500 word discussion post Homeland Security (wk8)

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INTL613

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Discussion Questions: What are the most significant issues to consider in “rethinking” homeland security intelligence (and why)? This question is asking for your perspective on the future of HSINT as discussed in the lesson. Share with us the two current limitations or anticipated future challenges in intelligence support to the homeland security enterprise that you chose to address in your final assignment.

Instructions: Fully utilize the materials that have been provided to you in order to support your response. Your initial post should be at least 500 words. 


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Office of the Director of National Intelligence Domestic Approach to National Intelligence Domestic Approach to National Intelligence UNITED TO PROTECT 2 Office of the Director of National Intelligence Table of Contents 4 Preface 5 Introduction 7 Purpose 8 Challenge 10 Integrating National Intelligence 23 Other Key Considerations 24 Way-Ahead 25 Abbreviations 3 Preface This publication comprises inputs from a broad array of participants representing elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) and its partners in the domestic field. We thank everyone involved for their time and valuable contributions. The process began with meetings and resulted in many conversations, drafts, revisions, and rounds of coordination with subject matter experts, lawyers, privacy and civil liberties officials, and senior leadership. Over time, we realized the topic is very complex and often characterized differently by the various participants and stakeholders, depending upon their vantage point and mission. Segments explaining the role of specific IC agencies and departments were written and provided by the entity itself. The Domestic Approach to National Intelligence describes the “as is,” or current picture, of the operating environment for the IC’s key engagements with federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners inside the United States. The next step—one that may be even more complex and challenging—is to move beyond the “as is” descriptions and work toward a vision of the “should be.” Challenges aside, we owe it to the American people to strengthen the national security apparatus to best protect our citizens and their privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. Introduction Office of the Director of National Intelligence Since my appointment as the Director of National Intelligence in 2010, one of my highest priorities has been strengthening intelligence partnerships to help preserve the country's national security. Partnerships have long been a foundation of our work overseas. In light of 9/11 and the rapidly evolving natur e of foreign threats to the homeland, we also must renew our focus on how the Intelligenc e Community (IC) collaborates with partner agencies inside the United States to ensure that we carry out our national and homeland security missions as effectively as possible. Protecting the privacy and civil liberties of our citizens is fundamental to this endeavor. Significant progress has been made since 9/11 in building capacity, standardizing practices, and sharing information with partn ers in the United States to defend against and respond to foreign and foreign-inspired threa ts to our homeland. As vital as that progress has been, I believe that we still have work to do to ensure that all those involved in this effort —including the American people—share a common understanding of how this mosaic fits together. Thus, I directed my staff to work with our partners to describe in a single document the "as-is" operating environment for the IC’s key engagements with federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners inside the United States. The result of my request is the paper, Domestic Approach to National Intelligence. This paper was prepared in consultation with the ODNI's Office of Civil Liberties, Privacy and Transparency and Office of Gene ral Counsel and coordinated with mission partners. Appropriately, the paper's descriptio n of the "as-is" operating environment reflec ts each agency's limitations imposed by law, policy, and mission, and highlights the importance of protecting privacy and civil libert ies, an imperative for all partners engaged in this committed effort. The paper does not purport to describe the specific laws, polici es, safeguards, or operations relating to each agency's activities, nor does it make recommendations for change. I believe the Domestic Approach to National Intelligence provides, in a transparent manner, a common general understanding of the current state of intelligence exchange between the IC and its domestic mission partn ers, and serves to further our collaborative efforts. We trust that it will serve as a usefu l foundation for the ongoing, productive dialo gue on homeland security that the American peop le rightfully expect. James R. Clapper Director 5 Domestic Approach to National Intelligence “ We need to deal with the realities of globalization – the blurring these days of foreign and domestic matters. Because when threats like terrorism and international organized crime transcend borders, it’s critical that we think holistically about intelligence. But we’re also a people who – Constitutionally and culturally – attach a high premium to our personal freedoms and our personal privacy.” James R. Clapper 6 Office of the Director of National Intelligence Purpose This paper, the Domestic Approach to National Intelligence, describes certain key roles and relationships that characterize efforts by members of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) and federal, state, local, tribal and territorial (FSLTT) government organizations to engage with one another to carry out the shared mission of protecting the homeland. These partners work with one another, and through established channels with the private sector (e.g., critical infrastructure owners and operators), as part of a complex web of relationships. Each partner, regardless of level, plays an important role in protecting the homeland with respect to warning, interdiction, prevention, mitigation, and response. The importance of partnerships and collaboration is emphasized in this paper, as is the IC’s responsibility to the public to protect privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. Descriptions related to organizational responsibilities and/or authorities are provided by the respective agencies. The Domestic Approach to National Intelligence is consistent with the framework and recommendations outlined in the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council’s (CICC) National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, the strategies in support of the National Network of Fusion Centers, and information sharing and safeguarding standards outlined by the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE). By describing these roles and relationships in one place, this paper strives to foster an important national dialogue that will promote a better understanding of how the IC engages with key partners in this domestic enterprise and supports the holistic ideals articulated by the Director of National intelligence (DNI). PROTECTING PRIVACY, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES To prevent and deter acts of terrorism and other threats on American soil, we must continue to develop lines of coordination and appropriately align intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security efforts. However, this must be accomplished only in accordance with the Constitution, laws, Executive Order 12333, and core values of our nation. Protecting fundamental rights and liberties is an important national security end in and of itself. The Domestic Approach to National Intelligence is fully committed to exemplifying America’s values: operating under the rule of law, consistent with Americans’ expectations for the protection of privacy and civil liberties, respectful of human rights, and preserving the trust of the American people. As President Obama stated at the National Archives in May 2009, “We uphold our fundamental principles and values not just because we choose to, but because we swear to. Not because they feel good, but because they help keep us safe. They keep us true to who we are… So as Americans, we reject the false choice between our security and our ideals. We can and we must and we will protect both.” Thus, it is essential that we comply with all applicable legal and policy authorities including, but not limited to, the Privacy Act, Executive Order 12333, and the Information Sharing Privacy Guidelines. Similarly, IC elements and FSLTT organizations must continue to operate within their defined mission roles and responsibilities. President Obama, photo provided by the White House “We uphold our fundamental principles and values not just because we choose to, but because we swear to. Not because they feel good, but because they help keep us safe. They keep us true to who we are… So as Americans, we reject the false choice between our security and our ideals. We can and we must and we will protect both.” President Obama National Archives in May 2009 (Opposite) Director Clapper briefing the President, photo provided by the White House 7 Domestic Approach to National Intelligence Challenge Our nation must deal with a wide range of complex threats to our people and interests both overseas and within the nation’s borders. These threats include foreign-based and foreign-inspired terrorism, foreign intelligence activities, homegrown violent extremism, transnational organized crime, cyber-attacks by foreign actors or their agents, and more. Shrinking budgets and growing mission requirements demand effective, interoperable, and non-duplicative–that is, “smart”–government operations. This new dynamic also demands greater teamwork and responsible information sharing between members of the IC and FSLTT partners—as well as appropriate and responsible information sharing with the private sector—that is consistent with law, policy, and regulation and protects privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. Such partnerships provide access to the expertise and unique capabilities and authorities held by each partner, resulting in benefits not only to those involved but also to the nation as a whole. As the nature of threats to the homeland changes, so too does the nature of the challenges the nation must address. Transnational organized crime poses a significant and growing threat to national and international security and bears dire implications for public safety, public health, the security of democratic institutions, and economic stability across the globe. For example, transnational drug traffickers and human smugglers operating across U.S. borders and within the U.S. reap enormous profits that enable them to undermine legitimate governance in their countries of origin. At the same time, international criminal organizations, terrorists, and state-sponsored cyber attackers have demonstrated their ability to compromise information systems. Many of these threats have low-level signatures. Detecting them and determining their attribution can be difficult. Washington DC, photo provided by ODNI 8 9/11 Museum and One World Trade Center, photo provided by ODNI The U.S. is considered a high-priority intelligence target by many foreign intelligence entities. While traditionally the threat has been to our political, military, and diplomatic interests at home and abroad, the loss of sensitive economic information and technology is a growing threat to our national security. In recent years, economic espionage conducted by foreign intelligence entities, corrupt insiders, and corporate competitors has exploited vulnerabilities in cyberspace that may weaken our economic advantage. Cyber espionage has not replaced traditional espionage as a way to steal secrets, but the ability to focus technology on lesser protected information is a significant and growing threat. Even before the 9/11 attacks, the IC elements and FSLTT organizations started developing relationships to identify and address particular threats and national intelligence challenges in the homeland. There was, however, no integrated national approach. Since 9/11, significant progress has been made in building capacity, standardizing Office of the Director of National Intelligence CBP helicopter flying over New York City, photo provided by CBP practices, and sharing information, both horizontally and vertically, to support foreign operations, perimeter protection, and homeland security and law enforcement (HS&LE) requirements. Nonetheless, inconsistent practices, absence of doctrine, and a lack of unity of effort across levels of government still characterize the domestic landscape. This domestic enterprise is more ad hoc and independent than organized and enterpriseoriented, and often depends more on personal or preexisting relationships than defined engagement protocols. Many potential stakeholders and contributors are left out of the equation as well, particularly on issues other than counterterrorism. In navigating this enterprise, it is important for individual IC elements and FSLTT organizations to continue to work within their respective missions and authorities, even as they seek to enhance responsible collaboration and information sharing. In particular, the sharing activities and relationships between IC elements and FSLTT organizations are undertaken through established channels and in accordance with legal and policy requirements that are designed to ensure agencies are acting within their authorities and missions and are protecting privacy, civil rights and civil liberties. Sharing with the private sector is undertaken with special care so that applicable legal and policy requirements are identified and followed. 