1 Don Klumpp/The Image Bank/Getty Images Introduction to Ethics and Social Responsibility Learning Objectives At the end of this chapter, you should be able to: • Explain why it is important to study ethics and engage in ethical debates. • Describe the roles of argument and emotion in ethics. • Describe the function of logic in an argument and characterize an effective ethi­ cal argument. • Explain how ethical theory can be applied to moral questions. • Discuss how individual decisions can have consequences in the broader society. • Identify the three dominant ethical theories in Western philosophy: utilitarian­ ism, deontology, and virtue ethics. • Identify the influential ethical theories that have been proposed as alternatives to classical theories. mos85880_01_c01.indd 1 10/28/13 1:06 PM Section 1.1  Why Study Ethics? CHAPTER 1 Introduction P eople have worried about ethical questions—most simply stated, what is right and wrong—since the earliest of days. From the most basic, everyday concerns to the most important challenges a society can face, we confront these basic ethical questions all the time. In the following pages, we will look at many such moral problems, as well as some of the ethical theories philosophers have offered to solve them. The study of ethics can be frustrating at times, largely because the problems dealt with rarely lead to a result that satisfies everyone. Hence, the arguments continue, new points are raised, old views are discarded, and we seem to go nowhere. But some of this frustration can be alleviated when we realize that as long as people debate questions of right and wrong, these disagreements will persist. At the same time, however, we will discover that our understanding of those disagreements can be deepened and our abilities to reason about them improved. We may not solve all the ethical problems we confront, but we can make progress by solving some of them, and making clearer what is at stake in the problems themselves. 1.1  Why Study Ethics? Y ou are standing in line at the movies, and someone cuts in front of you. Your child is sent home from school because what is written on her t-shirt is considered “inappropriate.” You discover that your best friend is cheating on his wife. You are forced to pay taxes to support behavior you think is wrong. Your commanding officer punishes you for something you didn’t do. Your boss promotes a co-worker who took credit for work that was, in fact, done by you. You have a little extra money and, on your way to play the lottery, pass a homeless woman with her child. These situations illustrate some of the ethical situations we may confront that would force us to consider what we should do, and whether our response is good or bad, right or wrong, moral or immoral. The study of those problems constitutes the discipline of philosophy known as ethics. The study of ethics is ancient and can be found across all cultures and in all times that humans have lived in social groups. That people consider what is right and wrong, and what they ought to do, is fundamental to living in communities. Thus, another way of thinking about ethics is that it is the study of “oughts” and “shoulds”—what ought I do, what should others do, what ought society do. Even though our focus in this text will be on the subject of ethics itself, we will also explore the long history of ethics and some of its important relationships with religious traditions and legal and political doctrines before we reach the conclusion of our readings. Recognizing how our philosophical concepts—particularly ethical concepts—inform and clarify our understanding of religion, the law, and politics is important. At the same time, we all have what philosophers call moral intuitions. Intuitions, in the philosophical sense, are views that we hold, and share with others, without any specific argument or reasoning involved. They tend to be immediate and spontaneous. Perhaps you see an animal being treated with great cruelty, and you immediately and spontaneously object to that treatment. This reflects your intuition that such cruelty is wrong; you don’t hesitate to consider the evidence and arguments involved—you simply react. Such intuitions are often correct, and the study of ethics can help support them by providing mos85880_01_c01.indd 2 10/28/13 3:32 PM Section 1.1  Why Study Ethics? CHAPTER 1 deeper reflection on the issues involved and developing sophisticated arguments that support these intuitions. It is also possible that such intuitions may be wrong, or at least may be considered by many others to be wrong. A person’s intuitions may tell him any number of things: that stealing is sometimes okay, that violence can sometimes solve problems, that women or people of other races or religions are inferior. Many of us may object to these intuitions. The study of ethics puts us in a stronger position to be able not just to say that we disapprove, but also to explain why we disapprove and why such intu­ itions may both be wrong and lead to other immoral results. As we shall see, some phi­ losophers are content to say these intuitions are the end of the story: We either approve or disapprove of something. Many others, however, insist that we should be able to give some kind of reason for our beliefs and support those beliefs if at all possible with arguments. Most ethical debates revolve around questions where the correct answer isn’t always obvious. If it were obvi­ ous, of course, there wouldn’t be much room for debate. This can be frustrating, for ethical arguments seem never to end, and rarely is a serious moral problem solved in a way that everyone accepts. At the same time, we shouldn’t be terribly surprised that this happens in eth­ ics, for at least two reasons. Ethical questions are often the most impor­ tant, but most difficult, problems we ever deal with because ethics is Gary Huner/Photographer’s Choice/Getty Images a grey area. It would be easier if the When we judge an action as right or wrong, the view we answers were black and white, like have comes from our moral intuitions. those in math. If we had an “ethical calculator,” we could enter a couple of numbers into it, press the “multiply” button, and be guaranteed of the answer. But ethics doesn’t work this way: First, there is rarely an agreed-upon set of rules to follow (presumably, most of us, in contrast, agree on the basic rules of multiplication). Second, we may not even agree on how to describe the moral question itself. If two people are debating the morality of physician-assisted suicide, and one person insists on the exis­ tence of an eternal human soul while the other denies its existence, they almost certainly will disagree over how to describe the problem itself. As we will see, however, ethics can lead to solutions that seem to indicate actual “prog­ ress.” As we proceed, we will also look at some historical debates that are based on cer­ tain assumptions about people—assumptions that have changed and led to corresponding changes in our moral understanding of human beings and in our laws. This is a reminder that much can be gained by looking more closely at moral challenges, examining the argu­ ments that arise relative to these challenges, and considering what assumptions are made in constructing these arguments. Studying ethics allows us to do this more carefully and with more sophistication. Although studying ethics will not solve all our problems, it does offer a great deal in terms of understanding those problems and determining what is involved in the solutions to those problems that have been offered. That is why we study ethics! mos85880_01_c01.indd 3 10/28/13 1:06 PM Section 1.2  Argument and Emotion in Ethics CHAPTER 1 Be the Ethicist Leftover Embryos In her article “What Is the Fate of Leftover Frozen Embryos?” Laura Beil notes, Experts estimate that hundreds of thousands of embryos have accumulated in fertility clinics throughout the country, some awaiting transfer but many literally frozen in time as parents ask themselves questions few among us ever consider with such immediacy: When does life begin? What does “life” mean, anyway? In a recent survey of 58 couples, researchers from the University of California in San Francisco found that 72 percent were undecided about the fate of their stored embryos. In another study last year of more than 1,000 fertility patients from nine clinics, 20 percent of couples who wanted no more children said they planned or expected to keep their embryos frozen indefinitely. (http://www.today.com/id/32489239/ns/today-parenting_and_family/t /what-fate-leftover-frozen-embryos/) This can be a very difficult issue that challenges our moral intuitions about the beginning of life, about in vitro fertilization, and about what our responsibilities are, if any, to frozen embryos that are not implanted. (As the article notes, there can also be substantial costs involved.) As a way of introducing the kinds of questions that the study of ethics looks at, read the article that is linked above, and try to answer the following questions: 1. Is the embryo a human being? 