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D e m o c r a t i z a t i o n in Taiwan: The interaction of structure,
political institutions, and political elites
Wang, Kao-cheng, Ph.D.
University of Pennsylvania, 1992
Copyright ©1992 by Wang, Kao-cheng. All rights reserved.
U-M-
300N.ZeebRd.
Ann Arbor, MI 48106
DEMOCRATIZATION IN TAIWAN: THE INTERACTION OF STRUCTURE,
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, AND POLITICAL ELITES
Kao-cheng Wang
A DISSERTATION
in
Political Science
Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
1992
COPYRIGHT
Kao-cheng Wang
1992
To My Parents: Kuo-hua Wang and Wan-peng Shao
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work could not have been completed
assistance
without the
of many persons. Among them, I would like to
express my deepest gratitude to my major advisor Professor
Jack Nagel. It was he who encouraged me to pursue this subject
when I first brought it to his attention three years ago.
Professor Nagel has carefully read my numerous drafts and has
given me many insightful comments throughout my dissertation
writing effort. As a result of his advice, this work was set
on the right direction and was substantially improved from its
first draft. Professors
Thomas M. Callaghy
and Peter A.
Swenson also served on my dissertation committee. They, too,
gave me many invaluable comments which further improved this
work. Professors Chong-sik Lee, Avery Goldstein, Michaela W.
Richter, and Susan Naquin also provided helpful suggestions
when I prepared the proposal for this dissertation.
Also
invaluable
to
me
have
been
the
teachings
of
professors Jack Nagel, Joanne Gowa, Friedrich Kratochwil,
Avery Goldstein, and Peter A. Swenson. These teachers have
tremendously enlightened my understanding in some subjects of
political science and have given me training and knowledge
that will be an asset for the rest of my life.
For help in providing the funds needed to complete my
iv
courses and conduct the research for my dissertation, I would
like to thank the Chairman of the Political Science Department
of
the
University
of
Pennsylvania,
Professor
Oliver
P.
Williams.
Mindy Brown and Susan Pomeran helped proofread a large
part of this dissertation, while my classmates at Penn Amir
Pasic, Jean-Marc Blanchard, and Shreedevi Thacker helped with
the rest. Other classmates offered me friendship and academic
assistance that supported me through the writing of this
dissertation. They are Hak-soon Paik, Jong-chan Rhee, Rosanna
Perotti, Arvid Lukauskas, Fang Ji, Abraham James, Hyuk-sang
Sohn, Ian Hemphill, Cathleen Compton, Lisa Moore, and Taegun
Moon. Political
Arrington
and
Science Department
Calli
Berg
have
staff members
also
given
me
Eleanor
valuable
administrative assistance.
Finally, I would like to share my academic accomplishment
at Penn with my wife Ya-ling Liu. Her encouragement
and
assistance enabled me to concentrate on my research and to
complete the writing of my dissertation in a relatively short
amount of time.
v
ABSTRACT
Democratization in Taiwan: The Interaction of Structure,
Political Institutions, and Political Elites
Kao-cheng Wang
Jack Nagel
This
There
dissertation
are
two
major
condition-oriented
oriented
explores
types
Taiwan's
of
democratization.
democratization
theories:
and actor-oriented theories. Condition-
theories
emphasize
the
role
of
change
in
socioeconomic conditions in fostering democratization. Such
theories, because they neglect the roles of political elites,
have
the
weakness
of
providing
correlative,
static,
deterministic, society-oriented, and class-based analysis of
democratization. Actor-oriented theories, on the other hand,
stress the influence of socioeconomic change and political
elites' choices in driving democratization. This dissertation
argues
that,
in
addition
to
considering
socioeconomic
conditions and political elites, one must also look at the
constraints
posed by political
institutions
in
order to
explain democratization in Taiwan.
Societal pressures for democratization emerged in Taiwan
because of favorable socioeconomic conditions, institutional
protection of elections, and the leadership of opposition
vi
elites. Economic development, however, also strengthened the
Kuomintang
(KMT) regime's control over society. The Single
Nontransferable Vote electoral system used in Taiwan has
constrained the opposition and maintained the KMT's hegemonic
power. The beginning of democratization in Taiwan was caused
by Chiang Ching-kuo's illness, drop in the legitimacy of the
KMT,
and
opposition
institutional
pressures.
constraints
Socioeconomic
(the constitution
conditions,
and electoral
laws), and the choices, power, ideology, and interactions of
political elites have substantially influenced the process and
outcome of democratization in Taiwan, with the result that the
KMT has dominated the process of democratization and is likely
to continue in a hegemonic position during the foreseeable
future. The major arguments derived from my study of the
Taiwanese case are validated by comparing it with Spain, South
Korea, the Soviet Union, and China.
VII
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
iv
ABSTRACT
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
viii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ix
LIST OF TABLES
x
PREFACE
xii
Chapter
1.
DEFINITIONS AND THEORIES
2.
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
43
3.
PRE-DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS
73
4.
THE ELECTORAL LAWS
97
5.
THE OPPOSITION BEFORE 1985
127
6.
THE BEGINNING OF DEMOCRATIZATION,
1986-1987
156
DEMOCRATIZATION DURING A POWER SUCCESSION,
1988-1989
186
8.
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, 1990-1991
215
9.
CONCLUSION AND COMPARISON
252
7.
1
(Appendix)
2 95
(Bibliography)
2 97
viii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ALYM
Added Legislative Yuan Member
BATC
Backup Association for Tangwai Candidates
CYP
China Youth Party
DPP
Democratic Progressive Party
DSP
Democratic Socialist Party
FATEW
Friendship Association of the Tangwai Editors and
Writors
FCF
Free China Fortnightly
KMT
Kuomintang
SNTV
Single Nontransferable Vote
TRAPP
Tangwai Research Association for Public Policies
ix
LIST OF TABLES
Table
2-1.
2-2.
2-3.
2-4.
2-5.
2-6.
2-7.
3-1.
3-2.
3-3.
3-4.
3-5.
3-6.
Page
Industrial Growth Rate and Change in the
Structure of Trade in Taiwan, 1952-1986..
46
Employment Pattern in Taiwan, 1951-1988
(as a Percentage of the Labor Force)
49
National Income Per Capita and Annual Growth
Rate in Taiwan, 1951-1988 (at Current
Price)
50
Income of Household—Percent Distribution by
Quintile in Taiwan, 1954-1988
51
Selected Indices of Modern Material Goods in
Taiwan, 1952-1984 (Possession per
Thousand Persons)
52
The Educational Level of Residents Over
Sixteen Year Old in Taiwan, 1951-1988....
52
Distribution of Important Political
Positions among Taiwanese and
Mainlanders, 1987
62
Ethnic Background and Partisan Distribution
of Provincial Assemblymen in Taiwan,
1954-1985
76
Ethnic Background and partisan Distribution
of County Magistrates and City Mayors in
Taiwan, 1950-1985
76
Ethnic Background and Partisan Distribution
of County and City Councilors in Taiwan,
1950-1986
77
Ethnic Background and Partisan Distribution
of Subcounty Chiefs in Taiwan, 19501986
77
The Distribution of Seats among Four Groups
of Added Legislative Yuan Members, 19721989
Proportion of Added Members to the Total
Members in the Legislative Yuan, 19801989
x
84
87
Partisan Distribution of the Added
Legislative Yuan Members in Taiwan,
1972-1989
93
Partisan Distribution of Seats for County
and City Councilors in Taiwan, 19501968 (number/ratio)
104
The Average District Magnitude for County
and City Councilors in Taiwan, 19501968
104
The Average District Magnitude and
Advantage Ratio of Parties in the
Elections of the Added Legislative
Yuan Members, 1972-1989
106
The Average Ratios of Parties in Selected
House of Representatives Elections in
Japan, 1947-1983 (%)
117
The Central Government Proposed by the DPP.
