What Is Strategy?
The Idea in Brief
The myriad activities that go into creating, producing, selling, and delivering a product or service are
the basic units of competitive advantage. Operational effectiveness means performing these activities
better— that is, faster, or with fewer inputs and defects—than rivals. Companies can reap enormous
advantages from operational ef- fectiveness, as Japanese firms demon- strated in the 1970s and 1980s
with such practices as total quality management and continuous improvement. But from a com- petitive
standpoint, the problem with oper- ational effectiveness is that best practices are easily emulated. As all
competitors in an industry adopt them, the productivity frontier—the maximum value a company can
deliver at a given cost, given the best available technology, skills, and manage- ment techniques—
shifts outward, lowering costs and improving value at the same time. Such competition produces
absolute improvement in operational effectiveness, but relative improvement for no one. And the more
benchmarking that companies do, the more competitive convergence you have—that is, the more
indistinguish- able companies are from one another.
Strategic positioning attempts to achieve sustainable competitive advantage by preserving what is
distinctive about a com- pany. It means performing different activi- ties from rivals, or performing
similar activi- ties in different ways.
Three key principles underlie strategic positioning.
1. Strategy is the creation of a unique and valuable position, involving a different set of activities.
Strategic position emerges from three distinct sources:
• serving few needs of many customers (Jiffy Lube provides only auto lubricants)
• serving broad needs of few customers (Bessemer Trust targets only very high- wealth clients)
• serving broad needs of many customers in a narrow market (Carmike Cinemas op- erates only in
cities with a population under 200,000)
2. Strategy requires you to make trade-offs in competing—to choose what not to do. Some
competitive activities are incompatible; thus, gains in one area can be achieved only at the expense of
another area. For example, Neutrogena soap is positioned more as a me- dicinal product than as a
cleansing agent. The company says “no” to sales based on deodor- izing, gives up large volume, and
sacrifices manufacturing efficiencies. By contrast, Maytag’s decision to extend its product line and acquire other brands represented a failure to make difficult trade-offs: the boost in reve- nues came at the
expense of return on sales.
3. Strategy involves creating “fit” among a company’s activities. Fit has to do with the ways a
company’s activities interact and rein- force one another. For example, Vanguard Group aligns all of
its activities with a low-cost strategy; it distributes funds directly to con- sumers and minimizes
portfolio turnover. Fit drives both competitive advantage and sus- tainability: when activities mutually
reinforce each other, competitors can’t easily imitate them. When Continental Lite tried to match a few
of Southwest Airlines’ activities, but not the whole interlocking system, the results were disastrous.
Employees need guidance about how to deepen a strategic position rather than broaden or compromise
it. About how to ex- tend the company’s uniqueness while strengthening the fit among its activities.
This work of deciding which target group of cus- tomers and needs to serve requires discipline, the
ability to set limits, and forthright commu- nication. Clearly, strategy and leadership are inextricably
linked.
I. Operational Effectiveness Is Not Strategy
For almost two decades, managers have been learning to play by a new set of rules. Compa- nies must
be flexible to respond rapidly to competitive and market changes. They must benchmark continuously
to achieve best prac- tice. They must outsource aggressively to gain efficiencies. And they must nurture
a few core competencies in race to stay ahead of rivals.
Positioning—once the heart of strategy—is rejected as too static for today’s dynamic mar- kets and
changing technologies. According to the new dogma, rivals can quickly copy any market position, and
competitive advantage is, at best, temporary.
But those beliefs are dangerous half-truths, and they are leading more and more companies down the
path of mutually destructive compe- tition. True, some barriers to competition are falling as regulation
eases and markets become global. True, companies have properly invested energy in becoming leaner
and more nimble. In many industries, however, what some call
harvard business review • november–december 1996
hypercompetition is a self-inflicted wound, not the inevitable outcome of a changing paradigm of
competition.
The root of the problem is the failure to dis- tinguish between operational effectiveness and strategy.
The quest for productivity, quality, and speed has spawned a remarkable number of management tools
and techniques: total quality management, benchmarking, time-based com- petition, outsourcing,
partnering, reengineering, change management. Although the resulting operational improvements have
often been dramatic, many companies have been frustrated by their inability to translate those gains
into sustainable profitability. And bit by bit, almost imperceptibly, management tools have taken the
place of strategy. As managers push to im- prove on all fronts, they move farther away from viable
competitive positions.
Operational Effectiveness: Necessary but Not Sufficient. Operational effectiveness and strategy are
both essential to superior performance, which, after all, is the primary goal of any en- terprise. But they
work in very different ways.
A company can outperform rivals only if it can establish a difference that it can preserve. It must
deliver greater value to customers or create comparable value at a lower cost, or do both. The
arithmetic of superior profitability then fol- lows: delivering greater value allows a company to charge
higher average unit prices; greater efficiency results in lower average unit costs.
Ultimately, all differences between companies in cost or price derive from the hundreds of ac- tivities
required to create, produce, sell, and de- liver their products or services, such as calling on customers,
assembling final products, and training employees. Cost is generated by per- forming activities, and
cost advantage arises from performing particular activities more effi- ciently than competitors.
Similarly, differentia- tion arises from both the choice of activities and how they are performed.
Activities, then are the basic units of competitive advantage. Overall ad- vantage or disadvantage
results from all a com- pany’s activities, not only a few.1
Operational effectiveness (OE) means per- forming similar activities better than rivals per- form them.
Operational effectiveness includes but is not limited to efficiency. It refers to any number of practices
that allow a company to bet- ter utilize its inputs by, for example, reducing de- fects in products or
developing better products faster. In contrast, strategic positioning means performing different
activities from rivals’ or per- forming similar activities in different ways.
Differences in operational effectiveness among companies are pervasive. Some companies are able to
get more out of their inputs than others because they eliminate wasted effort, employ more advanced
technology, motivate employees better, or have greater insight into managing particular activities or
sets of activ- ities. Such differences in operational effective- ness are an important source of differences
in profitability among competitors because they directly affect relative cost positions and levels of
differentiation.
Differences in operational effectiveness were at the heart of the Japanese challenge to Western
companies in the 1980s. The Japa- nese were so far ahead of rivals in operational effectiveness that
they could offer lower cost and superior quality at the same time. It is worth dwelling on this point,
because so much recent thinking about competition depends on it. Imagine for a moment a productivity
frontier that constitutes the sum of all existing
What Is Strategy?
best practices at any given time. Think of it as the maximum value that a company deliver- ing a
particular product or service can create at a given cost, using the best available tech- nologies, skills,
management techniques, and purchased inputs. The productivity frontier can apply to individual
activities, to groups of linked activities such as order processing and manufacturing, and to an entire
com- pany’s activities. When a company improves its operational effectiveness, it moves toward the
frontier. Doing so may require capital in- vestment, different personnel, or simply new ways of
managing.
