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What Is the Right Supply Chain for Your Products?
Master Notes
Enter notes here
14/14
SCHM6201: Operations and Supply Chain Management
Reading 1
Read the following:
Fisher, M.L. (1997) “What is the right supply chain for your product?” Harvard Business
Review (March/April), pp.105–116.
Lesson 1: Why Focus on Supply Chain Management?
Introduction
The rapid growth of global business has resulted in large quantities of goods and materials
moving between countries and continents. Raw materials are shipped from producing countries
to manufacturing facilities. The manufacturing plants in their turn ship their products (finished
goods) to markets all over the world. When the manufacturer and the customer were in a small
region or in one country, the coordination of the various stages in the supply chain was not very
difficult. Additionally, until recently, each stage of the supply chain just described acted
independently. The steel plant dealt only with the ore producers on the raw-material side and
the steel distributors on the market side as far as its production decisions were concerned; it did
not look at the impact of its decisions on the automobile manufacturer or other producers that
used steel. However, this is no longer the case.
Increasingly, businesses rely on multiple firms for resources, supplies, services, access to
innovation, and so on. Many firms focus on areas of their core competency and outsource other
functions. As such, many firms have to manage a complex network of supply chain partners that
affect its operations and competitiveness in different ways. They have to focus on and manage
an entire supply chain.
What is a Supply Chain Management?
A supply chain can be defined as the network of organizations that are involved in the design,
production, delivery, consumption, and disposal of goods, services, and related information.
Supply chain management entails integrating business functions and processes within and
across companies to achieve seamless, efficient, and effective performance.
A supply chain entails a network of supply-side partners (for example, component suppliers;
sub-component suppliers; suppliers in tier 1, tier 2, tier 3 levels; and so on) and demand-side
partners (such as distributors, retailers, and logistics service providers) of a focal firm.
As shown in the following diagram, the supply chain of a typical manufacturer can extend over a
number of tiers. (This image shows only three tiers, but it can extend to many tiers depending
on the complexity of the product.) The vendors at different levels provide not only materials but
SCHM6201: Operations and Supply Chain Management
also services. An efficient supply chain has to manage both the material flow and the service
flow through the chain such that the materials and the services are available to the different
stages when needed in adequate quantities and at the lowest cost.
Supply Chain Chart Alternate Version
Dynamics of Supply Chains
Uncertainty in the Supply Chain
Uncertainty and risk in the supply chain can make or break any supply chain member. What are
the causes of risk and uncertainty, and how can companies alleviate them? Uncertainty in the
supply chain stems from many factors, some of which are demand driven, others supply
created, and yet others produced by further aspects of the supply chain. Some issues include
fluctuations in demand, receiving variability, quality problems, transportation matters, and
seasonality, to name just a few.
The major negative impacts of poor supply chain decisions are widely known in the public
domain. One case in point is Cisco, which wrote off $2.25 billion in inventory in 2001. Pfizer
Pharmaceuticals is another example of a company that suffered disastrous losses of about $2.8
billion as a result of ill-advised supply chain decisions. Finally, Boeing’s global outsourcing
strategy for building the new 787 Dreamliner highlights yet another notorious failure. Although
on the surface Boeing’s strategy made sense to cut costs, it completely backfired and led to
severe product delivery delays caused by defective components and unplanned outlays of more
than $2 billion.
SCHM6201: Operations and Supply Chain Management
There are various frameworks to understand and mitigate uncertainty in the supply chain. One
distinguishes between uncertainties within a company and those external to it. The internal
uncertainties can be dealt with by managerial responses. While companies cannot control
external uncertainties, they might be able to take actions over time as various scenarios
become clearer. External uncertainties stem from the supply chain being an association of
entities with some common goals and some explicitly individual company goals.
Postponement, in its many forms, has been one of the primary means to mitigate uncertainty in
the supply chain. It involves, wherever possible, delaying supply chain activities to reduce
uncertainty. Postponement can involve purchasing, manufacturing, and distribution activities
and other areas of the supply chain. Regardless of the stage in the supply chain, the underlying
strength of postponement is that it allows better-informed managerial decisions because the
decisions are made closer to the decision point. That positively affects forecasting, inventory,
and distribution.
Postponing examples abound, but here are just a few:
A retail company redesigns its supply chain to delay the dyeing of its garments until
much closer to the selling season.
An appliances manufacturer restructures its distribution system to delay shipments until
customer orders are received.
A manufacturer moves the final assembly of its printers to a later stage in the supply
chain.
As stated, uncertainty in the supply chain stems from many factors including demand, supply,
and other aspects of the supply chain. Let’s examine it within the SCOR (Supply Chain
Operations Reference) model created by the APICS Supply Chain Council.
The SCOR framework illustrates a closed-loop supply chain. The Plan, Source, Make, and
Deliver aspects deal with the forward supply chain. The Return facet handles reverse logistics.
Specifically, the Plan area shows that a supply chain should be a competitive weapon
embedded in the corporate strategy. Demand forecasting is essential to this endeavor. Sourcing
includes procurement and outsourcing. The Make aspect of the framework deals with
production scheduling and inventory management. The Deliver phase includes order and
distribution management. Finally, the framework deals with reverse logistics, which involves
product returns among other things. The simulation game covers most of these aspects.
How can we now categorize uncertainty according to this framework? On the demand side, it
comes from each company simply dealing with the customers it supplies. Because companies
do not integrate into the supply chain and exchange information with all other constituents, this
leads to the bullwhip effect, otherwise known as the amplification effect. On the supply side, the
quality and timeliness of the suppliers contribute to this concern. In particular, manufacturers
use metrics to evaluate suppliers related to cost, quality, lead time, and time to market for new
products. In addition, the manufacturing process also contributes to uncertainty in the supply
SCHM6201: Operations and Supply Chain Management
chain. The lack of flexibility and inefficiency in this process can also add to the uncertainty.
Finally, if planning and control systems, such as ERPs, are not effectively implemented or
managed, they will also result in increased uncertainty.
References:
Johnson, Luo, Margherita, Patil. “787 Dreamliner,” MBA Project, Northeastern
University.
Hult, Craighead, Ketchen. (2010). Risk Uncertainty and Supply Chain Decisions: A Real
Options Perspective, Decision Sciences, Volume 41 Number 3, pp. 435-458.
Prater and Whitehead. (2013). An Introduction to Supply Chain Management: A Global
Supply Chain Support Perspective, Chapter 9. HBSP Publishing.
The Bullwhip Effect
The behavior by the P&G supply chain participants has been widely documented in a whole
host of instances throughout the global economy. It is known as the bullwhip effect. It is a
phenomenon exhibited by supply chains where relatively minor shifts in downstream demand
generate disproportional variability in the supply position of upstream entities. This volatility
amplifies as you move further upstream in the supply chain.
The bullwhip effect is characteristic of uncoupled or loosely coupled supply chains, where each
member entity makes myopic decisions solely related to their own bottom line. The bullwhip
effect results in major issues involving increased cost, poorer service, and sustainability issues.
What are the specific supply chain limitations that lead to such actions by its constituency and
their dire consequences?
Bullwhip Effect Alternate Version
SCHM6201: Operations and Supply Chain Management
Causes of the Bullwhip Effect
Broadly speaking, the bullwhip effect arises from the impact of the aforementioned decisions on
the time dimension in the supply chain. That is to say that these decisions, albeit rational,
inevitably lead to delays in goods manufacturing and shipping downstream, upstream
information communication, and financial transactions throughout the supply chain.
More specifically, there are quite a number of causes of escalating demand fluctuations in the
supply chain. In their seminal article, Lee, Padmanabhan, and Whang identified four major
reasons for the bullwhip effect:1
Demand forecast updating
o Managers at each level in the chain make adjustments to the demand estimates
received from their immediate downstream operation. This, in turn, obscures the
actual customer demand.
Order batching
o Volume cost reductions (such as quantity discounts) and transportation discounts
created by lower full truckload rates are among the factors that lead to this
situation.
Price fluctuation
o Promotions of all sorts involve desirable prices that skew the consumers’ buying
pattern with respect to their actual consumption behavior.
Rationing and shortage gaming
o To counter product rationing by manufacturers in periods of supply shortages,
customers order more than they need. This behavior provides suppliers little
visibility of real customer demand.
In addition to these factors, lack of coordination and/or communication among the supply chain
partners, irregular or magnified orders designed to decrease inventory or address backlog
positions, and free return policies create an environment prone to the bullwhip effect. Moreover,
quality problems, strikes, natural disasters, and security issues only make the situation worse.
Realizing the severe impact of this phenomenon, many corporations have implemented
successful countermeasures.
[1] Lee, H.L., Padmanabhan, V., & Whang, S., 1997. The bullwhip effect in supply chains. MIT
Sloan Management Review, vol. 38, issue 3 (Spring), pp. 93-102
SCHM6201: Operations and Supply Chain Management
How to Overcome the Bullwhip Effect
According to Lee, Padmanabhan, and Whang, the bullwhip effect can be mitigated in a number
of ways:
Improve forecasting throughout the supply chain
o Share demand information with upstream supply chain partners, such as point of
sale (POS) data.
o Collaborate with suppliers to allow them control over replenishment decisions
known as Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI).
o Forecast closer to the downstream’s entity stocking decision, by means of
information sharing and better forecasting software.
