Created by Alice Noble ETHICS AND ENGINEERING DISASTERS PRESENTATION OUTLINE 1. Code of Ethics Review 2. Case Study 1: Charles de Gaulle Airport - Put all answers at the end of this case study on discussion board on eCampus 3. Case Study 2: I-35 Bridge Collapse -Put all answers at the end of this case study on discussion board on eCampus 4. Case Study 3: Space Shuttle Columbia -Put all answers at the end of this case study on discussion board on eCampus WHY TALK ABOUT ETHICS? • Very important to engineering practice • Learning outcome: demonstrate an understanding of professional ethics and application to real-life situations; • Grows out of a need: • Became a focus in mid 70’s • Growing recognition of ethics and social responsibility • Political controversy of nuclear weapons, environmental quality and consumer rights • Changing educational standards promoted by ABET ABET CRITERION 3 A-K Engineering programs must demonstrate that their students attain: a) b) c) d) e) f) g) h) i) j) k) An ability to apply knowledge of math, science and engineering Ability to design and conduct experiments, as well as to analyze and interpret data An ability to design a system, component, or process to meet desired needs within realistic constraints such as economic, environmental, social, political, ethical, health and safety, manufacturability, and sustainability An ability to function on multi-disciplinary teams An ability to identify, formulate, and solve engineering problems An understanding of professional and ethical responsibility An ability to communicate effectively The broad education necessary to understand the impact of engineering solutions in a global, economic, environmental, and societal context A recognition of the need for, and an ability to engage in life-long learning A knowledge of contemporary issues An ability to use the techniques, skills and modern engineering tools necessary for engineering practice. ABET CRITERION 3F “An understanding of professional and ethical responsibility” What does above statement mean you should be able to do? DECISION MAKING AND ENGINEERING ETHICS • Ethics is just one part of a continuum of principles of conduct governing an individual or a group. Engineering Ethics Preferences Morals Ethics Increasing rigidity Laws DECISION MAKING AND ENGINEERING ETHICS Engineering Ethics Preferences Morals Ethics • Preferences – Can make significant impact on career – Not just chocolate or vanilla – Type of preferred environment • Geographical – Urban / Rural – Northern / Southern • Government / Private Industry • Design / Manufacturing – Can impact career path and standard of living – No real ethical issues Laws DECISION MAKING AND ENGINEERING ETHICS Engineering Ethics Preferences Morals Ethics Laws • Laws – Legislation passed by governmental body – Specify illegal activity • You are guilty or innocent. – Carry fines paid to government – May also carry jail terms DECISION MAKING AND ENGINEERING ETHICS Engineering Ethics Preferences Morals Ethics Laws • Morals – Personal belief systems • Unwritten rules to live by • Everyone is a little different – Group situations, you’ll need to defend your position based on your morals. Always respect their perspective. – Based on religious, societal norms, cultural differences and more – Ex. How you treat others (Golden Rule) ENGINEERING ETHICS Engineering Ethics Preferences Morals Ethics Laws • Ethics – Guidelines specified by professional body • Written rules but not enforced by the judicial system • Enforced by the body that publishes the code – Based on how professionals in field expected to behave – Could result in loss of licensing, fines paid to licensing body, sanctions against license – Could result in loss of profession, no one will hire unethical engineer – Give guidance, clarity and support for decision-making ENGINEERING ETHICS • National Society of Professional Engineers – NSPW created a Code of Conduct for Engineers – There are 6 Fundamental Canons NATIONAL SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS • Engineers, in the fulfillment of their professional duties, shall: • 1. Hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public. • Safety is your top priority • 2. Perform services only in areas of their competence. • Only do what you know and do not dabble in things that are out of your range of expertise. NATIONAL SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS • 3. Issue public statements only in an objective and truthful manner. • Don’t lie • 4. Act for each employer or client as faithful agents or trustees. • No double dealing or conflicts of interest NATIONAL SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS • 5. Avoid deceptive acts. • Don’t misrepresent yourself or buy influence • 6. Conduct themselves honorably, responsibly, ethically, and lawfully so as to enhance the honor, reputation, and usefulness of the profession. • Don’t embarrass the rest of us NSPE CODE OF ETHICS • Fundamental Canons 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) • 1. Hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public. 