Capitalizing on Mass Incarceration U.S. Growth in Private Prisons For more information, contact: The Sentencing Project 1705 DeSales Street NW 8th Floor Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 628-0871 sentencingproject.org twitter.com/sentencingproj facebook.com/thesentencingproject This report was written by Kara Gotsch, Director of Strategic Initatives, and Vinay Basti, intern, at The Sentencing Project, with consultation from Nicole D. Porter, Director of Advocacy. It builds upon the research and analysis of The Sentencing Project’s report, Too Good to be True: Private Prisons in America, by Cody Mason. The Sentencing Project is a national non-profit organization engaged in research and advocacy on criminal justice issues. Our work is supported by many individual donors and contributions from the following: Morton K. and Jane Blaustein Foundation craigslist Charitable Fund Elsie P. van Buren Foundation Ford Foundation Foundation Beyond Belief Bernard F. and Alva B. Gimbel Foundation Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund General Board of Global Ministries of the United Methodist Church JK Irwin Foundation Mott Philanthropy Open Society Foundations Overbrook Family Advised Fund Pinion Street Foundation Public Welfare Foundation Elizabeth B. and Arthur E. Roswell Foundation Tikva Grassroots Empowerment Fund of Tides Foundation Wallace Global Fund Copyright © 2018 by The Sentencing Project. Reproduction of this document in full or in part, and in print or electronic format, only by permission of The Sentencing Project. 2 The Sentencing Project TABLE OF CONTENTS Overview 5 I. Trends in Privatization 7 II. Challenges of Private Prisons 10 III. Private Contractors and their Expanding Reach 12 IV. Recommendations 14 Appendix: State Profiles in Prison Privatization 16 Capitalizing on Mass Incarceration: U.S. Growth in Private Prisons 3 4 The Sentencing Project OVERVIEW The War on Drugs and harsher sentencing policies, including mandatory minimum sentences, fueled a rapid expansion in the nation’s prison population beginning in the 1980s. The resulting burden on the public sector led to the modern emergence of for-profit private prisons in many states and at the federal level. The United States has the world’s largest private prison population. Of the 1.5 million people in state and federal prisons in 2016, 8.5 percent, or 128,063, were incarcerated in private prisons.1 Another 26,249 people -73 percent of all people in immigration detention- were confined in privately-run facilities on a daily basis during fiscal year 2017.2 From 2000 to 2016 the number of people housed in private prisons increased five times faster than the total prison population. Over a similar timeframe, the proportion of people detained in private immigration facilities increased by 442 percent. The federal government and 27 states utilized private prisons operated by for-profit and non-profit entities during 2016.3 New Mexico and Montana led the nation in their reliance on private prisons with 43 percent and 39 percent of their prison populations, respectively, Table 1. Population in U.S. Private Prisons and Immigration Detention Centers 2000 2016 % change 2000-2016 1,381,892 1,505,400 9% Total Private 87,369 128,063 47% Federal Private 15,524 34,159 120% State Private 71,845 94,164 31% 4,841 26,249 442% Total Prison Population *Private Immigrant Detention Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Prisoners Series (2000, 2016). Mason, C. (2012). Dollars and Detainees: The Growth of For-Profit Detention. The Sentencing Project. Data of average daily count obtained from Detention Watch Network and the Center for Constitutional Rights. * Immigrant detention numbers are from 2002 and 2017 and are not included in the total prison population numbers. The 2017 numbers exclude counts from three facilities. housed within them (See Table 2). Between 2000 and 2016, eight states – Arkansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Nevada, North Dakota, Utah and Wisconsin – eliminated their use of private prisons due to concerns about safety and cost cutting.4 In 2016, Louisiana changed the classification of its contracted beds and reported its private prison population as zero for the first time during this period. Alternatively, five states – Alabama, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and Vermont – began contracting with private prisons between 2000 and 2016. The federal government is the single largest user of private prisons in the United States but has reduced its population in private prisons in recent years. However, in 2017 Attorney General Jeff Sessions withdrew an Obama-era directive to phase out private prison contracting because of concern for the federal correctional system’s ability “to meet future needs.”5 This report provides a portrait of private prisons as a component of the American corrections landscape and assesses its impact on mass incarceration. Among its most striking features is the broad variation found across jurisdictions in reliance on private prisons. As outlined in the state case studies examining the history of prison privatization in Florida, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina and Texas (available in the appendix), those corrections systems most committed to the industry have faced controversy, including riots, deaths, and allegations of improper financial influence from for-profit prison companies. Political influence has been instrumental in determining the growth of for-profit private prisons and continues today in various ways. If overall prison populations continue the current trend of modest decline, the privatization debate will likely intensify as opportunities for the prison industry dry up and corrections companies seek profit in other areas of criminal justice services and immigration detention. Capitalizing on Mass Incarceration: U.S. Growth in Private Prisons 5 KEY FINDINGS: • Of the total U.S. prison population, one in 12 people (128,063) was incarcerated in private prisons in 2016; an increase of 47 percent since 2000. • 26,249 people were also confined in privately-run immigration detention facilities in fiscal year 2017; a 442 percent increase since 2002. • Federal prisons incarcerated the largest number of people in private prisons, 34,159, marking a 120 percent increase since 2000. • The largest private prison corporations, Core Civic and GEO Group, collectively manage over half of the private prison contracts in the United States with combined revenues of $3.5 billion as of 2015. • Companies often trim prison budgets by employing mostly non-union and lowskilled workers at lower salaries and offer limited benefits compared to staff at publicly run institutions. • Cost savings claims associated with prison privatization are unfounded according to decades of research. 6 The Sentencing Project TRENDS IN PRIVATIZATION Figure 1. Number of People Incarcerated in State and Federal Private Prisons, 2000-2016 State 100,000 80,000 60,000 Federal 40,000 20,000 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 0 Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Prisoners Series. STATE PRIVATE PRISON POPULATION TRENDS Between 2000 and 2016, the number of people incarcerated in private prison facilities increased 47 percent while the overall prison population increased 9 percent. The private prison population reached a peak of 137,220 in 2012; it then declined to 126,272 in 2015, before rising again in 2016 to 128,063.6 At the state level 27 states utilized private prison beds, with contracts ranging from a low of 12 in South Carolina to a high of 13,692 in Texas (See Table 2). Six states have more than doubled the number of individuals in private prisons since 2000. Arizona had the largest increase, holding 479 percent more people in private prisons in 2016 than in 2000, followed by Indiana (296 percent), Ohio (226 percent), Florida (211 percent), Georgia (113 percent), and Tennessee (112 percent). New Mexico had the highest proportion of its population held privately in both 2000 and 2016, with respective rates of 40 and 43 percent, followed closely by Montana with a rate of 39 percent in 2016. Four additional states incarcerated 20% or more of their prison population privately: Oklahoma (27 percent), Tennessee (26 percent), Hawaii (25 percent), and Arizona (20 percent). Capitalizing on Mass Incarceration: U.S. Growth in Private Prisons 7 Table 2. Incarceration in private prisons Jurisdiction Number of people, 2000 Number of people, 2016 Percent private, 2016 0 348 1.2 ~ Alaska 1,383 551 12.4 -60.2 Arizona 1,430 8,285 19.6 479.4 Arkansas 1,540 0 0 -100 California 4,547 7,005 5.4 54.1 Colorado Alabama Percent change, 2000-2016 2,099 3,564 17.8 69.8 Connecticut 0 508 3.4 ~ Delaware 0 0 0 District of Columbia 2,342 * * Florida 3,912 12,176 12.2 211.3 Georgia 3,746 7,973 14.9 112.8 Hawaii 1,187 1,405 25.1 18.4 Idaho 1,162 420 5.1 -63.9 Illinois 0 0 0 991 3,927 15.4 Iowa 0 0 0 Kansas 0 0 0 Kentucky 1,268 0 0 -100 Louisiana 3,068 0 0 -100 11 0 0 -100 127 25 0.1 -80.3 0 0 0 Indiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan 449 0 0 Minnesota 0 0 0 Mississippi 3,230 3,078 16 Missouri 0 0 0 Montana 986 1,481 38.8 Nebraska 0 0 0 508 0 0 Nevada New Hampshire 296.3 -100 -4.7 50.2 -100 0 0 0 New Jersey 2,498 2,720 13.7 8.9 New Mexico 2,155 3,040 43.1 41.1 0 0 0 North Carolina 330 30 0.1 North Dakota 96 0 0 -100 Ohio 1,918 6,259 12 226.3 Oklahoma 6,931 7,149 26.6 3.1 New York -90.9 Oregon 0 0 0 Pennsylvania 0 680 1.4 Rhode Island 0 0 0 South Carolina 0 12 0.1 ~ South Dakota 45 34 0.9 -24.4 3,510 7,433 26.4 111.8 13,985 13,692 8.4 -2.1 -100 Tennessee Texas Utah ~ 208 0 0 0 264 15.2 1,571 1,576 4.2 Washington 0 0 0 West Virginia 0 0 0 4,337 0 0 -100 -2.2 Vermont Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming 0.3 275 269 11.3 Federal 15,524 34,159 18.1 120 Total 87,369 128,063 8.5 46.6 ~ Use of private prisons implemented after 2000; *District of Columbia count incorporated in federal numbers Sources: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prisoners Series (2000, 2016); interviews with North Dakota and Oregon corrections officials. FEDERAL PRISON PRIVATIZATION PRIVATE IMMIGRATION DETENTION While both federal and state governments have increasingly relied on privatization since 2000, the federal prison system’s commitment to privatization grew more dramatically. The number of federal prisoners held in private prisons rose 120 percent from 15,524 in 2000 to 34,159 in 2016, while the number of state prisoners incarcerated privately grew by 31 percent over the same time period, from 71,845 to 94,164. Among those confined under private contracts in the federal system, about 37% are in halfway houses or are on home confinement.7 In 2002, approximately 4,800 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainees were held in privately run facilities.13 By 2017, that number had jumped to 26,249 people.14 This expansion of detention was influenced by a shift in immigration policy enforcement. A reduction in the overall federal prison population that began in 2014 resulted from changes in sentencing policy and influenced a modest decline in private prison use in 2016. The overall declines in the prison population helped persuade President Obama’s Department of Justice to phase out federal private for-profit prison contracts. The move was bolstered by a report from the Department of Justice’s Office of the Inspector General that outlined safety issues in for-profit facilities. The report concluded that private prisons had “more safety and security incidents per capita than comparable BOP [Bureau of Prisons] institutions,” in such areas as presence of contraband, prison lockdowns, and inmate discipline.8 However, in February 2017, Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced the reversal of this plan, indicating that the Bureau of Prisons would continue to rely on these facilities. Sessions stated that private prison companies would assist in meeting “the future needs of the federal correctional system.”9 This policy reversal was followed by a directive to prosecutors to pursue the most serious charges and toughest sentences in all federal cases. These changes are projected to increase prison admissions and sentence length, which is likely to contribute to an expansion of private facility contracting.10 