In: Current Politics and Economics of Africa
ISSN: 1098-4070
Volume 4, Number 2
© 2011 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.
ILLEGAL DRUG TRADE IN AFRICA:
TRENDS AND U.S. POLICY
Liana Sun Wyler and Nicolas Cook
ABSTRACT
Africa has historically held a peripheral role in the transnational
illicit drug trade, but in recent years has increasingly become a locus
for drug trafficking, particularly of cocaine. Recent estimates suggest
that in recent years, apart from late 2008 and 2009, between 46 and
300 metric tons of South American cocaine may have transited West
Africa en route to Europe. Recent cocaine seizure levels are sharply
higher than those in the late 1990s and early 2000s, which in all of
Africa rarely exceeded 1 metric ton a year. Africa‘s emergence as a
trafficking nexus appears to have resulted from structural shifts in
international drug trafficking patterns, including heighted European
demand for cocaine, international counternarcotics pressure driving
drug traffickers away from traditional trafficking routes, and the
operational allure for traffickers of low levels of law enforcement
capacity and high rates of corruption in many African countries.
The growth of drug trafficking through Africa poses new
challenges to international counternarcotics efforts, as well as a variety
of emergent threats to the United States. Novel strategies and
adaptations of existing efforts may be required to track emergent drug
flow patterns, dismantle major criminal syndicates involved in such
trafficking, and prevent future hotspots from emerging. While most of
the cocaine transiting Africa is destined for Europe, and little of it
enters the United States, other illicit substances trafficked through the
region, notably heroin and illegally traded chemical precursors used to
produce illicit drugs, do enter the United States. The growing drug
This is an edited, reformatted and augmented version of CRS Report R40838, dated February
26, 2010.
266
Liana Sun Wyler and Nicolas Cook
trade in Africa also poses other threats to U.S. interests. These include
the reported involvement of Latin American criminal groups, including
elements of at least one U.S.-designated terrorist organization, which
are targets of U.S. counternarcotics or military operations. Other
challenges include threats to U.S. policy interests and assistance
programs in Africa, such as efforts to advance good governance,
political stability, rule of law, and human rights, and programs to build
African law enforcement and counternarcotics capacities.
U.S. counternarcotics policy responses to the rise in trans-Africa
drug trafficking are in the formative stages. Several U.S. agencies are
evaluating the scope of the problem and identifying short-term
remedies, such as efforts to expand drug monitoring and interdiction in
Africa, and long-term efforts designed to strengthen local capacity to
combat drugs in the region. In recent years, U.S. agencies have begun
to devote greater resources to combating the drug trade in Africa. The
State Department requested $7.5 million for counternarcotics
assistance in Africa in FY2010, up from about $0.5 million in FY2006,
while the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to allocate $19.3
million in FY2009 and $28 million in FY2010 to counternarcotics
programs in Africa.
The threat of drug trafficking in Africa has drawn attention in
recent Congresses. P.L. 110-417, for instance, required that DOD
submit a report to Congress laying out a counternarcotics strategy for
the region. On June 23, 2009, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
held a hearing entitled Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa.
In responding to recent and ongoing executive branch efforts to devote
increased resources and attention to this problem, Congress may
choose to review existing authorities and funding levels for
counternarcotics programs in Africa. Key policy questions that may
arise in this respect include how best to reduce gaps in intelligence and
data collection relating to the drug trade in Africa, how to balance
short-term and long-term counternarcotics goals and strategies, how
various U.S. civilian and military and international agency
counternarcotics roles and responsibilities in Africa should be defined,
and what types and levels of resources these efforts may require.
INTRODUCTION:
THE RISING DRUG TRAFFICKING THREAT
A rise in illicit drug trafficking in Africa in recent years has drawn the
attention of U.S. policy makers. The 110th Congress, for instance, passed P.L.
110-417, requiring the Department of Defense (DOD) to author a report to
Illegal Drug Trade in Africa
267
Congress laying out a counternarcotics strategy for the region, among other
related goals. The issue has also arisen in the 111th Congress. On June 23,
2009, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) held a hearing entitled
Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa, and other recent hearings, such
as a late 2009 SFRC hearing on U.S. counterterrorism activities in Africa‘s
Sahel region, have also referenced this issue. President Barack Obama has also
highlighted the challenge posed by drug trafficking in Africa, which he has
stated ―threatens stability‖ throughout West Africa [1]
Africans have been involved in the global illicit drug trade for several
decades, both in Africa and elsewhere, but as a region, sub-Saharan Africa
played a generally peripheral role in large-scale global drug trafficking prior to
the mid-2000s. This was due, in part, to its geographic distance from
traditional key centers of non-cannabis illicit drug production and
consumption and from primary transit routes between them. While
commercially significant amounts of some drugs, particularly heroin,
reportedly transited the region in the 1980s and 1990s, the amounts trafficked
were generally much smaller than those in most other global regions. With the
exception of cannabis, local drug demand and supply incentives also remained
low by global standards for several reasons. These included a relative lack of
purchasing power as a result of low average household incomes across much
of sub-Saharan Africa (―Africa‖ hereafter, except where otherwise noted),
along with widespread cultural unfamiliarity with and exposure to the main
non-cannabis, illicit narcotics common in other parts of the world.
Africa‘s historically relative peripheral status vis-à-vis the global trade in
non-cannabis illicit narcotic drugs appears, however, to be ending. Hotspots of
illegal drug activity have emerged in West Africa and East Africa, as well as
in Southern Africa. Diverse signs of drug trafficking activity in West Africa
during the past five years indicate that this sub-region is emerging as a key
warehousing and transshipment hub for large-scale consignments of South
American cocaine being smuggled en route to Europe [2]. In recent years—
albeit not in late 2008 or 2009, an anomaly discussed below—the region has
witnessed a sharp rise in record-sized multi-ton cocaine seizures and a rise in
reported cocaine criminal cases involving diverse foreign and African
individuals, including African state officials and Latin American drug
syndicate members.
According to analyses by government and multilateral agencies, Kenya
and Ethiopia are notable transshipment hubs for heroin from Afghanistan and
Pakistan. East Africa is the primary smuggling conduit for moving heroin from
Southwest Asia to Africa for further transshipment around the globe,
268
Liana Sun Wyler and Nicolas Cook
according to the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) [3] South
Africa has become a source and transshipment point for synthetic drugs, like
methamphetamine and other amphetamine-type drugs, for both domestic
consumption and foreign destinations in Europe and South Asia. There are
also reports that multiple countries in Africa are being used as hubs for the
illicit diversion of chemical precursors used to manufacture illegal drugs.
According to the INCB, Africa ―has emerged as a major area‖ for the
diversion to the Americas and elsewhere of the key methamphetamine
precursor chemicals ephedrine and pseudoephedrine [4]
Local drug consumption trends are generally not well documented because
of a paucity of data on illicit drug usage rates [5] Cannabis use rates in Africa,
however, are reportedly among the highest worldwide, while available data
indicate that use of other drugs, including cocaine, heroin, and amphetamines,
is generally below the use rates of other world regions but is growing in some
African countries [6]
Recent Developments
On December 18, 2009, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) announced the extradition from Ghana and arrest of three West
Africans on narco-terrorism charges. The indictees allegedly agreed to
transport cocaine for the Colombian drug trafficking and terrorist organization,
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), from West Africa to
Europe with the assistance and protection of regional affiliates of the Al Qaeda
terrorist group. These arrests and other reports and congressional testimony
suggest that there may be collaboration between drug traffickers and terrorist
organizations in the region, as well as linkages between drug smuggling and
other types of illicit trafficking and criminal activities. (See ―Potential Links
Between Drug Trafficking and Terrorist Groups,‖ below.)
On December 8, 2009, the U.N. Security Council held a special session on
drug trafficking as a threat to international peace and security with a focus on
Africa. The meeting focused on the ―numerous security risks caused by drug
trafficking ... in Africa,‖ among other world regions, including ―serious threats
posed‖ by linkages between transnational organized crime and the ―increasing
link, in some cases, between drug trafficking and the financing of terrorism.‖
[7] (See ―Multilateral and Regional Efforts to Combat Drug Trafficking in
Africa,‖ below.)
Illegal Drug Trade in Africa
269
In 2009, U.S. government agencies continued to formulate and refine
Africa-specific counternarcotics programs and assistance plans. Notable in this
regard was the completion of several interagency country assessments, which
are used to evaluate needs and program counternarcotics assistance for
countries and regions in Africa. In addition, in September 2009, the
Department of Defense produced a congressionally mandated counternarcotics
strategy for the region. Notwithstanding such efforts, P.L. 111-117
(Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010) did not explicitly allocate funds for
Africa-specific counternarcotics efforts, as it did for some other countries and
regions, although the bill does fund a variety of global programs that are likely
to support such ends in Africa. (See ―U.S. Policy,‖ below.)
There was a decline in reported cocaine seizures in West Africa in the
latter half of 2008 and in 2009, following a rapid rise in such seizures in recent
prior years. The decline in such reports has spurred analysts to debate whether
there has been a corresponding actual decline in volumes of trafficked through
the region, and if so what its duration may be―or whether there was no such
decline and whether other factors, such as changes in trafficking patterns or a
lack of law enforcement intelligence or capacities, may explain the dearth of
reported seizures. The discovery in Mali in November 2009 of a wrecked
Boeing 727 believed to have been used to transport cocaine, along with other
reports indicating the increased use of air-based methods to traffic cocaine in
the region, suggests that smuggling methods may have changed, but that
volumes at issue may not be declining. (See coverage of cocaine in ―Drug
Trafficking Trends in Africa‖ section, below.)
Some reports in 2009 suggested that traffickers may be seeking to
transform Africa into a drug- processing and production hub where unrefined
illegal base drugs may be converted into finished products, although there is
reason to believe that such efforts are embryonic. (See ―Implications for U.S.
Interests‖, below, and coverage of heroin and synthetic drugs and precursor
chemicals in ―Drug Trafficking Trends in Africa,‖ below.)
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTERESTS
Historically, U.S. and international policy makers directed relatively little
attention to counternarcotics issues in Africa, largely because the potential
consequences for the United States and other non-African countries arising
from drug trafficking in the region were typically viewed as limited. The
perception that such activity may indeed threaten U.S. and other international
270
Liana Sun Wyler and Nicolas Cook
interests has grown, however, as Africa‘s role in global trafficking has
expanded. Some U.S. observers now argue that the rise in drug trafficking in
Africa has been so rapid and large—an indication that international drug
trafficking patterns are in flux—that it must now be given heightened
consideration within the context of global U.S. counternarcotics goals and
strategies [8]. The extent of this rise also suggests that such activities have the
potential to threaten diverse U.S. security, foreign policy, and economic
interests within Africa.