2. Perform services only in areas of their competence. 3. Issue public statements only in an objective and truthful manner. 4. Act for each employer or client as faithful agents or trustees. 5. Avoid deceptive acts. 6. Conduct themselves honorably, responsibly, ethically, and lawfully so as to enhance the honor, reputation, and usefulness of the profession. See more at: http://www.nspe.org/resources/ethics/code-ethics Roof Collapse at Charles de Gaulle Airport Paris, France CASE STUDY 1: CHARLES DE GAULLE AIRPORT ROOF • Terminal 2E at Charles de Gaulle airport was a 650 meter long innovatively designed concourse. As seen in the figures, the concourse is an large open area where the ceiling is supported by the steel superstructure. Figure 1: Schematic of Terminal 2E at Charles de Gaulle Airport (Architecture Week) Figure 2: Inside of the terminal, Photo: Report Berthier/ Ministry of Transport CHARLES DE GAULLE AIRPORT ROOF • On May 23, 2004, 2 years and 4 months after the construction, a 30 meter section of the roof collapsed. This event occurred near where inter-connecting passageways connect Terminal 2E to other parts of the airport. Looking at the post-collapse images we see that the passenger area of the terminal was directly under the collapsed area and killed 6 people while injuring 3 others. Figure 3: The deadly collapse of Terminal E. Photo: Report Berthier/ Ministry of Transport Figure 4: Schematic of Terminal 2E at Charles de Gaulle Airport Post Collapse (Architecture Week) CHARLES DE GAULLE AIRPORT ROOF • Investigation led by engineer Jean Berthier • Possible causes – Procedural: • For thermal expansion, roof not rigidly fixed, its supports on roller bearings • ADP designed building & managed construction • Architect (Paul Andreu) somewhat inflexible about design shapes without concern for costs, risk and efficiency – Structural: • External struts punctured shell near footbridge • Fractured beam supporting roller bearings CHARLES DE GAULLE AIRPORT ROOF Possible causes of collapse - Perforations of concrete for metal support structure - Concrete suffer from temperature variation - Stakeholder and political pressure to finish on time Official reason: - Weakened concrete due to cyclic loading - This loading conditions should have been considered during the design phase of the roof superstructure and concrete panels. QUESTIONS TO ANSWER IN THE DISCUSSION BOARD ON ECAMPUS • Was the architect/architectural engineer ethical? Why or why not • Did the construction company do anything unethical? Why or why not LESSONS LEARNED – CDG AIRPORT • The same company should not be responsible for both the design and construction a building. – Having different companies involved will increase the number of people reviewing the design and increase the chances of finding any oversights before completion of a project. – This would in turn place an accountability system into the creation of buildings and other designs. MORE ON LESSONS LEARNED • The next terminal to be built at Charles de Gaulle Airport was 2F which has a similar design to the collapsed Terminal 2E but the designers added over 5,000 tons of steel to the super-structure. I-35 W Bridge Collapse Minneapolis, Minnesota CASE STUDY 2: I-35 BRIDGE • • Designed by Sverdrup & Parcel and Associates Plans approved • • • • Foundation in 1964 Bridge in 1965 Construction • Started 1964 • Completed 1971 Figure 5: Picture of the I-35 Bridge “Structurally deficient” since 1991 I-35 BRIDGE Figure 6: East elevation of bridge, deck truss portion of the bridge extends from just south of Pier 5 to just north of Pier 8. I-35 BRIDGE MODIFICATIONS • • • 1977 • Milled depth by ¼ inch • Added 2 inches of low-slump “wearing course” of concrete 1998 • Median barrier replaced • Upgraded railings • Installed anti-icing system 