University of Toronto Political Science Essay

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Question: Are democracies more likely to be consolidated when elites play a larger or smaller role during the process of democratic transition? You MUST use three out of four cases from Republican China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.

Read the Journal of Democracy article from Andreas Schedler titled, “What is Democratic Consolidation?” You don’t have to use all the concepts of democratic consolidation he mentions in the piece (see Figure at the end of the article), but start your discussion with one or two that best fit your cases. 

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INFORMATION TO USERS This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer. The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book. Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order. UMI University Microfilms International A Bell & Howell Information ComDany 300 North Zeeb Road. Ann Arbor. Ml 48106-1346 USA 313/761-4700 800/521-0600 Order Number 9235218 D e m o c r a t i z a t i o n in Taiwan: The interaction of structure, political institutions, and political elites Wang, Kao-cheng, Ph.D. University of Pennsylvania, 1992 Copyright ©1992 by Wang, Kao-cheng. All rights reserved. U-M- 300N.ZeebRd. Ann Arbor, MI 48106 DEMOCRATIZATION IN TAIWAN: THE INTERACTION OF STRUCTURE, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, AND POLITICAL ELITES Kao-cheng Wang A DISSERTATION in Political Science Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 1992 COPYRIGHT Kao-cheng Wang 1992 To My Parents: Kuo-hua Wang and Wan-peng Shao iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This work could not have been completed assistance without the of many persons. Among them, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my major advisor Professor Jack Nagel. It was he who encouraged me to pursue this subject when I first brought it to his attention three years ago. Professor Nagel has carefully read my numerous drafts and has given me many insightful comments throughout my dissertation writing effort. As a result of his advice, this work was set on the right direction and was substantially improved from its first draft. Professors Thomas M. Callaghy and Peter A. Swenson also served on my dissertation committee. They, too, gave me many invaluable comments which further improved this work. Professors Chong-sik Lee, Avery Goldstein, Michaela W. Richter, and Susan Naquin also provided helpful suggestions when I prepared the proposal for this dissertation. Also invaluable to me have been the teachings of professors Jack Nagel, Joanne Gowa, Friedrich Kratochwil, Avery Goldstein, and Peter A. Swenson. These teachers have tremendously enlightened my understanding in some subjects of political science and have given me training and knowledge that will be an asset for the rest of my life. For help in providing the funds needed to complete my iv courses and conduct the research for my dissertation, I would like to thank the Chairman of the Political Science Department of the University of Pennsylvania, Professor Oliver P. Williams. Mindy Brown and Susan Pomeran helped proofread a large part of this dissertation, while my classmates at Penn Amir Pasic, Jean-Marc Blanchard, and Shreedevi Thacker helped with the rest. Other classmates offered me friendship and academic assistance that supported me through the writing of this dissertation. They are Hak-soon Paik, Jong-chan Rhee, Rosanna Perotti, Arvid Lukauskas, Fang Ji, Abraham James, Hyuk-sang Sohn, Ian Hemphill, Cathleen Compton, Lisa Moore, and Taegun Moon. Political Arrington and Science Department Calli Berg have staff members also given me Eleanor valuable administrative assistance. Finally, I would like to share my academic accomplishment at Penn with my wife Ya-ling Liu. Her encouragement and assistance enabled me to concentrate on my research and to complete the writing of my dissertation in a relatively short amount of time. v ABSTRACT Democratization in Taiwan: The Interaction of Structure, Political Institutions, and Political Elites Kao-cheng Wang Jack Nagel This There dissertation are two major condition-oriented oriented explores types Taiwan's of democratization. democratization theories: and actor-oriented theories. Condition- theories emphasize the role of change in socioeconomic conditions in fostering democratization. Such theories, because they neglect the roles of political elites, have the weakness of providing correlative, static, deterministic, society-oriented, and class-based analysis of democratization. Actor-oriented theories, on the other hand, stress the influence of socioeconomic change and political elites' choices in driving democratization. This dissertation argues that, in addition to considering socioeconomic conditions and political elites, one must also look at the constraints posed by political institutions in order to explain democratization in Taiwan. Societal pressures for democratization emerged in Taiwan because of favorable socioeconomic conditions, institutional protection of elections, and the leadership of opposition vi elites. Economic development, however, also strengthened the Kuomintang (KMT) regime's control over society. The Single Nontransferable Vote electoral system used in Taiwan has constrained the opposition and maintained the KMT's hegemonic power. The beginning of democratization in Taiwan was caused by Chiang Ching-kuo's illness, drop in the legitimacy of the KMT, and opposition institutional pressures. constraints Socioeconomic (the constitution conditions, and electoral laws), and the choices, power, ideology, and interactions of political elites have substantially influenced the process and outcome of democratization in Taiwan, with the result that the KMT has dominated the process of democratization and is likely to continue in a hegemonic position during the foreseeable future. The major arguments derived from my study of the Taiwanese case are validated by comparing it with Spain, South Korea, the Soviet Union, and China. VII TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iv ABSTRACT vi TABLE OF CONTENTS viii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ix LIST OF TABLES x PREFACE xii Chapter 1. DEFINITIONS AND THEORIES 2. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 43 3. PRE-DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS 73 4. THE ELECTORAL LAWS 97 5. THE OPPOSITION BEFORE 1985 127 6. THE BEGINNING OF DEMOCRATIZATION, 1986-1987 156 DEMOCRATIZATION DURING A POWER SUCCESSION, 1988-1989 186 8. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, 1990-1991 215 9. CONCLUSION AND COMPARISON 252 7. 1 (Appendix) 2 95 (Bibliography) 2 97 viii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ALYM Added Legislative Yuan Member BATC Backup Association for Tangwai Candidates CYP China Youth Party DPP Democratic Progressive Party DSP Democratic Socialist Party FATEW Friendship Association of the Tangwai Editors and Writors FCF Free China Fortnightly KMT Kuomintang SNTV Single Nontransferable Vote TRAPP Tangwai Research Association for Public Policies ix LIST OF TABLES Table 2-1. 2-2. 2-3. 2-4. 2-5. 2-6. 2-7. 3-1. 3-2. 3-3. 3-4. 3-5. 3-6. Page Industrial Growth Rate and Change in the Structure of Trade in Taiwan, 1952-1986.. 46 Employment Pattern in Taiwan, 1951-1988 (as a Percentage of the Labor Force) 49 National Income Per Capita and Annual Growth Rate in Taiwan, 1951-1988 (at Current Price) 50 Income of Household—Percent Distribution by Quintile in Taiwan, 1954-1988 51 Selected Indices of Modern Material Goods in Taiwan, 1952-1984 (Possession per Thousand Persons) 52 The Educational Level of Residents Over Sixteen Year Old in Taiwan, 1951-1988.... 52 Distribution of Important Political Positions among Taiwanese and Mainlanders, 1987 62 Ethnic Background and Partisan Distribution of Provincial Assemblymen in Taiwan, 1954-1985 76 Ethnic Background and partisan Distribution of County Magistrates and City Mayors in Taiwan, 1950-1985 76 Ethnic Background and Partisan Distribution of County and City Councilors in Taiwan, 1950-1986 77 Ethnic Background and Partisan Distribution of Subcounty Chiefs in Taiwan, 19501986 77 The Distribution of Seats among Four Groups of Added Legislative Yuan Members, 19721989 Proportion of Added Members to the Total Members in the Legislative Yuan, 19801989 x 84 87 Partisan Distribution of the Added Legislative Yuan Members in Taiwan, 1972-1989 93 Partisan Distribution of Seats for County and City Councilors in Taiwan, 19501968 (number/ratio) 104 The Average District Magnitude for County and City Councilors in Taiwan, 19501968 104 The Average District Magnitude and Advantage Ratio of Parties in the Elections of the Added Legislative Yuan Members, 1972-1989 106 The Average Ratios of Parties in Selected House of Representatives Elections in Japan, 1947-1983 (%) 117 The Central Government Proposed by the DPP. 22 6 The Central Government in the Five-Yuan System 229 Comparison of the DPP and the KMT Reform Proposals 233 Regime Elite Choices and the Outcomes of Democratization in Five Countries 270 XI PREFACE Since the mid-1970s, there has been a strong world-wide tendency toward the democratization of authoritarian regimes. This phenomenon has occurred in Latin America, Southern Europe, Asia, and some countries in Africa. The collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 198 9 and the Soviet Union in 1991 demonstrates that this world-wide movement of democratization has reached its peak. These transformations have attracted the attention of many political scientists and drawn them to study the issue of democratization again. Taiwan has also gradually moved towards democracy since the early 1970s, and this process has accelerated since 1986. In contrast to many other countries' experiences, Taiwan's democratization