Humanities
Northwestern Michigan College Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions Essay

Northwestern Michigan College

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I have attached an article called the Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions please read it and critique it (3 PAGES DOUBLE SPACE)

  1. The literature critique can be organized as follows:
    1. Description of the work: main argument; building blocks of the argument; make sure you have a statement summarizing what the piece is about on the first page.
    2. Methodology (how the author achieved his/her stated goals): Did the author present historical, statistical, anecdotal evidence to support his/her argument? Was the evidence sufficient? Did it address the argument? Was the evidence presented in a sequential and logical manner? Was the argument presented in a clear fashion?
    3. Organization of the material and sources: Is the material easy to follow? Does it make a compelling case? Are the sources reliable? Are they biased (i.e. reflecting only one side of the argument)?
    1. Personal critical evaluation: Has the author achieved his/her goal? Is the material a contribution to the field? What could the author have done to improve the piece under review? Strengths, weaknesses and limitations of main argument? PLEASE END THE PAPER WITH A SOLID CLEAR LOGIC CONCLUSION

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International Organization Foundation The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions Author(s): Nicholas L. Miller Source: International Organization, Vol. 68, No. 4 (Fall 2014), pp. 913-944 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the International Organization Foundation Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/43283283 Accessed: 23-03-2020 23:41 UTC JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms International Organization Foundation, Cambridge University Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Organization This content downloaded from 68.33.74.53 on Mon, 23 Mar 2020 23:41:39 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions Nicholas L. Miller Abstract Building on the rationalist literature on sanctions, this article argues that economic and political sanctions are a successful tool of nonproliferation policy, but that selection effects have rendered this success largely hidden. Since the late 1970s - when the United States made the threat of sanctions credible through congressional legislation and began regularly employing sanctions against proliferating states - sanctions have been ineffective in halting ongoing nuclear weapons programs, but they have succeeded in deterring states from starting nuclear weapons programs in the first place and have thus contributed to a decline in the rate of nuclear pursuit. The logic of the argument is simple: rational leaders assess the risk of sanctions before initiating a nuclear weapons program, which produces a selection effect whereby states highly vulnerable to sanctions are deterred from starting nuclear weapons programs in the first place, so long as the threat is credible. Vulnerability is a function of a state's level of economic and security dependence on the United States - states with greater dependence have more to lose from US sanctions and are more likely to be sensitive to US -sponsored norms. The end result of this selection effect is that since the late 1970s, only insulated, inward-looking regimes have pursued nuclear weapons and become the target of imposed sanctions, thus rendering the observed success rate of nonproliferation sanc- tions low. I find support for the argument based on statistical analysis of a global sample of countries from 1950 to 2000, an original data set of US nonproliferation sanc- tions episodes, and qualitative analysis of the South Korean and Taiwanese nuclear weapons programs. Starting in the 1970s and continuing to sanctions against Iran in the present day, US policy-makers have long considered sanctions central to US efforts to halt nuclear proliferation and have employed them regularly. Many scholars of nonproliferation are similarly optimistic about the role of sanctions, arguing they are an important component of the nonproliferation policy toolkit.1 Despite their centrality to US nonproliferation policy, the efficacy of these efforts - which include financial and trade restrictions, economic and military aid cutoffs, termination of peaceful nuclear cooperation, as well as threats to weaken military alliance relationships - remains The author thanks Daniel Altman, Mark Bell, Eugenie Carabatsos, Fotini Christia, Christopher Clary, Chad Hazlett, David Jae, Vipin Narang, Kai Quek, participants in the MIT International Relations Working Group, and the editor and two anonymous reviewers for comments and suggestions. 