2007 • Repaving • Under renovation during collapse I-35 BRIDGE COLLAPSE • • Time of collapse was 6:05pm CST on Aug 1, 2007 Center span separated from bridge and collapsed – – – • • 456 ft span fell into Mississippi River 111 vehicles were on the bridge – • • 3 seconds from initial movement Remained level East/West North end was higher than the South end 17 recovered from water 13 people died 145 people injured I-35 BRIDGE COLLAPSE Security video captured collapse Figure 7: View of the I-35W Bridge center span 8 minutes before collapse Figure 8: Close-up of initiation of collapse sequence I-35 BRIDGE COLLAPSE • Some key people – – Construction supervisor – Requested to remove more than 2 inch “wearing” layer – Stored stockpiles of aggregates on bridge in an attempt to meet deadlines and cut time Mn/DOT construction inspector – Permitted stockpiles of aggregates – Static loads did not exceed design loads of bridge I-35 BRIDGE COLLAPSE Figure 9: Reconstruction of the estimated weight distribution of the I-35 bridge at the time of collapse, about 1.25 million pounds QUESTIONS TO ANSWER IN THE DISCUSSION BOARD ON ECAMPUS • Was the construction engineer unethical? Why or why not • Was the construction inspector ethical? Why or why not • What questionable decisions were made? Why or why not I-35 BRIDGE COLLAPSE: LESSONS LEARNED • Approval for material stockpiles was not granted by Project Engineer • Mn/DOT updated policy about aggregates on bridges under construction • Annual inspection reports were ignored I-35 BRIDGE COLLAPSE: OFFICIAL REPORT • • • Aggregate loads were within design loads of bridge Discusses multiple possible causes: • Corrosion damage • Floor truss fracture • Preexisting cracking • Temperature effects • Pier movement Most likely: • Material substitution in gusset plate • Design firm error in verifying calculated stresses in gusset plate Space Shuttle Columbia Accident CASE STUDY 3: SPACE SHUTTLE COLUMBIA • • • • Oldest of the Space Shuttles Completed 27 missions STS-1: April 1981 Inspection and retrofit • August 1991: 50 modifications • September 1999: over 100 modifications NASA STS-107 • 28th flight of Columbia • Mission Objectives • • • Multi-discipline science mission Joint US/Israeli Dust Experiment Fast Reaction Experiments Enabling Science, Technology, Applications and Research • Crew received 4,811 hours of training Figure 10: STS-107 Launch January 16, 2003 (CAIB) NASA STS-107 • What happened? • Post launch video analysis • • • • • Insulating foam tile struck the left wing Piece was only 21 - 27 inches by 12 - 18 inches Relative velocity: 625-840 ft/s Flight Day 8: Mission control notified Commander and Pilot of foam impact on wing "no concern for re-entry" Orbiter disintegrated on re-entry Figure 11: Upper atmospheric disintegration of Columbia (www.dallasnews.com) NASA STS-107 Figure 12: During the history of the shuttle program there have been a surprisingly large number of dings on the shuttle, the figure shown here illustrates that after several missions there were more than 100 different one inch or large dings on the lower surface of the Orbiter after a mission. NASA STS-107 • Debris Assessment Team – – – – – Protocol existed due to history of foam strikes (6 other cases from bipod area) Formed after photo analysis Requested high res. imagery of Orbiter in flight Used modeling tool “Crater” to access damage Model designed for a different impact type • CAIB Conclusions/ Contributing Factors – Systemic • • • – Constrained budget Kraft report mischaracterization of “mature and reliable system” Delay of replacement technology Physical • Foam strike on left wing QUESTIONS TO ANSWER IN THE DISCUSSION BOARD ON ECAMPUS  Was the Debris Assessment Team ethical? Why or why not  Was engineering management ethical? Why or why not REFERENCES • • • • • Horn, Christian. "ArchitectureWeek - News - Paris Air Terminal Collapse Report - 2005.0427." ArchitectureWeek - News - Paris Air Terminal Collapse Report - 2005.0427. N.p., n.d. Web. 14 Mar. 2014. Torres, Pablo, “Case Study: The New Terminal 2E at Paris-Charles de Gaulle Airport”, MIT December 2004 NTSB, Collapse of I-35W Highway Bridge, August 1, 2007, NTSB/HAR-08/03 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report Volume 1, August 2003, NASA CNN Library. "Space Shuttle Columbia Fast Facts." www.cnn.com. Cable News Network, 31 Jan. 2014. Web 11 Mar. 2014.
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