Indeed, in May 2017, the DOJ issued a new solicitation to increase capacity by 1,600 beds in privately-run Criminal Alien Requirement facilities intended for noncitizens charged with lower-level offenses, including drug and immigration offenses.11 This was followed in January 2018 with a Bureau of Prisons memorandum to federal prison officials outlining goals for increasing population levels in private facilities and ordering officials to expedite transfers of people deemed eligible for placement in contract institutions.12 Beginning in 2009, Congress established a quota for immigrant detention beds under appropriations law, requiring that the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) funding be linked to maintaining 33,400 immigration detention beds a day even if there were not a sufficient number of people in detention to fill them. By fiscal year 2013 the quota was raised to 34,000 beds.15 In 2014, a major influx of migrants from Central America led to an expansion of immigration detention under the Obama Administration. Individuals fleeing violence in Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala crossed the Southern border in search of asylum;16 many families were held in privatelyrun family detention centers. Incidents of assault, hunger protests, and medical neglect were reported at these facilities. In one GEO Group facility in Colorado, thousands of immigrant detainees were allegedly forced to work for $1 a day. Nine of those detainees filed a lawsuit against GEO Group claiming that they were paid for labor with “chicken, potato chips, soda, or candy.”17 In Washington State in 2017, the state’s Attorney General sued GEO Group for allegations that immigrant detainees were mandated to work for $1 a day. The Attorney General argued that the state’s minimum wage was $11 an hour, and that the detainees were being held under “civil charges, not criminal charges,” meaning that that minimum wage must be upheld.18, 19 According to ICE reports, arrests and detentions of immigrants have increased more than 40 percent since mid-2017. To accommodate the increases, President Trump’s 2018 proposed budget to Congress asked for $1.2 billion to add 15,000 more private prison beds for immigration detention.20 In September 2017 ICE requested that a new immigrant detention center be constructed in South Texas, stating that it would need to hold approximately 1,000 more migrants.21 This facility will be operated by GEO Group, and is expected to open in late 2018. GEO Group and Core Civic will reportedly be pursuing additional contracts to meet the detention demands of President Trump’s immigration policies. Capitalizing on Mass Incarceration: U.S. Growth in Private Prisons 9 CHALLENGES OF PRIVATE PRISONS ILLUSIVE COST SAVINGS Prison privatization has prospered because of claims that for-profit facilities are more cost efficient at providing services than publicly-run institutions. The evidence does not support this assertion. In 1996, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) looked at four state-funded studies and one commissioned by the federal government assessing the cost benefits of private prisons. The outcomes of the research varied, leading the authors to conclude that “…these studies do not offer substantial evidence that savings have occurred.”22 Similar conclusions were reached in a 2009 meta-analysis by researchers at the University of Utah that looked at eight cost comparison studies resulting in vastly different conclusions. The analysis led the researchers to state, “…prison privatization provides neither a clear advantage nor disadvantage compared to publicly managed prisons” and that “…cost savings from privatization are not guaranteed.”23 Many of these findings have been replicated in individual states. In Ohio, state officials have contended that private facilities regularly meet or surpass the legal requirement of containing costs at least five percent below a state-run equivalent. However, a report by the nonpartisan Policy Matters Ohio criticized the state’s measurements for comparing privately operated prisons to hypothetical public facilities, exaggerating overhead and staff costs for public prisons, and failing to account for the higher proportion of prisoners in public institutions requiring expensive high-level security. Accounting for these factors greatly reduced if not completely diminished the purported advantages of private prisons.24 10 The Sentencing Project In Arizona, which also has cost-saving requirements for private prisons, research conducted by the state’s Department of Corrections in 2010 found that the state had not saved money by contracting out minimum security beds, and that more money is actually spent on private medium security beds than would be spent in a publicly operated institution.25 QUALITY AND SAFETY CONCERNS Private prison companies face a challenge in reducing costs and offering services necessary to maintaining safety in prisons while also generating a profit for shareholders. The primary approach to controlling spending is by maintaining lower levels of staff benefits and salary than publicly-run facilities. Labor costs normally account for 60 to 70 percent of annual operating budgets. Such savings, though, risk compromising safety and security within prisons. Corrections officers employed by private corporations earn up to $23,850 less on average in annual salary compared to the public sector.26 Oliver Hart, the 2016 winner of the Nobel Prize in economics, contends that for-profit prison contracts lack sufficient incentives for proper job training.27 Consequently, there are higher employee turnover rates in private prisons than in publicly operated facilities. BOP’s former Director of Research, Gerry Gaes, lamented: “You can begin to squeeze money out of the system. Maybe you can squeeze a half a percent out, who knows? But it’s not as if these systems are overfunded to begin with. And at some point, you start to lose quality. And because quality is very difficult to measure in prisons, I’m just worried that you’re getting in a race to the bottom.”28 These dynamics may contribute to safety problems within prisons. Studies have found that assaults in private prisons can occur at double the rate found in public facilities. Researchers also find that public facilities tend to be safer than their private counterparts and that “privately operated prisons appear to have systemic problems in maintaining secure facilities.”29, 30 PROFITING FROM INCARCERATION For-profit prison companies exist to make money, and therefore the size and status of the country’s criminal justice system is of upmost importance to them. This connection was summed up in Corrections Corporation of America’s (now-Core Civic) 2010 Annual Report: Core Civic and GEO Group were involved with ALEC at a time when it worked with members to draft model legislation impacting sentencing policy and prison privatization. These policies promoted mandatory minimum sentences, three strikes laws, and truth-insentencing, all of which contribute to higher prison populations. ALEC also helped draft legislation that could increase the number of people held in immigration detention facilities. While no longer a member of ALEC, Core Civic and GEO face the bottom line reality that a decline in incarceration is bad for business. Our growth is generally dependent upon our ability to obtain new contracts to develop and manage new correctional and detention facilities. This possible growth depends on a number of factors we cannot control, including crime rates and sentencing patterns in various jurisdictions and acceptance of privatization. The demand for our facilities and services could be adversely affected by the relaxation of enforcement efforts, leniency in conviction or parole standards and sentencing practices or through the decriminalization of certain activities that are currently proscribed by our criminal laws.31 In order to overcome these challenges, private prison companies at times have joined with lawmakers, corporations, and interest groups to advocate for privatization through the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC). This organization is a nonprofit membership association focused on advancing “the Jeffersonian principles of free markets, limited government, federalism, and individual liberty.” This is pursued in part by advocating for large-scale privatization of governmental functions. Core Civic paid between $7,000 and $25,000 per year as an association member before leaving the organization in 2010. The company contributed additional funds to sit on issue task forces and sponsor events hosting legislators.32 Capitalizing on Mass Incarceration: U.S. Growth in Private Prisons 11 PRIVATE CONTRACTORS AND THEIR EXPANDING REACH When established in 1983, Corrections Corporation of America pledged to build and operate prisons with the same quality of service provided in publicly operated prisons but at a lower cost. Core Civic and its closest competitor, GEO Group, collectively manage over half of the private corrections contracts in the United States, with combined revenues of $3.5 billion in 2015. Core Civic maintains more than 80,000 beds in over 70 facilities, including prisons, immigrant detention, and reentry centers. GEO Group operates a similar number of facilities. Smaller companies, including Management & Training Corporation, LCS Correctional Services, and Emerald Corrections, also hold multiple prison and detention contracts throughout the United States. In 2016, following the Department of Justice’s announcement that it would phase out private prisons, stock prices dropped 50 percent. Damon Hininger, CEO of Corrections Corporation of America, announced the company would change its name to Core Civic. The new name sought to represent the firm’s changing status as a provider of “largely corrections and detention services” to a company that works on “a wider range of government solutions.”33 In 2017 private prison stocks for Core Civic and GEO Group more than doubled after the Department of Justice, under Sessions’ leadership, announced that it would be maintaining contracts with for-profit prisons. While the firms’ stock prices have since declined, in early 2018 they were substantially higher than their 2016 low. Private prison companies have contributed millions to President Trump’s campaign and associated super 12 The Sentencing Project PACs. Moreover, at least one prison company appears to be acting in the personal financial interest of President Trump. GEO Group changed the location of its annual meeting from a resort in Boca Raton, Florida to the Trump National Doral Golf Club in Miami. This club is reported to be the “single biggest contributor to Trump’s cash flow.”34 Private prison companies are seeking to expand their influence with state governments as well. In Montana, lawmakers are fiercely debating the merits of accepting a cash payment of $35.7 million from Core Civic for renewal of the state’s prison contract which ends in 2019.35 The money had originally been set aside to allow the state to purchase the private facility. The state is facing a major budget shortfall and many in the legislature are urging the governor to accept the offer. Negotiations have stalled because of complaints of comparatively low pay for corrections officers compared to the state’s publicly-run prisons, and restrictions on staff unionizing. PRIVATE PRISON COMPANIES’ EXPANDED PROGRAMMING Since 2005, GEO Group and Core Civic have spent $2.2 billion to acquire smaller companies in order to branch out to new industries beyond incarceration. For instance, in 2011, GEO Group acquired BI Incorporated, an ankle bracelet monitoring company. The companies also provide prison healthcare services and have established residential reentry centers. Core Civic has embraced the community corrections sector by investing $270 million in the acquisition of half-way houses which are often used as a transition point between prison and release. Core Civic has also sought to reconfigure its public imagine as a supporter of the movement against mass incarceration by lobbying for policies “that reduce recidivism and making campaign contributions to candidates who endorse those policies.”36 GEO Group has also recently attempted to rebrand its services. In 2017, GEO Group purchased the