has shown three interesting puzzles which will be explored in this study. First, compared to Taiwan's level of economic development, the period between 1970 and 1985 was marked by only limited democratization. As a result of a decade's rapid economic development in the 19 60s, Taiwan had an industrial, modern, and pluralistic development in society Taiwan in has the early generated 1970s. Economic increasing societal demands for democracy, but the level of social pressure was not strong enough to force the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) regime to initiate large-scale democratization until 1986. Only limited democratization was offered in Taiwan in the early 1970s and its progress was slow in the period spanning 1970xii 1985. This process was even reversed for a short period in the late 1970s when the opposition movement was crushed by the KMT regime. It accelerated was only after significantly. The 1986 that democratization first puzzle that I will address is the question of why there was a time lag between the appearance of favorable socioeconomic conditions and the emergence of rapid democratization in Taiwan in the period between 1970 and 1985? Second, the opposition in Taiwan did not present an immediate threat to the survival of the KMT regime in 1986. Consequently, the opposition by itself was not strong enough to force the KMT to accelerate democratization on a large scale in 1986. The second puzzle then is why would the KMT regime promote rapid democratization in 1986 when there was no immediate threat to its survival from outside the regime? Third, the KMT regime did not collapse or lose its ruling power after democratization began in 1986 and there has been no serious political and social unrest in Taiwan during this recent process of democratization. The third puzzle I will look at is what factors have influenced the process and outcome of democratization in Taiwan so that the KMT remained in power after 1986? In addition to these three puzzles, the conclusion of this study will also speculate about what type of democracy can one expect to emerge from such a democratization in Taiwan? These puzzles show the theoretical weakness of conditionxiii oriented theories to explain democratization. Instead , this study argues that it is necessary to consider a nation's political institutions and the role of its political elites, in addition to its socioeconomic conditions, to be able to solve these puzzles. Favorable socioeconomic conditions and the electoral system Nontransferable Vote legitimacy power, and democratization. chairman Chiang The used in system—have and issue Taiwan—the enhanced delayed of Ching-kuo's power the the KMT's beginning succession planning Single of and KMT contributed to accelerated democratization after 1986. The democratization process and outcome are substantially influenced by political institutions and political elites' choices, ideology, and power. The type of democratization in Taiwan may eventually create an incomplete democracy where there is little possibility of the transfer of ruling power and only limited party competition in the near future. xiv CHAPTER 1 DEFINITIONS AND THEORIES In this chapter democratization I will introduce the definitions of and other major concepts adopted in this dissertation. Then I will compare two major types of theories about democratization—condition-oriented theories and actororiented theories. The comparison will show that actor- oriented theories are more powerful than condition-oriented theories for explaining democratization in Taiwan. I will also argue that it is necessary to consider the factors of objective (structural) conditions, political institutions, and political elites to explain a country's democratization. The final section of this chapter will discuss the major arguments derived from Taiwan's democratization and the research method and data on which this dissertation is based. Definitions Democratization in this dissertation means transition from a totalitarian or an authoritarian regime toward a democracy. A totalitarian regime is a political system in which the party state completely penetrates and dominates a politicized society. There is only one party which has monopolized power and controls the state apparatus in that system. The party has 1 a dominant leader, a centralized organization, and a consistent ideology. People in the society are organized, censored and mobilized by the party and they are also indoctrinated by the party's ideology. Through these measures, the dominant leader and party can completely control the state and people in such a political system.1 An authoritarian regime, according to Juan Linz, is a political system with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones.2 Robert Dahl has offered a useful definition of democracy. For him, a polyarchy (democracy) is a regime "that has been substantially popularized and liberalized, that is, highly inclusive and extensively open to public contestation."3 By expanding Dahl's definition, Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour M. Lipset define a democracy as *For a discussion of a totalitarian regime, see Juan J. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, " in Handbook of Political Science, eds. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, vol. 3, Macropolitical Theory (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1975), 187-264. 2 Ibid, 264; see also Juan J. Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: the Case of Spain," in Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology, eds. Eric Allard and Stein Rokkan (New York: Free Press, 1970) . 3 Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 8; see also Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 220. 2 a system of government that meets three essential conditions: meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organized groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force; a highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through regular and fair elections, such that no major (adult) social group is excluded; and a level of civil and political liberties—freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organizations—sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation.4 In addition to the previous three conditions, this study adds a fourth condition to define a complete democracy: the occurrence, at least once, of a peaceful transition of power from the government to the opposition, once the opposition has won an major election.5 Democratization is a matter of degree. A democratizing country can be positioned anywhere along the continuum between a totalitarian regime and a democracy. In order to 4 Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour M. Lipset, eds., Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia, vol. 3 (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), xvi. 5 This condition is necessary for testing whether the government really governs based on people's consent. Even an authoritarian regime may allow political participation and opposition. The difference between it and a democratic regime should be that a democratic regime's ruling elites are willing to step down from their positions and hand over their power peacefully once they lose the support of the majority of people, while an authoritarian regime's ruling elites may refuse to give up their power and cancel people's rights for participation and opposition when they face the real situation that they must relinquish their power. Therefore, a country cannot be said to have a complete democracy unless it has passed the crucial test of having a peaceful alternation of power according to people's will. Judged by this condition, Taiwan and other countries such as Japan where people have full right to participate in political activities and oppose the government have not yet had a complete democracy. 3 describe accurately and explain the progress of a nation's democratization, some scholars have developed the concept of liberalization. According to Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, liberalization means "the process of making effective certain rights that protect both individuals and social groups from arbitrary or illegal acts committed by the state or third parties."6 From their statements, we may say that liberalization mainly refers to the acquisition of certain political liberties by the people. The other dimension of polyarchy—the organization of the opposition and its public competition with the regime for government positions— has not yet been fully recognized at this stage. For these scholars, liberalization represents the first step that an authoritarian regime makes toward democracy and it usually has the effect of triggering further democratization.7 In the following, I will also use the concept of liberalization in pursuing my study. Alternative Theories of Transition to Democracy There are basically two types of theories regarding regime 6 Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rules: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 7; see also Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 6. 7 Ibid., 10. 4 transitions: condition-oriented and actor-oriented theories.8 In the following, I will first introduce the condition- oriented theories and evaluate their validity in explaining regime transition. Then I will move on to discuss the actororiented theories. The Condition-Oriented Theories The main theme of the condition-oriented theories is that they explore regime transitions by focusing on a society's objective (or structural) conditions. These conditions mainly include economic performance, social cleavages, and political culture. These theories argue that objective conditions substantially determine the characteristics of the regime. Therefore, once the regime's objective conditions change, the form of the regime will also change subsequently. Based on this reasoning, the condition-oriented theories further argue that certain objective conditions will favor the emergence of democracy. These conditions usually include economic development, a strong bourgeoisie, high levels of urbanization and education, and a participant political culture. Obviously, Karl Marx's explanation of the emergence of parliamentary democracy is a classic example of the condition8 See Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," in Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, eds. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), 47. Przeworski does not use the terms conditions-oriented and actor-oriented theories. They are created by the author for this study based on Przeworski's arguments. 5 oriented theories. He argues: it is always the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers which reveals the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social structure, and with it...the corresponding specific form of the state.9 The specific form of production generates a specific form of class structure and a corresponding political form. For example, a capitalistic economy and the emergence of the bourgeoisie, according to Marx, create a parliamentary democracy. He says: each step in the development of the bourgeoisie was accompanied by a corresponding political advance of that class...the bourgeoisie has at last, since the establishment of Modern Industry and the world market, conquered for itself, in the modern representative State, exclusive political sway.10 Barrington Moore, though a non-Marxist, also emphasizes the capitalist economy and its corresponding class structure as crucial requisites for the emergence of democracy. In studying the transformation of a traditional agricultural society toward a modern one, Moore argues: among the most decisive determinants influencing the course of subsequent political evolution (toward democracy) are whether or not a landed aristocracy has turned to commercial agriculture and, if so, the form that this commercialization has taken.11 9 Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 3, The Process of Capitalist Production as a Whole, ed. Frederick Engels (New York: International Publishers, 1967), 791. 10 Quote from The Communist Manifesto, reprinted in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1968), 37. n Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 419. 6 The commercialized landed upper class, according to Moore, has a common interest with the emerging bourgeoisie in opposing monarchic absolutism. Subsequently, the bourgeoisie must replace the landed upper class and become the dominant class in the society in order to ensure the emergence of democracy. In Moore's words, it is important that the fusion (of the landed upper class and the bourgeoisie) take place in opposition to the royal bureaucracy. A second condition appears to be that the commercial and industrial leaders must be on their way to becoming the dominant element in society.12 In addition to the classic Marxist thesis, the so-called liberal model of economic and political development has also made the same arguments since the 1950s. Modernization theory of the transformation from a traditional society into a modern one is an explicit example. For example, Daniel Lerner thinks that the emergence of democracy has been closely associated with the process of modernization. He says: urbanization, industrialization, secularization, democratization, education, media participation do not occur in haphazard and unrelated fashion....Our multiple correlations showed them to be so highly associated as to raise the question whether some are genuinely independent factors at all—suggesting that perhaps they went together so regularly because, in some historical sense, they had to go together.13 For him, democracy is not just an aspect of modernization but is also caused by other aspects of modernization. He says 12 Ibid., 425. 13 Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (New York: Free Press, 1958), 438. 7 that "democratic governance comes late, historically, and typically appears as a crowning institution of participant society."14 Through the process of modernization, people will increase their literacy and media exposure, and tend to "have opinions" on public matters. They will actively participate in politics. Democracy thus emerges in the end. Karl Deutsch develops similar arguments. He uses the term social mobilization to change" that happens describe the "overall process of in countries which are experiencing modernization.15 During social mobilization, a large portion of the population is mobilized and will subsequently have a lot of new needs. Under such conditions, Deutsch argues, "the growth in the numbers pressures for the transition institutions."16 pressures of these people produces and The expand regime of political will political then mounting practices submit participation to and and these public services. Seymour M. Lipset has produced very influential research on the relationship between socioeconomic conditions and democracy. His conclusion is that a high level of economic development is favorable to the sustenance of democracy. Lipset says: 14 Ibid., 64. 15 Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review 55, no. 3 (September 1961): 493. 16 Ibid., 498. 8 perhaps the most common generalization linking political systems to the aspects of society has been that democracy is related to the state of economic development. The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy.17 In fact, the characteristics of a nation's economic development, described by Lipset, are similar to the contents of modernization defined by Lerner. Lipset argues that "all the various aspects of economic development— industrialization, urbanization, wealth, and education—are so closely interrelated as to form one major factor."18 And he thinks that this "one major factor" has the "political correlate of democracy."19 Along with the socioeconomic conditions correlated with modernization, some scholars emphasize the effects of national political culture on democracy. For example, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba argue that a "civic culture" favors the stability of democracy. In a civic culture, according to Almond and Verba, "(citizens') participant political orientations combine with and do not replace subject and parochial political orientations."20 Citizens, who have a "Seymour M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," American Political Science Review 53 (March 1963) : 75; see also Seymour M. Lipset, "Economic Development and Democracy," in Political Man (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 31. 18 Ibid., 80. 19 Ibid. 20 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 31. 9 civic culture, will actively participate in politics and pressure governmental officials to account for the citizens' interests in making policies. On the other hand, the civic culture will also make citizens refrain from putting too much pressure on the government, as the civic culture makes them generally accept governmental policies and laws. Therefore, they conclude: Unless the political culture is able to support a democratic system, the chances for the success of that system are slim....The civic culture appears to be particularly appropriate for a democratic political system. It is not the only form of democratic political culture, but it seems to be the one most congruent with a stable, democratic system.21 Critiques of the Condition-Oriented Theories Although the condition-oriented theories have been widely in studying democratization,22 they have accepted several weakness. (1) Some condition-oriented theorists do not offer an effective causal explanation for regime transitions and some of them only provide a correlative analysis. For Marx, development Moore, generates and some Deutsch, societal capitalistic groups who economic have an interest in building a democratic polity and these groups will 21 Ibid., 498. 22 For a list of other scholars' works which adopt the conditions-oriented approach to study democratization, see Tatu Vanhanen, The Process of Democratization: A Comparative Study of 147 States, 1980-88 (New York: Taylor & Francis, 1990), 40-41. 10 pressure an authoritarian government to democratize. However, the transitions of authoritarian democracy represent the authoritarian political power the imposition of to opposition restrictions on toward rulers' cession of and the regimes society, privileges and the of the authoritarian rulers. A crucial question that must be answered in explaining democratization is why the regime's rulers in the face of social pressure are willing to give up their power and privileges. A theory that claims to have an effective causal explanation of democratization must offer explanations for the authoritarian rulers' decisions to give up their power and privileges in addition to arguing that societal groups will press an authoritarian regime to provide democracy. Marx, Moore, and Deutsch only emphasize social pressure on the regime but fail to consider regime elites' calculations and choices. For Lerner, the reasons why authoritarian rulers surrender power are not clear because he only argues that democracy "goes together" with socioeconomic development in the process of modernization.23 Lipset, Almond and Verba do not even bother to consider the authoritarian rulers' decisions on ceding power to the opposition. Their studies are concerned with the conditions for the stability of a democracy after it has come into existence. Lipset says: "Lerner, 46. 