2. Should such embryos be kept frozen for as long as possible? 3. If it costs $40/month to keep the frozen embryos, an embryo that is maintained for 10 years would cost almost $5,000. Who is responsible for that cost? 4. Should the cost be considered a factor in making this decision? If so, how big of a factor should it be in the decision? 5. What other things might be done with these embryos? 1.2  Argument and Emotion in Ethics P eople often disagree and express that disagreement through arguments. Two peo­ ple may disagree about which is better: football or baseball. They may see a movie together and not agree about whether it was a good movie. They can debate the merits of two presidential candidates or to which restaurant they should go. A parent and a teenager may have a serious disagreement about what an appropriate curfew is. All these disputes can, and often do, lead to arguments, with each participant trying to establish his or her claim on the basis of evidence, reasons, and logic. Sometimes ethical arguments can become very heated, and some arguments have been known to lead to violence. Presumably, an argument that is settled violently is one where evidence, reasons, and logic don’t play much of a role. Other arguments are settled by one person simply saying, “This is what is going to happen.” Thus, a parent who may (legitimately) say, “This is when you will be home!” isn’t providing so much of an argument as imposing his or her will on the situation. Philosophers use the word argument in a somewhat different way, a way that empha­ sizes the idea that arguments put forth reasons to accept a conclusion. A philosopher or mos85880_01_c01.indd 4 10/28/13 1:06 PM Section 1.2  Argument and Emotion in Ethics CHAPTER 1 mathematician would call this the argument for the transitive property in arithmetic, even though there is probably little passion or a threat of violence involved here: 10 , 20 5 , 10 THEREFORE 5 , 20. For philosophers, the term “argument” doesn’t imply the idea it often does when we use the term to suggest anger, emotion, and hurt feelings. Rather, in this context, arguments simply present a conclusion and suggest why certain reasons indicate that conclusion is true or probable. At the same time, arguments about ethical questions tend to generate quite a bit more pas­ sion, and it can be difficult to keep emotion out of the discussion. Whether it be abortion, taxes, gun control, gay rights, race, spanking children, or a whole host of other issues, we have a bit more at stake personally than we may have, for instance, in the transitive property in arithmetic. These are issues that we seem to care about a great deal, and it is difficult to keep our emotions out of the debate. Indeed, it isn’t clear whether we should keep all emotion out of it; we may be motivated to construct better arguments, weigh the evidence more carefully, and examine the logic more meticulously if we care a great deal about the issue over which we are arguing. In arguing about ethical issues, most of which are very controversial and involve some of our most deeply held beliefs, it is important to try to make sure the arguments focus on the evidence, the reasons, the logic, and the argument. This doesn’t eliminate the emo­ tional element, if such a thing is possible; rather, it is to try to focus on the arguments themselves, and not to let the conclusions be driven by emotion. Unlike parents with children, we can’t “settle” arguments by dictating the conclusion. Nor, of course, is it legitimate to establish a conclusion on the basis of violence or even an implied threat of violence. Rather, we have to stick to the arguments themselves and see if we can support our conclusions on the basis of good evidence and solid reasoning. As some philosophers have insisted, it is only by submitting our most cherished beliefs to such critical scrutiny that we determine which of our beliefs can really sustain this kind of examination. In evaluating arguments, we’ve mentioned evidence and reason as crucial elements of that evaluation. One of the most useful tools philosophers have to examine arguments is logic, the discipline that investigates the rules of reasoning. It is to logic that we now turn, if only briefly, so that we can have some of its apparatus at our disposal. Opinions, Belief, and Knowledge Consider the following sentences. Are these beliefs, opinions, or knowledge claims, or would you use some other terms to describe them? 1. The book is on the table. 2. I have an immortal soul. mos85880_01_c01.indd 5 10/28/13 1:06 PM Section 1.2  Argument and Emotion in Ethics CHAPTER 1 3. Chicago is a better town than Atlanta. 4. Seven is greater than five. 5. Thou shalt not kill. As we have just seen, philosophers use the term “argument” to refer to a set of claims (the premises) that support another claim (the conclusion). But, as we know, “argument” is used in a different way in ordinary life and can, sometimes, be unpleasant; if we argue with another person, we may upset that person, we may get angry, or both people in the argument may have their feelings hurt. It often seems easier just to say, “Let’s agree to dis­ agree,” or “Everyone has a right to his or her opinion.” In that way, we may have a better chance of not making someone angry. Although some in ethics think this is reasonable resolution, others aren’t so sure. After all, do we really want to say that about all of a person’s claims? Let’s consider a few examples that are not ethical in nature, but that are easily relatable. Imagine you are accused of being late on paying your income taxes. You say you have paid them, and your accoun­ tant (or the Internal Revenue Service) says that you have not. Can we really resolve this by saying each of the people involved has a right to his or her opinion, and that that settles the issue? If a mother heard her son say, “Two plus two equals nine,” would she say that he is entitled to his opinion, or would she correct him? So, to make the point, we probably hesitate to say that anyone is justified in saying anything. It can sometimes be difficult to determine whether a claim someone makes is simply an opinion, or is something that has more support, such as a justified belief or a knowledge claim. To summarize these points, one could merely assert something as an opinion and not be surprised if someone else rejected it. If that opinion is held more strongly, it may qualify as a belief; if it is held more strongly on the basis of reasons, arguments, and evi­ dence, it may qualify as a justified belief; if that justified belief is true, it may qualify as knowledge. Philosophers, as noted, disagree about some of these terms and how they are used; since 1963, they have focused a great deal of attention on whether a justified true belief is sufficient to be called knowledge. When we turn to the sentences above, we start to see the kinds of distinctions one might want to start making between opinions and, for lack of a better term, claims. For the purposes of this discussion, we can use opinion to refer to anything someone believes, regardless of any evidence, argument, or justification for that belief. One person might believe chocolate ice cream is better than vanilla; another might believe that vanilla ice cream is better than chocolate. Without any further information, we are probably satisfied to see this kind of belief as an opinion and generally not something one could be right or wrong about. Hence, we probably would be reluctant to get into a serious argument about who was right in this case. In contrast to an opinion, we can refer to beliefs that have some degree of specific evi­ dence or reasoning that can be appealed to in order to back up the belief. “This watch is more expensive than that watch” would be a claim in this case; we can compare the prices, and see that if the first watch costs more, the claim is true (and if it is not, then the claim is false). In general, then, we want to make sure we determine whether a given belief is merely an opinion, or if more is at stake. Is the person putting forth the belief simply asserting an opinion? Is the belief something