Alabama Therapeutic Education Facility,37 a reentry facility for the Alabama Department of Corrections which set a two-year contract for up to $18.8 million.38 The facility expects to enroll up to 600 people and provide training, drug treatment and resources for reentry. The contract is an important foothold for GEO in a state without private prisons. It also has a contract in the state to oversee immigrants on community supervision under ICE’s authority.39 Because these companies remain profit-making entities, concerns about the quality of their public safety services persist among critics who question company investments in training, staffing levels and programming. Capitalizing on Mass Incarceration: U.S. Growth in Private Prisons 13 RECOMMENDATIONS The United States has experienced 40 years of unprecedented growth in its prison population but a recent stabilization and modest reduction in incarceration has largely ended the prison building boom and now provides an opportunity to reexamine policies of prison privatization. The complications of mass incarceration that include the fracturing of low-income communities of color, the mistreatment of incarcerated people and the subjugation of people with criminal records cannot be wholly laid at the feet of private prison corporations. Over several decades, public institutions and lawmakers, with public consent, implemented policies that led to mass incarceration and the collateral consequences that followed. But private prisons have capitalized on the chaos of this policy approach and have worked to sustain it. Public corrections systems have been plagued by poor conditions of confinement and mismanagement that require significant reform. But the introduction of profit incentives into the country’s incarceration buildup crosses a troubling line that puts financial gain above the public interest of safety and rehabilitation, and with limited transparency. As a result the worst elements of incarceration are exacerbated by privatization. Developing public awareness about the excesses of the criminal justice system, coupled with the recent nationwide declines in prison populations, provides an opportunity to work towards creating a more humane and restorative prison system that one day will manage only a fraction of the people it does today. With that objective in mind we propose the following recommendations: 14 The Sentencing Project ELIMINATE CONTRACTS WITH FOR-PROFIT PRISON COMPANIES Due to the numerous safety and transparency issues associated with for-profit prisons, states and the federal government should phase out their reliance on these facilities through terminating contracts. States such as North Carolina have demonstrated that it is possible for governments to discontinue their reliance on for-profit prisons. In other jurisdictions where prison capacity may now be exceeding demand due to overall declines in the prison population, the political support for phasing out private prisons should increase. EXPAND TRANSPARENCY REQUIREMENTS To the extent that jurisdictions continue to contract with private prisons they should adopt policies requiring greater transparency and openness to public inquiry. Currently, the federal Freedom of Information Act does not apply to private prisons, and therefore there is no legal remedy if a private prison refuses to disclose information about its practices. U.S. Representative Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX) has introduced the Private Prison Information Act to address this issue by requiring that the Freedom of Information Act apply to private prisons. Such laws would subject private prison companies to the same level of scrutiny as government run prison facilities. END THE PRACTICE OF INCARCERATING PEOPLE FAR FROM HOME In contrast to public prisons, private prisons frequently contract with state governments to confine people out-of-state, with 10,500 people housed this way as of 2013.40 States such as Vermont—which has no private prisons—shipped people out of state to avoid the cost of building state-run prison facilities. For many years Hawaii has flown prisoners thousands of miles to private prisons in Arizona. Other states that have adopted this practice include California and Idaho, which rely on for-profit prisons in Colorado, Oklahoma, and Mississippi. The practice negatively affects families because it limits opportunities for visitation and strains relationships which are critical to successful reintegration after incarceration. In addition, Vermont’s chief public defender recently noted that it is “much more difficult to communicate with clients” when they are held out of state. It is harder to “meet the needs they might have, or even just to address ongoing legal issues.”41 ELIMINATE THE FEDERAL BED QUOTA FOR IMMIGRANT DETENTION The Department of Homeland Security’s bed quota for immigrant detention requires the agency to maintain no less than 34,000 beds at any given time. Because of this quota, Immigration and Customs Enforcement expanded its contracts with private prison companies to house federal immigrant detainees. It provides an incentive to maintain private prison contracts and keep immigration detention beds full. Capitalizing on Mass Incarceration: U.S. Growth in Private Prisons 15 APPENDIX - STATE PROFILES ON PRISON PRIVATIZATION The following five case studies—featuring Florida, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina and Texas—highlight the significant variation in the use of private correctional facilities across states over the last several decades. The profiles offer historical context about state criminal justice policies, and document the political culture, perspectives and circumstances that influenced the rise or fall of private prisons in each jurisdiction. FLORIDA In the early 1990s, Florida became the second state— after Texas—to use private prisons. Proponents of private prisons argued that they would increase the quality of care by improving rehabilitation and reducing recidivism rates. State officials stated that free market incentives would significantly fix the inefficiencies in the adult correctional system.42 However, by 2003, a study by Florida State University concluded that Florida’s Figure 2. Number of People Incarcerated in Private Prisons in Florida 13,000 9,750 6,500 3,250 16 The Sentencing Project 2015 2016 2013 2014 2011 Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Prisoners Series. 2012 2010 2009 2008 2007 2005 2006 2003 2004 2001 2002 2000 0 recidivism rates for private and public prison facilities were similar. There were three key phases to Florida’s private prison build-up. From 2000 to 2004, Florida’s private prison population saw modest growth. Then, from 2004 to 2010, the private prison population more than tripled. In 2010, the population in private prisons began to stabilize and even declined 2.5% between 2015 and 2016. In 1993, the Florida state legislature passed Chapter 957, a statute that allowed for prison management to be put in the hands of for-profit prison companies43 and established the Corrections Privatization Committee, a body that oversaw Florida’s contracts with private corrections groups.44 The Committee subsequently engaged in a series of ethics violations. In 2002, Mark Hodges, director of the Committee, was fined $10,000 by the Florida Commission on Ethics for earning $150,000 from his holdings in prison consulting contracts in other states.45 Ken Kopczynski, a policing analysist in Florida, notes that Hodges owned thousands of shares in Core Civic. In 2006, another former director of the Committee, Alan Duffee, pled guilty to embezzling $200,000 from a private prisons maintenance fund.46 These violations by officials in the Corrections Privatization Committee led to the office being shut down by the state legislature in 2006. Today, Florida has eight privately-run prison facilities. The GEO Group has its headquarters in Boca Raton and runs five of the facilities. In addition to adult prisons, 95% of Florida’s juvenile facilities are privately owned.47 In 2012, Governor Rick Scott and the Florida State Senate narrowly failed to pass a bill to privatize all adult correctional facilities.48 3,100 2,325 1,550 775 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2005 2006 0 2003 New Mexico’s corrections department may share responsibility for the dangerous conditions at the private prisons. The Department of Corrections’ custody classification system made a number of assignment errors by ignoring “known enemies” and “gang affiliations” of prisoners when determining placement in the private facilities.55 People who found themselves in danger were denied reassignment. Figure 3. Number of People Incarcerated in Private Prisons in New Mexico 2004 Opponents of New Mexico’s private prison system immediately called for reform, but Gov. Johnson refused to implement any shifts in practice at the Wackenhut facilities. Calls for an independent study of the private prison facilities were resisted and deemed “unnecessary.”53 Johnson did threaten to transfer people from the troubled facilities to state-run facilities if the violence continued, but his warnings did not curb unrest or assaults. Johnson’s corrections head, Rob Perry, claimed the riots were “an attempt to discredit private prisons.” Records of political contributions reveal that in 1998 Wackenhut donated $9,330 to Johnson’s reelection campaign.54 2001 Beginning in 1998, New Mexico opened two private prisons within two years, the Lea County Correctional Facility and the Guadalupe Correctional Center, both operated by Wackenhut Correctional Center (currently known as GEO Group). Both facilities experienced violent incidents within the first year of opening. By January of 1999, 12 prisoners had been stabbed in Wackenhut correctional facilities. By 2000, four prisoners and one correctional officer had been killed.51 Riots protesting Wackenhut’s poor management in the Guadalupe and Lea County correctional facilities erupted and involved over 100 prisoners.52 From 2000 to 2016 New Mexico witnessed steady growth in its for-profit prisons, increasing the population by 41%. Currently, GEO Group runs three private prisons in New Mexico, while Core Civic and Management and Training Corporation operate two facilities. In August 2017, Core Civic executives threatened to close its Torrance Correctional Facility in Estancia unless there was an expansion of at least 300 people in the local private prison population.58 A company spokesman said government officials had 60 days to increase the prison population or the prison would close. Local news reports feared that the prison closure would have detrimental economic effects on the city of Estancia, including the loss of 200 jobs for local residents.59 Core Civic ultimately closed the Torrance Correctional Facility in September, 2017.60, 61 2002 New Mexico leads the nation in its dependence on private prisons. The state incarcerated 43% of its prison population in for-profit prisons as of 2016. It began the contracts during the 1990s when former Governor Gary Johnson proposed the privatization of all the state’s prisons,49 claiming that they would provide “the same goods and services at two-thirds the cost.”50 While the legislature never approved the full conversion of the state’s prison system to private hands, prison corporations have contributed generously to political leaders there to ensure the industry’s prominence in the state. New Mexico’s next governor, Bill Richardson, who served from 2003-2011, maintained many of the Johnson-era policies on private prisons. Richardson also received significant campaign contributions from private prison corporations, with GEO Group donating $42,750 to his campaigns beginning in 2005.56 Overall, during the 2006 election cycle Richardson received more in campaign contributions from private prison corporations than any other official then running for state office in the United States.57 2000 NEW MEXICO Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Prisoners Series. Capitalizing on Mass Incarceration: U.S. Growth in Private Prisons 17 NEW YORK New York has never adopted for-profit prisons. However, in the 1990s, there was a massive expansion in New York’s correctional population, resulting in speculation that the state might contract with private facilities.62 In response, the