9 Domestic Approach to National Intelligence Integrating National Intelligence The effective integration of national intelligence with relevant information from FSLTT partners is essential to protecting the nation. This integration requires agile, robust, and responsible processes that leverage existing partnerships and encourage new ones. These partnerships enable appropriate information sharing and build trust, consistent with the missions and authorities of each agency and the need to protect privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. As trust and partnerships mature, efficient integration across stakeholders is also increased, resulting in an enhanced understanding of respective capabilities, information, and requirements (including how customers use products and services). This graphic depicts some types of FSLTT information and intelligence shared in the domestic environment. In some cases, information can be categorized as both FSLTT information and intelligence. FSLTT PARTNER INFORMATION 10 • Criminal Intelligence • Homeland Security Information • Investigative Information • Cyber Threat Information • Suspicious Activity Reporting • Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Information • Other Information IC ELEMENT INTELLIGENCE • National Intelligence • Foreign Intelligence • Counterintelligence Office of the Director of National Intelligence ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES The IC interacts with and serves a wide range of customers and partners, both within and outside the U.S. Government (USG), with intelligence support designed to meet the customers’ and partners’ responsibilities and specific mission requirements. Customers are those who have requirements for intelligence products or support, and use it to carry out their official responsibilities. Within the domestic enterprise, federal customers directly receive unique support from the IC based on their mission needs, often through a Federal Intelligence Coordination Office (FICO). With regard to state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) customers, information categorized or derived from national intelligence is generally disseminated by the Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence & Analysis (DHS/I&A), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). Dissemination occurs directly or via a “hub & spoke” approach through entities like fusion centers, and Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). The widearray of customers for intelligence support include departmental secretaries and senior policymakers, threat coordinators, governors, state homeland security advisors, mayors, police chiefs, sheriffs, first responders, federal officials, and others who are directly engaged in making decisions related to public safety. In addition, appropriate threat and warning information is provided to the private sector (e.g., owners and operators of critical infrastructures), through established channels. New York City Police Department patrol cars, photo provided by NYPD FSLTT partners include HS&LE organizations operating across our country to protect our borders, points-of-entry, infrastructure, and communities. These professionals are on the front line of ensuring public safety and protecting the nation from all threats. Partner preparedness is crucial to our national security, as they have the greatest visibility on local criminal activity relevant to national intelligence and will be the first responders on the scene during threat situations and incidents. Information sharing at this level supports law enforcement and public safety offices best equipped to understand current threats and the risks associated with them, inform resource allocation, and interdict or investigate criminal actors. Crucial to their efforts is the timely and efficient sharing of criminal intelligence, public safety, and open source information via communication networks designed to store and transmit Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) information. These partners also play a critical role in identifying suspicious activities and reporting this information following protocols established by the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative (NSI). Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agents, photo provided by ODNI Additionally, appropriate and responsible information sharing with private sector entities, particularly the owners and operators of infrastructure critical to national security whose businesses may be exploited by nefarious actors, is fundamental to the protection and resilience of the nation. Such sharing takes place through established channels and in accordance with applicable law and policies. Private sector organizations undertake security and threat mitigation measures to protect lives and property and have unique information and expertise that can help the IC and FSLTT better understand existing threats. Thus, the domestic enterprise is characterized by an extraordinarily complex set of customer and partner relationships, composed of both informational and organizational architectures that are involved in the collection, analysis, use, and dissemination of information and intelligence. Relationships are described in general terms, recognizing that there is no national standard or doctrine for these interactions. It is also important to note that the descriptions on the following page do not include the multiple layers of legal and policy requirements that govern these relationships. 11 Domestic Approach to National Intelligence The Domestic Enterprise This graphic broadly illustrates the relationships between FSLTT and U.S. IC partners. FSLTT Organizations 1 U.S. IC A Global Emphasis Customers 5 2 Partners Domestic Emphasis 3 4 B 1 FSLTT Organizations Organizations operating on the front lines across the country to protect border points-of-entry, infrastructure, and communications, such as federal departments and agencies, DHS component agencies, local police departments, first responders, and other entities involved directly in infrastructure security and resilience. 2 Customers Individuals that maintain a ‘customer’ relationship with the IC, such as governors, homeland security advisors, mayors, critical infrastructure owners and operators, and HS&LE leaders. 3 Partners Organizations that carry out the intelligence cycle under their respective authorities and may maintain formal partnerships with the IC, such as fusion centers, High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs), Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) Centers, Criminal Intelligence Units (CIUs), and federal departments and agencies with FICOs. 4 IC Elements with Domestic Emphasis Federal departments and agencies with both Title 50 and Non-Title 50 components, such as DEA, DHS, FBI (to include Field Intelligence Groups (FIGs), JTTFs, the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC)), and USCG. DHS/I&A and FBI are primarily responsible for the IC’s domestic analysis and information sharing efforts with HS&LE partners. 5 IC Elements with Global Emphasis Federal departments and agencies that provide support to FSLTT partners, through appropriate channels, in the form of current intelligence, alerts, warnings, and notifications, such as CIA, DIA, NGA, NSA, etc. A SAR/NSI, Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs), Criminal Intelligence, and Investigative Information FSLTT-initiated processes for documenting, processing, analyzing, and sharing national intelligence with the IC. B Alerts, Warnings, Notifications, Bulletins, TTPs, and other intelligence reporting IC-initiated processes for documenting, processing, analyzing, and sharing national intelligence with FSLTT partners. 12 Domestic Approach to National Intelligence UNCLASSIFIED Office of the Director of National Intelligence State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers Olympia Salem Bismarck Helena Montpelier Saint Paul Boise Pierre Madison Des Moines Cheyenne Sacramento Carson City Salt Lake City Denver Topeka Frankfort Oklahoma City Little Rock Santa Fe Harrisburg Springfield Jefferson City Phoenix Lansing Indianapolis Lincoln Austin Columbus Charleston Nashville Atlanta Jackson Baton Rouge Albany Richmond Augusta Concord Boston Providence Hartford Trenton Dover Annapolis Washington, D.C. Raleigh Columbia Montgomery Tallahassee Also located in: Anchorage, Alaska, San Juan, Puerto Rico, Honolulu, Hawaii, and St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands NCTC 017657d [0097cs] AI 1-15 KEY FSLTT SHARING ORGANIZATIONS/FUNCTIONS Certain FSLTT entities have formed specialized sharing organizations, or include specific sharing functions, that serve as points of intersection between FSLTT elements and the IC. State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers The 78 federally-recognized fusion centers in the country form the National Network of Fusion Centers and operate to assist HS&LE partners in preventing and responding to crime, including terrorism. Fusion centers serve as focal points for the gathering, receipt, analysis, and sharing of threat-related information between partners. They are owned and operated by state and local entities with support from federal partners in the form of deployed personnel, training, technical assistance, exercise support, security clearances, connectivity to federal systems, technology, and grant funding. Located in states and major urban areas throughout the country, fusion centers are uniquely situated to empower front-line law enforcement, public safety, fire service, emergency response, public health, critical infrastructure owners and operators, and private sector security personnel with an understanding of the local implications of national intelligence. Additionally, fusion centers are optimally positioned to identify local, regional, and statewide trends regarding criminal or suspicious activity that relate to national security threats. Fusion centers provide interdisciplinary expertise and situational awareness to support decision making at all levels of government. Most fusion centers have access to SECRET-level systems, to include systems operated by DHS, FBI, and/or the Department of Defense (DOD). This connectivity enables fusion centers to obtain and review classified reports disseminated in accordance with applicable laws and policies. High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs) The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) provides assistance via the HIDTA program to federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies operating in 28 areas determined to be the nation’s critical drug trafficking regions. The program’s goal is to reduce drug availability by assisting agencies participating in HIDTAs with federal support to dismantle and disrupt drug trafficking organizations, which includes analytic support to tactical counterdrug operations. Although many of the participating officers are cleared at the SECRET-level, the majority of their work is done at the UNCLASSIFIED and LAW ENFORCEMENTSENSITIVE-levels. The HIDTA program is built on the premise that participating agencies should have an equal voice in addressing regional drug threats. UNCLASSIFIED 13 Domestic Approach to National Intelligence High Intensity Financial Crime Areas (HIFCAs) and HIDTAs, contribute to federal task force investigations, and support other decision makers. The Department of the Treasury’s HIFCA program is intended to concentrate law enforcement efforts at the federal, state, and local levels to combat money laundering in designated high-intensity money laundering zones. In order to implement this goal, a moneylaundering action team was created or identified within each HIFCA to spearhead a coordinated anti-money laundering effort. Each action team is composed of all relevant federal, state, and local enforcement authorities, prosecutors, and financial regulators. Participating agencies leverage their respective authorities and resources to meet mission requirements. The seven HIFCA areas are California Northern District, California Southern District, Southwest Border, Chicago, New York, Puerto Rico, and South Florida. