Discourses on Livy by Niccolo Machiavelli
DISCOURSES ON LIVY
By Nicolo Machiavelli
The Federalist Papers Project
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Table of Contents
DISCOURSES ON THE FIRST DECADE OF TITUS LIVIUS..............................................................8
BOOK I.......................................................................................................................................8
PREFACE....................................................................................................................................8
CHAPTER I.—Of the Beginnings of Cities in general, and in particular of that of Rome. .........9
CHAPTER II.—Of the various kinds of Government; and to which of them the Roman
Commonwealth belonged. .....................................................................................................12
CHAPTER III.—Of the Accidents which led in Rome to the creation of Tribunes of the
People; whereby the Republic was made more perfect. .......................................................15
CHAPTER IV.—That the Dissensions between the Senate and Commons of Rome, made
Rome free and powerful.........................................................................................................16
CHAPTER V.—Whether the Guardianship of public Freedom is safer in the hands of the
Commons or of the Nobles; and whether those who seek to acquire Power or they who seek
to maintain it are the greater cause of Commotions. ............................................................18
CHAPTER VI.—Whether it was possible in Rome to contrive such a Government as would
have composed the Differences between the Commons and the Senate. .............................19
CHAPTER VII.—That to preserve Liberty in a State there must exist the Right to accuse. .....23
CHAPTER VIII.—That Calumny is as hurtful in a Commonwealth as the power to accuse is
useful. .....................................................................................................................................25
CHAPTER IX.—That to give new Institutions to a Commonwealth, or to reconstruct old
Institutions on an entirely new basis, must be the work of one Man.....................................27
CHAPTER X.—That in proportion as the Founder of a Kingdom or Commonwealth merits
Praise, he who founds a Tyranny deserves Blame. .................................................................29
CHAPTER XI.—Of the Religion of the Romans. .......................................................................31
CHAPTER XII.—That it is of much moment to make account of Religion; and that Italy,
through the Roman Church, being wanting therein, has been ruined. .................................33
CHAPTER XIII.—Of the use the Romans made of Religion in giving Institutions to their City, in
carrying out their Enterprises, and in quelling Tumults..........................................................35
CHAPTER XIV.—That the Romans interpreted the Auspices to meet the occasion; and made
a prudent show of observing the Rites of Religion even when forced to disregard them; and
any who rashly slighted Religion they punished.....................................................................37
CHAPTER XV.—How the Samnites, as a last resource in their broken Fortunes, had recourse
to Religion. ..............................................................................................................................38
CHAPTER XVI.—That a People accustomed to live under a Prince, if by any accident it
become free, can hardly preserve that Freedom. ...................................................................39
CHAPTER XVII.—That a corrupt People obtaining Freedom can hardly preserve it. ..............41
CHAPTER XVIII.—How a Free Government existing in a corrupt City may be preserved, or not
existing may be created..........................................................................................................43
CHAPTER XIX.—After a strong Prince a weak Prince may maintain himself: but after one
weak Prince no Kingdom can stand a second.........................................................................45
CHAPTER XX.—That the consecutive Reigns of two valiant Princes produce great results: and
that well-ordered Commonwealths are assured of a Succession of valiant Rulers by whom
their Power and Growth are rapidly extended. ......................................................................47
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CHAPTER XXI.—That it is a great reproach to a Prince or to a Commonwealth to be without
a national Army. .....................................................................................................................47
CHAPTER XXII.—What is to be noted in the combat of the three Roman Horatii and the three
Alban Curiatii. .........................................................................................................................48
CHAPTER XXIII.—That we should never hazard our whole Fortunes where we put not forth
our entire Strength; for which reason to guard a Defile is often hurtful. ...............................49
CHAPTER XXIV.—That well-ordered States always provide Rewards and Punishments for
their Citizens; and never set off Deserts against Misdeeds. ...................................................50
CHAPTER XXV.—That he who would reform the Institutions of a free State, must retain at
least the semblance of old Ways. ...........................................................................................51
CHAPTER XXVI.—A new Prince in a City or Province of which he has taken Possession, ought
to make Everything new. ........................................................................................................52
CHAPTER XXVII.—That Men seldom know how to be wholly good or wholly bad. ................53
CHAPTER XXVIII.—Whence it came that the Romans were less ungrateful to their Citizens
than were the Athenians. .......................................................................................................54
CHAPTER XXIX.—Whether a People or a Prince is the more ungrateful. ...............................54
CHAPTER XXX.—How Princes and Commonwealths may avoid the vice of Ingratitude; and
how a Captain or Citizen may escape being undone by it. .....................................................57
CHAPTER XXXI.—That the Roman Captains were never punished with extreme severity for
Misconduct; and where loss resulted to the Republic merely through their Ignorance or
Want of Judgment, were not punished at all. ........................................................................58
CHAPTER XXXII.—That a Prince or Commonwealth should not delay conferring Benefits until
they are themselves in difficulties. .........................................................................................59
CHAPTER XXXIII.—When a Mischief has grown up in, or against a State, it is safer to
temporize with than to meet it with Violence. .......................................................................60
CHAPTER XXXIV.—That the authority of the Dictator did good and not harm to the Roman
Republic: and that it is not those Powers which are given by the free suffrages of the People,
but those which ambitious Citizens usurp for themselves, that are pernicious to a State. ....62
CHAPTER XXXV—Why the Creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, although brought about by
the free and open Suffrage of the Citizens, was hurtful to the Liberties of that Republic ......63
CHAPTER XXXVI.—That Citizens who have held the higher Offices of a Commonwealth
should not disdain the lower. .................................................................................................65
CHAPTER XXXVII.—Of the Mischief bred in Rome by the Agrarian Law: and how it is a great
source of disorder in a Commonwealth to pass a Law opposed to ancient Usage and with
stringent retrospective Effect. ................................................................................................65
CHAPTER XXXVIII.—That weak Republics are irresolute and undecided; and that the course
they may take depends more on Necessity than Choice. .......................................................68
CHAPTER XXXIX.—That often the same Accidents are seen to befall different Nations. .......70
CHAPTER XL.—Of the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and what therein is to be noted.
Wherein among other Matters is shown how the same Causes may lead to the Safety or to
the Ruin of a Commonwealth. ................................................................................................71
CHAPTER XLI.—That it is unwise to pass at a bound from leniency to severity, or to a
haughty bearing from a humble. ............................................................................................75
CHAPTER XLII.—How easily Men become corrupted. .............................................................75
CHAPTER XLIII.—That Men fighting in their own Cause make good and resolute Soldiers. ..75
CHAPTER XLIV.—That the Multitude is helpless without a Head: and that we should not with
the same breath threaten and ask leave. ...............................................................................76
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CHAPTER XLV.—That it is of evil example, especially in the Maker of a Law, not to observe
the Law when made: and that daily to renew acts of injustice in a City is most hurtful to the
Governor. ................................................................................................................................77
CHAPTER XLVI.—That Men climb from one step of Ambition to another, seeking at first to
escape Injury and then to injure others. .................................................................................78
CHAPTER XLVII.—That though Men deceive themselves in Generalities, in Particulars they
judge truly...............................................................................................................................79
CHAPTER XLVIII.—He who would not have an Office bestowed on some worthless or wicked
Person, should contrive that it be solicited by one who is utterly worthless and wicked, or
else by one who is in the highest degree noble and good. .....................................................82
CHAPTER XLIX.—That if Cities which, like Rome, had their beginning in Freedom, have had
difficulty in framing such Laws as would preserve their Freedom, Cities which at the first
have been in Subjection will find this almost impossible........................................................82
CHAPTER L.—That neither any Council nor any Magistrate should have power to bring the
Government of a City to a stay. ..............................................................................................84
CHAPTER LI.—What a Prince or Republic does of Necessity, should seem to be done by
Choice. ....................................................................................................................................85
CHAPTER LII.—That to check the arrogance of a Citizen who is growing too powerful in a
State, there is no safer Method, or less open to objection, than to forestall him in those
Ways whereby he seeks to advance himself. .........................................................................85
CHAPTER LIII.—That the People, deceived by a false show of Advantage, often desire what
would be their Ruin; and that large Hopes and brave Promises easily move them. ..............87
CHAPTER LIV.—Of the boundless Authority which a great Man may use to restrain an
excited Multitude....................................................................................................................89
CHAPTER LV.—That Government is easily carried on in a City wherein the body of the People
is not corrupted: and that a Princedom is impossible where Equality prevails, and a Republic
where it does not. ...................................................................................................................90
CHAPTER LVI.—That when great Calamities are about to befall a City or Country, Signs are
seen to presage, and Seers arise who foretell them. ..............................................................93
CHAPTER LVII.—That the People are strong collectively, but individually weak. ...................94
CHAPTER LVIII.—That a People is wiser and more constant than a Prince ............................95
CHAPTER LIX.—To what Leagues or Alliances we may most trust; whether those we make
with Commonwealths or those we make with Princes. ..........................................................99
CHAPTER LX.—That the Consulship and all the other Magistracies in Rome were given
without respect to Age. ........................................................................................................100
BOOK II..................................................................................................................................101
PREFACE................................................................................................................................101
CHAPTER I.—Whether the Empire acquired by the Romans was more due to Valour or to
Fortune. ................................................................................................................................103
CHAPTER II.—With what Nations the Romans had to contend, and how stubborn these were
in defending their Freedom. .................................................................................................106
CHAPTER III.—That Rome became great by destroying the Cities which lay round about her,
and by readily admitting strangers to the rights of Citizenship. ..........................................110
CHAPTER IV.—That Commonwealths have followed three Methods for extending their
Power. ...................................................................................................................................111
CHAPTER V.—That changes in Sects and Tongues, and the happening of Floods and
Pestilences, obliterate the Memory of the Past....................................................................115
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CHAPTER VI.—Of the Methods followed by the Romans in making War.............................116
CHAPTER VII.—Of the Quantity of Land assigned by the Romans to each Colonist. ............118
CHAPTER VIII.—Why certain Nations leave their ancestral Seats and overflow the Countries
of others................................................................................................................................118
CHAPTER IX.—Of the Causes which commonly give rise to Wars between States. .............121
CHAPTER X.—That contrary to the vulgar opinion, Money is not the Sinews of War. .........122
CHAPTER XI.—That it were unwise to ally yourself a Prince who has Reputation rather than
Strength. ...............................................................................................................................124
CHAPTER XII.—Whether when Invasion is imminent it is better to anticipate or to await it.
