 years Connecticut policymakers
have adopted four intervention methods that have
been shown to reduce prison populations through
a combination of bipartisan legislative justice reform,
judicial discretion, and executive action.
A key theme of the reform effort is the importance
of reducing the number of young people entering
the criminal justice system. Given the high rate of
recidivism for people sentenced to prison, officials
in the state believe that stemming the flow of new
admissions can produce substantial short-term and
long-term results. Initiatives designed to accomplish
this goal have included “raise the age” legislation,
addressing the “school to prison pipeline,” and
expanding community engagement.
Increased releases from prison
•
Established Community Release Unit to shift
release decisions and transition planning from
custody staff to professionals trained in reentry
processes, as well as establishing discharge
planners in every facility; resulted in increased
parole approval rates, shortened wait times for
release, and coordinated reentry programming;
•
Enacted Risk Reduction Earned Credit program
to allow sentence reductions of five days per
month for program participation.
Reduced returns to prison
•
Key changes in policy and practice included:
Focus on reducing young people’s contact with the
criminal justice system
•
•
Reduced youth arrests by 63% from 2009-2016
by adopting policy changes to reduce school
suspensions and expulsions, and changing
criteria for detention. Impact extended to young
adults as well, with a 60% reduction in corrections
pretrial admissions for defendants under 25,
compared to a 31% reduction for those 25 and
older;
Achieved a 55% reduction in returns to prison,
accounting for more than a third of the overall
admissions decline, by strengthening
collaboration between reentry staff and local
officials in the state’s major urban communities;
this led to the creation of reentry councils and
focus on higher risk and higher need cases
Enacted statutory changes
•
The legislature eliminated mandatory sentences
and reclassified certain drug possession crimes
to misdemeanors
Adopted Raise the Age legislation to successively
raise the age of adult jurisdiction from 16 to 18.
Decarceration Strategies: How 5 States Achieved Substantial Prison Population Reductions 11
A. Increasing the Feasibility and/or Efficiency of
Release
Nearly 50% of Connecticut’s prison population reduction
occurred after 2013, primarily due to the accumulating
impacts of more effective prisoner reentry coordination
brought about by executive action to support the Second
Chance Society concepts. One set of those concepts
is to ensure that release from incarceration can be
responsibly earned, efficiently approved, and made to
happen as close to first eligibility for release as
reasonably possible. The change which led to the largest
increase in prison releases after 2013, was the creation
of a Community Release Unit in 2015 within the existing
authority of the Department of Correction (DOC). This
Unit centralized reentry planning by shifting the release
decision and movement to transition services from
custody staff to specialized professionals trained in
reentry processes.
Centralized reentry planning in addition to standardized
decision-making and accountability improved the
coordination of reentry programming, increased release
approval rates, and improved administrative efficiencies
to shorten wait times for release. These changes led
to both a significant increase in the prison release rate
and, as an added benefit, fewer negative incidents during
the shortened waiting period.
Adding to the impact of these reforms has been the
development of processes for graduated reductions in
security classification in advance of transfers to the
reintegration unit, and placing “discharge planners” in
every facility.10
Efforts to restructure parole processing in Connecticut
have also contributed to an estimated 15% of the overall
prison population reduction since 2007:
•
Starting in 2007 the Sentencing and Parole Review
Task Force conducted a comprehensive review of
release and supervision processes. They
recommended changes to strengthen decisionmaking and improve efficiency including, “…the
elimination of administrative reviews, the establishment
of full panel hearings for all parole cases, an expansion
of staffing, and a greater utilization of information and
communications technology.”11 In response to their
12 The Sentencing Project
recommendations, the Board of Pardons and Parole
reorganized and streamlined the parole process,
lifted the temporary ban on parole consideration
for violent offenses, and reinstated a 45-day reentry
furlough pre-release readiness process for end-ofsentence cases. As a result, the backlog of paroleeligible cases was significantly reduced.
•
The Second Chance Society initiative also
contributed to the efficiency of releases after 2013
by statutorily establishing a simplified pardon
process and expedited parole hearings for nonviolent
offenses.12
B. Reduced Incarceration for Failure on Community
Supervision
Another set of Second Chance Society concepts focuses
on reducing returns to prison. The 55% reduction in
returns to prison in Connecticut accounts for more than
a third of the state’s overall decrease in admissions.
After working for a number of years to broaden the
range of sanctions and diversionary alternatives for
community release violators, when the DOC centralized
its reentry decision-making and implementation, it also
took steps to increase local collaboration. This was
most evident in the state’s major urban communities,
including New Haven, Hartford, and Bridgeport. The
improvements included providing communities with
advance information and data about pending releases
and better alignment of services with other state nonjustice agencies.