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) ATF strives to enhance public safety by protecting Americans from gun violence, the criminal misuse of explosives, and acts of arson. In support of these key missions, ATF also regulates the explosives and firearms industries. ATF’s investigative and regulatory expertise is especially helpful due to its jurisdiction over firearms and explosives – two “commodities” that can possibly relate to terrorism and national security. At the headquarterslevel, ATF maintains contact with several IC agencies through direct liaison positions within ATF’s Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information. Additionally, ATF’s intelligence analysts and supervisors maintain working relationships with such entities as the National Network of Fusion Centers, and JTTFs. Finally, ATF publishes Intelligence Information Reports (IIR) for the community at large, both at the classified and unclassified levels, and is in the process of posting formally published criminal intelligence reporting on various IC platforms. Civil Applications Committee (CAC) Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agent, photo provided by ODNI Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) Centers The RISS network, funded by the DOJ’s Bureau of Justice Assistance, consists of six centers across the country that provide tailored analytic, technical, and research support, database access, equipment loans, event deconfliction, and training to local law enforcement agencies. RISS centers operate at the UNCLASSIFIED and LAW ENFORCEMENT-SENSITIVE-levels. Criminal Intelligence Units (CIUs) CIUs serve as the principal collectors of criminal intelligence at the state and local law enforcement levels. Independently owned and operated by major city, major county, and state police law enforcement agencies, these intelligence units conduct strategic law enforcement intelligence operations on organized criminal activity, transnational threats, and terrorism within their jurisdictions. While separate and distinct from federal task forces and the IC, these units help support the analytic efforts of fusion centers 14 The CAC is an interagency committee led by the Department of the Interior that coordinates and oversees the federal civil use of classified and unclassified collections. Chartered by the President in 1975, the CAC provides federal civil agencies access to national systems data in support of their mission responsibilities. Specifically, it provides a forum through which the federal civil agencies coordinate data requirements, develop tasking strategies, certify the proper use of data, and track and plan for the progress and evolution of national systems. CAC activities have expanded beyond traditional mapping applications to a broad range of environmental and remote-sensing applications central to federal agency civil missions, such as monitoring recovery from natural disasters and related hazards. The CAC also coordinates the use of imagery exploitation and application resources and supports remote-sensing research and development activities at special facilities, such as the United States Geological Survey (USGS) Advanced Systems Center. Examples of CAC facilitated activity include monitoring volcanoes, detecting wildland fires, coordinating emergency response to natural disasters (such as hurricanes, earthquakes, and floods), monitoring ecosystems, and mapping wetlands. Office of the Director of National Intelligence Federal Intelligence Coordination Offices (FICOs) Outside of the IC, numerous federal departments or agencies have staff charged with intelligence-like functions. Cleared to the TOP SECRET levels, many with access to classified networks, FICOs serve as an interface between the IC and federal partner communities. FICOs provide varying levels of support to senior policymakers and consumers of intelligence/ information within their organization. Examples of departments with a FICO include the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Department of Transportation, and Department of Commerce. Federal Senior Intelligence Coordinators (FSICs), designated by their Secretary or agency head, are the highest ranking individuals within a federal department or agency that serve as the primary liaisons between the respective departments or agencies and the IC. Designation of FSICs at Executive Branch departments and agencies, which began in 2012, assists in defining responsibilities and moving toward true intelligence integration. See Something Say Something campaign, provided by DHS U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY The IC consists of 17 Executive Branch agencies and organizations that conduct intelligence and counterintelligence activities in support of U.S. foreign policy and the protection of our national security. Intelligence informs policy decisions, military actions, international negotiations, and interactions with foreign countries. IC elements that have a global emphasis make significant contributions to our homeland security and defense. Intelligence from these organizations in the form of alerts, warnings, notifications, and other reporting is shared in accordance with appropriate safeguards primarily through DHS/I&A and the FBI to domestic enterprise customers and partners. The organizations described below serve as primary gateways for appropriate IC engagements with FSLTT partners (e.g., serving as integration points for sharing through the FSLTT intersection points described above, task force participation, and the exchange of staff officers and analysts with HS&LE organizations). DHS DHS is responsible for the unified national effort to secure the U.S. by preventing and deterring terrorist attacks and responding to other threats and hazards. It also has statutory responsibilities to provide threat information to the owners and operators of critical infrastructure and key resources. DHS/I&A provides intelligence support across the full range of homeland security missions. DHS/I&A ensures that information related to homeland security threats is collected, analyzed, and disseminated to all relevant customers across the domestic enterprise. The DHS Under Secretary for I&A also serves as their Chief Intelligence Officer and reports to both the Secretary of DHS and the DNI. DHS/I&A has a unique mandate within the IC for sharing information and serving as an information conduit and intelligence advocate for state, local, tribal, and territorial governments. DHS/I&A supports fusion centers with deployed personnel and SECRETlevel systems, security clearances, training, technical assistance, exercise support, and collaboration. This National Network of Fusion Centers is the hub of much of the two-way intelligence and information flow among the FSLTT partners. Fusion centers represent a shared commitment between the federal government and the state and local governments who own and operate them. DHS/I&A officers report and disseminate information of intelligence value from DHS components, FSLTT partners, and open source collection to the IC and the DHS Intelligence Enterprise. DHS/I&A also supports statutory responsibilities to provide terrorism, cyber, and other threat information to the owners and operators of critical infrastructures and key resources. Several other DHS component agencies have regular interaction with the IC, including Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Secret Service (USSS), and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). 15 Domestic Approach to National Intelligence FBI agents arresting a suspect, photo provided by FBI FBI The FBI’s ability to leverage law enforcement and intelligence capabilities is critical to protecting the homeland. The FBI has the lead domestic role in investigating international terrorist threats to, and in conducting counterintelligence activities to meet foreign entities’ espionage and intelligence efforts directed against, the U.S. The FBI is also responsible for coordinating collection of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities with other IC elements inside the U.S., and leads the IC effort to integrate intelligence support in the domestic field through the DNI Representative (DNI Rep) program. The FBI is able to execute these roles because, under applicable statutes and Executive Order 12333, it can exercise a broader range of domestic activities than other intelligence agencies. The FBI can also leverage the capacities of its 56 field offices, supporting FIGs, JTTFs, cyber teams, and criminal authorities to support its efforts. A critical force multiplier for the FBI is its engagement in over 400 national security and criminal task forces with FSLTT partners and its participation in the National Network of Fusion Centers. The JTTF is an example of active partnership. The 104 JTTFs are multi-jurisdictional task forces established to conduct terrorism-related investigations. JTTF investigations are focused on known threat actors or identified individuals who meet the thresholds under the Attorney General Guidelines for domestic FBI operations. Using the information derived from FBI FIGs, JTTFs, and fusion centers, the FBI develops intelligence products on significant developments or trends related to terrorism. These intelligence products may be used by partners to support their law enforcement and homeland security activities, such as intelligence-led policing efforts, implementing protective measures, or other target-hardening initiatives. 