Computer Science
Rider Maersk Global Shipping Management System Case Discussion

Rider University

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Management Information Systems 16e KENNETH C. LAUDON AND JANE P. LAUDON CHAPTER 8 CASE 2 SUMMARY SECURING INFORMATION SYSTEMS Cyberespionage: The Chinese Threat This video examines the economic and national security costs of cyberespionage. Cyberespionage involves the theft of intellectual property, as well as valuable situational and personal information, using surreptitious means on the Internet. While many advanced nations engage in cyberespionage, China has been implicated in many major cyberespionage programs aimed at the United States. L= 21:14. Systems CNBC - Cyber Espionage: The Chinese Threat URL CASE http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Js52FjOsgPA Cyberespionage is very different from cyberwarfare. The objective in cyberespionage is to, without detection, gain access to computer systems that contain valuable commercial and/or military information; to remain in place for continuous data gathering; and to remove data from the target system. The point is not to destroy enemy systems, but instead to colocate inside them and continuously drain information. This is similar to the goals of the British intelligence agency MI6 during World War II, when they broke the military codes of the Germans quite early in the war. MI6 spent a great deal of effort to insure the Germans never discovered their communications were being closely monitored and intercepted for over four years. In contrast, the objective of cyberwarfare is to destroy and disrupt enemy capabilities. When cyberwarfare continued Chapter 8, Case 2 Cyberespionage: The Chinese Threat 2 succeeds, the very fact of succeeding permits the enemy to become aware of the intrusion and take steps to defend itself. In October 2011, in a report to Congress by the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, national security officials concluded that foreign collectors of sensitive economic information are able to operate in cyberspace with relatively little risk of detection by their private sector targets. The proliferation of malicious software, prevalence of cybertool sharing, use of hackers as proxies, and routing of operations through third countries make it difficult to attribute responsibility for computer network intrusions. Cybertools have enhanced the economic espionage threat, and the Intelligence Community (IC) judges the use of such tools is already a larger threat than more traditional espionage methods. The threat comes from adversaries as well as partners. Allegedly, according to American and European media and governments, Chinese actors are the world’s most active and persistent perpetrators of economic espionage. U.S. private sector firms and cybersecurity specialists have reported an onslaught of computer network intrusions that have originated in China, but the intelligence community cannot definitively confirm who is responsible because of the possibility that the attacks originate elsewhere but use compromised Chinese computers to implement the attacks. Russia’s intelligence services come in second place. They are also conducting a range of activities to collect economic information and technology from U.S. targets. In addition, some U.S. allies and partners use their broad access to U.S. institutions to acquire sensitive U.S. economic and technology information, primarily through aggressive elicitation and other human intelligence (HUMINT) tactics. In Europe, both France and the U.S. military are accused of leading the largest cyberespionage operations against European countries, even larger than China or Russia. According to leaked U.S. diplomatic cables (WikiLeaks) from the U.S. embassy in Berlin, “French espionage is so widespread that the damages it causes the German economy are larger as a whole than those caused by China or Russia.” Berry Smutny, the head of German satellite company OHB Technology, is quoted in the diplomatic note as saying: “France is the Empire of Evil in terms of technology theft, and Germany knows it.” The United States is also the object of commercial and military espionage originating from its major Middle Eastern ally, Israel. U.S. national security officials consider Israel to be, at times, a frustrating ally and a genuine counterintelligence threat. Reviewing all the various reports and allegations, from the United States, to Europe, and China, it appears that all nation states, and their commercial affiliates, engage in a variety of activities that be could called espionage, or intelligence gathering. In some cases these activities are illegal, or skirt the laws of both the target and the initiating states. The size of these cyberespionage activities reflects both the economic strength of the nations involved (advanced countries like the United States and European councontinued Chapter 8, Case 2 Cyberespionage: The Chinese Threat 3 tries arguably have the largest and most sophisticated programs), and the demand in developing countries for stolen intellectual property. It is also difficult to estimate the economic cost of these thefts to the U.S. economy. In a 2011 report to Congress from