International Organization Foundation
The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions
Author(s): Nicholas L. Miller
Source: International Organization, Vol. 68, No. 4 (Fall 2014), pp. 913-944
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the International Organization
Foundation
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The Secret Success of Nonproliferation
Sanctions
Nicholas L. Miller
Abstract Building on the rationalist literature on sanctions, this article argues that
economic and political sanctions are a successful tool of nonproliferation policy, but that
selection effects have rendered this success largely hidden. Since the late 1970s - when
the United States made the threat of sanctions credible through congressional legislation
and began regularly employing sanctions against proliferating states - sanctions have
been ineffective in halting ongoing nuclear weapons programs, but they have succeeded
in deterring states from starting nuclear weapons programs in the first place and have
thus contributed to a decline in the rate of nuclear pursuit. The logic of the argument
is simple: rational leaders assess the risk of sanctions before initiating a nuclear
weapons program, which produces a selection effect whereby states highly vulnerable
to sanctions are deterred from starting nuclear weapons programs in the first place, so
long as the threat is credible. Vulnerability is a function of a state's level of economic
and security dependence on the United States - states with greater dependence have
more to lose from US sanctions and are more likely to be sensitive to US -sponsored
norms. The end result of this selection effect is that since the late 1970s, only insulated,
inward-looking regimes have pursued nuclear weapons and become the target of
imposed sanctions, thus rendering the observed success rate of nonproliferation sanc-
tions low. I find support for the argument based on statistical analysis of a global
sample of countries from 1950 to 2000, an original data set of US nonproliferation sanc-
tions episodes, and qualitative analysis of the South Korean and Taiwanese nuclear
weapons programs.
Starting in the 1970s and continuing to sanctions against Iran in the present day, US
policy-makers have long considered sanctions central to US efforts to halt nuclear
proliferation and have employed them regularly. Many scholars of nonproliferation
are similarly optimistic about the role of sanctions, arguing they are an important
component of the nonproliferation policy toolkit.1 Despite their centrality to US
nonproliferation policy, the efficacy of these efforts - which include financial and
trade restrictions, economic and military aid cutoffs, termination of peaceful nuclear
cooperation, as well as threats to weaken military alliance relationships - remains
The author thanks Daniel Altman, Mark Bell, Eugenie Carabatsos, Fotini Christia, Christopher Clary,
Chad Hazlett, David Jae, Vipin Narang, Kai Quek, participants in the MIT International Relations
Working Group, and the editor and two anonymous reviewers for comments and suggestions.
1. See Campbell and Einhorn 2004; Braun and Chyba 2004, 43-45; Montgomery 2005, 181-82; Sagan
1996, 72; Solingen 2007, 289-99; and Levite 2002, 78-80.
International Organization 68, Fall 2014, pp. 913-944
© The IO Foundation, 2014 doi: 1 0.1 01 7/S00208 183 140002 16
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914 International Organization
hotly debated. This disagreement is reflected in policy debates over sanctions on
Iran,2 recent scholarly work on sanctions and nuclear proliferation,3 and an extensive
literature that argues imposed sanctions are generally ineffective.4
As in other policy realms, selection effects pose an obstacle to assessing the efficacy of sanctions in nonproliferation.5 As the editor of a recent volume on the topic
observes, "selection effects entail the plausibility that sanctions are only applied in
instances where targets estimate (correctly or incorrectly) that sanctions will not
work in their own particular case."6 In other words, if states expect that sanctions
are likely and too costly to endure, they may abstain from nuclear proliferation in
the first place, which may mean that sanctions succeed before they are even
implemented - biasing downward our estimates of sanctions' efficacy. However,
much like early work on economic sanctions that focused on cases where sanctions
were imposed rather than threatened,7 the literature on nonproliferation has focused
almost entirely on cases where sanctions were imposed.8 Although this is an important topic of inquiry, on its own it cannot settle the issue of sanctions' efficacy as an
overall policy.
Building on the rationalist literature on sanctions, this article incorporates the selec-
tion effects issue into the theoretical argument and systematically tests its observa-
tional implications. I argue that economic and political sanctions are indeed a
successful nonproliferation tool, but that selection effects have rendered this
success largely hidden. I provide evidence that since the late 1970s - when the
United States made clear through congressional legislation that positive economic
and security relations with the country were contingent on nonproliferation and
began regularly employing sanctions against proliferating states - sanctions have
been ineffective in halting ongoing nuclear weapons programs, but have succeeded
in deterring states from starting nuclear weapons programs in the first place and
have thus contributed to a decline in the rate of nuclear pursuit.9 The logic is
simple: rational leaders assess the risk of sanctions before initiating a nuclear
weapons program, which produces a selection effect whereby states highly vulnerable to sanctions are deterred from starting nuclear weapons programs in the first
place, so long as the threat is credible. Vulnerability is a function of a state's level
of economic and security dependence on the United States - states with greater
dependence have more to lose from US sanctions and are more likely to be sensitive
to US-sponsored norms. The end result of this selection effect is that since the
United States made the threat of sanctions credible in the late 1970s, only insulated,
2. Recent examples include Esfandiary and Fitzpatrick 201 1; and Maloney 2010.
3. Solingen 2012a.
4. See Galtung 1967; Lindsay 1986; Pape 1997; Morgan and Schwebach 1997; Drezner 1998 and 2003;
and Lacy and Niou 2004.
5. See Fearon 2002.
6. Solingen 2012b, 8, 299-301.
7. See, most prominently, Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990; and Pape 1997.
8. See Solingen 2012a, for the most recent work in this tradition.
9. For a visualization of the decline, see Sagan 201 1, c2.
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The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions 915
inward-looking regimes with few ties to the United States have pursued nuclear
weapons and become the target of imposed sanctions, rendering the observed
success rate of nonproliferation sanctions low.10
To evaluate this argument, I test three key observable implications: (1) controlling
for other predictors of proliferation, states dependent on the United States econom-
ically and militarily should be significantly less likely to pursue nuclear weapons,
but only since the threat of sanctions became credible in the late 1970s; (2) the
observed success rate of sanctions threatened or imposed against ongoing nuclear
programs should be low; and (3) the rare cases of observed sanctions success
should be largely confined to instances where states dependent on the United
States underestimated the risk of sanctions when initiating their nuclear pursuit.
Utilizing quantitative analysis on a global sample of countries from 1950 to 2000,
an original data set of US nonproliferation sanctions episodes, and historical analysis
of South Korean and Taiwanese nuclear programs drawing on US archival documents, this article finds strong support for the theoretical argument.
Existing Literature on Sanctions and Nuclear Proliferation
A large body of literature examines the efficacy of economic sanctions, and although
some scholars are relatively optimistic about the efficacy of imposing sanctions,1 1 the
majority view is that sanctions are usually ineffective in securing the desired behavioral changes from the target state.12 The arguments for why imposed sanctions are
unsuccessful fall into three different camps, and suggest different policy implications.
First are those who argue that nationalism and the possibility of substitution allow
states to weather economic disruption.13 Second are those arguing that domestic political incentives or international conflict expectations lead sanctions to be poorly
designed and targeted - thus, it is not that sanctions are inherently ineffective but
rather that policy-makers implement them in imperfect ways.14 Finally, and most rel-
evant to this article's argument, a third group of scholars focuses on the rational calculations of leaders and the incentives for reaching a bargain before the imposition of
sanctions. Their intuition is that rational states consider the future costs of sanctions
when weighing their options - the result is that those who are particularly vulnerable
10. Although multilateral sanctions have been imposed against recent proliferators such as North Korea
and Iran, I focus on the United States because it has taken the lead in virtually all nonproliferation sanctions
campaigns, has been by far the most frequent imposer of nonproliferation sanctions, and has the most longstanding and clearly articulated sanctions regime and policies. Based on data from Hufbauer et al. 2008, Of
twenty-one cases of sanctions related to nuclear proliferation identified through 2006, 14 (67 percent) were
imposed by the United States.
11. For example, see Baldwin 1985; Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990; and Baldwin 1999.
12. On measuring efficacy, see Baldwin 1999.
13. See Galtung 1967; Lindsay 1986; and Pape 1997.
14. See Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988; Lindsay 1986, 153-54; Whang 2011; and Drezner 1998,
710-11.