..............................................................................................................................................125
CHAPTER XIII.—That Men rise from humble to high Fortunes rather by Fraud than by Force.
..............................................................................................................................................128
CHAPTER XIV.—That Men often err in thinking they can subdue Pride by Humility. ...........129
CHAPTER XV.—That weak States are always dubious in their Resolves; and that tardy
Resolves are always hurtful. .................................................................................................130
CHAPTER XVI.—That the Soldiers of our days depart widely from the methods of ancient
Warfare. ...............................................................................................................................132
CHAPTER XVII.—What importance the Armies of the present day should allow to Artillery;
and whether the commonly received opinion concerning it be just. ....................................135
CHAPTER XVIII.—That the authority of the Romans and the example of ancient Warfare
should make us hold Foot Soldiers of more account than Horse..........................................139
CHAPTER XIX.—That Acquisitions made by ill-governed States and such as follow not the
valiant methods of the Romans, tend rather to their Ruin than to their Aggrandizement. .142
CHAPTER XX.—Of the Dangers incurred by Princes or Republics who resort to Auxiliary or
Mercenary Arms. ..................................................................................................................145
CHAPTER XXI.—That Capua was the first City to which the Romans sent a Prætor; nor there,
until four hundred years after they began to make War. ....................................................146
CHAPTER XXII.—That in matters of moment Men often judge amiss. .................................148
CHAPTER XXIII.—That in chastising their Subjects when circumstances required it the
Romans always avoided half-measures. ..............................................................................150
CHAPTER XXIV.—That, commonly, Fortresses do much more Harm than Good..................152
CHAPTER XXV.—That he who attacks a City divided against itself, must not think to get
possession of it through its Divisions. ...................................................................................157
CHAPTER XXVI.—That Taunts and Abuse breed Hatred against him who uses them, without
yielding him any Advantage. ................................................................................................158
CHAPTER XXVII.—That prudent Princes and Republics should be content to have obtained a
Victory; for, commonly, when they are not, theft-Victory turns to Defeat. .........................159
CHAPTER XXVIII.—That to neglect the redress of Grievances, whether public or private, is
dangerous for a Prince or Commonwealth. ..........................................................................161
CHAPTER XXIX.—That Fortune obscures the minds of Men when she would not have them
hinder her Designs. ...............................................................................................................163
CHAPTER XXX.—That really powerful Princes and, Commonwealths do not buy Friendships
with Money, but with their Valour and the Fame of their Prowess. ....................................164
CHAPTER XXXI.—Of the Danger of trusting banished Men. .................................................167
CHAPTER XXXII.—In how many Ways the Romans gained Possession of Towns. ................168
CHAPTER XXXIII.—That the Romans intrusted the Captains of their Armies with the fullest
Powers. .................................................................................................................................170
BOOK III.................................................................................................................................171
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CHAPTER I.—For a Sect or Commonwealth to last long, it must often be brought back to its
Beginnings. ...........................................................................................................................171
CHAPTER II.—That on occasion it is wise to feign Folly. .......................................................175
CHAPTER III.—That to preserve a newly acquired Freedom we must slay the Sons of Brutus.
..............................................................................................................................................176
CHAPTER IV.—That an Usurper is never safe in his Princedom while those live whom he has
deprived of it.........................................................................................................................177
CHAPTER V.—How an Hereditary King may come to lose his Kingdom. ..............................177
CHAPTER VI.—Of Conspiracies. ............................................................................................178
CHAPTER VII.—Why it is that changes from Freedom to Servitude, and from Servitude to
Freedom, are sometimes made without Bloodshed, but at other times reek with Blood. ...193
CHAPTER VIII.—That he who would effect Changes in a Commonwealth, must give heed to
its Character and Condition ..................................................................................................194
CHAPTER IX.—That to enjoy constant good Fortune we must change with the Times........196
CHAPTER X.—That a Captain cannot escape Battle when his Enemy forces it on him at all
risks. ......................................................................................................................................197
CHAPTER XI.—That one who has to contend with many, though he be weaker than they, will
prevail if he can withstand their first onset. .........................................................................200
CHAPTER XII.—A prudent Captain will do what he can to make it necessary for his own
Soldiers to fight, and to relieve his Enemy from that necessity. ...........................................202
CHAPTER XIII.—Whether we may trust more to a valiant Captain with a weak Army, or to a
valiant Army with a weak Captain. ......................................................................................204
CHAPTER XIV.—Of the effect produced in Battle by strange and unexpected Sights or
Sounds. .................................................................................................................................205
CHAPTER XV.—That one and not many should head an Army: and why it is harmful to have
more Leaders than one. ........................................................................................................207
CHAPTER XVI.—That in Times of Difficulty true Worth is sought after; whereas in quiet
Times it is not the most deserving, but those who are recommended by Wealth or
Connection who are most in favour......................................................................................208
CHAPTER XVII.—That we are not to offend a Man, and then send him to fill an important
Office or Command. ..............................................................................................................210
CHAPTER XVIII.—That it is the highest Quality of a Captain to be able to forestall the designs
of his Adversary. ...................................................................................................................211
CHAPTER XIX.—Whether Indulgence or Severity be more necessary for controlling a
Multitude. .............................................................................................................................212
CHAPTER XX.—How one humane act availed more with the men of Falerii, than all the
might of the Roman Arms.....................................................................................................214
CHAPTER XXI.—How it happened that Hannibal pursuing a course contrary to that taken by
Scipio, wrought the same results in Italy which the other achieved in Spain. ......................214
Chapter XXII.—That the severity of Manlius Torquatus and the gentleness of Valerius
Corvinus won for both the same Glory. ................................................................................216
CHAPTER XXIII.—Why Camillus was banished from Rome. ..................................................220
CHAPTER XXIV.—That prolonged Commands brought Rome to Servitude. .........................220
CHAPTER XXV.—_Of the poverty of Cincinnatus and of many other Roman Citizens. ........221
CHAPTER XXVI.—How Women are a cause of the ruin of States. ........................................223
CHAPTER XXVII......................................................................................................................224
CHAPTER XXVIII.....................................................................................................................225
CHAPTER XXIX.—That the Faults of a People are due to its Prince. .....................................226
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CHAPTER XXX.—That a Citizen who seeks by his personal influence to render signal service
to his Country, must first stand clear of Envy. How a City should prepare for its defence on
the approach of an Enemy....................................................................................................227
CHAPTER XXXI.—That strong Republics and valiant Men preserve through every change the
same Spirit and Bearing........................................................................................................230
CHAPTER XXXII.—Of the methods which some have used to make Peace impossible.........232
CHAPTER XXXIII.—That to insure victory in battle you must inspire your Men with confidence
in one another and in you. ....................................................................................................233
CHAPTER XXXIV.—By what reports, rumours, or surmises the Citizens of a Republic are led
to favour a Fellow-citizen: and-whether the Magistracies are bestowed with better
judgment by a People or by a Prince. ...................................................................................234
CHAPTER XXXV.—Of the Danger incurred in being the first to recommend new Measures;
and that the more unusual the Measures the greater the Danger. .....................................237
CHAPTER XXXVI.—Why it has been and still may be affirmed of the Gauls, that at the
beginning of a fray they are more than Men, but afterwards less than Women.................238
CHAPTER XXXVII.—Whether a general engagement should be preceded by skirmishes; and
how, avoiding these, we may get knowledge of a new Enemy. ...........................................240
CHAPTER XXXVIII.—Of the Qualities of a Captain in whom his Soldiers can confide. ..........242
CHAPTER XXXIX.—That a Captain should have good knowledge of Places. ........................243
CHAPTER XL.—That Fraud is fair in War...............................................................................244
CHAPTER XLI.—That our Country is to be defended by Honour or by Dishonour; and in either
way is well defended. ...........................................................................................................245
CHAPTER XLII.—That Promises made on Compulsion are not to be observed. ....................246
CHAPTER XLIII.—That Men born in the same Province retain through all Times nearly the
same Character.....................................................................................................................247
CHAPTER XLIV.—That where ordinary methods fail, Hardihood and Daring often succeed.