for which one can provide support? It is not always mos85880_01_c01.indd 6 10/28/13 1:06 PM CHAPTER 1 Section 1.2  Argument and Emotion in Ethics obvious whether something a person believes is based on an opinion, or is being put forth as a claim for which there is, at least implicitly, some kind of support. In ethics, and elsewhere, we generally want to focus on claims that we can give reasons for; that is, we want to be able to justify our beliefs with arguments. This does not mean that opinions are without value; it means, rather, that opinions alone cannot provide the kind of claims that we can fruitfully argue about. Consequently, when stating your beliefs, you will want to make sure that they are the kinds of things you can back up, if asked to. And if they are beliefs that cannot be backed up with an argument or with evidence, you should be pre­ pared to say why (see Figure 1.1 for one model of how to construct an effective argument). One good test for this is to consider your claim from the perspective of someone who does not share your beliefs: Would that person regard you as putting forth an opinion, or a claim that you should be expected to support? If you are unwilling to offer such support, should your claims be accepted, or is it as good (or as bad) as any other opinion that has nothing to support it? It might be worth making a list of some of the things you might think are true, or think might be true; should some of these be considered merely opinions, while others would be things you think have some degree of support or evidence? Figure 1.1: A model of argument Warrant Surveys place teacher salaries near the bottom of all white-collar professions. mos85880_01_c01.indd 7 Grounds Claim Teachers in public schools are among the lowest earners, yet perform a vital service. Public school teacher salaries should be increased by 30%. Backing Counter-claim A salary comparison shows that teachers earn less than most city employees. Many teachers fail to meet basic educational standards. Qualifier Conclusion Instructors who do not foster student success should be paid less. Teacher salaries should be raised commensurate with their skill. 10/28/13 1:06 PM Section 1.3  A Brief Look at Logic CHAPTER 1 1.3  A Brief Look at Logic L ogic is the study of arguments and how they are put together. The study of logic is one of the oldest parts of philosophy—possibly as old as ethics!—and is a rich and vast field of inquiry. Here, we will look at only some of the basics of logic, in order to have some of its technical language available when we want to talk about arguments, and to get an overview of what “good” arguments look like. If you want to see more complete discussions of arguments and how they are evaluated, extensive discussions of logic are easily found on the Web, and most libraries have dozens of introductory logic textbooks. Sentences Arguments are constructed out of sentences, but not just any string of words qualifies as a “sentence” in the sense we will be using the term. In the following list, the sentences are underlined: Shut the door! The door is shut. It is not the case that the door is shut. Is the door shut? The door is shut or the door is not shut. As you can see from this list, commands, or imperatives (such as “Shut the door!”), and questions are not treated as sentences. For our purposes, sentences are strings of words that can have the values of true or false applied to them. Here we can assume that all sentences will be only true or false—these are called truth values—and assume what logi­ cians call bivalence, the two values of true and false. Sentences that provide reasons to accept a claim are called premises; the claims that sup­ port these premises are called the conclusions. For our purposes, all arguments will have premises and conclusions. Premises will be true or false, and conclusions will be true or false (as premises and conclusions are sentences). However, only the components of the argument—the individual sentences that constitute the premises and conclusion—are said to be true or false; the arguments as a whole are themselves characterized in a differ­ ent way. Arguments Logicians generally distinguish two basic kinds of arguments: deductive and inductive. A deductive argument is an argument that draws a conclusion solely on the basis of the premises provided; that is, the information in the conclusion is (or should be) contained entirely within the premises. Deductive arguments are characterized by their validity or invalidity; a valid deductive argument supports the conclusion in a specific way, and an invalid deductive argument fails to support the conclusion. We want to be able to show mos85880_01_c01.indd 8 10/28/13 1:06 PM Section 1.3  A Brief Look at Logic CHAPTER 1 whether an argument is valid or not, for if we can show an argument is not valid, we can reject it. If we determine that an argument is valid, then we can go on to worry about whether the premises are, in fact, true. Validity is a structural feature of arguments. Here are two valid deductive arguments. The first is perhaps the most famous argument in the history of logic: 1.  Socrates is a man. All men are mortal. THEREFORE Socrates is mortal. The second is, on the other hand, rather silly: 2.  Socrates is a trombone. All trombones are made of peanut butter. THEREFORE Socrates is made of peanut butter. As noted previously, both of these arguments are valid; this is because the premises support the conclusion in the appropriate way, and if the premises are taken as true, then the conclusion must be taken as true: That’s what validity means. To say a deductive argument is valid is to say that if its premises are accepted as true, then the conclusion must be true. But it is crucial to see the role “if” plays here. A valid argument may have premises that make no sense but have the structure that a deductive argument must have to be iStockphoto/Thinkstock valid; if so, they are said to be valid, All monkeys are primates. All primates are mammals. Therefore, all monkeys are mammals. This is an example of no matter how ridiculous the actual argument may be. In our example a sound deductive argument. above, the premises are actually true only in the first argument; I think we can agree that the premises in the second argument are in fact false (not true). A valid argument that has premises that are actually true reflects soundness. A sound argument is thus a deductive argument that is valid, and its premises are, in fact, accepted as true. In general, when we are looking at deductive arguments, we have two tests: Is it valid? If it is mos85880_01_c01.indd 9 10/28/13 1:06 PM Section 1.3  A Brief Look at Logic CHAPTER 1 valid, are the premises true? If the argument is not valid, we can reject it; if the argument is valid, we then have to determine whether the premises are actually true. That, of course, is where a great deal of work has to be done. In other words, when considering validity, the logician doesn’t have to worry about the “real world.” So in considering whether an argu­ ment is valid, we must keep in mind the “big if”: If the premises are true, then we must accept the conclusion as true. But it is a different question, usually ignored by the logician, of whether the premises are “in fact,” or “actually,” or “in the real world” true. Logicians worry, for the most part, about the validity of arguments; others worry much more about whether an argument is sound or not. Using Logic As we mentioned earlier, when we are looking at deductive arguments, we can reject them if we discover that they are not valid. Here is a sequence one can follow in evaluat­ ing deductive arguments: Is the argument valid? No: We can reject the argument as stated. Yes: We then see if the argument is sound. Is the argument sound? No: We can reject the argument as stated, and we can see which premises are false. Yes: We can then accept the argument as stated. Maybe: We can debate whether one or more of the premises are true, or whether one could accept one or more of the premises as true on a specific interpretation. The purely logical examination is complete once we discover a deductive argument is valid; most of the debates we will see will be over whether claims put forth as premises should be regarded as true, as false, or require further debate, or whether they offer suf­ ficient support to accept a conclusion. Some examples follow. A valid deductive argument that is not sound: No dogs are canines. Some canines are ballerinas. THEREFORE Some dogs are not ballerinas. mos85880_01_c01.indd 10 10/28/13 1:06 PM Section 1.3  A Brief Look at