The productivity frontier is constantly shift- ing outward as new technologies and man- agement
approaches are developed and as new inputs become available. Laptop com- puters, mobile
communications, the Internet, and software such as Lotus Notes, for exam- ple, have redefined the
productivity frontier for sales-force operations and created rich possibilities for linking sales with such
activi- ties as order processing and after-sales sup- port. Similarly, lean production, which involves a
family of activities, has allowed substantial improvements in manufacturing productivity and asset
utilization.
For at least the past decade, managers have been preoccupied with improving operational effectiveness.
Through programs such as TQM, time-based competition, and benchmarking, they have changed how
they perform activities in order to eliminate inefficiencies, improve customer satisfaction, and achieve
best practice. Hoping to keep up with shifts in the produc- tivity frontier, managers have embraced continuous improvement, empowerment, change management, and the so-called learning orga- nization.
The popularity of outsourcing and the virtual corporation reflect the growing recognition that it is
difficult to perform all activities as productively as specialists.
As companies move to the frontier, they can often improve on multiple dimensions of per- formance at
the same time. For example, manu- facturers that adopted the Japanese practice of rapid changeovers in
the 1980s were able to lower cost and improve differentiation simul- taneously. What were once
believed to be real trade-offs—between defects and costs, for example—turned out to be illusions
created by poor operational effectiveness. Managers have learned to reject such false trade-offs.
Constant improvement in operational ef- fectiveness is necessary to achieve superior profitability.
However, it is not usually suffi- cient. Few companies have competed success- fully on the basis of
operational effectiveness over an extended period, and staying ahead of rivals gets harder every day.
The most obvious reason for that is the rapid diffusion of best practices. Competitors can quickly
imitate management techniques, new technologies, input improvements, and superior ways of meeting
customers’ needs. The most generic solutions—those that can be used in multiple settings—diffuse the
fastest. Witness the pro- liferation of OE techniques accelerated by support from consultants.
OE competition shifts the productivity fron- tier outward, effectively raising the bar for everyone. But
although such competition pro- duces absolute improvement in operational ef- fectiveness, it leads to
relative improvement for no one. Consider the $5 billion-plus U.S. commercial-printing industry. The
major players— R.R. Donnelley & Sons Company, Quebecor, World Color Press, and Big Flower
Press—are competing head to head, serving all types of customers, offering the same array of printing
technologies (gravure and web offset), in- vesting heavily in the same new equipment, running their
presses faster, and reducing crew sizes. But the resulting major productivity
What Is Strategy?
gains are being captured by customers and equipment suppliers, not retained in superior profitability.
Even industry-leader Donnelley’s profit margin, consistently higher than 7% in the 1980s, fell to less
than 4.6% in 1995. This pattern is playing itself out in industry after industry. Even the Japanese,
pioneers of the new competition, suffer from persistently low profits. (See the insert “Japanese
Companies Rarely Have Strategies.”)
The second reason that improved opera- tional effectiveness is insufficient—competitive
convergence—is more subtle and insidious. The more benchmarking companies do, the more they look
alike. The more that rivals out- source activities to efficient third parties, often the same ones, the more
generic those activities become. As rivals imitate one an- other’s improvements in quality, cycle times,
or supplier partnerships, strategies converge and competition becomes a series of races down identical
paths that no one can win. Competition based on operational effective- ness alone is mutually
destructive, leading to wars of attrition that can be arrested only by limiting competition.
The recent wave of industry consolidation through mergers makes sense in the context of OE
competition. Driven by performance pres- sures but lacking strategic vision, company after company
has had no better idea than to buy up its rivals. The competitors left standing are often those that
outlasted others, not com- panies with real advantage.
After a decade of impressive gains in opera- tional effectiveness, many companies are facing
diminishing returns. Continuous improvement has been etched on managers’ brains. But its tools
unwittingly draw companies toward imi- tation and homogeneity. Gradually, managers have let
operational effectiveness supplant strat- egy. The result is zero-sum competition, static or declining
prices, and pressures on costs that compromise companies’ ability to invest in the business for the long
term.
II. Strategy Rests on Unique Activities
Competitive strategy is about being different. It means deliberately choosing a different set of activities
to deliver a unique mix of value.
Southwest Airlines Company, for example, offers short-haul, low-cost, point-to-point service between
midsize cities and secondary airports in large cities. Southwest avoids large airports and does not fly
great distances. Its customers include business travelers, families, and stu- dents. Southwest’s frequent
departures and low fares attract price-sensitive customers who otherwise would travel by bus or car,
and convenience-oriented travelers who would choose a full-service airline on other routes.
Most managers describe strategic position- ing in terms of their customers: “Southwest Airlines serves
price- and convenience-sensitive travelers,” for example. But the essence of strat- egy is in the
activities—choosing to perform activities differently or to perform different ac- tivities than rivals.
Otherwise, a strategy is nothing more than a marketing slogan that will not withstand competition.
A full-service airline is configured to get passengers from almost any point A to any point B. To reach
a large number of destinations and serve passengers with connecting flights, full-service airlines
employ a hub-and-spoke system centered on major airports. To attract passengers who desire more
comfort, they offer first-class or business-class service. To accommodate passengers who must change
planes, they co- ordinate schedules and check and transfer baggage. Because some passengers will be
traveling for many hours, full-service airlines serve meals.
Southwest, in contrast, tailors all its activities to deliver low-cost, convenient service on its par- ticular
type of route. Through fast turnarounds at the gate of only 15 minutes, Southwest is able to keep planes
flying longer hours than rivals and provide frequent departures with fewer aircraft. Southwest does not
offer meals, assigned seats, interline baggage checking, or premium classes of service. Automated
ticketing at the gate encourages customers to bypass travel agents, al- lowing Southwest to avoid their
commissions. A standardized fleet of 737 aircraft boosts the efficiency of maintenance.
Southwest has staked out a unique and valu- able strategic position based on a tailored set of activities.
On the routes served by South- west, a full-service airline could never be as convenient or as low cost.
Ikea, the global furniture retailer based in Sweden, also has a clear strategic positioning. Ikea targets
young furniture buyers who want style at low cost. What turns this marketing concept into a strategic
positioning is the tai- lored set of activities that make it work. Like Southwest, Ikea has chosen to
perform activi- ties differently from its rivals.