Confluence of Transnational Drug Syndicates and Other
Security Threats
The growth of drug trafficking through Africa poses new challenges to
international counternarcotics efforts, as well as a variety of emergent threats
to the United States. These trends suggest that novel strategies or adaptations
of existing ones may be required to track emergent drug flow patterns,
dismantle major criminal syndicates involved in such trafficking, and prevent
future hotspots from emerging. Many observers have raised concerns about
potentially growing operational linkages between Latin American, West
African, and Southwest Asian drug syndicates and European criminal elements
[9]. The increased trade suggests that such organizations are growing in
capacity, strength, and global reach [10]. There are signs that Latin American
trafficking syndicates have expanded into the region. Several Latin American
individuals from countries such as Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and
Mexico, some with known or suspected ties to cocaine syndicates, have been
arrested in cocaine cases in West Africa in recent years. DEA also reports that
since 2007, ―DEA has identified at least nine top-tier South American and
Mexican DTOs [drug trafficking organizations] that have established
operations in Africa‖ [11] Numerous Latin American persons, some suspected
of having drug links, have reportedly established residences and businesses in
Africa, particularly in West Africa [12]
Many of the same transnational Latin American drug trafficking
organizations that supply U.S. drug markets and engage in other, often violent,
crimes targeting U.S. citizens, interests, or jurisdictions are believed to be
playing a key role in the rapid growth of drug trafficking in Africa [13]. In this
respect, the threat to U.S. interests posed by this trend is direct, because these
actors‘ expansion into Africa increases their global reach and provides them
additional profits and organizational linkages, making them more financially
Illegal Drug Trade in Africa
271
and operationally diversified, robust, and versatile—and thus more difficult to
track and halt. For West African criminal groups, growing involvement with
Latin American cocaine traffickers signifies their expansion beyond heroin
trafficking, their traditional niche in the drug trade.
Potential Links between Drug Trafficking and Terrorist Groups
Drug trafficking in Africa may also facilitate collaboration or other
synergies between drug trafficking organizations and the activities or interests
of other entities that are adversarial to U.S. interests [14]. These may include
non-drug-related transnational organized crime networks and, potentially,
U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organizations, including the leftist rebel
group from Colombia, the FARC, and Hezbollah. Both of these groups are
reportedly involved in drug trafficking and money laundering in regions other
than Africa, and Hezbollah supporters are reportedly common among West
Africa‘s Lebanese commercial diaspora. These or similar entities, potentially
including Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), could earn money
directly from participation in the African drug trade [15]. Such entities could
also derive indirect benefits from the African drug trade (e.g., sources of
financing for non-drug operations, increased international ties with other illicit
actors, or access to barter deals involving drugs and other illicit goods, such as
black market arms) [16]
The strongest known link between drug trafficking and international
terrorist groups in West Africa involves the FARC, which has been linked to
cocaine trafficking into Venezuela, from where much of the cocaine now
transiting West Africa is believed to be exported [17] Hezbollah, which
reportedly has financial and business ties and a network of supporters in West
Africa and in Europe, among other world regions, has been linked to cocaine
traffic originating in or transiting Venezuela, as well as in other countries,
including the United States. Although there are no substantiated public reports
of Hezbollah involvement in trans-African cocaine traffic originating in
Venezuela, given the group‘s reported involvement in cocaine trafficking in
other countries and its links in Africa, some analysts believe that Hezbollah
may be involved in Africa-related trafficking trade, particularly with regard to
the laundering of trafficking earnings between Europe and Africa [18]. Some
analysts believe that a portion of earnings from the trade are laundered through
a process in which cash earnings are illicitly exported to African countries,
where the funds are then legally wired to banks in the Middle East in which
272
Liana Sun Wyler and Nicolas Cook
Hezbollah may play a role. Little known evidence, however, indicates that
either Hezbollah or AQIM are playing a significant role in drug flows through
the region—with the possible exception of hashish in the case of AQIM [19]
In late December 2009, the DEA announced the extradition from Ghana
and arrest of three West African individuals on narco-terrorism charges. The
indictees, reportedly self-described associates of Al Qaeda, allegedly agreed to
transport cocaine for purported representatives of the Colombian drug
trafficking and terrorist organization, the FARC, from Mali through North
Africa into Spain with the assistance and protection of Al Qaeda. A key charge
in the indictment is the allegation that the indictees‘ actions would have
provided pecuniary benefits to Al Qaeda and AQIM, which, like the FARC,
are designated as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) by the State
Department. [20] The indictment is believed to be the first publicly known use
of 21 U.S.C. 960a to prosecute crimes related to drug trafficking in support of
terrorism alleged to have been committed in sub-Saharan Africa [21]. It also
marks the first prosecution of associates of Al Qaeda for narco-terrorism
offenses [22].
These arrests reinforce claims that drug traffickers and terrorist
organizations in the region may collaborate [23]. In the absence of verifiable
proof, some have suggested that a burnt Boeing 727 discovered in Mali (see
below) may have had links to Islamic militants or Tuareg rebels known to
have operated in the region of Mali where the airplane was found [24]. Firm
evidence documenting a verifiable drug-terrorism linkage in West Africa has
not been documented in detail in publicly available sources. However,
UNODC‘s Costa stated in February 2010 that ―there is more than just spotty
evidence‖ of drug trafficker-terrorist links, and multiple media articles have
outlined the possible dynamics of and rationales for the existence of such
relationships [25].
Costa also stated that there is ―plenty of evidence‖ to suggest that cocaine
is being exchanged for arms in the region. Similar assertions have been made
in other forums; according to UNODC and other analyses, the drug-for-arms
trade may be just one of several secondary or derivative illicit economies
growing in the region, including trafficking in persons.26 In at least one case
that may illustrate such linkages, a local Malian ethnic Arab leader who has
allegedly played a role in negotiations for hostages held by AQIM in late 2009
and 2010 is reportedly linked to the alleged air-based delivery of a large
shipment of cocaine in central Mali in 2010 [27]
Illegal Drug Trade in Africa
273
Potential for Narco-Violence?
Some analysts warn that the rise in drug trafficking in Africa could prompt
a rise in criminal violence in the region. African authorities have seized small
arms from Latin American cocaine trafficking suspects in several West
African cocaine cases, and several drug trade-related shoot- outs and murders
in the region are known to have occurred in recent years. With a few notable
exceptions, however, to date there has been no marked or widespread rise in
drug-linked criminal violence in Africa [28]. While analysts may debate
whether there is a potential for the growth of drug-related violence in Africa,
other countries‘ experiences, most notably Mexico today, highlight the
potential danger of drug-related violence.
One of the most recent violent, possibly drug-related incidents involved
the assassination of Guinea-Bissau‘s armed forces chief, Batista Tagme Na
Wai, on March 1, 2009, which was followed within hours by a reportedly
retaliatory murder of the country‘s president, Joao Bernardo ―Nino‖ Vieira. No
publicly available evidence suggests that drug trafficking organizations were
behind the assassinations, and there are strong indications that political factors
may have played a role in the deaths. Both men were party to Guinea-Bissau‘s
1998 civil war, and the two men were reportedly bitter political rivals. Some
reports suggest, however, that the remote-controlled bomb that was used to
assassinate Na Wai could imply a drug link in his death. Such devices are
reportedly rarely used in the region but are frequently used by Mexican and
Colombian drug trafficking organizations. Both men had taken public stances
against drug trafficking, but both were also reportedly believed by diplomatic
sources, international organization representatives, and some analysts to have
had links to the drug trade [29]
A New Drug Production Zone?
A possible nascent shift in drug trafficking tactics in the region involves
reported efforts to transform West Africa into a drug processing and
production hub where unrefined illegal base drugs may be converted into
finished products. For some years, synthetic drugs have been produced for
local and regional consumption in South Africa, as well as other countries in
Southern and East Africa [30] South African authorities report to the United
Nations that they dismantle approximately 30 synthetic drug labs annually. In
July 2009, Guinean officials discovered in at least two locations large
274
Liana Sun Wyler and Nicolas Cook
quantities of precursor chemicals and solvents known to be used in the
processing of cocaine, heroin, and ecstasy, along with specialized equipment
used in the manufacture of these drugs, suggesting the presence of clandestine
drug processing laboratories on West African soil [31]. These discoveries—
and in particular the implication that ecstasy is being manufactured in West
Africa, which would constitute a novel development— possibly suggest that
the drug trade is being further entrenched in the region [32]. The international
community views the July 2009 discovery as a cause for concern, with the
International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) in February 2010 calling for
greater awareness of the risk that African countries may be used for illegal
drug production [33]. However, there have been few similar reports,
suggesting that such developments are embryonic at most.
Other Threats to U.S. Foreign Policy Goals
Growing transnational drug trafficking in Africa may directly jeopardize
other U.S. foreign and economic policy goals in Africa, such as the promotion
of legitimate economic growth, state institution-building, and diverse other
foreign aid program goals [34]. It could also put at risk large amounts of
peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction assistance that the United States
and other donors have invested in the region, notably in West Africa, in recent
decades.
Corruption and Other Funding-Based Threats to Law Enforcement
An increase in drug trafficking could have a negative impact on levels of
corruption among law enforcement, judicial, and military officials. Drug
corruption poses a particular danger to African states since, due to their
institutional and economic weaknesses, relatively small financial resources
may be required to elicit high levels of corrupt behavior by officials and to
vastly expand the challenges faced by already-challenged criminal justice
systems (see text box below on ―Regional Vulnerabilities.‖) [35]
Moreover, the high volumes and value of the drugs being moved through
the region mean that large-scale traffickers have at their disposal financial
resources that are significant in relation to low average incomes common in
the region.
There are indications that this threat is being realized—particularly at
regional air and sea ports of entry, where high levels of corruption and low
official pay facilitate the trafficking of illegal drugs [36]
Illegal Drug Trade in Africa
275
State officials have been implicated in a number of drug-related cases in
multiple African countries. Similarly, the organizational and logistical assets
that Latin American drug syndicates can potentially bring to bear in operations
in Africa are extensive and sophisticated in comparison to those available to
many law enforcement agencies in the region. Should trafficking through the
region grow substantially, these assets could pose a substantial added
challenge to governments‘ capacities to combat such activities.
Possible Economic Effects
There are some indications that the scale of the illicit narcotics trade may
be growing so large as to rival the volume of legal trade in some sectors.
UNODC has reported that the wholesale value of the cocaine transiting West
Africa, for example, may be starting to rival that of a number of primary legal
export commodities produced in the region.