22 6
The Central Government in the Five-Yuan
System
229
Comparison of the DPP and the KMT Reform
Proposals
233
Regime Elite Choices and the Outcomes of
Democratization in Five Countries
270
XI
PREFACE
Since the mid-1970s, there has been a strong world-wide
tendency toward the democratization of authoritarian regimes.
This phenomenon
has
occurred
in Latin America,
Southern
Europe, Asia, and some countries in Africa. The collapse of
communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 198 9 and the Soviet
Union in 1991 demonstrates that this world-wide movement of
democratization has reached its peak. These transformations
have attracted the attention of many political scientists and
drawn them to study the issue of democratization again.
Taiwan has also gradually moved towards democracy since
the early 1970s, and this process has accelerated since 1986.
In contrast to many other countries' experiences, Taiwan's
democratization has shown three interesting puzzles which will
be explored in this study.
First, compared to Taiwan's level of economic development,
the period between 1970 and 1985 was marked by only limited
democratization. As a result of a decade's rapid economic
development in the 19 60s, Taiwan had an industrial, modern,
and
pluralistic
development
in
society
Taiwan
in
has
the
early
generated
1970s.
Economic
increasing
societal
demands for democracy, but the level of social pressure was
not strong enough to force the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) regime
to
initiate
large-scale
democratization
until
1986. Only
limited democratization was offered in Taiwan in the early
1970s and its progress was slow in the period spanning 1970xii
1985. This process was even reversed for a short period in the
late 1970s when the opposition movement was crushed by the KMT
regime.
It
accelerated
was
only
after
significantly.
The
1986
that
democratization
first puzzle
that
I will
address is the question of why there was a time lag between
the appearance of favorable socioeconomic conditions and the
emergence of rapid democratization in Taiwan in the period
between 1970 and 1985?
Second, the opposition
in Taiwan did not present
an
immediate threat to the survival of the KMT regime in 1986.
Consequently, the opposition by itself was not strong enough
to force the KMT to accelerate democratization on a large
scale in 1986. The second puzzle then is why would the KMT
regime promote rapid democratization in 1986 when there was no
immediate threat to its survival from outside the regime?
Third, the KMT regime did not collapse or lose its ruling
power after democratization began in 1986 and there has been
no serious political and social unrest in Taiwan during this
recent process of democratization. The third puzzle I will
look at is what factors have influenced the process and
outcome of democratization in Taiwan so that the KMT remained
in power after 1986? In addition to these three puzzles, the
conclusion of this study will also speculate about what type
of
democracy
can
one
expect
to
emerge
from
such
a
democratization in Taiwan?
These puzzles show the theoretical weakness of conditionxiii
oriented theories to explain democratization. Instead , this
study argues that it is necessary to consider
a nation's
political institutions and the role of its political elites,
in addition to its socioeconomic conditions, to be able to
solve these puzzles. Favorable socioeconomic conditions and
the
electoral
system
Nontransferable
Vote
legitimacy
power,
and
democratization.
chairman
Chiang
The
used
in
system—have
and
issue
Taiwan—the
enhanced
delayed
of
Ching-kuo's
power
the
the
KMT's
beginning
succession
planning
Single
of
and
KMT
contributed
to
accelerated democratization after 1986. The democratization
process and outcome are substantially influenced by political
institutions and political elites' choices, ideology, and
power. The type of democratization in Taiwan may eventually
create
an
incomplete
democracy
where
there
is
little
possibility of the transfer of ruling power and only limited
party competition in the near future.
xiv
CHAPTER 1
DEFINITIONS AND THEORIES
In this chapter
democratization
I will
introduce the definitions of
and other major concepts adopted in this
dissertation. Then I will compare two major types of theories
about democratization—condition-oriented theories and actororiented
theories. The
comparison
will
show that actor-
oriented theories are more powerful than condition-oriented
theories for explaining democratization in Taiwan. I will also
argue
that
it
is necessary
to
consider
the
factors
of
objective (structural) conditions, political institutions, and
political elites to explain a country's democratization. The
final section of this chapter will discuss the major arguments
derived from Taiwan's democratization and the research method
and data on which this dissertation is based.
Definitions
Democratization in this dissertation means transition from
a totalitarian or an authoritarian regime toward a democracy.
A totalitarian regime is a political system in which the party
state
completely
penetrates
and
dominates
a
politicized
society. There is only one party which has monopolized power
and controls the state apparatus in that system. The party has
1
a
dominant
leader,
a
centralized
organization,
and
a
consistent ideology. People in the society are organized,
censored
and
mobilized
by
the
party
and
they
are
also
indoctrinated by the party's ideology. Through these measures,
the dominant leader and party can completely control the state
and people in such a political system.1
An authoritarian regime, according to Juan Linz, is a
political system
with limited, not responsible, political pluralism,
without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with
distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive
political mobilization, except at some points in their
development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small
group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits
but actually quite predictable ones.2
Robert Dahl has offered a useful definition of democracy.
For him, a polyarchy (democracy) is a regime "that has been
substantially popularized and liberalized, that is, highly
inclusive and extensively open to public contestation."3 By
expanding Dahl's definition, Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and
Seymour M. Lipset define a democracy as
*For a discussion of a totalitarian regime, see Juan J.
Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, " in Handbook of
Political Science, eds. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W.
Polsby, vol. 3, Macropolitical Theory (Reading, Mass.:
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1975), 187-264.
2
Ibid, 264; see also Juan J. Linz, "An Authoritarian
Regime: the Case of Spain," in Mass Politics: Studies in
Political Sociology, eds. Eric Allard and Stein Rokkan (New
York: Free Press, 1970) .
3
Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 8; see also Robert
A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1989), 220.
2
a system of government that meets three essential
conditions: meaningful and extensive competition among
individuals and organized groups (especially political
parties) for all effective positions of government power,
at regular intervals and excluding the use of force; a
highly inclusive level of political participation in the
selection of leaders and policies, at least through
regular and fair elections, such that no major (adult)
social group is excluded; and a level of civil and
political liberties—freedom of the press, freedom to form
and join organizations—sufficient to ensure the integrity
of political competition and participation.4
In addition to the previous three conditions, this study
adds a fourth condition to define a complete democracy: the
occurrence, at least once, of a peaceful transition of power
from the government to the opposition, once the opposition has
won an
major election.5
Democratization is a matter of degree. A democratizing
country
can be positioned
anywhere
along the
continuum
between a totalitarian regime and a democracy. In order to
4
Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour M. Lipset,
eds., Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia, vol. 3
(Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), xvi.
5
This condition is necessary for testing whether the
government really governs based on people's consent. Even an
authoritarian regime may allow political participation and
opposition. The difference between it and a democratic regime
should be that a democratic regime's ruling elites are willing
to step down from their positions and hand over their power
peacefully once they lose the support of the majority of
people, while an authoritarian regime's ruling elites may
refuse to give up their power and cancel people's rights for
participation and opposition when they face the real situation
that they must relinquish their power. Therefore, a country
cannot be said to have a complete democracy unless it has
passed the crucial test of having a peaceful alternation of
power according to people's will. Judged by this condition,
Taiwan and other countries such as Japan where people have
full right to participate in political activities and oppose
the government have not yet had a complete democracy.