Break order batches
o Provide frequent production and work-in-process (WIP) information to customers
over the Internet to determine whether partial orders are acceptable.
o Use just-in-time (lean) delivery management.
o Rely on third-party logistics providers to consolidate loads with those of other
companies to derive better transportation rates.
Stabilize prices
o Replace promotion pricing with everyday low pricing policies. However, this is
very difficult to implement given the history and nature of different industries.
o Provide incentives aimed at ordering at regular intervals in order to eliminate
customer buying surges.
o Limit or discontinue discounts for buying in bulk and address the causes of order
reductions or cancellations.
Eliminate gaming in shortage
o Fulfill orders based on past sales.
o Share capacity and inventory information with all members of the supply chain.
o Ask customers to place orders well ahead of the sales season.
References:
Lee, H.L., Padmanabhan, V., & Whang, S., 1997. The bullwhip effect in supply chains.
Sloan Management Review, vol. 38, issue 3 (Spring), pp. 93-102
Elements of Supply Chain Management
Measures of Effectiveness of Supply Chain Management
The main objective of good supply chain management is to get the products to the customer in
the needed quantities at the right time with the least amount of inventory at the various stages in
the manufacture and distribution. With this as the guiding principle, we can devise a number of
SCHM6201: Operations and Supply Chain Management
measures to evaluate the effectiveness of a supply chain, such as:
Aggregate inventory
Weeks of supply
Inventory turns
Percentage defects
Percentage on-time delivery
Supplier lead times
An important measure is total inventory in the system. More inventory in the system means
more money is tied up in inventory. An efficient supply chain should have as little inventory as
needed to provide an adequate level of service. Another related measure is the number of
weeks of supply in the system. For example, in a manufacturing plant, the number of weeks the
plant can run with the existing inventory of purchased parts and raw materials is an important
measure. More weeks of supply indicates poor management of the supply chain because the
firm has invested in idle inventory.
Inventory turns can be a measures of the efficiency of the purchasing and inventory
management in providing materials to the plant and in maintaining finished goods inventories.
For example, if the average inventory of all items (including finished goods) is $10 million and
the annual sales is $100 million, then the inventory turns is 10 per year ($100 million/$10
million). Good supply chain management should focus on increasing the number of inventory
turns. Most firms using traditional methods of materials management have inventory turns of
right to 12 per year. Firms using some of the just-in-time (JIT) techniques in their manufacturing
and having a good vendor management program have achieved inventory turns of 60 or more.
This means that their supply chain and operations are so efficient that they can run their
operations with about a week's supply of materials.
These measures all refer to the quantity of inventories held at different stages in the supply
chain. Other measures evaluate other important characteristics. An important measure is the
percent of defects. This indicates the care with which the vendors have been chosen as well as
the manufacturing plants performance in terms of quality. A good supply chain must enable the
firm to keep to its delivery commitments. Delays in delivery are usually the result of problems in
the supply chain. Finally, a good supply chain should have vendors that can respond quickly, as
measured by the lead time for their deliveries. These measures should be evaluated frequently
to monitor the performance of the supply chain.
Just in Time
During the latter part of the last century, Japanese manufacturers, and especially Toyota Motor
Co., developed and implemented in their manufacturing operations a new system of scheduling
and materials management called Just in Time (JIT). As the name implies, the system provided
materials and components in the correct quantities just when they were needed—not early or
late. Such a system is called a pull system, where material is pulled along depending on the
SCHM6201: Operations and Supply Chain Management
demand.
Traditionally, firms would procure components from vendors in large quantities, taking into
account the long lead times (the time for delivery from the vendor), the lower quality, and the
variability of both demand and delivery times. It was very common to add additional quantities
(usually called safety stocks) to the expected demand just to be sure that the materials were
available when needed. Such systems are called push systems and were facetiously called JIC
(Just in Case) systems.
JIT is usually employed in repetitive manufacturing situations and requires the following
conditions to be satisfied:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Have a reasonably steady demand.
Produce only as much as needed by the next stage.
Produce and deliver in smaller batches.
Maintain a very high quality level.
It is claimed that by producing in smaller batches and in exact quantities needed by the next
stage, thereby reducing inventory, mistakes that lead to quality problems and other issues are
exposed, which can then be corrected or eliminated.
JIT leads to smaller inventories of WIP (work in process). Some of the leading practitioners of
JIT claim keeping only a day’s worth of WIP.
The main benefits of JIT include:
Reduced setup time
More efficient use of employees with multiple skills
Greater synchronization of production scheduling with demand
Receiving supplies at regular intervals throughout the production day
Increased emphasis on supplier relationships
Minimizing the need for storage space
A more comprehensive approach using this philosophy is called Lean Manufacturing.
The basic idea is to eliminate waste—waste of materials, waste of time, waste of effort,
and any other type of waste. You may want to see the following YouTube videos to
enhance your understanding of JIT.
o
o
25 JIT at McDonalds (Closed captioning is available on the YouTube player.)
Four Principles Lean Management - Get Lean in 90 Seconds (Closed captioning
is available on the YouTube player.)
SCHM6201: Operations and Supply Chain Management
Summary
This lesson discussed the supply chain and explored the impact of various operational decisions
relating to the supply chain on the efficiency and costs of operation. Supply chain management
has become important with the globalization of industries and markets. Products are produced
in relatively low-wage countries and sold all over the world. Materials for these operations have
to travel long distances over long periods of time, resulting in large amounts held in inventories
at various points in the chain. Efficient supply chain management looks at the entire chain and
attempts to minimize the total costs of inventory and handling of these materials by maintaining
minimum amounts of inventories without affecting the service level. New integrative software
such as Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) has helped many firms to achieve efficient supply
chain management.
Lesson 2: Operations Management
Introduction
In this lesson, we will explore a typical operations system and its components. We will discuss
the interactions between different components of the system, the information flow among them,
and the mechanisms available to the manager for controlling the outputs of the system. This
lesson will further discuss the capacity of an operations system and the factors that contribute to
limiting that capacity. Utilization and efficiency of an operations system are also discussed.
The Components of an Operations System
An operations system takes in the right inputs, processes them through the transformation
process, and produces outputs of goods and services desired by the society.
Note: Manufacturing typically produces tangible goods, while services usually produce
intangible "goods". Also, typically with services, there is more direct contact with the customer.
SCHM6201: Operations and Supply Chain Management
The Operations System Alternative Text
From the input stage, the materials flow to the process stage where they are processed,
and finally, they are pushed through to the output stage. From the output stage, they
reach the customers.
Although materials flow in the forward direction, a number of information flows travel through the
system in both forward and backward directions. Information about the quantity and quality of
output is a feedback step that flows from the output stage to the process stage and also back to
the input stage. For example, if the quality of output is not up to the specifications, that
information comes to the process stage, where corrective steps can be taken, and also to the
input stage, where the incoming materials can be thoroughly checked.
Similarly, other information flows affect the operation. For example, information about external
factors such as weather, economy, and market trends flow to all three stages, because they
affect all three. For instance, weather may dictate the product mix, and the economy might
suggest slowing down the rate of production in the process, which in turn affects the input rate.
The operations manager's job is to maintain the process in the presence of all these factors to
produce the output needed by the market and to be profitable.
In service operations, the input is usually the customer. For example, in a restaurant, we can
think of the hungry patron as the input to the restaurant system, while a satisfied customer is an
output. The services provided by the restaurant—such as food preparation (chef), order
processing and customer service (wait staff), and clean up (busboys)—are part of the
SCHM6201: Operations and Supply Chain Management
transformation process.
The external influences operating on a restaurant are usually things such as weather, restaurant
reviews, and advertisements. The number of meals served in a day and the satisfaction of
customers after eating at the restaurant are measures of the output.
Operations Management
Although the operations manager manages these three stages (inputs, transformation process,
and outputs), the emphasis is on the transformation process. Thus, an operations manager in a
manufacturing operation is responsible for the transformation of raw materials and purchased
parts into finished goods to be sold in the market. He/she has to see that the operations run
smoothly, the output schedules are met, and the products are of the right quality.
In a service operation such as a hotel, the manager is responsible for the satisfaction of the
customers through the services provided by the hotel and its employees. He/she has to see that
the employees are performing their jobs well to the satisfaction of the customers, that the
restaurant is serving quality food consistent with the hotel's reputation, and that customer
requests and complaints are met with appropriate courtesy and promptness.
The operations manager manages the transformation stage after evaluating how the process is
performing in terms of the output quantity and its quality. If the output deviates from the desired
or planned output, the process must be adjusted to bring it into line. The deviation could be
because of quantity problems that reduce the output. The manager must take corrective action
to improve the quality by examining the process or the incoming material. If the output's quality
deviates from the desired quality level, the manager should examine the process and incoming
materials to correct the problem.
An operations manager has to take corrective action for events that occur over which he/she
has no control, such as weather conditions or the state of the economy. These events have an
effect on the output quantities and input materials, so the operations manager has to take
corrective action to compensate for these changes.
Process Capacity and Bottleneck
In any process, material moves through the different steps (or machines) in the process. In this
passage, the material gets worked on; when the material reaches the end of the process, the
operation is complete and the output can be released to the outside world or the next
department. The rate of output from the process is called the capacity of the process. The
processing capacity is usually expressed as a rate: units/hour. For example, the process
capacity of an automobile assembly line is 60 cars/hour.
