Task organization of Operation Anaconda Paper

Anonymous

Question Description

i need a extra set of eyes on the paper to look for rewording and being free of grammatical errors.

Unformatted Attachment Preview

Running head: OPERATION ANACONDA Task organization of Operation Anaconda SFC (P) Xavier C. Presume Master Leader Course Class 502 Introduction 1 OPERATION ANACONDA 2 We thought it was a simple mission to run the enemy forces out of the Shahit Kot valley; Operation Anaconda proved to be more difficult due to several factors. Intelligence information was not accurate. Originally, intelligence stated that there were roughly 200 - 300 enemy combatants in the area; however, on March 2, 2002 (D-Day), those numbers were higher than initially estimated. Another factor is between the planning phase and the execution phase; there was not enough time to ensure they had all the components, and the proper support to carry out the mission. The lack of task organization and the inability of functional service and component commanders to operate under a single Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) was the leading cause of the initial failure of the operation. Task organization The task organization for Operation Anaconda had multiple units, with different elements under one command to accomplish a mission. The commander would have command and control over all the units, and personnel that would be supporting them. Within Operation Anaconda the Joint Task Force Commander (JTF), General Franks who was the Combatant Commander, US Central Command (CENTCOM), had to assign one command team to take the lead in planning and execution. On January 6, the Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) was the lead, but somehow between Feb11-13, the 10th Mountain Division (TF Mountain) had taken the lead because of the number of task forces involved, this made them the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). TF Mountain had tactical control (TACON) over the following: Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), TF DAGGER, TF K-BAR, and TF 64. They also had operational control (OPCON) over TF RAKKASAN, which consisted of, 1-87 IN, 1-187 IN, 2-187 IN, and 7-101 AVN. Other components that were involved with Operation Anaconda were TF 58, Black Special Operations Forces (SOF), 18th Air Force OPERATION ANACONDA 3 organizations (ASOG), Central Command (CENTCOM), Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC), Forward Combined Force Land Component Commander Forward (CFLCC FWD), Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC), Joint Forces Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC), TF Anvil, and TF Hammer. (Fleri, Howard, Hukill, & Searle, 2003) Functional Component Commander Major General Hagenbeck the TF Mountain commander plan was to trap and destroy the enemy element within the Shahit Kot Valley. They would accomplish this by having small special reconnaissance (SR) teams from TF K-BAR taking a position east of the valley and teams from TF 64 establishing positions south of the valley; this would enhance situational awareness before the attack. TF K-BAR and TF DAGGER would both be responsible for the airstrikes against the enemy before the attack if they tried to flee. TF DAGGER remaining troops along with General Zia's forces, also made up of SOF would be attacking from the north and south in a classic double envelopment maneuver. The blocking positions on the east side of the valley would be TF RAKKASAN with air-assaults (Brigade TAC), with U.S. conventional infantry forces. The Afghan troops (friendly) would accompany the U.S. infantry further east, behind the blocking position, this was to prevent or catch any enemy that tried to escaped or evade into Pakistan. According to the plan, the enemy would retreat or run, had the battle went as planned; it would have only been two days; instead, the battle lasted 14 days. (Sean Naylor 2004) If Maj General Hagenbeck had developed a more conceptualized plan, Operation Anaconda would have been a success early on. The planning shows that for joint operations, including air and ground operations, should extend down to the tactical level, and he also OPERATION ANACONDA 4 indicates that we should preserve legacy assets in which we need on the modern battlefield. Having command and control with the service components was one of the biggest mistakes with Operation Anaconda. Service Component Commanders Service Components are any support forces, units, individuals, detachments, organizations, or installations under that command. The service component also includes the support forces that being assign to a combatant command or further assigned to a joint task force. The service components in Operation Anaconda consisted of some of the following, Black SOF, TF-DAGGER, TF K-BAR, and TF RAKKASAN, JSOAC , Air Control Element (ACE), SOF, TF 64 (Australian Special Forces), TF 58 (United States Marine Corp) TF Hammer , TF Anvil (Fleri, Howard, Hukill, & Searle, 2003) (https://www.militaryfactory.com/dictionary/militaryterms-defined.asp?term_id=4826) Black SOF and interagency AC – 130's (who had TACON) TF DAGGER retained OPCON of their associated aviation assets TF K-BAR kept OPCON of their associated aviation assets TF RAKKASAN 64 Apache helicopters and close air support (CAS) Air control element (ACE) Joint Special Operation Air component (JSOAC) SOF forces assumed AC 130's (only) Conclusion In conclusion, the lack of task organization and the inability of functional service and component commanders to operate under a single Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) was the leading cause of the initial failure of the operation. However, Operation Anaconda considered a OPERATION ANACONDA victory; it was not a straightforward victory. Because the Combined Joint Task Force Commander did not have sufficient time to plan and execute, we took some losses that could be avoided. If the CJTF commander had task organization, functional component and the service component commanders, and command and control this would not have led to the confusion on the battlefield as it relates to calling in for airstrikes, missile. Essential the Army had to change the way they operate on and off the battlefield, Operation Anaconda. 5 OPERATION ANACONDA 6 References Baranick, M., Binnendijk, H., Kugler, R. L., (2009). Operation Anaconda. Lessons for joint operations. National Defense University, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, 1-59. Fleri, E., Howard, E., Hukill, J., & Searle, T.R. (2003). Operation Anaconda case study. College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1-28. Headquarters, Department of the Army. (2012). Leader development (FM 6-22). Washington DC Author. Retrieved from https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/fm6_22.pdf Sean, Naylor (2004). Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda ...
Purchase answer to see full attachment

Tutor Answer

henryprofessor
School: UC Berkeley

Attached.

Task organization of Operation Anaconda
SFC (P) Xavier C. Presume
Master Leader Course
Class 502

Introduction
In the beginning, it looked a simple operation n to drive out rebel forces from the t
Shahit Kot valley. However, Operation Anaconda proved to be more difficult due to several
factors. Intelligence information was not accurate. Originally, intelligence estimated that s
approximately 200 to 300 militant forces were in the area. However, on March 2, 2002 (D-Day),
those numbers were higher than initially estimated. Another factor that made operation
Anaconda difficult is poor organization in the planning and the execution phase due to lack of
time. Most importantly, poor task organization and failure of functional service and component
commanders to operate under a single Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) was the leading cause
of the failure of the operation.
Task organization
The task organization for Operation Anaconda involved units, with different elements all
working less than one command to accomplish a mission. The commander was in charge and
had control over all the units as well as the supporting personnel. During the Operation, the Joint
Task Force Commander (JTF), General Franks who was the Combatant Commander, US Cen...

flag Report DMCA
Review

Anonymous
Goes above and beyond expectations !

Brown University





1271 Tutors

California Institute of Technology




2131 Tutors

Carnegie Mellon University




982 Tutors

Columbia University





1256 Tutors

Dartmouth University





2113 Tutors

Emory University





2279 Tutors

Harvard University





599 Tutors

Massachusetts Institute of Technology



2319 Tutors

New York University





1645 Tutors

Notre Dam University





1911 Tutors

Oklahoma University





2122 Tutors

Pennsylvania State University





932 Tutors

Princeton University





1211 Tutors

Stanford University





983 Tutors

University of California





1282 Tutors

Oxford University





123 Tutors

Yale University





2325 Tutors