UNODC findings have also highlighted several economic trends that may
be indicative of drug-related effects on economies in the region, including the
unexplained doubling or tripling in annual remittances from Europe to several
West African countries, and relatively sudden, substantial increases in foreign
direct investments in several others [37]
If drug-related criminality in the region were to increase markedly, some
analysts fear that legal foreign investment in the region—which is already low
in many countries, due to a variety of factors—could be further deterred,
potentially negatively affecting U.S. interests in the region [38]
For example, State Department analysts suggest that such inhibitions on
investment could potentially negatively affect U.S. energy security interests in
the region by affecting U.S. oil sector investments [39] On the other hand, it
remains unclear how much of a marginal increase drug-related inhibitions on
investment, including investment in the energy sector, might add to a
substantial existing level of foreign business reticence to invest in Africa.
Large energy firms have long routinely operated in very challenging business
climates, remote and harsh environmental contexts, and in countries that are
affected by high levels of corruption or political instability.
Possible Governance Impacts
Corruption and the economic value of inflows of drug-related hard
currency funds into Africa‘s relatively small economies hold the potential to
undermine the political will to strongly back substantive and effective counternarcotics efforts, and could pose a range of broader governance threats. These
include the potential undermining of civil and constitutional liberties, notably
276
Liana Sun Wyler and Nicolas Cook
freedom of the press, and limitations on citizens‘ franchise powers to suit the
interests of corrupt officials. In the extreme, in cases in which the operational
influence of drug trafficking networks significantly penetrates key institutions,
such as the military, the sovereignty or viability of states as independent rule
of law-based entities may be jeopardized. Such concerns have been repeatedly
raised by many analysts with regard to Guinea-Bissau, as well as Guinea,
albeit to a lesser extent, during the final years in power of the late President
Conte.
DRUG TRAFFICKING TRENDS IN AFRICA
Trafficking: Overview
Although long considered a relatively minor global source, destination,
and transit point for illegal drugs, Africa‘s role in global illicit drug trade has
grown in recent years (see Table 1 for drug seizure levels in 2006, the most
recent year for which Africa-wide data were available).
Most prominent among recent drug trafficking trends in Africa is the
record number of multi-ton seizures of cocaine in West Africa. Between 2005
and 2008, West African, European, and U.S. officials have seized at least 46
metric tons of cocaine bound for Europe via West Africa. This represents a
significant rise over impoundment levels in the late 1990s and early 2000s,
when total drug seizures rarely exceeded more than 1 metric ton per year for
the entire continent. Although the region has long been a transit point for small
consignments of cocaine destined for Europe, the volume and frequency of
cocaine seizures in recent years appears to indicate emerging changes in
methods used for trafficking of cocaine, the mix of criminal actors involved,
and in patterns of global cocaine movement and consumption. How durable
such changes may prove, however, is unclear. While a wide variety of factors
may explain the relatively sudden rise of cocaine trafficking through West
Africa, a number of structural and institutional characteristics common to
many African countries may make the region as a whole susceptible to
trafficking of various illicit substances. These are discussed in the following
text box.
Table 1.2006 Drug Seizures in Africa
(simplified drug breakdown, in kilogram equivalents)
Cocaine
East Africa
Heroin
and Morphine
137.9
Cannabis
Plant
32,236.1
Cannabis
Resin
2.3
Amphe
tamines
N/A
Ecstasy
17.0
Cannabis
Herb
225,340.6
North Africa
78.6
91.2
146,490.5
427.7
118,523.6
2.1
1.0
Southern Africa
29.7
363.4
637,227.9
145,751.6
54.8
315.4
22.9
West and Central Africa
107.6
14,578.9
207,820.0
928.4
10,426.0
517.7
3.5
Africa Total
353.8
15,050.6
1,216,879.1
179,343.7
129,006.8
835.1
27.5
World Total
103,991.6
705,789.4
5,239,695.3
1,340,507.5
1,024,828.6
43,171.5
4,510.7
African Share of Global Total (%)
0.3%
2.1%
23.2%
13.4%
12.5%
1.9%
0.6%
0.0
Source: UNODC, Interactive Seizures Tables and Graphs. Data current as of September 30, 2008.
Notes: Data may not total due to rounding. According to the UNODC, a possible seizure estimate error related to a cocaine case in
Nigeria in 2006 may exaggerate total cocaine seizures for the region by as much as 11 tons for that year. In addition, a lack of data
for some countries may result in under-reporting for all years.
No other source for comparable data is available as of June 10, 2009.
Table 2. Cocaine Seizures in Africa, 2000-2006
(simplified drug breakdown, in kilogram equivalents)
East Africa
2000
8.0
2001
7.5
2002
25.0
2003
5.7
2004
1,178.4
2005
12.2
2006
17.0
North Africa
35.8
6.4
21.6
17.2
9.2
843.4
91.2
Southern Africa
West & Central Africa
AFRICA TOTAL
Change from Prior Year (%)
272.6
137.1
453.5
2.6%
180.7
273.0
467.7
3.1%
455.1
98.3
599.9
28.3%
818.7
269.3
1,110.9
85.2%
611.0
1,797.9
3,596.6
223.8%
343.9
1,365.0
2,564.4
-28.7%
363.4
14,578.9
15,050.6
486.9%
Number of Reported Drug Seizures
1,750
539
148
69
2,533
3,681
4,081
Number of African
Countries Reporting Seizures
23
21
21
24
25
30
27
344,454.1
0.1%
365,922.2
0.1%
372,418.2
0.2%
499,025.2
0.2%
579,526.7
0.6%
749,895.7
0.3%
705,789.4
2.1%
GLOBAL TOTAL
AFRICA‘S SHARE OF
GLOBAL TOTAL (%)
Source: UNODC, Interactive Seizures Tables and Graphs, data current as of September 30, 2008.
Notes: Data may not total due to rounding. According to the UNODC, an error in data for West Africa in 2006 may likely exaggerate
total cocaine seizures for the region by as much as 11 tons. No other source for comparable data is available as of June 10, 2009.
Illegal Drug Trade in Africa
279
Regional Vulnerabilities
Africa—in particular West Africa with respect to cocaine trafficking—
is viewed as attractive to traffickers because they are likely to face relatively
lower risks of monitoring and apprehension by law enforcement there than
in many other world regions. While the capabilities of African governments
vary, sometimes substantially, many countries on the sub-continent share a
number of socioeconomic and state characteristics that appear to make the
region a favorable operating environment for traffickers. These include the
following:
Poor internal transport and communications systems, which impede
tracking and monitoring of drug trafficking.
Large, sparsely populated, remote zones; porous land borders,
frequent, often long-established patterns of unrecorded or illicit crossborder trade.
Lack of maritime, air, and land surveillance and interdiction
technical capacities, and often limited seaport, airport, and border post
security and goods shipment controls, and lack of operational and
logistical resources for these purposes.
Institutionally weak law enforcement and judicial systems that, in
some cases, are subject to corruption or political influence.
Limited state regulatory controls and administrative capacities, and
a frequent general lack of public fiscal resources, resulting in low levels
of public sector compensation and/or salary arrears and often widespread
public sector corruption.
High rates of poverty and unemployment, and a sizable differential
between average income levels in the region and the amount of
operational capital and profits available to large-scale trafficking
organizations.
The latter three factors may give rise to financial incentives that may
prompt significant numbers of African citizens or public officials to accept
payment in exchange for facilitating or participating in trafficking. Several
countries also share other unique features seen as making them particularly
susceptible to trafficking. Gambia, Benin, and Togo, for instance, host busy
ports that function as large-scale import and re-export hubs for regional trade
in licit, gray, and black market goods. This loosely regulated, high-volume
trade may offer a useful conduit for concealing illicit drugs. Similarly,
several countries, notably Senegal, Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Ghana,
280
Liana Sun Wyler and Nicolas Cook
host regional commercial air traffic hubs that connect the region to Europe
and are used by drug mules. Lastly, several countries, notably including
Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, are seen as especially vulnerable
to trafficking activities because they have emerged from civil wars within
the last decade. Their institutional and governance capacities, notably in the
area of law enforcement, remain weak and rudimentary, even in regional
comparison. They also have lengthy histories of public sector corruption.
Sizable cocaine seizures have taken place in each of them, indicating that
trafficking can be empirically documented as affecting them.
Cocaine
Sources and Destinations
As with practically all illegal cocaine, that which transits West Africa
originates in South America, where it is processed in Colombia and Peru using
coca leaves grown in the same countries.40 In 2007, Colombian authorities
estimated that approximately 35% of cocaine produced and shipped from the
coasts of Colombia, Venezuela, the Guyanas, and Brazil is trafficked via West
Africa to Europe [41] During the same time period, U.S. and international
authorities estimated that approximately 80% of cocaine traveling from Latin
America to Africa moved by sea and the remaining 20% by air. In recent
years, the proportion of Latin American cocaine moving through West Africa
en route to Europe has increased.
UNODC reports that seizures in Africa increased from under 1 metric ton
per year in the 1998- 2002 period to 15 metric tons in 2006, and that during
the three years from 2005 through 2007, officials seized at least 33 metric tons
of cocaine bound for Europe via West Africa [42] There has been a
corresponding increase in other drug trafficking indicators: in 2006, 34% and
30% of cocaine seized at European airports came from the Caribbean and
Latin America, respectively, and 24% came from Africa. In 2007, European
cocaine seizures that transited through Africa had jumped to 46% of the total,
while those trafficked directly from Latin America provenance increased only
slightly, to 33%, and those from the Caribbean dropped to 12%. [43] In global
terms, African cocaine seizures increased from 0.1% of total global seizures in
2000 to 0.3% in 2005 to 2.1% in 2006 Table 2. [44] While this rise may
suggest that cocaine trafficking through Africa remains peripheral in global
terms, the proportional rate of growth of this increase has been abrupt, as has
its potential impact on European and African drug supply and use trends.
Illegal Drug Trade in Africa
281
Volume
The actual amount of cocaine transiting Africa en route to Europe is not
known; estimates of both the total amount of annual European cocaine
consumption and the amount being trafficked through Africa vary
significantly. Based on reported drug usage levels in Europe and
extrapolations based on drug seizure data, various U.S., European, and
international agency estimates suggest that between 46 tons and as much as
300 metric tons of cocaine consumed in Europe may transit West Africa
annually [45]. Estimates of the value of this trade, and the possible amount of
profit that it may generate for traffickers, also vary widely. One UNODC study
estimated that in 2006, about 40 tons of cocaine worth $1.8 billion—just over
27% of total European cocaine consumption of 146 tons in that year—passed
through Africa. Wholesale profits on this 40 ton amount are estimated at $450
million, or 25% of the value; these profits may have been significantly higher
if some of this amount was retailed [46]. Potential earnings may also be far
higher given that some estimates of the total amount of cocaine entering
Europe are significantly higher than the 146 tons used by UNODC to compile
this estimate [47]
In contrast to reported sharp rises in the volume of cocaine trafficked
through West Africa during much of the past decade, in the latter half of 2008
and in 2009, there were few reports of major cocaine seizures in West Africa.