corrections officer union began a campaign to lobby for a ban of for-profit prisons in the state. Shortly thereafter, then-State Attorney General Dennis Vacco issued an opinion that New York was precluded from adopting for-profit facilities.63 Vacco’s opinion set a major precedent for the state. At the municipal level, New York City has engaged in a debate about the city’s pension holdings in private prison companies. In 2017, the city of New York divested a total of $48 million in stocks and bonds from a range of for-profit correctional companies, the first municipal government in the country to do so.64 NORTH CAROLINA North Carolina is one of a handful of states to close its for-profit private prison facilities. In 1998, the state’s corrections department set up a contract with Core Civic to open two private prison facilities: the Palmico Correctional Institution and the Mountain View Correctional Institution.65 Both were medium-security facilities that housed approximately 500 prisoners each, and they were proposed to reduce costs for the state. Figure 4. Number of People Incarcerated in Private Prisons in North Carolina 400 300 However, by 2000, the corrections department found that Core Civic’s facilities had produced “little costsavings” compared to state-run facilities. “It really felt like a failure,” said Representative Paul McCrary.66 He noted flaws in the state’s contract with Core Civic, arguing that the company was “going to take some shortcuts when they can.” Even though Core Civic was slated to run these facilities until 2003, the corrections department terminated the partnership early in October 2000.67 North Carolina currently has a few dozen individuals housed in a non-profit facility called the Center for Community Transition, which houses women who are finishing their prison sentences. Aside from this institution, the state relies on state-run prison facilities. TEXAS During the 1980s, the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) experienced an overcrowding crisis. Admissions to Texas prisons increased by 113 percent from 1980 to 1986, and outpaced system capacity increases by 52 percent.68 A federal court order stemming from a prisoner lawsuit challenging conditions of confinement created prison population caps for TDCJ.69 Facing court fines if they violated the capacity restrictions, lawmakers were eager to find a new source of prison beds. In 1987, Texas legislators overwhelmingly passed Senate Bill 251 to allow contracts with private prison vendors to manage and construct private prison facilities.70 As the prison population continued to expand during the 1990s in response to the passage of tougher penalties, the overcrowding problem persisted and private prison growth increased. By 2007, after an intensive lobbying effort by GEO Group, the Texas legislature passed a bill that expanded the number of people that private prisons could house at their facilities. This bill was sponsored by Rep. Jerry Madden, the head of the House Committee on Corrections, who was a proponent of privately-run prison facilities.71 Madden’s bill proposed raising the number of private prison beds in the state by 1,000.72 200 100 Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Prisoners Series. 18 The Sentencing Project 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2007 2008 2005 2006 2003 2004 2001 2002 2000 0 Coincidentally, that same year, Texas lawmakers including Madden worked to avoid new prison construction and its associated costs because of the Figure 5. Number of People Incarcerated in Private Prisons in Texas 21,000 15,750 10,500 5,250 2015 2016 2013 2014 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2003 2004 2001 2002 2000 0 Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Prisoners Series. state’s projected prison growth.73 At the same time, the Texas legislature rejected a proposed open-record law that would have increased transparency of private prison companies.74 In 2008 with the private prison population at its peak of 20,000 people, Texas lawmakers recognized that TDCJ had overbuilt its prison capacity. Privately operated county jails, which had been built with an expectation of housing overflow from state facilities, had half their beds empty by 2011.75 Crime and incarceration rates were falling, which led many lawmakers to suggest that TDCJ was spending too much on prison beds. Several prisons have closed in Texas since 2011, including private facilities.76 By 2016 the number of people in private prisons dropped to 13,692. Capitalizing on Mass Incarceration: U.S. Growth in Private Prisons 19 ENDNOTES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Carson, E.A. (2018). Prisoners in 2016. United States Department of Justice: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Retrieved from https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p16. pdf. Detention Watch Network & Center for Constitutional Rights. Retrieved from https://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/ sites/default/files/DWN%20Spreadsheet%20Memo.pdf. Data of average daily count obtained from Immigration and Custom Enforcement and Removal Operations division by Detention Watch Network and the Center for Constitutional Rights as part of a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit. Count excludes three privately run detention facilities for families and women. Carson, E.A. (2018). See note 1. Louisiana is also newly included among states without private prisons but the change results from the state’s reclassification of these institutions as “local facilities.” Sessions, J.B. (2017, February 21). Rescission of Memorandum on Use of Private Prisons. Office of the Attorney General. Retrieved from https://www.bop.gov/ resources/news/pdfs/20170224_doj_memo.pdf. Carson, E.A. (2018). See note 1. Carson, E.A. (2018). See note 1. Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice (2016). Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Monitoring of Contract Prisons. Retrieved from https://oig.justice.gov/ reports/2016/e1606.pdf Sessions, J.B. (2017, February 21). See note 5. Meyersohn, N. (2017, May 19). Justice Department Seeks Increase in Private Prison Beds. CNN. Retrieved from http:// www.cnn.com/2017/05/19/politics/private-prisons/index. htm. Meyersohn, N. (2017, May 19). See note 10. Lara, F. (2018, January 24). Increasing Population Levels in Private Contract Facilities. U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons. Retrieved from https://admin. govexec.com/media/gbc/docs/pdfs_ edit/012518privateprisons.pdf. Mason, C. (2012, July 19). Dollars and Detainees: The Growth of For-Profit Detention. The Sentencing Project. Retrieved from http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/dollars-anddetainees-the-growth-of-for-profit-detention/. Detention Watch Network & Center for Constitutional Rights. See note 2. Chan, J. (2017) Immigration Detention Bed Quota Timeline [Blog Post]. Retrieved from https://www.immigrantjustice. org/staff/blog/immigration-detention-bed-quota-timeline. Nakamura, D. (2016, September 22). Flow of Central Americans to U.S. Surging, Expected to Exceed 2014 Numbers. The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www. washingtonpost.com/politics/flow-of-central-americans-tous-surging-expected-to-exceed-2014-numbers/2016/09/22/ ee127578-80da-11e6-8327-f141a7beb626_story.html. Pauly, M. (2017, September 20). Washington Just Sued a Giant Private Prison Company for Paying Immigrant Workers $1 Per Day. Mother Jones. Retrieved from http://www. motherjones.com/politics/2017/09/washington-just-sued-agiant-private-prison-company-for-paying-immigrant-workers1-per-day/. 20 The Sentencing Project 18 Rosenberg, M. (2017, September 20). Washington State Sues Over $1/day Wages Paid to Immigrant Detainees. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usaimmigration-strike/washington-state-sues-over-1-day-wagespaid-to-immigrant-detainees-idUSKCN1BV2XN. 19 Associated Press. (2017, June 22). Working for $1 a Day: Ex-Immigration Detainees Allege Abuse. CBS News. Retrieved from https://www.cbsnews.com/news/working-for-1-a-dayex-immigration-detainees-allege-abuse/. 20 Montoya, N. (2018, May 29). California, Out of Space, Sending Immigrant Detainees to Arizona. Arizona Public Media. Retrieved from https://news.azpm.org/p/news-topicalborder/2018/5/29/130366-california-out-of-space-sendingimmigrant-detainees-to-arizona/. 21 Michels, P. (2017, September 28). ICE Issues Plan to Detain 1,000 More Migrants in Texas [Blog Post]. Retrieved from https://www.revealnews.org/blog/ice-issues-plan-to-detain1000-more-migrants-in-texas/. 22 Sloane, D., Alexander, D., Stolz, B., Rabinowitz, B., Williams, P., Hamilton, G., Burton, D., Boyles, S., & Svoboda, D. (1996). Private and Public Prisons: Studies Comparing Operational Costs and/or Quality of Service. United States General Accounting Office, General Government Division. Retrieved from http:// www.gao.gov/archive/1996/gg96158.pdf. 23 Lundahl, B., Kunz, C., Brownell, C., Harris, N., & Van Vleet, R. (2009). Prison Privatization: A Meta-Analysis of Cost Effectiveness and Quality of Confinement Indicators. Research on Social Work Practice, 19, Pgs. 383-395. 24 Paynter, B. (2011). Cells for Sale: Understand Prison Costs & Savings. Policy Matters Ohio. Retrieved from http://www. policymattersohio.org/pdf/CellsForSale2011.pdf. 25 Ryan, L. (2011). FY 2010 Operating Per Capita Cost Report: Cost Identification and Comparison of State and Private Contract Beds. Arizona Department of Corrections, Bureau of Planning, Budget, and Research. Retrieved from http://www. azcorrections.gov/adc/reports/ADC_FY2010_PerCapitaRep. pdf. 26 CorrectionalOfficerEdu.org (n.d.). Corrections Officer Salary. Retrieved from https://www.correctionalofficeredu.org/ salaries/. 27 Mumford, M., Schanzenbach, D., & Nunn, R. (2016). The Economics of Private Prisons. The Brookings Institute. Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/ uploads/2016/10/es_20161021_private_prisons_economics. pdf. 28 Paynter, B. (2011). See note 24. 29 Camp, S. & Gaes, G.(2001). Growth and Quality of U.S. Private Prisons: Evidence from a National Survey. Federal Bureau of Prisons, Office of Research and Evaluation. Retrieved from http://www.bop.gov/news/research_projects/published_ reports/pub_vs_priv/oreprres_note.pdf 61. 30 Lundahl, B., Kunz, C., Brownell, C., Harris, N., & Van Vleet, R. (2009). See note 23. 31 Corrections Corporation of America. (2010). 2010 annual report on form 10-K. Corrections Corporation of America. 32 Ortega, B. (2011, September 4). Arizona Prison Businesses are Big Political Contributors. The Arizona Republic. Retrieved from http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2011/09/04/2 0110904arizona-prison-businesspolitics.html; Owen, S. Director of Public Affairs, Corrections Corporation of America. (2011, September 28). Personal Communication. 33 Andrews, B. (2017, June 23). The Corrections Corporation of America is Freeing Itself from its Old Corporate Identity. Mother Jones. Retrieved from http://www.motherjones.com/ politics/2016/10/corrections-corporation-america-privateprison-rebranding/. 34 Brittain, A. & Harwell, D. (2017, October 25). Private-Prison Giant, Resurgent in Trump Era, Gathers at President’s Resort. The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www. washingtonpost.com/politics/with-business-booming-undertrump-private-prison-giant-gathers-at-presidentsresort/2017/10/25/b281d32c-adee-11e7-a908a3470754bbb9_story.html?utm_term=.4534b392073e. 35 Drake, P. (2018, April 5) State Rejects Offer Over Shelby Prison Contract. Great Falls Tribune. Retrieved from https:// www.greatfallstribune.com/story/news/2018/04/05/ state-rejects-offer-over-shelby-prison-contract/491372002/. 36 Takei, C. (2017, November 7). Private Prison Giant Core Civic Wants to Corner the Mass Incarceration ‘Market’ in the States. ACLU. Retrieved from https://www.aclu.org/blog/massincarceration/privatization-criminal-justice/private-prisongiant-corecivics-wants-corner. 