Note: Capacity = Units/Hour
SCHM6201: Operations and Supply Chain Management
The capacity of a process depends on the individual capacities of the machines or steps that
make up the process. Each step or machine feeds into other steps or machines. The capacity of
the process is not the sum of the individual machines, but is controlled by the step or machine
with the least capacity.
For analytical purposes, a process flow diagram is used. A process flow diagram is shown here.
In this representation, each step or machine where something is done to the material or
information is represented as a block; the details of the step (processing time or capacity) are
shown under the corresponding block. The sequence of steps is represented by the arrows
connecting the steps.
Example of a Process Flow Diagram Alternative Text
In this process, Machine 3 (or Step 3) has the smallest capacity (the longest processing time). It
can process only 25 pieces/hour, while the other machines can process more than that. Such a
machine or step (the one with the smallest capacity) is called a bottleneck. The bottleneck step
determines the maximum output of the process. The process illustrated in the diagram can
never produce more than 25 pieces per hour. The capacity of the whole process, therefore, is
25 per hour even though individual machines or steps can produce more than that. We can
therefore conclude the following.
Note: The capacity of a process consisting of a series of steps or machines is equal to the
capacity of the bottleneck step.
Because bottlenecks determine the maximum output from a process, identifying the bottleneck
step becomes very important. Although other machines in the process can produce more in a
given time, the final output cannot be more than what the bottleneck produces. To increase the
output of a process, we must increase the capacity of the bottleneck step. In the illustrated
process example, we can increase the output of the process by increasing the capacity of
Machine 3.
But how much can we increase Machine 3's capacity? If we add another Machine 3, the
capacity of this step increases to 50 pieces per hour (25 from each). Has the capacity of the
SCHM6201: Operations and Supply Chain Management
process increased to 50 pieces per hour? No, because, now Machine 1 becomes the new
bottleneck with a capacity of 30. The new output capacity of the process will now be only 30 per
hour, even though we doubled the capacity of the earlier bottleneck machine.
Increasing the capacity of the bottleneck will increase the output of the system; however, we
can only increase the capacity of the bottleneck until some other machine becomes the
bottleneck.
The bottleneck is a very important concept in determining the capacities of plants, factories, or
departments. Many wrong decisions of capacity increase can be avoided if we identify the
correct bottleneck step or machine.
Analyzing the capacities of individual steps or machines in a process is a key step in the
evaluation of a process. Not every process has this sequential arrangement, where the output of
one step or machine enters the next step. In many situations, the flow is relatively jumbled,
where there are many flows in different directions depending on the process requirements. Even
in such cases, it is the bottleneck step that determines the capacity of the system.
How do we identify a bottleneck step if we do not have all the process details? From the
preceding description of a process, we can infer that the output from the steps preceding the
bottleneck step will be at a faster rate than that of the bottleneck. Therefore, work piles up
before the bottleneck step, waiting for its turn at the bottleneck step.
Note: A bottleneck step or machine can usually be identified by the work piling up before it.
In the process flow example discussed earlier, the process involves four machines. The
production of a piece will take 7.1 minutes (2 + 1.5 + 2.4 + 1.2 = 7.1) to pass through the entire
process if it does not have to wait at any of the steps. This time is called the total processing
time. If we include the wait times at some of the steps (resulting from the unavailability of a
machine when a piece arrives), the total time a piece spends in the process will be longer. The
total time a piece spends in the process (from the time Step 1 starts processing to the time Step
4 completes the work on the piece, including waiting) is called the throughput time (flow time).
Because there is inevitable waiting at many machines or steps, the throughput time is generally
longer than the total process time.
To reduce throughput time, we need to reduce the wait times before different steps. We can
accomplish this by making the processing time at each step approximately the same and move
the items from step to step in a constant flow. With such an arrangement, the throughput time
will be almost equal to the total processing time. There will still be some waiting at some steps
that could be avoided by letting the faster steps remain idle for part of the time so that they
produce at the same rate as the bottleneck step. This concept is often applied to assembly
lines, where the time for each step is made very close to the bottleneck time. This bottleneck
time is usually called cycle time in assembly lines. In the previous example, step 3 is the
bottleneck and its time is the cycle time (2.4 minutes) for this process.
SCHM6201: Operations and Supply Chain Management
Gantt Charts (1 of 2)
The Gantt chart is a visual representation of the activities in a process and identifies when they
take place on a time scale. Such charts are very useful for representing project activities,
especially when many different activities are scheduled. The chart helps to plan activities before
some required preceding activity is completed. It also shows whether a resource is being called
into use by more than one task. This chart represents the activities of different resources (labor,
machines, and so on) as bars along a timeline. The length of the bar corresponds to the length
of time of the activity. Many commercial software programs such as Microsoft Project can help a
planner develop Gantt charts for any project. You can also use an Excel spreadsheet to draw a
Gantt chart.
Let us revisit the admitting procedure in a hospital consisting of the following steps with
additional information about who performs the task:
Time Needed to
Complete the Step
Resource
1. Check-in with
receptionist
5 minutes/patient
Clerk
2. Filling out forms
8 minutes/patient
Patient
3. Interview with
doctor
10 minutes/patient
Doctor, Patient
4. Other
administrative chores
6 minutes/patient
2nd Clerk
Step
These activities can be represented in a Gantt chart as shown. From the example Gantt chart,
we see that the first patient does not have to wait anywhere. However, the second patient has to
wait five minutes for the doctor to finish with the first patient. On the other hand, the second
clerk finishes with first patient and then has to wait for the second patient to come from the
doctor, resulting in an idle time of four minutes for this clerk. This process repeats for every
patient (as long as the patients are arriving in a constant stream). Thus for every patient, the
second clerk is idle for four minutes, while the patient has to wait for at least five minutes for the
doctor. (The wait will be longer as the number of patients arriving increases)
SCHM6201: Operations and Supply Chain Management
Admitting Procedure in a Hospital Alternate Version
Gantt Charts (2 of 2)
Question: Assuming the patients are arriving constantly, determine how long the fourth patient
has to wait for the doctor.
Type your answer in the space provided and then select Compare to view your
instructor's answer.
Log in to the course to access interactive course content and alternative version.
Gantt Charts Operations Systems Alternate Version
Utilization
Because of imbalances in process capacities and waiting between steps, the process will not
produce as much as it could under ideal circumstances. The actual output will usually be less
than what the process can produce. The ratio of actual output to the capacity is
called utilization.
Note: Utilization = Actual Output/Capacity
Thus, in the previous process, if the actual output was 20/hour, the utilization of this process
would be 20/25 = 80%. The lower output (compared to what the process could produce) may
result from inefficiencies in the system, such as waiting, bad quality, and other factors that
SCHM6201: Operations and Supply Chain Management
reduce output.
Additional Notes about Capacity
Some of the terms used in this lecture have a more precise meaning. Capacity refers to two
different things: design capacity and effective capacity.
Design capacity is the amount that the designers planned to have when they designed
the process. This assumes that everything in the process goes smoothly and that there
are no delays or holdups.
Effective capacity is what we get because of inefficiencies in the process, such as
machine breakdowns, bad quality, poor planning, change of product mix, and such other
factors.
For our purposes, we will refer to effective capacity as simply capacity. Actual output is what we
get from the process.
Actual output is what one gets from the process.
With these terms, we can define two measures for the effectiveness of a
process: efficiency and utilization.
Efficiency of a process = Actual Output/Effective Capacity
Utilization = Actual Output/Design Capacity
Summary
This lesson discussed the operations system and the processes employed in such systems. It
described the capacities of operations systems and how to determine a system's capacity. It
introduced specific terms used in this context—bottleneck, throughput time, and capacity
utilization.
Lesson 3: Case Study 1 - Wal-Mart Case
Reading 2
Read the following:
Half a century of supply chain management at Wal-Mart (Ivey, #W12894).
08/10/2019
Print canvas
9B12D010
HALF A CENTURY OF SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT AT WALMART1
Ken Mark wrote this case under the supervision of Professor P. Fraser Johnson solely to provide material for class discussion. The authors do not intend to illustrate
either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The authors may have disguised certain names and other identifying information to protect
confidentiality.
This publication may not be transmitted, photocopied, digitized or otherwise reproduced in any form or by any means without the permission of the copyright holder.
Reproduction of this material is not covered under authorization by any reproduction rights organization. To order copies or request permission to reproduce
materials, contact Ivey Publishing, Ivey Business School, Western University, London, Ontario, Canada, N6G 0N1; (t) 519.661.3208; (e) cases@ivey.ca;
www.iveycases.com.
Copyright © 2012, Richard Ivey School of Business Foundation
Version: 2013-11-12
INTRODUCTION
James Neuhausen was a U.S. stock analyst tasked with preparing a recommendation on what his firm, a large U.S. investment
house, should do with its stake in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. It was an unseasonably warm day in early February 2012, and
Neuhausen was reviewing his notes on the firm. Wal-Mart, the world’s largest retailer, was trying to recover from a series of
missteps that had seen competitors such as Dollar Stores and Amazon.com close the performance gap. Competitors had
copied many aspects of Wal-Mart’s distribution system, including cross-docking product to eliminate storage time in
warehouses, positioning stores around distribution centres and widespread adoption of electronic data interchange (EDI), to
manage ordering and shipping from suppliers. Neuhausen stated:
Wal-Mart is believed to have one of the most efficient supply chains in the retail world. What impact will the
increasing variety of product, store formats and the growing importance of international stores have on the way it
distributes product? What improvements to its supply chain does the company need to make in order to continue
to stay ahead of competitors?