the Office of National Counterintelligence, intelligence experts concluded that the economic cost was in the billions of dollars, and millions of jobs. The potential impact of cyberespionage is illustrated in the following examples. Google Attack: Commercial Espionage and Punishment Google announced in January 2010 that it had been the target of a highly sophisticated Chinese cyberattack. At least 34 other companies, including Yahoo, Symantec, Adobe, Northrop Grumman, and Dow Chemical, were attacked at the same time. According to the experts, the attacks at defense contractors were aimed at obtaining information on weapons systems, while those on technology companies sought out valuable source code that powers these companies’ software applications. At Google, the attackers also gained access to the Gmail accounts of Chinese human rights advocates in the United States, Europe, and China. Experts say that the attacks followed the familiar “phishing” technique. A recipient opens a message that purports to be from someone he knows and, not suspecting malicious intent, opens an attachment containing a malicious program that embeds in his computer. That program then paves the way for downloading and concealing additional programs that allow the attacker to gain total control over the recipient’s computer. Subsequent investigation determined that the Google break-in started with an instant message sent to a Google employee in China who was using Microsoft’s Messenger program. By clicking on a link within this instant message, the employee inadvertently downloaded malware that allowed the attackers to gain access to the employee’s computer and then, through that computer, access to the computers of a critical group of software developers at Google headquarters. Joint Strike Fighter The Joint Strike Fighter, also known as the F-35 Lightning II, is reportedly the costliest and most technically challenging weapons program the DoD has ever attempted. Intruders apparently entered this program repeatedly during the 2007–2009 period through vulnerabilities in the networks of contractors working on the program. These include Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and BAE Systems. One example of the continued Chapter 8, Case 2 Cyberespionage: The Chinese Threat 4 sophistication of these attacks is that the intruders inserted technology that encrypts the data as it is being stolen. As a result, investigators cannot determine exactly what data has been taken. The source of the attacks was traced back to China. GhostNet Information Warfare Monitor, a Canadian research organization, conducted a detailed investigation of Chinese cyberespionage against the Tibetan community and Tibetan Government-in-Exile during the period June 2008 to August 2009. It identified an extensive network of cyberpenetration of Tibetan targets that it called GhostNet. This is relevant here not just because of the successful penetration of Tibetan targets, but for what was learned about successful penetration of other targets during a second phase of this investigation. This investigation led to the discovery of four commercial Internet access accounts located in Hainan, China, that received data from, and sent instructions to at least 1,295 infected computers in 103 different countries. Almost 30 percent of the infected computers were what might be considered high-value intelligence targets. This included the ministries of foreign affairs of Bangladesh, Latvia, Indonesia, Philippines, Brunei, Barbados, and Bhutan; embassies of India, South Korea, Indonesia, Romania, Cyprus, Malta, Thailand, Taiwan, Portugal, Germany, and Pakistan; the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Secretariat, SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), and the Asian Development Bank; news organizations; and an unclassified computer located at NATO headquarters. The GhostNet system allowed the attackers to gain complete, real-time control over the infected computers. This includes searching and downloading specific files and covertly operating any attached devices, including microphones and web cameras. It is not known whether all of the infected computers were actually being exploited by the attackers. It is possible that some of the infected computers were infected coincidentally through emails received from an infected computer. References “US sees Israel, tight Mideast ally, as spy threat,” by Adam Goldman, New York Times, July 28, 2012. “U.S. Report Accuses China and Russia of Internet Spying” By Thom Shanker, New York Times, November 3, 2012. “Foreign Spies Stealing US Economics Secrets in Cyberspace,” Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, Washington D.C., November 3, 2011. continued Chapter 8, Case 2 Cyberespionage: The Chinese Threat VIDEO CASE QUESTIONS 5 1. What are cyberespionage groups stealing from the United States? 2. What does the video claim is the evidence these attacks are coming from China? Is this believable? 3. What does Adam Siegel in the video claim is the motivation of the Chinese government for conducting cyberespionage against the United States? 4. Why didn’t Nortel management take the Chinese threat seriously? Why do various contributors in the video claim that American management does not take the problem seriously? 