37 Sheets, C. (2017, April 8) How a Private Prisons Corporation is Creeping into Alabama. AL.com. Retrieved from https:// www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2017/04/how_a_private_ prisons_corporat.html. 38 Cason, M. (2017, July 12) Alabama Prison System Renewing Contract for Reentry Program. AL.com.Retrieved from https:// www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/2017/07/post_320. html. 39 Sheets, C. (2017, April 8). How a Private Prisons Corporation is Creeping into Alabama. AL.com. Retrieved from https:// www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2017/04/how_a_private_ prisons_corporat.html. 40 Cohen, D. (2015, October 29). Minnesotans Say “No Thanks” to Private Prison Company. Huffington Post. Retrieved from https://www.huffingtonpost.com/donald-cohen/ minnesotans-say-no-thanks_b_8423918.html. 41 Associated Press. (2017, November 1). Lawyers: Out-Of-State Prison Limiting Inmate Communication. US News. Retrieved from https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/vermont/ articles/2017-11-01/lawyers-out-of-state-prison-limitinginmate-communication. 42 Associated Press. (2017, November 1). See note 41; Gaes, G. (2005). Prison Privatization in Florida: Promise, Premise, and Performance. Criminology & Public Policy, 4(1), Pgs. 83-88. 43 Private Corrections Institute. (2012). Correctional Privatization in Florida: A brief history and timeline. Private Corrections Institute. Retrieved from https://www.privateci.org/private_ pics/PCI%20policy%20brief%20on%20Florida%20private%20 prison%20history%202012.pdf. 44 Kopczynski, K., Director of Research, Florida Police Benevolent Association. (2017). Personal Interview. 45 Associated Press. (2002, February 11). Commission Finds Probable Cause Against Corrections Official. Corrections.com, Retrieved from http://www.corrections.com/articles/11708commission-finds-probable-cause-against-correctionsofficial. 46 Kopczynski, K. (2017). See note 44. 47 Francilus, J. (2012, October 15). Florida to Completely Privatize Juvenile Correctional Facilities. Huffington Post. Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/15/ florida-privatize-juvenile-detention_n_1967464.html. 48 Francilus, J. (2012, October 15). See note 47. 49 Talvi, S. (2006, September 04). Follow the Prison Money Trail. In These Times. Retrieved from http://inthesetimes.com/ article/2797/. 50 Talvi, S. (2006, September 04). See note 49. 51 Reutter, D. (2007, August 15). Prison Privatization Launders Taxpayer Dollars into Political Contributions. Prison Legal News. Retrieved from https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/ news/2007/aug/15/prison-privatization-launders-taxpayerdollars-into-political-contributions/. 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 Reutter, D. (2007, August 15). See note 51. Talvi, S. (2006, September 04). See note 49. Reutter, D. (2007, August 15). See note 51. Talvi, S. (2006, September 04). See note 49. New Mexico PBS. (2016, August 30). The Line: Private Prisons in New Mexico. New Mexico in Focus. Retrieved from http://www.newmexicopbs.org/productions/ newmexicoinfocus/the-line-private-prisons-in-new-mexico/ Talvi, S. (2006, September 04). See note 49. Haywood, P. (2017, July 25). Company Plans to Close Private Estancia Prison, Lay off 200. Santa Fe New Mexican. Retrieved from http://www.santafenewmexican.com/news/local_news/ company-plans-to-close-private-estancia-prison-lay-off/ article_1ecd4d0e-caa1-5a05-bab2-. Haywood, P. (2017, July 25). See note 58. Haywood, P. (2017, July 25). See note 58. Brown, R. (2017, September 18). Will Federal Immigration Crackdown Benefit NM’s Private Prisons? Public News Service. Retrieved from http://www.publicnewsservice.org/2017-0918/human-rights-racial-justice/will-federal-immigrationcrackdown-benefit-nms-private-prisons/a59463-1. Greene, J., Director, Justice Strategies. (2017). Personal Interview. Greene, J. (2017). See note 62. Haskell, P. (2017, June 08). New York City Divests Pension Funds From Private Prisons. CBS. Retrieved from http:// newyork.cbslocal.com/2017/06/08/nyc-pensions-privateprisons/ Associated Press. (2000, October 16). North Carolina Takes Back CCA Facilities. Corrections.com. Retrieved from http:// www.corrections.com/articles/7040-north-carolina-takesback-cca-facilities. Associated Press. (2000, October 16). See note 67. North Carolina Department of Public Safety (n.d.). Pamlico Correctional Institution. North Carolina Department of Public Safety. Retrieved from https://www2.ncdps.gov/index2.cfm? a=000003%2C002240%2C002380%2C002277. Ethridge, P. & Marquart, J. (1993). Private Prisons in Texas: The New Penology for Profit. Justice Quarterly, 10(1). Ethridge, P. & Marquart, J. (1993). See note 68. Ethridge, P. & Marquart, J. (1993). See note 68. House Research Organization. (2007, April 17). Increasing Cap on Number of Inmates in Private Prisons. House Research Organization. Retrieved from http://www.hro.house.state.tx. us/pdf/ba80r/hb0198.pdf#navpanes=0. Madden. (2007, June 15). Relating to the capacity of certain correctional facilities operated under contracts between the Texas Board of Criminal Justice and a private vendor or county commissioners court. Texas Legislature. Retrieved from http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/BillLookup/History. aspx?LegSess=80R&Bill=HB198=80R&Bill=HB198. Texas Public Policy Foundation. (2017, March 01). Right on Crime Celebrates 10 Years in Texas. Texas Public Policy Foundation. Retrieved from https://www.texaspolicy.com/ events/detail/right-on-crime-celebrates-10-years-of-criminaljustice-reform-in-texas. N. (2009, July 27). Texas Watchdog Looks at the Big Bad Private Prison Lobby [Blog Post]. Retrieved from http://www. hro.house.state.tx.us/pdf/ba80r/hb0198.pdf#navpanes=0. Burnett, J. (2011, March 28). Private Prison Promises Leave Texas Towns In Trouble. NPR. Retrieved from http://www.npr. org/2011/03/28/134855801/private-prison-promises-leavetexas-towns-in-trouble Porter, N., Director of Advocacy, The Sentencing Project. (2017). Personal Interview. Capitalizing on Mass Incarceration: U.S. Growth in Private Prisons 21 Capitalizing on Mass Incarceration: U.S. Growth in Private Prisons Kara Gotsch and Vinay Basti August 2018 Related publications by The Sentencing Project: • • • 1705 DeSales Street NW, 8th Floor Washington, D.C. 20036 Tel: 202.628.0871 Fax: 202.628.1091 sentencingproject.org Private Prisons in the United States (updated 2018) International Growth Trends in Prison Privatization (2013) Too Good to be True: Private Prisons in America (2012) The Sentencing Project works for a fair and effective U.S. justice system by promoting reforms in sentencing policy, addressing unjust racial disparities and practices, and advocating for alternatives to incarceration. DECARCERATION STRATEGIES How 5 States Achieved Substantial Prison Population Reductions For more information, contact: The Sentencing Project 1705 DeSales Street NW 8th Floor Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 628-0871 sentencingproject.org twitter.com/sentencingproj facebook.com/thesentencingproject Copyright © 2018 by The Sentencing Project. Reproduction of this document in full or in part, and in print or electronic format, only by permission of The Sentencing Project. This report was written by Dennis Schrantz, Stephen T. DeBor, and Marc Mauer. Schrantz is a corrections consultant and the former deputy director of the Michigan Department of Corrections. DeBor was the senior policy executive in charge of research, planning and automated data systems for the Michigan Department of Corrections until his retirement 36 years after joining the agency. Mauer is the Executive Director of The Sentencing Project. We thank the many policymakers and practitioners in the five states examined in this report for their willingness to engage in extensive discussions regarding the complex factors contributing to prison population reduction. The Sentencing Project is a national non-profit organization engaged in research and advocacy on criminal justice issues. Our work is supported by many individual donors and contributions from the following: Morton K. and Jane Blaustein Foundation craigslist Charitable Fund Elsie P. van Buren Foundation Ford Foundation Foundation Beyond Belief Bernard F. and Alva B. Gimbel Foundation Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund General Board of Global Ministries of the United Methodist Church JK Irwin Foundation Mott Philanthropy Open Society Foundations Overbrook Family Advised Fund Pinion Street Foundation Public Welfare Foundation Elizabeth B. and Arthur E. Roswell Foundation Tikva Grassroots Empowerment Fund of Tides Foundation Wallace Global Fund 2 The Sentencing Project TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary 5 I. Connecticut 9 II. Michigan 17 III. Mississippi 25 IV. Rhode Island 33 V. South Carolina 41 Decarceration Strategies: How 5 States Achieved Substantial Prison Population Reductions 3 4 The Sentencing Project EXECUTIVE SUMMARY From 1980 until its peak in 2009, the total federal and state prison population of the United States climbed from about 330,000 to more than 1.6 million - a nearly 400% increase - while the total general population of the country grew by only 36%, and the crime rate fell by 42%.1 The catalyst of this prison expansion was policy changes that prioritized “getting tough” on crime. The national prison population began a gradual descent after 2009, lessening by nearly 113,000 (6%) from 2009 through 2016. Several factors contributed to this decline: ongoing decreases in crime rates leading to fewer felony convictions; scaling back “war on drugs” policies; increased interest in evidence-based approaches to sentencing and reentry; and growing concerns about the fiscal cost of corrections and its impact on other state priorities. The state of California alone was responsible for 36% of the overall population decline, a function of a 2011 U.S. Supreme Court ruling declaring its overcrowded prison system to be unconstitutional and subsequent legislative responses to reduce the use of state incarceration. Despite the decline, the overall pace of change is quite modest. A recent analysis documents that at the rate of change from 2009 to 2016 it will take 75 years to reduce the prison population by half. And while 42 states have experienced declines from their peak prison populations, 20 of these declines are less than 5%, while 8 states are still experiencing rising populations.2 To aid policymakers and criminal justice officials in achieving substantial prison population reductions, this report examines the experience of five states – Connecticut, Michigan, Mississippi, Rhode Island, and South Carolina – that have achieved prison population reductions of 14-25%. This produced a cumulative total of 23,646 fewer people in prison with no adverse effects on public safety. (While a handful of other states have also experienced significant population reductions – including California, New York, and New Jersey – these have been examined in other publications, and so are not addressed here.3 The five states highlighted in this report are geographically and politically diverse and have all enacted a range of shifts in policy and practice to produce these outcomes. All five were engaged in the Justice Reinvestment Initiative process, spearheaded by the Pew Charitable Trusts and the Council on State Governments, which was designed to work with stakeholders to respond to the driving forces of prison expansion in each state and to develop strategies for change in policy and practice. This report seeks to inform stakeholders in other states of the range of policy options available to them for significantly reducing their prison population. While we provide some assessment of the political environment which contributed to these changes, we do not go into great detail in this area since stakeholders will need to make their own determinations of strategy based on the particularities of their state. We note, though, that the leaders of reform varied among states, and emerged among governors, legislators, criminal justice officials, and advocacy organizations, often benefiting from media coverage and editorial support. The prison population reductions in these five states were achieved through data-driven policy reforms that pursued bipartisan consensus. Changes were advanced in the areas of risk and needs assessment, community supervision, alternatives to incarceration, sentencing and sanctions, prison release mechanisms, prisoner reentry and community reintegration. Five key strategies and practices that were employed in these states are summarized below, followed by extensive reviews for each of the five states. Decarceration Strategies: How 5 States Achieved Substantial Prison Population Reductions 5 FIVE KEY STRATEGIES AND PRACTICES THAT REDUCED PRISON POPULATIONS 1. Measures to Get Justice Reforms Underway and Maintain Momentum • High-profile leadership, bipartisanship and inter-branch collaboration (all 5 states). • Leveraging outside technical assistance and research findings on evidence-based practices (all 5 states). • Community engagement as a foundation of successful reentry and community reintegration (CT, MI, RI). • Pilots or staged implementation as innovation incubators (CT, MI). 