1. See Campbell and Einhorn 2004; Braun and Chyba 2004, 43-45; Montgomery 2005, 181-82; Sagan 1996, 72; Solingen 2007, 289-99; and Levite 2002, 78-80. International Organization 68, Fall 2014, pp. 913-944 © The IO Foundation, 2014 doi: 1 0.1 01 7/S00208 183 140002 16 This content downloaded from 68.33.74.53 on Mon, 23 Mar 2020 23:41:39 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 914 International Organization hotly debated. This disagreement is reflected in policy debates over sanctions on Iran,2 recent scholarly work on sanctions and nuclear proliferation,3 and an extensive literature that argues imposed sanctions are generally ineffective.4 As in other policy realms, selection effects pose an obstacle to assessing the efficacy of sanctions in nonproliferation.5 As the editor of a recent volume on the topic observes, "selection effects entail the plausibility that sanctions are only applied in instances where targets estimate (correctly or incorrectly) that sanctions will not work in their own particular case."6 In other words, if states expect that sanctions are likely and too costly to endure, they may abstain from nuclear proliferation in the first place, which may mean that sanctions succeed before they are even implemented - biasing downward our estimates of sanctions' efficacy. However, much like early work on economic sanctions that focused on cases where sanctions were imposed rather than threatened,7 the literature on nonproliferation has focused almost entirely on cases where sanctions were imposed.8 Although this is an important topic of inquiry, on its own it cannot settle the issue of sanctions' efficacy as an overall policy. Building on the rationalist literature on sanctions, this article incorporates the selec- tion effects issue into the theoretical argument and systematically tests its observa- tional implications. I argue that economic and political sanctions are indeed a successful nonproliferation tool, but that selection effects have rendered this success largely hidden. I provide evidence that since the late 1970s - when the United States made clear through congressional legislation that positive economic and security relations with the country were contingent on nonproliferation and began regularly employing sanctions against proliferating states - sanctions have been ineffective in halting ongoing nuclear weapons programs, but have succeeded in deterring states from starting nuclear weapons programs in the first place and have thus contributed to a decline in the rate of nuclear pursuit.9 The logic is simple: rational leaders assess the risk of sanctions before initiating a nuclear weapons program, which produces a selection effect whereby states highly vulnerable to sanctions are deterred from starting nuclear weapons programs in the first place, so long as the threat is credible. Vulnerability is a function of a state's level of economic and security dependence on the United States - states with greater dependence have more to lose from US sanctions and are more likely to be sensitive to US-sponsored norms. The end result of this selection effect is that since the United States made the threat of sanctions credible in the late 1970s, only insulated, 2. Recent examples include Esfandiary and Fitzpatrick 201 1; and Maloney 2010. 3. Solingen 2012a. 4. See Galtung 1967; Lindsay 1986; Pape 1997; Morgan and Schwebach 1997; Drezner 1998 and 2003; and Lacy and Niou 2004. 5. See Fearon 2002. 6. Solingen 2012b, 8, 299-301. 7. See, most prominently, Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990; and Pape 1997. 8. See Solingen 2012a, for the most recent work in this tradition. 9. For a visualization of the decline, see Sagan 201 1, c2. This content downloaded from 68.33.74.53 on Mon, 23 Mar 2020 23:41:39 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions 915 inward-looking regimes with few ties to the United States have pursued nuclear weapons and become the target of imposed sanctions, rendering the observed success rate of nonproliferation sanctions low.10 To evaluate this argument, I test three key observable implications: (1) controlling for other predictors of proliferation, states dependent on the United States econom- ically and militarily should be significantly less likely to pursue nuclear weapons, but only since the threat of sanctions became credible in the late 1970s; (2) the observed success rate of sanctions threatened or imposed against ongoing nuclear programs should be low; and (3) the rare cases of observed sanctions success should be largely confined to instances where states dependent on the United States underestimated the risk of sanctions when initiating their nuclear pursuit. Utilizing quantitative analysis on a global sample of countries from 1950 to 2000, an original data set of US nonproliferation sanctions episodes, and historical analysis of South Korean and Taiwanese nuclear programs drawing on US archival documents, this article finds strong support for the theoretical argument. Existing Literature on Sanctions and Nuclear Proliferation A large body of literature examines the efficacy of economic sanctions, and although some scholars are relatively optimistic about the efficacy of imposing sanctions,1 1 the majority view is that sanctions are usually ineffective in securing the desired behavioral changes from the target state.12 The arguments for why imposed sanctions are unsuccessful fall into three different camps, and suggest different policy implications. First are those who argue that nationalism and the possibility of substitution allow states to weather economic disruption.13 Second are those arguing that domestic political incentives or international conflict expectations lead sanctions to be poorly designed and targeted - thus, it is not that sanctions are inherently ineffective but rather that policy-makers implement them in imperfect ways.14 Finally, and most rel- evant to this article's argument, a third group of scholars focuses on the rational calculations of leaders and the incentives for reaching a bargain before the imposition of sanctions. Their intuition is that rational states consider the future costs of sanctions when weighing their options - the result is that those who are particularly vulnerable 10. Although multilateral sanctions have been imposed against recent proliferators such as North Korea and Iran, I focus on the United States because it has taken the lead in virtually all nonproliferation sanctions campaigns, has been by far the most frequent imposer of nonproliferation sanctions, and has the most longstanding and clearly articulated sanctions regime and policies. Based on data from Hufbauer et al. 2008, Of twenty-one cases of sanctions related to nuclear proliferation identified through 2006, 14 (67 percent) were imposed by the United States. 