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University of Miami Mitchell v Wisconsin Warrant Requirements Discussion

University of Miami

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I need an explanation for this English question to help me study.

Please use this forum to discuss the case you have chosen to research/write about for your Final Research Paper.

In your post:(a) Identify the case you’ve selected and explain why you’ve selected the case you have. (1 paragraph); and (b) Link to (or attach as a pdf) one article that addresses an aspect of the case you have selected. This can be from a periodical or a journal/law review. With the link (or pdf attachment), summarize how the article may be helpful (or contribute to) completion of your Final Research Paper. Please be sure this link/article is not just a summary, blog, or informational page about the case. (1 paragraph).

The case is labeled in the attached file Mitchell v. Wisconsin.

I have to write a final paper on this same case

All of the instructions are posted above

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CRJ 330 Law and Courts Spring 2020 Final Research Paper (Checkpoint Assignment) For your research paper, please select a U.S. Supreme Court decision (one from the alternatives below) and conduct a thorough analysis of the Court’s decision. In doing so, please discuss the facts of the case, explain where the case originated, and track its development through the lower courts to the U.S. Supreme Court (procedural history). Identify and discuss the issue(s) presented in the case and the court’s ruling on these issues (holding). Likewise, offer a lengthy analysis of the Court’s reasoning/rationale for this ruling (and dissenting opinions, if any) – paying particular attention to the influence of public policy (or public opinion). Lastly, and arguably most important, analyze the social or political ramifications of the Court’s decision (either real or hypothetical). Please select one of the case alternatives below. “An individual was pulled over and given a breathalyzer, which showed his blood alcohol content (BAC) was three times the legal limit in Wisconsin. The officer drove him to the police station to conduct a more reliable test, but Mitchell was too "lethargic" to do the test by that point, so the officer took him to the hospital to do a blood test there, which was legal under state law. He sued on the grounds that the officer violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches.” Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 2019 “An artist sued the federal government on grounds that it violated his First Amendment rights by refusing to register the trademark for his clothing line, FUCT.” Iancu v. Brunetti, 2019 “The government's power to detain noncitizens with criminal records during deportation proceedings.” Nielsen v. Preap, 2019 Please comply with all APA formatting/citation guidelines. This means that you will include in-text citations and a references page as well as title page, etc. The paper should be typed, double-spaced, and with 1 inch margins throughout. This is an approximately 10-12 page paper. Submit to Canvas by 11:59pm on Sunday, May 3. No late submissions will be accepted. See below for a general idea of how you will be assessed with respect to the content of your paper. Enjoy! Remember: I am here to support you. Please contact me if you run in to a roadblock. Checkpoint #4: CRJ 330 Law and the Courts – shared with Political Science and Liberal Arts Critical Assignment Rubric Excellent Above Average Average Below Average Unacceptable Track development and procedure of case SLO 1.4, SLO 1.5 Student rigorously tracks development and procedure of the case Student tracks development and procedure of the case in a significant manner Student tracks development and procedure of the case but omits one or two significant details Student tracks the development and procedure of the case in a superficial manner Student does not track development and procedure of the case Identify facts pertinent to issue(s) of the case SLO 1.4 Student rigorously identifies facts pertinent to issue(s) of the case Student identifies facts pertinent to issue(s) of the case Student identifies most facts pertinent to issue(s) of the case Student identifies some facts pertinent to issue(s) in the case Student does not identify facts or issue(s) in the case Explain the decision and the court’s rationale SLO 1.4, SLO 4.2 Student rigorously explains the decision and Court’s rationale Student explains the decision and Court’s rationale in a significant manner Student explains the decision and Court’s rationale, but omits one or two significant details Student explains the decision and Court’s rationale in a superficial manner Student does not explain the decision and Court’s rationale Analyze social and political ramifications of decision SLO 1.5, SLO 4.2, SLO 5.2 Student rigorously analyzes the social and political ramifications of the decision Student analyzes the social and political ramifications