Seizures at European airports on flights originating in West Africa also
reportedly declined markedly.
Geography of Trafficking
Traditionally, cocaine destined for Europe followed a northerly route from
South America, through the eastern Caribbean and the Azores, to landing
points on the Iberian peninsula and the Netherlands. Interdiction pressures and
other factors appear to have prompted a southward shift in routing, generating
the rise in cocaine trafficking to Europe through West Africa. Large
consignments of cocaine are now transported from Colombia and onward to
Brazil, Venezuela, and some smaller destinations, from where they are
dispatched to Africa, primarily West Africa.
For much of the past decade, the largest known loads of cocaine en route
to Europe via West Africa are believed to have been transported by boat
(including fishing boats, sailing yachts, and speedboats) and on container ships
and other so-called mother ships that hand off shipments to smaller, faster
boats outside territorial waters [48]. Small private airplanes have also
commonly been used. The bulk of cocaine shipments were believed to arrive
282
Liana Sun Wyler and Nicolas Cook
in Cape Verde and in countries along the West African coast, ranging from
Mauritania southward along the West African Atlantic coast as far west as
Nigeria. Key regional entry points have included Senegal, Guinea-Bissau,
Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Ghana, among others. Some shipments are also
offloaded in Southern Africa, primarily South Africa, which is a destination
for small quantities of cocaine as well as a transit point [49]. Major European
entry points for cocaine transiting through West Africa include Spain,
Portugal, the Netherlands, France, and Italy.
While more circuitous than direct routes between South America and
Europe, the southern trans- Atlantic oceanic distance between South America
and Africa is geographically shorter and thus more secure for trafficking
purposes than that between South America and Europe. These southern routes
are also located south of the Atlantic zone where U.S. and European maritime
shipping monitoring and drug interdiction efforts have historically been most
intense. In recent years, the southern routes through Africa have been
reportedly characterized by denser traffic and larger average cocaine cargo
sizes than the northern ones, as indicated by a growing number of large
seizures, including a number of multi-ton consignments [50] During the past
decade, smuggling roughly along Latitude 10 North between northern South
America and the West African coast (specifically between Venezuela and
Guinea and adjacent Guinea-Bissau), became so common that law
enforcement agencies dubbed it ―Highway 10.‖ Another major southern route
appeared to link northern Latin American source countries with Gulf of
Guinea countries from Ghana to Nigeria. There was also an increase in
smuggling through some landlocked Sahelian countries that lie along routes
connecting coastal West Africa to northern Africa via the Sahel, such as Mali
[51]
Analysts are debating whether the decline in reported seizures noted above
indicates an absolute decline in trafficking through the region and, if so,
whether such a decline is a short-term or longterm phenomenon, or whether
the absence of such reports can be explained by other factors. One set of
conjectures centers around the possibility that the decline in reported seizures
is the result of an actual decline in volumes trafficked through the region,
potentially due to increasing counterdrug efforts in the region or other factors.
An alternative explanation is that the decline may be attributable to a lack of
data, law enforcement intelligence, or interdiction successes, possibly
underpinned by drug traffickers‘ successful use of tactical trafficking
innovations to evade detection [52]. There is some information to suggest that
the latter may be true, given an apparent emergent shift of smuggling
Illegal Drug Trade in Africa
283
operations toward the Sahel and in light of assertions by many analysts that
many prior large seizures in the region were a result of serendipity or foreign
law enforcement assistance, rather than systemic, endogenously run police
operations in the region.
There is no firm evidence to suggest that the coastal West African country
routes that have been prominent over the past decade have been abandoned.
There are, however, some signs that the Sahel may be emerging as an
increasingly important locus of trafficking, due to a potentially developing
trend in which transnational traffickers active in West Africa may be
increasing their use of air transport, possibly by employing much larger,
longer-range aircraft than those used in prior years. According to news articles
and the United Nations (U.N.) Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC),
traffickers transporting cocaine across the Atlantic Ocean from South America
to West Africa are increasingly employing irregular private flights to do so,
using aircraft ranging in size from twin engine turboprops to executive jets to
Boeing 727s. [53] At least 10 such aircraft have been linked to such smuggling
through the region since 2006 [54] Similar types of aircraft, including Boeing
727s, have been used by Latin American drug traffickers to transport narcotics
shipments from South America through the Caribbean-Central American
transit zone en route to the United States since at least the early 1990s. [55]
A further indication of such a trend was the discovery, in November 2009,
of an abandoned, burnt-out wreckage of a Boeing 727 in northeastern Mali,
which the UNODC reports was used to carry cocaine [56]. In a similar, but
little reported case, a Panamanian-flagged aircraft crewed by ―South
American‖ nationals that carried ―250 large drums of cocaine‖ reportedly
landed in central Mali in January 2010. [57]
The considerable size and range of the wrecked 727 and the location of its
discovery in the Sahel, if indicative of a new trend, may help explain the
decrease in reported West African cocaine seizures in 2008 and 2009 (see
―Volume,‖ above). Use of a 727 aircraft, reportedly one of several being used,
according to the UNODC, would allow much larger air-based drug shipments
to be transported much longer distances than in the past, enabling traffickers to
drop payloads at delivery sites in the remote, sparsely populated, often
unpatrolled Sahel belt [58]. Such a strategy would obviate the need to land in
or further transport the drugs through the more densely populated and
relatively more policed West African coastal countries, and would place drug
shipments in a location geographically nearer to end-destinations in Europe.
As a result, it would reduce the number of onward transport contingencies
faced by traffickers and lower the associated risk of surveillance and
284
Liana Sun Wyler and Nicolas Cook
interdiction per unit of cocaine smuggled. Concomitantly, it would likely
reduce the number of drug seizure reports in the region, since the locus of
smuggling would shift to fewer countries and more remote, unsurveilled
zones.
Trafficking Patterns and Actors
Limited data on cocaine trafficking into and within Africa are available,
but many indications suggest that the bulk of cocaine is trafficked into West
Africa, as opposed to other sub-regions on the continent. This pattern may be
explained by geographic factors and changes in trafficking patterns spurred by
developments outside of Africa, but it may also be rooted in the preexisting
role of West Africans in the international narcotics trade. As early as the
1970s, reports indicate West Africans of multiple nationalities were
significantly involved in international heroin and cocaine trafficking [59]. In
2000, the U.S. government International Crime Threat Assessment report
stated that Nigerian criminal syndicates dominated ―transatlantic cocaine
shipments between Brazil and Africa‖ and were ―increasingly trafficking
South American cocaine to various regions in Africa and throughout Europe.‖
[60] The report stated that Nigerian traffickers primarily transshipped cocaine
using drug couriers traveling via commercial air flights.
As the size of the cocaine shipments has grown in recent years, the actors
involved in its trans- Atlantic transport appear to have changed. Much of the
recent large-scale trafficking from South America to West Africa appears to
have been dominated by Latin Americans, in particular Colombians, and some
Europeans [61]. The rise in cocaine trafficking through West Africa in recent
years had led some analysts to conclude that the increase might indicate a
long-term shift in strategies by Latin American cocaine traffickers. However,
the sharp drop in cocaine seizures in early 2009 suggests to others that such a
conclusion might be premature or inaccurate. Despite such uncertainties, there
are some indications that suspected Latin American traffickers have been
establishing a long-term permanent presence in West Africa in recent years. A
relatively recent small flow of apparently wealthy Latin Americans into West
Africa has drawn attention in a number of countries in the sub-region. A
number of these persons, who often claim to be investors in the local
economy, have purchased or constructed elaborate villas and compounds, and
often drive expensive vehicles [62]. Another possible indicator that traffickers
may be moving portions of the wholesale cocaine supply chain across the
Atlantic is the discovery of cocaine processing labs that convert cocaine base
Illegal Drug Trade in Africa
285
into a finished product, cocaine hydrochloride (HCl). Several such labs have
been recently found in Spain and Portugal [63]
Latin American traffickers are believed both to directly organize cocaine
transport onward from West Africa to Europe and to collaborate with West
African traffickers in other cocaine redistribution and export activities.
According to UNODC, ―[t]here appear to be two parallel flows. One, mainly
involving large maritime and private air shipments, is owned and managed by
South Americans,‖ while West African crime groups, either in collaboration
with nationals from other world regions or individually, ―also traffic these
drugs to Europe, usually via commercial air flights.‖ [64] West African
traffickers are reportedly paid in kind with cocaine for their logistics services
and buy wholesale consignments of cocaine from their South American
counterparts. Some of these actors may, in turn, sell or consign cocaine to lowlevel, freelancing traffickers who are also involved in moving cocaine from
West Africa to Europe [65]. West Africans have also been associated with
relatively smaller amounts of cocaine smuggled from South America to
Africa.
Tracking the movement of cocaine from West Africa to Europe is
challenging for law enforcement and intelligence agencies because of a lack of
manpower, technological, and other resources. Some patterns have been
identified, however. In general, drug syndicates, mainly from West Africa and,
to a lesser extent, South America, move cocaine from West Africa to Europe
using human couriers flying commercial air passenger routes. Parcel post,
private air flights, trans-Sahel land and air routes, and boats are also employed.
[66] The trafficking of cocaine via commercial airlines is, in particular,
believed to be well-established among West African drug syndicates. Recent
UNODC drug seizure data suggest that two sub-regional repackaging and
redistribution trafficking patterns have emerged. One involves cocaine
entering Guinea Bissau that is then routed to Senegal, Guinea, Gambia, and
Mali for onward transport to Europe, primarily by passenger air flights, but
also by land. Cocaine entering the Gulf of Guinea, by contrast, reportedly
often flows through Ghana into Togo, Benin, and Nigeria, and then onward to
Europe, primarily by passenger air flight [67]
Surveillance efforts in Europe targeting commercial air flights regularly
interdict numerous human couriers, known as mules, who either swallow their
shipments (a procedure known as ―body packing‖) or transport them on their
persons or in their luggage. This mode of trafficking appears to use a so-called
―shotgun‖ approach, in which numerous individual mules each carry amounts
typically ranging from a few ounces to several kilograms. Jointly, they
286
Liana Sun Wyler and Nicolas Cook
transport large quantities of cocaine, but traffickers face relatively low losses if
some of the mules are apprehended [68]. According to the UNODC, between
2004 and a portion of 2008, at least 1,357 couriers were detected on Europebound flights originating in West Africa, with each courier attempting to
smuggle up to 4 kilograms of cocaine [69]
Heroin
Africa is not a global production source of illegal heroin and other
opioids. Some limited opium poppy cultivation takes place in Algeria and the
Sinai Peninsula of Egypt, but U.N. reports indicate that production is solely for
regional consumption, primarily in Egypt [70]. About 1.24 million Africans
were estimated to have used heroin in 2008. This number, which accounted for
about 11% of the global user population, was 54% higher than that reported in
2004. This rise, along with some other indicators, suggests that heroin use in
Africa is growing steadily, notably in countries along key heroin trafficking
routes (see Table 3) [71]
Heroin trafficking through Africa and by African drug networks, however,
is a relatively longstanding phenomenon, with one of the first reported
instances of heroin trafficking occurring in Nigeria in the early 1980s. [72]
West African crime networks, in particular, have long played a key role in
international heroin trafficking, both with respect to the procurement of
wholesale heroin from producer countries and with regard to the wholesale
and retail sale of heroin in consumer countries, including the United States.