2. Decreased Prison Admissions via Fewer New Prison Commitments • Crime reduction helped in all 5 states – but reduced crime is no guarantee of less imprisonment. • Reductions in criminal penalties or adjusting penalties according to seriousness (all 5 states). • Elimination of various mandatory minimum sentences, sometimes retroactively (CT, MI, RI, SC). • Creation or expansion of specialty courts and/or other alternatives to incarceration (CT, MI, MS, SC). • Modifications of responses to at-risk youth to disrupt school-to-prison pipeline (CT, SC). 3. Decreased Prison Admissions via Reduced Incarceration for Failure on Community Supervision • Implementation of graduated intermediate sanctions for non-criminal violations (CT, MI, MS, SC). • Engagement with community service providers and employers before release from prison (CT, MI, RI). • State and local collaboration regarding case management and supervision (CT, MI, RI). • Greater focus on intermediate outcomes (CT, MI, RI). • Imposition of shorter terms of community supervision (MS, RI, SC). 4. Increased Prison Releases via Increasing the Feasibility and/or Efficiency Of Release • Incorporation of dynamic risk and needs assessment into justice processes (all 5 states). • Inclusion of releasing authorities in planning/implementation (CT, MI, RI, SC). • Expanded initiatives to overcome barriers to the feasibility of release (CT, MI, RI, SC). • Conditional release approval earlier in the process before eligibility for release (CT, MI, RI). • Feedback to releasing authorities regarding outcomes to build trust in reentry (CT, MI, RI). • Centralized reentry planning, trained specialists, and a goal of release at first opportunity (CT, MI, MS). • Simplified and/or expedited release processing especially when backlogs in processing (CT, MI, RI). 5. Increased Prison Releases via Requiring Less Time Served Before Eligibility for Release • Allowance or expansion of sentence credits through a variety of measures (CT, MS, RI, SC). • Reduction of criminal penalties even though still prison-bound (CT, MI, SC). • Modifications to sentence enhancements for aggravating factors (MS, SC). • Reductions in time served prior to eligibility for repeat paroles after revocation (MI, MS). 6 The Sentencing Project LESSONS LEARNED Even with the population reductions achieved in these states, they continue to have prison populations that average more than three times those of 1980. Most of these jurisdictions expect to make additional gains based on current trends and justice reforms, but much of the changes enacted to date are experiencing diminishing returns and the next layer of effort will be even more challenging. • It is critical to target specific goals such as reduction of racial disparity: Explicit attention and goal setting must be focused on problems meant to be impacted by justice reform, as evidenced by only modest progress in these states on alleviating racial disparity (and primarily as a by-product of the reforms rather than because of directly addressing the problem). A couple of the states are now targeting the lessening of racial disparity as a new goal. • The promise of Justice Reinvestment needs to be re-examined and augmented with other achievable and significant goals: The original concept of Justice Reinvestment referred to the goal of routing back into distressed communities the savings generated by closing prisons to address the precursors to crime and help neighborhoods recover from overuse of incarceration by financing housing, health care, education, and jobs. While most of these states have been successful in transferring resources within the justice system from prisons to community supervision, the goal of achieving broader redistribution of resources remains. • Broad reforms require additional focus on issues beyond prison population reduction: Overcoming barriers to enable sustained or deeper prison population reductions include the need for: To advance decarceration further these and other jurisdictions will need to heed six lessons that we’ve learned from the states that have been successful in achieving effective and sustainable prison population reduction reforms: • • Adequate funding is critical to achieving reforms: Acquiring supplemental funding for implementation was a commonly reported obstacle to compliance with statutory requirements enacted in the state reforms. Mandates without sufficient dollars for implementation inevitably meant that some reforms were delayed, failed to achieve the full benefits, or were never implemented. Projected cost savings are difficult to achieve and actual savings are often overstated: Projections of the anticipated impact of reforms were occasionally off-the-mark. This was especially true of forecasts regarding expected cost savings, in part because of either faulty assumptions or overly optimistic projections of the benefits, but also because of offsetting cost increases in other areas that were either missed or unanticipated when calculating presumed impact – such as escalating prison health care costs. • Post-incarceration employment solutions – still a struggling metric critical to reentry success. • Release and reentry solutions for more serious or higher risk cases – typically excluded from reforms. • Adequate community funding solutions – a poor stepchild compared to state-level reforms. • Rigorous monitoring and evaluation of justice reform implementation to propel change. Prison Population Reductions in the Five States Peak Prison Population Peak Year Population Prison Population Year-End 2016 Connecticut 2007 19,438 Michigan 2006 Mississippi State Reduction in Prison Population Decrease % Change 14,532 -4,096 -25.2% 51,454 41,122 -10,332 -20.1% 2008 22,831 18,833 -3,998 -17.5% Rhode Island 2008 4,045 3,103 -942 -23.3% South Carolina 2008 24,326 20,858 -3,468 -14.3% Decarceration Strategies: How 5 States Achieved Substantial Prison Population Reductions 7 • Enhancing penalties for violent offenses reduces the impact of sentencing reforms: Policymakers in some states have enacted harsher penalties for violent offenses as part of a reform “package” that includes reduced penalties for non-violent offenses. This is a problematic strategy for two reasons: 1) it inherently reduces the potential decarceration impact of sentencing reform; and, 2) research has documented that enhancing already harsh sentences adds little crime deterrent effect and produces diminishing returns for incapacitation effects. Policymakers around the country have much to learn from the population reduction successes of the five states documented in this report, as well as others that have achieved double-digit reductions in recent years. While crime rates have declined in all states during the period examined in this report, many states have only experienced a modest decline in prison populations and some are still experiencing growing populations. This reinforces the finding that just as prison populations rose during the 1980s and 1990s due to policy choices, so too can they decline as policymakers adopt targeted goals and strategies. 1. 2. 3. The national crime rate declined consistently throughout the 37-year period, except for a gradual uptick of 17% between 1985 and 1991 (during which the rate remained lower than in 1980). Nazgol Ghandnoosh, (March 2018). Can We Wait 75 Years to Cut the Prison Population in Half? The Sentencing Project: https://www. sentencingproject.org/publications/can-wait-75-years-cut-prison-population-half/ The handful of other states that have also experienced similar reductions since their peak populations includes: California, Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Indiana, New Jersey, New York, Massachusetts, and Vermont. Examples of the research and media attention that some of the larger states have already received include the following: • Fewer prisoners, less crime: A tale of three states: https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Fewer-Prisoners-LessCrime-A-Tale-of-Three-States.pdf • California, New York & New Jersey crime rates and prisoners plunge: https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2016/aug/4/california-new-yorknew-jersey-crime-rates-prisoners-plunge/ • How three states are beating the prison population boom: http://maltajusticeinitiative.org/how-three-states-are-beating-the-prison-populationboom/ • The mass incarceration problem in America: https://news.vice.com/article/the-mass-incarceration-problem-in-america • Overcrowding and overuse of imprisonment in the United States: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/RuleOfLaw/OverIncarceration/ACLU. pdf 8 The Sentencing Project CONNECTICUT 25% PRISON POPULATION REDUCTION FROM 2007-2016 KEY PRISON POPULATION TRENDS SINCE 2007 • Prison population: -25% through calendar 2016 to 14,532 from 19,438 in 2007. • Index crime rate: -27% through 2016 – including both violent and property crime rates – pushing overall crime in Connecticut to a 50-year low.1 • Arrests: -32% through 2016.2 • New prison commitments: -27% through 2016. • Returns to prison: -55% through 2016 across all community release violator return types.3 • Downsizing: Closure of 3 correctional facilities, a juvenile detention center, and housing units in 3 other facilities. • Cost savings: $39.8 million per year estimated savings generated by closed facilities and units.4 BACKGROUND Since 1980, increases in Connecticut’s prison population5 resulted in overcrowding and contributed to the state’s growing budget crisis. Beginning in 1999, Connecticut’s Department of Corrections transferred hundreds of people to prisons in Virginia, including a “supermax” where two men died over 18 months. The transfers resulted in a lawsuit from the American Civil Liberties Union, protests back home from family members, a critical report from the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, and an investigation of mental health conditions at the facility by the Connecticut Office of Protection and Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities. In 2001, under pressure, the state announced it would stop transfers to the supermax prison but continue to house people in another Virginia facility. In 2004, Connecticut, which has a unified system with all forms of supervision, detention, and incarceration under state authority, took a different approach. It became the first state in the nation to pass bipartisan legislation through the Justice Reinvestment Initiative (JRI), developed by the Council of State Governments and the Pew Charitable Trusts/Center for the States to help states stabilize their corrections population and reduce expenditures. The JRI in Connecticut resulted in a reform package, the “Act Concerning Prison Overcrowding,” which increased prison releases, reduced probation and parole technical violator admissions to prison, and reduced overall lengths of stay. Some of the savings were expected to be reallocated into reentry programs and community supervision. The legislative package was projected to end prison population growth and even reduce the prison population by up to 2,000 over time.6 By year-end 2005, the prison population had indeed decreased by 3% (-594) and Connecticut had stopped sending prisoners out of state. Decarceration Strategies: How 5 States Achieved Substantial Prison Population Reductions 9 However, an 8% resurgence in the prison population (+1,510) occurred from 2006-2007, driven by public reaction to a high-profile case involving the murder of three family members during a home invasion committed by two persons on parole supervision. The state responded with a ban on parole for individuals with violent histories, and other stringent measures, such as classification of