5. The video claims the attacks on American corporate and military computer systems are increasingly sophisticated. Do you believe this is true? 6. Industrial espionage is a kind of technology transfer. The video claims the very DNA of Google is being drained by China, and that the United States will lose its competitive advantages with respect to China. Do you agree or disagree? Why? How else is technology transferred? Is it possible to stop technology transfer of any kind? COPYRIGHT NOTICE Copyright © 2019 Kenneth Laudon. This work is protected by United States copyright laws and is provided solely for the use of instructors in teaching their courses and assessing student learning. Dissemination or sale of any part of this work (including on the World Wide Web) will destroy the integrity of the work and is not permitted. The work and materials from this site should not be made available to students except by instructors using the accompanying text in their classes. All recipients of this work are expected to abide by these restrictions and to honor the intended pedagogical purposes and the needs of other instructors who rely on these materials. Management Information Systems 16e KENNETH C. LAUDON AND JANE P. LAUDON CHAPTER 9 ACHIEVING OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE AND CUSTOMER INTIMACY: ENTERPRISE SYSTEMS CASE 1 Maersk Develops a Global Shipping Management System SUMMARY: Maersk, the world’s largest container shipping company, turns to the Internet of Things (IoT) and business analytics to develop a global enterprise system. Systems Maersk Line: Using the Internet of Things, Data, and Analytics to Change Their Culture and Strength URL CASE https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KEC5DQqCykI L= 4:11 A.P. Moller-Maersk is a Danish shipping, logistics, and energy which operates the largest container fleet in the world with over 600 ships, moving 13 million containers a year, with 340 port facilities in 36 countries, and offices in 130 countries. Standard steel shipping containers revolutionized world shipping in the latter half of the 20th Century because they could be used to bundle cargo into unitized loads in a single steel box that could be easily moved, stored, and re-used. Also called “inter-modal containers”, they can be moved from ship to rail and trucks without re-loading or breaking up the contents by hand, greatly adding to the efficiency of world trade. The standard container is 8.5 feet high, and 20 or 40 feet long. Containers are more than just steel boxes. With the growth in global shipments of food and produce, specialized reefer containers refrigerate their contents to levels of temperature and humidity needed to preserve food. Maersk ships 25% of the refrigerated containers in the world. Maersk refers to itself as the world’s largest shipping company. Founded in 1904 by steamship captain Peter Maersk Moller, in 2018 it accounts for about 15% of the world’s $80 trillion continued Chapter 9, Case 1 Maersk Develops a Global Shipping Management System 2 global domestic product, which amounts to an estimated $12 trillion in goods. Today it operates as two separate divisions: transport and logistics, and energy logistics. In 2017 it exited the oil exploration business, but retained its energy logistics business. In 2017 it generated $31 billion in revenue, up 7% from the previous year, and cut its 2016 losses of nearly $2 billion down to $1.1 billion, a 40% improvement. Maersk has 88,000 employees worldwide. While most industries and firms have undergone extensive changes and disruptions in the last 25 years as digital technology and the Internet have developed, this has not been true of the global shipping industry. The underlying business processes involved in shipping today are still largely manual paper-based transactions although individual companies have made extensive digital investments in ship systems, navigation, communications, and container tracking. The culture of global shipping firms has focused primarily on the process of shipping, and not on the processes needed to manage millions of containers, or provide digital services to their customers. The lack of industry- wide and governmentwide standards has been a major impediment to improving performance using digital systems. In part this is because of the complexity of shipping goods among 130 countries, each of which has different kinds of documents like bills of lading, different export-import documents and procedures, and different legal and financial systems. Firms that use international shipping also have their own unique shipping systems developed by a variety of enterprise software companies. There are no industry or inter-governmental standards that address the business processes for managing global container shipping. Standardization typically comes about in industries when either one or a few companies dominate the industry, and establish standards (as in the telephone industry), or through some government intervention that forces standards on industries (as in the automobiles and pharmaceutical industries). The Internet is an exception to this rule: the Internet grew out of university