Logic CHAPTER 1 A valid deductive argument that is sound: All fish are vertebrates. All trout are fish. THEREFORE All trout are vertebrates. An invalid deductive argument: All dogs have four legs. All cats have four legs. THEREFORE All cats are dogs. Since a deductive argument has to be valid in order to be sound, there aren’t any sound arguments that are not valid. Inductive arguments are different than deductive arguments in a couple of crucial ways. First, the information in the conclusion of an inductive argument is not completely con­ tained within the premises; the conclusion introduces new information that can’t be found in the premises. Thus, we often see inductive arguments used to make predictions about the future, based on our current evidence. However, we can also construct inductive argu­ ments about the past, by looking at the evidence we have in seeing what kind of conclu­ sions that evidence might support. This leads to the second way inductive arguments are distinct from deductive arguments: No matter how much support the premises may provide for the conclusion, the conclu­ sion can still be false. That is, even if we have premises that are true and provide good rea­ sons for the conclusion, the conclusion of the inductive argument may not be true. These arguments can be regarded as establishing, on the basis of reasons given in the premises, a probability that the conclusion is true. Here are a couple of examples to indicate how we evaluate inductive arguments. 1.  Every morning in the past, the sun has risen. The sun rose this morning. THEREFORE The sun will rise tomorrow morning. mos85880_01_c01.indd 11 10/28/13 1:06 PM Section 1.3  A Brief Look at Logic CHAPTER 1 2.  Every time I’ve washed my car in the past, it has then rained. I will wash my car tomorrow. THEREFORE It will rain tomorrow. The first inductive argument here is said to be very, very strong; so strong we are tempted to think that its conclusion is necessary. But since we know that the sun—as do all stars— will explode, collapse, or burn out, at some point in the future, it will not do what we call “rising.” It is, however, such a strongly supported conclusion that we don’t think twice about whether the sun will rise tomorrow. In contrast, the second inductive argument is relatively weak; we probably think we just have bad luck, and that it is just a coinci­ dence that it rains after we wash the car. For, otherwise, if we thought this was a strong argument, we might be tempted to think that by washing the car, we cause it to rain. Obviously, we may not want to draw this conclusion with any more confidence than the rooster should think that he causes the sun to come up by crowing. Remember that, in general, deductive arguments are evaluated using one of two sets of terms: Deductive arguments are either valid or not valid, and if valid, they are either sound or not sound. In contrast, inductive arguments are evaluated in terms of a continu­ ous scale of strength: from very, very strong (establishing a conclusion we rarely, if ever, doubt) to very, very weak (so its conclusion is seen to be purely accidental). In the arguments we will examine in our study of ethics, we will see a mix of both deduc­ tive and inductive arguments. This shouldn’t come as much of a surprise, in that this is what we already do in our everyday reasoning. I may argue, for instance, that aspirin stops headaches, and that I have a headache; I conclude that to stop my headache, it would make sense to take some aspirin. But the claim “aspirin stops headaches” may be the conclusion of an inductive argument. Many times in the past, aspirin has stopped my headache; I thus have a fairly strong inductive argument that aspirin will do so again. On the other hand, you may not have had such good luck, and so the claim “aspirin stops headaches” isn’t well supported. Here, and in most of our reasoning, we see a mix of deductive and inductive arguments, and in evaluating ethical arguments in general, we will have to keep this distinction in mind. In understanding the structure of arguments, and seeing how well premises support their conclusions, these terms will be very useful in our examination of the specific arguments we will encounter. Logic and Ethics The relationship between logic and ethics may not be immediately clear; logic has to do with how we reason (correctly and incorrectly), while ethics is concerned without evaluat­ ing how we act (morally or otherwise). However, an important part of ethics is determining whether a given choice is the right one (or not), and that can often involve arguments: We may construct arguments to justify a choice, to demonstrate that another choice is preferable, or to criticize another person’s own argument. In other words, ethical reasoning frequently appeals to arguments; hence, mos85880_01_c01.indd 12 10/28/13 1:06 PM Section 1.4  Application of Theory in Practice CHAPTER 1 if we want that reasoning to be satisfactory, we must at least make sure our arguments don’t fail because of the logic involved. Perhaps one runs across this argument: We started trying juveniles as adults, and then crime decreased. Therefore, trying juveniles as adults caused crime to decrease. This may sound like a persuasive argument, but it is actually fallacious: One can see this with an argument that has the same structure but draws a pretty dubious conclusion: It rained, and then I won the lottery. Therefore, raining caused me to win the lottery. The argument here fails because of a simple logical point: Just because one thing precedes another, it does not necessarily mean that the first thing caused the second thing. This is a logical mistake known as the “false cause” fallacy and is often referred to with its Latin name, post hoc ergo propter hoc. The advantage of looking at the logic of an ethical argument is that it provides a prelimi­ nary test to see if we should examine the argument further. If we are looking at a deduc­ tive argument that is not valid, or an inductive argument that is extremely weak, we don’t need to go any further. Identifying a deductive argument as invalid means that it can be rejected, simply for that reason. Inductive arguments that are seen as so weak that no one would accept them as stated means that they can also be rejected in that form, although there may be ways of strengthening the argument by adding more evidence to support the conclusion, or by weakening the conclusion itself. 1.4  Application of Theory in Practice C an you identify a decision you’ve had to make recently that raised ethical kinds of questions? How did you go about making that decision? What reasons—if any— did you use to make it? Did you consider only whether the act itself was the right thing to do? Did you consider what kinds of results might occur from the decision you made? Did you consider whether a “good” or “moral” person would make the kind of decision you made? As we will see, these kinds of general questions are central to the most influential ethical theories that have been developed in the history of philosophy. Our actual, everyday lives are pretty messy, and they can be at their messiest in dealing with questions of morality. Often, when confronting an ethical problem, we may see vari­ ous solutions, as well as all sorts of different factors that need to be considered. We may need to take into account our perspective and the view of others, often many others, and all of these perspectives can involve vast amounts of information. We may need to factor in our religious and moral perspectives while trying to keep out, to the extent that we can, mos85880_01_c01.indd 13 10/28/13 1:06 PM Section 1.5  The Individual and Society CHAPTER 1 our biases and emotions. But the others who may be affected by our decision probably have their own biases, emotions, and perspectives that will influence the way they under­ stand the ethical problem and how they evaluate its proposed solution. Thus, when we stop to think about it, actually putting ethical decisions into practice can seem to become complicated—and possibly even overwhelming in its complexity. That may seem to be a recipe for seeking to avoid making ethical decisions, but, of course, refusing to make such a decision is, in its own way, to make that decision. If I see some­ thing that I regard as deeply immoral, and do nothing about it, I have thereby decided that I won’t try to prevent it. Many of us will regard this result as itself objectionable, and ethi­ cists have consequently developed various theories to try to make clearer what is at stake in making ethical decisions and to offer useful and