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916 International Organization
to the sanctions will concede at the mere threat rather than defying the sender and
enduring the costs.15
Turning to the literature on nuclear proliferation, extant work has identified three
classes of motivations for proliferation: security, domestic politics, and norms.16
More precisely, states pursue nuclear weapons to (1) ensure their security against
nuclear or overwhelming conventional threats,17 (2) serve domestic bureaucratic or pol-
itical interests,18 or (3) build international prestige or fulfill conceptions of national
identity.19 Consequently, states may renounce nuclear weapons programs when they
promise to harm rather than help their security, threaten domestic political or bureaucratic interests, or when nuclear proliferation is believed to violate an important inter-
national norm or contradict a state's national identity. Apart from motivations for
proliferation, recent work has examined how peaceful nuclear cooperation and sensitive nuclear assistance provide a supply-side impetus for the pursuit and acquisition
of nuclear weapons.20 However, no extant work systematically examines how dependence on the United States deters nuclear pursuit by the threat of sanctions; indeed, the
role of US nonproliferation policy and strategic interaction between potential proliferators and opponents of proliferation is largely absent from the literature.
Argument and Methods
Building on the rationalist work on economic sanctions, I argue that the key to under-
standing the dynamics of sanctions in nonproliferation is that rational leaders con-
sider the risk of sanctions before initiating a nuclear weapons program. If the
probability and cost of sanctions are sufficiently high for a given state - in particular,
if the state is highly dependent on the United States and the threat of sanctions is cred-
ible - it will not pursue nuclear weapons at all and no explicit threat of sanctions will
be needed. In other words, the selection effect is one step further removed than the
rationalist work on economic sanctions suggests: states can be deterred even
before an explicitly targeted threat. As Drezner notes, "It is quite likely that potential
targets try to comply with US demands before the articulation of a threat . . . There
may ... be instances in which a target refrains from acting against the sender's prefer-
ences because of the anticipation of sanctions."21
The threat of sanctions can help deter proliferation by states dependent on the
United States through each of the three pathways of proliferation identified in the
15. See Lacy and Niou 2004; Drezner 2003; and Hovi, Huseby, and Sprinz 2005.
16. This trinity of motivations was originally suggested in Sagan 1996. Also see Paul 2000; Meyer 1984;
Jo and Gartzke 2007; and Singh and Way 2004.
17. Thayer 1995.
18. Solingen 2007.
19. Hymans 2006.
20. See Fuhrmann 2009; and Kroenig 2009.
21. Drezner 2003, 653-55.
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The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions 917
literature: security, domestic politics, and norms. First, in terms of security, states
dependent on US troops or military aid are likely to think twice about proliferating
if it threatens to jeopardize these important relations with the United States. Thus,
although states may desire nuclear weapons to ensure security against nuclear or con-
ventional threats, they may be unwilling to accept the window of vulnerability that
would occur if they started a nuclear weapons program and lost American troop commitments and military aid shortly thereafter - the average time to complete a nuclear
weapons program (among those who succeeded in building the bomb) is not short:
about ten years.22
Second, in terms of domestic politics, recent work by Solingen has highlighted
how regimes whose political coalitions depend on the international economy are
less likely to pursue nuclear weapons because such a pursuit poses risks to the
states' internationalist agenda.23 The threat of sanctions is clearly relevant here:
ruling coalitions relying on trade or foreign aid from the United States are likely to
oppose a nuclear program to avoid costly trade embargos or aid cutoffs that may
threaten their political survival. Alternately, domestic nuclear scientists and bureaucrats whose work is advanced through international nuclear cooperation may oppose
the initiation of a nuclear weapons program because it jeopardizes international
assistance.24
Finally, in terms of norms, sanctions ought to be equally critical. Although much of
the international relations literature has focused on the moral, ideational, and sociological sources of norms,25 there is an extensive literature in international relations
and other disciplines that argues norms derive much of their power from sanctions
that serve as enforcement mechanisms.26 Finnemore and Sikkink note that socialization is the primary mechanism of a norm cascade, and that "in the context of inter-
national politics, socialization involves diplomatic praise or censure, either bilateral
or multilateral, which is reinforced by material sanctions and incentives."27 Goertz
and Diehl observe that even if norms become internalized, the fact remains that "in
virtually all cases of functioning norms, there seem to be some sanctions."28
Drawing on this research, scholars should expect that the credibility of and vulnerability to sanctions should strengthen norms against proliferation, helping to deter
nuclear pursuit.
This argument suggests that a serious selection effect is at play. As Fearon
explains, "selection effects occur when factors that influence the choices that
produce cases also influence the outcome or dependent variable for each case."29
22. Data for this calculation are from Way 201 1.
23. Solingen 2007.
24. Hymans 201 1. It should be noted that other scholars, for example, Fuhrmann 2009, argue that international nuclear cooperation may spur nuclear weapons programs.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
See Finnemore 1996; Nadelmann 1990; Barnett and Finnemore 1999; and Tannenwald 2005.
See Axelrod 1986; Heckathorn 1988; Goertz and Diehl 1992; and Fehr and Fischbacher 2004.
Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 902.
Goertz and Diehl 1992, 638.
Fearon 2002, 7.
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918 International Organization
Thus, when the threat of sanctions is credible, dependence on the United States is
likely to influence both (1) whether a state starts a nuclear weapons program (and
thus becomes a possible observed case of nonproliferation sanctions) and (2)
whether that state concedes in the face of sanctions that are ultimately threatened
or imposed.30 The result of this selection effect is that states vulnerable to sanctions
are likely to be deterred from initiating nuclear weapons programs; meanwhile, those
that choose to initiate them are likely to be precisely those states that are least vulner-
able to sanctions (and therefore unlikely to make major concessions). A natural question arises: Why does the United States continue to impose sanctions in cases where it
is likely to fail? The answer, simply, is that a reputation for imposing sanctions is
necessary for the policy to successfully deter.31
To test this argument, I explore multiple observable implications using a variety of
sources and methods. Despite their disagreements, both quantitative and qualitative
methodologists agree that rigorous theory testing should explore as many observable
implications of a theory as feasible.32 Although no test is expected to be fully convin-
cing on its own, in combination the tests shed considerable light on the theory's val-
idity. Specifically, one should observe that states that are more vulnerable to US
sanctions (that is, more dependent on the United States economically and militarily)
should be less likely to pursue nuclear weapons, even controlling for other predictors
of proliferation, but only after the threat of sanctions became credible in the late
1970s. Second, one should find that the observed success rate of sanctions threatened
or imposed against proliferating states is low. Third, sanctions should be most likely
to succeed at halting existing nuclear weapons programs when targeted at states that
had reasons to miscalculate the probability of sanctions when initiating their nuclear
pursuit, particularly those with high economic and security dependence on the United
States.
The Deterrent Effect of Nonproliferation Sanctions
The argument I have elaborated suggests that dependence on the United States should
be associated with nuclear forbearance, but only when the threat of sanctions is cred-
ible. As a proxy for the credibility of the threat of American sanctions, I exploit the
shift in US nonproliferation policy that occurred between 1975 and 1978. Before
1975, when the United States imposed sanctions on South Africa, the United
30. The target's dependence on the United States is also likely to be correlated with the costs of the sanctions to the United States. Imposing sanctions that are costly to the sender more effectively conveys resolve
by sinking costs (see Schelling 1966; Fearon 1997; and Lektzian and Sprecher 2007). However, the threat
to impose sanctions that are costly to the sender may be less credible because of the self-harm they would
inflict if carried out. As I argue, the United States resolved this problem by adopting congressional legislation that tied the president's hands - beginning only in the late 1970s, however.
3 1 . On the importance of establishing a reputation for imposing sanctions, see Lacy and Niou 2004; and
Peterson 2013.