Last year, Wal-Mart suffered nine consecutive quarters of declining same store sales. Procter & Gamble’s Chief
Executive, Robert McDonald, pointed out that part of the problem was that there were execution issues at WalMart’s U.S. stores.2 More nimble competitors such as Dollar General are rolling out small format stores that are
eating into Wal-Mart’s share. In the online space, Amazon.com has become a major threat. Wal-Mart has also
changed over the years and it now operates a variety of store formats under 60 different banners around the
world. International sales hit US$109 billion in fiscal year 2011, more than a quarter of its business. Can its
supply chain keep up and still deliver efficiency gains?
THE RETAIL INDUSTRY
U.S. retail sales, excluding motor vehicles and parts dealers, reached US$3.9 trillion in 2011. Major categories in the U.S.
retail industry included general merchandise, food and beverage, health and personal care and other categories as can be seen
in Exhibit 1. In the United States, retailers competed at local, regional and national levels, with some of the major chains such
as Wal-Mart and Costco counting operations in foreign countries as well. In addition to the traditional one-store owneroperated retailer, the industry included formats such as discount stores, department stores (selling a large percentage of soft
goods, or clothing), variety and convenience stores, specialty stores, supermarkets, supercentres (combination discount and
supermarket stores), Internet retailers and catalog retailers. Online retail sales were rising in importance, accounting for
US$197 billion in 2011.3
The top 200 retailers accounted for approximately 30 per cent of worldwide retail sales.4 Major retailers competed for
employees and store locations as well as customers. There were two broad strategies in global retailing: variable pricing, or
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“hi-lo pricing,” and everyday low price (EDLP). Hi-lo pricing, practiced by retailers for decades, involved adjusting the retail
price of items to optimize gross margins. For example, at traditional grocery stores, while prices of key items — such as
milk, sugar, eggs and butter — were kept consistently low, items such as toothpaste, detergent and tissue had high prices. The
goal in a hi-lo environment was to generate increased sales by having the manufacturer fund the trade promotions on some
items — lowering prices by 25 to 30 per cent — every month or quarter.
On the other hand, an EDLP strategy meant that prices on items were generally consistent from week to week but were kept
as low as possible so as to generate the highest consumer foot traffic. Running an EDLP strategy generally required the
retailer to focus on keeping operational costs as low as possible and investing any savings into lowering retail prices. The
goal, in an EDLP environment, was to generate higher aggregate gross profit by increasing the volume of items sold.
As many of the top global retailers faced intense competition in their home markets, a growing trend for these global retailers
was international expansion, especially into developing markets such as Asia, South America and Africa. The objective of
international expansion was to find a way to continue to grow earnings at a faster pace than was possible domestically.
Retailers going abroad sought to capitalize on global purchasing economies of scale and to leverage international expertise
from one market to another. But international expansion was fraught with risk, and it was not uncommon for retailers to pull
out of a market if they were unable to build profitable operations.
WAL-MART STORES, INC.
Based in Bentonville, Arkansas and founded by the legendary Sam Walton, Wal-Mart was the number one retailer in the
world with fiscal year 2011 net income, from continuing operations, of US$16 billion on sales of US$419 billion. It had over
2 million employees and 8,500 stores in 15 countries, the result of a series of acquisitions over the past 20 years. Beginning
with its “big box” discount store format in the 1960s, Wal-Mart’s store formats around the world had grown to include
supercentres, which were a larger version of a discount store that included groceries, supermarkets, wholesale outlets,
restaurants and apparel stores. Globally, it served about 200 million customers per week.5
Wal-Mart’s strategy was to provide a broad assortment of quality merchandise and services at “everyday low prices” (EDLP)
and was best known for its discount stores, which offered merchandise such as apparel, small appliances, housewares,
electronics and hardware. In the U.S. general merchandise arena, Wal-Mart’s competitors included Sears and Target, with
specialty retailers including Gap and Limited. Department store competitors included Dillard, Federated and J.C. Penney.
Grocery store competitors included Kroger, Albertsons and Safeway. The major membership-only warehouse competitor was
Costco Wholesale. Wal-Mart was facing growing competition for large ticket general merchandise products and from online
retailers such as Amazon.com.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF WAL-MART’S SUPPLY CHAIN
Before he started Wal-Mart Stores in 1962, Sam Walton owned a successful chain of stores under the Ben Franklin Stores
banner, a franchisor of variety stores in the United States. Although he was under contract to purchase most of his
merchandise requirements from Ben Franklin Stores, Walton was able to selectively purchase merchandise in bulk from new
suppliers and transport these goods to his stores directly. When Walton realized that a new trend, discount retailing — based
on driving high volumes of product through low-cost retail outlets — was sweeping the nation, he decided to open up large
warehouse-style stores in order to compete. To stock these new stores, initially named “Wal-Mart Discount City,” Walton
needed to step up his merchandise procurement efforts. As none of the suppliers were willing to send their trucks to his
stores, which were located in rural Arkansas, self-distribution was necessary.
Wal-Mart undertook an initial public offering in 1969 to raise funds to build its first distribution centre in Bentonville,
Arkansas. As the company grew in the 1960s to 1980s, it benefited from improved road infrastructure and the inability of its
competitors to react to changes in legislation, such as the removal of “resale price maintenance,” which had prevented
retailers from discounting merchandise. To keep an eye on his growing network, Walton piloted a small single-engine
airplane, which he would land at air strips close to his new stores.
Wal-Mart’s supply chain, a key enabler of its growth from its beginnings in rural Arkansas, was long considered by many to
be a major source of competitive advantage for the company. It was one of the first firms to rely on data to make operational
decisions, using bar codes, sharing sales data with suppliers, controlling its own trucking fleet and installing computerized
point-of-sale systems that collected item-level data in real time. When Wal-Mart was voted “Retailer of the Decade” in 1989,
its distribution costs were estimated at 1.7 per cent of its cost of sales, comparing favourably with competitors such as Kmart
(3.5 per cent total sales) and Sears (5 per cent of total sales).6
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Its successes were widely publicized, and competitors had adopted many of Wal-Mart’s management techniques. Yet WalMart continued to lead the industry in efficiency, achieving inventory turns of 11.5 times in fiscal year 2011. For perspective,
for the same period, key U.S. competitors Target Corp., Amazon.com and Sears had inventory turns of 8.7 times, 6.2 times,
and 4.7 times, respectively. But Kroger Co., the second largest grocery retailer in the United States, had inventory turns of
14.2 times, primarily due to its focus on high-turning perishable food items.7
Procurement
As his purchasing efforts increased in scale, Walton and his senior management team would make trips to buying offices in
New York City, cutting out the middleman (wholesalers and distributors). Wal-Mart’s U.S. buyers, located in Bentonville,
worked with suppliers to ensure that the correct mix of staples and new items were ordered. Over time, many of Wal-Mart’s
largest suppliers maintained offices in Bentonville, staffed by analysts and managers supporting Wal-Mart’s business.
In addition, Wal-Mart started sourcing products globally, opening the first of these offices in China in the mid-1980s. WalMart’s international purchasing offices worked directly with local factories to source Wal-Mart’s private label merchandise.
Private label products were appealing to customers as they were often priced at a significant discount to brand name
merchandise; for Wal-Mart, the private label items generated higher margins than suppliers’ branded products. Private label
sales at Wal-Mart, first developed in the 1980s, were believed to account for just 16 per cent of Wal-Mart’s sales, compared
to 25 per cent at U.S. rivals Safeway and Kroger.8 This was because Wal-Mart’s stated strategy was to be a “house of
brands,” procuring top brands in volume and selling them at low prices.9
Every quarter, buyers met in Bentonville to review new merchandise, exchange buying notes and tips and review a fully
merchandised prototype store, which was located in a warehouse. In order to gather field intelligence, buyers toured stores
two or three days a week and worked on sales floors helping associates stock and sell merchandise.
Wal-Mart wielded enormous power over its suppliers. For example, observers noted that increase bargaining clout was a
contributing factor in Procter & Gamble’s (P&G) acquisition of chief rival Gillette.10 Prior to the acquisition, sales to WalMart accounted for 17 per cent of P&G’s and 13 per cent of Gillette’s revenues.11 On the other hand, these two suppliers
combined accounted for about 8 per cent of Wal-Mart’s sales.12 Some viewed Wal-Mart’s close cooperation with suppliers in
a negative light:
Wal-Mart dictates that its suppliers ... accept payment entirely on Wal-Mart’s terms ... share information all the
way back to the purchasing of raw materials. Wal-Mart controls with whom its suppliers speak, how and where
they can sell their goods and even encourages them to support Wal-Mart in its political fights. Wal-Mart all but
dictates to suppliers where to manufacture their products, as well as how to design those products and what
materials and ingredients to use in those products.13
When negotiating with its suppliers, Wal-Mart insisted on a single invoice price and did not pay for cooperative advertising,
discounting or distribution. Globally, Wal-Mart was thought to have around 40,000 suppliers, of whom 200 — such as Nestle,
P&G, Unilever, and Kraft — were key global suppliers. With Wal-Mart’s expectations on sales data analysis, category
management responsibilities and external research specific to their Wal-Mart business, it was not uncommon for a supplier to
have several employees working full-time to support the Wal-Mart business.