home invasion as a violent crime, and expanded penalties for repeat offenses.7 A 351% increase in the Connecticut prison population from 1980 to 2007 resulted in a record high population. The related costs of increased incarceration served as a catalyst for change as the state embarked on an unprecedented era of justice reform. The efforts led to successful legislative and executive actions that contributed directly to reducing crime, lowering the prison population, and decreasing costs. Continuing leadership by Governor Dannel P. Malloy helped maintain and reinforce the state’s results. In 2015, the Governor initiated Connecticut’s “Second Chance Society” (a collection of both innovative reentry strategies and bipartisan legislative reforms), which has boosted the momentum for change.8 The Commissioner of Corrections, Scott Semple, praised the governor’s efforts: Governor Malloy has expended enormous political capital on corrections reform and he’s made it a hallmark of his administration… trying to bring the culture along and giving the Department of Correction the opportunity to implement change… and he has even pushed many colleagues in other states regarding the Second Chance Society concepts.9 JUSTICE REFORM LEADERSHIP Connecticut’s executive branch took important steps in 2006 and 2007 to analyze and improve the state’s criminal justice system. A Criminal Justice Policy and Planning Division was created within the Governor’s Office of Policy and Management and a Connecticut Sentencing and Parole Review Task Force was formed. These initiatives built on sustained advocacy for drug policy and criminal justice reform by Community Partners in Action, the Drug Policy Alliance, and other key groups in the state. Connecticut’s organizational efforts at comprehensive planning, combined with the advocacy of the state’s top leadership, have produced a broad array of ongoing initiatives that with steadily declining crime rates have reduced the prison population nearly every year since 2007. Connecticut Prison Population, 2003-2016 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 Source: Online State Data 10 The Sentencing Project 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 0 HOW CONNECTICUT REDUCED THE SIZE OF ITS PRISON POPULATION Over the past 10 years Connecticut policymakers have adopted four intervention methods that have been shown to reduce prison populations through a combination of bipartisan legislative justice reform, judicial discretion, and executive action. A key theme of the reform effort is the importance of reducing the number of young people entering the criminal justice system. Given the high rate of recidivism for people sentenced to prison, officials in the state believe that stemming the flow of new admissions can produce substantial short-term and long-term results. Initiatives designed to accomplish this goal have included “raise the age” legislation, addressing the “school to prison pipeline,” and expanding community engagement. Increased releases from prison • Established Community Release Unit to shift release decisions and transition planning from custody staff to professionals trained in reentry processes, as well as establishing discharge planners in every facility; resulted in increased parole approval rates, shortened wait times for release, and coordinated reentry programming; • Enacted Risk Reduction Earned Credit program to allow sentence reductions of five days per month for program participation. Reduced returns to prison • Key changes in policy and practice included: Focus on reducing young people’s contact with the criminal justice system • • Reduced youth arrests by 63% from 2009-2016 by adopting policy changes to reduce school suspensions and expulsions, and changing criteria for detention. Impact extended to young adults as well, with a 60% reduction in corrections pretrial admissions for defendants under 25, compared to a 31% reduction for those 25 and older; Achieved a 55% reduction in returns to prison, accounting for more than a third of the overall admissions decline, by strengthening collaboration between reentry staff and local officials in the state’s major urban communities; this led to the creation of reentry councils and focus on higher risk and higher need cases Enacted statutory changes • The legislature eliminated mandatory sentences and reclassified certain drug possession crimes to misdemeanors Adopted Raise the Age legislation to successively raise the age of adult jurisdiction from 16 to 18. Decarceration Strategies: How 5 States Achieved Substantial Prison Population Reductions 11 A. Increasing the Feasibility and/or Efficiency of Release Nearly 50% of Connecticut’s prison population reduction occurred after 2013, primarily due to the accumulating impacts of more effective prisoner reentry coordination brought about by executive action to support the Second Chance Society concepts. One set of those concepts is to ensure that release from incarceration can be responsibly earned, efficiently approved, and made to happen as close to first eligibility for release as reasonably possible. The change which led to the largest increase in prison releases after 2013, was the creation of a Community Release Unit in 2015 within the existing authority of the Department of Correction (DOC). This Unit centralized reentry planning by shifting the release decision and movement to transition services from custody staff to specialized professionals trained in reentry processes. Centralized reentry planning in addition to standardized decision-making and accountability improved the coordination of reentry programming, increased release approval rates, and improved administrative efficiencies to shorten wait times for release. These changes led to both a significant increase in the prison release rate and, as an added benefit, fewer negative incidents during the shortened waiting period. Adding to the impact of these reforms has been the development of processes for graduated reductions in security classification in advance of transfers to the reintegration unit, and placing “discharge planners” in every facility.10 Efforts to restructure parole processing in Connecticut have also contributed to an estimated 15% of the overall prison population reduction since 2007: • Starting in 2007 the Sentencing and Parole Review Task Force conducted a comprehensive review of release and supervision processes. They recommended changes to strengthen decisionmaking and improve efficiency including, “…the elimination of administrative reviews, the establishment of full panel hearings for all parole cases, an expansion of staffing, and a greater utilization of information and communications technology.”11 In response to their 12 The Sentencing Project recommendations, the Board of Pardons and Parole reorganized and streamlined the parole process, lifted the temporary ban on parole consideration for violent offenses, and reinstated a 45-day reentry furlough pre-release readiness process for end-ofsentence cases. As a result, the backlog of paroleeligible cases was significantly reduced. • The Second Chance Society initiative also contributed to the efficiency of releases after 2013 by statutorily establishing a simplified pardon process and expedited parole hearings for nonviolent offenses.12 B. Reduced Incarceration for Failure on Community Supervision Another set of Second Chance Society concepts focuses on reducing returns to prison. The 55% reduction in returns to prison in Connecticut accounts for more than a third of the state’s overall decrease in admissions. After working for a number of years to broaden the range of sanctions and diversionary alternatives for community release violators, when the DOC centralized its reentry decision-making and implementation, it also took steps to increase local collaboration. This was most evident in the state’s major urban communities, including New Haven, Hartford, and Bridgeport. The improvements included providing communities with advance information and data about pending releases and better alignment of services with other state nonjustice agencies. This concentrated focus on achieving local buy-in resulted in partnerships with urban mayors who became more proactive about reentry. They formed reentry councils that assisted with higher risk and higher need cases through their community provider networks. Local reentry program funding from non-justice agencies allowed community service providers to blend resources with services and funding from many different partners and to determine on a case-by-case basis the details of improved individualized case planning and management. Actual reinvestment of cost savings as a result of prison population reductions has been difficult to achieve due to ongoing state budget challenges, particularly the costs of health interventions. Consequently, the primary focus is on continued crime reduction to preserve progress. The need for more community engagement to focus on higher-risk cases has been partly addressed by adding more DOC staff and lowering caseloads to enable greater opportunity for interaction with community advocates and providers on the specific risks and needs of each case. This individualized approach to crime reduction has resulted in positive outcomes, while safely mitigating the prison population crisis created in response to the notorious 2007 murders.13 C. Fewer New Prison Commitments New court commitments to prison in Connecticut have declined since 2007 for two primary reasons: (1) the state’s strategic effort to reduce youth crime in order to break the pattern of repeated re-incarceration (data shows that if an individual is not sentenced to prison by age 25, then it’s likely they never will be), have led to a 27% lower index crime rate overall; and, (2) new statutory initiatives which address the drivers of crime and provide new approaches when crimes occur: • Raise the Age legislation was adopted, which increased the age of adult criminal jurisdiction in Connecticut from age 16 to 17 in 2010 and then to age 18 in 2012. The legislation was augmented with policy changes to reduce school suspensions and expulsions, conduct juvenile assessments via juvenile review boards, and change criteria for detention.14 As a result of this change in approach for handling at-risk youth, 2009-2016 arrests for youth under age 18 decreased by 63% and incarceration by 77%,15 directly impacting prison admissions. The impact appears to extend even beyond the youngest at-risk youth (those 18 and under), as the ongoing decline in Connecticut prison admissions is notable for a reduction in the number of young adults as well.16 For example, between 2008 and 2015 new admissions to DOC on pretrial status fell by 31% for defendants 25 and older, but were reduced by 60% for defendants under 25 years of age.17 • The Connecticut General Assembly passed other justice reform legislation over the years to enact changes in the state’s responses to crime, such as the elimination of mandatory minimum sentences, and reclassification of nonviolent drug possession to a misdemeanor. A Driving Under the Influence (DUI) Home Confinement Program18 that was instituted in 2012 resulted in fewer incarcerations and reduced recidivism.19 These statutory changes were the result of long-term advocacy both within the state government and from outside non-profit groups. Both promoted reforms to drug treatment policy, drunk driving diversion, and other alternatives to incarceration. These efforts have contributed to fewer new court commitments via diversion, more effective sanctions/programs, and shorter lengths of stay for those sentenced to prison. D. Requiring Less Time Served Before Eligibility for Release In 2011, a statutorily enacted Risk Reduction Earned Credit (RREC) program was established to allow for a sentence reduction of up to five days per month for adherence to program accountability plans and participating in a specified set of treatment programs and/or educational classes. Negative behaviors led to revocation of the credits. Thousands of qualified individuals earned relatively modest numbers of credits under this program, yet the cumulative effects shortened lengths of stay and increased releases to the community. Despite these increased releases, returns to prison for violations declined an average of 21% following enactment of the RREC program. 