West African crime networks have long played a substantial role in the U.S.
and European heroin markets [73]. In 1994, Nigerian-controlled couriers
accounted for 30% of all heroin seized by the U.S. Customs Service [74]. The
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration has reported that West Africans are
continuing to play a primary role in transporting and distributing heroin in the
United States [75]
Historically, West African networks have sourced heroin in Southeast
Asia and trafficked it to consuming countries through networks mainly
controlled from Nigeria and transnational operations based in various
countries, particularly Southeast Asian ones, such as Thailand. In recent years,
as Southwest Asian heroin has come to dominate the global market, West
African heroin networks have become active in the trafficking of Southwest
Asian heroin, particularly from Afghanistan and Pakistan. According to
UNODC data, for example, at least 600 Nigerians have been arrested in
Pakistan since 2000 in possession of more than 100 grams of heroin [76]
Table 3. Heroin and Morphine Seizures in Africa, 2000-2006
(simplified drug breakdown, in kilogram equivalents)
East Africa
North Africa
Southern Africa
2000
59.5
48.6
17.5
2001
66.7
57.3
30.9
2002
95.7
66.0
15.5
2003
68.3
36.0
35.6
2004
87.8
56.7
19.9
2005
79.8
57.0
49.5
2006
137.9
78.6
29.7
West & Central Africa
100.0
77.4
114.7
105.7
237.5
140.5
107.6
AFRICA TOTAL
Change from Prior Year (%)
225.5
-2.5%
232.4
3.0%
291.7
25.6%
245.6
-15.8%
401.9
63.7%
326.7
-18.7%
353.8
8.3%
Number of Reported Drug Seizures
785
2,594
900
1,121
1,530
2,712
4,883
Number of African
Countries Reporting Seizures
22
26
26
22
26
30
23
80,924.4
0.3%
65,613.4
0.4%
73,447.9
0.4%
97,565.7
0.3%
100,089.8
0.4%
90,427.6
0.4%
103,991.6
0.3%
GLOBAL TOTAL
AFRICA‘S SHARE OF GLOBAL TOTAL (%)
Source: UNODC, Interactive Seizures Tables and Graphs. Data current as of September 30, 2008.
Notes: Data may not total due to rounding.
Table 4. Cannabis Herb Seizures in Africa, 2000-2006
(simplified drug breakdown, in kilogram equivalents)
East Africa
2000
36,268.1
2001
683,111.6
2002
175,663.7
2003
769,986.1
2004
983,384.4
2005
162,876.0
2006
225,340.6
North Africa
116,004.5
118,544.6
147,812.0
153,878.6
398,866.0
193,084.0
146,490.5
Southern Africa
1,062,221.8
161,966.0
141,894.4
151,059.0
878,503.8
347,094.4
637,227.9
West & Central Africa
284,082.7
335,268.2
526,007.0
562,363.0
697,871.2
162,919.8
207,820.0
AFRICA TOTAL
1,498,577.1
1,298,890.4
991,377.0
1,637,286.7
2,958,625.4
865,974.2
1,216,879.1
Change from Prior Year (%)
201.4%
-13.3%
-23.7%
65.2%
80.7%
-70.7%
40.5%
Number of Reported Drug
Seizures
18,469
8,156
19,288
8,193
11,402
10,050
35,245
Number of African
Countries Reporting Seizures
28
27
31
30
30
34
25
GLOBAL TOTAL
4,679,750.8
4,758,433.4
4,798,430.3
5,940,558.1
7,152,169.8
4,667,495.8
5,229,695.3
AFRICA‘S SHARE OF
GLOBAL TOTAL (%)
32.0%
27.3%
20.7%
27.6%
41.4%
18.6%
23.3%
Source: UNODC, Interactive Seizures Tables and Graphs. Data current as of September 30, 2008.
Notes: Data may not total due to rounding.
Table 5. Cannabis Plant Seizures in Africa, 2000-2006
(simplified drug breakdown, in kilogram equivalents)
East Africa
2000
10,981.0
2001
81,098.8
2002
1,057,021.1
2003
674,8621.4
2004
15,454.2
2005
436,113.4
2006
32,236.1
North Africa
Southern Africa
West & Central Africa
N/A
929,438.4
50.6
73,857.7
660,035.7
273607.5
93,613.0
760,604.2
5120.5
21,091.1
98,803.4
313.9
421.2
97,414.8
2790.0
37,590.0
3,397.4
N/A
427.7
145,751.6
928.4
AFRICA TOTAL
940,470.1
1,088,599.8
1,916,358.8
6,868,829.8
116,080.2
477,100.8
179,343.7
246.1%
15.8%
76.0%
258.4%
-98.3%
311.0%
-62.4%
509
1606
727
1,359
1,888
529
754
9
14
14
14
11
10
13
6,120,773.1
15.4%
6,098,692.7
17.9%
11,351,607.3
16.9%
12,253,027.8
56.1%
3,597,710.2
3.2%
3,790,275.2
12.6%
1,340,507.5
13.4%
Change from Prior Year (%)
Number of Reported Drug
Seizures
Number of African
Countries Reporting Seizures
GLOBAL TOTAL
AFRICA‘S SHARE OF
GLOBAL TOTAL (%)
Source: UNODC, Interactive Seizures Tables and Graphs. Data current as of September 30, 2008.
Notes: Data may not total due to rounding.
Table 6. Cannabis Resin Seizures in Africa, 2000-2006
(simplified drug breakdown, in kilogram equivalents)
East Africa
2000
6,404.1
2001
51.5
2002
1,885.8
2003
898.4
2004
0.2
2005
12,333.7
2006
2.3
North Africa
150,119.8
71,892.2
70,604.1
117,970.5
107,705.0
109,145.4
118,523.6
Southern Africa
27,056.6
539.5
1,744.2
219.6
0.0
95.0
54.8
West & Central Africa
350.0
13.0
2.0
13.2
975.7
1.4
10,426.0
AFRICA TOTAL
183,930.4
72,496.2
74,236.1
119,101.7
108,681.0
121,575.6
129,006.8
Change from Prior Year (%)
192.2%
-60.6%
2.4%
60.4%
-8.8%
11.9%
6.1%
Number of Reported Drug
Seizures
128
28
421
567
1215
7960
7512
Number of African
Countries Reporting Seizures
13
15
16
15
10
16
12
GLOBAL TOTAL
1,050,590.5
941,518.6
1,088,429.8
1,391,926.6
1,470,752.4
1,269,506.1
1,024,828.6
AFRICA‘S SHARE OF
GLOBAL TOTAL (%)
17.5%
7.7%
6.8%
8.6%
7.4%
9.6%
12.6%
Source: U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Interactive Seizures Tables and Graphs. Data current as of September 30, 2008.
Notes: Data may not total due to rounding.
Illegal Drug Trade in Africa
291
According to the State Department, Nigerian and Ghanaian trafficking
organizations are involved in smuggling heroin from Afghanistan and Pakistan
to several parts of the United States, including Ohio and the New York area
[77]
Today, heroin is smuggled from Southwest Asia through East and West
Africa into Europe and North America, usually by commercial air courier as
well as sea routes [78]. According to U.N. estimates, approximately 30 to 35
tons of Afghan heroin are trafficked through Africa, with approximately 25
tons consumed within Africa and 5 to 10 tons transiting through Africa en
route to other final destinations [79] Approximately 20 tons of heroin are
smuggled through today‘s primary route, from Afghanistan to Pakistan to
Africa via both air and sea. Other major transit point for Afghan heroin en
route to Africa include Iran (4 tons), India (3 tons), Persian Gulf states (5
tons), and South and Southeast Asian states (1 ton). For the 5 to 10 tons of
heroin in transit through Africa, final destinations include the United States (3
tons), Europe (2 to 3 tons), and China (4 tons).
East Africa—which has long-standing trading links with South Asia, a
global heroin source region, and the Middle East, a heroin transit zone that is
today linked with these regions via multiple commercial airline routes and
growing trade ties—is a particularly notable entry point for heroin shipments
to the continent [80]. Some evidence suggests that global flows of cocaine and
heroin are crisscrossing through Africa, with cocaine originating in Latin
America trafficked from West Africa to East Africa, and heroin originating in
Southwest Asia trafficked from East Africa to West Africa [81] Annual
reported seizure volumes and incident totals in Africa, however, are generally
very limited compared with those in other world regions [82]. In 2008, African
countries reported to the United Nations heroin seizures totaling 0.3 tons (1%
of global seizures) [83]
Cannabis and Cannabis Resin
Cannabis has long been produced, trafficked, or used in practically every
country in Africa—and analysts predict strong long-term increases in cannabis
production in the region (see Table 4 and Table 5) [84] The illegal cannabis
drug market is by far the largest drug market in Africa; according to the
UNODC, somewhere between 28.9 million and 56.4 million Africans used
cannabis at least once in 2007 [85] Like other world regions, cannabis
production in Africa supplies a largely domestic or intra-regional population of
292
Liana Sun Wyler and Nicolas Cook
users. In addition—and unlike most other world regions—the continent is the
source of a significant cross-regional cannabis export market, mainly to West
and Central Europe and to a lesser extent to East Asia and North America [86]
According to UNODC figures, Africa contributes between an estimated
22% and 26% of global cannabis production. Major producers include Benin,
Cote d‘Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ghana, Guinea, Malawi,
Nigeria, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, and Zambia, along with
Egypt and Morocco in North Africa [87] Compared to other regions, Africa is
one of the largest annual sources of cannabis production and ranks among the
top regions with respect to the number and volume of annual local cannabis
seizures. While cannabis is known to be widely produced in Africa, and some
cannabis-related production, distribution, retail value, and use trends can be
discerned, detailed country-level data on these phenomena are often lacking
[88] While cannabis availability is widespread across the continent, views
regarding the acceptability of its use vary considerably by country and among
social groups. In some African countries, cannabis has long been widely used
for diverse work-related, recreational, medicinal, cultural, and other purposes.