..............................................................................................................................................248
CHAPTER XLV.—Whether in battle it is better to await and repel the Enemy's attack, or to
anticipate it by an impetuous onset. ....................................................................................249
CHAPTER XLVI.—How the Characteristics of Families come to be perpetuated. .................250
CHAPTER XLVII.—That love of his Country should lead a good Citizen to forget private
Wrongs. ................................................................................................................................250
CHAPTER XLVIII.—That on finding an Enemy make what seems a grave blunder, we should
suspect some fraud to lurk behind. ......................................................................................251
CHAPTER XLIX.—That a Commonwealth to preserve its Freedom has constant need of new
Ordinances. Of the services in respect of which Quintius Fabius received the surname of
Maximus. ..............................................................................................................................251
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DISCOURSES ON THE FIRST DECADE OF
TITUS LIVIUS.
BOOK I.
*****
PREFACE.
Albeit the jealous temper of mankind, ever more disposed to censure than to praise
the work of others, has constantly made the pursuit of new methods and systems no
less perilous than the search after unknown lands and seas; nevertheless, prompted
by that desire which nature has implanted in me, fearlessly to undertake whatsoever I
think offers a common benefit to all, I enter on a path which, being hitherto
untrodden by any, though it involve me in trouble and fatigue, may yet win me
thanks from those who judge my efforts in a friendly spirit. And although my feeble
discernment, my slender experience of current affairs, and imperfect knowledge of
ancient events, render these efforts of mine defective and of no great utility, they
may at least open the way to some other, who, with better parts and sounder
reasoning and judgment, shall carry out my design; whereby, if I gain no credit, at all
events I ought to incur no blame.
When I see antiquity held in such reverence, that to omit other instances, the mere
fragment of some ancient statue is often bought at a great price, in order that the
purchaser may keep it by him to adorn his house, or to have it copied by those who
take delight in this art; and how these, again, strive with all their skill to imitate it in
their various works; and when, on the other hand, I find those noble labours which
history shows to have been wrought on behalf of the monarchies and republics of old
times, by kings, captains, citizens, lawgivers, and others who have toiled for the
good of their country, rather admired than followed, nay, so absolutely renounced by
every one that not a trace of that antique worth is now left among us, I cannot but at
once marvel and grieve; at this inconsistency; and all the more because I perceive
that, in civil disputes between citizens, and in the bodily disorders into which men
fall, recourse is always had to the decisions and remedies, pronounced or prescribed
by the ancients.
For the civil law is no more than the opinions delivered by the ancient jurisconsults,
which, being reduced to a system, teach the jurisconsults of our own times how to
determine; while the healing art is simply the recorded experience of the old
physicians, on which our modern physicians found their practice. And yet, in giving
laws to a commonwealth, in maintaining States and governing kingdoms, in
organizing armies and conducting wars, in dealing with subject nations, and in
extending a State's dominions, we find no prince, no republic, no captain, and no
citizen who resorts to the example of the ancients.
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This I persuade myself is due, not so much to the feebleness to which the present
methods of education have brought the world, or to the injury which a pervading
apathy has wrought in many provinces and cities of Christendom, as to the want of a
right intelligence of History, which renders men incapable in reading it to extract its
true meaning or to relish its flavour. Whence it happens that by far the greater
number of those who read History, take pleasure in following the variety of incidents
which it presents, without a thought to imitate them; judging such imitation to be not
only difficult but impossible; as though the heavens, the sun, the elements, and man
himself were no longer the same as they formerly were as regards motion, order, and
power.
Desiring to rescue men from this error, I have thought fit to note down with respect
to all those books of Titus Livius which have escaped the malignity of Time,
whatever seems to me essential to a right understanding of ancient and modern
affairs; so that any who shall read these remarks of mine, may reap from them that
profit for the sake of which a knowledge of History is to be sought. And although the
task be arduous, still, with the help of those at whose instance I assumed the burthen,
I hope to carry it forward so far, that another shall have no long way to go to bring it
to its destination.
CHAPTER I.—Of the Beginnings of Cities in general,
and in particular of that of Rome.
No one who reads how the city of Rome had its beginning, who were its founders,
and what its ordinances and laws, will marvel that so much excellence was
maintained in it through many ages, or that it grew afterwards to be so great an
Empire.
And, first, as touching its origin, I say, that all cities have been founded either by the
people of the country in which they stand, or by strangers. Cities have their origins in
the former of these two ways when the inhabitants of a country find that they cannot
live securely if they live dispersed in many and small societies, each of them unable,
whether from its situation or its slender numbers, to stand alone against the attacks of
its enemies; on whose approach there is no time left to unite for defence without
abandoning many strongholds, and thus becoming an easy prey to the invader. To
escape which dangers, whether of their own motion or at the instance of some of
greater authority among them, they restrict themselves to dwell together in certain
places, which they think will be more convenient to live in and easier to defend.
Among many cities taking their origin in this way were Athens and Venice; the
former of which, for reasons like those just now mentioned, was built by a scattered
population under the direction of Theseus. To escape the wars which, on the decay of
the Roman Empire daily renewed in Italy by the arrival of fresh hordes of
Barbarians, numerous refugees, sheltering in certain little islands in a corner of the
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Adriatic Sea, gave beginning to Venice; where, without any recognized leader to
direct them, they agreed to live together under such laws as they thought best suited
to maintain them. And by reason of the prolonged tranquility which their position
secured, they being protected by the narrow sea and by the circumstance that the
tribes who then harassed Italy had no ships wherewith to molest them, they were able
from very small beginnings to attain to that greatness they now enjoy.
In the second case, namely of a city being founded by strangers, the settlers are either
wholly independent, or they are controlled by others, as where colonies are sent forth
either by a prince or by a republic, to relieve their countries of an excessive
population, or to defend newly acquired territories which it is sought to secure at
small cost. Of this sort many cities were settled by the Romans, and in all parts of
their dominions. It may also happen that such cities are founded by a prince merely
to add to his renown, without any intention on his part to dwell there, as Alexandria
was built by Alexander the Great. Cities like these, not having had their beginning in
freedom, seldom make such progress as to rank among the chief towns of kingdoms.
The city of Florence belongs to that class of towns which has not been independent
from the first; for whether we ascribe its origin to the soldiers of Sylla, or, as some
have conjectured, to the mountaineers of Fiesole (who, emboldened by the long
peace which prevailed throughout the world during the reign of Octavianus, came
down to occupy the plain on the banks of the Arno), in either case, it was founded
under the auspices of Rome nor could, at first, make other progress than was
permitted by the grace of the sovereign State.
The origin of cities may be said to be independent when a people, either by
themselves or under some prince, are constrained by famine, pestilence, or war to
leave their native land and seek a new habitation. Settlers of this sort either establish
themselves in cities which they find ready to their hand in the countries of which
they take possession, as did Moses; or they build new ones, as did Æneas. It is in this
last case that the merits of a founder and the good fortune of the city founded are best
seen; and this good fortune will be more or less remarkable according to the greater
or less capacity of him who gives the city its beginning.
The capacity of a founder is known in two ways: by his choice of a site, or by the
laws which he frames. And since men act either of necessity or from choice, and
merit may seem greater where choice is more restricted, we have to consider whether
it may not be well to choose a sterile district as the site of a new city, in order that the
inhabitants, being constrained to industry, and less corrupted by ease, may live in
closer union, finding less cause for division in the poverty of their land; as was the
case in Ragusa, and in many other cities built in similar situations. Such a choice
were certainly the wisest and the most advantageous, could men be content to enjoy
what is their own without seeking to lord it over others. But since to be safe they
must be strong, they are compelled avoid these barren districts, and to plant
themselves in more fertile regions; where, the fruitfulness of the soil enabling them
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to increase and multiply, they may defend themselves against any who attack them,
and overthrow any who would withstand their power.
And as for that languor which the situation might breed, care must be had that
hardships which the site does not enforce, shall be enforced by the laws; and that the
example of those wise nations be imitated, who, inhabiting most fruitful and
delightful countries, and such as were likely to rear a listless and effeminate race,
unfit for all manly exercises, in order to obviate the mischief wrought by the amenity
and relaxing influence of the soil and climate, subjected all who were to serve as
soldiers to the severest training; whence it came that better soldiers were raised in
these countries than in others by nature rugged and barren. Such, of old, was the
kingdom of the Egyptians, which, though of all lands the most bountiful, yet, by the
severe training which its laws enforced, produced most valiant soldiers, who, had
their names not been lost in antiquity, might be thought to deserve more praise than
Alexander the Great and many besides, whose memory is still fresh in men's minds.
