INTL613 APUS Week 6 Homeland Security Intelligence Discussion


Question Description

What are the strengths and limitations of a distributed homeland security intelligence production -- a federal system with independent and largely "sovereign" state, local, tribal jurisdictions? Provide for at least one specific suggestion for improvement as it relates to one of the limitations you found within the homeland security intelligence production. Locate the nearest Fusion Center to you via the U.S. Homeland Security link Once you find your local Fusion Center, discuss the specific role of mission of that Fusion Center.

Instructions: Fully utilize the materials that have been provided to you in order to support your response. Your initial post should be at least 500 words.

Forum posts are graded on timeliness, relevance, knowledge of the weekly readings, and the quality of original ideas. Sources utilized to support answers are to be cited in accordance with the APA writing style by providing a general parenthetical citation (reference the author, year and page number) within your post, as well as an adjoining reference list. Refer to grading rubric for additional details concerning grading criteria.

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Office of the Director of National Intelligence Domestic Approach to National Intelligence Domestic Approach to National Intelligence UNITED TO PROTECT 2 Office of the Director of National Intelligence Table of Contents 4 Preface 5 Introduction 7 Purpose 8 Challenge 10 Integrating National Intelligence 23 Other Key Considerations 24 Way-Ahead 25 Abbreviations 3 Preface This publication comprises inputs from a broad array of participants representing elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) and its partners in the domestic field. We thank everyone involved for their time and valuable contributions. The process began with meetings and resulted in many conversations, drafts, revisions, and rounds of coordination with subject matter experts, lawyers, privacy and civil liberties officials, and senior leadership. Over time, we realized the topic is very complex and often characterized differently by the various participants and stakeholders, depending upon their vantage point and mission. Segments explaining the role of specific IC agencies and departments were written and provided by the entity itself. The Domestic Approach to National Intelligence describes the “as is,” or current picture, of the operating environment for the IC’s key engagements with federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners inside the United States. The next step—one that may be even more complex and challenging—is to move beyond the “as is” descriptions and work toward a vision of the “should be.” Challenges aside, we owe it to the American people to strengthen the national security apparatus to best protect our citizens and their privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. Introduction Office of the Director of National Intelligence Since my appointment as the Director of National Intelligence in 2010, one of my highest priorities has been strengthening intelligence partnerships to help preserve the country's national security. Partnerships have long been a foundation of our work overseas. In light of 9/11 and the rapidly evolving natur e of foreign threats to the homeland, we also must renew our focus on how the Intelligenc e Community (IC) collaborates with partner agencies inside the United States to ensure that we carry out our national and homeland security missions as effectively as possible. Protecting the privacy and civil liberties of our citizens is fundamental to this endeavor. Significant progress has been made since 9/11 in building capacity, standardizing practices, and sharing information with partn ers in the United States to defend against and respond to foreign and foreign-inspired threa ts to our homeland. As vital as that progress has been, I believe that we still have work to do to ensure that all those involved in this effort —including the American people—share a common understanding of how this mosaic fits together. Thus, I directed my staff to work with our partners to describe in a single document the "as-is" operating environment for the IC’s key engagements with federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners inside the United States. The result of my request is the paper, Domestic Approach to National Intelligence. This paper was prepared in consultation with the ODNI's Office of Civil Liberties, Privacy and Transparency and Office of Gene ral Counsel and coordinated with mission partners. Appropriately, the paper's descriptio n of the "as-is" operating environment reflec ts each agency's limitations imposed by law, policy, and mission, and highlights the importance of protecting privacy and civil libert ies, an imperative for all partners engaged in this committed effort. The paper does not purport to describe the specific laws, polici es, safeguards, or operations relating to each agency's activities, nor does it make recommendations for change. I believe the Domestic Approach to National Intelligence provides, in a transparent manner, a common general understanding of the current state of intelligence exchange between the IC and its domestic mission partn ers, and serves to further our collaborative efforts. We trust that it will serve as a usefu l foundation for the ongoing, productive dialo gue on homeland security that the American peop le rightfully expect. James R. Clapper Director 5 Domestic Approach to National Intelligence “ We need to deal with the realities of globalization – the blurring these days of foreign and domestic matters. Because when threats like terrorism and international organized crime transcend borders, it’s critical that we think holistically about intelligence. But we’re also a people who – Constitutionally and culturally – attach a high premium to our personal freedoms and our personal privacy.” James R. Clapper 6 Office of the Director of National Intelligence Purpose This paper, the Domestic Approach to National Intelligence, describes certain key roles and relationships that characterize efforts by members of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) and federal, state, local, tribal and territorial (FSLTT) government organizations to engage with one another to carry out the shared mission of protecting the homeland. These partners work with one another, and through established channels with the private sector (e.g., critical infrastructure owners and operators), as part of a complex web of relationships. Each partner, regardless of level, plays an important role in protecting the homeland with respect to warning, interdiction, prevention, mitigation, and response. The importance of partnerships and collaboration is emphasized in this paper, as is the IC’s responsibility to the public to protect privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. Descriptions related to organizational responsibilities and/or