This concentrated focus on achieving local buy-in
resulted in partnerships with urban mayors who became
more proactive about reentry. They formed reentry
councils that assisted with higher risk and higher need
cases through their community provider networks. Local
reentry program funding from non-justice agencies
allowed community service providers to blend resources
with services and funding from many different partners
and to determine on a case-by-case basis the details
of improved individualized case planning and
management.
Actual reinvestment of cost savings as a result of prison
population reductions has been difficult to achieve due
to ongoing state budget challenges, particularly the
costs of health interventions. Consequently, the
primary focus is on continued crime reduction to
preserve progress. The need for more community
engagement to focus on higher-risk cases has been
partly addressed by adding more DOC staff and
lowering caseloads to enable greater opportunity for
interaction with community advocates and providers
on the specific risks and needs of each case.
This individualized approach to crime reduction has
resulted in positive outcomes, while safely mitigating
the prison population crisis created in response to
the notorious 2007 murders.13
C. Fewer New Prison Commitments
New court commitments to prison in Connecticut
have declined since 2007 for two primary reasons:
(1) the state’s strategic effort to reduce youth crime
in order to break the pattern of repeated re-incarceration
(data shows that if an individual is not sentenced to
prison by age 25, then it’s likely they never will be),
have led to a 27% lower index crime rate overall; and,
(2) new statutory initiatives which address the drivers
of crime and provide new approaches when crimes
occur:
•
Raise the Age legislation was adopted, which
increased the age of adult criminal jurisdiction in
Connecticut from age 16 to 17 in 2010 and then
to age 18 in 2012. The legislation was augmented
with policy changes to reduce school suspensions
and expulsions, conduct juvenile assessments
via juvenile review boards, and change criteria for
detention.14 As a result of this change in approach
for handling at-risk youth, 2009-2016 arrests for
youth under age 18 decreased by 63% and
incarceration by 77%,15 directly impacting prison
admissions. The impact appears to extend even
beyond the youngest at-risk youth (those 18 and
under), as the ongoing decline in Connecticut
prison admissions is notable for a reduction in
the number of young adults as well.16 For example,
between 2008 and 2015 new admissions to DOC
on pretrial status fell by 31% for defendants 25
and older, but were reduced by 60% for defendants
under 25 years of age.17
•
The Connecticut General Assembly passed other
justice reform legislation over the years to enact
changes in the state’s responses to crime, such
as the elimination of mandatory minimum
sentences, and reclassification of nonviolent drug
possession to a misdemeanor. A Driving Under
the Influence (DUI) Home Confinement Program18
that was instituted in 2012 resulted in fewer
incarcerations and reduced recidivism.19 These
statutory changes were the result of long-term
advocacy both within the state government and
from outside non-profit groups. Both promoted
reforms to drug treatment policy, drunk driving
diversion, and other alternatives to incarceration.
These efforts have contributed to fewer new court
commitments via diversion, more effective
sanctions/programs, and shorter lengths of stay
for those sentenced to prison.
D. Requiring Less Time Served Before Eligibility
for Release
In 2011, a statutorily enacted Risk Reduction Earned
Credit (RREC) program was established to allow for
a sentence reduction of up to five days per month for
adherence to program accountability plans and
participating in a specified set of treatment programs
and/or educational classes. Negative behaviors led
to revocation of the credits. Thousands of qualified
individuals earned relatively modest numbers of
credits under this program, yet the cumulative effects
shortened lengths of stay and increased releases to
the community. Despite these increased releases,
returns to prison for violations declined an average
of 21% following enactment of the RREC program. 20
Additional reduction in time-served factors that
increased Connecticut releases in recent years include
expanded use of Transitional Placement (with peaks
of 100-250 individuals in approved community
placements or private residences following successful
halfway house terms) and some early releases to
non-prison nursing homes for prisoners with Medicaid
eligibility. The latter strategy grew out of legislation
permitting the DOC authority, “…to release the severely
incapacitated for ‘palliative and end of life’ care.” 21
Decarceration Strategies: How 5 States Achieved Substantial Prison Population Reductions 13
IMPACT ON RACIAL DISPARITY
Racial disparity persists in justice system populations
throughout the country, as individuals of color have
long been convicted in numbers disproportionate to
their presence in the general population. Connecticut
is no exception, but the 25% reduction in the state’s
prison population between 2007 and 2016 did
modestly reduce racial disparity within the system.