And even in recent times, any one contemplating the kingdom of the Soldan, and the
military order of the Mamelukes before they were destroyed by Selim the Grand
Turk, must have seen how carefully they trained their soldiers in every kind of
warlike exercise; showing thereby how much they dreaded that indolence to which
their genial soil and climate might have disposed them, unless neutralized by
strenuous laws. I say, then, that it is a prudent choice to found your city in a fertile
region when the effects of that fertility are duly balanced by the restraint of the laws.
When Alexander the Great thought to add to his renown by founding a city,
Dinocrates the architect came and showed him how he might build it on Mount
Athos, which not only offered a strong position, but could be handled that the city
built there might present a semblance of the human form, which would be a thing
strange and striking, and worthy of so great a monarch. But on Alexander asking
how the inhabitants were to live, Dinocrates answered that he had not thought of
that. Whereupon, Alexander laughed, and leaving Mount Athos as it stood, built
Alexandria; where, the fruitfulness of the soil, and the vicinity of the Nile and the
sea, might attract many to take up their abode.
To him, therefore, who inquires into the origin of Rome, if he assign its beginning to
Æneas, it will seem to be of those cities which were founded by strangers if to
Romulus, then of those founded by the natives of the country. But in whichever class
we place it, it will be seen to have had its beginning in freedom, and not in subjection
to another State. It will be seen, too, as hereafter shall be noted, how strict was the
discipline which the laws instituted by Romulus, Numa, and its other founders made
compulsory upon it; so that neither its fertility, the proximity of the sea, the number
of its victories, nor the extent of its dominion, could for many centuries corrupt it,
but, on the contrary, maintained it replete with such virtues as were never matched in
any other commonwealth.
And because the things done by Rome, and which Titus Livius has celebrated, were
effected at home or abroad by public or by private wisdom, I shall begin by treating,
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and noting the consequences of those things done at home in accordance with the
public voice, which seem most to merit attention; and to this object the whole of this
first Book or first Part of my Discourses, shall be directed.
CHAPTER II.—Of the various kinds of
Government; and to which of them the Roman
Commonwealth belonged.
I forego all discussion concerning those cities which at the outset have been
dependent upon others, and shall speak only of those which from their earliest
beginnings have stood entirely clear of all foreign control, being governed from the
first as pleased themselves, whether as republics or as princedoms.
These as they have had different origins, so likewise have had different laws and
institutions. For to some at their very first commencement, or not long after, laws
have been given by a single legislator, and all at one time; like those given by
Lycurgus to the Spartans; while to others they have been given at different times, as
need rose or accident determined; as in the case of Rome. That republic, indeed, may
be called happy, whose lot has been to have a founder so prudent as to provide for it
laws under which it can continue to live securely, without need to amend them; as
we find Sparta preserving hers for eight hundred years, without deterioration and
without any dangerous disturbance. On the other hand, some measure of unhappiness
attaches to the State which, not having yielded itself once for all into the hands of a
single wise legislator, is obliged to recast its institutions for itself; and of such States,
by far the most unhappy is that which is furthest removed from a sound system of
government, by which I mean that its institutions lie wholly outside the path which
might lead it to a true and perfect end. For it is scarcely possible that a State in this
position can ever, by any chance, set itself to rights, whereas another whose
institutions are imperfect, if it have made a good beginning and such as admits of its
amendment, may in the course of events arrive at perfection. It is certain, however,
that such States can never be reformed without great risk; for, as a rule, men will
accept no new law altering the institutions of their State, unless the necessity for such
a change be demonstrated; and since this necessity cannot arise without danger, the
State may easily be overthrown before the new order of things is established. In
proof whereof we may instance the republic of Florence, which was reformed in the
year 1502, in consequence of the affair of Arezzo, but was ruined in 1512, in
consequence of the affair of Prato.
Desiring, therefore, to discuss the nature of the government of Rome, and to
ascertain the accidental circumstances which brought it to its perfection, I say, as has
been said before by many who have written of Governments, that of these there are
three forms, known by the names Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, and that
those who give its institutions to a State have recourse to one or other of these three,
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according as it suits their purpose. Other, and, as many have thought, wiser teachers,
will have it, that there are altogether six forms of government, three of them utterly
bad, the other three good in themselves, but so readily corrupted that they too are apt
to become hurtful. The good are the three above named; the bad, three others
dependent upon these, and each so like that to which it is related, that it is easy to
pass imperceptibly from the one to the other. For a Monarchy readily becomes a
Tyranny, an Aristocracy an Oligarchy, while a Democracy tends to degenerate into
Anarchy. So that if the founder of a State should establish any one of these three
forms of Government, he establishes it for a short time only, since no precaution he
may take can prevent it from sliding into its contrary, by reason of the close
resemblance which, in this case, the virtue bears to the vice.
These diversities in the form of Government spring up among men by chance. For in
the beginning of the world, its inhabitants, being few in number, for a time lived
scattered after the fashion of beasts; but afterwards, as they increased and multiplied,
gathered themselves into societies, and, the better to protect themselves, began to
seek who among them was the strongest and of the highest courage, to whom,
making him their head, they tendered obedience. Next arose the knowledge of such
things as are honourable and good, as opposed to those which are bad and shameful.
For observing that when a man wronged his benefactor, hatred was universally felt
for the one and sympathy for the other, and that the ungrateful were blamed, while
those who showed gratitude were honoured, and reflecting that the wrongs they saw
done to others might be done to themselves, to escape these they resorted to making
laws and fixing punishments against any who should transgress them; and in this
way grew the recognition of Justice. Whence it came that afterwards, in choosing
their rulers, men no longer looked about for the strongest, but for him who was the
most prudent and the most just.
But, presently, when sovereignty grew to be hereditary and no longer elective,
hereditary sovereigns began to degenerate from their ancestors, and, quitting worthy
courses, took up the notion that princes had nothing to do but to surpass the rest of
the world in sumptuous display and wantonness, and whatever else ministers to
pleasure so that the prince coming to be hated, and therefore to feel fear, and passing
from fear to infliction of injuries, a tyranny soon sprang up. Forthwith there began
movements to overthrow the prince, and plots and conspiracies against him
undertaken not by those who were weak, or afraid for themselves, but by such as
being conspicuous for their birth, courage, wealth, and station, could not tolerate the
shameful life of the tyrant. The multitude, following the lead of these powerful men,
took up arms against the prince and, he being got rid of, obeyed these others as their
liberators; who, on their part, holding in hatred the name of sole ruler, formed
themselves into a government and at first, while the recollection of past tyranny was
still fresh, observed the laws they themselves made, and postponing personal
advantage to the common welfare, administered affairs both publicly and privately
with the utmost diligence and zeal. But this government passing, afterwards, to their
descendants who, never having been taught in the school of Adversity, knew nothing
of the vicissitudes of Fortune, these not choosing to rest content with mere civil
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equality, but abandoning themselves to avarice, ambition, and lust, converted,
without respect to civil rights what had been a government of the best into a
government of the few; and so very soon met with the same fate as the tyrant.
For the multitude loathing its rulers, lent itself to any who ventured, in whatever
way, to attack them; when some one man speedily arose who with the aid of the
people overthrew them. But the recollection of the tyrant and of the wrongs suffered
at his hands being still fresh in the minds of the people, who therefore felt no desire
to restore the monarchy, they had recourse to a popular government, which they
established on such a footing that neither king nor nobles had any place in it. And
because all governments inspire respect at the first, this government also lasted for a
while, but not for long, and seldom after the generation which brought it into
existence had died out. For, suddenly, liberty passed into license, wherein neither
private worth nor public authority was respected, but, every one living as he liked, a
thousand wrongs were done daily. Whereupon, whether driven by necessity, or on
the suggestion of some wiser man among them and to escape anarchy, the people
reverted to a monarchy, from which, step by step, in the manner and for the causes
already assigned, they came round once more to license. For this is the circle
revolving within which all States are and have been governed; although in the same
State the same forms of Government rarely repeat themselves, because hardly any
State can have such vitality as to pass through such a cycle more than once, and still
together. For it may be expected that in some sea of disaster, when a State must
always be wanting prudent counsels and in strength, it will become subject to some
neighbouring and better-governed State; though assuming this not to happen, it
might well pass for an indefinite period from one of these forms of government to
another.
I say, then, that all these six forms of government are pernicious—the three good
kinds, from their brief duration the three bad, from their inherent badness. Wise
legislators therefore, knowing these defects, and avoiding each of these forms in its
simplicity, have made choice of a form which shares in the qualities of all the first
three, and which they judge to be more stable and lasting than any of these
separately. For where we have a monarchy, an aristocracy, and a democracy existing
together in the same city, each of the three serves as a check upon the other.