authorities are provided by the respective agencies. The Domestic Approach to National Intelligence is consistent with the framework and recommendations outlined in the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council’s (CICC) National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, the strategies in support of the National Network of Fusion Centers, and information sharing and safeguarding standards outlined by the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE). By describing these roles and relationships in one place, this paper strives to foster an important national dialogue that will promote a better understanding of how the IC engages with key partners in this domestic enterprise and supports the holistic ideals articulated by the Director of National intelligence (DNI). PROTECTING PRIVACY, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES To prevent and deter acts of terrorism and other threats on American soil, we must continue to develop lines of coordination and appropriately align intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security efforts. However, this must be accomplished only in accordance with the Constitution, laws, Executive Order 12333, and core values of our nation. Protecting fundamental rights and liberties is an important national security end in and of itself. The Domestic Approach to National Intelligence is fully committed to exemplifying America’s values: operating under the rule of law, consistent with Americans’ expectations for the protection of privacy and civil liberties, respectful of human rights, and preserving the trust of the American people. As President Obama stated at the National Archives in May 2009, “We uphold our fundamental principles and values not just because we choose to, but because we swear to. Not because they feel good, but because they help keep us safe. They keep us true to who we are… So as Americans, we reject the false choice between our security and our ideals. We can and we must and we will protect both.” Thus, it is essential that we comply with all applicable legal and policy authorities including, but not limited to, the Privacy Act, Executive Order 12333, and the Information Sharing Privacy Guidelines. Similarly, IC elements and FSLTT organizations must continue to operate within their defined mission roles and responsibilities. President Obama, photo provided by the White House “We uphold our fundamental principles and values not just because we choose to, but because we swear to. Not because they feel good, but because they help keep us safe. They keep us true to who we are… So as Americans, we reject the false choice between our security and our ideals. We can and we must and we will protect both.” President Obama National Archives in May 2009 (Opposite) Director Clapper briefing the President, photo provided by the White House 7 Domestic Approach to National Intelligence Challenge Our nation must deal with a wide range of complex threats to our people and interests both overseas and within the nation’s borders. These threats include foreign-based and foreign-inspired terrorism, foreign intelligence activities, homegrown violent extremism, transnational organized crime, cyber-attacks by foreign actors or their agents, and more. Shrinking budgets and growing mission requirements demand effective, interoperable, and non-duplicative–that is, “smart”–government operations. This new dynamic also demands greater teamwork and responsible information sharing between members of the IC and FSLTT partners—as well as appropriate and responsible information sharing with the private sector—that is consistent with law, policy, and regulation and protects privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. Such partnerships provide access to the expertise and unique capabilities and authorities held by each partner, resulting in benefits not only to those involved but also to the nation as a whole. As the nature of threats to the homeland changes, so too does the nature of the challenges the nation must address. Transnational organized crime poses a significant and growing threat to national and international security and bears dire implications for public safety, public health, the security of democratic institutions, and economic stability across the globe. For example, transnational drug traffickers and human smugglers operating across U.S. borders and within the U.S. reap enormous profits that enable them to undermine legitimate governance in their countries of origin. At the same time, international criminal organizations, terrorists, and state-sponsored cyber attackers have demonstrated their ability to compromise information systems. Many of these threats have low-level signatures. Detecting them and determining their attribution can be difficult. Washington DC, photo provided by ODNI 8 9/11 Museum and One World Trade Center, photo provided by ODNI The U.S. is considered a high-priority intelligence target by many foreign intelligence entities. While traditionally the threat has been to our political, military, and diplomatic interests at home and abroad, the loss of sensitive economic information and technology is a growing threat to our national security. In recent years, economic espionage conducted by foreign intelligence entities, corrupt insiders, and corporate competitors has exploited vulnerabilities in cyberspace that may weaken our economic advantage. Cyber espionage has not replaced traditional espionage as a way to steal secrets, but the ability to focus technology on lesser protected information is a significant and growing threat. Even before the 9/11 attacks, the IC elements and FSLTT organizations started developing relationships to identify and address particular threats and national intelligence challenges in the homeland. There was, however, no integrated national approach. Since 9/11, significant progress has been made in building capacity, standardizing Office of the Director of National Intelligence CBP helicopter flying over New York City, photo provided by CBP practices, and sharing information, both horizontally and vertically, to support foreign operations, perimeter protection, and homeland security and law enforcement (HS&LE) requirements. Nonetheless, inconsistent practices, absence of doctrine, and a lack of unity of effort across levels of government still characterize the domestic landscape. This domestic enterprise is more ad hoc and independent than organized and enterpriseoriented, and often depends more on personal or preexisting relationships than defined engagement protocols. Many potential stakeholders and contributors are left out of the equation as well, particularly on issues other than counterterrorism. In navigating this enterprise, it is important for individual IC elements and FSLTT organizations to continue to work within their respective missions and authorities, even as they seek to enhance responsible collaboration and information sharing. In particular, the sharing activities and relationships between IC elements and FSLTT organizations are undertaken through established channels and in accordance with legal and policy requirements that are designed to ensure agencies are acting within their authorities and missions and are protecting privacy, civil rights and civil liberties. Sharing with the private sector is undertaken with special care so that applicable legal and policy requirements are identified and followed. 