32. See Van Evera, 1997, 35; and King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 19-20.
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The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions 919
States had never imposed sanctions in the context of nonproliferation. This policy
was strengthened and formalized between 1976 and 1977, when Congress passed
the Symington and Glenn amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
These amendments, codified in the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, banned all
US economic assistance, military aid, and export credits to states that export or
import plutonium reprocessing technology or unsafeguarded, nonmultilaterally
managed uranium enrichment technology after 4 August 1977 - significantly,
these are the only two methods for producing the material needed to build a
nuclear bomb - as well as to states that test a nuclear bomb. Only a presidential
waiver, submitted to Congress, could exempt a country from these sanctions.33
This policy was bolstered by the passage of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act
(NNPA) in 1978, which mandated a cutoff in nuclear cooperation (absent a presidential exemption) with nonnuclear weapons states that did not conform to a set of
strict nonproliferation criteria, including full-scope International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all their nuclear facilities, a commitment not to
explode a nuclear device and not to enrich or reprocess US-supplied nuclear
materials without prior approval.34 Between 1975 and 1978, the United States also
spearheaded the establishment of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), an international cartel of nuclear suppliers devoted to preventing the export of sensitive
nuclear materials to states without IAEA safeguards.35 Importantly, however, since
the NSG included the Soviet Union as well as Japan and European suppliers,
its effect would not account for the decline in proliferation among only countries
dependent on the United States that the theoretical argument predicts (and the evidence supports).
Although the United States sponsored the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
which entered into force in 1970 and prohibited nonnuclear weapons states that ratified the treaty from developing nuclear weapons, the treaty did not include an explicit
sanctioning mechanism. Moreover, while US policy stood in opposition to further
proliferation, President Richard Nixon himself was not strongly opposed, at least
among friendly states. Although he went through with ratification of the NPT after
taking office in 1969, Nixon insisted, "There should be no efforts by the US
Government to pressure other nations, in particular the Federal Republic of
Germany, to follow suit."36 Nixon considered the NPT an unwelcome product of
the Johnson Administration - as he told National Security Advisor Henry
Kissinger in a meeting in June 1972, "I supported nonproliferation because we had
to." Instead, he believed that "Each nation should handle this problem in the light
33. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2011, 1082-86.
34. Ibid, 1050-52.
35. Nye 1981. Also see Strulak 1993.
36. National Security Decision Memorandum 6, Washington, 5 February 1969, Nixon-Ford
Administrations, Vol. E-2, Document 8, Foreign Relations of the United States. Available at http://
history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frusl969-76ve02/d8, accessed 27 January 2013.
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920 International Organization
of its own circumstances."37 Overall, nonproliferation "remained on the periphery of
the Nixon administration's foreign policy agenda in light of other, more pressing
Cold War concerns."38 When India exploded a nuclear device in May 1974,
the United States initially responded calmly, increasing economic assistance in the
short term and continuing nuclear fuel shipments, policies that continued into the
Ford administration.39
In the long run, however, the Indian nuclear test, along with the revelation of com-
mercial deals that promised to transfer reprocessing and enrichment technology from
European suppliers to Brazil, South Korea, and Pakistan, convinced many US policymakers that (1) nonproliferation needed to be a higher priority, and (2) the NPT was
insufficient to halt proliferation.40 In other words, it was precisely the limitations of
the NPT - its inability to influence states that chose to remain outside the treaty and
lack of controls on the spread of sensitive nuclear technology that could be used to
build weapons as well as for peaceful purposes - that led to the firmer US sanctions
policies emerging between 1976 and 197 8. 41
The threat of sanctions developed between 1976 and 1978 meets the primary criteria for threat credibility identified in the deterrence literature: (1) the United States
had both the interest and capability to carry out the threat,42 (2) communicated the
threat clearly to the world,43 and (3) signaled its commitment by adopting handtying mechanisms that generate domestic audience costs.44 First, in terms of capabil-
ity, it is clear that the United States had the power to employ sanctions against
proliferating states if it desired. The United States also had an interest in doing so:
as one of the few states with nuclear weapons, and the only state with truly global
power projection capabilities, any additional nuclear state reduced American relative
power and limited the American military's influence and freedom of action.45 As a
pivotal 1965 US government report concluded, additional nuclear proliferation
"will add complexity and instability to the deterrent balance between the US and
the Soviet Union, aggravate suspicions and hostility among states neighboring new
nuclear powers . . . impede the vital tasks of controlling and reducing weapons
around the world, and eventually constitute direct military threats to the US."46
Although it took about a decade until the United States developed enforcement
mechanisms, this blanket policy of opposition to nuclear proliferation was ultimately
37. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),
Washington, 13 June 1972, Nixon-Ford Administrations, Vol. E-2, Document 58, Foreign Relations of the
United States. Available at http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frusl969-76ve02/d58.
38. Martinez 2002, 262.
39. See Reiss 1988, 232; and Perkovich 1999, 184.
40. See Lellouche 1979, 337; Martinez 2002, 262; and Nye 1981, 18-19.
41. Nye 1981, 18-20.
42. Classic works include Schelling 1966; and George and Smoke 1974. More recently, see Press 2005
and Danilovic 2001.
43.
44.
45.
46.
See Schelling 1966, 70-76; and George, Hall, and Simons 1971.
See Schelling 1966, 35-125; Powell 1990; Fearon 1994 and 1997; and Slantchev 2011.
See Kroenig 2009.
US Department of State 1965.
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The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions 921
applied to allies and enemies alike, and was largely driven by the belief in a nuclear
domino theory - once one state got nuclear weapons, others would inevitably follow,
further constraining US power.47 In fact, since the Symington and Glenn amendments
cut off military and economic aid to offending states, and the NNPA cut off US
nuclear energy cooperation, one might conclude that the policy was targeted
especially at allies, since US adversaries would not be receiving US aid or nuclear
cooperation in the first place.
The second criterion for credible threats, clear communication, is also met by the US
sanctions policy, which was publicly codified in US law, reported on in the media,48
and privately communicated to states that seemed in danger of violating it.49 Finally, if
American interests in nuclear nonproliferation were not clear enough, the US sanctions
legislation tied the president's hands, automatically cutting off aid to proliferating
states without a presidential waiver. By granting a waiver the president would incur
audience costs, a nontrivial matter given the importance of nonproliferation as an
American political issue starting with the 1976 presidential campaign.50 In fact, the
one case between 1976 and 2000 where the president did waive the Symington amendment (sanctions against Pakistan were lifted after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
convinced President Ronald Reagan that Pakistani support was crucial) was
accompanied by significant congressional and public criticism and efforts by
Congress to restrict the presidential waiver, namely the Pressler and Solarz amend-
ments.51 Although Israel is often mentioned as a case where US nonproliferation
law was sidestepped, Israel has in fact never triggered sanctions because "(1) it has
not been documented to have received any un-safeguarded nuclear fuel since the enact-
ment of the Symington Amendment and the NNPA, (2) it does not receive any US
nuclear assistance, and (3) it has never overtly tested a nuclear device."52
To test the hypothesized deterrent effect of US sanctions, I analyze a country-year
data set from 1950 to 2000, adapted from Singh and Way and incorporating data from
Fuhrmann on nuclear cooperation agreements.53 Measuring the key causal variable,
47. Gavin 2004. Also see Miller 2014.
48. See, for instance, Bernard Gwertzman, "US and Pakistan Try to Avoid Split on Nuclear Plant,"
New York Times , 10 August 1976, 1; Clyde Farnsworth, "French-Pakistani Atom Deal Fading,"
New York Times, 12 November 1976, 3; and James Markham, "US-Pakistani Rift on Atom Fuel
Grows," New York Times , 8 May 1977, 9.
49. These include Pakistan, South Korea, and Taiwan. See US Department of State 1976a and 1976c;
and Reiss 1988.
50. See Martinez 2002; and Nye 1978.
51. On the Pressler and Solarz amendments, see Reiss 1995, 183-231. For examples of domestic criticism, see Judith Miller, "Senate Panel Votes to Lift Restrictions on Pakistan Aid," New York Times, 15 May
1981, 6; "Weapons Are Not a Policy," New York Times, 19 June 1981, 26; Neal Hoptman, "Mr. Reagan's
$3 Billion Pakistani Mistake," New York Times, 1 July 1981, 26; Barbara Crossette, "Strings Are Attached
by Senators to Aid Going to Pakistanis," New York Times, 21 October 1981, 9.