and private efforts at first, and then was developed by both nongovernment engineering groups, and government agencies within the United States. None of these conditions apply to global shipping firms where no one firm dominates the industry, and international standards have not been imposed by international organizations such as the United Nations. This is a problem for an industry with over 200 million shipping containers, six million of them onboard vessels, and making 200 million trips a year! For each container shipped, there may be up to 30 different parties involved such as government agencies, the shippers and the receivers of goods, port authorities, and tax authorities, communicating up to 200 times for each container being shipped. The result is costly and inefficient industry-wide business practices, with significant opportunities for improvement. Maersk is one global shipping firm that has built an enterprise-wide digital shipping management system that can reduce fuel consumption of its fleet by optimizing voyage routing, optimize utilization of its containers, enhance the tracking of containers on its ships, as well as manage the empty containers waiting to be deployed. One foundation of continued Chapter 9, Case 1 Maersk Develops a Global Shipping Management System 3 this effort involves the Internet of Things (IoT): using sensors on every container to continuously monitor its location, and movement, along with the temperature and humidity of its contents for reefers. A second foundation of Maersk’s system is using business analytics to achieve optimal fuel and voyage management. Longer term, Maersk is planning to commercialize this capability by enabling shipping customers to access the system to track their cargos directly, and to reserve containers for their use based on their own production and shipping plans. The goal, in the end, is to make global shipping as convenient as domestic UPS or FedEx shipping. Changing the culture at Maersk involves in part becoming a digital services company with a customer-friendly system, while maintaining its fleet of ships and containers. VIDEO CASE QUESTIONS 1. Why is Maersk’s business model “complex”? 2. What role do IoT sensors play in Maersk’s systems? 3. Why is tracking empty containers so important to efficient operations? 4. What is the “data driven culture” that Maersk is trying to strengthen? 5. Why does Maersk want to give their customers access to their system? COPYRIGHT NOTICE Copyright © 2020 Kenneth Laudon. This work is protected by United States copyright laws and is provided solely for the use of instructors in teaching their courses and assessing student learning. Dissemination or sale of any part of this work (including on the World Wide Web) will destroy the integrity of the work and is not permitted. The work and materials from this site should not be made available to students except by instructors using the accompanying text in their classes. All recipients of this work are expected to abide by these restrictions and to honor the intended pedagogical purposes and the needs of other instructors who rely on these materials. ...
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Surname 1
Name of student
Institution affiliation
Date
Response to questions in case_2.2
1. What gets stolen from the U.S
The cyberespionage assemblies are pilfering sensitive economic and military information from the
systems of the U.S. without being recognized. The goal in cyber espionage is to, with no
recognition, gain entree to computer structures that comprise valuable profitmaking and military
data, to stay in place for constant data collecting, and to eradicate data from the aimed system. The
fact is not to abolish enemy schemes, but as an alternative to collocate in them and continuously
drain data. These groups of cyber espionage are collectors of confidential economic data and can
function in cyberspace with comparatively little danger of discovery by their set apart segment
targets. They are similarly piloting various actions to gather commercial info and expertise from
U.S. boards. Also, other U.S. allies and associates take their large entrance to U.S. organizations
to obtain confidential the United States' cost-effective and technology data, primarily over hostile
elicitation and other human intellect tactics.

2. Where the attacks originate from
The video states that the threat arises from opponents as well as associates. Supposedly, conferring
to European and American governments and media, Chinese performers are the world's supreme
active and insistent committers of cyber economic espionage. The United States private segment
corporations and cybersecurity experts have described an attack of computer network interferences
that have initiated in China. Still, the intelligence public cannot ultimately confirm who is
accountable because of the likelihood that the assaults originate somewhere else but use cooperated
Chinese supercomputers to implement the threats of attacks. However, from the video, it's not
realistic that the crimes originate from the Chinese government.
3. Chinese government motivation
The in...

Lincolvin (13590)
Cornell University

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