3
describe accurately and explain the progress of a nation's
democratization, some scholars have developed the concept of
liberalization. According to Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe
Schmitter,
liberalization
means
"the
process
of
making
effective certain rights that protect both individuals and
social groups from arbitrary or illegal acts committed by the
state or third parties."6 From their statements, we may say
that
liberalization
mainly
refers
to the
acquisition
of
certain political liberties by the people. The other dimension
of polyarchy—the
organization
of the opposition
and its
public competition with the regime for government positions—
has not yet been fully recognized at this stage. For these
scholars, liberalization represents the first step that an
authoritarian regime makes toward democracy and it usually has
the effect of triggering further democratization.7 In the
following, I will also use the concept of liberalization in
pursuing my study.
Alternative Theories of Transition to Democracy
There are basically two types of theories regarding regime
6
Guillermo
O'Donnell
and
Philippe
C.
Schmitter,
Transitions from Authoritarian Rules: Tentative Conclusions
about Uncertain Democracies
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1986), 7; see also Alfred Stepan, Rethinking
Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1988), 6.
7
Ibid., 10.
4
transitions: condition-oriented and actor-oriented theories.8
In the
following,
I will first
introduce the condition-
oriented theories and evaluate their validity in explaining
regime transition. Then I will move on to discuss the actororiented theories.
The Condition-Oriented Theories
The main theme of the condition-oriented theories is that
they explore regime transitions by focusing on a society's
objective (or structural) conditions. These conditions mainly
include economic performance, social cleavages, and political
culture.
These
theories
argue
that
objective
conditions
substantially determine the characteristics of the regime.
Therefore, once the regime's objective conditions change, the
form of the regime will also change subsequently. Based on
this reasoning, the condition-oriented theories further argue
that certain objective conditions will favor the emergence of
democracy.
These
conditions
usually
include
economic
development, a strong bourgeoisie, high levels of urbanization
and education, and a participant political culture.
Obviously, Karl Marx's explanation of the emergence of
parliamentary democracy is a classic example of the condition8
See Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the
Transition to Democracy," in Transition from Authoritarian
Rule: Comparative Perspectives, eds. Guillermo O'Donnell,
Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead
(Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), 47. Przeworski does not
use the terms conditions-oriented and actor-oriented theories.
They are created by the author for this study based on
Przeworski's arguments.
5
oriented theories. He argues:
it is always the direct relationship of the owners of the
conditions of production to the direct producers which
reveals the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the
entire social structure, and with it...the corresponding
specific form of the state.9
The specific form of production generates a specific form
of class structure and a corresponding political form. For
example, a capitalistic economy and the emergence of the
bourgeoisie,
according
to
Marx,
create
a
parliamentary
democracy. He says:
each step in the development of the bourgeoisie was
accompanied by a corresponding political advance of that
class...the
bourgeoisie
has
at
last,
since
the
establishment of Modern Industry and the world market,
conquered for itself, in the modern representative State,
exclusive political sway.10
Barrington Moore, though a non-Marxist, also emphasizes
the capitalist economy and its corresponding class structure
as crucial requisites for the emergence of democracy. In
studying the transformation of a traditional agricultural
society toward a modern one, Moore argues:
among the most decisive determinants influencing the
course
of
subsequent
political
evolution
(toward
democracy) are whether or not a landed aristocracy has
turned to commercial agriculture and, if so, the form that
this commercialization has taken.11
9
Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 3, The Process of Capitalist
Production as a Whole, ed. Frederick Engels (New York:
International Publishers, 1967), 791.
10
Quote from The Communist Manifesto, reprinted in Karl
Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works
(New York:
International Publishers, 1968), 37.
n
Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship
and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 419.
6
The commercialized landed upper class, according to Moore,
has
a common
interest
with
the
emerging
bourgeoisie
in
opposing monarchic absolutism. Subsequently, the bourgeoisie
must replace the landed upper class and become the dominant
class in the society in order to ensure the emergence of
democracy. In Moore's words,
it is important that the fusion (of the landed upper class
and the bourgeoisie) take place in opposition to the royal
bureaucracy. A second condition appears to be that the
commercial and industrial leaders must be on their way to
becoming the dominant element in society.12
In addition to the classic Marxist thesis, the so-called
liberal model of economic and political development has also
made the same arguments since the 1950s. Modernization theory
of the transformation from a traditional society into a modern
one is an explicit example. For example, Daniel Lerner thinks
that the emergence of democracy has been closely associated
with the process of modernization. He says:
urbanization,
industrialization,
secularization,
democratization, education, media participation do not
occur in haphazard and unrelated fashion....Our multiple
correlations showed them to be so highly associated as to
raise the question whether some are genuinely independent
factors at all—suggesting that perhaps they went together
so regularly because, in some historical sense, they had
to go together.13
For him, democracy is not just an aspect of modernization
but is also caused by other aspects of modernization. He says
12
Ibid., 425.
13
Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society:
Modernizing the Middle East (New York: Free Press, 1958), 438.
7
that
"democratic governance comes late, historically, and
typically appears as a crowning institution of participant
society."14 Through the process of modernization, people will
increase their literacy and media exposure, and tend to "have
opinions" on public matters. They will actively participate in
politics. Democracy thus emerges in the end.
Karl Deutsch develops similar arguments. He uses the term
social mobilization
to
change" that happens
describe
the
"overall
process
of
in countries which are experiencing
modernization.15 During social mobilization, a large portion
of the population is mobilized and will subsequently have a
lot of new needs. Under such conditions, Deutsch argues, "the
growth
in the numbers
pressures
for the transition
institutions."16
pressures
of these people produces
and
The
expand
regime
of political
will
political
then
mounting
practices
submit
participation
to
and
and
these
public
services.
Seymour M. Lipset has produced very influential research
on the
relationship
between
socioeconomic
conditions
and
democracy. His conclusion is that a high level of economic
development
is favorable to the sustenance of democracy.
Lipset says:
14
Ibid., 64.
15
Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political
Development," American Political Science Review 55, no. 3
(September 1961): 493.
16
Ibid., 498.
8
perhaps the most common generalization linking political
systems to the aspects of society has been that democracy
is related to the state of economic development. The more
well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will
sustain democracy.17
In
fact, the
characteristics
of
a nation's
economic
development, described by Lipset, are similar to the contents
of modernization defined by Lerner. Lipset argues that "all
the
various
aspects
of
economic
development—
industrialization, urbanization, wealth, and education—are so
closely interrelated as to form one major factor."18 And he
thinks
that
this
"one major
factor" has
the
"political
correlate of democracy."19
Along with the socioeconomic conditions correlated with
modernization, some scholars emphasize the effects of national
political culture on democracy. For example, Gabriel Almond
and Sidney Verba argue that a "civic culture" favors the
stability of democracy. In a civic culture, according to
Almond
and
Verba,
"(citizens')
participant
political
orientations combine with and do not replace subject and
parochial political
orientations."20 Citizens, who have a
"Seymour M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy:
Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," American
Political Science Review 53 (March 1963) : 75; see also Seymour
M. Lipset, "Economic Development and Democracy," in Political
Man (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 31.
18
Ibid., 80.
19
Ibid.
20
Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture:
Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1963), 31.
9
civic culture, will actively participate
in politics and
pressure governmental officials to account for the citizens'
interests in making policies. On the other hand, the civic
culture will also make citizens refrain from putting too much
pressure on the government, as the civic culture makes them
generally accept governmental policies and laws. Therefore,
they conclude:
Unless the political culture is able to support a
democratic system, the chances for the success of that
system are slim....The civic culture appears to be
particularly appropriate for a democratic political
system. It is not the only form of democratic political
culture, but it seems to be the one most congruent with a
stable, democratic system.21
Critiques of the Condition-Oriented Theories
Although the condition-oriented theories have been widely
in studying democratization,22 they have
accepted
several
weakness.
(1) Some condition-oriented theorists do not offer an
effective causal explanation for regime transitions and some
of them only provide a correlative analysis.