16 FIGs are located in each of the FBI’s 56 field offices and are staffed with FBI intelligence analysts, language analysts, and special agents who provide domain awareness for their areas of responsibility (AOR) and complement the overall FBI analytic effort. FIGs are the primary mechanism through which FBI field offices develop human intelligence, identify emerging trends, and identify, evaluate, and prioritize threats within their AORs. They support domain awareness and investigative efforts through the use of strategic and tactical analysis, linguists, subject matter experts, special operations groups, and specialized surveillance groups. FIGs have established processes for collecting, analyzing, and producing intelligence information. These processes enhance the nation’s ability to successfully penetrate national and transnational criminal networks, terrorist organizations, foreign intelligence services, and other entities that seek to harm the U.S. FIGs may also disseminate information to the IC and other federal, state, local, and tribal agencies, as well as foreign counterparts. Utilizing dissemination protocols, FIGs contribute to local and regional perspectives on all threats, and serve as the FBI’s primary intelligence link with fusion centers. The Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) serves as the USG’s consolidation point for known and suspected foreign and domestic terrorist watch list information. The consolidated watch list contains thousands of records that are updated daily and shared with FSLTT law enforcement, IC members, and select international partners to ensure that individuals with links to terrorism are appropriately screened. The TSC, which is administered by the FBI and supported by federal departments and agencies, including DOJ, DHS, the Department of State (DoS), the ODNI, and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), ensures that information provided to and consolidated by TSC is thorough, current, and accurate. Office of the Director of National Intelligence DEA DEA is the lead federal agency for the enforcement of controlled substances laws and regulations of the U.S. It brings to the criminal and civil justice system those organizations and principal members of organizations involved in the cultivation, manufacturing, or distribution of controlled substances appearing in or destined for illicit traffic in the U.S., and supports non-enforcement programs aimed at reducing the availability of illicit controlled substances on the domestic and international markets. DEA has 226 domestic offices and its workforce is supplemented with nearly 2,500 domestic police officers that are deputized as DEA task force agents. These agents, working under DEA supervision, are authorized to enforce federal laws and are the cornerstone of DEA’s interaction with state and local law enforcement. DEA coordinates drug intelligence worldwide to assist in disrupting or dismantling international drug trafficking organizations. DEA maintains both a global and domestic presence, and ensures that a clear bridge exists between the two. The DEA intelligence program works to provide predictive intelligence to identify trends and vulnerabilities in order to guide and prioritize the application of limited enforcement resources. The Office of National Security Intelligence (ONSI) was designated a member of the IC in February 2006. The objective of ONSI is to maximize DEA’s contribution to national security, while protecting the primacy of its law enforcement mission. Domestically, DEA shares intelligence with appropriate FSLTT agencies at multiple stages and at multiple points. Initial sharing of information occurs through direct contact with the partners. Each DEA field division and district office maintains a presence on the local JTTF, providing a direct conduit for sharing. Outside of the JTTF, information is shared directly with the responsible agency and/or through the HIDTAs and fusion centers. Additionally, DEA task force officers offer a direct link to their parent departments and agencies. Concurrently, relevant information is shared at the national level via the ONSI and the Special Operations Division, ensuring that information obtained by DEA is shared across multiple tracks with all relevant customers and partners. Seizure by the Drug Enforcement Administration, photo provided by DEA and, to the extent possible, predict and prevent economic and financial crises. Treasury also performs a critical and far-reaching role in enhancing national security by implementing economic sanctions against foreign threats to the U.S., identifying and targeting the financial support networks of national security threats, and improving the safeguards of the country’s financial systems. Created under the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2004, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA) is Treasury’s IC component. OIA officers help draft Treasury policy and support the execution of Treasury’s regulatory and enforcement authorities by providing all-source intelligence analysis. Often, traditional intelligence is integrated with financial intelligence generated by administrative, law enforcement, and private sector partners. OIA also supplements intelligence support provided by DHS to the Treasury Department in its role as the financialsector agency for critical infrastructure protection. Department of the Treasury Treasury is the department responsible for promoting economic prosperity and ensuring the financial security of the U.S. Treasury. It is responsible for a wide range of activities, such as advising the President on economic and financial issues, encouraging sustainable economic growth, and fostering improved governance in financial institutions. Treasury works with other federal agencies, foreign governments, and international financial institutions to encourage global economic growth, raise standards of living, 17 Domestic Approach to National Intelligence USCG As the principal federal agency responsible for maritime safety, security, and stewardship, the USCG protects vital economic and security interests of the U.S. and has strong partnerships with FSLTT entities. In addition to its responsibility for the safety and security of the maritime public, the maritime transportation system, and the integrity of maritime borders, the USCG fills a unique niche in the IC. USCG intelligence provides timely and actionable intelligence and criminal investigative expertise to support tactical and operational commanders, strategic planners and leaders, and to meet national and homeland security intelligence requirements. As a result of its diverse authorities and mission areas, the USCG maintains broad awareness of the maritime environment. SUPPORTING DOMESTIC INTEGRATION The following ODNI components are tasked with supporting and improving intelligence integration in the domestic field: NCTC NCTC has primary responsibility within the USG for analysis and integration of all intelligence possessed or acquired by the USG pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism, excepting intelligence pertaining exclusively to domestic terrorists and domestic counterterrorism. NCTC executes these duties through NCTC Operations Center, provided by NCTC 18 USCG vessel, photo provided by USCG efforts in intelligence analysis, information sharing, counterterrorism strategic operational planning, and maintaining the USG’s central repository of identities information for known or suspected terrorists in support of the USG’s terrorist screening process. Supporting the counterterrorism mission is the NCTCled Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team (JCAT), which replaced the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) in April 2013. Its mission is to improve information sharing and enhance public safety. In coordination with the FBI and DHS, JCAT collaborates with other members of the IC to research, Domestic Approach to National Intelligence UNCLASSIFIED Office of the Director of National Intelligence DNI Reps in the U.S. Seattle Boston Chicago San Francisco New York Pittsburgh Washington, D.C. Denver Los Angeles Atlanta Houston Miami NCTC 017657g [0097cs] AI 4-15 produce, and disseminate counterterrorism intelligence products for FSLTT partners, and advocates for the counterterrorism intelligence requirements and needs of these partners throughout the IC. JCAT aims to improve the quantity and quality of intelligence products for FSLTT partners. Like ITACG, JCAT is located within NCTC and is composed of fully cleared state, local, and tribal HS&LE partners, as well as representatives from NCTC and its federal partners, DHS and FBI. NCTC maintains the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE), which is the USG’s central and shared knowledge bank on known or suspected international terrorist identities. NCTC also has the unique mission to be the two-way interface between domestic law enforcement and homeland security apparatus and the IC for terrorist identity and encounter information. NCTC is the single point of national integration for information sharing regarding terrorist identity data through the TIDE database. It provides selected exports of terrorist identity information to U.S. domestic screening and border entities through the TSC. Additionally, NCTC’s domestic representatives are uniquely equipped to facilitate the flow of both strategic and regional counterterrorism information to and from NCTC. They are primarily co-located with DNI Reps UNCLASSIFIED and strive to share counterterrorism-related intelligence with federal, state, local, and tribal personnel, always working via their FBI and DHS counterparts. NCSC The National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC), previously known as the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, was established to help counter threats from foreign adversaries who seek to acquire national defense information, undermine the country’s economic and technological advantage, and influence governmental processes. NCSC facilitates the enhancement of U.S. counterintelligence activities by: 1) enabling the counterintelligence community to fulfill its mission of identifying, assessing, prioritizing, and countering the intelligence threats to the U.S.; 2) ensuring that the counterintelligence community acts in an efficient and effective manner; and 3) providing for the integration of all counterintelligence activities. Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center (CTIIC) In February 2015, the President directed the DNI to establish the CTIIC to support the federal government’s efforts to anticipate, mitigate, and counter foreign cyber threats to the U.S. and our national interests. CTIIC supports the federal cyber community—including cybersecurity centers, the IC, other relevant departments and agencies, and senior policymakers. It facilitates the timely information sharing of threat intelligence and related indicators, integrates analysis of threat trends and events, identifies gaps in knowledge, and helps the community identify opportunities to degrade or mitigate threat capabilities. 19 Domestic Approach to National Intelligence DNI Representatives in the U.S. Leveraging 12 senior FBI officials across the U.S., the primary mission of the DNI Rep is to lead IC efforts within his or her AOR by creating an IC enterprise that is coordinated, integrated, agile, and effective. The role of a DNI Rep is to engage and periodically convene U.S. senior field representatives of each IC element in their respective AOR. DNI Reps conduct coordinated outreach to ensure that appropriate entities are aware of the IC’s capabilities, analytic products, and resources while facilitating and monitoring implementation of DNI direction, policies, and procedures. This single-enterprise approach integrates intelligence in defense of the homeland and supports U.S. national security interests at home and abroad. U.S.-Mexico Border, photo provided by CBP 20 National Intelligence Manager (NIM) for the Western Hemisphere and the Homeland (NIM-WHH) The NIM for the Western Hemisphere and the Homeland is responsible for partnering closely with other functional and regional NIM teams, ODNI/Partner Engagement, and DNI Reps to ensure FSLTT equities (e.g. homeland security information, criminal intelligence, etc.) are identified and considered at the national intelligence level. The Unifying Intelligence Strategy (UIS) for the Western Hemisphere serves as a key instrument for integrating the efforts of the IC in support of the Western Hemisphere, which includes the U.S. homeland. The UIS identifies opportunities and priorities for intelligence integration in support of IC and FSLTT partners where foreign intelligence affects FSLTT information, and vice versa. Office of the Director of National Intelligence National Maritime IntelligenceIntegration Office (NMIO) NMIO’s mission is to advance maritime intelligence integration, information sharing, and domain awareness to foster unity of effort for decision advantage that protects the United States, its allies and partners against threats in or emanating from the global maritime domain. NMIO serves as the nexus for the Global Maritime Community of Interest (GMCOI) to improve collaboration and facilitate integration, while keeping the highest levels of the U.S. Government informed on maritime information issues. Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment PM-ISE is designed with one key goal in mind: to combat terrorism more effectively. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (2004) established an Information Sharing Environment (ISE), which is managed by the Program Manager for the ISE and comprises policies, procedures, and technologies linking the resources (people, systems, databases, and information) of FSLTT entities to facilitate terrorism information sharing, access, and collaboration. PM-ISE has a government-wide mandate to facilitate the sharing of information with regard to terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and homeland security in a manner consistent with national security and applicable legal standards relating to privacy and civil liberties. PM-ISE is working to achieve discrete, coordinated, and focused efforts leading to the delivery of interoperable, reused, and in some cases shared agency capabilities to accelerate mission impact. DOD DoD’s role can be summarized as follows: 1) homeland defense - the protection of U.S. territory, its domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression; and 2) civil support providing military support to civil authorities at the federal, state, and local levels across a range of conditions. The Secretary of Defense describes the three circumstances under which DoD assets could be involved in homeland defense and civil support missions as follows: In extraordinary circumstances, DoD would conduct military missions such as combat air patrols or maritime defense operations. DoD would take the lead in defending the people and the territory of our country, supported by other agencies. Included in this category are cases in which the President, exercising constitutional authority as Commanderin-Chief and Chief Executive, authorizes military action to counter threats within the U.S. In emergency circumstances, such as managing the consequences of a terrorist attack, natural disaster, or other catastrophe in support of civil authorities, DoD could be asked to act quickly to provide capabilities that other agencies do not possess or that have been exhausted or overwhelmed. In non-emergency circumstances of limited scope or planned duration, DoD would support civil authorities where other agencies have the lead— for example, providing security at a special event such as the Olympics, or assisting other federal agencies to develop capabilities to detect chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological threats. DoD cannot provide for all aspects of homeland security. The homeland security mission requires the use of the full range of political, economic, diplomatic, and military tools, including enhanced intelligence to improve potential detection of future attacks. Domestic law enforcement agencies will bear a heavier burden in meeting domestic security needs. In addition, emergency preparedness planning and capabilities, which integrate the strengths of federal, state, and local authorities, are the first lines of response and defense in the homeland. Much of homeland security will entail localized responses, supported by planning and coordination with other levels of government. U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) USNORTHCOM’s mission is to conduct homeland defense (protection against external threats and aggression), civil support, and security cooperation to defend and secure the U.S. and its interests. Its primary area of operation includes air, land, and sea approaches and encompasses the continental U.S., Alaska, Canada, Mexico, and the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles. It also includes the Gulf of Mexico, the Straits of Florida, and portions of the Caribbean region to include the Bahamas, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The Commander of USNORTHCOM also commands North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) Command, a combined U.S.-Canadian team responsible for aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning for Canada, Alaska, and the continental U.S. In conjunction with its other missions, NORAD assists in the detection and monitoring of merchant vessels and aircraft suspected of illicit trafficking. This information is passed to civilian law enforcement agencies to help combat the flow of contraband into North America. 21 Domestic Approach to National Intelligence Military jet conducting a patrol exercise, photo provided by DoD Joint Task Force North (JTF North), a subcomponent of USNORTHCOM, is the DoD organization tasked to support our nation’s federal law enforcement agencies in the interdiction of suspected transnational threats within and along the approaches to the continental U.S. Transnational threats comprise activities conducted by individuals or groups that involve international terrorism, cyber threats, narcotics trafficking, alien smuggling, weapons of mass destruction, and the delivery systems for such weapons that threaten the national security of the U.S. JTF North support to federal law enforcement agencies is organized into the following six categories: intelligence, operational, engineering, general, interagency synchronization, and technology integration. Within the intelligence support category, JTF North provides the following: agency case-sensitive intelligence support, collaborative threat assessments, geospatial intelligence support, modified threat vulnerability assessments, and threat link analysis products. 22 Office of the Director of National Intelligence Other Key Considerations SECURITY CLEARANCE REFORM The ability to share classified information across the domestic enterprise at the SECRET-level, between the IC and FSLTT partners, is critical for effective intelligence integration. A key enabler to support this requirement is a streamlined process for nominating, investigating, adjudicating, granting, and tracking security clearances for partner agencies. Security clearance reform set the conditions for great progress over the last five years. In August 2010, Executive Order 13549, “Classified National Security Information Program for FSLTT entities”, designated the Secretary of Homeland Security as the Executive Agent for this effort. Working with the FBI and other federal partners, DHS established governance and an oversight structure to promote the uniform application of SECRET-level security clearance standards. Additionally, security liaison officers were designated at state and major urban area fusion centers to assist with nominations and the processing of security clearance requests. In 2006, the average processing time for initial security clearances was 165 days. Presently interim SECRET clearance determinations are made based on preliminary checks within 14 days of requests being received by the sponsoring agency. Final clearances are issued once the Office of Personnel Management completes its investigation and there is a favorable adjudication of the request. The average processing time in 2015 for a final SECRET clearance was 116 days. DHS and FBI currently hold over 10,000 SLTT and private sector clearances. promote secure and responsible information sharing. The strategy does not define particular categories or types of information that must be shared. Rather, it shifts the focus of information sharing and safeguarding policy to defining information requirements that support effective decision making. The strategy outlines a vision with a national policy roadmap to guide information sharing and safeguarding within existing law and policy. This strategy does not replace the National Strategy for Information Sharing (2007 NSIS), as the 2007 NSIS continues to provide a policy framework and directs many core initiatives intended to improve information sharing. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR INFORMATION SHARING & SAFEGUARDING Our national security depends on the ability to share the right information, with the right people, at the right time. This information sharing mandate requires sustained and responsible collaboration between the IC and FSLTT partners. Over the last few years, the IC and FSLTT partners have successfully streamlined policies and processes, overcome cultural barriers, and better integrated information systems to enable information sharing. Today’s dynamic environment, nonetheless, poses challenges to the continuing effort to improve information sharing and safeguarding processes and capabilities. While innovation has enhanced the ability to share, increased sharing has created the potential for vulnerabilities that require strengthened safeguarding practices. The 2012 National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding provides guidance for effective development, integration, and implementation of policies, processes, standards, and technologies to 23 Domestic Approach to National Intelligence Way-Ahead This paper promotes a better understanding of the current operating environment of the domestic enterprise. Going forward, it will be important to move beyond the “as is” descriptions and work toward a vision of the “should be.” This vision must guide longterm investment strategies that align assets to better synchronize intelligence collaboration and interplay with FSLTT partners, while ensuring the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of our citizens are fully protected. It must also help to identify potential changes to policies, technologies, and organizational and informational frameworks to optimize both cost and effectiveness. Ultimately, the domestic enterprise must be postured to provide all-source intelligence and enhance responsible information sharing and collaboration across public safety, law enforcement, and intelligence activities. This will ensure that our customers and partners— from first responders to our national leaders—have the most accurate and current intelligence. 24 Office of the Director of National Intelligence Abbreviations NCSC National Counterintelligence and Security Center NCTC NGA NIM NORAD NORTHCOM NRO NSA NSI National Counterterrorism Center NSIS National Strategy for Information Sharing Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence & Analysis ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence DIA Defense Intelligence Agency DNI Director of National Intelligence OIA Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Treasury Department DoD Department of Defense Office of National Drug Control Policy DoJ Department of Justice ONDCP ONSI DoS Department of State DOT Department of Transportation Office of Personnel Management EMS Emergency Medical Services OPM PM-ISE FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation FICO Federal Intelligence Coordination Office Regional Information Sharing System FIG Field Intelligence Group FSIC Federal Senior Intelligence Coordinator FSLTT Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial RISS SAR SBU TIDE HHS Health and Human Services HIDTA High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Transportation Security Administration HIFCA High Intensity Financial Crime Area HSA Homeland Security Advisor HS&LE Homeland Security & Law Enforcement IC Intelligence Community ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement TSA TSC TTP UIS USCG USCIS IIR Intelligence Information Report INR Bureau of Intelligence and Research U.S. Government ISC Investigative Support Center ITACG Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group USG USGS USSS JCAT Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team JTF Joint Task Force JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force LE Law Enforcement AOR Area of Responsibility ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives CAC Civil Applications Committee CBP Customs and Border Protection CI Counterintelligence CIA Central Intelligence Agency CICC Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council CIU Criminal Intelligence Unit CT Counter Terrorism DEA Drug Enforcement Administration DHS Department of Homeland Security DHS/I&A National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency National Intelligence Manager North American Aerospace Defense Northern Command National Reconnaissance Office National Security Agency Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative Office of National Security Intelligence Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment Suspicious Activity Report Sensitive But Unclassified Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment Terrorist Screening Center Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Unifying Intelligence Strategy U.S. Coast Guard U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services U.S. Geological Survey U.S. Secret Service 25 Domestic Approach to National Intelligence Domestic Approach to National Intelligence Domestic Enterprise Seattle Olympia WA Portland Salem Helena MT ND MN Bismarck OR Saint Paul ID Minneapolis SD Boise WI Pierre WY Madison Sioux Falls Milwaukee IA Carson City Sacramento Salt Lake City NV Cheyenne UT NE Denver San Francisco Topeka CO CA Des Moines Chicago Kansas City Springfield Omaha Lincoln KS Las Vegas IL Jefferson City MO In Saint Louis Springfield Santa Fe Los Angeles AZ San Diego 0 Phoenix Nashv OK Oklahoma City Albuquerque NM AR Little Rock MS 300 Kilometers 0 Jackson 300 Miles Dallas TX El Paso LA Austin DNI Representative NCTC Representative San Antonio Drug Enforcement Administration Division Office Baton Rouge New Orle pending Federal Bureau of Investigations Field Office High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Headquarters Element Regional Information Sharing System Center State/Major Urban Area Fusion Center US Coast Guard District Office Shaded areas represent the DNI Rep Regions. This map was created in June 2013 to provide a general overview of the domestic enterprise. It is not meant to be all-inclusive. 