Distribution
Wal-Mart’s store openings were driven directly by its distribution strategy. Because its first distribution centre was a
significant investment for the firm, Walton insisted on saturating the area within a day’s driving distance in order to gain
economies of scale. Over the years, competitors had copied this “hub-and-spoke” design of high volume distribution centres
serving a cluster of stores. This distribution-led store expansion strategy persisted for the next two decades as Wal-Mart
added thousands of U.S. stores, expanding across the nation from its headquarters in Arkansas.
Stores were located in low-rent, suburban areas close to major highways. In contrast, key competitor Kmart’s stores were
thinly spread throughout the U.S. and located in prime urban areas. By the time the rest of the retail industry started to take
notice of Wal-Mart in the 1980s, it had built up the most efficient logistics network of any retailer. Wal-Mart’s 75,000-person
logistics and its information systems division included the largest private truck fleet employee base of any firm — 6,600
trucks and 55,000 trailers, which delivered the majority of merchandise sold at stores.14 Its 150 distribution centres, located
throughout the United States, were a mix of general merchandise, food and soft goods (clothing) distribution centres,
processing over five billion cases a year through its entire network.
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In the United States, Wal-Mart’s distribution centres received about 315,000 inbound truckloads, of which 115,000 were
shipped “collect,” which meant they were picked up directly from suppliers’ warehouses by Wal-Mart’s trucking fleet, The
remaining 200,000 loads were shipped by suppliers’ trucks or by logistics providers. The goal at Wal-Mart’s distribution
centres was for high turning items — such as fresh food or other perishable merchandise — to be cross-docked, or directly
transferred from inbound to outbound trailers without extra storage.
The average distance from distribution centre to stores was approximately 130 miles. Each of these distribution centres were
profiled in a store friendly way, with similar products stacked together. Merchandise purchased directly from factories in
offshore locations such as China or India were processed at coastal distribution centres before shipment to U.S. stores.
On the way back from delivering product to stores, Wal-Mart’s trucks generated “backhaul” revenue by transporting unsold
merchandise on trucks that would be otherwise empty. Wal-Mart’s backhaul revenues — its private fleet operated as a forhire carrier when it was not busy transporting merchandise from distribution centres to stores — were more than US$1 billion
per year.15 In mid-2010, Wal-Mart was looking to expand its backhaul program, to pick up more product directly from
suppliers’ factories. It was seeking, in some cases, a 6 per cent reduction in the manufacturer’s selling price. For perspective,
suppliers estimated the actual transportation expense was just 3 per cent of the selling price.16
Because their trucking employees were non-unionized and in-house, Wal-Mart was able to implement and improve upon
standard delivery procedures, coordinating and deploying the entire fleet as necessary. Uniform operating standards ensured
that miscommunication between traffic coordinators, truckers and store level employees were minimized. During an analyst
meeting in October 2011, Johnnie Dobbs, Wal-Mart Stores’ (Wal-Mart’s) EVP Logistics, had stated:
Everyday low cost is the foundation for everyday low prices. So our focus across the organization is delivering
products that our customers need in the most efficient method and process available. So, here’s an example of a
sustained cost reduction in our transportation area. We have improved visibility and routing tools. We’ve
reengineered processes that have decreased the number of empty miles and out-of-route miles that our drivers
drive. Our merchants and our suppliers have improved packaging, and we’ve adjusted methods that we use to
load our trailers, resulting in increased cases in cube in every trailer that we ship.... (This year) we’ll ship 335
million more cases while we’ll drive 300 million fewer miles.17
Store Network
In the early years, Wal-Mart grew rapidly as customers were attracted by its assortment of low-priced product. Over time, the
company copied the merchandise assortment strategies of other retailers, mostly through observation as a result of store
visits. It bought in bulk, bypassing distributors, and passed savings onto consumers.
Each Wal-Mart store aimed to be the “store of the community,” tailoring its product mix to appeal to the distinct tastes of that
community. Thus, two Wal-Mart Stores a short distance apart could potentially stock different merchandise. In contrast, most
other retailers made purchasing decisions at the district or regional level.
The display of merchandise was suggested by a store-wide template, with a unique template for each store, indicating the
layout of Wal-Mart’s various departments. This template was created by Wal-Mart’s merchandising department after
analyzing historical store sales and community traits. Associates were free to alter the merchandising template to fit their
local store requirements. Shelf space in Wal-Mart’s different departments — from shoes to household appliances to
automotive supplies — was divided up, each spot allocated to specific SKUs.
Unlike its competitors in the 1970s and 1980s, Wal-Mart implemented an EDLP policy, which meant that products were
displayed at a steady price and not discounted on a regular basis. In a “hi-lo” discounting environment, discounts would be
rotated from product to product, necessitating huge inventory stockpiles in anticipation of a discount. In an EDLP
environment, demand was smoothed out to reduce the “bullwhip effect.” Because of its EDLP policy, Wal-Mart did not need
to advertise as frequently as their competitors and channeled the savings back into price reductions. To generate additional
volume, Wal-Mart buyers worked with suppliers on price rollback campaigns. Price rollbacks, each lasting about 90 days and
funded by suppliers, had the goal of increasing product sales between 200 and 500 per cent. A researcher remarked:
“Consumers certainly love Wal-Mart’s low prices, which are an average of 8 per cent to 27 per cent lower than the
competition.”18
The company also ensured that its store level operations were at least as efficient as its logistics operations. The stores were
simply furnished and constructed using standard materials. Efforts were made to continually reduce operating costs. For
example, light and temperature settings for all U.S. stores were controlled centrally from Bentonville.
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As Wal-Mart distribution centres had close to real-time information on stores’ in-stock levels, the merchandise could be
pushed to stores automatically. In addition, store level information systems allowed manufacturers to be notified as soon as
an item was purchased. In anticipation of changes in demand for some items, associates had the authority to manually input
orders or override impending deliveries. In contrast, most of Wal-Mart’s retail competitors did not confer merchandising
responsibility to entry level employees as merchandising templates were sent to stores via head office and were expected to
be followed precisely. To ensure that employees were kept up-to-date, management shared detailed information about
day/week/month store sales with all employees during daily 10-minute long “standing” meetings.
Information Systems
Walton had always been interested in gathering and analyzing information about his company operations. As early as 1966,
when Walton had 20 stores, he attended an IBM school in upstate New York with the intent on hiring the smartest person in
the class to come to Bentonville to computerize his operations.19 Even with a growing network of stores in the 1960s and
1970s, Walton was able to personally visit and keep track of operations in each one, due to his use of a personal airplane,
which he used to observe new construction development (to determine where to place stores) and to monitor customer traffic
(by observing how full the parking lot was).
In the mid-1980s, Wal-Mart invested in a central database, store level point-of-sale systems and a satellite network.
Combined with one of the retail industry’s first chain-wide implementation of UPC bar codes, store level information could
now be collected instantaneously and analyzed. By combining sales data with external information such as weather forecasts,
Wal-Mart was able to provide additional support to buyers, improving the accuracy of its purchasing forecasts.
In the early 1990s, Wal-Mart developed Retail Link. At an estimated 570 terabytes — which, Wal-Mart claimed, was larger
than all the fixed pages on the Internet — Retail Link was the largest civilian database in the world. By 2008, Retail Link had
2.5 petabytes (2,500 terabytes) in data storage capacity, second only to eBay’s 4-petabyte installation.20 For a description of
how Retail Link fits in with Wal-Mart’s supply chain, see Exhibit 2. Retail Link contained data on every sale ever made at the
company during a two-decade period. Wal-Mart gave its suppliers access to real-time sales data on the products they
supplied, down to individual stock-keeping items at the store level. In order to harness the knowledge of its suppliers, key
category suppliers, called “category captains,” first introduced in the late 1980s, provided input on shelf space allocation. As
an observer noted:
One obvious result [of using category captains] is that a producer like Colgate-Palmolive will end up working
intensively with firms it formerly competed with, such as Crest manufacturer P&G, to find the mix of products
that will allow Wal-Mart to earn the most it can from its shelf space. If Wal-Mart discovers that a supplier
promotes its own products at the expense of Wal-Mart’s revenue, the retailer may name a new captain in its
stead.21
In 1990, Wal-Mart became one of the early adopters of collaborative planning, forecasting and replenishment (CPRF), an
integrated approach to planning and forecasting through sharing critical supply chain information, such as data on
promotions, inventory levels and daily sales.22 Wal-Mart’s vendor managed inventory (VMI) program (also known as
continuous replenishment) required suppliers to manage inventory levels at the company’s distribution centres, based on
agreed service levels. The VMI program started with P&G diapers in the late 1980s and by 2006 had expanded to include all
major suppliers.23 In some situations, particularly grocery products, suppliers owned the inventory in Wal-Mart stores up to
the point that the sale was scanned at checkout.