Consider the typical furniture store. Show- rooms display samples of the merchandise. One area might
contain 25 sofas; another will display five dining tables. But those items rep- resent only a fraction of
the choices available to customers. Dozens of books displaying fabric swatches or wood samples or
alternate styles offer customers thousands of product varieties to choose from. Salespeople often escort
cus- tomers through the store, answering questions and helping them navigate this maze of choices.
Once a customer makes a selection, the order is relayed to a third-party manufacturer. With luck, the
furniture will be delivered to the cus- tomer’s home within six to eight weeks. This is a value chain that
maximizes customization and service but does so at high cost.
In contrast, Ikea serves customers who are happy to trade off service for cost. Instead of having a sales
associate trail customers around the store, Ikea uses a self-service model based on clear, in-store
displays. Rather than rely solely on third-party manufacturers, Ikea designs its own low-cost, modular,
ready-to-assemble furniture to fit its positioning. In huge stores, Ikea displays every product it sells in
room-like settings, so customers don’t need a decorator to help them imagine how to put the pieces together. Adjacent to the furnished showrooms is a warehouse section with the products in boxes on
pallets. Customers are expected to do their own pickup and delivery, and Ikea will even sell you a roof
rack for your car that you can return for a refund on your next visit.
Although much of its low-cost position comes from having customers “do it themselves,” Ikea offers a
number of extra services that its com- petitors do not. In-store child care is one. Ex- tended hours are
another. Those services are uniquely aligned with the needs of its custom- ers, who are young, not
wealthy, likely to have children (but no nanny), and, because they work for a living, have a need to
shop at odd hours.
The Origins of Strategic Positions. Strategic positions emerge from three distinct sources, which are
not mutually exclusive and often overlap. First, positioning can be based on pro- ducing a subset of an
industry’s products or services. I call this variety-based positioning because it is based on the choice of
product or service varieties rather than customer segments. Variety-based positioning makes economic
sense when a company can best produce particular products or services using distinctive sets of
activities.
Jiffy Lube International, for instance, spe- cializes in automotive lubricants and does not offer other car
repair or maintenance services. Its value chain produces faster service at a lower cost than broader line
repair shops, a combination so attractive that many customers subdivide their purchases, buying oil
changes from the focused competitor, Jiffy Lube, and going to rivals for other services.
The Vanguard Group, a leader in the mutual fund industry, is another example of variety- based
positioning. Vanguard provides an array of common stock, bond, and money market funds that offer
predictable perfor- mance and rock-bottom expenses. The com- pany’s investment approach
deliberately sacrifices the possibility of extraordinary per- formance in any one year for good relative
performance in every year. Vanguard is known, for example, for its index funds. It avoids mak- ing
bets on interest rates and steers clear of narrow stock groups. Fund managers keep trading levels low,
which holds expenses down; in addition, the company discourages customers from rapid buying and
selling be- cause doing so drives up costs and can force a fund manager to trade in order to deploy new
Strategic competition can be thought of as the process of perceiving new positions that woo customers
from established positions or draw new customers into the market. For ex- ample, superstores offering
depth of mer- chandise in a single product category take market share from broad-line department
stores offering a more limited selection in many categories. Mail-order catalogs pick off customers
who crave convenience. In princi- ple, incumbents and entrepreneurs face the same challenges in
finding new strategic po- sitions. In practice, new entrants often have the edge.
Strategic positionings are often not obvi- ous and finding them requires creativity and insight. New
entrants often discover unique positions that have been available but simply overlooked by established
competitors. Ikea, for example, recognized a customer group that had been ignored or served poorly.
Cir- cuit City Stores’ entry into used cars, CarMax, is based on a new way of performing activities—
extensive refurbishing of cars, product guaran- tees, no-haggle pricing, sophisticated use of in- house
customer financing—that has long been open to incumbents.
New entrants can prosper by occupying a position that a competitor once held but has ceded through
years of imitation and strad- dling. And entrants coming from other indus- tries can create new
positions because of dis- tinctive activities drawn from their other businesses. CarMax borrows heavily
from Circuit City’s expertise in inventory manage- ment, credit, and other activities in consumer
electronics retailing.
Most commonly, however, new positions open up because of change. New customer groups or
purchase occasions arise; new needs emerge as societies evolve; new distri- bution channels appear;
new technologies are developed; new machinery or informa- tion systems become available. When
such changes happen, new entrants, unencum- bered by a long history in the industry, can often more
easily perceive the potential for a new way of competing. Unlike incum- bents, newcomers can be
more flexible be- cause they face no trade-offs with their existing activities.
capital and raise cash for redemptions. Vanguard also takes a consistent low-cost ap- proach to
managing distribution, customer service, and marketing. Many investors in- clude one or more
Vanguard funds in their portfolio, while buying aggressively managed or specialized funds from
competitors.
The people who use Vanguard or Jiffy Lube are responding to a superior value chain for a particular
type of service. A variety-based positioning can serve a wide array of custom- ers, but for most it will
meet only a subset of their needs.
A second basis for positioning is that of serv- ing most or all the needs of a particular group of
customers. I call this needs-based positioning, which comes closer to traditional thinking about
targeting a segment of customers. It arises when there are groups of customers with dif- fering needs,
and when a tailored set of activi- ties can serve those needs best. Some groups of customers are more
price sensitive than others, demand different product features, and need varying amounts of
information, support, and services. Ikea’s customers are a good example of such a group. Ikea seeks to
meet all the home furnishing needs of its target customers, not just a subset of them.
A variant of needs-based positioning arises when the same customer has different needs on different
occasions or for different types of transactions. The same person, for example, may have different
needs when traveling on business than when traveling for pleasure with the family. Buyers of cans—
beverage compa- nies, for example—will likely have different needs from their primary supplier than
from their secondary source.
It is intuitive for most managers to conceive of their business in terms of the customers’ needs they are
meeting. But a critical element of needs-based positioning is not at all intuitive and is often overlooked.
Differences in needs will not translate into meaningful positions unless the best set of activities to
satisfy them also differs. If that were not the case, every competitor could meet those same needs, and
there would be nothing unique or valuable about the positioning.