of the decision in a significant manner Student analyzes the social and political ramifications of the but omits one or two significant details Student analyzes the social and political ramifications of the decision in a superficial manner Student does not analyze social and political ramifications of the decision (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2018 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus NIELSEN, SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL. v. PREAP ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 16–1363. Argued October 10, 2018—Decided March 19, 2019* Federal immigration law empowers the Secretary of Homeland Security to arrest and hold a deportable alien pending a removal decision, and generally gives the Secretary the discretion either to detain the alien or to release him on bond or parole. 8 U. S. C. §1226(a). Another provision, §1226(c)—enacted out of “concer[n] that deportable criminal aliens who are not detained continue to engage in crime and fail to appear for their removal hearings,” Demore v. Kim, 538 U. S. 510, 513—sets out four categories of aliens who are inadmissible or deportable for bearing certain links to terrorism or for committing specified crimes. Section 1226(c)(1) directs the Secretary to arrest any such criminal alien “when the alien is released” from jail, and §1226(c)(2) forbids the Secretary to release any “alien described in paragraph (1)” pending a determination on removal (with one exception not relevant here). Respondents, two classes of aliens detained under §1226(c)(2), allege that because they were not immediately detained by immigration officials after their release from criminal custody, they are not aliens “described in paragraph (1),” even though all of them fall into at least one of the four categories covered by §§1226(c)(1)(A)–(D). Because the Government must rely on §1226(a) for their detention, respondents argue, they are entitled to bond hearings to determine if they should be released pending a decision on their status. The District Courts ruled for respondents, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. —————— * Together with Wilcox, Acting Field Office Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al. v. Khoury et al. (see this Court’s Rule 12.4), also on certiorari to the same court. 2 NIELSEN v. PREAP Syllabus Held: The judgments are reversed, and the cases are remanded. 831 F. 3d 1193 and 667 Fed. Appx. 966, reversed and remanded. JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, III–A, III–B–1, and IV, concluding that the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of §1226(c) is contrary to the plain text and structure of the statute. Pp. 10–17, 20–26. (a) The statute’s text does not support the argument that because respondents were not arrested immediately after their release, they are not “described in” §1226(c)(1). Since an adverb cannot modify a noun, §1226(c)(1)’s adverbial clause “when . . . released” does not modify the noun “alien,” which is modified instead by the adjectival clauses appearing in subparagraphs (A)–(D). Respondents contend that an adverb can “describe” a person even though it cannot modify the noun used to denote that person, but this Court’s interpretation is not dependent on a rule of grammar. The grammar merely complements what is conclusive here: the meaning of “described” as it appears in §1226(c)(2)—namely, “to communicate verbally . . . an account of salient identifying features,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 610. That is the relevant definition since the indisputable job of the “descri[ption] in paragraph (1)” is to “identif[y]” for the Secretary which aliens she must arrest immediately “when [they are] released.” Yet the “when . . . released” clause could not possibly describe aliens in that sense. If it did, the directive given to the Secretary in §1226(c)(1) would be incoherent. Moreover, Congress’s use of the definite article in “when the alien is released” indicates that the scope of the word “alien” “has been previously specified in context.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1294. For that noun to have been previously specified, its scope must have been settled by the time the “when . . . released” clause appears at the end of paragraph (1). Thus, the class of people to whom “the alien” refers must be fixed by the predicate offenses identified in subparagraphs (A)– (D). Pp. 10–14. (b) Subsections (a) and (c) do not establish separate sources of arrest and release authority; subsection (c) is a limit on the authority conferred by subsection (a). Accordingly, all the relevant detainees will have been arrested by authority that springs from subsection (a), and that fact alone will not spare them from subsection (c)(2)’s prohibition on release. The text of §1226 itself contemplates that aliens arrested under subsection (a) may face mandatory detention under subsection (c). If §1226(c)’s detention mandate applied only to those arrested pursuant to subsection (c)(1), there would have