productive guidance in making them. The ethical theories we will be looking at and applying to specific moral problems have enormous advantages to offer in analyzing these problems and suggesting solutions to them. The three main theories we will be looking at—utilitarianism, deontology, and vir­ tue ethics—offer sophisticated and rigorous ways of both describing and resolving the ethical challenges we confront. They help clarify how those problems arise, provide spe­ cific ways of thinking about right and wrong, and make explicit the tools we can use in evaluating the various solutions put forth. At the same time, however, they may oversim­ plify and generalize ethical issues, and it is a good idea to remember that what we gain in terms of argumentative strength and analytical clarity may, at least on occasion, require us to sacrifice some of the specific details involved in a particular case. Thus, the relationship between ethical theory and ethical practice tends to be a two-way street. We may apply a specific ethical theory to a specific ethical problem and discover that, in the particular case involved, important details in the case require some adjustment in applying the theory. Or, perhaps, the theory offers us a way to describe the problem itself and allows us to see it in a different way. In general, ethical theory can be developed by looking at ethical practice, but at the same time, ethical practice can utilize ethical the­ ory; each informs the other. Engineers might refer to this as a feedback mechanism, where two things are in a mutually dependent relationship and have to be adjusted in terms of how one component is affected by the other. Philosophers tend to describe such a relation­ ship as dialectical. The important point, in any case, is to see that theory and practice in ethics are in this kind of relationship: A theory that cannot be applied is not very helpful, but trying to understand ethical problems without some sort of theoretical apparatus is to risk proceeding without any guidance at all. 1.5  The Individual and Society W hen we are asked to describe ourselves, we probably do so in terms of the vari­ ous relationships we have with other people. We may characterize ourselves as a daughter, a father, a brother, or a grandparent; that is, we may think of our­ selves as part of a family, and those relationships are crucial to how we think of ourselves. There are many other such relationships, of course: A person might consider herself part of a religious group; or identify herself as a member of a specific ethnicity or culture; or claim to be a resident of a town, a community, a state, or a nation. These are all social con­ ceptions; that is, we often think of ourselves in terms of our relationships to other people mos85880_01_c01.indd 14 10/28/13 1:06 PM Section 1.5  The Individual and Society CHAPTER 1 and other groups of people. Many philosophers have argued that our self-conception is fundamentally described in terms of these relationships, and that we cannot think of our­ selves without thinking of the many interdependent relationships we have with other people. Try to describe yourself without using such “social” terms and see how important those terms are in describing who, and what, you are. If this is the case, then who we are cannot be sepa­ rated from all those others to whom we are some­ how related, whether directly or indirectly. This means that many—perhaps most, or even all—of our decisions will have an effect on others, and those effects must often be taken into account in making ethical decisions. Sometimes this idea is expressed as an implied “social contract”—we all agree to obey certain rules simply in order to be able to live together in a society. Sometimes these rules, such as those against murder and theft, are so important that they become part of a society’s legal code. Other rules are more informal and are simply the kinds of things we agree to do to get along with each other. There might not be a law against cutting in front of someone waiting in line, but we have probably experienced line jumping, so we have a pretty good idea of why we object to such behavior. This may be how our first ethical intuitions begin to develop: Someone does some­ thing wrong that affects us, and we come to see that our understanding of it as wrong tells us that we shouldn’t do such a thing. It is a quick step to the Golden Rule: Treat others as you would like to be treated. iStockphoto/Thinkstock Many philosophers believe that our selfconception is tied to how we view ourselves in terms of our relationships with other people. As noted, many of our decisions have effects on others. Evaluating these effects, and our responsibilities involved, can be difficult. The effects may be fairly obvious if I live with someone who never does the dishes or takes out the trash. But do I have any responsibili­ ties if I buy clothes that I discover are so inexpensive because those who make them are paid very low wages and treated badly? If I continue to purchase such clothing, do I help support such a system? If our decisions affect others, how we determine which others we include in our moral evaluations can therefore make an important difference. Indeed, some philosophers have even argued that in evaluating questions about, for instance, the environment or the increased national debt, we must consider the effects on generations to come. In what follows, we will look at a number of ethical problems, some of which seem to be individual decisions; often such problems involve “victimless crimes” such as not wear­ ing one’s seatbelt or doing drugs. We will also look at issues that clearly have an effect on many others, including those who live and work far away. We will see our ethical intu­ itions challenged, and we will confront a number of different ways of thinking about those challenges. But a crucial feature of many ethical arguments will be the realization that we mos85880_01_c01.indd 15 10/28/13 1:06 PM Section 1.6  Classical Theories CHAPTER 1 often cannot isolate our behavior, and its evaluation, from the effects it has on others. It will be important for what follows to keep in mind the nature of the relationship between an individual and the society in which that individual lives, and the difficulty inherent in understanding individuals and their behavior apart from the other members—and their values—who make up that society. Straight to the Source The Paradox of Tolerance Sometimes people argue that all views should be tolerated. As the great philosopher Karl Popper noted in Volume 1 of The Open Society and Its Enemies, this leads to a paradox: The paradox of tolerance: Unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance. If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them.—In this formulation, I do not imply, for instance, that we should always suppress the utterance of intolerant philosophies; as long as we can counter them by rational argument and keep them in check by public opinion, suppression would certainly be unwise. But we should claim the right to suppress them if necessary even by force; for it may easily turn out that they are not prepared to meet us on the level of rational argument, but begin by denouncing all argument; they may forbid their followers to listen to rational argument, because it is deceptive, and teach them to answer arguments by the use of their fists or pistols. We should therefore claim, in the name of tolerance, the right not to tolerate the intolerant. We should claim that any movement preaching intolerance places itself outside the law, and we should consider incitement to intolerance and persecution as criminal, in the same way as we should consider incitement to murder, or to kidnapping, or to the revival of the slave trade, as criminal. (1971, p. 226) Is Popper right here? If we are tolerant of all views, do we therefore have to tolerate those who reject tolerance? When we look at specific ethical issues, such as gun control and immigration, we will, for the most part, be applying the three classical ethical theories of utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics. There are, unsurprisingly, other approaches to ethics—such as relativ­ ism and emotivism—that we will only be able to mention briefly. But those approaches can also be very useful to remind us that it can sometimes be difficult to provide a satisfac­ tory analysis of a given moral problem, although we may be shirking our moral responsi­ bility if we try to avoid doing so. 1.6  Classical Theories E very day we are confronted with questions of right and wrong. These