11 the main criteria used in this paper to locate European democracies are the uninterrupted continuation of political democracy since World War I. ...The somewhat less stringent criterion employed for Latin America is whether a given country has had a history of more or less free elections for most of the post World War I period.24 For Almond and Verba, the research question asks "is there a democratic political culture—a pattern of political attitudes that fosters democratic stability?"25 And they answer this question by looking at "the political culture in the two relatively stable and successful democracies, Great Britain and the United States."26 Therefore, what they and Lipset have offered is not a causal explanation of the democratic transition but arguments of functional correlation between democracy and other factors. In Dankwart Rustow's terms, they are not genetic theories of democracy.27 The major problem for a correlative explanation is that the direction of influence between the explaining and dependent variables is not clearly indicated.28 For example, it is not clear whether socioeconomic development and civic culture lead to democracy, or vice versa, or both. The condition-oriented theories argue that the former leads to the 24 Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," 73-74. "Almond, 473. 26 Ibid. "Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy," Comparative Politics, no. 2 (April 1970) : 340-43. 28 Ibid., 342. 12 emergence of the later. But, we can also argue that a democracy may facilitate the development of a modern economy and a participant political culture. The data of correlation cannot discredit either of the above arguments. (2) The condition-oriented theories fail to fully explain the process and outcome of democratization. The process and outcome of democratization are no less important than its beginning. The beginning of democratization cannot guarantee its accomplishment in the end. The process of democratization may take a long time and will affect the outcome of democratization. We will miss a very crucial and interesting aspect regarding democratization if we do not study the process of democratization. The last institutionalize stage the of democratization whole process by will be installing to new democratic institutions. Scholars have argued that political institutions have an impact on a democracy's stability,29 competitiveness, and fairness once it has come into existence. Therefore, the discussion of the choice of particular democratic institutions is also an indispensable part in studying democratization. The exploration of the process and outcome of democratization is especially important from the point of view 29 For example, Juan Linz argues that a two-party system is more favorable to a stable democracy than a multiparty system. See Juan J. Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 24-27. 13 of policy-making. Democracy is the ultimate form of polity for many democratizing nations in the world today. Research on the process in generating a democracy may help people in those nations learn how to fulfill their goals as smoothly as possible. Marx and explaining analysis Deutsch, emphasizing democratization, of the process fail and social to outcome pressure provide of a in complete democratization because they ignore regime elites' decisions and interactions with societal groups. Other condition-oriented theorists who only offer a correlative explanation for the transition to democracy totally fail to explain the process and outcome of democratization. Lipset, Almond and Verba do not examine the histories of democratization in the nations which they study. What they have done is to measure the correlation between the level of economic development or types of political culture with the stability of democracy. Therefore, the analysis in these theories is not process-oriented. Their research can only show the relations between the objective conditions and democracy at a single given point in time. (3) The condition-oriented theories tend to be element of deterministic in explaining democratization. The Marxist thesis has the strongest determinism in explaining regime transition. For Marx, the form of polity is determined by the means of production and class structure; parliamentary 14 democracy comes out of a capitalist economy. Some liberal condition-oriented theories also tend to have some element of determinism because they do not explore the process of democratization. They tend to argue that once a nation acquires favorable objective conditions, it will eventually have a democratic polity. The step from the appearance of favorable objective conditions to the emergence of a democracy is direct and end-determined. However, historical facts have shown that there are many roads democracy.30 to breakdown returned And many of democratization to authoritarian nations have and democracy regimes. The as seen the they have development of democratization is indeterminate and reversible. (4) The causal relation between the objective conditions and democratization is not as strong as the condition-oriented theories proclaim. In examining the above three weak points of the conditionoriented theories, we have assumed that there is a strong correlation between the objective conditions and democratization. However, even this argument is not always logically and empirically true. Guillermo A. O'Donnell argues that instead of sustaining a democratic regime, economic development will at some stage lead to an authoritarian regime. After studying the cases of 30 For example, Alfred Stepan has suggested eight categories of paths toward democratization. See Alfred Stepan, "Paths toward Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations," in O'Donnell, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, 64-84. 15 Argentina and Brazil, he finds that the emergence of authoritarian regimes in these two countries in the 1960s was mainly due to the need for advancing economic development. According to O'Donnell, after the "exhaustion" of the "easy" stage of industrialization (i. e. the end of the period of extensive, horizontal industrial growth based on substitution for imports of finished consumer goods),31 these two nations faced inflation and economic stagnation. To remedy these economic problems, the governments had to turn to "intensive" industrialization which involved "the vertical integration of domestic industry for the production of a wide range of raw, intermediate, and capital goods."32 However, the previous import-substitution policies had created a large urban working class. They demanded increased governmental subsidies for import-substitution industries and opposed the governments' plans to shift resources to develop technology-intensive industries. The workers used strikes and demonstrations to pursue their demands and thus caused social instability. Finally, the military stepped in to replace the democratic government and suppress the political activities of the urban working class in order to solve the nation's economic and 31 Guillermo A. O'Donnell, Modernization and BureaucraticAuthoritarianism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 57-58. 32 Ibid., 59. 16 social difficulties.33 Samuel Huntington modernization development. does He also not starts argues that necessarily from the the lead process to same position of political as other modernization theorists by arguing that economic development brings about a high level of political participation. However, unlike other modernization theorists, Huntington argues that if the political institutions are unable to mediate and moderate the participant social forces the society will become a "praetorian society."34 In such a society, there are a lot of riots, strikes, demonstrations, and coups.35 In other words, there is political decay instead of political modernization. Therefore, Huntington concludes: In actuality, only some of the tendencies frequently encompassed in the concept "political modernization" characterized the "modernizing" areas. Instead of a trend toward competitiveness and democracy, there was an "erosion of democracy" and a tendency to autocratic military regimes and one-party regimes.36 (5) The condition-oriented theories totally fail to consider the "supply-side" of democratization and provide an incomplete explanation of the "demand-side" of democratization. The "supply-side" of democratization means 33 Ibid., 75; see also David Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism in Latin American (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979) . 34 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 80; 196. 35 Ibid., 196. 36 Ibid., 36. 17 regime leaders' decision to initiate democratization or tolerate its beginning. The "demand-side" of democratization refers to social demands for democratization. Studying the occurrence of social revolutions, Theda Skocpol finds that the state, which the social revolutions aim to overthrow, is "potentially autonomous from socioeconomic interests interests, and structure."37 the state will In order to protect repress popular its own forces and revolutionary movements. Skocpol's work democratization. can shed light Democratization on always the study involves of the redistribution of political power. It can be understood as a process of struggle for power between the state and society, or between regime elites and opposition elites. Each group will use its resources to maximize its own interests. The authoritarian rulers will not voluntarily give up their power and privileges simply because the opposition and society demand it. As Huntington argues, the attitude of the political elites toward political participation is, in any society, probably the single most decisive factor influencing the nature of participation in the society....Autonomous participation can occur at reasonable costs only if political elites encourage it, permit it, or are unable or unwilling to suppress it.38 Therefore, we must consider the roles played by the regime 37 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 14. 