Among those who have earned special praise by devising a constitution of this
nature, was Lycurgus, who so framed the laws of Sparta as to assign their proper
functions to kings, nobles, and commons; and in this way established a government,
which, to his great glory and to the peace and tranquility of his country, lasted for
more than eight hundred years. The contrary, however, happened in the case of
Solon; who by the turn he gave to the institutions of Athens, created there a purely
democratic government, of such brief duration, that I himself lived to witness the
beginning of the despotism of Pisistratus. And although, forty years later, the heirs of
Pisistratus were driven out, and Athens recovered her freedom, nevertheless because
she reverted to the same form government as had been established by Solon, she
could maintain it for only a hundred years more; for though to preserve it, many
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ordinances were passed for repressing the ambition of the great and the turbulence of
the people, against which Solon had not provided, still, since neither the monarchic
nor the aristocratic element was given a place in her constitution, Athens, as
compared with Sparta, had but a short life.
But let us now turn to Rome, which city, although she had no Lycurgus to give her
from the first such a constitution as would preserve her long in freedom, through a
series of accidents, caused by the contests between the commons and the senate,
obtained by chance what the foresight of her founders failed to provide. So that
Fortune, if she bestowed not her first favours on Rome, bestowed her second;
because, although the original institutions of this city were defective, still they lay
not outside the true path which could bring them to perfection. For Romulus and the
other kings made many and good laws, and such as were not incompatible with
freedom; but because they sought to found a kingdom and not a commonwealth,
when the city became free many things were found wanting which in the interest of
liberty it was necessary to supply, since these kings had not supplied them. And
although the kings of Rome lost their sovereignty, in the manner and for the causes
mentioned above, nevertheless those who drove them out, by at once creating two
consuls to take their place, preserved in Rome the regal authority while banishing
from it the regal throne, so that as both senate and consuls were included in that
republic, it in fact possessed two of the elements above enumerated, to wit, the
monarchic and the aristocratic.
It then only remained to assign its place to the popular element, and the Roman
nobles growing insolent from causes which shall be noticed hereafter, the commons
against them, when, not to lose the whole of their power, they were forced to
concede a share to the people; while with the share which remained, the senate and
consuls retained so much authority that they still held their own place in the republic.
In this way the tribunes of the people came to be created, after whose creation the
stability of the State was much augmented, since each the three forms of government
had now its due influence allowed it. And such was the good fortune of Rome that
although her government passed from the kings to the nobles, and from these to the
people, by the steps and for the reasons noticed above, still the entire authority of the
kingly element was not sacrificed to strengthen the authority of the nobles, nor were
the nobles divested of their authority to bestow it on the commons; but three,
blending together, made up a perfect State; which perfection, as shall be fully shown
in the next two Chapters, was reached through the dissensions of the commons and
the senate.
CHAPTER III.—Of the Accidents which led in
Rome to the creation of Tribunes of the People;
whereby the Republic was made more perfect.
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They who lay the foundations of a State and furnish it with laws must, as is shown
by all who have treated of civil government, and by examples of which history is
full, assume that 'all men are bad, and will always, when they have free field, give
loose to their evil inclinations; and that if these for a while remain hidden, it is owing
to some secret cause, which, from our having no contrary experience, we do not
recognize at once, but which is afterwards revealed by Time, of whom we speak as
the father of all truth.
In Rome, after the expulsion of the Tarquins, it seemed as though the closest union
prevailed between the senate and the commons, and that the nobles, laying aside
their natural arrogance, had learned so to sympathize with the people as to have
become supportable by all, even of the humblest rank. This dissimulation remained
undetected, and its causes concealed, while the Tarquins lived; for the nobles
dreading the Tarquins, and fearing that the people, if they used them ill, might take
part against them, treated them with kindness. But no sooner were the Tarquins got
rid of, and the nobles thus relieved of their fears, when they began to spit forth
against the commons all the venom which before they had kept in their breasts,
offending and insulting them in every way they could; confirming what I have
observed already, that men never behave well unless compelled, and that whenever
they are free to act as they please, and are under no restraint everything falls at once
into confusion and disorder. Wherefore it has been said that as poverty and hunger
are needed to make men industrious, so laws are needed to make them good. When
we do well without laws, laws are not needed; but when good customs are absent,
laws are at once required.
On the extinction of the Tarquins, therefore, the dread of whom had kept the nobles
in check, some new safeguard had to be contrived, which should effect the same
result as had been effected by the Tarquins while they lived. Accordingly, after much
uproar and confusion, and much danger of violence ensuing between the commons
and the nobles, to insure the safety of the former, tribunes were created, and were
invested with such station and authority as always afterwards enabled them to stand
between the people and the senate, and to resist the insolence of the nobles.
CHAPTER IV.—That the Dissensions between the
Senate and Commons of Rome, made Rome free and
powerful.
Touching those tumults which prevailed in Rome from the extinction of the Tarquins
to the creation of the tribunes the discussion of which I have no wish to avoid, and as
to certain other matters of a like nature, I desire to say something in opposition to the
opinion of many who assert that Rome was a turbulent city, and had fallen into utter
disorder, that had not her good fortune and military prowess made amends for other
defects, she would have been inferior to every other republic.
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I cannot indeed deny that the good fortune and the armies of Rome were the causes
of her empire; yet it certainly seems to me that those holding this opinion fail to
perceive, that in a State where there are good soldiers there must be good order, and,
generally speaking, good fortune. And looking to the other circumstances of this city,
I affirm that those who condemn these dissensions between the nobles and the
commons, condemn what was the prime cause of Rome becoming free; and give
more heed to the tumult and uproar wherewith these dissensions were attended, than
to the good results which followed from them; not reflecting that while in every
republic there are two conflicting factions, that of the people and that of the nobles, it
is in this conflict that all laws favourable to freedom have their origin, as may readily
be seen to have been the case in Rome. For from the time of the Tarquins to that of
the Gracchi, a period of over three hundred years, the tumults in Rome seldom gave
occasion to punishment by exile, and very seldom to bloodshed. So that we cannot
truly declare those tumults to have been disastrous, or that republic to have been
disorderly, which during all that time, on account of her internal broils, banished no
more than eight or ten of her citizens, put very few to death, and rarely inflicted
money penalties. Nor can we reasonably pronounce that city ill-governed wherein
we find so many instances of virtue; for virtuous actions have their origin in right
training, right training in wise laws, and wise laws in these very tumults which many
would thoughtlessly condemn. For he who looks well to the results of these tumults
will find that they did not lead to banishments, nor to violence hurtful to the common
good, but to laws and ordinances beneficial to the public liberty. And should any
object that the behaviour of the Romans was extravagant and outrageous; that for the
assembled people to be heard shouting against the senate, the senate against the
people; for the whole commons to be seen rushing wildly through the streets, closing
their shops, and quitting the town, were things which might well affright him even
who only reads of them; it may be answered, that the inhabitants of all cities, more
especially of cities which seek to make use of the people in matters of importance,
have their own ways of giving expression to their wishes; among which the city of
Rome had the custom, that when its people sought to have a law passed they
followed one or another of those courses mentioned above, or else refused to be
enrolled as soldiers when, to pacify them, something of their demands had to be
conceded. But the demands of a free people are hurtful to freedom, since they
originate either in being oppressed, or in the fear that they are about to be so. When
this fear is groundless, it finds its remedy in public meetings, wherein some worthy
person may come forward and show the people by argument that they are deceiving
themselves. For though they be ignorant, the people are not therefore, as Cicero says,
incapable of being taught the truth, but are readily convinced when it is told them by
one in whose honesty they can trust.
We should, therefore, be careful how we censure the government of Rome, and
should reflect that all the great results effected by that republic, could not have come
about without good cause. And if the popular tumults led the creation of the tribunes,
they merit all praise; since these magistrates not only gave its due influence to the
popular voice in the government, but also acted as the guardians of Roman freedom,
as shall be clearly shown in the following Chapter.
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CHAPTER V.—Whether the Guardianship of public
Freedom is safer in the hands of the Commons or of
the Nobles; and whether those who seek to acquire
Power or they who seek to maintain it are the greater
cause of Commotions.
Of the provisions made by wise founders of republics, one of the most necessary is
for the creation of a guardianship of liberty; for according as this is placed in good or
bad hands, the freedom of the State will be more or less lasting. And because in
every republic we find the two parties of nobles and commons, the question arises, to
which of these two this guardianship can most safely be entrusted. Among the
Lacedæmonians of old, as now with the Venetians, it was placed in the hands of the
nobles, but with the Romans it was vested in the commons. We have, therefore, to
determine which of these States made the wiser choice. If we look to reasons,
something is to be said on both sides of the question; though were we to look to
results, we should have to pronounce in favour of the nobles, inasmuch as the liberty
of Sparta and Venice has had a longer life than that of Rome.
As touching reasons, it may be pleaded for the Roman method, that they are most fit
to have charge of a thing, who least desire to pervert it to their own ends. And,
doubtless, if we examine the aims which the nobles and the commons respectively
set before them, we shall find in the former a great desire to dominate, in the latter
merely a desire not to be dominated over, and hence a greater attachment to freedom,
since they have less to gain than the others by destroying it. Wherefore, when the
commons are put forward as the defenders of liberty, they may be expected to take
better care of it, and, as they have no desire to tamper with it themselves, to be less
apt to suffer others to do so.