In others, acceptance of its use differs among social or economic groups; for
example, in many African countries, cannabis is primarily consumed by poor
populations, notably in urban areas, and shunned by elites [89]
In many African countries, law enforcement efforts to counter the
cannabis trade are sporadic, in part because often under-resourced police
agencies face a range of more serious, violent crimes. In addition, according to
the UNODC, while the drug is considered a problem from a public health
perspective, it is often seen as less of a threat to national security than other
types of drugs, such as cocaine and heroin. In general, illicit profits and
incidents of drug-related violence associated with African cannabis trafficking
are fewer than those associated with other drugs or criminal activities [90]
Cannabis resin, which is used in the production of hashish, is the second
most widely trafficked drug in Africa, but is predominantly produced in North
Africa (see Table 6). In addition to possessing the world‘s largest documented
cannabis cultivation area, Morocco is the world‘s largest producer of cannabis
resin [91] Unlike cannabis herb production, cannabis resin production is
reportedly set for a gradual but global decline, due in large part to declining
demand in Europe and various other factors [92] One well-known smuggling
route for both cannabis and cannabis resin to Europe is through Morocco.
From Morocco, traffickers reportedly smuggle illegal cannabis into Spain,
where it can be easily transshipped to other EU countries because of limited
border security within the EU [93]. Some of the same routes used for
Illegal Drug Trade in Africa
293
trafficking cannabis from Morocco to Europe are reportedly being used for
transiting cocaine. EUROPOL has found that Colombian and Moroccan
criminal groups are cooperating together to smuggle both cocaine and
cannabis into Europe [94]. Such trends may not last, however. Some analysts
hypothesize that the co-mingling of cocaine and cannabis shipments and their
transport along North African routes traditionally used for cannabis smuggling
may decline because of concern by smugglers that the merger of cocaine and
cannabis trafficking might draw increased law enforcement attention and
increase the risk of interdiction. At the same time, however, reported drug
seizures by the government of Niger indicate that North African smugglers are
willing to go to considerable lengths to protect their routes. In one incident, for
example, the Nigerien military encountered ―considerable resistance‖ from a
―professional‖ hashish smuggling operation that was trafficking the drug in
convoys of three to five four-wheel drive vehicles secured with military-grade
weaponry and satellite phones [95]
Synthetic Drugs and Precursor Chemicals
The illegal synthetic drug market in Africa is reportedly relatively small
(see Table 7 and Table 8). One exception to this is South Africa, which is a
destination and sometimes also a production source for methaqualone,
methamphetamine, and MDMA (ecstasy); foreign production sources for these
drugs include China, India, and Europe. Maxiton Forte, an amphetamine-type
drug, is also reportedly produced in Egypt for domestic abuse. Despite limited
data availability, reports indicate that the non-medical abuse of pharmaceutical
preparations containing psychotropic substances occurs in West and Central
Africa [96]. Amphetamine users in Africa are estimated at 2.3 million, or
approximately 9% of the world total, and the International Narcotics Control
Board (INCB) predicts that the number of users in Africa will continue to
increase gradually, in large part due to increasing South African demand for
methamphetamine and crystal methamphetamine [97] The INCB reports that
Africa‘s significance as a transshipment point for the illicit diversion of
precursor chemicals, particularly ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, used to
manufacture illicit drugs, which had grown in the mid-2000s, may now be
declining.[98] Ephedrine and pseudoephedrine are two key precursor
chemicals used to manufacture methamphetamine.
Table 7. Amphetamine-Type Drug Seizures in Africa, 2000-2006
(simplified drug breakdown, in kilogram equivalents)
East Africa
2000
6.0
2001
N/A
2002
N/A
2003
0.3
2004
N/A
2005
N/A
2006
N/A
North Africa
13.6
17.0
11.8
0.3
3.4
1.4
2.1
Southern Africa
0.0
1.8
1.3
0.5
N/A
1078.5
315.4
West & Central Africa
6.2
6.0
3.2
2,326.8
344.2
2,064.5
835.1
AFRICA TOTAL
25.8
24.8
16.3
2,327.9
348.2
2,064.5
835.1
Change from Prior Year (%)
-93.9%
-4.2%
-34.3%
14,211.4%
-85.0%
492.9%
-59.6%
Number of Reported Drug Seizures
Number of African
Countries Reporting Seizures
59
321
17
204
N/A
4026
4881
8
7
6
8
3
6
4
GLOBAL TOTAL
43,622.2
26,343.0
22,773.0
36,840.4
30,485.3
41,302.2
43,171.5
AFRICA‘S SHARE OF
GLOBAL TOTAL (%)
0.1%
0.1%
0.1%
6.3%
1.1%
5.0%
1.9%
Source: UNODC, Interactive Seizures Tables and Graphs. Data current as of September 30, 2008.
Notes: Data may not total due to rounding.
Table 8. Ecstasy Seizures in Africa, 2000-2006
(simplified drug breakdown, in kilogram equivalents)
East Africa
2000
N/A
2001
N/A
2002
N/A
2003
N/A
2004
N/A
2005
0.0
2006
0.0
North Africa
0.3
0.7
0.1
0.4
0.6
1.3
1.0
Southern Africa
West & Central Africa
30.9
N/A
9.6
N/A
58.9
N/A
40.2
N/A
195.0
N/A
0.0
N/A
22.9
3.5
AFRICA TOTAL
31.2
10.3
58.9
40.6
195.6
1.4
27.5
Change from Prior Year (%)
933.8%
-66.9%
469.9%
-31.1%
381.9%
-99.3%
1,933.4%
Number of Reported Drug Seizures
779
327
3
5
3129
6
33
Number of African
Countries Reporting Seizures
3
4
4
5
4
6
6
4,993.5
0.6%
4,537.5
0.2%
6,865.5
0.9%
4,810.9
0.8%
8,209.2
2.4%
5,131.8
0.0%
4,510.7
0.6%
GLOBAL TOTAL
AFRICA‘S SHARE OF GLOBAL TOTAL (%)
Source: UNODC, Interactive Seizures Tables and Graphs. Data current as of September 30, 2008.
Notes: Data may not total due to rounding. Ecstasy data includes the psychotropic compounds MDA, MDEA, MDMA.
296
Liana Sun Wyler and Nicolas Cook
Reports had indicated that more than 120 metric tons precursor chemicals
for methamphetamine had been diverted to or through Africa in 2006. The
countries in Africa to which these shipments were destined included
Botswana, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia,
Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia
[99] If the precursor chemicals had not been seized, they could have been
converted into a total of approximately 80 metric tons of methamphetamine—
a total that represents approximately one-third of current global
methamphetamine production estimates [100]
Since 2006, reported precursor seizures have been in decline; aggregate
confiscations in the region totaled 75 tons in 2007 and 22 tons in 2008, and
there were no reported seizures during the first nine months of 2009 [101] The
INCB reported in February 2010, however, that Africa may have emerged in
2009 as a target area for drug traffickers in search of acetic anhydride, a
chemical used in the production of heroin as well as for numerous licit
purposes [102].
The low level of commercial and pharmacological regulation and a
frequent lack of trade monitoring and weak customs capacities in much of
Africa compared to those in many other world regions have made the
continent attractive as a transshipment hub for precursor chemicals used in
illicit drug manufacture.
Once in Africa, traffickers may be able to relatively easily divert such
chemicals from the legal commerce into illicit trade. As a result, new precursor
routes and re-shipment operations are expected to continue to emerge in
Africa, given that many governments in the region lack the enforcement and
forensic infrastructure to detect such trafficking [103]
In July 2009, Guinean authorities seized large quantities of solvents used
to process cocaine and heroin, precursor chemicals used in the manufacture of
MDMA (ecstasy), and equipment used in such production processes.
A subsequent assessment by the UNODC and INTERPOL found that the
―quantities and nature‖ of the chemicals found were ―far in excess of the
legitimate demands in Guinea.‖ Their findings suggested that ―the clandestine
production of controlled drugs might be widespread in Guinea‖ and that the
discoveries provide ―the best evidence yet for clandestine [illicit drug]
laboratory activity‖ [104]
Illegal Drug Trade in Africa
297
ILLICIT DRUG USE TRENDS IN AFRICA
U.N. data also suggest that regional consumption of heroin, cocaine,
cannabis, and amphetamine- type drugs is increasing, likely as a side effect of
the continent‘s growing prominence in the global drug trade (see Table 9).
South Africa has long been the largest consumer of illegal drugs in Africa.
There is a well-established trade in all major illicit drugs in South Africa,
where cannabis, methaqualone (known locally as mandrax), methamphetamine
(known locally as tik), and MDMA (ecstasy) are produced for domestic
consumption and international export. East Africa is reportedly a growing
transit point for heroin from Southwest Asia mainly to Europe, and heroin
abuse is a relatively small but growing problem in Kenya, Mauritius, South
Africa, and Zambia, as well as in Egypt, in North Africa [105]. As drug abuse
continues to grow in Africa, the INCB has raised concerns about the absence
of sufficient medical facilities available for drug treatment and rehabilitation.
[106]
Table 9. Number of Drug Users in Africa, 2005-2006
(number of drug users and percent share)
Africa Use
2005
2006
2005
2006
Africa Use as a
Share of Global
Use
2005
2006
Opiates
980,000
1,360,000
15,550,000
16,540,000
6.3%
8.2%
Cocaine
1,084,000
1,147,000
14,257,000
15,987,000
7.6%
7.2%
Cannabis
38,200,000
41,600,000
158,800,000
165,600,000
24.1%
25.1%
2,100,000
2,260,000
24,890,000
24,650,000
8.4%
9,2%
193,000
199,000
8,561,000
9,047,000
2.3%
2.2%
Amphetamines
Ecstasy
Global Use
Source: UNODC, 2007 and 2008 Word Drug Reports; World Bank World
Development Indicators, and CRS calculations.
Notes: Estimates of domestic drug use in Africa are inherently limited by a lack of
consistent or reliable data collection and reporting. Africans constituted 11.8%
and 12% of the total world population in 2005 and 2006, respectively. As a result,
drug use rates are proportionally lower for Africa than the global average for all
drugs, except cannabis. However, estimates of drug use in Africa may vary
substantially from rates estimated by the UNODC, since there is little available
data on drug use trends in many African countries.
298
Liana Sun Wyler and Nicolas Cook
FOCUS ON WEST AFRICA: EXPLAINING THE
EMERGENCE OF THE SUB-REGION
AS A GLOBAL COCAINE
Transit Hub
In the 1980s and 1990s, Nigerian-dominated criminal organizations active
in many countries became key players in the international smuggling of
heroin, particularly into the United States, drawing the concern of U.S. policy
makers. Apart from heroin, however, West Africa long remained a minor
destination and transshipment point for other illegal drugs from regions
outside of Africa. During the past half decade, West Africa has become a
prominent locus of international drug trafficking, especially with regard to
cocaine being trafficked onward to Europe, as previously discussed.