9 Domestic Approach to National Intelligence Integrating National Intelligence The effective integration of national intelligence with relevant information from FSLTT partners is essential to protecting the nation. This integration requires agile, robust, and responsible processes that leverage existing partnerships and encourage new ones. These partnerships enable appropriate information sharing and build trust, consistent with the missions and authorities of each agency and the need to protect privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. As trust and partnerships mature, efficient integration across stakeholders is also increased, resulting in an enhanced understanding of respective capabilities, information, and requirements (including how customers use products and services). This graphic depicts some types of FSLTT information and intelligence shared in the domestic environment. In some cases, information can be categorized as both FSLTT information and intelligence. FSLTT PARTNER INFORMATION 10 • Criminal Intelligence • Homeland Security Information • Investigative Information • Cyber Threat Information • Suspicious Activity Reporting • Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Information • Other Information IC ELEMENT INTELLIGENCE • National Intelligence • Foreign Intelligence • Counterintelligence Office of the Director of National Intelligence ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES The IC interacts with and serves a wide range of customers and partners, both within and outside the U.S. Government (USG), with intelligence support designed to meet the customers’ and partners’ responsibilities and specific mission requirements. Customers are those who have requirements for intelligence products or support, and use it to carry out their official responsibilities. Within the domestic enterprise, federal customers directly receive unique support from the IC based on their mission needs, often through a Federal Intelligence Coordination Office (FICO). With regard to state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) customers, information categorized or derived from national intelligence is generally disseminated by the Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence & Analysis (DHS/I&A), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). Dissemination occurs directly or via a “hub & spoke” approach through entities like fusion centers, and Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). The widearray of customers for intelligence support include departmental secretaries and senior policymakers, threat coordinators, governors, state homeland security advisors, mayors, police chiefs, sheriffs, first responders, federal officials, and others who are directly engaged in making decisions related to public safety. In addition, appropriate threat and warning information is provided to the private sector (e.g., owners and operators of critical infrastructures), through established channels. New York City Police Department patrol cars, photo provided by NYPD FSLTT partners include HS&LE organizations operating across our country to protect our borders, points-of-entry, infrastructure, and communities. These professionals are on the front line of ensuring public safety and protecting the nation from all threats. Partner preparedness is crucial to our national security, as they have the greatest visibility on local criminal activity relevant to national intelligence and will be the first responders on the scene during threat situations and incidents. Information sharing at this level supports law enforcement and public safety offices best equipped to understand current threats and the risks associated with them, inform resource allocation, and interdict or investigate criminal actors. Crucial to their efforts is the timely and efficient sharing of criminal intelligence, public safety, and open source information via communication networks designed to store and transmit Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) information. These partners also play a critical role in identifying suspicious activities and reporting this information following protocols established by the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative (NSI). Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agents, photo provided by ODNI Additionally, appropriate and responsible information sharing with private sector entities, particularly the owners and operators of infrastructure critical to national security whose businesses may be exploited by nefarious actors, is fundamental to the protection and resilience of the nation. Such sharing takes place through established channels and in accordance with applicable law and policies. Private sector organizations undertake security and threat mitigation measures to protect lives and property and have unique information and expertise that can help the IC and FSLTT better understand existing threats. Thus, the domestic enterprise is characterized by an extraordinarily complex set of customer and partner relationships, composed of both informational and organizational architectures that are involved in the collection, analysis, use, and dissemination of information and intelligence. Relationships are described in general terms, recognizing that there is no national standard or doctrine for these interactions. It is also important to note that the descriptions on the following page do not include the multiple layers of legal and policy requirements that govern these relationships. 11 Domestic Approach to National Intelligence The Domestic Enterprise This graphic broadly illustrates the relationships between FSLTT and U.S. IC partners. FSLTT Organizations 1 U.S. IC A Global Emphasis Customers 5 2 Partners Domestic Emphasis 3 4 B 1 FSLTT Organizations Organizations operating on the front lines across the country to protect border points-of-entry, infrastructure, and communications, such as federal departments and agencies, DHS component agencies, local police departments, first responders, and other entities involved directly in infrastructure security and resilience. 2 Customers Individuals that maintain a ‘customer’ relationship with the IC, such as governors, homeland security advisors, mayors, critical infrastructure owners and operators, and HS&LE leaders. 3 Partners Organizations that carry out the intelligence cycle under their respective authorities and may maintain formal partnerships with the IC, such as fusion centers, High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs), Regional Information S ...
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