For
Marx,
development
Moore,
generates
and
some
Deutsch,
societal
capitalistic
groups
who
economic
have
an
interest in building a democratic polity and these groups will
21
Ibid., 498.
22
For a list of other scholars' works which adopt the
conditions-oriented approach to study democratization, see
Tatu Vanhanen, The Process of Democratization: A Comparative
Study of 147 States, 1980-88 (New York: Taylor & Francis,
1990), 40-41.
10
pressure an authoritarian government to democratize.
However, the transitions
of authoritarian
democracy
represent
the authoritarian
political
power
the
imposition
of
to
opposition
restrictions
on
toward
rulers' cession of
and
the
regimes
society,
privileges
and the
of
the
authoritarian rulers. A crucial question that must be answered
in explaining democratization is why the regime's rulers in
the face of social pressure are willing to give up their power
and privileges. A theory that claims to have an effective
causal explanation of democratization must offer explanations
for the authoritarian rulers' decisions to give up their power
and privileges in addition to arguing that societal groups
will press an authoritarian regime to provide democracy.
Marx, Moore, and Deutsch only emphasize social pressure on
the regime but fail to consider regime elites' calculations
and choices. For Lerner, the reasons why authoritarian rulers
surrender power are not clear because he only argues that
democracy "goes together" with socioeconomic development in
the process
of modernization.23
Lipset, Almond and Verba do not even bother to consider
the authoritarian rulers' decisions on ceding power to the
opposition. Their studies are concerned with the conditions
for the stability of a democracy after it has come into
existence.
Lipset says:
"Lerner, 46.
11
the main criteria used in this paper to locate European
democracies are the uninterrupted continuation of
political democracy since World War I. ...The somewhat less
stringent criterion employed for Latin America is whether
a given country has had a history of more or less free
elections for most of the post World War I period.24
For Almond and Verba, the research question asks "is there a
democratic political culture—a pattern of political attitudes
that fosters democratic stability?"25 And they answer this
question by looking at "the political culture in the two
relatively stable and successful democracies, Great Britain
and the United States."26 Therefore, what they and Lipset
have offered is not a causal explanation of the democratic
transition but arguments of functional correlation between
democracy and other factors. In Dankwart Rustow's terms, they
are not genetic theories of democracy.27
The major problem for a correlative explanation is that
the
direction
of
influence
between
the
explaining
and
dependent variables is not clearly indicated.28 For example,
it is not clear whether socioeconomic development and civic
culture
lead to democracy,
or vice versa, or both. The
condition-oriented theories argue that the former leads to the
24
Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," 73-74.
"Almond, 473.
26
Ibid.
"Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy,"
Comparative Politics, no. 2 (April 1970) : 340-43.
28
Ibid., 342.
12
emergence
of the
later. But, we
can
also
argue that a
democracy may facilitate the development of a modern economy
and a participant political culture. The data of correlation
cannot discredit either of the above arguments.
(2) The condition-oriented theories fail to fully explain
the process and outcome of democratization.
The process and outcome of democratization are no less
important than its beginning. The beginning of democratization
cannot guarantee its accomplishment in the end. The process of
democratization may take a long time and will affect the
outcome of democratization. We will miss a very crucial and
interesting aspect regarding democratization if we do not
study the process of democratization.
The
last
institutionalize
stage
the
of
democratization
whole
process
by
will
be
installing
to
new
democratic institutions. Scholars have argued that political
institutions have an impact on a democracy's
stability,29
competitiveness, and fairness once it has come into existence.
Therefore,
the
discussion
of
the
choice
of
particular
democratic
institutions is also an indispensable part in
studying democratization.
The
exploration
of
the
process
and
outcome
of
democratization is especially important from the point of view
29
For example, Juan Linz argues that a two-party system
is more favorable to a stable democracy than a multiparty
system. See Juan J. Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes:
Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1978), 24-27.
13
of policy-making. Democracy is the ultimate form of polity for
many democratizing nations in the world today. Research on the
process in generating a democracy may help people in those
nations learn how to fulfill their goals as smoothly as
possible.
Marx
and
explaining
analysis
Deutsch,
emphasizing
democratization,
of
the
process
fail
and
social
to
outcome
pressure
provide
of
a
in
complete
democratization
because they ignore regime elites' decisions and interactions
with societal groups. Other condition-oriented theorists who
only offer a correlative explanation for the transition to
democracy totally fail to explain the process and outcome of
democratization. Lipset, Almond and Verba do not examine the
histories of democratization in the nations which they study.
What they have done is to measure the correlation between the
level of economic development or types of political culture
with the stability of democracy. Therefore, the analysis in
these theories is not process-oriented. Their research can
only show the relations between the objective conditions and
democracy at a single given point in time.
(3)
The
condition-oriented
theories
tend
to
be
element
of
deterministic in explaining democratization.
The
Marxist
thesis
has
the
strongest
determinism in explaining regime transition. For Marx, the
form of polity is determined by the means of production and
class
structure; parliamentary
14
democracy
comes
out
of a
capitalist economy. Some liberal condition-oriented theories
also tend to have some element of determinism because they do
not explore the process of democratization. They tend to argue
that once a nation acquires favorable objective conditions, it
will eventually have a democratic polity. The step from the
appearance of favorable objective conditions to the emergence
of a democracy is direct and end-determined.
However, historical facts have shown that there are many
roads
democracy.30
to
breakdown
returned
And
many
of democratization
to
authoritarian
nations
have
and democracy
regimes.
The
as
seen
the
they have
development
of
democratization is indeterminate and reversible.
(4) The causal relation between the objective conditions
and democratization is not as strong as the condition-oriented
theories proclaim.
In examining the above three weak points of the conditionoriented theories, we have assumed that there is a strong
correlation
between
the
objective
conditions
and
democratization. However, even this argument is not always
logically and empirically true.
Guillermo A. O'Donnell argues that instead of sustaining
a democratic regime, economic development will at some stage
lead to an authoritarian regime. After studying the cases of
30
For example, Alfred Stepan has suggested eight
categories of paths toward democratization. See Alfred Stepan,
"Paths toward Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative
Considerations," in O'Donnell, Transitions from Authoritarian
Rule: Comparative Perspectives, 64-84.
15
Argentina
and
Brazil,
he
finds
that
the
emergence
of
authoritarian regimes in these two countries in the 1960s was
mainly due to the need for advancing economic development.
According to O'Donnell, after the "exhaustion" of the "easy"
stage of industrialization
(i. e. the end of the period of
extensive, horizontal industrial growth based on substitution
for imports of finished consumer goods),31 these two nations
faced inflation and economic
stagnation. To remedy these
economic problems, the governments had to turn to "intensive"
industrialization which involved "the vertical integration of
domestic industry for the production of a wide range of raw,
intermediate, and capital goods."32
However, the previous
import-substitution policies had created a large urban working
class. They demanded increased governmental subsidies for
import-substitution industries and opposed the governments'
plans to
shift
resources
to develop
technology-intensive
industries. The workers used strikes and demonstrations to
pursue their demands and thus caused social
instability.
Finally, the military stepped in to replace the democratic
government and suppress the political activities of the urban
working class in order to solve the nation's economic and
31
Guillermo A. O'Donnell, Modernization and BureaucraticAuthoritarianism (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1973), 57-58.
32
Ibid., 59.