Department of Correction officials noted that the
reduction in racial disparity was mostly a by-product
of the overall prison population decline. However, it
is clear that policy changes certainly contributed, in
large part due to the disproportionate representation
of people of color at the affected points of the justice
system, including:
•
Changes made to drug sentencing and mandatory
minimum sentencing;
•
Raise the Age legislation – where there was a
large disparity in the impacted age group;
•
Bail bond reform – where there was a 3:1 people
of color-to-white ratio in bond denial;
•
Enacting Project Longevity to address gun
violence – adopted in the major cities by
identifying and serving young people who are the
most likely to become involved; and,
•
Establishing local reentry councils which
supported solutions from people formerly
incarcerated that were incorporated by
Connecticut criminal justice agencies.
Despite the modest reduction in racial disparity,
incarceration rates for black residents remain 9 times
higher, and for Hispanic residents 4 times higher,
than for white residents of Connecticut. The Governor
supports examining and addressing the issue in
proactive, direct ways. For instance, Connecticut
applied for and received a $2.5 million Safety and
Justice Challenge grant in 2016 from the John D.
and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The project
is working to address racial imbalance in pretrial jail
facilities due to disparities in the rates of custodial
arrest in urban communities of color.
14 The Sentencing Project
Improving racial balance in the pretrial facilities is
expected to carry over into the prisons as well since
incarcerated people pass through the Connecticut
pretrial settings to prison.22 Among the pretrial
reforms to be implemented is a court processing
pilot to divert defendants, reduce lengths of stay,
screen and refer to detention alternatives, and expand
diversion programs.
In addition, the state has proposed to expand implicit
bias training for police, prosecutors, public defenders,
community providers, and key decision makers and
to evaluate current racial and ethnic disparities in
order to establish a baseline for improvement. 23
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT FOR REFORMS
Connecticut officials indicated that most of these
legislative reforms have been bipartisan, with the
added benefit of strategic leadership by Governor
Malloy and the Undersecretary for the Criminal
Justice Policy and Planning Division, Michael Lawlor,
who made them a priority. Lawlor previously served
as a long-term and respected co-chair of the Judiciary
Committee in the General Assembly. Support for the
reform agenda is also credited to the state’s unified
criminal justice system. Local stakeholders who
commonly present opposition in other states, either
do not exist in Connecticut (county sheriffs) or are
not elected (prosecutors). The state budget crises
also helped bring all sides to the table. Early successes
increased confidence in the potential for further
reform. Significant ongoing decreases in crime rates
curbed the potential for opposition as well. And lastly,
the nature of the reforms – and their impact – helped
to solidify support:
•
Raise the Age statutory change resulted in
reduced imprisonment and continued crime
declines;
•
Enactment of risk reduction earned credits was
somewhat controversial, so adjustments were
made to ease political opposition; and
•
The DUI home confinement program was
supported through a partnership with Mothers
Against Drunk Driving, which reduced pushback.
There has been little resistance to prison closings
in the state. Connecticut is a small and densely
populated state, and the prison facilities are close
to each other. None of the affected communities are
inordinately dependent on prisons economically, and
staff reductions have been through attrition. In the
1990s, 10,000 prison beds were added in the state,
and at that time, new employees could retire with
full pensions after 20 years. It is now 20 years later,
so many retirements coincided with the facility
closings and no layoffs have been necessary.24
•
The female prison population has been
comparatively flat, so a commensurate 25%
reduction among women would reduce the overall
prison population further. DOC officials indicated
they may be able to address the unique risks and
needs for women within a year.
•
A statutorily required Juvenile Justice Policy and
Oversight Committee regularly provides additional
policy and process recommendations. One
consideration is to “raise the age” for juvenile
jurisdiction as high as age 21 (which the governor
supports). In addition, an innovative project was
adapted from Germany in 2017. “Emerging adults”
(ages 18-24 years old) receive services based on
best practices (such as bringing in mentors,
increasing family engagement, and shifting the
culture as to staff responsibilities) that help
reduce impulsivity and behavioral incidents,
which also reduces recidivism.
•
Bail reform may reduce the incarcerated
population by another 250 individuals.27
PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER DECLINE
In January 2017, the Connecticut Office of Policy
and Management (OPM) within the Governor’s Office
reported:
Our expectation, today, is that the prison population
will continue to decline over the coming year… due
to the fact that the system, as a whole, is contracting.
Virtually every measure from criminal arrests to
discharges has tracked consistently lower over the
past several years. Taken in sum, these factors
suggest that the prison population, barring any
major external developments, is heading down...
the most pressing question is when will the
population bottom out.25
The expectation of continued prison population
reduction in 2017 has been borne out. As of October
2017, Connecticut’s prison population was
approaching 14,000 - another 4% drop since 2016.
The projection is for this trend to continue and
additional bed closings are forecast for 2018.