52. Thyagaraj and Thomas 2006, 360. The only nuclear cooperation agreement between the United
States and Israel is strictly limited to sharing information on nuclear safety. See Yossi Melman, "Israel
and US Sign Nuclear Cooperation Agreement," Haaretz (Internet ed.), 14 April 2008.
53. See Singh and Way 2004; and Fuhrmann 2009. 1950 is the starting date because of data limitations
vis-à-vis trade and US troops levels.
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922 International Organization
dependence on the United States, requires the recognition that dependence is a multi-
dimensional concept. Empirically, the United States maintains a variety of economic
and security relationships with other states in the international system. As an economical way of capturing these relationships, each of which may contribute to a
state's dependence on the United States, and each of which could be endangered
by US sanctions, for every country-year I code a dependence score that sums together
four binary indicators: (1) whether the state received economic aid from the United
States, (2) whether the state received military aid from the United States,54 (3)
whether the state stationed any US troops,55 and (4) whether the United States was
a major trade partner for the state (more than the median in the full sample, or
1.67 percent of the state's gross domestic product (GDP) involved in imports from
or exports to the United States).56 This five-point dependence score thus measures
the extent to which a state relies on the United States economically and militarily,
with economic aid and trade measuring economic dependence and troop presence
and military aid measuring security dependence.57 I expect that in the post- 1976
period, greater dependence on the United States should reduce the likelihood that a
state initiates a nuclear weapons program - the greater the number of pathways
through which a state is dependent on the United States, the more likely it will be
deterred by the threat of sanctions. In the pre- 1976 period, meanwhile, dependence
on the United States should have no effect on the probability of pursuing nuclear
weapons.
As an initial, informal way of exploring this hypothesis, Tables 1 and 2 display
each of the four dimensions of dependence for all states that have pursued nuclear
weapons post-1950, divided by time period. I draw on Singh and Way's coding of
nuclear pursuit, which requires that a state "do more than simply explore the possibility of a weapons program. They have to take additional further steps aimed at
acquiring nuclear weapons, such as a political decision by cabinet-level officials,
movement toward weaponization, or development of single-use, dedicated technology."58 I utilize Way's 201 1 codings of nuclear program dates.59 Although proliferation is a fluid phenomenon, with many states hedging or exploring the nuclear
option without formally authorizing a program,60 for my purposes the explicit political decision to pursue nuclear weapons is most theoretically relevant, since at this
54. US aid data, originally from US GreenbooJc, is from Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007.
55. Data from Kane 2006. The results are also robust to 100 and 1,000 troop thresholds.
56. Trade dependence data, originally from Gleditsch 2002, are from Gartzke and Jo 2009. Trade data for
Taiwan are from Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins 2009. Results are robust to using the trade data from ibid.
GDP data are from Penn World Tables.
57. Adding whether a state has an alliance with the United States to the dependence score does not significantly alter the results, nor does including only the economic components of the dependence score or
only the military components. The results are also robust to excluding the US troops indicator from the
dependence score.
58. Singh and Way 2004, 866.
59. Way 201 1 . These codings have since been updated (see Way 2012). The results are robust to utilizing
the new codings.
60. See, for example, Singh and Way 2004; and Levite 2002.
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The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions 923
pursuit stage it is most accurate to code deterrence as having failed.61 To mitigate
reverse causality issues, the data displayed are from the year before the onset of a
nuclear weapons program. As the tables illustrate, the average state that pursued
nuclear weapons in the pre- 1976 time period was significantly more dependent on
the United States than in the post- 1976 era.
TABLE 1. Pre-sanctions nuclear aspirants
Pre-1976 Year Economic aid Military aid US troops High trade Dependence score
France
1953
China
Israel
1957
Australia
India
Egypt
South
X
X
1969
X
1971
X
3
X
4
X
4
XX
3
X
X
X
3
3
XX
X
X
3
X
XX
X
X
1969
Korea
3
0
XX
X
X
1964
1966
Pakistan
XX
X
1961
1963
Taiwan
Libya
X
1954
X
X
4
South
Africa
1973
XX
2
Average 72.7% 63.6% 90.9% 63.6% 2.91
TABLE
2.
Post-sanctions
nuclear
aspir
Post- 1976 Year Economic aid Military aid US troops High trade Dependence score
Brazil
1977
Argentina
North
Korea
Iraq
Of
20%
1
1979
0
XI
suggestive.
40%
select
states
test
the
argum
on
work by
whether
Singh and Way and
a state decides to p
6
2007.
1
.
The
state
results
has
an
global
o
may
analysis
a
a
1.0
data
that
To
0
20%
these
reasons
3
X
1984
20%
course,
nate
XX
1982
Iran
Average
X
1978
are
robust
ongoing
sample
to
using
nuclear
62. The results are also robust to the use of probit, ReLogit, a linear probability model, and a linear probability model with country fixed effects.
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a
progr
924 International Organization
data set while nuclear programs are ongoing).63 To test the theoretical argument, I
include the dependence score for each country-year, a dummy variable for the
post- 1976 period, and create an interaction between these two variables (since de-
pendence on the United States is expected to have an effect only after 1976).64
Whereas the dependence score proxies the costs of sanctions for a given state, the
dummy variable for time period proxies the expected probability of sanctions.
Before 1976, when the United States lacked a sanctions policy, the expected prob-
ability was close to zero; after 1976, as a result of US legislation, the expected
probability was at least in theory close to 100 percent (because the sanctions were
intended to be automatic). The interaction term can therefore be interpreted as the
expected value of the cost of sanctions. I estimate three primary models: one that
includes only the theoretical variables, one that includes all control variables
employed in Fuhrmann,65 excluding NPT variables out of concerns for posttreatment
bias,66 and one that includes the NPT variables as well. I use a leading dependent
variable to mitigate reverse causality concerns and cluster standard errors by country.
Table 3 displays the results of the primary models and shows that regardless of
whether controls are included or excluded, and whether variables measuring the
NPT era and NPT membership are included, significance and signs on the variables
of interest remain largely stable. Because the coefficient and statistical significance of
the interaction term cannot be interpreted directly,67 and because logit coefficients do
not represent the marginal effects that are of substantive interest, I use Clarify to estimate first differences based on Model 2.68 These first differences illustrate how much
the yearly probability of pursuing nuclear weapons changes in the pre- and post- 1976
63. States reenter the data set when they abandon nuclear weapons programs. The results are robust to
accounting for temporal dependence by including as covariates the number of years since the last
pursuit of nuclear weapons, as well as the squared and cubic terms of this variable (see Carter and
Signorino 2010). The results are also robust to the exclusion of any individual country that pursued
nuclear weapons.
64. 1 also conducted several placebo tests with different cutoff years. If the argument advanced in this
article is correct, the results should attenuate as one moves the cutoff further back in time. This is
indeed what one finds: the results are attenuated as the cutoff date is moved further back, with the
results completely disappearing when a 1964 cutoff date is used. Indeed, if a model is estimated on the
1964-76 period alone, dependence on the United States has an insignificant effect. Finally, the results
are also robust to a using a 1978 cutoff (when the Nuclear Suppliers Group was fully formed).
65. Fuhrmann 2009.
66. Posttreatment bias occurs when a variable is included as a control that is partially a consequence or
the key causal variable. Because states have often signed the NPT only when they have decided against
proliferation and because this can be a response to US pressure and sanctions threats, including it as a
control may bias the results of dependence on the US toward zero. See King and Zeng 2007, 201-2. It
is also possible that dependence on the United States in the post- 1976 era caused states to be more
secure vis-à-vis shared rivals, producing a spurious result. To account for this, I ran a model where I controlled for (1) the number of militarized interstate disputes a state experienced with the USSR/Russia over
the past five years and (2) the same variable vis-à-vis China. The results are robust to the inclusion of these
variables.
67. Braumoeller 2004.
68. King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000. The results remain significant if Model 1 or Model 3 is used.
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The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions 925
era as dependence on the United States increases, holding all control variables at their
median.