been no need for subsection (a)’s sentence on the release of aliens to include the words “[e]xcept as provided in subsection (c).” It is also telling that subsection (c)(2) does not limit mandatory detention to those arrested Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2019) 3 Syllabus “pursuant to” subsection (c)(1) or “under authority created by” subsection (c)(1), but to anyone so much as “described in” subsection (c)(1). Pp. 15–17. (c) This reading of §1226(c) does not flout the interpretative canon against surplusage. The “when . . . released” clause still functions to clarify when the duty to arrest is triggered and to exhort the Secretary to act quickly. Nor does this reading have the incongruous result of forbidding the release of a set of aliens whom there is no duty to arrest in the first place. Finally, the canon of constitutional avoidance does not apply where there is no ambiguity. See Warger v. Shauers, 574 U. S. 40, 50. Pp. 20–26. JUSTICE ALITO, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, concluded in Parts II and III–B–2: (a) This Court has jurisdiction to hear these cases. The limitation on review in §1226(e) applies only to “discretionary” decisions about the “application” of §1226 to particular cases. It does not block lawsuits over “the extent of the Government’s detention authority under the ‘statutory framework’ as a whole.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U. S. ___, ___. For reasons stated in Jennings, “§1252(b)(9) does not present a jurisdictional bar.” See id., at ___. Whether the District Court in the Preap case had jurisdiction under §1252(f)(1) to grant injunctive relief is irrelevant because the court had jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief. And, the fact that by the time of class certification the named plaintiffs had obtained either cancellation of removal or bond hearings did not make these cases moot. At least one named plaintiff in both cases could have been returned to detention and then denied a subsequent bond hearing. Even if that had not been so, these cases would not be moot because the harms alleged are transitory enough to elude review. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U. S. 44, 52. Pp. 7–10. (b) Even assuming that §1226(c)(1) requires immediate arrest, the result below would be wrong, because a statutory rule that officials “ ‘shall’ act within a specified time” does not by itself “preclud[e] action later,” Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U. S. 149, 158. This principle for interpreting time limits on statutory mandates was a fixture of the legal backdrop when Congress enacted §1226(c). Cf. Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U. S. 202, 209. Pp. 17–20. JUSTICE THOMAS, joined by JUSTICE GORSUCH, concluded that three statutory provisions—8 U. S. C. §§1252(b)(9), 1226(e), and 1252(f)(1)—limit judicial review in these cases and it is unlikely that the District Courts had Article III jurisdiction to certify the classes. Pp. 1–6. ALITO, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the 4 NIELSEN v. PREAP Syllabus opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, III–A, III–B–1, and IV, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts II and III–B–2, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KAVANAUGH, J., joined. KAVANAUGH, J., filed a concurring opinion. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which GORSUCH, J., joined. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2019) 1 Opinion of the Court NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 16–1363 _________________ KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. MONY PREAP, ET AL. BRYAN WILCOX, ACTING FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. BASSAM YUSUF KHOURY, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT [March 19, 2019] JUSTICE ALITO announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, III–A, III–B–1, and IV, and an opinion with respect to Parts II and III–B–2, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE KAVANAUGH join. Aliens who are arrested because they are believed to be deportable may generally apply for release on bond or parole while the question of their removal is being decided. These aliens may secure their release by proving to the satisfaction of a Department of Homeland Security officer or an immigration judge that they would not endanger others and would not flee if released from custody. Congress has decided, however, that this procedure is too risky in some instances. Congress therefore adopted a special rule for aliens who have committed certain dangerous crimes and those who have connections to terrorism. Under a statutory provision enacted in 1996, 110 2 NIELSEN v. PREAP Opinion of the Court Stat. 3009–585, 8 U. S. C. §1226(c), these aliens must be arrested “when [they are] released” from custody on criminal charges and (with one narrow exception not involved in these cases) must be detained without a bond hearing until the question of their removal is resolved. In these cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that this mandatory-detention requirement applies only if a covered alien is arrested by immigration officials as soon as he is released from jail. If the alien evades arrest for some short period of time— according to respondents, even 24 hours is too long—the mandatory-detention requirement is inapplicable, and the alien must have an opportunity to apply for release on bond or parole. Four other Circuits have rejected this interpretation of the statute, and we agree that the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation is wrong. We therefore reverse the judgments below and remand for further proceedings. I A Under federal immigration law, aliens present in this country may be removed if they fall “within one or more . . . classes of deportable aliens.” 8 U. S. C. §1227(a). In these cases, we focus on two provisions governing the arrest, detention, and release of aliens who are believed to be subject to removal. The first provision, §1226(a),1 applies to most such —————— 1 This provision states: “(a) Arrest, detention, and release “On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States. Except as provided in subsection (c) and pending such decision, the Attorney General— “(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and “(2) may release the alien on— “(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General; or Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2019) 3 Opinion of the Court aliens, and it sets out the general rule regarding their arrest and detention pending a decision on removal. Section 1226(a) contains two sentences, one dealing with taking an alien into custody and one dealing with detention. The first sentence empowers the Secretary of Homeland Security2 to arrest and hold an alien “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” The second sentence generally gives the Secretary the discretion either to detain the alien or to release him on bond or parole. If the alien is detained, he may seek review of his detention by an officer at the Department of Homeland Security and then by an immigration judge (both exercising power delegated by the Secretary), see 8 CFR §§236.1(c)(8) and (d)(1), 1003.19, 1236.1(d)(1) (2018); and the alien may secure his release if he can convince the officer or immigration judge that he poses no flight risk and no danger to the community. See §§1003.19(a), 1236.1(d); Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37 (BIA 2006). But while 8 U. S. C. §1226(a) generally permits an alien to seek release in this way, that provision’s sentence on release states that all this is subject to an exception that is set out in §1226(c). Section 1226(c) was enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, and it sprang from a “concer[n] that deportable criminal —————— “(B) conditional parole; but “(3) may not provide the alien with work authorization (including an ‘employment authorized’ endorsement or other appropriate work permit), unless the alien is lawfully admitted for permanent residence or otherwise would (without regard to removal proceedings) be provided such authorization.” 2 We replace “Attorney General” with “Secretary” because Congress has empowered the Secretary to enforce the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U. S. C. §1101 et seq., though the Attorney General retains the authority to administer removal proceedings and decide relevant questions of law. See, e.g., 6 U. S. C. §§202(3), 251, 271(b), 542 note, 557; 8 U. S. C. §§1103(a)(1) and (g), 1551 note. 4 NIELSEN v. PREAP Opinion of the Court aliens who are not detained continue to engage in crime and fail to appear for their removal hearings in large numbers.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U. S. 510, 513 (2003). To address this problem, Congress mandated that aliens who were thought to pose a heightened risk be arrested and detained without a chance to apply for release on bond or parole. Section 1226(c) consists of two paragraphs, one on the decision to take an alien into “[c]ustody” and another on the alien’s subsequent “[r]elease.”3 The first paragraph (on custody) sets out four categories of covered aliens, namely, those who are inadmissible or deportable on specified grounds. It then provides that the Secretary must take any alien falling into one of these categories “into custody” “when the alien is released” from criminal custody. The second ...
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Discussion Forum 4
The Supreme Court discourages against drunk driving by making it clear that it poses a
significant threat to public safety. States have enacted laws that impose criminal penalties on
drivers with a blood alcohol content over a stated amount. In such cases, proof of the driver's
blood alcohol content is a critical piece of evidence that seems to continuously disappear due to
the dissipation of the alcohol in the criminal's bloodstream. Therefore, officers find themselves in
a ...

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