On the other hand, he who defends the method followed by the Spartans and
Venetians, may urge, that by confiding this guardianship to the nobles, two desirable
ends are served: first, that from being allowed to retain in their own hands a weapon
which makes them the stronger party in the State, the ambition of this class is more
fully satisfied; and, second, that an authority is withdrawn from the unstable
multitude which as used by them is likely to lead to endless disputes and tumults,
and to drive the nobles into dangerous and desperate courses. In instance whereof
might be cited the case of Rome itself, wherein the tribunes of the people being
vested with this authority, not content to have one consul a plebeian, insisted on
having both; and afterwards laid claim to the censorship, the prætorship and all the
other magistracies in the city. Nor was this enough for them, but, carried away by the
same factious spirit, they began after a time to pay court to such men as they thought
able to attack the nobility, and so gave occasion to the rise of Marius and the
overthrow of Rome.
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Wherefore one who weighs both sides of the question well, might hesitate which
party he should choose as the guardian of public liberty, being uncertain which class
is more mischievous in a commonwealth, that which would acquire what it has not,
or that which would keep the authority which it has already. But, on the whole, on a
careful balance of arguments we may sum up thus:—Either we have to deal with a
republic eager like Rome to extend its power, or with one content merely to maintain
itself; in the former case it is necessary to do in all things as Rome did; in the latter,
for the reasons and in the manner to be shown in the following Chapter, we may
imitate Venice and Sparta.
But reverting to the question which class of citizens is more mischievous in a
republic, those who seek to acquire or those who fear to lose what they have
acquired already, I note that when Marcus Menenius and Marcus Fulvius, both of
them men of plebeian birth, were made the one dictator, the other master of the
knights, that they might inquire into certain plots against Rome contrived in Capua,
they had at the same time authority given them by the people to investigate whether,
in Rome itself, irregular and corrupt practices had been used to obtain the consulship
and other honours of the city. The nobles suspecting that the powers thus conferred
were to be turned against them, everywhere gave out that if honours had been sought
by any by irregular and unworthy means, it was not by them, but by the plebeians,
who, with neither birth nor merit to recommend them, had need to resort to
corruption. And more particularly they accused the dictator himself. And so telling
was the effect of these charges, that Menenius, after haranguing the people and
complaining to them of the calumnies circulated against him, laid down his
dictatorship, and submitted himself to whatever judgment might be passed upon him.
When his cause came to be tried he was acquitted; but at the hearing it was much
debated, whether he who would retain power or he who would acquire it, is the more
dangerous citizen; the desires of both being likely to lead to the greatest disorders.
Nevertheless, I believe that, as a rule, disorders are more commonly occasioned by
those seeking to preserve power, because in them the fear of loss breeds the same
passions as are felt by those seeking to acquire; since men never think they hold what
they have securely, unless when they are gaining something new from others. It is
also to be said that their position enables them to operate changes with less effort and
greater efficacy. Further, it may be added, that their corrupt and insolent behaviour
inflames the minds of those who have nothing, with the desire to have; either for the
sake of punishing their adversaries by despoiling them, or to obtain for themselves a
share of those riches and honours which they see the others abuse.
CHAPTER VI.—Whether it was possible in Rome to
contrive such a Government as would have composed
the Differences between the Commons and the Senate.
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I have spoken above of the effects produced in Rome by the controversies between
the commons and the senate. Now, as these lasted down to the time of the Gracchi,
when they brought about the overthrow of freedom, some may think it matter for
regret that Rome should not have achieved the great things she did, without being
torn by such disputes. Wherefore, it seems to me worth while to consider whether the
government of Rome could ever have been constituted in such a way as to prevent
like controversies.
In making this inquiry we must first look to those republics which have enjoyed
freedom for a great while, undisturbed by any violent contentions or tumults, and see
what their government was, and whether it would have been possible to introduce it
into Rome. Of such republics we have an example in ancient times in Sparta, in
modern times in Venice, of both which States I have already made mention. Sparta
created for herself a government consisting of a king and a limited senate. Venice
has made no distinction in the titles of her rulers, all qualified to take part in her
government being classed under the one designation of "Gentlemen," an arrangement
due rather to chance than to the foresight of those who gave this State its
constitution. For many persons, from causes already noticed, seeking shelter on these
rocks on which Venice now stands, after they had so multiplied that if they were to
continue to live together it became necessary for them to frame laws, established a
form of government; and assembling often in their councils to consult for the
interests of their city, when it seemed to them that their numbers were sufficient for
political existence, they closed the entrance to civil rights against all who came
afterwards to live there, not allowing them to take any part in the management of
affairs. And when in course of time there came to be many citizens excluded from
the government, to add to the importance of the governing body, they named these
"Gentlemen" (gentiluomini), the others "Plebeians" (popolani). And this distinction
could grow up and maintain itself without causing disturbance; for as at the time of
its origin, whosoever then lived in Venice was made one of the governing body,
none had reason to complain; while those who came to live there afterwards, finding
the government in a completed form, had neither ground nor opportunity to object.
No ground, because nothing was taken from them; and no opportunity, because those
in authority kept them under control, and never employed them in affairs in which
they could acquire importance. Besides which, they who came later to dwell in
Venice were not so numerous as to destroy all proportion between the governors and
the governed; the number of the "Gentlemen" being as great as, or greater than that
of the "Plebeians." For these reasons, therefore, it was possible for Venice to make
her constitution what it is, and to maintain it without divisions.
Sparta, again, being governed, as I have said, by a king and a limited senate, was
able to maintain herself for the long period she did, because, from the country being
thinly inhabited and further influx of population forbidden, and from the laws of
Lycurgus (the observance whereof removed all ground of disturbance) being held in
high esteem, the citizens were able to continue long in unity. For Lycurgus having by
his laws established in Sparta great equality as to property, but less equality as to
rank, there prevailed there an equal poverty; and the commons were less ambitious,
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because the offices of the State, which were held to their exclusion, were confined to
a few; and because the nobles never by harsh treatment aroused in them any desire to
usurp these offices. And this was due to the Spartan kings, who, being appointed to
that dignity for life, and placed in the midst of this nobility, had no stronger support
to their authority than in defending the people against injustice. Whence it resulted
that as the people neither feared nor coveted the power which they did not possess,
the conflicts which might have arisen between them and the nobles were escaped,
together with the causes which would have led to them; and in this way they were
able to live long united. But of this unity in Sparta there were two chief causes: one,
the fewness of its inhabitants, which allowed of their being governed by a few; the
other, that by denying foreigners admission into their country, the people had less
occasion to become corrupted, and never so increased in numbers as to prove
troublesome to their few rulers.
Weighing all which circumstances, we see that to have kept Rome in the same
tranquility wherein these republics were kept, one of two courses must have been
followed by her legislators; for either, like the Venetians, they must have refrained
from employing the commons in war, or else, like the Spartans, they must have
closed their country to foreigners. Whereas, in both particulars, they did the opposite,
arming the commons and increasing their number, and thus affording endless
occasions for disorder. And had the Roman commonwealth grown to be more
tranquil, this inconvenience would have resulted, that it must at the same time have
grown weaker, since the road would have been closed to that greatness to which it
came, for in removing the causes of her tumults, Rome must have interfered with the
causes of her growth.
And he who looks carefully into the matter will find, that in all human affairs, we
cannot rid ourselves of one inconvenience without running into another. So that if
you would have your people numerous and warlike, to the end that with their aid you
may establish a great empire, you will have them of such a sort as you cannot
afterwards control at your pleasure; while should you keep them few and unwarlike,
to the end that you may govern them easily, you will be unable, should you extend
your dominions, to preserve them, and will become so contemptible as to be the prey
of any who attack you. For which reason in all our deliberations we ought to
consider where we are likely to encounter least inconvenience, and accept that as the
course to be preferred, since we shall never find any line of action entirely free from
disadvantage.
Rome might, therefore, following the example of Sparta, have created a king for life
and a senate of limited numbers, but desiring to become a great empire, she could
not, like Sparta, have restricted the number of her citizens. So that to have created a
king for life and a limited senate had been of little service to her.
Were any one, therefore, about to found a wholly new republic, he would have to
consider whether he desired it to increase as Rome did in territory and dominion, or
to continue within narrow limits. In the former case he would have to shape its
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constitution as nearly as possible on the pattern of the Roman, leaving room for
dissensions and popular tumults, for without a great and warlike population no
republic can ever increase, or increasing maintain itself. In the second case he might
give his republic a constitution like that of Venice or Sparta; but since extension is
the ruin of such republics, the legislator would have to provide in every possible way
against the State which he had founded making any additions to its territories. For
these, when superimposed upon a feeble republic, are sure to be fatal to it: as we see
to have been the case with Sparta and Venice, the former of which, after subjugating
nearly all Greece, on sustaining a trifling reverse, betrayed the insufficiency of her
foundations, for when, after the revolt of Thebes under Pelopidas, other cities also
rebelled, the Spartan kingdom was utterly overthrown. Venice in like manner, after
gaining possession of a great portion of Italy (most of it not by her arms but by her
wealth and subtlety), when her strength was put to the proof, lost all in one pitched
battle.