TABLE 3. Logistic regression results
Model
dependence
score
1
0.398
(0.279)
post-
1976
Model
dummy
2
Model
0.553
0.457
(0.302)$
2.113
3
(0.294)
2.579
2.489
(1.124)$ (1.514)1 (1.714)
DEPENDENCE SCORE * POST- 1976 -1.591 -1.643 -1.359
(0.616)* (0.575)** (0.587)*
NO.
OF
NCAS
0.048
.030
(0.042) (.044)
NCAXAVERAGE NO. OF MIDS IN PAST 5 YEARS 0.038 0.063
(0.020)$ (0.018)**
AVERAGE NO. OF MIDS IN PAST 5 YEARS 0.339 0.355
(0.089)** (0.090)**
GDP
PER
CAPITA
0.000
0.000
(0.000)$ (0.000)
INDUSTRIAL
CAPACITY
THRESHOLD
1.641
1.977
(0.670)* (.767)*
GDP
PER
CAPITA
SQUARED
-0.000
-0.000
(0.000)* (0.000)*
POLITY
SCORE
0.003
0.005
(0.048) (0.051)
NUCLEAR
ALLY
-0.144
0.246
(0.701) (0.803)
INTERSTATE
RIVALRY
1.683
1.314
(0.866)$ (0.825)
TRADE
OPENNESS
-0.003
0.002
(0.011) (0.010)
CHANGE IN POLITY SCORE IN PAST 5 YEARS -0.101 -0.103
(0.080) (0.071)
CHANGE IN TRADE OPENNESS IN PAST 5 YEARS 0.024 0.022
(0.013)$ (0.012)$
NPT
NPT
NO
MEMBER
ERA
(POST-
PROLIFERATION
-3.468
1970)
YEARS
(1.49
0.704
(1.065)
0.004
0.032
(0.023) (0.024)
Constant -6.556 -10.028 -10.376
(0.863)** (1.372)** (1.476)**
W
5,835
5,156
5,156
Pseudo
R2
.0611
.3288
.3761
Notes : Clustered standard errors are in paren
agreements. NPT = Nuclear Non-Proliferatio
Table
4
displays
the
suggest that increases
liferation, but only in
insignificant,
in
the
the
positive
dependence
post-1976
era
estimates.
in
effect.
score
by
depende
post- 1
the
.0018,
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Spe
from
0
with
926 International Organization
Although this sounds small, proliferation is a rare outcome, and this first difference
represents an approximately 536 percent decrease from the median yearly predicted
probability of proliferation generated by the model. An increase to 2, 3, or 4 in
dependence score reduces the probability of proliferation by .0023 to .0025 between a 685 percent to 745 percent reduction from the median; all of these first
differences are significant at the 95 percent level.
TABLE 4. First differences
First difference 95% confidence %A relative to median
estimate intervals probability
Dependence score, 0 to 1, post-1976 era -.0018* -.0075, -.0001 -536%
Dependence score, 0 to 2, post- 1976 era -.0023* -.0092, -.0001 -685%
Dependence score, 0 to 3, post-1976 era -.0024* -.0095, -.0001 -715%
Dependence score, 0 to 4, post-1976 era -.0025* -.0096, -.0001 -745%
Dependence score, 0 to 1, pre- 1976 era .0001 -.0000, .0006 +30%
Dependence score, 0 to 2, pre- 1976 era .0003 -.0001, .0016 +89%
Dependence score, 0 to 3, pre-1976 era .0008 -.0001, .0037 +238%
Dependence score, 0 to 4, pre-1976 era .0017 -.0001, .0082 +507%
Note: * Significant at the 95% confidence level.
Figure 1 displays these first differences graphically. The figure shows
pre-sanctions era, there is an insignificant, positive effect of changes in
score (the 95 percent confidence interval always includes zero). In the po
era, however, the first differences are always negative and significant (n
zero), as theoretically expected, with the biggest change in simply moving f
in the dependence score. While the first differences of moving from 1 to 2
3 to 4 in the dependence score are still negative and statistically significa
much smaller in magnitude, suggesting that moving from 0 to 1 is mos
Although it is hard to tell from the figures, the 95 percent confidence
first differences in the two eras never overlap. This means that one can
95 percent confidence that the effect of dependence on the United States w
in the two eras.
Figure 2 shows the first differences of moving from the pre- to postsanctions era at
different levels of dependence score. This treats dependence as the conditioning
variable in the interaction term rather than era (as in Figure l).69 The results
suggest that for states with relatively low dependence on the United States (scores
of 0 or 1), moving to the postsanctions era is associated with an insignificant
increase in the probability of pursuing nuclear weapons. For those with high dependence (scores of 3 or 4), moving to the postsanctions era is associated with a significant decrease in the probability of pursuing nuclear weapons, as theoretically
69. Berry, Golder, and Milton 2012 note that interaction terms are inherently symmetric (meaning that
each component variable conditions the other) and therefore recommend constructing plots both ways.
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The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions 927
FIGURE 1. Effects of changes in dependence on the United States, by era
expected.70 Taken together, these results suggest that in the postsanctions era, the
biggest dampening effect is moving from no dependence to some dependence.
However, moving from the pre- to postsanctions era has the biggest negative effect
on states with the highest levels of dependence.
FIGURE 2. Effect of changing from pre-1976 to post-1976 era , by dependence score
70. The estimates are statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence interval for dependence scores
of 1, 3, and 4 and significant at the 95 percent level only for dependence scores of 4. For a list of country-
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928 International Organization
Finally, although the effect of dependence is insignificant in the pre- 1976 era, the
fact that it is positive in sign suggests a shift not just in magnitude but in direction:
before the US sanctions policy, states dependent on the United States were actually
marginally more likely to pursue nuclear weapons, ceteris paribus, perhaps because
of greater access to nuclear technology and know-how before the United States tight-
ened its nonproliferation policy. This cuts against an important counterargument -
that states dependent on the United States do not pursue nuclear weapons simply
because they feel more secure - since before 1976 and the US sanctions regime,
states dependent on the United States were actually somewhat more likely to
proliferate.
The Inefficacy of Observed Sanctions
The argument suggests that starting in the late 1970s, states dependent on the United
States have been deterred from proliferation, an assertion supported by the empirical
evidence. This causes a selection effect: because only states with low dependence on
the United States are likely to pursue nuclear weapons in this time period, the
observed success rate for sanctions should be low - the United States will not have
the leverage necessary to succeed.
To test this prediction, I built a data set of all nonproliferation sanctions episodes
involving the United States from 1975 to the present.71 The data build on previous
data sets on economic sanctions collected by Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, and
Oegg,72 the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions Dataset compiled by Morgan,
Krustev, and Bapat,73 and are supplemented by my research. To qualify for the
data set, the United States must have threatened or imposed some cutoff in its econ-
omic or security relationship (trade, economic or military aid, nuclear energy
cooperation, US troop commitments) with a state exploring or pursuing nuclear
weapons, and the resumption of normal relations must have been linked to some
form of nuclear restraint on the part of the target state. A case is coded as successful
if the target state halted its development of nuclear weapons shortly following the
threat or during the imposition of sanctions. Cases where existing sanctions are tigh-
tened or expanded are not counted as separate observations; including them would
make the success rate lower.74
years that the models suggest would have had a high risk of proliferation in the absence of the sanctions
policy, see the online appendix.
71. 1 use 1975 as the start date since this is when the United states tirst imposed sanctions m tne context
of nonproliferation. Sources for sanctions episodes are listed in the online appendix.
72. Hufbauer et al. 2008. Full list available at http://www.piie.com/research/topics/sanctions/sanctionstimeline.cfm, accessed 17 July 2012.
73. Morgan, Krustev, and Bapat 2009.
74. Although the United States imposed nonprolireration sanctions against Iraq toiiowing tne uuir war,
Iraq did not have an active nuclear weapons program in this period and thus is not included in the data set. It
is possible, however, that the threat of further sanctions may have been responsible for the halting of the
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The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions 929
The cases are presented in Table 5, and the evidence strongly confirms the theoretical prediction - that the overall success rate of sanctions should be low. Only one
of eight cases of sanctions imposition has succeeded (Libya 2004), for a success rate
of 12.5 percent. Similarly, threats of sanctions have succeeded in only two of thirteen
tries (South Korea and Taiwan), for a success rate of 15.4 percent.75 Overall, there are
three cases of success out of twenty-one observations, a 14.3 percent rate of success.