16
social difficulties.33
Samuel
Huntington
modernization
development.
does
He
also
not
starts
argues
that
necessarily
from
the
the
lead
process
to
same position
of
political
as
other
modernization theorists by arguing that economic development
brings about a high level of political participation. However,
unlike other modernization theorists, Huntington argues that
if the political
institutions
are unable to mediate and
moderate the participant social forces the society will become
a "praetorian society."34 In such a society, there are a lot
of riots, strikes, demonstrations, and coups.35 In other
words,
there
is
political
decay
instead
of
political
modernization. Therefore, Huntington concludes:
In actuality, only some of the tendencies frequently
encompassed in the concept "political modernization"
characterized the "modernizing" areas. Instead of a trend
toward competitiveness and democracy, there was an
"erosion of democracy" and a tendency to autocratic
military regimes and one-party regimes.36
(5)
The
condition-oriented
theories
totally
fail
to
consider the "supply-side" of democratization and provide an
incomplete
explanation
of
the
"demand-side"
of
democratization. The "supply-side" of democratization means
33
Ibid., 75; see also David Collier, ed., The New
Authoritarianism in Latin American (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1979) .
34
Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing
Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 80; 196.
35
Ibid., 196.
36
Ibid., 36.
17
regime
leaders'
decision
to
initiate
democratization
or
tolerate its beginning. The "demand-side" of democratization
refers to social demands for democratization.
Studying the occurrence
of social
revolutions, Theda
Skocpol finds that the state, which the social revolutions aim
to overthrow, is "potentially autonomous from socioeconomic
interests
interests,
and
structure."37
the
state
will
In
order to protect
repress
popular
its own
forces
and
revolutionary movements.
Skocpol's
work
democratization.
can
shed
light
Democratization
on
always
the
study
involves
of
the
redistribution of political power. It can be understood as a
process of struggle for power between the state and society,
or between regime elites and opposition elites. Each group
will use its resources to maximize its own interests. The
authoritarian rulers will not voluntarily give up their power
and privileges
simply because the opposition
and society
demand it. As Huntington argues,
the attitude of the political elites toward political
participation is, in any society, probably the single most
decisive factor influencing the nature of participation in
the society....Autonomous participation can occur at
reasonable costs only if political elites encourage it,
permit it, or are unable or unwilling to suppress it.38
Therefore, we must consider the roles played by the regime
37
Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1979), 14.
38
Samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, No Easy Choice
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), 28.
18
elites in studying democratization.
The biggest blind point of the condition-oriented theories
is their neglect of the roles of the regime elites, that is,
the supply-side of democratization. For them, the state and
regime elites play no role, or, at most, a trivial role in the
process of transition to democracy. For Marx, the state is
only the tool of the dominant economic class in the society.
For
Lerner
and
Deutsch,
the
authoritarian
rulers'
only
response to the social demand for democracy is to fulfill that
demand.
In fact, as argued above, the state elites have their own
autonomous interests and can use the state's resources to
protect their interests. Even if the society puts pressure on
the state, submission to social pressure is not the only
choice available to the authoritarian rulers. As Charles Tilly
argues, "contention for power always involves at least two
parties. The behavior of the second party runs along a range
from repression to facilitation."39 The authoritarian rulers
can continue to use state resources to resist social pressure.
In fact, authoritarian rulers' first responses always seem to
be repression. In such a situation, the democratic movement
might be crushed or weakened.
Even on the demand-side of democratization, the process
the society uses to articulate its demand and put pressure on
39
Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading,
Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1978), 100.
19
the authoritarian regime, the condition-oriented theories'
explanation is oversimplified.
Democracy is like a public good40 for most people in a
society.41 Because of the characteristics of public goods,
Mancur Olson argues that each individual in that group will
tend to avoid bearing the costs of providing that good.42 To
overcome the "problem of collective action," Olson argues that
a few people must provide the resources and bear the costs if
the public good is to be provided. For these people the "gain
from having the collective good exceeds the total cost of
providing some amount of that collective good."43
Olson's
theory
has
pointed
out
the weakness
of the
condition-oriented theories. These theories do not have a
clear argument of how people who have the interest in seeing
that democracy is provided can form a collective pressure on
authoritarian government. They just assume that people in the
40
A public or collective good is defined by Mancur Olson
as "any good such that, if any person XI, . . . .Xi, . . . .Xn
consumes it, it cannot feasibly be withheld from the others in
that group...in other words, those who do not purchase or pay
for any of the public or collective good cannot be excluded or
kept from sharing in the consumption of the good, as they can
where noncollective goods are concerned." See Mancur Olson,
The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of
Groups (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 1415.
41
However, for some persons such as the opposition leaders
under an authoritarian regime, democracy is a private good.
Once democracy is built up, they will have a better
opportunity to own ruling power than most people.
42
Ibid., 16.
43
Ibid., 34.
20
society will automatically act collectively to pursue the goal
of democracy once they acquire that interest as a result of
the appearance of favorable objective conditions. For example,
Lerner argues that people will have opinions on public matters
-due to increase in their literacy and thus impose pressure on
the government.44 Deutsch also argues that people will have
many new needs as a result of rapid social mobilization and
generate
pressure
institutions
on
government
for
changing
political
and practices.45 However, Olson's theory has
shown that a rational actor may not automatically contribute
to the fulfillment of that goal even though he has an interest
in
its fulfillment. He simply may become a free-rider.
Moreover,
as
argued
above, the
regime
leaders
will
use
coercive means to suppress the demand for democracy. This will
further reduce the individual's incentive to participate in
collective action that pressures the government into promoting
democratization.
To overcome the collective action problem, Charles Tilly
also argues that mobilization and organization are needed.46
These two tasks require the leadership of political elites who
use different types of resources to increase the incentives
for
the
masses
to
join
in
their
struggle
against
the
authoritarian regime. Therefore, the leadership of political
"Lerner, 64.
45
Deutsch, 498.
46
Tilly, 54-55.
21
elites is indispensable for promoting democratization.
The condition-oriented theories have failed to discuss
the role of elite leadership. For Lerner and Deutsch, people's
participation
in politics
is automatic once they acquire
participant attitudes. They do not mention the leadership of
the political elites. For Marx and Moore, the unit of analysis
and social action is class. For example, Moore says that "this
book endeavors to explain the varied political roles played by
the landed upper class and the peasantry in the transformation
from agrarian societies to modern industrial ones."47 They,
but especially Marx, both agree that people act collectively
to pursue their class interests once they realize their class
interests. Neither
of them
emphasizes
the
leadership
of
political elites in mobilizing people to oppose authoritarian
regimes.
The
condition-oriented
providing
correlative,
theories have
static,
the weakness
deterministic,
of
society-
oriented, and class-based analysis of democratization. All
these weaknesses are mainly due to their neglecting the roles
played
by
opposition.
political
The
elites
in both
actor-oriented
the
theories
regime
and
are presumed
the
to
correct the weakness of the condition-oriented theories. I
will turn to them now.
"Moore, xi.
22
The Actor-Oriented Theories
The actor-oriented
theories are both
alternative
and
supplementary theories to the condition-oriented theories.
They emphasize the choices and actions of the regime elites
and the opposition elites in exploring democratization. As
Adam Przeworski observes, these theories "tend to concentrate
on
political
actors
and
their
strategies,
to
emphasize
interests and perceptions, and to formulate problems in terms
of possibilities and choices."48 It should be noted, however,
that
actor-oriented
theories do not deny the effects of
objective conditions. For these theories, objective conditions
constitute the environment in which the political actors act,
and the constraints on the actors in taking actions and making
choices. Yet, contrary to condition-oriented theories, actororiented theories assert that
completely
"determine"
the
objective conditions do not
actions
of
the
actors.
As
Przeworski points out, "objective factors constitute at most
constraints
to that
which
is possible
under
a
concrete
historical situation but do not determine the outcome of such
a
situation."49
These
objective
conditions
are
only
"constraints" on the actors' actions. They leave room for the
actors to have their own interests and to take actions to
pursue their interests.
48
Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the
Transitions to Democracy," in O'Donnell, Transition from
Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, 47.