In private banking, for example, Bessemer Trust Company targets families with a mini- mum of $5
million in investable assets who want capital preservation combined with wealth accumulation. By
assigning one sophis ticated account officer for every 14 families, Bessemer has configured its
activities for per- sonalized service. Meetings, for example, are more likely to be held at a client’s
ranch or yacht than in the office. Bessemer offers a wide array of customized services, including
invest- ment management and estate administration, oversight of oil and gas investments, and accounting for racehorses and aircraft. Loans, a staple of most private banks, are rarely needed by
Bessemer’s clients and make up a tiny frac- tion of its client balances and income. Despite the most
generous compensation of account officers and the highest personnel cost as a per- centage of
operating expenses, Bessemer’s dif- ferentiation with its target families produces a return on equity
estimated to be the highest of any private banking competitor.
Citibank’s private bank, on the other hand, serves clients with minimum assets of about $250,000 who,
in contrast to Bessemer’s clients, want convenient access to loans—from jumbo mortgages to deal
financing. Citibank’s account managers are primarily lenders. When clients need other services, their
account manager re- fers them to other Citibank specialists, each of whom handles prepackaged
products. Citibank’s system is less customized than Bessemer’s and allows it to have a lower managerto-client ratio of 1:125. Biannual office meetings are of- fered only for the largest clients. Both
Bessemer and Citibank have tailored their activities to meet the needs of a different group of private
banking customers. The same value chain can- not profitably meet the needs of both groups.
The third basis for positioning is that of seg- menting customers who are accessible in dif- ferent ways.
Although their needs are similar to those of other customers, the best configu- ration of activities to
reach them is different. I call this access-based positioning. Access can be a function of customer
geography or cus- tomer scale—or of anything that requires a different set of activities to reach
customers in the best way.
Segmenting by access is less common and less well understood than the other two bases. Carmike
Cinemas, for example, operates movie theaters exclusively in cities and towns with populations under
200,000. How does Car- mike make money in markets that are not only small but also won’t support
big-city ticket prices? It does so through a set of activities that result in a lean cost structure. Carmike’s
small-town customers can be served through standardized, low-cost theater complexes re- quiring
fewer screens and less sophisticated projection technology than big-city theaters. The company’s
proprietary information system and management process eliminate the need for local administrative
staff beyond a single theater manager. Carmike also reaps advan- tages from centralized purchasing,
lower rent and payroll costs (because of its locations), and rock-bottom corporate overhead of 2% (the
in- dustry average is 5%). Operating in small com- munities also allows Carmike to practice a highly
personal form of marketing in which the theater manager knows patrons and pro- motes attendance
through personal contacts. By being the dominant if not the only theater in its markets—the main
competition is often the high school football team—Carmike is also able to get its pick of films and
negotiate better terms with distributors.
Rural versus urban-based customers are one example of access driving differences in activities. Serving
small rather than large cus- tomers or densely rather than sparsely situ- ated customers are other
examples in which the best way to configure marketing, order processing, logistics, and after-sale
service ac- tivities to meet the similar needs of distinct groups will often differ.
Positioning is not only about carving out a niche. A position emerging from any of the sources can be
broad or narrow. A focused competitor, such as Ikea, targets the special needs of a subset of customers
and designs its activities accordingly. Focused competitors thrive on groups of customers who are
over- served (and hence overpriced) by more broadly targeted competitors, or underserved (and hence
underpriced). A broadly targeted com- petitor—for example, Vanguard or Delta Air Lines—serves a
wide array of customers, per- forming a set of activities designed to meet their common needs. It
ignores or meets only partially the more idiosyncratic needs of par- ticular customer customer groups.
Whatever the basis—variety, needs, access, or some combination of the three—positioning requires a
tailored set of activities because it is always a function of differences on the supply side; that is, of
differences in activities. How- ever, positioning is not always a function of differences on the demand,
or customer, side. Variety and access positionings, in partic- ular, do not rely on any customer
differences. In practice, however, variety or access differ- ences often accompany needs differences.
The tastes—that is, the needs—of Carmike’s small- town customers, for instance, run more toward
comedies, Westerns, action films, and family entertainment. Carmike does not run any films rated NC17.
Having defined positioning, we can now begin to answer the question,“What is strategy?” Strategy is
the creation of a unique and valu- able position, involving a different set of activi- ties. If there were
only one ideal position, there would be no need for strategy. Compa- nies would face a simple
imperative—win the race to discover and preempt it. The essence of strategic positioning is to choose
activities that are different from rivals’. If the same set of ac- tivities were best to produce all varieties,
meet all needs, and access all customers, companies could easily shift among them and operational
effectiveness would determine performance.
III. A Sustainable Strategic Position Requires Trade-offs
Choosing a unique position, however, is not enough to guarantee a sustainable advantage. A valuable
position will attract imitation by in- cumbents, who are likely to copy it in one of two ways.
First, a competitor can reposition itself to match the superior performer. J.C. Penney, for instance, has
been repositioning itself from a Sears clone to a more upscale, fashion- oriented, soft-goods retailer. A
second and far more common type of imitation is strad- dling. The straddler seeks to match the benefits
of a successful position while maintaining its existing position. It grafts new features, ser- vices, or
technologies onto the activities it already performs.
For those who argue that competitors can copy any market position, the airline industry is a perfect test
case. It would seem that nearly any competitor could imitate any other air- line’s activities. Any airline
can buy the same planes, lease the gates, and match the menus and ticketing and baggage handling
services offered by other airlines.
Continental Airlines saw how well South- west was doing and decided to straddle. While maintaining
its position as a full-service air- line, Continental also set out to match South- west on a number of
point-to-point routes. The airline dubbed the new service Conti- nental Lite. It eliminated meals and
first- class service, increased departure frequency, lowered fares, and shortened turnaround time at the
gate. Because Continental remained a full-service airline on other routes, it contin- ued to use travel
agents and its mixed fleet of planes and to provide baggage checking and seat assignments.
But a strategic position is not sustainable unless there are trade-offs with other positions. Trade-offs
occur when activities are incom- patible. Simply put, a trade-off means that more of one thing
necessitates less of another. An airline can choose to serve meals—adding cost and slowing turnaround
time at the gate— or it can choose not to, but it cannot do both without bearing major inefficiencies.
Trade-offs create the need for choice and protect against repositioners and straddlers. Consider
Neutrogena soap. Neutrogena Cor- poration’s variety-based positioning is built on a “kind to the skin,”
residue-free soap formu- lated for pH balance. With a large detail force calling on dermatologists,
Neutrogena’s mar- keting strategy looks more like a drug com- pany’s than a soap maker’s. It
advertises in medical journals, sends direct mail to doctors, attends medical conferences, and performs
re- search at its own Skincare Institute. To rein- force its positioning, Neutrogena originally focused its
distribution on drugstores and avoided price promotions. Neutrogena uses a
What Is Strategy?
slow, more expensive manufacturing process to mold its fragile soap.