Driving Factors
West Africa‘s increasing use as a trafficking nexus appears to have
resulted from changes in the mix of disincentives and incentives, or ―push‖
and ―pull‖ factors, that have traditionally structured international drug
trafficking patterns.
Push Factors
Push factors, notably with regard to cocaine, include heightened U.S. antidrug and counterterrorism law enforcement and border control efforts, and
U.S. and European interdiction efforts targeting northern trans-Atlantic
cocaine routes directly connecting South America cocaine production sources
with European destination markets. Such activities have reportedly gradually
forced smuggling southward toward Africa‘s western coast, to the waters off
Cape Verde en route to the Canary Islands and the Iberian peninsula, and
further south, to destinations from Mauritania to as far south as Nigeria.
Other push factors include continued counterdrug pressure in source
countries, stepped-up U.S. drug interdiction efforts in U.S. drug transit zones
in the Caribbean and the Pacific, and an expansion of cocaine exports via
Venezuela and Brazil from Colombia, in part due to increased involvement in
the cocaine trade by the Colombian FARC rebel group, as previously
discussed [107]. Growing Mexican government pressure on violent and
politically powerful Mexican trafficking organizations, which have enjoyed a
high degree of control of over traffic passing through Mexico into the United
Illegal Drug Trade in Africa
299
States—as well as competition between these groups—may also be driving
South American criminal organizations to seek alternative non-U.S. markets
and transit routes [108]. Other factors include the declining value of the U.S.
dollar prior to August 2008, declines in U.S. seizures attributed to increased
interdiction efforts, and relatively stable cocaine demand in the United States,
which remains the largest single cocaine consumption market globally [109]
Pull Factors
Important pull factors, or incentives attracting increased cocaine transit
through West Africa, include the high value of the Euro in recent years,
steadily rising European cocaine use rates and strong demand, and stable or
rising cocaine prices in Europe, where cocaine prices are as much as double
the level of U.S. prices, according to the UNODC [110]. West Africa is also
attractive to traffickers because it is the nearest land mass located en route
from South America to Europe [111] Traffickers may have also been attracted
to the lack of effective drug interdiction in countries such as Venezuela and
Brazil—countries that are well-positioned as transit countries for cocaine
movement across the Atlantic toward Africa and Europe.
Regional institutional and other state and economic weaknesses in the subregion are other major pull factors. West Africa is seen as attractive to
traffickers because many countries there lack law enforcement and border
control capabilities and resources, and are characterized by high levels of
corruption, poverty, and unemployment, as discussed below [112] Traffickers
operating in many West African countries are likely to face relatively lower
risks of apprehension by law enforcement than in many other world regions
where police and the justice system are more effective or less susceptible to
corruption. Large-scale traffickers with access to large amounts of capital are
also well-positioned, given high rates of poverty and unemployment in the
region, to tap a diverse pool of potential African accomplices who may be
willing to accept payment in exchange for facilitating or directly engaging in
trafficking activities. Latin American traffickers may also be able to tap into
an extensive pool of experienced West African drug traffickers to facilitate
drug transit through the region, as well as to connect with other criminals in
West Africa with expertise in related illicit activities, including money
laundering, human smuggling, and document fraud.
Driving Factors: Two Applied Examples
Some of the push and pull factors discussed above—as well as state
characteristics discussed in the earlier ―Regional Vulnerabilities‖ the text
300
Liana Sun Wyler and Nicolas Cook
box—are illustrated by a rise in trafficking in recent years in Guinea-Bissau, a
tiny impoverished country that suffered a civil war in 1998 and has been
wracked by numerous coups d‘état, putsches, political assassinations, periodic
civil unrest, and chronic military interference in governance.
It has seen a sharp rise in trafficking, in part due to geographic factors: its
territory contains a remote, lightly populated island archipelago and many
colonial-era airstrips. Numerous reports also suggest that trafficking is often
undertaken or facilitated by state security personnel, notably elements within
the military, which is among the most influential institutions in the country
[113]
Such reports indicate that the country fundamentally lacks a capacity to
counter trafficking. The national police system is highly underfunded and
operates without some of the most basic equipment, notably including vehicles
and fuel for them; the 60-person drug control agency has one vehicle and
police reportedly use public taxis for official business, such as transporting
arrested persons [114]. Police also receive ―low salaries that are seldom paid,
lack phones, computers, and often even electricity. They have almost no ships
to patrol a rugged coastline, and little fuel for their few police cars. Moreover,
many police officers can neither shoot a gun nor swim; the latter, a real
problem in a country with a long coastline and many islands‖ [115]
The judiciary is significantly under-resourced and the country is without a
prison, reportedly prompting judges to refrain from passing jail sentences on
convicted offenders [116] Many of these problems are recognized by the
government of Guinea-Bissau. The relatively new president of the country,
Malam Bacai Sanha, who was elected in July 2009, has pledged to end
Guinea-Bissau‘s use as a hub for drug trafficking [117]
Guinea-Bissau‘s southern neighbor, Guinea, has also reportedly emerged
as a key cocaine transshipment point. Investigations by the junta that took
power after President Lansana Conte‘s death in late 2008 indicate that Conte‘s
son and numerous top security sector officials were involved in cocaine
trafficking and used state resources, including diplomatic pouch traffic, in their
activities. Its anti-drug police unit, while slightly better equipped than that of
Guinea-Bissau, is also reportedly highly under-resourced and lacks operational
capabilities.
According to the State Department, the police agency that was until
recently in charge of counternarcotics activities lacks ―almost everything—
training, equipment, investigating skills, and organizational motivation—to
accomplish its mission.‖ [118]
Illegal Drug Trade in Africa
301
Role of West African Criminal Syndicates
West African crime groups operate in more than 80 countries and are
organized into more than 500 cells internationally [119]. They have long been
involved in heroin trafficking and marketing, but increasingly also smuggle
cocaine, other drugs and types of contraband, including persons, and are
involved in diverse other crime, such as financial fraud. Financial crimes,
including 419 fraud schemes, reportedly cost the United States alone between
$1 billion and $2 billion per year [120]. The transnational reach of such groups
has given them a reputation as being among the most aggressively
expansionist perpetrators of crime internationally. West African crime groups
are primarily engaged in financial frauds and drug trafficking.
The United States and the United Kingdom are reportedly key targets of
West African crime groups, but these groups operate small cells in
strategically useful locations worldwide (e.g., in illicit drug source and
producing countries, financial centers in which crime proceeds can be
laundered with relative ease, and key ports of entry and other international
transportation hubs). West Africans have long been associated with trafficking
of diverse drugs through south and southwest Asian countries, such as
Thailand, Malaysia, China, the Philippines, and India [121]
With respect to drug trafficking, West African crime groups in the 1 980s
were one of the primary groups to popularize the relatively low-risk but
sophisticated use of low-level traffickers, called couriers or mules, to traffic
drugs across international borders via commercial passenger flights [122]
When using this method of drug smuggling, West African crime groups
sometimes plant ―decoy‖ couriers who intentionally draw the attention of law
enforcement personnel and therefore increase the chances of one or more
couriers on the same flight—often couriers trafficking greater amounts of the
contraband substance—to avoid detection. West African crime groups also
recruit ―low profile‖ couriers, such as Caucasians, women with children, the
elderly, or the disabled, who may be less likely to draw the attention of
authorities [123]
Few publicly available documents describe the organizational structure
and composition of West African crime groups—and those that do broadly
describe them as highly fluid and adaptable, loosely organized across a
networked web of West African diaspora communities worldwide. Individual
West African crime groups vary, but in general, they
302
Liana Sun Wyler and Nicolas Cook
draw members from families or communities with which they have
close national, ethnic, regional, or kinship ties;
are composed of small, compartmentalized cells that often range in
size between 2 and 10 members, and limit members‘ access to
information or details about a criminal network to specific operations
or tasks for which they are responsible;
communicate mostly in African indigenous languages, which often
insulates the crime group from outside infiltration;
often function on a project-by-project basis, with impermanent
operating structures that last only as long as a given project;
may include members who are simultaneously active in more than one
crime network;
rarely fall under the permanent control of a static leader and loyalty to
a single crime boss is not required; and
are mainly motivated to participate in criminal activity in the pursuit
of profit [124]
These characteristics contrast sharply with those of traditional organized
crime, modeled on the Italian mafia and Chinese triads. While membership in
both traditional, non-African organized crime and West African groups
typically relies on kin-based, ethnic ties, the former groups tend to be
organized hierarchically, with senior leaders making decisions and low-level
actors carrying out the orders.
By contrast, membership in West African crime groups tends to be taskbased and revolve around distinct criminal specialties (e.g., procuring drugs,
falsifying passports and travel documentation, recruiting couriers, laundering
illicit proceeds, and similar activities).
West African crime groups also tend to be more willing than others to
cooperate with other West African crime groups, rather than to compete for
turf or dominance in a given crime sector. Instead, some have been known to
pool their joint resources in order to improve their mutual profit potential.
Their networked organizations also make West African crime groups more
immune to tactics typically used by law enforcement to dismantle traditional
organized crime groups, which can involve either targeting the senior leader or
pitting several groups against one another [125]
Illegal Drug Trade in Africa
303
U.S. POLICY
In general, U.S. policy responses to the rise in drug trafficking through
Africa remain in the formative stages [126]. Many African countries lack
effective law enforcement agencies and judicial systems, which fundamentally
limit counternarcotics efforts in the region. In many cases, substantial U.S. and
European operational cooperation or capacity-building assistance has
accompanied African government efforts to increase drug trafficking
monitoring, detection, and seizure rates. A fundamental challenge confronting
policy makers is how to develop a strategy and find the resources to both stem
the rising flow of drug trafficking through Africa— particularly West Africa—
in the short term, through such means as effective interdiction operations, and
simultaneously address the underlying, long-term law enforcement capacity
weaknesses that make the region vulnerable to drug trafficking.
Several U.S. government agencies are currently developing policy
strategies to achieve such ends, and the amounts of personnel, financial, and
other resources being devoted to anti-drug efforts in the region are increasing.