Undersecretary Lawlor (whose agency conducts the
data analyses and projections for the system)
observed that “the school to prison pipeline is fading,”
as the numbers of 18-21 year-olds in the justice
system in Connecticut have become progressively
smaller for years.26
Connecticut officials expressed optimism that the
efforts that led to a 25% population reduction from
2007 to 2016 can be enhanced, and they can achieve
a 50% reduction in the coming years. There is a
recognition that to do so will require not only further
evolution of reentry practices but also expanding the
measures to address populations that are perceived
as more challenging. This includes individuals
convicted of serious and/or repeat offenses, but for
whom excessively lengthy prison terms have become
counterproductive.
DOC officials have indicated that “low-hanging fruit”
remains for addressing additional prison population
control mechanisms that can sustain the downward
trend for some time:
Decarceration Strategies: How 5 States Achieved Substantial Prison Population Reductions 15
Endnotes
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2.
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4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
Dixon, K. (2016, September 11). Prison populations at 20-year low. CT Post, Retrieved from http://www.ctpost.com/local/article/Prison-populationsat-20-year-low-9212542.php
The crime rate and arrest statistics used in this publication are based on data reported by the U.S. DOJ FBI Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program.
The calendar year-end population data are based on data from Connecticut. The calendar year statistics on admissions and releases used in this
publication are based on data reported by the U.S. DOJ BJS National Statistics (NPS) program for consistency of definitions and timeframes.
Statistics self-published by the states are sometimes based on varied definitional criteria, and either on monthly averages or on fiscal years for which
the start/end points can vary depending on the state.
Dixon (n 1).
Connecticut is a unified system with all forms of supervision, detention and incarceration under state authority.
CSG Justice Center. (2014, April). Joint informational hearing, CT judiciary and appropriations committees. Council of State Governments, Retrieved
from https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/CT-Justice-Reinvestment-Informational.pdf
CT Office of Policy & Management. (2008). Annual report: Connecticut prison population projection study, Retrieved from http://www.ct.gov/opm/lib/
opm/cjppd/cjresearch/populationforecast/20080305_forecastingfinal.pdf
NYT Editorial Board. (2016, January 4). Connecticut’s Second-Chance Society. The New York Times, Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.
com/2016/01/04/opinion/connecticuts-second-chance-society.html?_r=0
Connecticut state contact interviews via phone, October, 2017.
Kuzyk, I., Baudoin, K. & Bobula, K. (2016, September 29). Connecticut’s declining prison population: Some contributing factors. CT Office of Policy
& Management, Retrieved from http://www.ct.gov/opm/lib/opm/cjppd/cjcjpac/20160930connecticuts_declining_prison_population.pdf and
Connecticut state contact interviews via phone, October, 2017.
CT Office of Policy & Management. (2010). Annual correctional population forecast report.
NYT Editorial Board. (2016). Connecticut’s Second-Chance Society.
Connecticut state contact interviews via phone, October, 2017.
Connecticut state contact interviews via phone, October, 2017.
Kuzyk, I., et al. (2016). Connecticut’s declining prison population.
Connecticut state contact interviews via phone, October, 2017.
Kuzyk, I., et al. (2016). Connecticut’s declining prison population.
Connecticut’s DUI Home Confinement Program includes features such as house arrest, car locks, ability to continue to work, etc.
Connecticut state contact interviews via phone, October, 2017.
CT Office of Policy & Management. (2013, February). Prison population projection, Retrieved from http://www.ct.gov/opm/lib/opm/cjppd/cjresearch/
populationforecast/prison_pop_projection_february_2013_pdf.pdf
Law, V. (2014, January 19). If the risk is low, let them go: Efforts to resolve the growing numbers of aging behind bars. Truthout, Retrieved from http://
www.truth-out.org/news/item/21120-if-the-risk-is-low-let-them-go-efforts-to-resolve-the-growing-numbers-of-aging-behind-bars
Connecticut state contact interviews via phone, October, 2017.
Safety and justice challenge fact sheet. (2016, April). Retrieved from http://www.safetyandjusticechallenge.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/
Connecticut-Safety-Justice-Challenge-Fact-Sheet.pdf
Connecticut state contact interviews via phone, October, 2017.
CT Office of Policy & Management. (2010, January). Monthly indicators report, Retrieved from http://www.ct.gov/opm/lib/opm/cjppd/cjresearch/
monthlyindicators/monthlyindicatorsreport_jan_2017_final.pdf
Connecticut state contact interviews via phone, October, 2017.
Connecticut state contact interviews via phone, October, 2017.
16 The Sentencing Project
MICHIGAN
20% PRISON POPULATION REDUCTION FROM 2006-2016
KEY PRISON POPULATION TRENDS SINCE 2006
•
Prison population: -20% through calendar 2016 to 41,122 from 51,454 in 2006.
•
Index crime rate: -37% through 2016 – including both violent (-19%) and property (-41%) crime rat...
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