I can well believe, then, that to found a republic which shall long endure, the best
plan may be to give it internal institutions like those of Sparta or Venice; placing it in
a naturally strong situation, and so fortifying it that none can expect to get the better
of it easily, yet, at the same time, not making it so great as to be formidable to its
neighbours; since by taking these precautions, it might long enjoy its independence.
For there are two causes which lead to wars being made against a republic; one, your
desire to be its master, the other the fear lest it should master you; both of which
dangers the precaution indicated will go far to remove. For if, as we are to assume,
this republic be well prepared for defence, and consequently difficult of attack, it will
seldom or never happen that any one will form the design to attack it, and while it
keeps within its own boundaries, and is seen from experience not to be influenced by
ambition, no one will be led, out of fear for himself, to make war upon it, more
particularly when its laws and constitution forbid its extension. And were it possible
to maintain things in this equilibrium, I veritably believe that herein would be found
the true form of political life, and the true tranquility of a republic. But all human
affairs being in movement, and incapable of remaining as they are, they must either
rise or fall; and to many conclusions to which we are not led by reason, we are
brought by necessity. So that when we have given institutions to a State on the
footing that it is to maintain itself without enlargement, should necessity require its
enlargement, its foundations will be cut from below it, and its downfall quickly
ensue. On the other hand, were a republic so favoured by Heaven as to lie under no
necessity of making war, the result of this ease would be to make it effeminate and
divided which two evils together, and each by itself, would insure its ruin. And since
it is impossible, as I believe, to bring about an equilibrium, or to adhere strictly to the
mean path, we must, in arranging our republic, consider what is the more honourable
course for it to take, and so contrive that even if necessity compel its enlargement, it
may be able to keep what it gains.
But returning to the point first raised, I believe it necessary for us to follow the
method of the Romans and not that of the other republics, for I know of no middle
way. We must, consequently, put up with those dissensions which arise between
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commons and senate, looking on them as evils which cannot be escaped if we would
arrive at the greatness of Rome.
In connection with the arguments here used to prove that the authority of the tribunes
was essential in Rome to the guardianship of freedom, we may naturally go on to
show what advantages result to a republic from the power of impeachment; which,
together with others, was conferred upon the tribunes; a subject to be noticed in the
following Chapter.
CHAPTER VII.—That to preserve Liberty in a State
there must exist the Right to accuse.
To those set forward in a commonwealth as guardians of public freedom, no more
useful or necessary authority can be given than the power to accuse, either before the
people, or before some council or tribunal, those citizens who in any way have
offended against the liberty of their country.
A law of this kind has two effects most beneficial to a State: first, that the citizens
from fear of being accused, do not engage in attempts hurtful to the State, or doing
so, are put down at once and without respect of persons: and next, that a vent is given
for the escape of all those evil humours which, from whatever cause, gather in cities
against particular citizens; for unless an outlet be duly provided for these by the laws,
they flow into irregular channels and overwhelm the State. There is nothing,
therefore, which contributes so much to the stability and permanence of a State, as to
take care that the fermentation of these disturbing humours be supplied by operation
of law with a recognized outlet. This might be shown by many examples, but by
none so clearly as by that of Coriolanus related by Livius, where he tells us, that at a
time when the Roman nobles were angry with the plebeians (thinking that the
appointment of tribunes for their protection had made them too powerful), it
happened that Rome was visited by a grievous famine, to meet which the senate sent
to Sicily for corn. But Coriolanus, hating the commons, sought to persuade the
senate that now was the time to punish them, and to deprive them of the authority
which they had usurped to the prejudice of the nobles, by withholding the
distribution of corn, and so suffering them to perish of hunger. Which advice of his
coming to the ears of the people, kindled them to such fury against him, that they
would have slain him as he left the Senate House, had not the tribunes cited him to
appear and answer before them to a formal charge.
In respect of this incident I repeat what I have just now said, how useful and
necessary it is for republics to provide by their laws a channel by which the
displeasure of the multitude against a single citizen may find a vent. For when none
such is regularly provided, recourse will be had to irregular channels, and these will
assuredly lead to much worse results. For when a citizen is borne down by the
operation or the ordinary laws, even though he be wronged, little or no disturbance is
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occasioned to the state: the injury he suffers not being wrought by private violence,
nor by foreign force, which are the causes of the overthrow of free institutions, but
by public authority and in accordance with public ordinances, which, having definite
limits set them, are not likely to pass beyond these so as to endanger the
commonwealth. For proof of which I am content to rest on this old example of
Coriolanus, since all may see what a disaster it would have been for Rome had he
been violently put to death by the people. For, as between citizen and citizen, a
wrong would have been done affording ground for fear, fear would have sought
defence, defence have led to faction, faction to divisions in the State, and these to its
ruin. But the matter being taken up by those whose office it was to deal with it, all
the evils which must have followed had it been left in private hands were escaped.
In Florence, on the other hand, and in our own days, we have seen what violent
commotions follow when the people cannot show their displeasure against particular
citizens in a form recognized by the laws, in the instance of Francesco Valori, at one
time looked upon as the foremost citizen of our republic. But many thinking him
ambitious, and likely from his high spirit and daring to overstep the limits of civil
freedom, and there being no way to oppose him save by setting up an adverse
faction, the result was, that, apprehending irregular attacks, he sought to gain
partisans for his support; while his opponents, on their side, having no course open to
them of which the laws approved, resorted to courses of which the laws did not
approve, and, at last, to open violence. And as his influence had to be attacked by
unlawful methods, these were attended by injury not to him only, but to many other
noble citizens; whereas, could he have been met by constitutional restraints, his
power might have been broken without injury to any save himself. I might also cite
from our Florentine history the fall of Piero Soderini, which had no other cause than
there not being in our republic any law under which powerful and ambitious citizens
can be impeached. For to form a tribunal by which a powerful citizen is to be tried,
eight judges only are not enough; the judges must be numerous, because a few will
always do the will of a few. But had there been proper methods for obtaining redress,
either the people would have impeached Piero if he was guilty, and thus have given
vent to their displeasure without calling in the Spanish army; or if he was innocent,
would not have ventured, through fear of being accused themselves, to have taken
proceedings against him. So that in either case the bitter spirit which was the cause
of all the disorder would have had an end. Wherefore, when we find one of the
parties in a State calling in a foreign power, we may safely conclude that it is
because the defective laws of that State provide no escape for those malignant
humours which are natural to men; which can best be done by arranging for an
impeachment before a sufficient number of judges, and by giving countenance to this
procedure. This was so well contrived in Rome that in spite of the perpetual struggle
maintained between the commons and the senate, neither the senate nor the
commons, nor any single citizen, ever sought redress at the hands of a foreign power;
for having a remedy at home, there was no need to seek one abroad.
Although the examples above cited be proof sufficient of what I affirm, I desire to
adduce one other, recorded by Titus Livius in his history, where he relates that a
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sister of Aruns having been violated by a Lucumo of Clusium, the chief of the
Etruscan towns, Aruns being unable, from the interest of her ravisher, to avenge her,
betook himself to the Gauls who ruled in the province we now name Lombardy, and
besought them to come with an armed force to Clusium; showing them how with
advantage to themselves they might avenge his wrongs. Now, had Aruns seen that he
could have had redress through the laws of his country, he never would have resorted
to these Barbarians for help.
But as the right to accuse is beneficial in a republic, so calumny, on the other hand, is
useless and hurtful, as in the following Chapter I shall proceed to show.
CHAPTER VIII.—That Calumny is as hurtful in a
Commonwealth as the power to accuse is useful.
Such were the services rendered to Rome by Furius Camillus in rescuing her from
the oppression of the Gauls, that no Roman, however high his degree or station, held
it derogatory to yield place to him, save only Manlius Capitolinus, who could not
brook such glory and distinction being given to another. For he thought that in saving
the Capitol, he had himself done as much as Camillus to preserve Rome, and that in
respect of his other warlike achievements he was no whit behind him. So that,
bursting with jealousy, and unable to remain at rest by reason of the other's renown,
and seeing no way to sow discord among the Fathers, he set himself to spread abroad
sinister reports among the commons; throwing out, among other charges, that the
treasure collected to be given to the Gauls, but which, afterwards, was withheld, had
been embezzled by certain citizens, and if recovered might be turned to public uses
in relieving the people from taxes or from private debts. These assertions so
prevailed with the commons that they began to hold meetings and to raise what
tumults they liked throughout the city. But this displeasing the senate, and the matter
appearing to them grave and dangerous, they appointed a dictator to inquire into it,
and to restrain the attacks of Manlius. The dictator, forthwith, caused Manlius to be
cited before him; and these two were thus brought face to face in the presence of the
whole city, the dictator surrounded by the nobles, and Manlius by the commons. The
latter, being desired to say with whom the treasure of which he had spoken was to be
found, since the senate were as anxious to know this as the commons, made no direct
reply, but answered evasively that it was needless to tell them what they already
knew. Whereupon the dictator ordered him to prison.