These efforts include the establishment of at least one new DEA office in
Ghana, and potentially more in other countries in the region in the future,
including in Nairobi, Kenya. Total Africa-related State Department
counternarcotics assistance is gradually expanding; it rose from approximately
$0.5 million in FY2006 to $1.6 million in FY2009. The Obama Administration
requested $7.5 million for such purposes in Africa in FY2010 [127]. In
February 2010, the White House Office on National Drug Control Policy
(ONDCP) released highlights from its FY2011 budget request [128]. In it, the
Administration requested $13.2 million for West Africa counternarcotics
programs conducted by the State Department to enhance law enforcement
investigative skills and justice sector capabilities to prosecute and convict drug
traffickers [129]
P.L. 111-117 (Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010) did not explicitly
allocate funds for Africa- specific counternarcotics efforts, as it did for some
other countries and regions, although the bill does fund a variety of programs
that are likely to support such ends in Africa [130]. Levels of funding for
counternarcotics efforts in Africa remain small compared to some other
regions, but there are indications that greater policy attention—in terms of
strategy development, programming, resources, and international
cooperation—is being devoted to combating the illegal drug trade in West
Africa and elsewhere on the continent.
304
Liana Sun Wyler and Nicolas Cook
Interagency Approach?
No public interagency counternarcotics strategy focusing specifically on
Africa has been formulated. However, several internal U.S. government
agency strategy documents outline specific plans and missions. One such
agency strategy involves the State Department‘s International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs Bureau (INL). As of February 2010, INL‘s strategy
was focused specifically on providing assistance to African countries for the
targeting, investigation, and prosecution of narcotics traffickers. In an effort to
ensure that U.S. counternarcotics assistance is not misused and for cost
reasons, assistance in the form of interdiction equipment, such as patrol boats
and law enforcement communications equipment, is reportedly discouraged. In
addition, INL has, since 2008, conducted several country assessments in West
Africa (see Table 10). INL conducts these assessments jointly with other U.S.
government agencies, including the Department of Defense (DOD), DEA, and
the Department of the Treasury. The country assessments are intended to
inform the development of multi-agency counternarcotics aid programs for the
individual countries and for the region as a whole.
Another indication of a growing U.S. government focus on
counternarcotics in Africa is the inclusion of seven African countries in the
2009 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), released by the
State Department but consisting of interagency agreement on the years‘ top
foreign counternarcotics priorities. The INCSR is an annual report mandated
by Congress that provides a country-by-country analysis of selected drug
producing or transit countries, including a description of the current drug
situation and government efforts to improve conditions. The 2008 INCSR
identified West Africa as an emerging ―hub for cocaine trafficking from South
America to Europe.‖ [131] New African country narratives for the 2009
INCSR include Cote D‘Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, and Togo.
DOD has also developed a counternarcotics strategy for the region. The
FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 110-417, requires that
DOD, in consultation with the State Department, submit to Congress no later
than June 30, 2009, ―a comprehensive strategy ... with regard to counternarcotics efforts in Africa, with an emphasis on West Africa and the Maghreb‖
[132]. Required components in the requested report include a description of
the overall U.S. counternarcotics policy for Africa and DOD‘s roles and
missions, including the U.S. Combatant Command for Africa, AFRICOM, in
support of overall U.S. counternarcotics policy in Africa. The required report,
Illegal Drug Trade in Africa
305
which was cleared for release to the requisite congressional committees in
September 2009, stated that it is DOD policy to ―train, equip, assist, advise,
and support partner nation law enforcement, paramilitary, and military units
that have a counternarcotics and narco-terrorism mission‖ [133] DOD‘s
primary stated counternarcotics missions in the region included (1) detecting
and monitoring drug trafficking; (2) sharing information with relevant
enforcement officials in the region; and (3) building foreign counternarcotics
capacity related to drug detection and monitoring, information sharing,
interdiction, enforcement, and border control.
Table 10. Status of Interagency Country Assessments
Country
Visit/Assessment
Completion Date
U.S. Agencies
Involved in the
Assessmenta
AFRICOM, DEA,
DOJ, DOS
Status of Country
Assessment/Strategy
Completion
Complete
Ghana
September 2008
Senegal
September 2008
AFRICOM, DEA,
DOJ, DOS
Complete
Guinea-Bissau
March 2009
AFRICOM, DEA,
DOS, FBI,
Treasury, USAID
Complete
Togo
March 2009
AFRICOM, DEA,
DOS, Treasury
Complete
TBD
—
TBD
—
Benin
Cape Verde
November/December
2009
November/December
2009
Liberia
October 2009
TBD
—
Sierra Leone
September 2009
TBD
—
Gambia
September 2009
TBD
—
Burkina Faso
2010
TBD
—
Guinea
TBD, post ―free and
fair elections‖
TBD
—
Source: State Department response to CRS inquiry, June 2, 2009.
Notes: Country assessments are not available for public distribution.
a.
AFRICOM: Africa Command; DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration; DOJ:
Department of Justice; DOS: Department of State.
306
Liana Sun Wyler and Nicolas Cook
As of early June 2009, the State Department‘s INL bureau had hosted one
working-level interagency meeting on counternarcotics and related issues in
Africa. It was attended by representatives from the State Department, DEA,
DOD, Treasury, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the
National Security Council (NSC). Each agency provided an overview of its
assistance in Africa. Participants also discussed next steps in developing and
coordinating a comprehensive approach to the Administration‘s
counternarcotics assistance in Africa [134]
Implementation
The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) is responsible for
overseeing the implementation of overall U.S. drug control policy, including
international counternarcotics efforts [135]. Primary agencies involved in
formulating and implementing counternarcotics efforts in Africa include the
U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), and the
DEA.
The State Department coordinates all U.S. foreign assistance to support
international efforts to combat illicit narcotics production and trafficking
[136]. DOD is responsible for the detection and monitoring of aerial and
maritime transit of illegal drugs, and is also authorized to provide
counternarcotics training and equipping assistance to foreign countries in
certain circumstances [137]. DEA leads U.S. coordination of law enforcement
investigations involving international production, trafficking and sale of illegal
drugs and other controlled substances. The Department of Homeland Security
is responsible for drug-related maritime security and border control and related
policy issues, while the Treasury Department occasionally undertakes
activities to combat drug-related financial crimes.
The United States has begun to increase multilateral cooperation on
countering drug trafficking in Africa with European and other partners, both
informally and formally. Formal coordination takes place through mechanisms
such as the U.S.-European Union (EU) Drug Troika talks [138] In addition,
since 2007, the United States has shared counternarcotics intelligence and
other information with the European Maritime Analysis and Operation
Center–Narcotics (MAOC-N), located in Lisbon, Portugal. In the 2008 U.S.E.U. Summit Declaration, the United States and the European Union also
symbolically committed to continue their counternarcotics cooperation,
particularly as it related to drug trafficking through West Africa.
Illegal Drug Trade in Africa
307
Counternarcotics Foreign Assistance
State Department
The two major sources of counternarcotics foreign assistance to the region
are administered by the State Department and DOD. The State Department
provides counterdrug assistance to a number of countries in Africa, primarily
through programs funded under its International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement (INCLE) account. A key INCLE program funded by the State
Department since 2001 is the International Law Enforcement Academy
(ILEA) in Gaborone, Botswana. There, the United States trains approximately
500 African law enforcement officials each year, providing courses on drug
enforcement, anti-corruption, financial crimes, border security, and other
matters [139]. INL also provides bilateral anti-crime assistance, which
includes efforts to bolster counternarcotics capacities, to a number of African
countries. The Obama Administration‘s FY2010 budget request included $7.5
million in counterdrug foreign aid to seven countries—up since the Bush
Administration‘s FY2009 budget request, which included $1.45 million in
counterdrug foreign aid to six countries in Africa (see Table 11).
Table 11. State Department Counternarcotics Assistance to Africa,
FY2006 Actual-FY2010 Request (in current $USD millions)
Country
Burkina Faso
Cape Verde
Ghana
FY2006
Actual
—
—
—
FY2007
Actual
—
—
—
FY2008
Actual
—
$0.496
$0.246
FY2009
Estimate
$0.100
$0.500
$0.500
FY2010
Request
$0.100
$2.000
$0.500
Guinea
—
—
—
$0.500
$0.110
Guinea-Bissau
Morocco
—
—
—
—
$0.600
—
$0.100
—
$3.000
$0.750
Nigeria
$0.495
$0.200
—
$0.360
$1.000
Africa Total
$0.495
$0.200
$1.342
$1.610
$7.500
$1,133.664
$1,322,277
$1,538.063
GLOBAL TOTAL
Source: State Department, Congressional Budget Justifications, FY2008-FY2010
(which include data from FY2006 actual to FY2010 request).
308
Liana Sun Wyler and Nicolas Cook
DOD/AFRICOM
DOD provides foreign assistance to train, equip, and improve
counternarcotics capacity and capabilities in foreign countries under two
authorities, commonly known as Section 1004 and Section 1033. Section 1004
of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 1991 (P.L.
101-510), authorizes DOD to provide counternarcotics-related training and
transport of foreign law enforcement personnel. Under its Section 1004
authority, DOD has provided counternarcotics training assistance for several
years. Section 1033 of the NDAA for FY1998 (P.L. 105-85), as amended,
enables DOD to assist 22 foreign countries‘ counternarcotics efforts by
providing non-lethal protective and utility personnel equipment, including
equipment for navigation, secure and non-secure communications, and radar
surveillance, as well as night vision systems, vehicles, aircraft, and boats.
In FY2009, Congress authorized DOD to provide Guinea-Bissau and
Senegal with Section 1033 counternarcotics assistance; this was the first
instance of a congressional grant of authority to DOD under Section 1033 to
provide counternarcotics aid to African countries. In FY2009, DOD estimates
that it will provide approximately $19.3 million for counternarcotics assistance
in Africa, mainly through AFRICOM (see Table 12) [140]. The bulk of the
assistance is committed to regional counternarcotics programming, which
cannot be attributed to a single country alone. Leading individual country
recipients in FY2009 include Nigeria ($1 million), Mauritania ($0.9 million),
Liberia ($0.8 million), Cameroon ($0.6 million), and Ghana ($0.6 million).
DOD also provides counternarcotics-related Excess Defense Articles to some
African countries. DOD‘s 2009 counternarcotics strategy in AFRICOM‘s area
of responsibility identifies specific priority sub-regions and countries in Africa
where DOD plans on focusing counternarcotics-related capacity building
efforts first. In order of priority, the sub-regions are West Africa, North Africa,
East Africa, South Africa, and Central Africa (see Table 13) [141]
Maritime and Airport Security Assistance
While maritime security in Africa is a general issue of interest for U.S.
policy, counterdrugrelated maritime security efforts in the region have focused
mainly on West Africa in recent years. According to General William E.
Ward, Commander of AFRICOM, the ―absence of credible maritime security
capacity‖ along the coast of West Africa has allowed drug trafficking and
other criminal activity in the region to thrive [142].
Illegal Drug Trade in Africa
309
...
Purchase answer to see full
attachment