49
Ibid., 48.
23
The basic reason for the limitation of the objective
conditions' effects is that actors can think and have their
own interests. In Alexander Wendt's words,
social structures have an inherently discursive dimension
in the sense that they are inseparable from the reasons
and self-understandings that agents bring to their
actions.... It does mean that the existence and operation
of social structures are dependent upon human selfunderstandings; it also means that social structures
acquire their causal efficacy only through the medium of
practical consciousness and action.50
Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter also make
the same arguments. They say that "the actors' perception of
this very abnormality surrounding regime change is itself a
factor affecting its eventual outcomes."51 The impact of the
objective
conditions
must
work
through
the
decisions
actors. The actors' perception and interpretation
of
of the
objective conditions will influence the conditions'' effects.
The same objective conditions may mean different things to
different actors. The actors also have their own ideologies
and interests. All these objective and subjective factors will
influence the actors' final decisions.
Without
denying
the
constraints
of
the
objective
conditions, all the actor-oriented theories emphasize the
political elites' roles in explaining democratization. In
50
Alexander E. Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in
International Relations Theory," International Organization
41, no. 3 (Summer 1987): 359.
51
Guillermo
O'Donnell
and Philippe
C. Schmitter,
Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions
about Uncertain Democracies
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1986), 4.
24
addition to this theme, there are four other major claims
argued by the actor-oriented theories.
First, all of them emphasize the "uncertainty" of the
transition to democracy. From the beginning of democratization
until its completion, the actors' interest and power change
dramatically. It is difficult for the actors to have complete
information in making decisions and to predict the outcome of
their actions. They may make wrong choices and jeopardize
democratization. As O'Donnell and Schmitter argue,
such a theory would have to include elements of accidents
and unpredictability, of crucial decisions taken in a
hurry with very inadequate information, of actors facing
irresolvable ethnic dilemmas and ideological confusions,
of dramatic turning points reached and passed without an
understanding of their future significance.52
Second, actor-oriented theories argue that the division of
the ruling elites and the alliance between some of them and
the opposition are the major causes for the beginning of
democratization.
Third, actor-oriented theorists believe that negotiation
and compromise among political elites with different political
positions are crucial for the progress of democratization.
Compromise among the political elites will facilitate the
conservatives' relinquishment of power, the creation of new
democratic institutions, and the respect of all political
elites for such institutions.
Fourth, the actor-oriented theories argue that political
Ibid., 3-4.
25
elites will design the new democratic institutions in a way
that serves their best interests.
Dankwart Rustow has made a model for explaining successful
democratization. His work represents an early contribution to
developing an actor-oriented analysis of democratization. He
criticizes the correlative analysis of democratization and
develops
a dynamic model
of democratization. For him, a
nation's democratization can be divided into four stages: the
background condition, the preparatory phase, the decision
phase, and the habituation phase.
The
only
national
background
unity.53
This
condition
is
the
that
only
Rustow
lists
similarity
is
between
Rustow's argument and those of condition-oriented theories.
Yet in the second and third stages, according to Rustow,
political elites play crucial roles. During the preparatory
stage, political elites mobilize the depressed people to
struggle against the authoritarian regime. He says:
the dynamic process of democratization itself is set off
by a prolonged and inconclusive political struggle. Such
a struggle is likely to begin as the result of the
emergence of a new elite that arouses a depressed and
previously
leaderless social group into concerted
action.54
During
the
decision
phase,
the
contending
political
leaders decide to end the conflict and create new democratic
institutions. As Rustow argues,
!
Rustow, 350.
Ibid., 352.
26
what concludes the preparatory phase is a deliberate
decision on the part of political leaders to accept the
existence of diversity in unity and, to that end, to
institutionalize some crucial aspect of democratic
procedure.55
During the last stage, the political leaders learn to
coexist peacefully under the new democratic institutions.
Their confidence in the new democratic institutions and their
habituation in resorting to them to solve major political and
social conflicts are crucial for the consolidation of the new
polity.56
During the last three stages, Rustow always emphasizes
that "many things can go wrong"57 and that the later stage
will not "flow automatically" from the former stages.58
O'Donnell and Schmitter have recently made an important
contribution to the development of actor-oriented theories.
After studying democratization in Southern European and Latin
American nations, they conclude that political elites have
played crucial roles. According to O'Donnell and Schmitter,
the
beginning
of
democratization
is
usually
caused
by
divisions among authoritarian elites who propose different
policies to deal with societal demands for democracy. They
say:
we assert that there is no transition whose beginning is
55
Ibid., 355.
56
Ibid., 358.
57
Ibid., 355.
58
Ibid., 357.
27
not the consequence—direct or indirect—of important
divisions within the authoritarian
regime itself,
principally along the fluctuating cleavage between hardliners and soft-liners.59
The soft-liners realize that the regime will have to
depend on electoral legitimation for its survival in the
future.60 They thus start to respond to the social demand for
democracy. This is how liberalization begins. During and after
liberalization,
the
opposition
would
demand
further
democratization. The soft-liners also find that their interest
will be damaged if the process of liberalization reverses,
because then the hard-liners would purge soft-liners for their
treachery.61 Therefore, the soft-liners will ally with the
opposition
to
promote
further
democratization.
As
democratization goes on, the power balance gradually moves
favorably
toward
the
soft-liners
and the
opposition
and
democratization will continue.
O'Donnell and Schmitter also argue that the creation of
pacts
is
important
for
facilitating
the
progress
of
transition. A pact, according to them, is
an explicit, but not always publicly explicated or
justified, agreement among a select set of actors which
seeks to define (or better, to redefine) rules governing
the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees
for the "vital interests" of those entering into it.62
59
0'Donnell, Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative
Conclusions, 19.
60
Ibid., 16.
61
Ibid., 25.
62
Ibid., 37.
28
The pact is used to reduce the intensity of conflict among all
the important groups during the transition. It also increases
the
willingness
of
competing
actors,
especially
the
extremists, to soften their positions and compromise with each
other. The creation of pacts relies on the efforts of the
political leaders. As O'Donnell and Schmitter argue, "they
(pacts) are typically negotiated among a small number of
participants
representing
established
(and
often
highly
oligarchical) groups or institutions."63
After the power balance gradually moves toward favoring
the alliance of the soft-liners and the opposition, a civil
society will emerge. Many important social groups such as
trade unions, religious groups and intellectuals' associations
will emerge and support democratization. Once a civil society
appears, the new democratic
institutions are created and
democratization is completed.
Adam Przeworski also thinks that political actors have
played
important
roles
in the democratic
transitions
in
Eastern European and Latin American nations. He, too, thinks
that the division of the ruling elites is the crucial factor
for the beginning of democratization. Przeworski argues that
the loss of legitimacy does not necessarily bring down the
authoritarian regime. Fear of the regime's coercive capacity
will dissuade the people from acting on their collective
Ibid, 38.
29
opposition to the regime.64
It is usually a split within the
regime elite that encourages people, who now
find their
potential ally within the regime, to publicly oppose the
regime. Przeworski does not deny the effects of social demands
in inducing the reformers to oppose the hard-liners. He says:
liberalization is a result of an interaction between
splits in the authoritarian regime and autonomous
organization of the civil society. Popular mobilization
signals to the potential liberalizers the possibility of
an alliance that could change the relations of forces
within the power bloc to their advantage; visible split in
the power bloc indicate to their civil society that
political space may have been opened for autonomous
organization.65
Once
liberalization
starts,
its
development
into
democratization will depend on negotiation and cooperation
among political leaders. Przeworski argues that cooperation
between the reformers within the regime and the moderates of
the
opposition
is
crucial
for
a peaceful
democracy.66 He says that "extrication
transition
to
(of the society from
the authoritarian regime) can result only from understanding
between
reformers
and
moderates."67
The
design
of
new
democratic institutions also depends on negotiations among
political leaders.68
64
Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and
Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 54-55.