38 Samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, No Easy Choice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), 28. 18 elites in studying democratization. The biggest blind point of the condition-oriented theories is their neglect of the roles of the regime elites, that is, the supply-side of democratization. For them, the state and regime elites play no role, or, at most, a trivial role in the process of transition to democracy. For Marx, the state is only the tool of the dominant economic class in the society. For Lerner and Deutsch, the authoritarian rulers' only response to the social demand for democracy is to fulfill that demand. In fact, as argued above, the state elites have their own autonomous interests and can use the state's resources to protect their interests. Even if the society puts pressure on the state, submission to social pressure is not the only choice available to the authoritarian rulers. As Charles Tilly argues, "contention for power always involves at least two parties. The behavior of the second party runs along a range from repression to facilitation."39 The authoritarian rulers can continue to use state resources to resist social pressure. In fact, authoritarian rulers' first responses always seem to be repression. In such a situation, the democratic movement might be crushed or weakened. Even on the demand-side of democratization, the process the society uses to articulate its demand and put pressure on 39 Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1978), 100. 19 the authoritarian regime, the condition-oriented theories' explanation is oversimplified. Democracy is like a public good40 for most people in a society.41 Because of the characteristics of public goods, Mancur Olson argues that each individual in that group will tend to avoid bearing the costs of providing that good.42 To overcome the "problem of collective action," Olson argues that a few people must provide the resources and bear the costs if the public good is to be provided. For these people the "gain from having the collective good exceeds the total cost of providing some amount of that collective good."43 Olson's theory has pointed out the weakness of the condition-oriented theories. These theories do not have a clear argument of how people who have the interest in seeing that democracy is provided can form a collective pressure on authoritarian government. They just assume that people in the 40 A public or collective good is defined by Mancur Olson as "any good such that, if any person XI, . . . .Xi, . . . .Xn consumes it, it cannot feasibly be withheld from the others in that group...in other words, those who do not purchase or pay for any of the public or collective good cannot be excluded or kept from sharing in the consumption of the good, as they can where noncollective goods are concerned." See Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 1415. 41 However, for some persons such as the opposition leaders under an authoritarian regime, democracy is a private good. Once democracy is built up, they will have a better opportunity to own ruling power than most people. 42 Ibid., 16. 43 Ibid., 34. 20 society will automatically act collectively to pursue the goal of democracy once they acquire that interest as a result of the appearance of favorable objective conditions. For example, Lerner argues that people will have opinions on public matters -due to increase in their literacy and thus impose pressure on the government.44 Deutsch also argues that people will have many new needs as a result of rapid social mobilization and generate pressure institutions on government for changing political and practices.45 However, Olson's theory has shown that a rational actor may not automatically contribute to the fulfillment of that goal even though he has an interest in its fulfillment. He simply may become a free-rider. Moreover, as argued above, the regime leaders will use coercive means to suppress the demand for democracy. This will further reduce the individual's incentive to participate in collective action that pressures the government into promoting democratization. To overcome the collective action problem, Charles Tilly also argues that mobilization and organization are needed.46 These two tasks require the leadership of political elites who use different types of resources to increase the incentives for the masses to join in their struggle against the authoritarian regime. Therefore, the leadership of political "Lerner, 64. 45 Deutsch, 498. 46 Tilly, 54-55. 21 elites is indispensable for promoting democratization. The condition-oriented theories have failed to discuss the role of elite leadership. For Lerner and Deutsch, people's participation in politics is automatic once they acquire participant attitudes. They do not mention the leadership of the political elites. For Marx and Moore, the unit of analysis and social action is class. For example, Moore says that "this book endeavors to explain the varied political roles played by the landed upper class and the peasantry in the transformation from agrarian societies to modern industrial ones."47 They, but especially Marx, both agree that people act collectively to pursue their class interests once they realize their class interests. Neither of them emphasizes the leadership of political elites in mobilizing people to oppose authoritarian regimes. The condition-oriented providing correlative, theories have static, the weakness deterministic, of society- oriented, and class-based analysis of democratization. All these weaknesses are mainly due to their neglecting the roles played by opposition. political The elites in both actor-oriented the theories regime and are presumed the to correct the weakness of the condition-oriented theories. I will turn to them now. "Moore, xi. 22 The Actor-Oriented Theories The actor-oriented theories are both alternative and supplementary theories to the condition-oriented theories. They emphasize the choices and actions of the regime elites and the opposition elites in exploring democratization. As Adam Przeworski observes, these theories "tend to concentrate on political actors and their strategies, to emphasize interests and perceptions, and to formulate problems in terms of possibilities and choices."48 It should be noted, however, that actor-oriented theories do not deny the effects of objective conditions. For these theories, objective conditions constitute the environment in which the political actors act, and the constraints on the actors in taking actions and making choices. Yet, contrary to condition-oriented theories, actororiented theories assert that completely "determine" the objective conditions do not actions of the actors. As Przeworski points out, "objective factors constitute at most constraints to that which is possible under a concrete historical situation but do not determine the outcome of such a situation."49 These objective conditions are only "constraints" on the actors' actions. They leave room for the actors to have their own interests and to take actions to pursue their interests. 48 Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transitions to Democracy," in O'Donnell, Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, 47. 49 Ibid., 48. 23 The basic reason for the limitation of the objective conditions' effects is that actors can think and have their own interests. In Alexander Wendt's words, social structures have an inherently discursive dimension in the sense that they are inseparable from the reasons and self-understandings that agents bring to their actions.... It does mean that the existence and operation of social structures are dependent upon human selfunderstandings; it also means that social structures acquire their causal efficacy only through the medium of practical consciousness and action.50 Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter also make the same arguments. They say that "the actors' perception of this very abnormality surrounding regime change is itself a factor affecting its eventual outcomes."51 The impact of the objective conditions must work through the decisions actors. The actors' perception and interpretation of of the objective conditions will influence the conditions'' effects. The same objective conditions may mean different things to different actors. The actors also have their own ideologies and interests. All these objective and subjective factors will influence the actors' final decisions. Without denying the constraints of the objective conditions, all the actor-oriented theories emphasize the political elites' roles in explaining democratization. In 50 Alexander E. Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," International Organization 41, no. 3 (Summer 1987): 359. 51 Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 4. 24 addition to this theme, there are four other major claims argued by the actor-oriented theories. First, all of them emphasize the "uncertainty" of the transition to democracy. From the beginning of democratization until its completion, the actors' interest and power change dramatically. It is difficult for the actors to have complete information in making decisions and to predict the outcome of their actions. They may make wrong choices and jeopardize democratization. As O'Donnell and Schmitter argue, such a theory would have to include elements of accidents and unpredictability, of crucial decisions taken in a hurry with very inadequate information, of actors facing irresolvable ethnic dilemmas and ideological confusions, of dramatic turning points reached and passed without an understanding of their future significance.52 Second, actor-oriented theories argue that the division of the ruling elites and the alliance between some of them and the opposition are the major causes for the beginning of democratization. Third, actor-oriented theorists believe that negotiation and compromise among political elites with different political positions are crucial for the progress of democratization. Compromise among the political elites will facilitate the conservatives' relinquishment of power, the creation of new democratic institutions, and the respect of all political elites for such institutions. Fourth, the actor-oriented theories argue that political Ibid., 3-4. 