26 UNCLASSIFIED Honolulu Hagatna GU M Houston El Paso Intelligence Center US Immigration and Customs Enforcement Memphis HI Office of the Director of National Intelligence UNCLASSIFIED ME Augusta Montpelier VT NH Albany MI Buffalo NY Lansing e Detroit PA Pittsburgh Cleveland ndianapolis Louisville VA Charleston Frankfort KY London NY Richmond Charlotte pending Columbia Atlanta AL Baltimore MD GA Jacksonville Trenton NJ Dover DE Annapolis Richmond FL Norfolk Orlando 0 0 Tampa Miami 100 Kilometers 100 Miles Charlotte Amalie AK San Juan Anchorage New York City VA Tallahassee eans Boston WASHINGTON, D.C. Montgomery Mobile Newark Harrisburg SC pending Providence RI Hartford CT New Haven Philadelphia NC TN Birmingham MA Albany PA Raleigh Knoxville ville Trenton Harrisburg NJ WASHINGTON, D.C. WV Cincinnati NH VT Dover MD DE Annapolis OH Columbus IN Concord Boston MA CT Providence Hartford RI PR VI Juneau NCTC 017657 [0097s] AI 7-15 27 Domestic Approach to National Intelligence This Page was Intentionally Left BLANK 28 Domestic Approach to National Intelligence This Page was Intentionally Left BLANK 29 Domestic Approach to National Intelligence This Page was Intentionally Left BLANK 30 UNITED TO PROTECT NCTC 029197 | December 2016 Original Article End-user perceptions of intelligence dissemination from a state fusion center Carla Lewandowskia,* and Jeremy G. Carterb a Law and Justice Studies, Rowan University, 561 Campbell Library, 201 Mullica Hill Road, Glassboro, NJ 08028, USA. E-mail: lewandowskic@rowan.edu b School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University – Purdue University Indianapolis, 801W. Michigan Street, BS 4081, Indianapolis, IN 46202, USA. E-mail: carterjg@iupui.edu *Corresponding author. Abstract This research examines end-user perceptions of an intelligence product disseminated from a state fusion center in the Northeast region of the United States. The current literature suffers from an empirical gap within the arena of contemporary law enforcement intelligence; largely because of the difficulty of obtaining data related to such practices. This research informs this gap and provides insights into local law enforcement intelligence sharing. Descriptive statistics and interview narratives are presented. Original survey data was collected from a sample of law enforcement agencies subscribed to the fusion center’s intelligence listserv. Random interviews with survey respondents were also conducted and NVivo software was utilized to develop qualitative constructs. Findings indicate the intelligence product is read daily and perceived to be moderately useful by recipients. End users are primarily concerned with jurisdiction-specific and officer safety-related information. Upper-level administrators are the organizational lynchpins for funneling information to patrol officers. Security Journal (2017) 30, 467–486. doi:10.1057/sj.2014.38; published online 1 September 2014 Keywords: intelligence; fusion center; information sharing; policing; end users Introduction In the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (hereafter 9/11), the concept of multi-agency information centers in the United States was transformed into what are now known as fusion centers to serve as a key mechanism to improve law enforcement information sharing and the utilization of intelligence products. In short, fusion centers are entities diverse in personnel and agency composition that serve as a conduit to facilitate effective information sharing across both geographic and authoritative jurisdictions (that is, local, state and federal). Though fusion centers are not the sole component of law enforcement intelligence, they perhaps represent the most significant investment of resources and tangible change in law enforcement post-9/11. Thus, it is not surprising that these centers have been the subject of intense debate. While the majority of government reports and © 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 0955-1662 Security Journal Vol. 30, 2, 467–486 www.palgrave.com/journals Lewandowski and Carter academic research to date has advocated for these centers (Carter and Chermak, 2012), concerns over their operations (U.S. Senate, 2012) and overall effectiveness (Taylor and Russell, 2012) have been called into question. The literature on fusion centers is progressing, but significant knowledge gaps remain. Specifically, the literature is sparse with respect to; (i) what extent do recipients of intelligence products further share this information within their own agency; (ii) the frequency at which fusion centers distribute intelligence products; and (iii) intelligence products desired by recipients from fusion centers. This research is not a parsimonious test of theory. Both scholars and professionals are in need of insight with regard to the practices examined within this research. Sparse evidence exists pertaining to reciprocal relationships for information and intelligence sharing between fusion center and state and local law enforcement. From an academic research perspective, the literature is uninformed about how state and local law enforcement perceive the products they receive from fusion centers as well as the perception of information provided to fusion centers from state and local law enforcement. The present study seeks to inform the literature regarding the former knowledge gap and provide insights into fusion center information sharing through original survey data and interviews with law enforcement personnel who receive fusion center analytic products. Law Enforcement Intelligence Information sharing One of the key elements to the successful use of intelligence for the prevention and mitigation of risk is widespread information sharing. Such risks, especially at the fusion center level, are focused on terrorism. The Office of Homeland Security’s National Strategy for Information Sharing (Homeland Security Council, 2007, p. 1) stated ‘Our success in preventing future terrorist attacks depends upon our ability to gather, analyze, and share information and intelligence regarding those who want to attack us, the tactics they use, and the targets that they intend to attack’. To this end, law enforcement must have effective mechanisms for sharing information as well as a willingness to engage in proactive information sharing. There is reason to suspect that, despite substantial effort, information sharing in the area of intelligence is significantly limited (Cooney et al, 2011; Chermak et al, 2013). Intelligence should guide law enforcement’s operational and strategic decision making (Carter, 2009). In order to achieve this desired end, intelligence must get into the hands of decision makers in the form of an actionable intelligence product from which action can be taken. Fusion centers are the medium through which actionable intelligence products reach state and local law enforcement. The fusion center model There are currently 78 official fusion centers in the United States (U.S. House of Representatives, 2013) to increase the exchange of information and data across government and private sectors to enhance law enforcement’s ability to fight crime and terrorism and prevent threats (Global Intelligence Working Group, 2005). The relationship between state 468 © 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 0955-1662 Security Journal Vol. 30, 2, 467–486 End-user perceptions and local law enforcement and fusion centers is reinforced by the National Strategy for Homeland Security that identifies the philosophy as one of the primary tools to combat terrorism and threats to the United States (Homeland Security Council, 2007). Fusion centers are designed to serve as a conduit for facilitating information sharing across jurisdictions while also providing an analytic capability for many local agencies that would otherwise not have access to crime and intelligence analysts. In order for fusion centers to meet their overarching mission, to improve information sharing, they must have an effective method of communication with state and local law enforcement. There is no single model for a fusion center, namely because of the diverse needs and environmental characteristics that affect the structure, processes and products of such a center. A Congressional Research Service report raised questions regarding the current and potential efficacy of fusion centers. The report notes that in light of the growth of the fusion centers in state and local jurisdictions without a coordinated national plan, ‘there appears to be no “one-size-fits-all” structural or operational model for fusion centers’ (Rollins, 2008, p. 18). From a centralized federal perspective, as reflected in the report, the lack of a uniform model is assumed to be a flaw (Taylor and Russell, 2012). However, the state and local perspective is somewhat different. Indeed, the ability to build a fusion center around grassroots needs is preferred; this permits state and local agencies to mold the fusion center into a model that best suits the needs and challenges that are idiosyncratic to each jurisdiction and the communities they serve. As noted by Johnson and Dorn (2008, p. 38) in describing the New York State Intelligence Center, Creating one center for intelligence and terrorism information, to combine and distribute that information to law enforcement agencies statewide, prevents duplication of effort by multiple agencies. Additionally, one state fusion center serving the entire New York law enforcement community provides a comprehensive picture of criminal and terrorists networks, aids in the fight against future terrorists events and reduces crime. Fusion centers and local police Fusion centers serve as a lynchpin of information sharing both vertically between levels of law enforcement as well as horizontally across state and local agencies. The nexus between threats to public safety and local law enforcement has been well-documented (Clarke and Newman, 2006; Newman and Clarke, 2008; Boba, 2009). Local law enforcement agencies are in a unique position to push vital information to fusion centers as a result of their knowledge about individuals, groups and organizations operating in local communities as part of their day-to-day operational work. As Bayley and Weisburd (2009) noted, ‘low policing’ that focuses on street-level interactions among law enforcement and community members is perhaps one of the most significant benefits police have in their counter-terrorism efforts. As Masse et al (2007, p.7) note in their report to Congress: ‘The 8 00 000 plus law enforcement officers across the country know their communities most intimately and, therefore, are best placed to function as the “eyes and ears” of an extended national security community. They have the experience to recognize what constitutes anomalous behavior in their areas of responsibility and can either stop it at the point of discovery (a more traditional © 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 0955-1662 Security Journal Vol. 30, 2, 467–486 469 Lewandowski and Carter law enforcement approach) or follow the anomaly or criminal behavior, either unilaterally or jointly with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), to extract the maximum intelligence value from the activity (a more intelligence-based approach)’. Fusion centers are positioned to be the operational capacity through which local law enforcement engage in the more intelligence-based approach (Masse et al, 2007; Carter, 2014). This, however, is a significant shortcoming of the current knowledge base as the majority of fusion center research has either been conceptual or focused on fusion center operations and practices rather than their interaction with local agencies. There are two notable studies that explored fusion centers and local law enforcement. Both of these studies focused primarily on local perceptions of the usefulness of fusion centers. First, in their study of the 184 local law