11. For example, see Baldwin 1985; Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990; and Baldwin 1999. 12. On measuring efficacy, see Baldwin 1999. 13. See Galtung 1967; Lindsay 1986; and Pape 1997. 14. See Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988; Lindsay 1986, 153-54; Whang 2011; and Drezner 1998, 710-11. This content downloaded from 68.33.74.53 on Mon, 23 Mar 2020 23:41:39 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 916 International Organization to the sanctions will concede at the mere threat rather than defying the sender and enduring the costs.15 Turning to the literature on nuclear proliferation, extant work has identified three classes of motivations for proliferation: security, domestic politics, and norms.16 More precisely, states pursue nuclear weapons to (1) ensure their security against nuclear or overwhelming conventional threats,17 (2) serve domestic bureaucratic or pol- itical interests,18 or (3) build international prestige or fulfill conceptions of national identity.19 Consequently, states may renounce nuclear weapons programs when they promise to harm rather than help their security, threaten domestic political or bureaucratic interests, or when nuclear proliferation is believed to violate an important inter- national norm or contradict a state's national identity. Apart from motivations for proliferation, recent work has examined how peaceful nuclear cooperation and sensitive nuclear assistance provide a supply-side impetus for the pursuit and acquisition of nuclear weapons.20 However, no extant work systematically examines how dependence on the United States deters nuclear pursuit by the threat of sanctions; indeed, the role of US nonproliferation policy and strategic interaction between potential proliferators and opponents of proliferation is largely absent from the literature. Argument and Methods Building on the rationalist work on economic sanctions, I argue that the key to under- standing the dynamics of sanctions in nonproliferation is that rational leaders con- sider the risk of sanctions before initiating a nuclear weapons program. If the probability and cost of sanctions are sufficiently high for a given state - in particular, if the state is highly dependent on the United States and the threat of sanctions is cred- ible - it will not pursue nuclear weapons at all and no explicit threat of sanctions will be needed. In other words, the selection effect is one step further removed than the rationalist work on economic sanctions suggests: states can be deterred even before an explicitly targeted threat. As Drezner notes, "It is quite likely that potential targets try to comply with US demands before the articulation of a threat . . . There may ... be instances in which a target refrains from acting against the sender's prefer- ences because of the anticipation of sanctions."21 The threat of sanctions can help deter proliferation by states dependent on the United States through each of the three pathways of proliferation identified in the 15. See Lacy and Niou 2004; Drezner 2003; and Hovi, Huseby, and Sprinz 2005. 16. This trinity of motivations was originally suggested in Sagan 1996. Also see Paul 2000; Meyer 1984; Jo and Gartzke 2007; and Singh and Way 2004. 17. Thayer 1995. 18. Solingen 2007. 19. Hymans 2006. 20. See Fuhrmann 2009; and Kroenig 2009. 21. Drezner 2003, 653-55. This content downloaded from 68.33.74.53 on Mon, 23 Mar 2020 23:41:39 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions 917 literature: security, domestic politics, and norms. First, in terms of security, states dependent on US troops or military aid are likely to think twice about proliferating if it threatens to jeopardize these important relations with the United States. Thus, although states may desire nuclear weapons to ensure security against nuclear or con- ventional threats, they may be unwilling to accept the window of vulnerability that would occur if they started a nuclear weapons program and lost American troop commitments and military aid shortly thereafter - the average time to complete a nuclear weapons program (among those who succeeded in building the bomb) is not short: about ten years.22 Second, in terms of domestic politics, recent work by Solingen has highlighted how regimes whose political coalitions depend on the international economy are less likely to pursue nuclear weapons because such a pursuit poses risks to the states' internationalist agenda.23 The threat of sanctions is clearly relevant here: ruling coalitions relying on trade or foreign aid from the United States are likely to oppose a nuclear program to avoid costly trade embargos or aid cutoffs that may threaten their political survival. Alternately, domestic nuclear scientists and bureaucrats whose work is advanced through international nuclear cooperation may oppose the initiation