In choosing this position, Neutrogena said no to the deodorants and skin softeners that many customers
desire in their soap. It gave up the large-volume potential of selling through supermarkets and using
price promotions. It sacrificed manufacturing efficiencies to achieve the soap’s desired attributes. In its
original po- sitioning, Neutrogena made a whole raft of trade-offs like those, trade-offs that protected
the company from imitators.
Trade-offs arise for three reasons. The first is inconsistencies in image or reputation. A com- pany
known for delivering one kind of value may lack credibility and confuse customers—or even
undermine its reputation—if it delivers an- other kind of value or attempts to deliver two inconsistent
things at the same time. For exam- ple, Ivory soap, with its position as a basic, inex- pensive everyday
soap, would have a hard time reshaping its image to match Neutrogena’s pre- mium “medical”
reputation. Efforts to create a new image typically cost tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars in a
major industry—a powerful barrier to imitation.
Second, and more important, trade-offs arise from activities themselves. Different positions (with their
tailored activities) require different product configurations, different equipment, different employee
behavior, different skills, and different management systems. Many trade-offs reflect inflexibilities in
machinery, people, or systems. The more Ikea has config- ured its activities to lower costs by having its
customers do their own assembly and delivery, the less able it is to satisfy customers who re- quire
higher levels of service.
However, trade-offs can be even more basic. In general, value is destroyed if an activity is
overdesigned or underdesigned for its use. For example, even if a given salesperson were capa- ble of
providing a high level of assistance to one customer and none to another, the sales- person’s talent (and
some of his or her cost) would be wasted on the second customer. Moreover, productivity can improve
when vari- ation of an activity is limited. By providing a high level of assistance all the time, the salesperson and the entire sales activity can often achieve efficiencies of learning and scale.
Finally, trade-offs arise from limits on inter- nal coordination and control. By clearly choos- ing to
compete in one way and not another, senior management makes organizational priorities clear.
Companies that try to be all things to all customers, in contrast, risk confu- sion in the trenches as
employees attempt to make day-to-day operating decisions without a clear framework.
Positioning trade-offs are pervasive in competition and essential to strategy. They
createtheneedforchoiceandpurposefully limit what a company offers. They deter straddling or
repositioning, because competi- tors that engage in those approaches under- mine their strategies and
degrade the value of their existing activities.
Trade-offs ultimately grounded Continental Lite. The airline lost hundreds of millions of dollars, and
the CEO lost his job. Its planes were delayed leaving congested hub cities or slowed at the gate by
baggage transfers. Late flights and cancellations generated a thousand complaints a day. Continental
Lite could not afford to compete on price and still pay stan- dard travel-agent commissions, but neither
could it do without agents for its full-service business. The airline compromised by cutting
commissions for all Continental flights across the board. Similarly, it could not afford to offer the same
frequent-flier benefits to travelers paying the much lower ticket prices for Lite service. It compromised
again by lowering the rewards of Continental’s entire frequent-flier program. The results: angry travel
agents and full-service customers.
Continental tried to compete in two ways at once. In trying to be low cost on some routes and full
service on others, Continental paid an enormous straddling penalty. If there were no trade-offs between
the two positions, Conti- nental could have succeeded. But the absence of trade-offs is a dangerous
half-truth that managers must unlearn. Quality is not always free. Southwest’s convenience, one kind
of high quality, happens to be consistent with low costs because its frequent departures are facili- tated
by a number of low-cost practices—fast gate turnarounds and automated ticketing, for example.
However, other dimensions of air- line quality—an assigned seat, a meal, or bag- gage transfer—
require costs to provide.
In general, false trade-offs between cost and quality occur primarily when there is redun- dant or
wasted effort, poor control or accuracy, or weak coordination. Simultaneous improve- ment of cost and
differentiation is possible
What Is Strategy?
only when a company begins far behind the productivity frontier or when the frontier shifts outward.
At the frontier, where compa- nies have achieved current best practice, the trade-off between cost and
differentiation is very real indeed.
After a decade of enjoying productivity ad- vantages, Honda Motor Company and Toyota Motor
Corporation recently bumped up against the frontier. In 1995, faced with in- creasing customer
resistance to higher auto- mobile prices, Honda found that the only way to produce a less-expensive car
was to skimp on features. In the United States, it replaced the rear disk brakes on the Civic with lowercost drum brakes and used cheaper fabric for the back seat, hoping customers would not notice. Toyota
tried to sell a version of its best- selling Corolla in Japan with unpainted bumpers and cheaper seats. In
Toyota’s case, customers rebelled, and the company quickly dropped the new model.
For the past decade, as managers have im- proved operational effectiveness greatly, they have
internalized the idea that eliminating trade-offs is a good thing. But if there are no trade-offs companies
will never achieve a sus- tainable advantage. They will have to run faster and faster just to stay in
place.
As we return to the question, What is strategy? we see that trade-offs add a new di- mension to the
answer. Strategy is making trade-offs in competing. The essence of strat- egy is choosing what not to
do. Without trade- offs, there would be no need for choice and thus no need for strategy. Any good idea
could and would be quickly imitated. Again, performance would once again depend wholly on
operational effectiveness.
IV. Fit Drives Both Competitive Advantage and Sustainability Positioning choices determine not
only which activities a company will perform and how it will configure individual activities but also
how activities relate to one another. While op- erational effectiveness is about achieving ex- cellence in
individual activities, or functions, strategy is about combining activities.
Southwest’s rapid gate turnaround, which allows frequent departures and greater use of aircraft, is
essential to its high-convenience, low-cost positioning. But how does Southwest achieve it? Part of the
answer lies in the company’s well-paid gate and ground crews, whose productivity in turnarounds is
enhanced by flexible union rules. But the bigger part of the answer lies in how Southwest performs
other activities. With no meals, no seat assignment, and no interline baggage transfers, Southwest
avoids having to perform activities that slow down other airlines. It selects airports and routes to avoid
congestion that introduces de- lays. Southwest’s strict limits on the type and length of routes make
standardized aircraft possible: every aircraft Southwest turns is a Boeing 737.
What is Southwest’s core competence? Its key success factors? The correct answer is that everything
matters. Southwest’s strategy in- volves a whole system of activities, not a col- lection of parts. Its
competitive advantage comes from the way its activities fit and rein- force one another.