enforcement executives in South Carolina, Cooney et al (2011) noted that while most local law enforcement personnel perceived the South Carolina fusion center to be useful, the percentage of locals with opposing perceptions was significant enough to warrant further research and policy reconsiderations. Their study also concluded that local agencies that identified themselves as engaging in ‘intelligence-led policing’ viewed the fusion center more favorably. Second, Ratcliffe and Walden (2010) utilized survey and interview information from 51 state troopers about their perception of information received from and sent to a fusion center in the Northeast region of the United States. Their findings indicated an overall ambiguity of the fusion center’s role with state and local law enforcement. Troopers tended to prefer information received from fellow troopers over fusion center products as well as rarely providing information to the center to be included in analysis. Despite low overall levels of trooper acceptance of the fusion center, it was noted that troopers consistently accessed fusion center information – likely because of its ease of access. Ratcliffe and Walden (2010) go on to note the importance for future research to explore how fusion centers can disseminate intelligence products more strategically and that such an exploration would require surveying end users of intelligence products. The current study seeks to build on this recommendation by surveying end-user perceptions of a fusion center in the Northeast region. Methodology Survey of intelligence product readers Empirical research exploring law enforcement intelligence issues has been severely hampered by a lack of access to, and unwillingness to participate by, intelligence personnel within agencies (see Chermak et al, 2013). Moreover, ideal surveying methods – such as random sampling – are not feasible given the fidelity of intelligence practices nationwide. Not every law enforcement agency in the country is actively engaged in information sharing and intelligence practices (Carter and Phillips, 2013), thus a targeted sample is required. Virtually all intelligence research to date (post-9/11) has been conducted based on purposive samples where the researchers had an existing relationship with the intelligence personnel (see Cope, 2004; Graphia-Joyal, 2010; Ratcliffe and Walden, 2010; Cooney et al, 2011; Carter and Phillips, 2013; Chermak et al, 2013; Darroch and Mazerolle, 2013; Ratcliffe et al, 2014). This purposive sampling approach is even more pertinent with regard to fusion centers. As per the Department of Homeland Security-mandated fusion center guidelines 470 © 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 0955-1662 Security Journal Vol. 30, 2, 467–486 End-user perceptions (Global Intelligence Working Group, 2005) and baseline capabilities of fusion centers (Global Intelligence Working Group, 2008), each fusion center is required to maintain strict security requirements, including having a sensitive compartmented information facility for the handling of classified information. Despite scholars not having an interest in classified information, the presence of such security measures is believed to inhibit a willingness to share even the most basic of information regarding fusion center practices. As a result, data extraction for research purposes relies on a rapport between researchers and intelligence practitioners. Such an approach is commonplace in other aspects of policing where information is sensitive, such as policing cybercrime (Holt and Bossler, 2012), the mentally ill (Borum et al, 1998) and sex workers (Simic et al, 2006). The present research required a purposive sampling frame in order to accurately explore end users of intelligence products from the fusion center. The present study utilizes a sample of law enforcement agencies that subscribe to the fusion center’s intelligence E-mail listserv, which distributes a daily intelligence bulletin. Information within this bulletin is divided into categories that include issues such as officer safety, current threats, be-on-the-lookout (BOLOs) and emerging crime tactics and techniques. A sentiment exists among some fusion center employees that very few people read the bulletin on a daily basis. As a result of this sentiment, there has also been dissatisfaction among some individuals who work to create the intelligence product because they question the usefulness of their work. To date, there has been no systematic tracking of the intelligence product to determine the number of people who access or share this product within their agency. Thus, the fusion center was eager to understand more about its daily product and to receive information that would help it decide how to make it more useful for law enforcement subscribers who seek to best utilize the information it contains. While beneficial for purposes of reaching end users, this listserv also created limitations for generalizability of the findings to be presented. Owing to obvious security concerns, the researchers were not able to have access to the persons directly through the listserv and thus relied on fusion center personnel to disseminate the survey instrument. As a result, the researchers had no control over the sampling frame. Simultaneous to the survey instrument being disseminated, the listserv being utilized for sampling was continuing to expand as part of a fusion center initiative to improve its reach to local law enforcement agencies. A Web-based survey was disseminated to agencies on the fusion center listserv. At the time the survey was initially disseminated to end users in March 2011, the listserv was comprised of 427 state, municipal and tribal law enforcement agencies as well as public works, other government organizations (such as the Attorney General’s Office) and members of the private sector. When the sampling period closed in May 2011, the listserv included 609 total organizations (from multiple contiguous states). In total, 315 agency responses were received. Each response was unique to a single agency. Since multiple persons from a single agency are included on the fusion center’s listserv, it was clearly communicated to the fusion center research partner managing the survey that any multiple responses from the same agency be identified. No multiple responses from the same agency were observed. A conservative response rate of 53 per cent (315/609) is reported for this study. Given the fusion center’s listserv is comprised of 85 per cent state and local law enforcement agencies (as explained by the fusion center research partner managing the E-mail dissemination) from urban areas and the proportion of state and local agencies within the responses received was 87 per cent (and 67 per cent urban), the © 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 0955-1662 Security Journal Vol. 30, 2, 467–486 471 Lewandowski and Carter findings are likely not influenced by non-response bias. However, since access to the listserv was restricted and no determinations could be made with regard to the characteristics of responding versus non-responding agencies, it cannot be said with certainty that nonresponses bias is not a limitation to this research. In addition to the descriptive statistics to follow, respondents were provided open-ended opportunities within the survey to express levels of satisfaction or disappointment with the intelligence product bulletin. Interviews with end-user personnel To better understand the interaction of end-user personnel with the intelligence product and the information reported in survey responses, interviews were conducted with the recipients to provide more depth and context to the survey results. Creswell (2008, p. 4) characterizes this research approach as ‘a means for exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem’. The intent of employing these interviews is not necessarily to arrive at an answer to a question, but rather to better understand the interviewee’s interpretation of phenomena through the lens of their practical experience (Seidman, 2006). Since state and local police departments represent the majority of the intelligence product listserv, and are arguably the most direct end users of fusion center products, a random sample of 20 municipal police personnel who completed the survey were interviewed for this research. Though not truly a random sample as the sample population does not include agencies that did not respond to the survey, the randomization process is important to establish the absence of researcher bias in agency selection for interviews. The researchers attempted to conduct interviews with agencies that did not respond to the survey to gather more representative information. However, the fusion center could not release contact information for agencies not consenting to be contacted via the survey. Respondents were asked to include their contact information if they were open to being contacted regarding their survey results; 112 persons provided their contact information. These 112 persons were then arranged alphabetically by last name and numbered from 0 to 112. A random number generator was then used to select 20 of these 112 persons. Of the 20 law enforcement personnel interviewed, 6 were chiefs of police or upper management, 8 were middle management and 6 were frontline supervisors or patrol officers. Each individual was interviewed for a period of 1 hour using a semi-structured interview format to allow the interviewer to employ proper follow-up queries in accordance with the person’s position within the department (that is, chief had different perspectives of intelligence than frontline officers). The insights provided by these personnel are critical to understanding under what circumstances police utilize intelligence products. Trends from the open-ended survey responses and interviews with personnel are included in the findings to provide contextual insights to the limited descriptive data. NVivo software was utilized to organize and identify thematic constructs from the qualitative information gleaned from the interviews. Findings For ease of interpretation, this section is organized by separating the survey and interview findings across each key area. While such a discussion, specifically of interviewee insights, 472 © 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 0955-1662 Security Journal Vol. 30, 2, 467–486 End-user perceptions Table 1: Descriptive statistics for survey respondents (n = 315) Per cent (n) Type of organization Federal State Local Tribal Private 7.9 (25) 25.1 (79) 61.9 (195) 1.0 (3) 4.1 (13) Level within organization Upper level Mid level Frontline 33.6 (106) 30.2 (95) 36.2 (114) Setting of department Urban Rural 67.6 (213) 32.4 (102) may arguably be more appropriate within the conclusions and discussion section, the information is provided here to contextualize the descriptive information. It should be noted that the findings presented are basic descriptives. Exploratory analyses were conducted by the researchers to provide additional insights from the data, such as variation by agency or personnel type. However, since no observable differences were identified and given space considerations for qualitative narrative, these analyses are not provided. A lack of variation was also observed across interviewees. The lack of differences by agency type is perhaps a welcomed diagnostic as intelligence practice (in theory) should not differ across varying agencies (Ratcliffe, 2008; Carter and Carter, 2009a). In addition, it would be interesting to examine these findings in parallel with crime. Differences in crime type and frequency could likely influence agency perceptions of intelligence products. Unfortunately, such an analysis was not possible because of the inability to identify specific agencies (fusion center security concern) to link their responses with corresponding crime data. Table 1 provides descriptives of agencies responding to the survey. The majority (61.9 per cent) of respondents were local agencies while a quarter of the respondents (25.1 per cent) were from a state organization and roughly 8 per cent worked for a federal entity. Only 1 per cent was from a tribal organization and 4 per cent of respondents worked in the private sector. There was an almost equal distribution of representation from upper-level management (33.6 per cent), middle-level management (30.2 per cent) and patrol (36.2 per cent). Most of the respondents (67.6 per cent) indicated