25 elites will design the new democratic institutions in a way that serves their best interests. Dankwart Rustow has made a model for explaining successful democratization. His work represents an early contribution to developing an actor-oriented analysis of democratization. He criticizes the correlative analysis of democratization and develops a dynamic model of democratization. For him, a nation's democratization can be divided into four stages: the background condition, the preparatory phase, the decision phase, and the habituation phase. The only national background unity.53 This condition is the that only Rustow lists similarity is between Rustow's argument and those of condition-oriented theories. Yet in the second and third stages, according to Rustow, political elites play crucial roles. During the preparatory stage, political elites mobilize the depressed people to struggle against the authoritarian regime. He says: the dynamic process of democratization itself is set off by a prolonged and inconclusive political struggle. Such a struggle is likely to begin as the result of the emergence of a new elite that arouses a depressed and previously leaderless social group into concerted action.54 During the decision phase, the contending political leaders decide to end the conflict and create new democratic institutions. As Rustow argues, ! Rustow, 350. Ibid., 352. 26 what concludes the preparatory phase is a deliberate decision on the part of political leaders to accept the existence of diversity in unity and, to that end, to institutionalize some crucial aspect of democratic procedure.55 During the last stage, the political leaders learn to coexist peacefully under the new democratic institutions. Their confidence in the new democratic institutions and their habituation in resorting to them to solve major political and social conflicts are crucial for the consolidation of the new polity.56 During the last three stages, Rustow always emphasizes that "many things can go wrong"57 and that the later stage will not "flow automatically" from the former stages.58 O'Donnell and Schmitter have recently made an important contribution to the development of actor-oriented theories. After studying democratization in Southern European and Latin American nations, they conclude that political elites have played crucial roles. According to O'Donnell and Schmitter, the beginning of democratization is usually caused by divisions among authoritarian elites who propose different policies to deal with societal demands for democracy. They say: we assert that there is no transition whose beginning is 55 Ibid., 355. 56 Ibid., 358. 57 Ibid., 355. 58 Ibid., 357. 27 not the consequence—direct or indirect—of important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself, principally along the fluctuating cleavage between hardliners and soft-liners.59 The soft-liners realize that the regime will have to depend on electoral legitimation for its survival in the future.60 They thus start to respond to the social demand for democracy. This is how liberalization begins. During and after liberalization, the opposition would demand further democratization. The soft-liners also find that their interest will be damaged if the process of liberalization reverses, because then the hard-liners would purge soft-liners for their treachery.61 Therefore, the soft-liners will ally with the opposition to promote further democratization. As democratization goes on, the power balance gradually moves favorably toward the soft-liners and the opposition and democratization will continue. O'Donnell and Schmitter also argue that the creation of pacts is important for facilitating the progress of transition. A pact, according to them, is an explicit, but not always publicly explicated or justified, agreement among a select set of actors which seeks to define (or better, to redefine) rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the "vital interests" of those entering into it.62 59 0'Donnell, Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions, 19. 60 Ibid., 16. 61 Ibid., 25. 62 Ibid., 37. 28 The pact is used to reduce the intensity of conflict among all the important groups during the transition. It also increases the willingness of competing actors, especially the extremists, to soften their positions and compromise with each other. The creation of pacts relies on the efforts of the political leaders. As O'Donnell and Schmitter argue, "they (pacts) are typically negotiated among a small number of participants representing established (and often highly oligarchical) groups or institutions."63 After the power balance gradually moves toward favoring the alliance of the soft-liners and the opposition, a civil society will emerge. Many important social groups such as trade unions, religious groups and intellectuals' associations will emerge and support democratization. Once a civil society appears, the new democratic institutions are created and democratization is completed. Adam Przeworski also thinks that political actors have played important roles in the democratic transitions in Eastern European and Latin American nations. He, too, thinks that the division of the ruling elites is the crucial factor for the beginning of democratization. Przeworski argues that the loss of legitimacy does not necessarily bring down the authoritarian regime. Fear of the regime's coercive capacity will dissuade the people from acting on their collective Ibid, 38. 29 opposition to the regime.64 It is usually a split within the regime elite that encourages people, who now find their potential ally within the regime, to publicly oppose the regime. Przeworski does not deny the effects of social demands in inducing the reformers to oppose the hard-liners. He says: liberalization is a result of an interaction between splits in the authoritarian regime and autonomous organization of the civil society. Popular mobilization signals to the potential liberalizers the possibility of an alliance that could change the relations of forces within the power bloc to their advantage; visible split in the power bloc indicate to their civil society that political space may have been opened for autonomous organization.65 Once liberalization starts, its development into democratization will depend on negotiation and cooperation among political leaders. Przeworski argues that cooperation between the reformers within the regime and the moderates of the opposition is crucial for a peaceful democracy.66 He says that "extrication transition to (of the society from the authoritarian regime) can result only from understanding between reformers and moderates."67 The design of new democratic institutions also depends on negotiations among political leaders.68 64 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 54-55. 65 Ibid., 57. 66 Ibid., 68. "Ibid. 68 Ibid., 80. 30 Giuseppe Southern Di Palma, after European political studying nations, also leaders. He democratization emphasizes too makes the same the in roles of argument that democratization usually begins as divisions emerge within authoritarian regimes.69 Subsequently, according to Di Palma, the strategies of political leaders are crucial for the completion of democratization. He uses the term "crafting" to show the importance of the political leaders' efforts in promoting democratization. Crafting, says Di Palma, includes (1) the quality of the finished product (the particular democratic rules and institutions that are chosen among the many availables; (2) the mode of decision makings leading to the selection of rules and institutions (paths and negotiations versus unilateral action); (3) the type of "craftsman" involved (the alliance and coalitions forged in the transition); and (4) the timing imposed on the various tasks and stages of the transition.70 Obviously, according to Di Palma, the interactions of political leaders, in addition to the timing and the content of their decisions, "ultimately influence the success of transition. "71 Among the strategies used by political leaders, Di Palma especially emphasizes the "inclusiveness," which he calls garantismo, of all the competing groups. He says that "garantismo should often imply the formation—ad-hoc, formal, "Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracy: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley: University California Press, 1990), 34. 70 Ibid., 9. 71 Ibid. 31 or implicit—of broad and inclusive constitutional coalitions, reaching the peripheries of the spectrum."72 political Through the strategy of garantismo, all the important groups' interests can be taken care of during the process of democratization. Consequently, the competing groups will not resort to extreme means in pursuing their goals. Furthermore, they will respect decisions made by political leaders and the new democratic rules and institutions.73 The actor-oriented theory, by emphasizing political elites' choices under the constraints of objective conditions, is a supplement to condition-oriented theory. Actor-oriented theories in essence synthesize the factors of objective conditions and political actors. Therefore, actor-oriented theories are more useful than condition-oriented theories in explaining democratization. Actor-oriented theories can offer a strong causal analysis of the beginning, process, and outcome of democratization. They are not deterministic, and consider both state and society in explaining democratization. Thus they provide a better fit with the empirical facts than do condition-oriented theories. This study of Taiwan's democratization will thus rely on the actor-oriented approach. It will show that the choices, power structures, and ideologies of political leaders, as well as objective socioeconomic conditions 72 Ibid., 56. 