20 Additional reduction in time-served factors that increased Connecticut releases in recent years include expanded use of Transitional Placement (with peaks of 100-250 individuals in approved community placements or private residences following successful halfway house terms) and some early releases to non-prison nursing homes for prisoners with Medicaid eligibility. The latter strategy grew out of legislation permitting the DOC authority, “…to release the severely incapacitated for ‘palliative and end of life’ care.” 21 Decarceration Strategies: How 5 States Achieved Substantial Prison Population Reductions 13 IMPACT ON RACIAL DISPARITY Racial disparity persists in justice system populations throughout the country, as individuals of color have long been convicted in numbers disproportionate to their presence in the general population. Connecticut is no exception, but the 25% reduction in the state’s prison population between 2007 and 2016 did modestly reduce racial disparity within the system. Department of Correction officials noted that the reduction in racial disparity was mostly a by-product of the overall prison population decline. However, it is clear that policy changes certainly contributed, in large part due to the disproportionate representation of people of color at the affected points of the justice system, including: • Changes made to drug sentencing and mandatory minimum sentencing; • Raise the Age legislation – where there was a large disparity in the impacted age group; • Bail bond reform – where there was a 3:1 people of color-to-white ratio in bond denial; • Enacting Project Longevity to address gun violence – adopted in the major cities by identifying and serving young people who are the most likely to become involved; and, • Establishing local reentry councils which supported solutions from people formerly incarcerated that were incorporated by Connecticut criminal justice agencies. Despite the modest reduction in racial disparity, incarceration rates for black residents remain 9 times higher, and for Hispanic residents 4 times higher, than for white residents of Connecticut. The Governor supports examining and addressing the issue in proactive, direct ways. For instance, Connecticut applied for and received a $2.5 million Safety and Justice Challenge grant in 2016 from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The project is working to address racial imbalance in pretrial jail facilities due to disparities in the rates of custodial arrest in urban communities of color. 14 The Sentencing Project Improving racial balance in the pretrial facilities is expected to carry over into the prisons as well since incarcerated people pass through the Connecticut pretrial settings to prison.22 Among the pretrial reforms to be implemented is a court processing pilot to divert defendants, reduce lengths of stay, screen and refer to detention alternatives, and expand diversion programs. In addition, the state has proposed to expand implicit bias training for police, prosecutors, public defenders, community providers, and key decision makers and to evaluate current racial and ethnic disparities in order to establish a baseline for improvement. 23 POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT FOR REFORMS Connecticut officials indicated that most of these legislative reforms have been bipartisan, with the added benefit of strategic leadership by Governor Malloy and the Undersecretary for the Criminal Justice Policy and Planning Division, Michael Lawlor, who made them a priority. Lawlor previously served as a long-term and respected co-chair of the Judiciary Committee in the General Assembly. Support for the reform agenda is also credited to the state’s unified criminal justice system. Local stakeholders who commonly present opposition in other states, either do not exist in Connecticut (county sheriffs) or are not elected (prosecutors). The state budget crises also helped bring all sides to the table. Early successes increased confidence in the potential for further reform. Significant ongoing decreases in crime rates curbed the potential for opposition as well. And lastly, the nature of the reforms – and their impact – helped to solidify support: • Raise the Age statutory change resulted in reduced imprisonment and continued crime declines; • Enactment of risk reduction earned credits was somewhat controversial, so adjustments were made to ease political opposition; and • The DUI home confinement program was supported through a partnership with Mothers Against Drunk Driving, which reduced pushback. There has been little resistance to prison closings in the state. Connecticut is a small and densely populated state, and the prison facilities are close to each other. None of the affected communities are inordinately dependent on prisons economically, and staff reductions have been through attrition. In the 1990s, 10,000 prison beds were added in the state, and at that time, new employees could retire with full pensions after 20 years. It is now 20 years later, so many retirements coincided with the facility closings and no layoffs have been necessary.24 • The female prison population has been comparatively flat, so a commensurate 25% reduction among women would reduce the overall prison population further. DOC officials indicated they may be able to address the unique risks and needs for women within a year. • A statutorily required Juvenile Justice Policy and Oversight Committee regularly provides additional policy and process recommendations. One consideration is to “raise the age” for juvenile jurisdiction as high as age 21 (which the governor supports). In addition, an innovative project was adapted from Germany in 2017. “Emerging adults” (ages 18-24 years old) receive services based on best practices (such as bringing in mentors, increasing family engagement, and shifting the culture as to staff responsibilities) that help reduce impulsivity and behavioral incidents, which also reduces recidivism. • Bail reform may reduce the incarcerated population by another 250 individuals.27 PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER DECLINE In January 2017, the Connecticut Office of Policy and Management (OPM) within the Governor’s Office reported: Our expectation, today, is that the prison population will continue to decline over the coming year… due to the fact that the system, as a whole, is contracting. Virtually every measure from criminal arrests to discharges has tracked consistently lower over the past several years. Taken in sum, these factors suggest that the prison population, barring any major external developments, is heading down... the most pressing question is when will the population bottom out.25 The expectation of continued prison population reduction in 2017 has been borne out. As of October 2017, Connecticut’s prison population was approaching 14,000 - another 4% drop since 2016. The projection is for this trend to continue and additional bed closings are forecast for 2018. Undersecretary Lawlor (whose agency conducts the data analyses and projections for the system) observed that “the school to prison pipeline is fading,” as the numbers of 18-21 year-olds in the justice system in Connecticut have become progressively smaller for years.26 Connecticut officials expressed optimism that the efforts that led to a 25% population reduction from 2007 to 2016 can be enhanced, and they can achieve a 50% reduction in the coming years. There is a recognition that to do so will require not only further evolution of reentry practices but also expanding the measures to address populations that are perceived as more challenging. This includes individuals convicted of serious and/or repeat offenses, but for whom excessively lengthy prison terms have become counterproductive. DOC officials have indicated that “low-hanging fruit” remains for addressing additional prison population control mechanisms that can sustain the downward trend for some time: Decarceration Strategies: How 5 States Achieved Substantial Prison Population Reductions 15 Endnotes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. Dixon, K. (2016, September 11). Prison populations at 20-year low. CT Post, Retrieved from http://www.ctpost.com/local/article/Prison-populationsat-20-year-low-9212542.php The crime rate and arrest statistics used in this publication are based on data reported by the U.S. DOJ FBI Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program. The calendar year-end population data are based on data from Connecticut. The calendar year statistics on admissions and releases used in this publication are based on data reported by the U.S. DOJ BJS National Statistics (NPS) program for consistency of definitions and timeframes. Statistics self-published by the states are sometimes based on varied definitional criteria, and either on monthly averages or on fiscal years for which the start/end points can vary depending on the state. Dixon (n 1). Connecticut is a unified system with all forms of supervision, detention and incarceration under state authority. CSG Justice Center. (2014, April). Joint informational hearing, CT judiciary and appropriations committees. Council of State Governments, Retrieved from https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/CT-Justice-Reinvestment-Informational.pdf CT Office of Policy & Management. (2008). Annual report: Connecticut prison population projection study, Retrieved from http://www.ct.gov/opm/lib/ opm/cjppd/cjresearch/populationforecast/20080305_forecastingfinal.pdf NYT Editorial Board. (2016, January 4). Connecticut’s Second-Chance Society. The New York Times, Retrieved from https://www.nytimes. com/2016/01/04/opinion/connecticuts-second-chance-society.html?_r=0 Connecticut state contact interviews via phone, October, 2017. Kuzyk, I., Baudoin, K. & Bobula, K. (2016, September 29). Connecticut’s declining prison population: Some contributing factors. CT Office of Policy & Management, Retrieved from http://www.ct.gov/opm/lib/opm/cjppd/cjcjpac/20160930connecticuts_declining_prison_population.pdf and Connecticut state contact interviews via phone, October, 2017. CT Office of Policy & Management. (2010). Annual correctional population forecast report. NYT Editorial Board. (2016). Connecticut’s Second-Chance Society. Connecticut state contact interviews via phone, October, 2017. Connecticut state contact interviews via phone, October, 2017. Kuzyk, I., et al. (2016). Connecticut’s declining prison population. Connecticut state contact interviews via phone, October, 2017. Kuzyk, I., et al. (2016). Connecticut’s declining prison population. Connecticut’s DUI Home Confinement Program includes features such as house arrest, car locks, ability to continue to work, etc. Connecticut state contact interviews via phone, October, 2017. CT Office of Policy & Management. (2013, February). Prison population projection, Retrieved from http://www.ct.gov/opm/lib/opm/cjppd/cjresearch/ populationforecast/prison_pop_projection_february_2013_pdf.pdf Law, V. (2014, January 19). If the risk is low, let them go: Efforts to resolve the growing numbers of aging behind bars. Truthout, Retrieved from http:// www.truth-out.org/news/item/21120-if-the-risk-is-low-let-them-go-efforts-to-resolve-the-growing-numbers-of-aging-behind-bars Connecticut state contact interviews via phone, October, 2017. Safety and justice challenge fact sheet. (2016, April). Retrieved from http://www.safetyandjusticechallenge.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/ Connecticut-Safety-Justice-Challenge-Fact-Sheet.pdf Connecticut state contact interviews via phone, October, 2017. CT Office of Policy & Management. (2010, January). Monthly indicators report, Retrieved from http://www.ct.gov/opm/lib/opm/cjppd/cjresearch/ monthlyindicators/monthlyindicatorsreport_jan_2017_final.pdf Connecticut state contact interviews via phone, October, 2017. Connecticut state contact interviews via phone, October, 2017. 16 The Sentencing Project MICHIGAN 20% PRISON POPULATION REDUCTION FROM 2006-2016 KEY PRISON POPULATION TRENDS SINCE 2006 • Prison population: -20% through calendar 2016 to 41,122 from 51,454 in 2006. • Index crime rate: -37% through 2016 – including both violent (-19%) and property (-41%) crime rat...
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