Retail Link had an estimated 100,000 registered users, working for suppliers, who accessed the system. They ran
approximately 350,000 weekly queries of the data warehouse that contained two years of weekly point-of-sale information.24
Wal-Mart buyers held regular meetings with category captains, who would come to the meeting prepared with category
analyses and recommendations for how shelf space for the various competitors should be allocated. In exchange for
providing suppliers access to these data, Wal-Mart expected them to proactively monitor and replenish product on a continual
basis.
To support this inventory management effort, supplier analysts worked closely with Wal-Mart’s supply chain personnel to
coordinate the flow of products from suppliers’ factories and resolved any supply chain issues, from routine issues such as
ensuring that products were ready for pick up by Wal-Mart’s trucks and arranging for the return of defective products, to last
minute issues such as managing sudden spikes in demand for popular items. When Wal-Mart buyers met, on a frequent basis,
with a supplier’s sales teams, two important topics of review were supplier’s out-of-stock rate and inventory levels at WalMart, indications of how well replenishment was being handled. Suppliers were provided targets for out-of-stock rates and
inventory levels.
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In addition to managing short-term inventory and discussing product trends, Wal-Mart worked with suppliers on medium- to
long-term supply chain strategies including factory location, cooperation with downstream raw materials suppliers and
production volume forecasting. Wal-Mart’s satellite network, in addition to receiving and transmitting point-of-sale data, also
provided senior management with the ability to broadcast video messages to the stores. Although the bulk of senior
management lived and worked in Bentonville, Arkansas, frequent video broadcasts to each store in their network kept store
employees informed of the latest developments in the firm. In an effort to emulate Wal-Mart’s ability to share information
with suppliers, Wal-Mart’s competitors began developing systems similar to Retail Link. Available through Agentrics LLC, a
software service provider, the software platform, built with the input of dozens of global retailers, was made available
through a subscription and collected and made available store level data by retailer. Agentrics’ customer base included many
of the world’s top retailers including Carrefour, Tesco, Metro, Costco, Kroger and Walgreen’s. Many of these retailers were
also investors in Agentrics.
RFID
To ensure that cases moved efficiently through the distribution centres, Wal-Mart worked with suppliers to standardize case
sizes and labeling. Since 2003, Wal-Mart had required its top 100 suppliers to affix RFID (radio-frequency identification)
tags to shipping cases to facilitate the tracking and sorting of inbound product.
RFID tags allowed Wal-Mart to increase stock visibility as stock moved in trucks through the distribution centres and on to
the stores. Wal-Mart would be able to track promotion effectiveness within the stores while cutting out-of-stock sales losses
and overstock expenses. The company placed RFID tag readers in several parts of the store: at the dock where merchandise
came in, throughout the backroom, at the door from the stockroom to the sales floor and in the box-crushing area where
empty cases eventually wound up. With those readers in place, store managers would know what stock was in the backroom
and what was on the sales floor.
According to researchers, about 25 per cent of out-of-stock inventory in the United States was not really out of stock: the
items could be misplaced on the floor or mis-shelved in the backroom. U.S-wide, about 8 per cent of merchandise was out of
stock at any given time, leading to lost sales for retailers.25 In a study performed by the University of Arkansas, Wal-Mart
stores with RFID showed a net improvement of 16 per cent fewer out-of-stocks on the RFID-tagged products that were
tested. However, RFID tags cost approximately 17 cents each.26 It was estimated that Wal-Mart saved US$500 million a year
by using RFID in its operations.27
Human Resources
By visiting each store and by encouraging associates to contribute ideas, Walton was able to uncover and disperse best
practices across the company in the 1960s and 1970s. To ensure that best practices were implemented as soon as possible, he
held regular “Saturday morning meetings” that convened his top management team in Bentonville. At 7:00 a.m. each
Saturday, the week’s business results were discussed and merchandising and purchasing changes implemented. Store layout
resets were managed on the weekend, and the rejigged stores were ready by Monday morning. Walton and his management
team often toured competitors’ stores, looking for new ideas to “borrow.”
Wal-Mart believed that centralization had numerous benefits including lower costs and improved communications between
different divisions. All of Wal-Mart’s divisions, from U.S. stores, International and Sam’s Club, to its logistics and
information systems division, were located in Bentonville, a town of 28,000 people in Northwest Arkansas. Regional
managers and in-country presidents were the few executives who were stationed elsewhere. Another key to Wal-Mart’s
ability to enjoy low operating costs was the fact that it was non-union. Without cumbersome labour agreements, management
could take advantage of technology to drive labour costs down and make operational changes quickly and efficiently. Being
non-union, however, had its drawbacks. As its store network encroached on unionized grocers’ territory, unions, such as the
United Food and Commercial Workers’ Union, started to become more aggressive in their anti-Wal-Mart publicity
campaigns, funding so-called grassroots groups whose goals were to undermine Wal-Mart’s expansion. Wal-Mart’s size also
made it a target for politicians: every stumble was magnified and played up in the press.
FOCUSING ON THE SUPPLY CHAIN
Wal-Mart remained focused on improving its supply chain. A recent initiative was Remix, which was started in the fall of
2005 and aimed at reducing the percentage of out-of-stock merchandise at stores by redesigning its network of distribution
centres. As Wal-Mart stores increased its line-up of grocery items (Wal-Mart was the U.S.’s largest grocer in 2005), the
company noticed that as employees sorted through truckloads of arriving merchandise to find fast-selling items, delays in
restocking shelves occurred.28 Moving from its original model of having distribution centres serve a cluster of stores, WalMart envisioned that fast-moving merchandise, such as paper towels, toilet paper, toothpaste and seasonal items, would be
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shipped from dedicated “high velocity” food distribution centres. Food distribution centres — of which there were 40 —
were designed to handle high-turn food items.
High velocity distribution centres differed from general merchandise distribution centres in the following ways: as primarily
food distribution centres, they were smaller and had temperature controls and less automation.29 In contrast, general
merchandise distribution centres required automation and conveyor belts to move full pallets of goods. Wal-Mart did not
elaborate on how much savings this move was expected to generate, but it was believed to be an incremental improvement to
the current system. Wal-Mart’s CIO, Rollin Ford, stated:
We could have done nothing and been fine from a logistics standpoint ... but as you continue to increase your
sales per square foot, you’ve got to do things differently to make those stores more productive.30
In 2006, Wal-Mart continued to seek improvements to its supply chain. Although the company publicly declined to outline its
targets for inventory reduction, its suppliers stated that Wal-Mart’s top executives spoke in January 2006 about eliminating as
much as $6 billion in excess inventory.31 In addition, the firm was undertaking a significant program to remodel most of its
U.S. stores to improve “checkout speed, customer service and store appearance.”
The company reported that remodeled stores could drive 125 to 200 basis points of improvement in both sales and gross
margin and 8 to 9 per cent in lower inventories.32 From fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2011, Wal-Mart had remodeled just
under 70 per cent of its store base. The company was opening fewer large format supercenters, down to 113 a year in fiscal
year 2011 from 277 in fiscal year 2006, and was facing competition from online competitors such as Amazon.com, which
enjoyed annual sales increases of 40 per cent from 2009 to 2011. And smaller format stores, or Dollar Stores, which were
10,000 square feet in size or smaller, were becoming popular. Wal-Mart had a small store format as well, Wal-Mart Express,
aiming to be a fill-in store for space-constrained urban areas. But even as competitors such as Dollar General were opening
over 500 new stores in 2011, Wal-Mart seemed hesitant with its small store format, opening only 35 small stores that year
(see Figure 1).33
Figure 1: Net New Small Store Plans — FY 2011
But execution issues at the store level and disruption from the remodeling had a negative impact on Wal-Mart’s sales. There
was also the financial crisis that started in 2008, along with a cutback on staffing levels. The result was nine consecutive
quarters of same store sales decline starting in the second quarter of 2009.34
Figure 2: Wal-Mart Same Store Sales Increases (Decreases)
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By October 2011, due to its lacklustre topline and earnings growth prospects, Wal-Mart’s stock price had languished in the
$45 to $55 dollar range for the entire decade. The stock price seemed to be a topic of conversation at every analyst meeting
that Neuhausen had attended for the past few years. This year, however, he wondered whether Wal-Mart’s management’s
efforts to drive additional gains from its already efficient operations could help its lagging stock price.