Fit locks out imitators by creating a chain that is as strong as its strongest link. As in most companies
with good strategies, Southwest’s activities complement one another in ways that create real economic
value. One activity’s cost, for example, is lowered because of the way other activities are performed.
Similarly, one activity’s value to customers can be en- hanced by a company’s other activities. That is
the way strategic fit creates competitive advan- tage and superior profitability.
TypesofFit.The importance of fit among functional policies is one of the oldest ideas in strategy.
Gradually, however, it has been sup- planted on the management agenda. Rather than seeing the
company as a whole, manag- ers have turned to “core” competencies, “criti- cal” resources, and “key”
success factors. In fact, fit is a far more central component of competitive advantage than most realize.
Fit is important because discrete activities often affect one another. A sophisticated sales force, for
example, confers a greater advan- tage when the company’s product embodies premium technology
and its marketing ap- proach emphasizes customer assistance and support. A production line with high
levels of model variety is more valuable when com- bined with an inventory and order processing
system that minimizes the need for stocking finished goods, a sales process equipped to ex- plain and
encourage customization, and an advertising theme that stresses the benefits of product variations that
meet a customer’s special needs. Such complementarities are pervasive in strategy. Although some fit
among activities is generic and applies to many companies, the most valuable fit is strategy-specific
because it enhances a posi- tion’s uniqueness and amplifies trade-offs.2
There are three types of fit, although they are not mutually exclusive. First-order fit is simple
consistency between each activity (func- tion) and the overall strategy. Vanguard, for example, aligns
all activities with its low-cost strategy. It minimizes portfolio turnover and does not need highly
compensated money managers. The company distributes its funds directly, avoiding commissions to
brokers. It also limits advertising, relying instead on pub- lic relations and word-of-mouth
recommenda- tions. Vanguard ties its employees’ bonuses to cost savings.
Consistency ensures that the competitive ad- vantages of activities cumulate and do not erode or cancel
themselves out. It makes the strategy easier to communicate to customers, employees, and
shareholders, and improves implementation through single-mindedness in the corporation.
Second-order fit occurs when activities are reinforcing. Neutrogena, for example, mar- kets to upscale
hotels eager to offer their guests a soap recommended by dermatolo- gists. Hotels grant Neutrogena the
privilege of using its customary packaging while requir- ing other soaps to feature the hotel’s name.
Once guests have tried Neutrogena in a lux- ury hotel, they are more likely to purchase it at the
drugstore or ask their doctor about it. Thus Neutrogena’s medical and hotel market- ing activities
reinforce one another, lowering total marketing costs.
In another example, Bic Corporation sells a narrow line of standard, low-priced pens to vir- tually all
major customer markets (retail, com- mercial, promotional, and giveaway) through virtually all
available channels. As with any variety-based positioning serving a broad group of customers, Bic
emphasizes a common need (low price for an acceptable pen) and uses marketing approaches with a
broad reach (a large sales force and heavy television adver- tising). Bic gains the benefits of
consistency across nearly all activities, including product design that emphasizes ease of
manufacturing, plants configured for low cost, aggressive purchasing to minimize material costs, and
in-house parts production whenever the economics dictate.
Yet Bic goes beyond simple consistency be- cause its activities are reinforcing. For example, the
company uses point-of-sale displays and frequent packaging changes to stimulate im- pulse buying. To
handle point-of-sale tasks, a company needs a large sales force. Bic’s is the largest in its industry, and
it handles point-of- sale activities better than its rivals do. More- over, the combination of point-of-sale
activity, heavy television advertising, and packaging changes yields far more impulse buying than any
activity in isolation could.
Third-order fit goes beyond activity rein- forcement to what I call optimization of effort. The Gap, a
retailer of casual clothes, considers product availability in its stores a critical ele- ment of its strategy.
The Gap could keep products either by holding store inventory or by re- stocking from warehouses.
The Gap has optimized its effort across these activities by restocking its selection of basic clothing
almost daily out of three warehouses, thereby mini- mizing the need to carry large in-store inventories. The emphasis is on restocking because the Gap’s merchandising strategy sticks to basic items in
relatively few colors. While compara- ble retailers achieve turns of three to four times per year, the
Gap turns its inventory seven and a half times per year. Rapid restock- ing, moreover, reduces the cost
of implement- ing the Gap’s short model cycle, which is six to eight weeks long. 3
Coordination and information exchange across activities to eliminate redundancy and minimize wasted
effort are the most basic types of effort optimization. But there are higher levels as well. Product design
choices, for example, can eliminate the need for after- sale service or make it possible for customers to
perform service activities themselves. Simi- larly, coordination with suppliers or distribu- tion channels
can eliminate the need for some in-house activities, such as end-user training.
In all three types of fit, the whole matters more than any individual part. Competitive ad- vantage
grows out of the entire system of activi- ties. The fit among activities substantially re- duces cost or
increases differentiation. Beyond that, the competitive value of individual activi- ties—or the
associated skills, competencies, or resources—cannot be decoupled from the sys- tem or the strategy.
Thus in competitive com- panies it can be misleading to explain success by specifying individual
strengths, core compe- tencies, or critical resources. The list of strengths cuts across many functions,
and one strength blends into others. It is more useful to think in terms of themes that pervade many
activities, such as low cost, a particular notion of customer service, or a particular conception of the
value delivered. These themes are em- bodied in nests of tightly linked activities.
Fitandsustainability.Strategic fit among many activities is fundamental not only to competitive
advantage but also to the sus- tainability of that advantage. It is harder for a rival to match an array of
interlocked ac- tivities than it is merely to imitate a particu- lar sales-force approach, match a process
technology, or replicate a set of product fea- tures. Positions built on systems of activities are far more
sustainable than those built on individual activities.
Consider this simple exercise. The probability that competitors can match any activity is often less than
one. The probabilities then quickly compound to make matching the en- tire system highly unlikely (.9
x .9 = .81; .9 x .9 x .9 x .9 = .66, and so on). Existing companies that try to reposition or straddle will
be forced to reconfigure many activities. And even new entrants, though they do not confront the tradeoffs facing established rivals, still face for- midable barriers to imitation.
The more a company’s positioning rests on activity systems with second- and third-order fit, the more
sustainable its advantage will be. Such systems, by their very nature, are usually difficult to untangle
from outside the com- pany and therefore hard to imitate. And even if rivals can identify the relevant
interconnec- tions, they will have difficulty replicating them. Achieving fit is difficult because it
requires the integration of decisions and actions across many independent subunits.