questions can appear to be very simple (Is it always wrong to lie?), as well as very complicated (Is it ever right to go to war?). Ethics is the study of those questions and suggests mos85880_01_c01.indd 16 10/28/13 1:06 PM Section 1.6  Classical Theories CHAPTER 1 various ways we might solve them. Here we will look at three traditional theories that have a long history and that provide a great deal of guidance in struggling with moral problems; we will also see that each theory has its own difficulties. Ethics can offer a great deal of insight into the issues of right and wrong; however, we will also discover that eth­ ics generally won’t provide a simple solution on which everyone can agree. Utilitarianism A natural way to see whether an act is the right thing to do (or the wrong thing to do) is to look at its results, or consequences. Utilitarianism argues that, given a set of choices, the act we should choose is that which produces the best results for the greatest number affected by that choice. Definition of Utilitarianism After helping their mother clean the attic, John and Mary are told they can each have a cookie. When they open the cookie jar, only one is left. What do you think would be the fairest solution for John and Mary? Those who follow utilitarianism suggest that there is an obvious solution that is fair, and it may be one that appeals to common sense as well: John and Mary should share the cookie. Since each has an equal right to it, they should split it in half. They may not get what they want—each wants the entire cookie—but both are better off with half a cookie than with no cookie. Dividing the cookie produces the greatest good for the greatest number. This is the fundamental principle of utilitarianism: One should choose to do that which produces a better outcome for the largest number of people. The cookie example is, of course, a very simple case, but it allows us to introduce some of the terminology philosophers use to examine ethical choices. Here, for instance, we might call the pleasure John and Mary get from the cookie their “utility”; a standard assump­ tion among ethicists, economists, and many others is that people seek to maximize their utility. Thus, Mary would like to maximize her utility by having the entire cookie, but that conflicts with John’s desire to maximize his utility (by also having the entire cookie). We should also see that part of this calculation is to minimize pain or suffering; a choice that maximizes utility may often be one that produces the least harm, given the options available. Utilitarianism is the theory that people should choose that which maximizes the utility of all those who are affected by a given act. Unfortunately, many ethical problems aren’t as easy to solve as the cookie example. At this point, however, we see the basic utilitarian principle and how to apply it. Now we can start to make it a bit more precise. According to utilitarianism, one should always act in a way that produces the greatest good for the greatest number of people relative to any other way one might act, or act in a way that maximizes the utility of all affected by an act, relative to any alternative to that act. mos85880_01_c01.indd 17 10/28/13 1:06 PM Section 1.6  Classical Theories CHAPTER 1 Examples of Utilitarianism A couple of examples should make clear how one might go about apply­ ing this utilitarian principle. One of the most common ways is to adopt a rule—a law, in this case—against shoplifting. While the shoplifter may maximize his utility by shoplifting, the utility of the store owner is obvi­ ously not maximized, and if rules against shoplifting weren’t enforced, prices would go up for all the other customers. So here, the greatest num­ ber of people (the shop owner and iStockphoto/Thinkstock the customers) achieve the greatest Paying taxes decreases an individual’s happiness, but a amount of good by preventing as utilitarian might argue that taxes are good because they much shoplifting as possible. This fund institutions such as schools that can increase utility seems like common sense, and that for a very large number of people. is one thing that makes utilitarian­ ism very attractive. Consider a tax that people in a given community pay for their very good public schools. No one likes to pay taxes, and any tax will decrease an individual’s happiness. But the school system in question not only provides the students with a high-quality education (thus increasing the utility of the students and their parents); it also makes the housing in that community more valuable, and thus increases the utility of all those who own houses there, not just parents with children. The utilitarian might argue that a relatively small decrease in hap­ piness brought about by the tax creates an increase in happiness for a very large number of people, and thus is the correct thing to do. Act Utilitarianism and Rule Utilitarianism We will see some more details that affect how one applies this utilitarian principle when we look at specific examples. It may already be clear that there can be problems in applying it; some make technical distinctions within utilitarianism, such as differentiating between act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism. Generally speaking, an act utilitarian looks at a specific act: Does this act produce the greatest good for the greatest number, given the various options available? If so, the act utilitarian says that this act is what should be done. The rule utilitarian may, in some cases, disagree, contending that one should do things that, as a rule, generate the greatest good for the greatest number. It may, for instance, turn out that cheating on a specific exam will produce, in this specific case, the greatest good for the greatest number. But, in general, cheating will not have that result, so the rule utili­ tarian will say cheating is wrong in this case, while an act utilitarian may say this specific act is okay. As we will see, many others will challenge, for different reasons, the very idea of using the principle of utility as a guide for making moral and ethical decisions. We can look at one of them here. mos85880_01_c01.indd 18 10/28/13 1:07 PM Section 1.6  Classical Theories CHAPTER 1 Challenges to Utilitarianism Bernard Williams (1929–2003) put forth one of the most famous problems for utilitarian­ ism. An explorer accidentally walks into a small village just as 20 natives are about to be shot. She is told by the village chief that it is a great honor for a visitor to shoot one of these natives, and because of that, if she shoots one native, the other 19 will be set free. If she declines, however, all 20 will be shot. It seems, as Williams points out, that the utilitarian principle makes it quite clear that the greatest good for the greatest number is produced by the explorer shooting one native, and that any other alternative will not produce as good a result. However, the explorer has profound objections to taking another person’s life; thus, we might wonder about an ethical theory that insists that doing so in this case is not just an option but is in fact the right thing to do. Although we aren’t often in the situation of this explorer, it is easy to imagine situations where one might confront this problem. For instance, should you do something that your boss tells you to do but that you think is morally wrong, even though it will produce good results for the company? Utilitarianism gives us what seems to be a clear and fairly easy principle to apply to ethi­ cal problems and so determine the right thing to do in specific cases. It also seems to be an idea that appeals to common sense and is often regarded, therefore, as one that most people use even when they don’t realize they are applying a specific ethical theory. As we go along, we will see in many cases that utilitarianism does do this, providing clear solu­ tions to ethical challenges that are simple, easy to explain, and easy to justify; it seems to be an obvious, common-sense response to those challenges. Unfortunately, we will also see that it can produce—as it may do in the case of the explorer—results that conflict with our sense of right and wrong. We will also recognize that it isn’t always easy to determine what, exactly, is the “greatest good,” or how we can decide what the relevant group is when we consider the good for the “greatest number.” We may also discover conflicts between short-term and long-term goods when applying utilitarianism. As we will con­ tinue to discover, ethical principles can frequently give us guidance and clarify ethical problems, but they usually