NEW INITIATIVES AND A REORGANIZATION
There were three significant initiatives at Wal-Mart whose goals were to improve its supply chain as the firm operated an
increasingly varied number of store types and grew its global operations. There were changes to the way it procured product
(Global Sourcing), optimizing product delivery to stores to increase on-shelf availability (Project One Touch) and finding
ways to leverage its strength in physical store locations to boost its online business (Multi-Channel). To facilitate the
improvements, Wal-Mart reorganized, combining its real estate division with store operations and logistics. Wal-Mart was
split into three geographic business units (GBUs) in the United States: West, South, and North.35
Global Sourcing
In February 2010, the Wal-Mart buying group was reorganized into Global Merchandising Centers: general merchandise;
food; consumables, health and wellness and Wal-Mart.com; and softlines.36 For its private label business, instead of
purchasing directly from factories, it entered into a partnership with Li & Fung. The latter would assist with product sourcing
in a range of categories and markets where Wal-Mart did not “have the scale or the competencies and skills to leverage.”37 In
2010, the first year of the agreement called for approximately $2 billion in goods to be purchased through Li & Fung.38 WalMart was targeting 5 to 15 per cent savings on the $100 billion in product it was purchasing through non-direct channels.39
Project One Touch
“Across the organization, we’re focused on the supply chain all the way down to the customer,” said Dobbs. “Improvements
in our DCs [distribution centres] and our transportation operations generate savings, but if you improve processes at the store
level, you have a significant multiplier, when you think about the 3,800 plus stores out there (in the United States).” He
continued:
So we’ve been working with our store operations team and our innovations teams to develop what we call
Project One Touch. We aligned the merchandise flow, our delivery schedules, and the store labor schedules
together. Then, we reorganized our high velocity distribution centers to deliver category group pallets that allow
our associates to easily transfer product from our trailers to the sales floor. Then, we added aisle and modular
locations to the general merchandise case labels to make it easy for our store associates to get these types of
products onto the shelf. And finally, this past year, we installed a systems-driven process that dramatically
improves the less than case back processing in our back rooms.40
In the 10 months from January to October 2011, Wal-Mart’s on-shelf availability increased by 5.7 per cent to over 90 per
cent. On key items, it had 93 per cent availability. In addition, as a result of reorganizing its logistics, Wal-Mart was able to
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reinvest the US$2 billion in cost reductions into reducing prices at store level.41
The Multi-Channel strategy
Wal-Mart aimed to build a “continuous channel approach” to leverage both its physical store and distribution centre
infrastructure and its growing presence online. Wal-Mart.com aimed to carry a broader selection of items not available in
stores. In addition, the firm looked to find ways to use the stores to drive online business. Joel Anderson, EVP and president
of Wal-Mart.com, stated:
Our store teams next year (in 2012) will get sales credit for both store sales and .com sales. This is like
unleashing a sales force of over 1 million people. That is a differentiation that will be hard to replicate. Secondly,
I want to focus on access. Several pilots are currently in place to leverage our ship food storage capabilities. We
will offer next day delivery at a very economical price. We will use these capabilities to reach customers in urban
areas that we have not yet penetrated. And finally, our online marketing efforts will over index in these areas we
haven’t penetrated so that we can continue to provide access to the Wal-Mart brand. The third area is fulfillment.
We already have unlimited assets in place. Nearly 4,000 stores, over 150 DCs, this will give us the flexibility to
offer our customers best in class delivery options.
For example, last week, we transitioned several disparaged shipping offers into one comprehensive fulfillment
program. We are now offering three compelling free shipping programs. This is an excellent example of multi
channel strategy beginning to come to life. Let’s look at this one a little bit closer. We call it fast, faster, fastest.
You have our site to store offer. And this offers our broadest merchandise assortment beyond the stores. Site to
store allows a customer to pick it up in our store or hundreds of urban FedEx locations for free. Home free in the
middle is our new faster program.
This launched just last week. Home free allows our customers to bundle their items into one order and have it
delivered to home for free. And there are no membership fees like some other online retailers currently charge.
Pickup today ... is our third program. It is our fastest option, and it provides the convenience of same day pickup
in our stores for free. Pickup today is available in every one of our stores on the hottest assortment we have to
offer.42
DECISION — HOLD, BUY OR SELL?
Neuhausen put his notes down and walked into the conference room where his analyst team was assembled. He switched on
the projector and clicked through the Wal-Mart stock presentation to the comparative information slides that included
financial information (see Exhibit 3) and a description of each competitor (see Exhibit 4). Neuhausen hit “enter” and brought
up Wal-Mart’s stock performance over the past 10 years (see Exhibit 5). He concluded:
We’ve owned Wal-Mart stock for the past decade, and it’s been basically flat over that period. During the same
time, we’d have made more money had we been invested in the S&P 500 index of the largest 500 U.S. stocks.
Should we continue to hold Wal-Mart stock?
I’d like to find out your views on Wal-Mart’s key competitive advantages, especially its supply chain strategy,
and whether these advantages are sustainable. The data suggest that new competitors, especially the Dollar
Stores, Amazon.com and Tesco,43 are gaining in popularity in the United States. Is Wal-Mart’s high volume “buy
it low, stack it high, sell it cheap” model still valid today?
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Exhibit 1
U.S. RETAIL CATEGORIES (PARTIAL LIST)
Category
General merchandise stores
2011 (US$ billions)
630.9
Food and beverage
615.4
Food services and drinking places
Gasoline
494.2
533.6
Building materials and gardening equipment and supplies
300.2
Furniture, home furnishings, electronics and appliances
190.9
Health and personal care
Clothing and clothing accessories
274.9
226.5
Sporting goods, hobby, books, music
88.9
Source: http://www.census.gov/retail/index.html#arts, accessed January 20, 2012.
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Exhibit 2
WAL-MART’S RETAIL LINK DATABASE
Source: Case writers.
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Exhibit 3
WAL-MART AND COMPETITORS — FINANCIAL RESULTS, 2002-2011
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Sources: Mergent, various company annual reports. Note that Tesco plc’s calculation of COGS (which Includes some operating expenses) may not be
directly comparable to other firms’ COGS figures. Tesco’s SG&A for 2002-04 have been estimated using figures from 2005-11. Kmart Holdings
Corporation purchased Sears, Roebuck and Co. on November 17, 2004, and the new firm was renamed “Sears Holding Corp.”
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Exhibit 4
COMPETITORS — DESCRIPTION
Target Corporation
Target operates as two reportable segments. Its Retail Segment includes its merchandising operations, including its online
business. Its Credit Card Segment provides the Target Visa and the Target Card credit cards, as well as the Target Debit Card.
Target’s Canadian segment consists of its leasehold interests in Canada. It operates Target general merchandise stores and
SuperTarget® stores, providing a range of general merchandise and food. The company’s merchandise includes household
products, hardlines, apparel and accessories, food and pet supplies and home furnishings and decor. As of January 28, 2012,
Target had 1,763 stores in 49 states and the District of Columbia.
Kroger Co.
Kroger operates retail food and drug stores, multi-department stores, jewelry stores and convenience stores. It also
manufactures and processes some of the food for sale in its supermarkets. As of January 29, 2011, Kroger operated, either
directly or through its subsidiaries, 2,460 supermarkets and multi-department stores, 1,014 of which had fuel centres. In
addition, as of January 29, 2011, it operated through subsidiaries 784 convenience stores and 361 fine jewelry stores.
Additionally, 87 convenience stores were operated through franchise agreements. These convenience stores offer an
assortment of staple food items and general merchandise and, in most cases, sell gasoline.
Costco Wholesale Corp.
Costco Wholesale operates membership warehouses. Its products include sundries, such as candy, snack foods, tobacco,
alcoholic and nonalcoholic beverages and cleaning and institutional supplies; hardlines, such as appliances, electronics,
health and beauty aids, hardware, office supplies, cameras, garden and patio, sporting goods, toys, seasonal items and
automotive supplies; food, such as dry and packaged foods; softlines, such as apparel, domestics, jewelry, housewares,
media, home furnishings and small appliances; fresh food, such as meat, bakery, deli and produce; and ancillary and other,
such as gas stations, pharmacy, food court, optical, one-hour photo, hearing aid and travel.
Safeway Inc.
Safeway is a food and drug retailer in North America, with 1,678 stores at December 31, 2011. Its U.S. retail operations are
located principally in California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington, Alaska, Colorado, Arizona, Texas, the Chicago metropolitan
area and the Mid-Atlantic region. Its Canadian retail operations are located principally in British Columbia, Alberta and
Manitoba/Saskatchewan. Its stores provide an array of grocery items tailored to local preferences. Most stores provide food
and general merchandise and include specialty departments such as bakery, delicatessen, floral, seafood and pharmacy. The
majority of stores provide Starbucks coffee shops and adjacent fuel centres.
Amazon.com
Amazon.com serves consumers through its retail websites. It provides merchandise and content purchased for resale from
vendors and those provided by third-party sellers; it also manufactures and sells the Kindle e-reader. It provides services such
as Amazon Web Services; fulfillment; miscellaneous marketing and promotional agreements, such as online advertising; and
co-branded credit cards. It has two principal segments: North America, which consists of retail sales of consumer products
and subscriptions through North America-focused websites; and International, which consists of retail sales of consumer
products and subscriptions through internationally focused locations.
Dollar General
Dollar General is a discount retailer. As of February 25, 2011, it operated 9,414 retail stores located in 35 states in the
southern, southwestern, midwestern and eastern United States. It provides a selection of merchandise, including
consumables, seasonal home products and apparel. Its products portfolio includes home cleaning supplies, food, beverages
and snacks, personal care products, pet supplies, decorations, toys, batteries, small electronics, greeting cards, stationery,
prepaid cell phones and accessories, gardening supplies, hardware, and automotive and home office supplies, as well as a
selection of home products and apparel products.
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Dollar Tree, Inc.
Dollar Tree is an operator of discount variety stores providing merchandise at the fixed price of $1.00. Its merchandise mix
consists of consumable merchandise, which includes candy and food and health and beauty care, and household consumables
such as paper, plastics, house chemicals and frozen food; variety merchandise, which includes toys, housewares, gifts, party
goods, greeting cards, softlines and other items; and seasonal goods, which include Easter, Halloween and Christmas
merchandise. At January 28, 2012, it operated 4,252 stores in 48 states and the District of Columbia, as well as 99 stores in
Canada under the Dollar Tree, Deal$, Dollar Tree Deal$, Dollar Giant and Dollar Bills names.