A competitor seeking to match an activity system gains little by imitating only some activities and not
matching the whole. Per- formance does not improve; it can decline. Recall Continental Lite’s
disastrous attempt to imitate Southwest.
Finally, fit among a company’s activities cre- ates pressures and incentives to improve opera- tional
effectiveness, which makes imitation even harder. Fit means that poor performance in one activity will
degrade the performance in others, so that weaknesses are exposed and more prone to get attention.
Conversely, im- provements in one activity will pay dividends in others. Companies with strong fit
among their activities are rarely inviting targets. Their superiority in strategy and in execution only
compounds their advantages and raises the hurdle for imitators.
When activities complement one another, ri- vals will get little benefit from imitation unless they
successfully match the whole system. Such situations tend to promote winner-take- all competition.
The company that builds the best activity system—Toys R Us, for instance— wins, while rivals with
similar strategies— Child World and Lionel Leisure—fall behind. Thus finding a new strategic
position is often preferable to being the second or third imita- tor of an occupied position.
The most viable positions are those whose activity systems are incompatible because of tradeoffs.
Strategic positioning sets the trade- off rules that define how individual activities will be configured
and integrated. Seeing strat- egy in terms of activity systems only makes it clearer why organizational
structure, systems, and processes need to be strategy-specific. Tailoring organization to strategy, in
turn, makes complementarities more achievable and contributes to sustainability.
One implication is that strategic positions should have a horizon of a decade or more, not of a single
planning cycle. Continuity fos- ters improvements in individual activities and the fit across activities,
allowing an orga- nization to build unique capabilities and skills tailored to its strategy. Continuity also
reinforces a company’s identity.
Conversely, frequent shifts in positioning are costly. Not only must a company reconfig- ure individual
activities, but it must also re- align entire systems. Some activities may never catch up to the vacillating
strategy. The inevitable result of frequent shifts in strategy, or of failure to choose a distinct position in
the first place, is “me-too” or hedged activity configurations, inconsistencies across func- tions, and
organizational dissonance.
What is strategy? We can now complete the answer to this question. Strategy is creating fit among a
company’s activities. The success of a strategy depends on doing many things well— not just a few—
and integrating among them. If there is no fit among activities, there is no distinctive strategy and little
sustainability. Management reverts to the simpler task of overseeing independent functions, and operational effectiveness determines an organiza- tion’s relative performance.
V. Rediscovering Strategy
The Failure to Choose. Why do so many com- panies fail to have a strategy? Why do manag- ers
avoid making strategic choices? Or, having made them in the past, why do managers so often let
strategies decay and blur?
Commonly, the threats to strategy are seen to emanate from outside a company because of changes in
technology or the behavior of competitors. Although external changes can be the problem, the greater
threat to strategy often comes from within. A sound strategy is undermined by a misguided view of
competi- tion, by organizational failures, and, especially, by the desire to grow.
Managers have become confused about the necessity of making choices. When many com- panies
operate far from the productivity fron- tier, trade-offs appear unnecessary. It can seem that a well-run
company should be able to beat its ineffective rivals on all dimensions simulta- neously. Taught by
popular management thinkers that they do not have to make trade- offs, managers have acquired a
macho sense that to do so is a sign of weakness.
Unnerved by forecasts of hypercompetition, managers increase its likelihood by imitating everything
about their competitors. Exhorted to think in terms of revolution, managers chase every new
technology for its own sake.
The pursuit of operational effectiveness is seductive because it is concrete and actionable. Over the past
decade, managers have been under increasing pressure to deliver tangible, measurable performance
improvements. Pro- grams in operational effectiveness produce reassuring progress, although superior
profitabil- ity may remain elusive. Business publications and consultants flood the market with information about what other companies are doing, reinforcing the best-practice mentality. Caught up in the
race for operational effectiveness, many managers simply do not understand the need to have a
strategy.
Companies avoid or blur strategic choices for other reasons as well. Conventional wisdom within an
industry is often strong, homogeniz- ing competition. Some managers mistake “cus- tomer focus” to
mean they must serve all cus- tomer needs or respond to every request from distribution channels.
Others cite the desire to preserve flexibility.
Organizational realities also work against strategy. Trade-offs are frightening, and mak- ing no choice
is sometimes preferred to risk- ing blame for a bad choice. Companies imitate one another in a type of
herd behavior, each assuming rivals know something they do not. Newly empowered employees, who
are urged to seek every possible source of improve- ment, often lack a vision of the whole and the
perspective to recognize trade-offs. The failure to choose sometimes comes down to the reluctance to
disappoint valued managers or employees.
The Growth Trap. Among all other influ- ences, the desire to grow has perhaps the most perverse
effect on strategy. Trade-offs and limits appear to constrain growth. Serv- ing one group of customers
and excluding others, for instance, places a real or imag- ined limit on revenue growth. Broadly targeted strategies emphasizing low price result in lost sales with customers sensitive to fea- tures or
service. Differentiators lose sales to price-sensitive customers.
Managers are constantly tempted to take in- cremental steps that surpass those limits but blur a
company’s strategic position. Eventually, pressures to grow or apparent saturation of the target market
lead managers to broaden the position by extending product lines, adding new features, imitating
competitors’ popular services, matching processes, and even making acquisitions. For years, Maytag
Corporation’s success was based on its focus on reliable, dura- ble washers and dryers, later extended
to include dishwashers. However, conventional wisdom emerging within the industry supported the
notion of selling a full line of products. Concerned with slow industry growth and competi- tion from
broad-line appliance makers, Maytag was pressured by dealers and encouraged by customers to extend
its line. Maytag expanded into refrigerators and cooking products under the Maytag brand and acquired
other brands— Jenn-Air, Hardwick Stove, Hoover, Admiral, and Magic Chef—with disparate
positions. Maytag has grown substantially from $684 mil- lion in 1985 to a peak of $3.4 billion in
1994, but return on sales has declined from 8% to 12% in the 1970s and 1980s to an average of less
than 1% between 1989 and 1995. Cost cutting will improve this performance, but laundry and
dishwasher products still anchor Maytag’s profitability.
Neutrogena may have fallen into the same trap. In the early 1990s, its U.S. distribution broadened to
include mass merchandisers such as Wal-Mart Stores. Under the Neutro- gena name, the company
expanded into a wide variety of products—eye-makeup remover and shampoo, for example—in which
it was not unique and which diluted its image, and it began turning to price promotions.