don’t guarantee a result on which everyone will agree. Be the Ethicist What Price the Bottom Line? You are the president of a major oil company. A very expensive safeguard, if installed, will almost certainly prevent an explosion of a well you are drilling offshore. You aren’t required, legally, to install this safeguard, but if you don’t, the risk of an explosion, while still small, is much greater than if you do install it. You are asked to weigh the costs, or risks, of installing the safeguard against the benefits of not installing it. How do you go about making this calculation? Whose interests should you consider: • • • • • Your company’s? Your stockholders’? The people who might be harmed in such an explosion? The larger population that might be affected by the explosion? All those affected by the pollution such an explosion might cause? (continued) mos85880_01_c01.indd 19 10/28/13 1:07 PM Section 1.6  Classical Theories CHAPTER 1 Be the Ethicist (continued) As the number of interests you consider increases, so does the cost to your company. How do you determine where to draw the line, maintaining a reasonable balance between your company’s profits and your company’s ethical responsibilities? Would you have the safeguard installed, or not? After deciding what you would do, reflect on the kinds of reasons you used to make your decision. For instance, did you weigh the costs and benefits here? Did you focus on the outcome or a general moral rule? Did you ask yourself what an ethical person might do in these circumstances? Deontology Rather than looking at the consequences of an act, deontology looks at the reason for which an act is done, and the rule according to which one chooses to act. Deontology doesn’t deny that acts have consequences; rather, it insists that those consequences should not play a role in our moral evaluation of such acts. Definition of Deontology Utilitarianism is sometimes called a consequentialist theory because it evaluates whether an act is right or wrong in terms of the act’s consequences. In contrast to consequentialist theories, a number of different approaches suggest distinct ways of evaluating the moral­ ity of an act. Perhaps the most famous of these is deontology. Coming from the Greek deon, which means “duty,” deontology (sometimes referred to as duty ethics) focuses on what we are obligated to do as rational moral agents. It is particularly important to see that the deontologist does not say that actions do not have consequences; rather, the deontolo­ gist insists that actions should not be evaluated on the basis of the action’s consequences. Again, we can try to bring out the idea of this theory with a simple example; later, we will apply it to considerably more complex situations. Examples of Deontology A computer hacker accesses your online banking account and proceeds to drain your account. Clearly, when you discover this, you think what the hacker has done is wrong. But is it due to the consequences of his act? After all, his utility is increased by exactly the same amount as yours is decreased. The amount the hacker gets is precisely the amount you lose, so this is what would be called a zero-sum game. We may feel that what the hacker has done is immoral, but the consequences don’t necessarily show that. Is there another way of looking at his act and seeing why it is immoral? mos85880_01_c01.indd 20 10/28/13 1:07 PM Section 1.6  Classical Theories The deontologist argues that we have a duty, or an obligation, to treat other people with respect; human beings have dignity, and we must take that dignity into consideration when dealing with them. (We also expect others to respect our dig­ nity when they deal with us.) As the most famous deontologist, Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), put it, we should never treat another person only as a means to our ends, or goals, but should regard other people as ends in themselves. In other words, I can’t simply use a person to get what I want, nor can someone use me to get what he or she wants. We have to consider the other person’s needs and desires, respect them, and try to avoid violating them. To give a very simple example: If I’m late to an appointment, I can’t run over the pedestrians who are in my way simply to achieve my goal of being on time. (We probably already knew that.) CHAPTER 1 iStockphoto/Thinkstock Deontologist Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) What does the deontologist say about the case of the computer hacker? His goal, evidently, was to steal your money. He used you to achieve that goal and failed to respect your human dignity. This is why the deontologist says the hacker’s actions are wrong. Notice that the deontologist didn’t take into consideration the results of the act. Perhaps the hacker needed to feed his family, travel to visit a dying relative, or donate to a local charity. What he needed (or wanted) the money for is irrelevant to the evaluation of his act; the only relevant thing here for the deontologist is that the computer hacker violated the general rule that you don’t steal from others. Universal Rule Test We can also say that the hacker’s actions failed what is called the universalization test. One way to know if an act is the right thing to do is to ask: Would this act always be the right thing to do, for everyone, in the same circumstances? It seems pretty obvious that we do not want everyone to be allowed to empty out others’ bank accounts, so this act can’t be universalized. Another simple example will clarify this idea but will also start to reveal why some critics of deontology regard it as conflicting with common sense or as being too rigid. Tradition­ ally, people are taught from an early age to tell the truth. The deontologist might, therefore, put forth this rule: “Never lie.” This will show respect for other people by telling them the truth and can be universalized in that one should always tell the truth. In other words, if I lie to a person, I am failing to respect that person’s right to be told the truth; such an act, as a violation of the rule “Never lie,” would therefore be wrong. One may see in the example of lying why the Golden Rule—treat others as you would want to be treated—is similar to deontological thinking. We don’t want to be lied to, so we should not lie to others. We expect people to tell the truth, and we can be very dismayed, and even harmed, when they do not. The Golden Rule gives us a pretty good idea of how deontology proceeds, mos85880_01_c01.indd 21 10/28/13 1:07 PM Section 1.6  Classical Theories CHAPTER 1 but it has its limitations. The Golden Rule asserts that I should treat others as I wish to be treated. But what if I only have sardine sandwiches and blueberry juice every night for supper; would that make it a good idea to insist that anyone who comes to my house for supper only be given sardine sandwiches and blueberry juice? Should I treat them as I would wish to be treated? Imagine a young girl sees a Santa Claus in the mall and asks her mother if Santa really exists and delivers presents to girls and boys who have been good. Should the mother tell the truth, or should she lie to her daughter? Some might say that the daughter is so young—perhaps not having reached the traditional “age of reason”—that in this case it is okay to lie (or at least not tell the truth). On that view, the principle “Never lie” isn’t violated. But what if I’ve been planning a surprise party for my wife and have had to go to great lengths in order to bring her friends in from all across the United States? If my wife asks, “Are you throwing a surprise party for me?” should I tell her the truth? That ruins the surprise for everyone involved, but I have treated her with the respect she deserves. If I lie to her, to maintain the surprise, don’t I violate our rule and fail to treat her as a person—fail to treat her as an end-in-herself—and thus do something wrong? We may be tempted to say, “It is okay to lie in some situations, but not others,” but then we have the problem of trying to figure out which situations do allow lying and which do not. In addi­ tion, we must justify violating our original rule that seemed, at first, to make sense. We might try to include in our ethical rules “Don’t ask questions you don’t want answered truthfully,” but, then again, we add another complication. One of the attractive features of deontology is the clarity of its rules. But changing the simple rule “Never lie” to the rule “Never lie except in certain situations or where the other person, who is sufficiently mature, has asked you a question that may not be the