that they worked in an urban setting. Dissemination of the intelligence product – Survey Survey items targeted how the intelligence product bulletin is received,1 how it is made available to patrol and, if E-mailed, to how many people it is forwarded. Table 2 illustrates the extent to which the intelligence product bulletin is disseminated. An overwhelmingly majority of respondents indicated they received the bulletin via E-mail (84.4 per cent). © 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 0955-1662 Security Journal Vol. 30, 2, 467–486 473 Lewandowski and Carter Table 2: Intelligence product dissemination Per cent (n) How do you receive the intelligence product? (n = 270) Personal/work E-mail From the chief/head of your organization Look-up manually 84.4 (228) 15.2 (41) 0.004 (1) How is intelligence made available to frontline personnel? (n = 268) E-mail Meeting Posting Other Not available 63.1 (169) 19.8 (53) 4.9 (13) 4.5 (12) 78.4 (21) To how many people in your organization do you regularly forward the intelligence product E-mail? (n = 271) 1–5 people 15.5 (42) 6–10 people 7.1 (20) 11–50 people 8.5 (23) 51 or more people 2.6 (7) Approximately 15 per cent indicated they received the bulletin from the chief administrator of their organization (that is, chief of police) while only one respondent indicated manually seeking the bulletin – likely through secured access of an electronic information sharing system such as the Regional Information Sharing System Network (RISSNET) (www .riss.net/). The primary audience for the intelligence product bulletin is the local law enforcement community; specifically patrol as they have the most day-to-day contact with the public. When asked how the information in the intelligence product bulletin is made available to those patrol officers and frontline personnel, the majority of respondents (63.1 per cent) said it was made available by E-mail, followed by a much less frequency of those receiving the information during a meeting (19.8 per cent) such as roll call, and just under 5 per cent indicated the information was posted in a public place within the agency. A similar percentage of respondents indicated the information was made available through other methods. Of the respondents who chose to provide an open response, a consistent theme emerged that information was made available to specific units within the department – such as gang or drug squads. Important to the aspect of information availability is the possibility that information – in this case the intelligence product bulletin – is passed between members of an organization. Thus, more personnel within a department are likely receiving information beyond what is captured by recipients on a listserv. Through interviews with officers from local agencies, it was identified that in some departments the supervisor is the only person who receives the intelligence product at their respective agency. He or she will then forward it to an intelligence officer, patrol officers or the entire frontline and middle management. Table 2 illustrates the extent to which respondents indicated the intelligence product bulletin is forwarded to others within the organization. Of those who responded, most indicated they forwarded the intelligence product to 1–5 other people within their organization on a regular basis (15.5 per cent). A similar number of respondents indicated they regularly forwarded the 474 © 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 0955-1662 Security Journal Vol. 30, 2, 467–486 End-user perceptions bulletin to 6–10 (7.1 per cent) and 11–50 people (8.5 per cent). Less than 3 per cent indicated they forwarded the bulletin to more than 51 people. Though the data do not allow for comparisons of these findings to respondents’ agency size, these findings are likely related to agency size. For example, while a respondent may have only forwarded the bulletin to 6–10 other persons, this could possibly represent the majority or entirety of the respondent’s organization. A consistent trend of the respondents who provided an open response indicated they selectively forwarded the bulletin to others whom they feel it was relevant. Dissemination of the intelligence product – Interviews In-depth interviews with officers from different agencies revealed four important and interesting findings related to the dissemination of the intelligence product bulletin. First, a trend that emerged from the interviews was that many of the officers interviewed did not know how they initially started receiving the intelligence product bulletin E-mails. Many of the officers in middle-management positions or in patrol said they started receiving the intelligence product one day and surmised their chief had included their names on the list. Moreover, these officers indicated they did not know whether others within the department were on the distribution list, but believed their colleagues also received it as a result of being enlisted by someone else as well. One of the detectives interviewed acknowledged he was always under the assumption everyone in the agency received the bulletin until interviews for this study were conducted and he was surprised to discover this was not the case. Second, the extent to which one person within a department would take it upon him/herself to make patrol aware of the intelligence product bulletin. Many departments lacked sufficient staff to cull through intelligence and send out only what was relevant to patrol. A majority of the officers interviewed indicated they printed out the bulletin, or specific parts of it, to distribute to patrol or display on a board where it would be noticed by patrol. Third, select officers may not forward the intelligence product to others in their agency if they believe everyone is receiving it already. Regardless of department size, dissemination of the intelligence product varies and is fragmented for some agencies. One officer interviewed from an urban agency indicated the department had its own intelligence unit and integrated information from the intelligence product into its own bulletin. Another officer, also from an urban agency, indicated there was a lack information sharing and intelligence product distribution in his department. Moreover, this officer went on to acknowledge this problem exists even among the different patrol shifts as officers did not communicate important local intelligence gathered from the night before. The final trend among the officers interviewed was that not all officers had access to work E-mail, and those who did were not required to check it regularly. Thus, the only way for them to receive the information consistently was if someone within the department was tasked, or takes the initiative, to disseminate the information to patrol via another manner – such as roll call or posting it within a common place. Utilization of the intelligence product – Survey Critical to exploring the utility of intelligence products is the extent to which different personnel within an agency use the intelligence provided. Responses to the item asking © 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 0955-1662 Security Journal Vol. 30, 2, 467–486 475 Lewandowski and Carter Table 3: Intelligence product utilization Per cent (n) Who in your organization primarily uses intelligence in the intelligence product? (n = 258) Investigative personnel 36.0 (93) Everyone 28.7 (74) Patrol 24.4 (63) Middle management 23.6 (61) Senior officials 19.8 (51) No one 2.3 (6) Other 5.0 (13) How often do you open the intelligence product attachment to read more about a topic? (n = 272) Daily 59.2 (161) 1–2 times a week 29.4 (80) Once a month 2.9 (8) Never 2.2 (6) Other 6.3 (17) When was the last time you read the intelligence product attachment closely? (n = 271) Within the last day Within the last 3 days Within the last week Within the last month Cannot remember 50.0 (136) 25.0 (68) 12.5 (34) 1.8 (5) 10.7 (29) respondents to indicated who in their organization primarily uses intelligence were not mutually exclusive; respondents could indicate multiple types of personnel as there are likely to be multiple users and restricting responses to a single selection would not be representative of practice. Table 3 presents the findings of the intelligence-users item. Of those who responded, most indicated investigative personnel primarily utilized the intelligence product bulletin (36 per cent) followed by the notion that everyone in the organization utilized the bulletin (28.7 per cent). Patrol (24.4 per cent), middle management (23.6 per cent) and senior officials (19.8 per cent) were indicated to utilize the intelligence product similarly. A promising finding is that less than 3 per cent indicated no one in the organization used the bulletin – thus hopefully reaffirming the overall utility of the intelligence product to the organizations to which it is distributed. In an effort to explore the extent to which recipients of the intelligence product bulletin are reading the actual bulletin, respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they read the bulletin attachment for further information as well as the last time they read the attachment closely. Beyond estimating the frequency of the actual bulletin being read, such measures also highlight the extent to which the bulletin appeals to the recipients. Table 3 further illustrates the extent to which the intelligence product bulletin is utilized by the recipients. The results are insightful. Of those who responded, 59.2 per cent indicated they opened the attachment daily followed by 29 per cent that indicated they read the attachment once or twice a week. Less than 3 per cent of respondents indicated they read the intelligence product bulletin once a month or never. Despite assurances that the survey was anonymous, survey respondents may have answered in what they perceived to be a socially desirable way and thus may have felt the 476 © 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 0955-1662 Security Journal Vol. 30, 2, 467–486 End-user perceptions need to overestimate how often they read the intelligence product bulletin. This bias was hopefully mitigated via the Web-based survey format as evidence exists that people will answer in a less socially desirable way when using an electronic survey (Kiesler and Sproull, 1986). In order to reaffirm these findings, a second question gauged respondents’ frequency of reading the intelligence product bulletin within a past timeframe. These results are also presented in Table 3. Among the respondents, 50 per cent acknowledged they read the intelligence product within the last day followed by 25 per cent responding they had read it in the last 3 days and 12.5 per cent within the last week at the time of the survey. Less than 2 per cent had not read the bulletin within the last month while 10.7 per cent acknowledged they could not remember the last time they read the bulletin. The findings from these two items related to the frequency at which recipients read the intelligence product bulletin attachment were consistent with one another. Utilization of the intelligence product – Interviews In-depth interviews were conducted to provide further context to how patrol received the intelligence product bulletin. In some departments, the chief had decided that all personnel should regularly receive the bulletin; either by E-mail or during the roll-call meeting at the beginning of the shift. Though the information was made available to all personnel, there appeared to be no informal or formal mechanisms to motivate personnel to actually read the bulletin. In other departments, only detectives received the bulletin. Interviews with other officers indicated their agency practice was to print the bulletin and place it in the break room or in a binder with other notices for the patrol. This binder would typically contain ‘BOLOs’ and other officer-safety notices. Interviews with officers from different agencies provided context for why end users of the intelligence product bulletin were motivated to open the attachment. Though respondents reported a variety of motives that prompted them to read the bulletin, consistent trends emerged. One of the most frequent trends was that officers perceived reading the bulletin as a responsibility of their job. These officers said it was their due diligence to keep up with threats in order to piece together information and make better decision...
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