Compromises and inconsistencies in the pur- suit of growth will erode the competitive advan- tage a
company had with its original varieties or target customers. Attempts to compete in several ways at
once create confusion and un- dermine organizational motivation and focus. Profits fall, but more
revenue is seen as the an- swer. Managers are unable to make choices, so the company embarks on a
new round of broad- ening and compromises. Often, rivals continue to match each other until
desperation breaks the cycle, resulting in a merger or downsizing to the original positioning.
Profitable Growth. Many companies, after a decade of restructuring and cost-cutting, are turning their
attention to growth. Too often, efforts to grow blur uniqueness, create com- promises, reduce fit, and
ultimately undermine competitive advantage. In fact, the growth im- perative is hazardous to strategy.
What approaches to growth preserve and re- inforce strategy? Broadly, the prescription is to
concentrate on deepening a strategic position rather than broadening and compromising it. One
approach is to look for extensions of the strategy that leverage the existing activity sys- tem by offering
features or services that rivals would find impossible or costly to match on a stand-alone basis. In other
words, managers can ask themselves which activities, features, or forms of competition are feasible or
less costly to them because of complementary ac- tivities that their company performs.
Deepening a position involves making the company’s activities more distinctive, strength- ening fit,
and communicating the strategy better to those customers who should value it. But many companies
succumb to the temptation to chase “easy” growth by adding hot features, products, or services without
screening them or adapting them to their strategy. Or they target new customers or markets in which
the com- pany has little special to offer. A company can often grow faster—and far more profitably—
by better penetrating needs and varieties where it is distinctive than by slugging it out in potentially
higher growth arenas in which the company lacks uniqueness. Carmike, now the largest the- ater chain
in the United States, owes its rapid growth to its disciplined concentration on small markets. The
company quickly sells any big-city theaters that come to it as part of an acquisition.
Globalization often allows growth that is consistent with strategy, opening up larger markets for a
focused strategy. Unlike broad- ening domestically, expanding globally is likely to leverage and
reinforce a company’s unique position and identity.
Companies seeking growth through broad- ening within their industry can best contain the risks to
strategy by creating stand-alone units, each with its own brand name and tai- lored activities. Maytag
has clearly struggled with this issue. On the one hand, it has orga- nized its premium and value brands
into sepa- rate units with different strategic positions. On the other, it has created an umbrella appliance
company for all its brands to gain critical mass. With shared design, manufacturing, distribu- tion, and
customer service, it will be hard to avoid homogenization. If a given business unit attempts to compete
with different positions for different products or customers, avoiding compromise is nearly impossible.
The Role of Leadership. The challenge of de- veloping or reestablishing a clear strategy is often
primarily an organizational one and de- pends on leadership. With so many forces at work against
making choices and tradeoffs in organizations, a clear intellectual framework to guide strategy is a
necessary counterweight. Moreover, strong leaders willing to make choices are essential.
In many companies, leadership has degen- erated into orchestrating operational improve- ments and
making deals. But the leader’s role is broader and far more important. General management is more
than the stewardship of individual functions. Its core is strategy: defining and communicating the
company’s unique position, making trade-offs, and forging fit among activities. The leader must
provide the discipline to decide which industry changes and customer needs the company will respond to, while avoiding organizational dis- tractions and maintaining the company’s distinctiveness.
Managers at lower levels lack the perspective and the confidence to main- tain a strategy. There will be
constant pres- sures to compromise, relax trade-offs, and emulate rivals. One of the leader’s jobs is to
teach others in the organization about strategy—and to say no.
Strategy renders choices about what not to do as important as choices about what to do. Indeed, setting
limits is another function of leadership. Deciding which target group of cus- tomers, varieties, and
needs the company should serve is fundamental to developing a strategy. But so is deciding not to
serve other customers or needs and not to offer certain features or services. Thus strategy requires
constant discipline and clear communication. Indeed, one of the most important functions of an
explicit, communicated strategy is to guide employees in making choices that arise because of tradeoffs in their individual activi- ties and in day-to-day decisions.
Improving operational effectiveness is a nec- essary part of management, but it is not strategy. In
confusing the two, managers have uninten- tionally backed into a way of thinking about competition
that is driving many industries to- ward competitive convergence, which is in no one’s best interest and
is not inevitable.
Managers must clearly distinguish opera- tional effectiveness from strategy. Both are es- sential, but
the two agendas are different.
The operational agenda involves continual improvement everywhere there are no trade- offs. Failure to
do this creates vulnerability even for companies with a good strategy. The operational agenda is the
proper place for con- stant change, flexibility, and relentless efforts to achieve best practice. In
contrast, the strate- gic agenda is the right place for defining a unique position, making clear trade-offs,
and tightening fit. It involves the continual search for ways to reinforce and extend the com- pany’s
position. The strategic agenda demands discipline and continuity; its enemies are distraction and
compromise.
Strategic continuity does not imply a static view of competition. A company must continu- ally
improve its operational effectiveness and actively try to shift the productivity frontier; at the same time,
there needs to be ongoing ef- fort to extend its uniqueness while strengthen- ing the fit among its
activities. Strategic conti- nuity, in fact, should make an organization’s continual improvement more
effective.
CRITERIA
Outstanding
Very Good
Above Average
Poor
Excellent
Good
Average
Very Poor
Satisfactory
Below Average Unacceptable
Identifies and Accurately identifies Accurately
Identifies most of the Inaccurate
analyzes the issue. the issues and provides identifies the issues issues, provides identification or
a well-developed and provides some inadequate analysis or analysis of issue
analysis
analysis
identifies weak issues
Identifies and Provides a thorough Provides and Evidence not directly Fails to identify or
assesses quality examination of the examines quality
supportive of
assess quality-
supporting evidence and develops evidence. Evidence argument. Does not supporting
data/evidence its accuracy, relevance, is relevant, if not justify position or evidence.
and completeness complete.
distinguish relevance
Identifies and Accurately identifies Accurately Does not explain Does not identify
considers the and provides a
lidentifies
contextual issues;
influence of the thorough explanation and provides an provides inaccurate
consider any
context on
of contextual issues explanation of information; or merely contextual issues.
the issue
potential
provides a list.
contextual issues
Demonstrates Provides a thorough Provides adequate Provides somewhat Provides little
higher level
explanation, insightful explanation, above uneven or superficial developed
thinking by analysis, able to
average analysis, explanation, limited explanation,
interpreting the discriminate
somewhat able to ability to discriminate analysis largely
context and issues importance of issues discriminate importance of issues superficial, issues
appropriately and evidence
importance of and evidence
and evidence
issues and
seem unimportant
evidence
or
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