This is lower than the 34 percent success rate Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot identified
in their analysis of 115 cases of economic sanctions, although higher than the 4.34
percent success rate Pape found after reanalyzing their data.76
TABLE 5. US nonproliferation sanctions episodes
Type
South
Africa
Years
Threat
Outcome
1975
Failure
South Africa Imposition 1975-82 Failure
South Korea Threat Early 1975 Failure
South
Korea
Threat
Late
1975
Success
Taiwan
Threat
1976
Failure
Taiwan
Threat
1977
Success
Pakistan
Threat
1976
Failure
Pakistan Imposition 1977-78 Failure
Argentina Threat 1978 Failure
Argentina Imposition 1978-82 Failure
Brazil
Brazil
Threat
Pakistan
Pakistan
Iran
1977
Imposition
Threat
Imposition
Threat
Failure
1978-81
1979
1979-80
1992
Failure
Failure
Failure
Failure
Iran Imposition 1992- Failure (so far)3
North Korea Threat 1993-94 Failureb
Libya Threat 1996 Failure
Libya Imposition 1996-2004 Success
North
Korea
Threat
2002
Failure
North Korea Imposition 2002- Failure
aAt the time of publication, Iran was engaged in negotiatio
nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. If this e
program, this case could be coded as a success.
hWhile a case could be made that the threat of sanctions
Framework that froze the North Korean plutonium progr
program, simply switching to the uranium enrichment ro
possessed a virtual nuclear capability through plutonium
dissenting view, see Hymans 2010.
Iraqi program (see Brands and Palkki 2011, 162sanctions against India from 1978-82; by this poi
Coding Iraq as a successful case of imposition and
success rate for imposed sanctions 20 percent.
75. In three cases where explicit evidence of a thre
1975, Iran 1992, and Libya 1996), I assume a priva
the success rate of threats 20 percent and the over
76. Pape 1997, 91-93.
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930 International Organization
Of course, the prediction that the success rate of imposed sanctions should be low
is not unique - it could also be explained by the inherent inefficacy of sanctions or
poor design and implementation. To provide greater confidence in my argument, I
test theoretical predictions about the rare cases of observed sanction success, predictions unique to this article's argument.
Miscalculation and the Rare Cases of Observed Sanctions Success
The argument that states consider the risk of sanctions before pursuing nuclear
weapons, and that this deters vulnerable states from starting nuclear weapons programs, holds only for states that are able to accurately assess the likelihood and
costs of sanctions. To the extent that states underestimate the risk, there is room
for vulnerable states to slip through and for explicitly targeted threats of sanctions
to have an impact. This logic suggests two observable implications: states with identifiable reasons for underestimating the risk of sanctions when initiating nuclear
weapons programs should (1) be surprised at the threat of sanctions, and (2) those
vulnerable states that underestimated the risk of sanctions should be likely to
concede to subsequent threats of sanctions, once they are made credible, for fear of
jeopardizing relations with the United States.
As a measure of whether states had reason to underestimate the risk of sanctions
when they initiated their nuclear programs, I again turn to the shift one would
expect to see when the United States began imposing sanctions as nonproliferation
policy after 1976. Countries that started nuclear weapons programs before 1976
would undoubtedly underestimate the future probability of sanctions from the
outset. After 1976 and the new emphasis on sanctions in US nonproliferation
policy, one would expect precisely those states that started nuclear programs
before 1976 but had not yet completed them to be most likely to fold in the face
of sanctions, in particular those states with high dependence on the United States.
The two countries that fit these criteria are South Korea and Taiwan. These represent two out of three successful cases of sanctions; there are no successes for sanctions against states that started programs post- 1976 (and thus were more likely to
accurately assess the risk of sanctions). Although Libya likely underestimated the
probability of sanctions (having started its nuclear weapons program in 1970) and
ultimately conceded to US-led sanctions, the mechanism in this case is different.
By the time Muammar Qaddafi initiated a nuclear weapons program in 1970,
Libya was no longer highly dependent on the United States; moreover, the literature
suggests that a combination of military threats and/or a change in Qaddafi' s general
preferences about international engagement were most relevant.77
Drawing on secondary sources and US archival documents, I seek to confirm the
theory's relevant observable implications in the South Korea and Taiwan cases: (1)
77. On Libya, see Solingen 2007, 213-28; Jentleson and Whytock 2005, St. John 2004; and Bowen 2006.
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The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions 931
that these states were surprised by the threat of sanctions and (2) that they subsequently
ended their nuclear weapons programs because of the threat of sanctions, once the
threat was made credible, because of their high dependence on the United States.
Taiwan
Taiwan was undoubtedly surprised when the United States began threatening sanctions in 1976 and 1977. Although US officials had opposed Taiwanese proliferation
since they judged Taiwan was pursuing nuclear weapons in 1972, 78 sanctions were
not clearly threatened until the introduction of the Symington amendment in 1976.
Instead, the United States initially focused on supply-side measures. In early 1973,
for example, the United States successfully pressured Germany to reject the
Taiwanese purchase of reprocessing equipment.79 The first direct verbal warnings
to Taiwan were vague and did not threaten sanctions. In October 1973, for
example, a US study team warned Taiwanese officials, "Should we have reason to
believe that the ROC has moved from consideration of a nuclear weapons
program to actual implementation , we would be forced to react. That reaction
would be based upon the circumstances at the time."80
Despite the Taiwanese foreign minister's promise to drop efforts to acquire a reprocessing facility,81 the vague US threats were insufficient to halt the Taiwanese
nuclear weapons program. In 1975, Chiang Ching-kuo came to power following
his father's death, and by early 1976, "the IAEA suspected that Taiwan's nuclear
ambitions might stretch beyond power production."82 Reacting to growing concerns
about the Taiwanese nuclear program, in September the US State Department
instructed the ambassador in Taipei to clearly threaten sanctions, namely an end to
nuclear cooperation and
legislative efforts by the US congress, such as the Symington Amendment, to
deny US military and economic assistance to any country that acquires a
national reprocessing capability. This reflects the growing sensitivity of congressional and public opinion on the issue of nuclear proliferation and the implications seem clear to my government - should the ROC [Republic of China] or
any other government seek national reprocessing facilities, this would risk jeopardizing additional highly important relationships with the US.83
Superficially, these threats appeared to be successful, as Chiang Ching-kuo reiterated
that Taiwan's policy was "not to manufacture nuclear weapons" and that "all nuclear
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
US Central Intelligence Agency 1972.
Solingen 2007, 101.
US Department of State 1973a. Emphasis is in the original.
US Department of State 1973b.
Hersman and Peters 2006, 544.
US Department of State 1976a.
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932 International Organization
research on Taiwan would be directed toward peaceful uses."84 He pledged that
Taiwan would cease all reprocessing activity and end attempts to purchase reproces-
sing technology abroad.85 Nonetheless, by December the ambassador was forced to
admit, "we have rather compelling evidence that in spite of solemn and public assurances given by the GROC [Government of the Republic of China] and personally by
Premier Chiang, the Chinese may not yet have given up their intentions of acquiring a
capability for reprocessing nuclear fuels."86
A major problem was that the new US nonproliferation policy was still inchoate.
Although the Symington amendment had been passed in Congress as of June 1976, it
would not go into effect until August 1977 and it was still unclear to outside observers
exactly how far the US government would go to enforce congressional dictates.
Thus, in January 1977 the Taiwanese Vice Foreign Minister Chien Fu complained
that he had "seen a press report that US would acquiesce in West German and
French sales of reprocessing facilities to Brazil and Pakistan respectively" and
"asked whether the US was applying a 'double standard' with regard to its policy
of opposing acquisition of reprocessing facilities."87 Even after being informed
that the new American policy was "global, and that the US would be 'unstinting'
in its efforts to prevent proliferation of sensitive technology to Brazil and
Pakistan," the Taiwanese vice foreign minister still felt the US policy was sufficiently vague that he asked, "out of 'curiosity,' what the penalties would be in the
event a nation did not follow US non-proliferation guidelines."88 The response was
clear and to the point: "the sanctions would not be confined to nuclear matters but
would also affect a wide range of relations, including military cooperation . . .