In this passage we are taught how hateful a thing is calumny in all free States, as,
indeed, in every society, and how we must neglect no means which may serve to
check it. And there can be no more effectual means for checking calumny than by
affording ample facilities for impeachment, which is as useful in a commonwealth as
the other is pernicious. And between them there is this difference, that calumny
needs neither witness, nor circumstantial proof to establish it, so that any man may
be calumniated by any other; but not impeached; since impeachment demands that
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there be substantive charges made, and trustworthy evidence to support them. Again,
it is before the magistrates, the people, or the courts of justice that men are
impeached; but in the streets and market places that they are calumniated. Calumny,
therefore, is most rife in that State wherein impeachment is least practised, and the
laws least favour it. For which reasons the legislator should so shape the laws of his
State that it shall be possible therein to impeach any of its citizens without fear or
favour; and, after duly providing for this, should visit calumniators with the sharpest
punishments. Those punished will have no cause to complain, since it was in their
power to have impeached openly where they have secretly calumniated. Where this
is not seen to, grave disorders will always ensue. For calumnies sting without
disabling; and those who are stung being more moved by hatred of their detractors
than by fear of the things they say against them, seek revenge.
This matter, as we have said, was well arranged for in Rome, but has always been
badly regulated in our city of Florence. And as the Roman ordinances with regard to
it were productive of much good, so the want of them in Florence has bred much
mischief. For any one reading the history of our city may perceive, how many
calumnies have at all times been aimed against those of its citizens who have taken a
leading part in its affairs. Thus, of one it would be said that he had plundered the
public treasury, of another, that he had failed in some enterprise because he had been
bribed; of a third, that this or the other disaster had originated in his ambition. Hence
hatred sprung up on every side, and hatred growing to division, these led to factions,
and these again to ruin. But had there existed in Florence some procedure whereby
citizens might have been impeached, and calumniators punished, numberless
disorders which have taken there would have been prevented. For citizens who were
impeached, whether condemned or acquitted, would have had no power to injure the
State; and they would have been impeached far seldomer than they have been
calumniated; for calumny, as I have said already, is an easier matter than
impeachment.
Some, indeed, have made use of calumny as a means for raising themselves to
power, and have found their advantage in traducing eminent citizens who withstood
their designs; for by taking the part of the people, and confirming them in their illopinion of these great men, they made them their friends. Of this, though I could
give many instances, I shall content myself with one. At the siege of Lucca the
Florentine army was commanded by Messer Giovanni Guicciardini, as its
commissary, through whose bad generalship or ill-fortune the town was not taken.
But whatever the cause of this failure, Messer Giovanni had the blame; and the
rumour ran that he had been bribed by the people of Lucca. Which calumny being
fostered by his enemies, brought Messer Giovanni to very verge of despair; and
though to clear himself he would willingly have given himself up to the Captain of
Justice he found he could not, there being no provision in the laws of the republic
which allowed of his doing so. Hence arose the bitterest hostility between the friends
of Messer Giovanni, who were mostly of the old nobility (grandi), and those who
sought to reform the government of Florence; and from this and the like causes, the
affair grew to such dimensions as to bring about the downfall of our republic.
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Manlius Capitolinus, then, was a calumniator, not an accuser; and in their treatment
of him the Romans showed how calumniators should be dealt with; by which I mean,
that they should be forced to become accusers; and if their accusation be proved true,
should be rewarded, or at least not punished, but if proved false should be punished
as Manlius was.
CHAPTER IX.—That to give new Institutions to a
Commonwealth, or to reconstruct old Institutions on
an entirely new basis, must be the work of one Man.
It may perhaps be thought that I should not have got so far into the history of Rome,
without some mention of those who gave that city its institutions, and saying
something of these institutions themselves, so far as they relate to religion and war.
As I have no wish to keep those who would know my views on these matters in
suspense, I say at once, that to many it might seem of evil omen that the founder of a
civil government like Romulus, should first have slain his brother, and afterwards
have consented to the death of Titus Tatius the Sabine, whom he had chosen to be his
colleague in the kingship; since his countrymen, if moved by ambition and lust of
power to inflict like injuries on any who opposed their designs, might plead the
example of their prince. This view would be a reasonable one were we to disregard
the object which led Romulus to put those men to death. But we must take it as a rule
to which there are very few if any exceptions, that no commonwealth or kingdom
ever has salutary institutions given it from the first or has its institutions recast in an
entirely new mould, unless by a single person. On the contrary, it must be from one
man that it receives its institutions at first, and upon one man that all similar
reconstruction must depend. For this reason the wise founder of a commonwealth
who seeks to benefit not himself only, or the line of his descendants, but his State
and country, must endeavour to acquire an absolute and undivided authority. And
none who is wise will ever blame any action, however extraordinary and irregular,
which serves to lay the foundation of a kingdom or to establish a republic. For
although the act condemn the doer, the end may justify him; and when, as in the case
of Romulus, the end is good, it will always excuse the means; since it is he who does
violence with intent to injure, not he who does it with the design to secure
tranquility, who merits blame. Such a person ought however to be so prudent and
moderate as to avoid transmitting the absolute authority he acquires, as an
inheritance to another; for as men are, by nature, more prone to evil than to good, a
successor may turn to ambitious ends the power which his predecessor has used to
promote worthy ends. Moreover, though it be one man that must give a State its
institutions, once given they are not so likely to last long resting for support on the
shoulders of one man only, as when entrusted to the care of many, and when it is the
business of many to maintain them. For though the multitude be unfit to set a State in
order, since they cannot, by reason of the divisions which prevail among them, agree
wherein the true well-being of the State lies, yet when they have once been taught
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the truth, they never will consent to abandon it. And that Romulus, though he put his
brother to death, is yet of those who are to be pardoned, since what he did was done
for the common good and not from personal ambition, is shown by his at once
creating a senate, with whom he took counsel, and in accordance with whose voice
he determined. And whosoever shall well examine the authority which Romulus
reserved to himself, will find that he reserved nothing beyond the command of the
army when war was resolved on, and the right to assemble the senate. This is seen
later, on Rome becoming free by the expulsion of the Tarquins, when the Romans
altered none of their ancient institutions save in appointing two consuls for a year
instead of a king for life; for this proves that all the original institutions of that city
were more in conformity with a free and constitutional government, than with an
absolute and despotic one.
In support of what has been said above, I might cite innumerable instances, as of
Moses, Lycurgus, Solon, and other founders of kingdoms and commonwealths, who,
from the full powers given them, were enabled to shape their laws to the public
advantage; but passing over these examples, as of common notoriety, I take one, not
indeed so famous, but which merits the attention of all who desire to frame wise
laws. Agis, King of Sparta, desiring to bring back his countrymen to those limits
within which the laws of Lycurgus had held them, because he thought that, from
having somewhat deviated from them, his city had lost much of its ancient virtue
and, consequently much of its strength and power, was, at the very outset of his
attempts, slain by the Spartan Ephori, as one who sought to make himself a tyrant.
But Cleomenes coming after him in the kingdom, and, on reading the notes and
writings which he found of Agis wherein his designs and intentions were explained,
being stirred by the same desire, perceived that he could not confer this benefit on
his country unless he obtained sole power. For he saw that the ambition of others
made it impossible for him to do what was useful for many against the will of a few.
Wherefore, finding fit occasion, he caused the Ephori and all others likely to throw
obstacles in his way, to be put to death; after which, he completely renewed the laws
of Lycurgus. And the result of his measures would have been to give fresh life to
Sparta, and to gain for himself a renown not inferior to that of Lycurgus, had it not
been for the power of the Macedonians and the weakness of the other Greek States.
For while engaged with these reforms, he was attacked by the Macedonians, and
being by himself no match for them, and having none to whom he could turn for
help, he was overpowered; and his plans, though wise and praiseworthy, were never
brought to perfection.
All which circumstances considered, I conclude that he who gives new institutions to
a State must stand alone; and that for the deaths of Remus and Tatius, Romulus is to
be excused rather than blamed.
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CHAPTER X.—That in proportion as the Founder of
a Kingdom or Commonwealth merits Praise, he who
founds a Tyranny deserves Blame.
Of all who are praised they are praised the most, who are the authors and founders of
religions. After whom come the founders of kingdoms and commonwealths. Next to
these, they have the greatest name who as commanders of armies have added to their
own dominions or those of their country. After these, again, are ranked men of
letters, who being of various shades of merit are celebrated each in his degree. To all
others, whose number is infinite, is ascribed that measure of praise to which his
profession or occupation entitles him. And, conversely, all who contribute to the
overthrow of religion, or to the ruin of kingdoms and commonwealths, all who are
foes to letters and to the arts which confer honour and benefit on the human race
(among whom I reckon the impious, the cruel, the ignorant, the indolent, the base
and the worthless), are held in infamy and detestation.
No one, whether he be wise or foolish, bad or good, if asked to choose between these
two kinds of men, will ever be found to withhold praise from what deserves praise,
or blame from what is to be blamed. And yet almost all, deceived by a false good and
a false glory, allow themselves either ignorantly or wilfully to follow in ...
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