Big Lots, Inc.
Big Lots is a broadline close-out retailer. Its merchandising categories consist of Consumables, which include food, health
and beauty, plastics, paper, chemical and pet departments; Furniture, which includes the upholstery, mattresses, ready-toassemble and case goods departments; Home, which includes domestics, stationery and home decorative departments;
Hardlines, which include electronics, appliances, tools and home maintenance departments; Seasonal, which includes lawn
and garden, Christmas, summer and other holiday departments; and Other, which includes toy, jewelry, infant accessories and
apparel departments. At January 29, 2011, it operated a total of 1,398 stores in 48 states.
Fred’s Inc.
Fred’s operates discount general merchandise stores and pharmacies. Its stores generally serve low, middle and fixed income
families located in small- to medium-sized towns. It also markets goods and services to its 24 franchised stores. Its stores
stock over 12,000 purchased items that address the needs of its customers, including brand name products, its label products
and off-brand products. Its FRED’S brand products include household cleaning supplies, health and beauty aids, disposable
diapers, pet foods, paper products and a variety of food and beverage products. As of January 29, 2011, it had 653 retail
stores and 313 pharmacies in 15 states primarily in the southeastern United States.
Sears Holding Corp.
Sears Holdings is the parent company of Kmart Holding Corporation (Kmart) and Sears, Roebuck and Co. (Sears). It is a
broadline retailer with 2,172 full-line and 1,338 specialty retail stores in the United States operating through Kmart and Sears
and 500 full-line and specialty retail stores in Canada operating through Sears Canada Inc., a 95%-owned subsidiary. As of
January 28, 2012, it operated three reportable segments: Kmart, Sears Domestic and Sears Canada.
Walgreen Co.
Walgreen, together with its subsidiaries, operates a retail drugstore chain. It sells prescription and non-prescription drugs as
well as general merchandise, including household products, convenience and fresh foods, personal care, beauty care,
photofinishing and candy. Its pharmacy, health and wellness services include retail, specialty, infusion and respiratory
services, mail service, convenient care clinics and worksite clinics. In addition, its Take Care Health Systems, Inc. subsidiary
is a manager of worksite health centres and in-store convenient care clinics. As of August 31, 2011, it operated 8,210
locations in 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and Guam.
CVS Caremark Corporation
CVS Caremark, together with its subsidiaries, is a pharmacy health care provider in the United States. Its segments include
Pharmacy Services, which provides a range of pharmacy benefit management services including mail order pharmacy
services, specialty pharmacy services, plan design and administration, formulary management and claims processing; and
Retail Pharmacy, which sells prescription drugs and a range of general merchandise, including over-the-counter drugs, beauty
products and cosmetics, photo finishing, seasonal merchandise, greeting cards and convenience foods. As of December 31,
2011, it had 7,300 CVS/pharmacy® retail stores.
Carrefour S.A.
Carrefour is a distribution group based in France. It engages in retailing business primarily in Europe, Asia, and Latin
America. It operates under four main grocery store formats: hypermarkets (offers food and non-food product lines);
supermarkets; hard discount (offers a reduced range at discount prices); and convenience stores, which included Cash &
Carry stores (which are conveniences stores for professionals) and E-commerce. Some of its trade names are Carrefour,
Carrefour Market, GB, GS, Dia, Ed, Shopi, Marche Plus, 8 a Huit, Proxi, Promocash and Docks Markets. As of December
31, 2010, it operated 15,937 stores worldwide.
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Tesco plc.
Tesco is engaged in retailing and associated activities. Its core U.K. segment consists of four different store formats: Express,
Metro, Superstore and Extra, as well as one trial format called Homeplus. Its Non-Food segment includes merchandise such
as electricals, home entertainment, clothing, health and beauty, stationery, cookshop and soft furnishings, and seasonal goods
such as barbecues and garden furniture in the summer. Its Retailing Services segment consists of several operations,
including Tesco Personal Finance, Tesco.com and Tesco Telecoms. Its International segment operates in 13 markets outside
the United Kingdom in Europe, Asia (including India) and North America.
Source: Mergent.
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Exhibit 5
WAL-MART STOCK PRICE
Source: Yahoo! Finance.
________________________
1
This case has been written on the basis of published sources only. Consequently, the interpretation and perspectives presented in this case are not necessarily those of
Wal-Mart or any of it employees.
2
http://operationsroom.wordpress.com/2011/03/07/is-wal-mart-losing-focus/, accessed January 4, 2012.
3
http://mashable.com/2011/02/28/forrester-e-commerce/, accessed January 15, 2012.
4
http://www.uneptie.org/pc/sustain/reports/Retail/Nov4Mtg2002/Retail_Stats.pdf, accessed May 10, 2006.
5
“WMT — 17th Annual Meeting for the Investment Community.” Thomson StreetEvents, October 13, 2010, accessed January 5, 2012.
6
“Low Distribution Costs Buttress Chain’s Profits,” Discount Store News, December 18, 1989.
7
Inventory turns calculated from respective firms’ 10-K filings.
8
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/762b1f80-1259-11de-b816-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1lv8XtooH, accessed January 15, 2012.
9
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a8ErNwolNpAw, accessed January 15, 2012.
10
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/content/?050214ta_talk_surowiecki, February 7 2005, accessed January 15, 2012.
11
Larry Dignan, “Procter & Gamble, Gillette Merger Could Challenge Wal-Mart RFID Adoption,” Extremetech.com, January 31, 2005.
http://www.extremetech.com/article2/0,1558,1758152,00.asp, accessed January 15, 2012.
12
Mark Roberti, “P&G-Gillette Merger Could Benefit RFID”, RFID Journal, February 4, 2005.
13
Barry C. Lynn, “Breaking the Chain,” Harper’s Magazine, July 2006, p. 34.
14
http://walmartprivatefleet.com/AboutUs/LeadershipProfiles.aspx, accessed January 2, 2012.
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15
http://www.dcvelocity.com/articles/july2004/inbound.cfm, accessed August 19, 2006.
16
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_23/b4181017589330.htm, accessed March 3, 2012.
17
“WMT — 18th Annual Meeting for the Investment Community,” Thomson StreetEvents, October 12, 2011, Investext, accessed January 12, 2012.
18
William Beaver, “Battling Wal-Mart: How Communities Can Respond,” Business and Society Review 110.2, Summer 2005, p. 159.
19
http://www.time.com/time/time100/builder/profile/walton2.html, accessed August 23, 2006.
20
http://www.informationweek.com/news/software/info_management/228800661, accessed March 3, 2012.
21
Barry C. Lynn, “Breaking the Chain,” 33.
22
A.H. Johnson, “35 Years of IT Leadership: A New Supply Chain Forged,” Computerworld, September 30, 2002, pp. 38-39.
23
T. Andel, “Partnerships With Pull,” Transportation and Distribution, July 1995, pp. 65-74; http://www.industrlalsupplymagazine.com/pages/Print-editinMayJune10lsVMIForYou.php, accessed April 10, 2012.
24
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0FNP/is_17_44/ai_n15624797, accessed January 15, 2012.
25
http://knowwpcarey.com/article.cfm?aid=803, accessed April 10, 2012.
26
http://knowledge.wpcarey.asu.edu/index.cfm?fa=viewfeature&id=1205, accessed March 3, 2012.
27
http://www.rfidprivacy.org/wal-marts-supply-chain-management-and-rfid.htm, accessed March 3, 2012.
28
Kris Hudson, “Wal-Mart’s Need for Speed,” The Wall Street Journal, September 26, 2005.
29
http://knowwpcarey.com/article.cfm?aid=803, accessed April 10, 2012.
30
http://cincom.typepad.com/simplicity/2005/09/index.html, accessed August 23, 2006.
31
Kris Hudson, “Wal-Mart Aims To Sharply Cut Its Inventory Costs,” The Wall Street Journal. April 20, 2005.
32
Patrick McKeever, “Wal-Mart Stores,” MKM Partners, May 28, 2010.
33
Charles Grom, Paul Trussell, Shane Higgins, and Matt Siler, “Broadline Retail Initiation,” Deutsche Bank, September 14, 2011, page 106.
34
Charles Grom, Paul Trussell, Shane Higgins, Matt Siler, “Broadline Retail Initiation,”page 106; Wal-Mart press releases.
35
http://www.chainstoreage.com/article/wal-mart-reorganization-designed-increase-efficiency, accessed January 15, 2012.
36
http://www.massmarketretailers.com/inside-this-issue/news/09-20-2010/changes-at-walmart, accessed January 15, 2012.
37
http://www.storebrandsdecisions.com/news/2010/02/02/wal-mart-creates-global-merchandising-centers-to-streamline-sourcing, accessed March 15, 2012.
38
http://www.chainstoreage.com/article/wal-mart-reorganization-designed-increase-efficiency accessed January 215, 012.
39
Charles Grom, Paul Trussell, Shane Higgins, Matt Siler, “Broadline Retail Initiation,” p. 118.
40
“WMT — 18th Annual Meeting for the Investment Community.”
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid.
43
Tesco opened four “Fresh & Easy” food markets in California, Arizona and Nevada. http://www.freshandeasy.com/whereweare.aspx, accessed January 15, 2012.
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Half a Century of Supply Chain Management at Wal-Mart
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