Levin [the US official] dwelt on the adverse consequences that questionable ROC
nuclear activities would have on weapons supply and cited the Symington
Amendment as an example of the increasingly restrictive US attitude toward pro-
liferation risks."89 In March, the United States continued to pressure Taiwan,
directing the American ambassador to emphasize to Taiwanese officials, "President
Carter's determination to do everything in his power to prevent nuclear prolifer-
ation . . . Our non-proliferation policy is global in scope and must be based on
long-term considerations."90
With the Symington amendment and Glenn amendment approaching entry into
force, increasing the credibility of American threats, Taiwan complied with the
tough American conditions, which went far beyond Taiwan's obligations under
the NPT.91 Both security and domestic political considerations deriving from the
84.
85.
86.
87.
US Department of State 1976d.
Albright and Gay 1998, 58.
US Department of State 1976b.
US Department of State 1977a.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid.
90. US Department of State 1977b.
91. Mitchell 2004, 301.
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The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions 933
importance of the United States to the Taiwanese economy played a role in this
decision. After all, "The US was not only Taiwan's main market, source of
foreign investment, and provider of weapons and security guarantees, but also its
principal supplier of low-enriched uranium for power reactors."92 As Solingen con-
cludes, "The KMT and its successors' military, political, and economic dependence
on the US are central to understanding Taiwan's nuclear history. Nuclear decisions
were embedded in a model of regime survival emphasizing economic growth, prosperity, stability, and the defeat of internal subversion, which explains widespread
receptivity to US demands and inducements."93 Evidence from US government
documents supports this conclusion. For example, in January 1977, a cable from
the US embassy in Taipei noted that high-ranking Taiwanese officials "gave the
impression that they believe it would be folly for ROC to endanger its nuclear
power program by conducting nuclear activities of questionable nature. We were particularly struck by Chien' s question about penalties that would result from defiance of
US nuclear policies. It seemed as if he might have been seeking ammunition - which
we supplied - to use within ROC policy counsels."94
Although evidence of small-scale uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing
emerged again in 1978 and 1987-88, respectively, there is no indication that Taiwan
ever made the political decision to pursue nuclear weapons again post- 1977.
Moreover, in both instances, the threat of US sanctions succeeded in bringing the
Taiwanese program under control.95
South Korea
When South Korea initiated its nuclear weapons program in 1970, the United States
was five years from its first application of sanctions in nonproliferation policy.
Predictably, then, South Korea was not expecting sanctions and was surprised
when confronted with threats of American sanctions in 1975. This fact was explicitly
noted by a 1978 CIA report:
What patchwork attempts were made to assess the political implications of the
nuclear weapons program in 1974-75 led [Park Chung-Hee] and some of his
senior advisers to conclude that Washington would tolerate this work. Blue
House staffers at that time drew an analogy between the cases of South Korea
and Israel. The US, they reasoned, provided Israel with billions of dollars in
defense assistance, including the most modern weapons in its inventory, even
while Washington suspected Tel Aviv of developing a nuclear weapons
program. The Koreans went on from there to conclude that the US - while
92. Solingen 2007, 112.
93. Ibid., 116.
94. US Department of State 1977a.
95. See Albright and Gay 1998, 59-60; and Burr 2007.
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934 International Organization
opposing short-term weapons work in Korea - would eventually recognize and
tolerate Korea's need to have an independent nuclear capability.96
The account of US diplomacy vis-à-vis the South Korean nuclear program starts in
early 1975, when US officials ramped up nuclear intelligence gathering efforts fol-
lowing the 1974 Indian nuclear test and obtained evidence of the South Korean
nuclear weapons efforts.97 This evidence included a South Korean deal to purchase
a nuclear reprocessing facility from a French firm - although this did not violate
South Korea's commitments under the NPT, the United States worried the facility
could be used to extract weapons grade plutonium.98 Despite their serious concern
over the matter, US officials initially decided to tread lightly to avoid another
public crisis in Asia following the fall of Saigon and America's ongoing diplomatic
focus on improving relations with China.99 Rather than explicitly confronting South
Korea about ending its nuclear weapons program and canceling the reprocessing deal,
the United States "first focused on South Korea's NPT membership."100 As part of
this effort, in March 1975 Congress delayed US. Export-Import Bank loans totaling
$236 million to South Korea's nuclear energy industry; the United States informed
South Korea that the loan was under review because of the Indian nuclear test and
that "Korea's very timely ratification of the NPT will be an important factor in Ex-
Im eventually gaining congressional agreement to finance Kori-2."101 This veiled
threat was shortly followed by South Korea ratifying the NPT in March,102 but it
did not end the South Korean nuclear program.
In summer 1975, the United States finally confronted South Korea about the reprocessing deal. Nonetheless, "despite possessing significant evidence that the South
was indeed pursuing a weapons program, the Americans refrained from any direct
accusation. Nor did they reveal the extent of their intelligence. Instead, the US vigorously objected to the reprocessing deal on the grounds of "'the appearances of
things' and the 'difficulties it would cause.'"103 Starting in August 1975, however,
"The Americans' threats became progressively costlier and increasingly explicit."104
The United States reportedly threatened to cut off $275 million in annual military
assistance.105 Even more broadly, according to the US ambassador in Seoul,
South Korean leaders were asked, "whether Korea (is) prepared (to) jeopardize availability of best technology and largest financing capability which only US could
offer, as well as vital partnership with US, not only in nuclear and scientific areas
96. US Central Intelligence Agency 1978.
97. Drezner 1999, 256.
98. Ibid.
99. Reardon 2010, 226.
100. Ibid., 227.
101. Quoted in ibid., fn. 443.
102. Drezner 1999, 258.
103. Reardon 2010, 230.
104. Ibid.
105. Drezner 1999, 258.
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The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions 935
but in broad political and security areas."106 By the end of the year, "the US had
threatened to cease civilian nuclear cooperation, including the training of scientists,
and to withdraw US security guarantees, including the nuclear umbrella."107 In
January 1976, South Korea canceled the reprocessing deal under the mounting
pressure, and by December 1976 the broader nuclear weapons program was canceled,
a decision "based both on US threats and the failure of the program to make any
significant technical progress."108
Although the Symington amendment had not yet entered into force, these threats
were credible because of a variety of signals the US government had sent in recent
years, including the US rapprochement with China and withdrawal from Vietnam,
both of which communicated to South Korea that anticommunism was no longer sufficient to merit unwavering military and political support from the United States.109
Bringing matters closer to home, in 1973 the United States withdrew 24,000 of the
70,000 American troops from Korea and was subsequently late in delivering a promised $1.5 billion military aid package.1 10 In 1974, Congress reduced the level of mili-
tary aid to South Korea because of human rights concerns.111 Taken together, these
signals made clear to South Korea that the United States was willing and able to withdraw its military and economic support.
Once President Jimmy Carter entered office in 1977, however, the nuclear
weapons issue surfaced once again. Echoing a pledge he had made while campaigning, in March Carter announced his intent to withdraw almost all US troops from
Korea, asserting that US air and naval forces could provide adequate security for
South Korea.112 Moreover, Carter announced plans to remove approximately one
thousand tactical nuclear weapons from the peninsula.113 South Korean officials
declared in May that they would have to develop their own nuclear weapons if the
United States went through with their plans and in August claimed they would
build their own indigenous reprocessing plant.114 Importantly, however, South
Korea did not fully revive its nuclear weapons program, instead focusing on
"keeping the option open" by developing dual-use missile, explosive, and heavy
water reactor technology.115 As Pollack and Reiss put it, "American officials never
found convincing evidence of a revived covert program."116 Indeed, the aforemen-
tioned 1978 CIA report found "No evidence that any nuclear weapons design
work is under way at present ... No evidence that the South Koreans are trying to
106. Quoted in ibid., 257-58.
107. Reardon 2010, 231.
108. Ibid., 232. Also see Hayes and Moon 201 1.
109. Reiss 1988, 80.
1 10. See ibid., 81; and Englehardt 1996, 32.