73 Ibid., 54-58. 32 have significantly affected Taiwan's democratization. However, the research also leads me to argue that political institutions, specifically elections, electoral laws, and the constitution, also had a significant effect on Taiwan's transition to democracy. The Roles of Political Institutions The effects of political institutions on politics and the economy have been widely studied in recent years.74 However, they have rarely been stressed in the study of regime transitions. The condition-oriented theories totally ignore the effects of political institutions in much the same way that they ignore the roles of political actors. Actor-oriented theories pay only a little attention to the influence of 74 For example, James G. March and Johan P. Olsen have provided a general study of institutions and their impact. See James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1989); James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," American Political Science Review 78, no. 3 (September 1984): 734-749. For the political effects of political institutions, see, for example, Stephen D. Krasner, "Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective, " Comparative Political Studies, 21, no. 1 (1988): 66-94; Juan J. Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism," Journal of Democracy 1, no. 1 (Winter 1990): 51-69; Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart, eds., Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences (New York: Agathon Press, 1986). For the economic effects of political institutions, see, for example, Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); G. John Ikenberry, "Conclusion: An Institutional Approach to American Foreign Economic Policy," in G. John Ikenberry, David A. Lake, and Michael Mastanduno, eds., The State and American Foreign Economic Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 219-43; Stephen D. krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 1983). 33 political institutions. For example, Rustow and Przeworski do not emphasize political institutions. Even if some actororiented theories mention political institutions, they tend to think that political institutions are outcomes of the choices of political elites, who are the most important explanatory variable in these theories. For example, Di Palma argues that political elites can design proper political institutions to facilitate inclusiveness and compromise.75 It is understandable for regime-transition theories to ignore political institutions. Most studies of the effects of institutions concentrate on events which happen during the "normal" period. Institutions must first come into being, and exist for some time, in order for them to exercise their effects. The transition of a regime can be considered as the transition from existing political institutions toward new ones. Before the new political institutions are stabilized, there seems to be little reason to explore their effects on political and economic development. However, this does not mean that there is no need to discuss the influence of political institutions during regime transition. As pointed out by Di Palma, "transitions tend to originate nowadays from the efforts of autocratic governments to extricate themselves."76 The sudden breakdown of the existing regime and immediate buildup of totally new political 75 Di Palma, 55. 76 Ibid., 48. 34 institutions is rare in recent cases of democratization. Therefore, even during the period of transition, political institutions exercise their influence. They will continue to constrain political elites' choices and interactions. This is especially During true when the period liberalization of has already liberalization, some started. democratic institutions and rules of the game have been created. These semi-democratic political institutions will have an important impact on later stages of transition to democracy. In my study of Taiwan, I find that political institutions have played conditions, two types political of roles. First, institutions like have objective constituted constraints on political elites' actions. They have shaped political elites' ideology and preference, and have constrained the range of choices that they could make, as in the example of the ROC constitution. Second, through their own institutional mechanisms, political institutions mediate and, sometimes, distort the effects of objective conditions on political elites. They have significantly influenced the distribution of capacities among political elites, as in the example of elections and electoral laws. Based on the above observation, we may argue that there is an interactive causal relation between political institutions and political elites' choices during democratization. As G. John Ikenberry argues, "a dependent variable at Tl may become 35 an independent or intervening variable at T2."77 Responding to the changing objective conditions, political elites redesign the existing political institutions. They will create new democratic institutions in a way that fulfills their advantage and reflects their ideology. Once new democratic institutions are chosen, they will function to constrain political elites' later choices and the distribution of power among them. The new democratic institutions will thus have a strong impact on the process and outcome of democratization. The result of institutional design will not just distinguish democracy from authoritarian rule. More importantly, it will decide which type of democracy a country will have. Therefore, in my dissertation, I will use the factors of political elites and political institutions to supplement the factor of socioeconomic conditions78 in explaining Taiwan's democratization. A Preview of Conclusions Several major conclusions derived from the case of Taiwan can be used as hypotheses to be tested in case analysis of other countries. To facilitate the exposition of the empirical information regarding the Taiwanese case in the subsequent chapters, I will list these major conclusions here, in 77 Ikenberry, "Conclusion," 225. 78 As pointed out in the preface and as will be further discussed in chapter 2, favorable objective conditions have existed in Taiwan since the early 1970s. 36 advance. (1) Economic development does lead some people to demand democracy. Yet successful economic development also enhances the regime's legitimacy due to the improvement of people's economic conditions. Through the process of economic development, the regime also strengthens its control over the society by incorporating some of its major sectors into the state and increasing their reliance on the state. Therefore, the pressure for democratization that would have been expected by the level of economic development has been partially offset by an increase in the regime's legitimacy and its control over society. (2) people Economic to act development collectively will to not automatically pressure the regime lead into democratization. The strength of popular pressure also depends on the leadership of opposition elites. The existence of elections further enhances the opposition elites' opportunity and incentives to mobilize and organize popular pressure on the regime. (3) Electoral systems work to transform social preferences into political power. Therefore, they can influence the distribution of political power between the regime and the opposition during democratization. The electoral system used in Taiwan is a Single Nontransferable Vote system. It has paradoxical dual effects of facilitating the emergence of an opposition and helping the ruling regime maintain its majority 37 power. (4) The popular pressure organized by the opposition is by itself not enough to bring about democratization. Given popular pressure, democratization will begin only when the regime leaders are willing to let it happen. There are several reasons for regime elites to make that decision. These reasons may appear separately or at the same time. First, the regime suffers serious failure in its important policies which causes its legitimacy to drop significantly. To restore its legitimacy, the regime leaders may promote limited democratization in exchange for the people's support. Second, regime leaders think that the cost of suppression is increasing even though they can still suppress the opposition's challenge.79 In the expectation that they may be unable to bear the suppression costs in the near future, they may take preemptive action to promote limited democratization to diffuse the pressure from the opposition and enhance the regime's chances for survival in the future. Third, a succession of power occurs in the regime. In order to succeed in a power struggle within the regime, some of the contending elites may support limited democratization in order to attract the support of the people. (5) The'power structure of political leaders does not just 79 Similar arguments have also been made by Robert Dahl. He says that "The likelihood that a government will tolerate an opposition increases as the expected costs of suppression increase." See Dahl, Polyarchy, 15. 38 affect the beginning of democratization; it also significantly influences the process of democratization. To ensure the continuity of democratization, a winning coalition that is pro-democracy must appear.80 It can facilitate compromise between opposition, the regime and the and exclude the interference of conservatives and radicals. The pro-democracy winning coalition can be comprised of (a) one dominant reform leader in the regime, (b) a coalition of reformers in the regime, or (c) a coalition of reformers in the regime and moderates in the opposition. (6) There is an interaction between the power structure of the political leaders and the strategies that they implement. The regime and the opposition will employ moderate strategies in their struggle against each other when reformers and moderates win the respective power struggles in the regime and opposition camps. In this scenario, the transition to democracy will be peaceful and it will probably succeed. 