65
Ibid., 57.
66
Ibid., 68.
"Ibid.
68
Ibid., 80.
30
Giuseppe
Southern
Di Palma, after
European
political
studying
nations, also
leaders. He
democratization
emphasizes
too makes
the
same
the
in
roles of
argument
that
democratization usually begins as divisions emerge within
authoritarian regimes.69 Subsequently, according to Di Palma,
the strategies
of political
leaders
are crucial
for the
completion of democratization. He uses the term "crafting" to
show the importance of the political leaders' efforts in
promoting democratization. Crafting, says Di Palma, includes
(1) the quality of the finished product (the particular
democratic rules and institutions that are chosen among
the many availables; (2) the mode of decision makings
leading to the selection of rules and institutions (paths
and negotiations versus unilateral action); (3) the type
of "craftsman" involved (the alliance and coalitions
forged in the transition); and (4) the timing imposed on
the various tasks and stages of the transition.70
Obviously,
according
to
Di
Palma,
the
interactions
of
political leaders, in addition to the timing and the content
of their decisions, "ultimately
influence the success of
transition. "71
Among the strategies used by political leaders, Di Palma
especially emphasizes the "inclusiveness," which he calls
garantismo,
of
all
the
competing
groups.
He
says
that
"garantismo should often imply the formation—ad-hoc, formal,
"Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracy: An Essay on
Democratic Transitions (Berkeley: University California Press,
1990), 34.
70
Ibid., 9.
71
Ibid.
31
or implicit—of broad and inclusive constitutional coalitions,
reaching
the
peripheries
of
the
spectrum."72
political
Through the strategy of garantismo, all the important groups'
interests
can
be
taken
care
of
during
the
process
of
democratization. Consequently, the competing groups will not
resort to extreme means in pursuing their goals. Furthermore,
they will respect decisions made by political leaders and the
new democratic rules and institutions.73
The
actor-oriented
theory,
by
emphasizing
political
elites' choices under the constraints of objective conditions,
is a supplement to condition-oriented theory. Actor-oriented
theories
in essence
synthesize
the
factors
of
objective
conditions and political actors. Therefore, actor-oriented
theories are more useful than condition-oriented theories in
explaining democratization. Actor-oriented theories can offer
a
strong
causal analysis
of the beginning, process, and
outcome of democratization. They are not deterministic, and
consider both state and society in explaining democratization.
Thus they provide a better fit with the empirical facts than
do condition-oriented theories.
This study of Taiwan's democratization will thus rely on
the actor-oriented approach. It will show that the choices,
power structures, and ideologies of political leaders, as well
as
objective
socioeconomic
conditions
72
Ibid., 56.
73
Ibid., 54-58.
32
have
significantly
affected Taiwan's democratization. However, the research also
leads me to argue that political institutions, specifically
elections, electoral laws, and the constitution, also had a
significant effect on Taiwan's transition to democracy.
The Roles of Political Institutions
The effects of political institutions on politics and the
economy have been widely studied in recent years.74 However,
they
have
rarely
been
stressed
in the
study
of
regime
transitions. The condition-oriented theories totally ignore
the effects of political institutions in much the same way
that they ignore the roles of political actors. Actor-oriented
theories pay only a little attention to the influence of
74
For example, James G. March and Johan P. Olsen have
provided a general study of institutions and their impact. See
James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions:
The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: The Free
Press, 1989); James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The New
Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life,"
American Political Science Review 78, no. 3 (September 1984):
734-749. For the political effects of political institutions,
see, for example, Stephen D. Krasner, "Sovereignty: An
Institutional Perspective, " Comparative Political Studies, 21,
no. 1 (1988): 66-94; Juan J. Linz, "The Perils of
Presidentialism," Journal of Democracy 1, no. 1 (Winter 1990):
51-69; Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart, eds., Electoral
Laws and Their Political Consequences (New York: Agathon
Press, 1986). For the economic effects of political
institutions, see, for example, Stephan Haggard, Pathways from
the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly
Industrializing Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1990); G. John Ikenberry, "Conclusion: An Institutional
Approach to American Foreign Economic Policy," in G. John
Ikenberry, David A. Lake, and Michael Mastanduno, eds., The
State and American Foreign Economic Policy (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1988), 219-43; Stephen D. krasner, ed.,
International Regimes (Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 1983).
33
political institutions. For example, Rustow and Przeworski do
not emphasize political institutions. Even if some actororiented theories mention political institutions, they tend to
think that political institutions are outcomes of the choices
of political elites, who are the most important explanatory
variable in these theories. For example, Di Palma argues that
political elites can design proper political institutions to
facilitate inclusiveness and compromise.75
It is understandable for regime-transition theories to
ignore political institutions. Most studies of the effects of
institutions concentrate on events which happen
during the
"normal" period. Institutions must first come into being, and
exist for some time, in order for them to exercise their
effects. The transition of a regime can be considered as the
transition from existing political institutions toward new
ones. Before the new political institutions are stabilized,
there seems to be little reason to explore their effects on
political and economic development.
However, this does not mean that there is no need to
discuss the influence of political institutions during regime
transition. As pointed out by Di Palma, "transitions tend to
originate nowadays from the efforts of autocratic governments
to extricate themselves."76
The sudden breakdown
of the
existing regime and immediate buildup of totally new political
75
Di Palma, 55.
76
Ibid., 48.
34
institutions
is rare
in recent cases of democratization.
Therefore, even during the period of transition, political
institutions exercise their influence. They will continue to
constrain political elites' choices and interactions. This is
especially
During
true when
the
period
liberalization
of
has already
liberalization,
some
started.
democratic
institutions and rules of the game have been created. These
semi-democratic political institutions will have an important
impact on later stages of transition to democracy.
In my study of Taiwan, I find that political institutions
have
played
conditions,
two
types
political
of
roles.
First,
institutions
like
have
objective
constituted
constraints on political elites' actions. They have shaped
political
elites'
ideology
and
preference,
and
have
constrained the range of choices that they could make, as in
the example of the ROC constitution. Second, through their own
institutional mechanisms, political institutions mediate and,
sometimes, distort the effects of objective conditions on
political
elites. They have
significantly
influenced
the
distribution of capacities among political elites, as in the
example of elections and electoral laws.
Based on the above observation, we may argue that there is
an interactive causal relation between political institutions
and political elites' choices during democratization. As G.
John Ikenberry argues, "a dependent variable at Tl may become
35
an independent or intervening variable at T2."77 Responding
to
the
changing
objective
conditions,
political
elites
redesign the existing political institutions. They will create
new democratic institutions in a way that fulfills their
advantage and reflects their ideology. Once new democratic
institutions
are chosen, they will function to constrain
political elites' later choices and the distribution of power
among them. The new democratic institutions will thus have a
strong impact on the process and outcome of democratization.
The result of institutional design will not just distinguish
democracy from authoritarian rule. More importantly, it will
decide which type of democracy a country will have.
Therefore, in my dissertation, I will use the factors of
political elites and political institutions to supplement the
factor of socioeconomic conditions78 in explaining Taiwan's
democratization.
A Preview of Conclusions
Several major conclusions derived from the case of Taiwan
can be used as hypotheses to be tested in case analysis of
other countries. To facilitate the exposition of the empirical
information regarding the Taiwanese case in the subsequent
chapters,
I will
list
these
major
conclusions
here, in
77
Ikenberry, "Conclusion," 225.