111. Yager 1985, 199.
1 12. Hersman and Peters 2006, 542.
113. Paul 2000, 121.
114. Englehardt 1996, 32.
1 15. Hayes and Moon 201 1.
116. Pollack and Reiss 2004, 263.
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936 International Organization
acquire a uranium enrichment capability ... No evidence of any current activity
related to the acquisition of a reprocessing capability ... No evidence of stockpiling
of fissile material ... [and] No evidence of work on weapons fabrication."117
After President Park was assassinated in 1979, successor Chun Doohwan ended
these nuclear hedging efforts.118 This occurred after Carter had scrapped the troop
withdrawal plan and was reinforced by the incoming Reagan administration's
promise to increase the American economic and security commitment to South
Korea, coupled with the threat of removing these benefits if South Korean nuclear
weapons activities continued.119 However, these reassurances occurred after South
Korea had canceled its nuclear weapons program, suggesting that it was the threat
of sanctions rather than the reassurance that played the key causal role. Drezner
reaches the same conclusions about the primacy of threats over assurances in his
analysis of the 1975-76 period.120 Thus, although the reassurance may have been
important for ending the nuclear hedging, the evidence suggests the sanctions
threats were sufficient to halt the active nuclear weapons effort.
Like Taiwan, South Korea conceded to US threats only because of its high dependence on the United States. Both security and economic considerations played a role in
the success of the sanctions threats. The United States was South Korea's largest
trading partner,121 purchasing 26 percent of South Korean exports at the time, and
the United States held much of South Korea's $20 billion foreign debt.122 Drezner
observes that, "the threat to suspend all trade in nuclear materials would have com-
pletely devastated ROK [Republic of Korea] plans for energy autonomy,"123 while
Solingen notes, "without US equipment and fuel supplies for South Korea's first
nuclear plant, still under construction in 1975, the economy might have stalled at
an already critical period following the oil crisis."124 Meyer similarly observes that
"The United States government took advantage of South Korea's political, military,
and economic dependence to compel the South Korean government to cancel its
nuclear weapons project ... the threat of an economic cutoff was particularly
potent."125
In terms of security, as Reiss notes, South Korea was simply unwilling to take the
risk of placing itself "in a position where it had neither nuclear arms nor the American
commitment,"126 an eventuality that would have been realized - at least for several
years - had the United States acted on its threats. In other words, even though part
of South Korea's motivation for pursuing nuclear weapons was uncertainty about
1 17. US Central Intelligence Agency 1978.
118. Pollack and Reiss 2004, 263.
119. Siler 1998, 75-6.
120. Drezner 1999, 269-75.
121. Hersman and Peters 2006, 541.
122. Englehardt 1996, 32.
123. Drezner 1999, 262.
124. Solingen 2007, 92.
125. Meyer 1984, 126.
126. Reiss 1988, 99.
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The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions 937
the long-term American security commitment,127 the short-term loss of American
support was simply too costly, both in economic and security terms. Overall, then,
the South Korean case is in line with theoretical expectations. South Korea conceded
to US threats after miscalculating, but only because of its high dependence on the
United States politically, economically, and militarily.
Conclusion
The argument and evidence presented in this article suggest that US sanctions have
indeed been an effective tool of nonproliferation policy, but that selection effects
have rendered this success largely hidden. Because states consider the probability
and cost of sanctions before initiating nuclear weapons programs, those that are
highly vulnerable to US sanctions are likely to be deterred from starting nuclear
weapons programs in the first place, so long as the threat of sanctions is credible.
Meanwhile, those that choose to pursue nuclear weapons are likely to be highly insulated and able to weather the threat and imposition of sanctions. Thus, while observed
sanctions campaigns are unlikely to succeed in halting ongoing nuclear programs, they
do deter less insulated states that might otherwise have pursued nuclear weapons.
On the causes of proliferation, the findings suggest one should move beyond focusing on the incentives and capacity to build nuclear weapons and pay more attention to
disincentives. Although important theoretical works have emphasized the disincentives in terms of negative economic and security externalities,128 sanctions have
been largely ignored and systematic empirical testing has been rare. Moreover, the
findings help resolve a puzzle in the nuclear proliferation literature: namely the disconnect between theoretical and qualitative empirical works that emphasize the role
of allied security commitments and international trade openness in reducing motivations for nuclear proliferation129 and quantitative studies that find these variables
to be insignificant or mixed in their effect.130 The findings suggest that international
integration and security commitments may inhibit proliferation only to the extent that
their continuation is contingent on nuclear abstinence, a condition that arguably did
not exist until the advent of US sanctions policies in the late 1970s. The key point is
that many states quite rationally may prefer an independent nuclear arsenal, a nuclear
ally, and an internationally integrated economy. Only when well-established sanctions policies make states choose between a nuclear arsenal and the latter two luxuries
should international integration and allied security commitments significantly inhibit
proliferation. More broadly, the results suggest the importance of historicizing the
127. See Pollack and Reiss 2004; and Hersman and Peters 2006.
128. See Solingen 2007; and Paul 2000.
129. On the role of security commitments, see Betts 1977; Frankel 1993; and Sagan 1996. On the importance of international integration, see Solingen 2007.
130. See Singh and Way 2004; Jo and Gartzke 2007; and Müller and Schmidt 2010. For an exception on
security commitments, see Bleek 2010a.
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938 International Organization
study of nuclear proliferation; for example, the disincentives to pursue nuclear
weapons have not been constant over time and nuclear cascades may have failed
to materialize partially because of determined efforts to prevent their occurrence by
the United States.131
In terms of theoretical implications for the study of sanctions, the findings suggest
that sanctions can be effective even in the realm of national security, contrary to
popular realist arguments. Thus, while the field has known since Drezner that selection effects understate the true efficacy of sanctions with regard to trade and environmental issues,132 scholars can now extend this argument to cases where security is
more directly at stake.
In terms of policy implications, three in particular stand out. First, nonproliferation
sanctions should continue to be employed by the United States, even though they are
unlikely to halt active nuclear weapons programs. After all, the threat of sanctions is
credible only to the extent that the United States actually employs them. The import-
ance of credible signals also suggests that recent US decisions to waive sanctions
against India and Pakistan in 2001 and sign a major civilian nuclear deal with
India in 2006 may reduce the efficacy of sanctions in the future - it should be
harder to deter states to the extent that the actual imposition of sanctions is less auto-
matic. On the other hand, both India and Pakistan suffered under years of sanctions
before reaching this point, and most states cannot count on an exception being made
for them. Depending on the importance of relations with the United States, even a
relatively small chance of sanctions may be enough to dissuade the potential proliferator. Moreover, although I have focused on the United States because it has the
most extensive nonproliferation sanctions track record, the findings should be gener-
alizable to other important bilateral relations. For example, if China and Russia had
credible sanctions policies in the early 1980s, Iran may not have pursued nuclear
weapons in the first place.
Second, US international engagement provides critical leverage in the realm of
nonproliferation - sanctions deter only states that are dependent on the United
States economically and/or militarily. In other words, to the extent that the United
States reduces its global economic and security commitments, a position that has
become more attractive in recent years because of its budget crisis and recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, it should expect a corresponding lack of nonprolifera-
tion leverage. This would be particularly problematic given recent research that
suggests nuclear weapons may not be a reliable or consistent deterrent to conflict.133
Third and finally, gauging the success of sanctions solely by studying cases where
they were imposed against states like Iran and North Korea is theoretically mis-
guided; success should not be expected in such cases. In these adversary cases
131. For an argument of this flavor, see Miller 2014. On the lack of support for nuclear domino predic-
tions, see Bleek 2010b; Gavin 2009; and Mueller 2010.
132. Drezner 2003.
133. See Narang 2013; and Bell and Miller forthcoming.
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The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions 939
where the United States had little relationship with the proliferating state to begin
with, multilateral sanctions involving important partners of the proliferating state
or inducements (whether in the form of economic assistance or security assurances)
are likely to be more effective since the United States has little to threaten in the way
of sanctions on its own.134
Supplementary material
Replication data are available at .
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