80 Used ex post facto, the term "winning coalition" obviously runs a risk of circularity. In countries where democratization succeeded, pro-democracy forces prevailed over the conservatives in a power struggle. However, it is not possible to specify generally, formally, and ex ante the conditions that make these coalitions "winning," in part because formal rules of the game have not yet been established in democratizing countries. Pro-democracy forces typically prevail over the conservatives by relying on informal factors, such as a dominant leader's authority, military support, or large scale street demonstrations. Therefore it is difficult to use objective criteria, such as seats in the parliament, to predict the victory of a political force in advance. We can identify a winning coalition only after we have seen that its preferences prevail, for example, whether democratization is promoted or crushed. 39 Conversely, the regime and the opposition will both employ extreme strategies when conservatives and radicals win the respective power struggles in the regime and opposition camps. In this scenario, the transition to democracy will be violent and it will probably fail. The extreme strategies used by the regime toward the opposition, due to the victory of conservatives in the regime, may cause radicals to win the power struggle against the moderates in the opposition camp. Conversely, conciliatory strategies used by the regime may cause the moderates to consolidate their power in the opposition camp. Similarly, the strategies used by the opposition can also affect the power structure in the regime. (7) The political leaders' choices of new democratic institutions are influenced by their ideologies, calculations of the costs and benefits that the political institutions will generate, and existing political institutions. The Content of the Dissertation The second chapter will introduce the process of economic development, the socioeconomic conditions that it has promoted, and state-society relations in Taiwan. The third and fourth chapters will discuss the political institutions of elections and electoral laws, and their impact on the distribution of political power between the KMT regime and the opposition. The fifth chapter will introduce the history of the development of the opposition and explore the roles of the 40 political elites in that process from 1949 to 1983. The sixth chapter will discuss the factors that led Chiang Ching-kuo to permit the beginning of democratization (liberalization) in Taiwan in 1986. The seventh chapter will discuss the impact of the power succession and subsequent change in the KMT regime's power structure, after Chiang died. The eighth chapter will discuss the factors that influence constitutional reform, during which new political institutions are created. The last chapter will sum up the findings concerning Taiwan's democratization and compare these with the experiences of Spain, South Korea, the Soviet Union, and China. A speculation on the prospects for democratization and democracy in Taiwan will conclude that chapter. Research Method and Data The research methods used in my dissertation are a combination of case study and comparative historical analysis. In order to provide a causal analysis of Taiwan's democratization, I first present an intensive case study of Taiwan and examine its political history. I will then compare Taiwan's historical experience with those of Spain, the Soviet Union, China, and South Korea. The primary data for Taiwan include newspapers, magazines, governmental publications, and interviews with political leaders. The secondary data include empirical surveys and studies conducted by other scholars. The data on other countries will be gathered by relying on other scholars' 41 research.(Appendices listing detailed sources of materials are available at the end of the dissertation.) 42 CHAPTER 2 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS As argued in chapter 1, socioeconomic conditions will constrain political beginning and elites' prospect of actions and influence democratization. the Socioeconomic conditions in Taiwan have undergone a drastic change due to rapid economic development. Among them, ethnic and class cleavages are most important. These changing socioeconomic conditions have facilitated the beginning of democratization, but they have also enabled the KMT leaders to manipulate its progress. This chapter first introduces the history of economic development in Taiwan from 1949 to the present. It then discusses the changing socioeconomic conditions that resulted from economic development, especially the class and ethnic cleavages. In the final section, the relationship between state and society in Taiwan is examined. The History of Economic Development Taiwan's economic development can be divided into several stages during which different strategies were adopted by the KMT regime. (1) Land Reform, 1949-1953. The first stage of economic development lasted from 194 9 to 1953. Land reform was the 43 major strategy enacted by the KMT regime. It proceeded through three major steps: First, rent was reduced from about 50 percent of produced crops to 37.5 percent. Second, the government accelerated the selling of public lands to the land cultivators and the landless tenants. Third, under the Landto-the-Tiller Act, the landlords were forced to sell agricultural holdings over three hectares to the government at prices that were 2.5 times the annual yield. The government then sold those price.81 Land lands to landless peasants reform was successful in at th
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Task; Process of democratic transition
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Running Head: DISCUSSION

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Process of Democratic Transition
Student’s Name
Institutional Affiliation
Course
Date

DISCUSSION

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Process of Democratic Transition
How to maintain a newly formed democratic system has been a severe issue for
countries experiencing democratization in recent years, especially for those with
authoritarian regimes in the past. Under such circumstances, Democratic Consolidation,
the idea of strengthening and stabilizing the democratic system, has been introduced and
discussed by the Republican administrations. In Schedler's article, critical elements of
democratic consolidation are avoiding democratic breakdown and democratic erosion
(Scheduler 1998). According to Schedler, there are four scales of democratic progress,
authoritarianism, electoral democracy, liberal democracy, and advanced democracy.
Authoritarianism and advanced democracy are respectively on the two ends of the scale
plate. In other words, advanced capitalism is the goal that every newly formed regime
should chase, whereas authoritarianism is the one that every system should avoid.
The idea of democratic breakdown illustrates the sudden collapse of democratic
progress and that the regime is going back to authoritarianism. Nevertheless, the concept
of democratic erosion represents the gradual recession of democracy of a country, from
liberal democracy to electoral democracy and eventually goes back to authoritarianism
Huntington and Samuel 1991). For example, "Unbounded uncertainty" in newly formed
democratic societies such as professional state violence, business class experiencing
benefit damage, drag cartels, or violent protesters significantly increase the possibility of
democratic breakdown. Nevertheless, political weaknesses caused by the poorly

DISCUSSION

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institutionalized democratic system such as reassertion of military supremacy, the unequal
electoral system caused by hegemonic parties, or the decay of electoral institutions also
profoundly relate to democratic erosion.
As a result, both contributions from civil society and the ruling class formed my
political elites have to be addressed in order to prevent not only authoritarian regression
but also consolidate democratic system. Democratic progress in East Asia has been a
significant example to study democratic consolidation. However, although both civil
society and the ruling class contribute to democratic consolidation, it seems like political
elites play a more significant role in democratic consolidation because the guarantee of
democratic continuity and democratic flexibility from elites provides stability of the
political system (Linz, Juan and Alfred 1996). Meanwhile, it seems like it is relatively hard
for civil society to form a strong agreement towards the political system.
Case studies of Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan will be provided to explain the 3
concepts mentioned above. Firstly, civil society has a relatively low chance to form a joint
agreement toward political structure; therefore, political elites have to play a more
significant role in consolidating the democratic system in the progress of the democratic
transition. Ordinary people in all three countries (Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan) are not
fully committed to democratic principles. Divisions among people are various. Although
there are differences in public ideas among three countries, the support of democratic
consolidation from the public is relatively low in all three countries.

DISCUSSIO...


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