of a nuclear weapons program because it jeopardizes international assistance.24 Finally, in terms of norms, sanctions ought to be equally critical. Although much of the international relations literature has focused on the moral, ideational, and sociological sources of norms,25 there is an extensive literature in international relations and other disciplines that argues norms derive much of their power from sanctions that serve as enforcement mechanisms.26 Finnemore and Sikkink note that socialization is the primary mechanism of a norm cascade, and that "in the context of inter- national politics, socialization involves diplomatic praise or censure, either bilateral or multilateral, which is reinforced by material sanctions and incentives."27 Goertz and Diehl observe that even if norms become internalized, the fact remains that "in virtually all cases of functioning norms, there seem to be some sanctions."28 Drawing on this research, scholars should expect that the credibility of and vulnerability to sanctions should strengthen norms against proliferation, helping to deter nuclear pursuit. This argument suggests that a serious selection effect is at play. As Fearon explains, "selection effects occur when factors that influence the choices that produce cases also influence the outcome or dependent variable for each case."29 22. Data for this calculation are from Way 201 1. 23. Solingen 2007. 24. Hymans 201 1. It should be noted that other scholars, for example, Fuhrmann 2009, argue that international nuclear cooperation may spur nuclear weapons programs. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. See Finnemore 1996; Nadelmann 1990; Barnett and Finnemore 1999; and Tannenwald 2005. See Axelrod 1986; Heckathorn 1988; Goertz and Diehl 1992; and Fehr and Fischbacher 2004. Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 902. Goertz and Diehl 1992, 638. Fearon 2002, 7. This content downloaded from 68.33.74.53 on Mon, 23 Mar 2020 23:41:39 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 918 International Organization Thus, when the threat of sanctions is credible, dependence on the United States is likely to influence both (1) whether a state starts a nuclear weapons program (and thus becomes a possible observed case of nonproliferation sanctions) and (2) whether that state concedes in the face of sanctions that are ultimately threatened or imposed.30 The result of this selection effect is that states vulnerable to sanctions are likely to be deterred from initiating nuclear weapons programs; meanwhile, those that choose to initiate them are likely to be precisely those states that are least vulner- able to sanctions (and therefore unlikely to make major concessions). A natural question arises: Why does the United States continue to impose sanctions in cases where it is likely to fail? The answer, simply, is that a reputation for imposing sanctions is necessary for the policy to successfully deter.31 To test this argument, I explore multiple observable implications using a variety of sources and methods. Despite their disagreements, both quantitative and qualitative methodologists agree that rigorous theory testing should explore as many observable implications of a theory as feasible.32 Although no test is expected to be fully convin- cing on its own, in combination the tests shed considerable light on the theory's val- idity. Specifically, one should observe that states that are more vulnerable to US sanctions (that is, more dependent on the United States economically and militarily) should be less likely to pursue nuclear weapons, even controlling for other predictors of proliferation, but only after the threat of sanctions became credible in the late 1970s. Second, one should find that the observed success rate of sanctions threatened or imposed against proliferating states is low. Third, sanctions should be most likely to succeed at halting existing nuclear weapons programs when targeted at states that had reasons to miscalculate the probability of sanctions when initiating their nuclear pursuit, particularly those with high economic and security dependence on the United States. The Deterrent Effect of Nonproliferation Sanctions The argument I have elaborated ...
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Running Head: THE SECRET SUCCESS OF NONPROLIFERATION SANCTIONS

The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions
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THE SECRET SUCCESS OF NONPROLIFERATION SANCTIONS
Critique: The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions
Description of the Work
The article, “The secret success of nonproliferation sanction,” Nicholas Miller focuses on
addressing the rationalist approach on sanctions. In that regard, the chief argument presented in
the article is the success of both the political and economic sanctions as tools in making
nonproliferation policy (Miller, 2014). Besides, Miller also argues that the selection made in
economic and political sanctions has affected the success of nonproliferation policy. More
importantly, Miller also claims that sanctions have been subjected to different threats that make
them ineffective in addressing global issues such as halting nuclear weapons programs.
Nonetheless, Miller acknowledges that sanctions cannot be underrated in minimizing the
use of nuclear weapons. Primarily, the article claims that sanctions have been used successfully
in deterring countries that m...

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