78
As pointed out in the preface and as will be further
discussed in chapter 2, favorable objective conditions have
existed in Taiwan since the early 1970s.
36
advance.
(1) Economic development does lead some people to demand
democracy. Yet successful economic development also enhances
the regime's legitimacy due to the improvement of people's
economic
conditions.
Through
the
process
of
economic
development, the regime also strengthens its control over the
society by incorporating some of its major sectors into the
state and increasing their reliance on the state. Therefore,
the pressure for democratization that would have been expected
by the level of economic development has been partially offset
by an increase in the regime's legitimacy and its control over
society.
(2)
people
Economic
to
act
development
collectively
will
to
not
automatically
pressure
the
regime
lead
into
democratization. The strength of popular pressure also depends
on the
leadership
of
opposition
elites. The
existence
of
elections further enhances the opposition elites' opportunity
and incentives to mobilize and organize popular pressure on
the regime.
(3) Electoral systems work to transform social preferences
into
political
power.
Therefore,
they
can
influence
the
distribution of political power between the regime and the
opposition during democratization. The electoral system used
in Taiwan
is a Single Nontransferable Vote system.
It has
paradoxical dual effects of facilitating the emergence of an
opposition and helping the ruling regime maintain its majority
37
power.
(4) The popular pressure organized by the opposition is by
itself
not
enough
to
bring
about
democratization.
Given
popular pressure, democratization will begin only when the
regime leaders are willing to let it happen. There are several
reasons for regime elites to make that decision. These reasons
may appear separately or at the same time.
First, the regime suffers serious failure in its important
policies which causes its legitimacy to drop significantly. To
restore its legitimacy, the regime leaders may promote limited
democratization in exchange for the people's support.
Second, regime leaders think that the cost of suppression
is
increasing
even
though
they
can
still
suppress
the
opposition's challenge.79 In the expectation that they may be
unable to bear the suppression costs in the near future, they
may take preemptive action to promote limited democratization
to diffuse the pressure from the opposition and enhance the
regime's chances for survival in the future.
Third, a succession of power occurs in the regime. In
order to succeed in a power struggle within the regime, some
of the contending elites may support limited democratization
in order to attract the support of the people.
(5) The'power structure of political leaders does not just
79
Similar arguments have also been made by Robert Dahl.
He says that "The likelihood that a government will tolerate
an opposition increases as the expected costs of suppression
increase." See Dahl, Polyarchy, 15.
38
affect the beginning of democratization; it also significantly
influences the process of democratization. To ensure the
continuity of democratization, a winning coalition that is
pro-democracy must appear.80
It can facilitate compromise
between
opposition,
the
regime
and
the
and
exclude
the
interference of conservatives and radicals. The pro-democracy
winning coalition can be comprised of (a) one dominant reform
leader in the regime, (b) a coalition of
reformers in the
regime, or (c) a coalition of reformers in the regime and
moderates in the opposition.
(6) There is an interaction between the power structure of
the political leaders and the strategies that they implement.
The regime and the opposition will employ moderate strategies
in their
struggle against
each other when reformers and
moderates win the respective power struggles in the regime and
opposition
camps.
In
this
scenario,
the
transition
to
democracy will be peaceful and it will probably succeed.
80
Used ex post facto, the term "winning coalition"
obviously runs a risk of circularity. In countries where
democratization succeeded, pro-democracy forces prevailed over
the conservatives in a power struggle. However, it is not
possible to specify generally, formally, and ex ante the
conditions that make these coalitions "winning," in part
because formal rules of the game have not yet been established
in democratizing countries. Pro-democracy forces typically
prevail over the conservatives by relying on informal factors,
such as a dominant leader's authority, military support, or
large scale street demonstrations. Therefore it is difficult
to use objective criteria, such as seats in the parliament, to
predict the victory of a political force in advance. We can
identify a winning coalition only after we have seen that its
preferences prevail, for example, whether democratization is
promoted or crushed.
39
Conversely, the regime and the opposition will both employ
extreme strategies when conservatives and radicals win the
respective power struggles in the regime and opposition camps.
In this scenario, the transition to democracy will be violent
and it will probably fail.
The extreme strategies used by the regime toward the
opposition, due to the victory of conservatives in the regime,
may cause radicals to win the power struggle against the
moderates in the opposition camp. Conversely,
conciliatory
strategies used by the regime may cause the moderates to
consolidate their power in the opposition camp. Similarly, the
strategies used by the opposition can also affect the power
structure in the regime.
(7) The political
leaders' choices of new democratic
institutions are influenced by their ideologies, calculations
of the costs and benefits that the political institutions will
generate, and existing political institutions.
The Content of the Dissertation
The second chapter will introduce the process of economic
development,
the
socioeconomic
conditions
that
it
has
promoted, and state-society relations in Taiwan. The third and
fourth chapters will discuss the political institutions of
elections
and
electoral
laws,
and
their
impact
on
the
distribution of political power between the KMT regime and the
opposition. The fifth chapter will introduce the history of
the development of the opposition and explore the roles of the
40
political elites in that process from 1949 to 1983. The sixth
chapter will discuss the factors that led Chiang Ching-kuo to
permit the beginning of democratization (liberalization) in
Taiwan in 1986. The seventh chapter will discuss the impact of
the power succession and subsequent change in the KMT regime's
power structure, after Chiang died. The eighth chapter will
discuss the factors that influence constitutional
reform,
during which new political institutions are created. The last
chapter
will
sum
up
the
findings
concerning
Taiwan's
democratization and compare these with the experiences of
Spain, South Korea, the Soviet Union, and China. A speculation
on the prospects for democratization and democracy in Taiwan
will conclude that chapter.
Research Method and Data
The
research methods
used
in my
dissertation
are a
combination of case study and comparative historical analysis.
In
order
to
provide
a
causal
analysis
of
Taiwan's
democratization, I first present an intensive case study of
Taiwan and examine its political history. I will then compare
Taiwan's historical experience with those of Spain, the Soviet
Union, China, and South Korea.
The primary data for Taiwan include newspapers, magazines,
governmental
publications,
and
interviews
with
political
leaders. The secondary data include empirical surveys and
studies
conducted
by
other
scholars.
The data
on
other
countries will be gathered by relying on other scholars'
41
research.(Appendices listing detailed sources of materials are
available at the end of the dissertation.)
42
CHAPTER 2
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
As argued in chapter 1, socioeconomic conditions will
constrain
political
beginning
and
elites'
prospect
of
actions
and
influence
democratization.
the
Socioeconomic
conditions in Taiwan have undergone a drastic change due to
rapid economic development. Among them, ethnic
and class
cleavages are most important. These changing socioeconomic
conditions have facilitated the beginning of democratization,
but they have also enabled the KMT leaders to manipulate its
progress.
This
chapter
first
introduces
the
history
of
economic development in Taiwan from 1949 to the present. It
then discusses the changing socioeconomic conditions that
resulted from economic development, especially the class and
ethnic cleavages. In the final section, the
relationship
between state and society in Taiwan is examined.
The History of Economic Development
Taiwan's economic development can be divided into several
stages during which different strategies were adopted by the
KMT regime.
(1) Land Reform, 1949-1953. The first stage of economic
development lasted from 194 9 to 1953. Land reform was the
43
major strategy enacted by the KMT regime. It proceeded through
three major steps: First, rent was reduced from about 50
percent
of produced
crops to
37.5 percent.
Second,
the
government accelerated the selling of public lands to the land
cultivators and the landless tenants. Third, under the Landto-the-Tiller
Act,
the
landlords
were
forced
to
sell
agricultural holdings over three hectares to the government at
prices that were 2.5 times the annual yield. The government
then
sold those
price.81
Land
lands to landless peasants
reform
was
successful
in
at th
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