kind of question one should ask expecting a truthful answer” makes things quite a bit more difficult in applying the rule to specific situations. Challenges to Deontology We saw that utilitarianism has a certain advantage in seeming to appeal to common sense. Clearly, deontology can claim that same advantage, in that one of its most famous ver­ sions is the Golden Rule. The Golden Rule is ancient and can be found in such different civilizations as Egypt, India, and ancient Greece, as well as in many religions including Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Judaism, and Islam. What is probably the best-known version comes from the Christian Bible: “Do to others what you would have them do to you” (Matthew 7:12 New International Version). In other words, if you don’t like being stolen from, you shouldn’t steal from others; if you don’t like someone cutting in line in front of you, you should not cut in line in front of her. You don’t want to be treated by oth­ ers as simply some kind of “thing,” so you yourself shouldn’t treat others that way. The appeal of this approach may be clear from the fact that parents often use this as one of the easiest ways to explain to children, even very young children, the difference between right and wrong. Just consider how many times parents ask their children, “How would you like it if someone did that to you?” But, as we have already noticed, and will continue to see, deontology can lead to results that conflict with common sense and what we might regard as our ordinary conceptions of right and wrong. Yet again, we discover that an ethical view may have many things going for it, but it can also confront ethical challenges that are difficult to solve. As we saw with utilitarianism, deontology may provide very useful guidance and be quite helpful in mos85880_01_c01.indd 22 10/28/13 1:07 PM Section 1.6  Classical Theories CHAPTER 1 clarifying the ethical issues we have to deal with, but we may be expecting too much from it—or any ethical theory—if we think it will solve all such ethical problems, and solve them in a way, which is satisfactory to everyone involved. Be the Ethicist Immigration Status You are the governor of a state with a large Hispanic population. The legislature has recently presented you with a new bill that would allow police and other officials to ask anyone for documents if they suspect the person is in the United States illegally. What questions might you ask yourself, when deciding whether to make this a law in your state? • • • • • Is this fair to all the people of my state? Who will benefit from this law? Who might be harmed by this law? Would I like to be asked for my documents on the basis of my appearance? Is there a presumption that some people are guilty based on their looks? Would you sign the legislation, or not? What are the crucial issues you needed to consider in deciding whether to sign or not? Did you consider, for instance, the interests of everyone affected by your decision, or a smaller group of people? If a smaller group, which group has the most compelling interest you need to consider here? Virtue Ethics Virtue ethics is distinct from both utilitarianism and deontology. Rather than focusing on the consequences of the act we wish to evaluate, or the reason or rule that guides the action, we look at the character of the person performing the act. Virtue ethics, thus, seeks to determine not what makes an act good but what makes a person virtuous. Definition of Virtue Ethics Emma is a senior in college; she makes excellent grades, is popular, pretty, funny, and a talented athlete. She has a reputation for being very honest and very generous. She knows how to have a good time, but she never drinks too much or gets out of control. She does, however, sometimes seem to brag a little too much about her accomplishments and seems a bit arrogant about her looks, her achievements, and her popularity. Once, when some gang members were threatening one of her friends, Emma stepped in, calmed the situa­ tion down, and got her friend out of trouble. Emma is an example of a person who is close to the ideal person, according to virtue ethics, possessing all the characteristics of a virtuous person and having all but one in the proper proportion. Virtue ethics emphasizes the moral, or virtuous, person who exempli­ fies moral behavior. mos85880_01_c01.indd 23 10/28/13 1:07 PM Section 1.6  Classical Theories CHAPTER 1 Emma, of course, has a character flaw: She lacks modesty and is a bit vain. Nevertheless, she does demonstrate the other virtues that virtue ethics identifies as the characteristics of the noble person. These characteristics include courage, temperance, generosity, pride, amiability, honesty, wittiness, friendship, and modesty. While lists of such virtues may vary from philosopher to philosopher, the general idea is pretty clear. The virtuous, or ethical, person will possess a certain set of characteristics in the correct amount and in harmony with each other. The character of Emma offers a specific example of the way virtue ethicists think about right and wrong. Virtue ethics focuses on the person’s character and what makes, in gen­ eral, a person a good (virtuous) person. Aristotle, who is given credit for the first system­ atic account of virtue ethics in the West (it is a very prominent and old theme in Chinese philosophy) emphasizes specific virtues. Those who possess them in an appropriate way, and in harmony with each other, will be regarded as moral and serve as examples of morality to others. What kind of virtues does Aristotle have in mind? He specifies a number of virtues, some of which have already been mentioned, including cour­ age, generosity, honesty, pride, and modesty. He also mentions one that is perhaps less common, temperance, or being moderate in one’s appe­ tites and desires. For example, one should nei­ ther indulge in overeating nor deprive oneself entirely of the enjoyment food can bring. Tem­ perance illustrates Aristotle’s general approach: that these virtues should be reflected in a per­ son’s character but should never be taken to an extreme. Thus, one who has too little courage is a coward, whereas one who has too much cour­ age is foolhardy. The virtuous person will have courage in the proper amount. On this view, we should see what is known as the Golden Mean, possessing virtue but never having too little or iStockphoto/Thinkstock too much of it. The truly virtuous person will have all the Aristotelian virtues and possess Aristotle cited a number of characteristics that make a person virtuous. them in the appropriate amount and in balance or harmony with each other. In our example, Emma is close to becoming truly moral or virtu­ ous, she lacks modesty and thus needs to find its Golden Mean in order to become truly moral or virtuous. Examples of Virtue Ethics Rachel is a bomb technician in the military, with the dangerous job of disposing of, or ren­ dering harmless, explosives, in particular improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Rachel’s commanding officer has described to her a situation that needs attention: An IED has been located in an urban area, but because of its construction, it may be particularly sensitive mos85880_01_c01.indd 24 10/28/13 1:07 PM Section 1.6  Classical Theories CHAPTER 1 and, thus, difficult to disarm. Because of the risks involved, the officer does not want to order anyone to take on this mission, but he is asking for volunteers. Courage is, of course, an important virtue, and one that Aristotle frequently mentioned. If Rachel simply volunteers, without giving the task any evaluation, fails to take any precau­ tions in approaching such a dangerous job, and immediately runs to where the IED has been located in order to disarm it, we might say that she is foolhardy. On the other hand, if she absolutely refuses to consider the mission, and in fact runs in the opposite direction from the IED’s location and hides under her bed, we might regard Rachel as a bit of a cow­ ard. In this case, Rachel could achieve the Golden Mean by being courageous: volunteer­ ing for the mission, but taking all the precautions she can to eliminate the risks involved. This could be one way of striking a balance between being foolhardy and being cowardly; but, as this example demonstrates, there may be differences in what can be taken to be the correct or virtuous action. Might it be prudent to recognize that the risks are too great? As we will see frequently in ethical debates, there may not be one absolutely right way of applying ethical theory to specific ethical questions. Challenges to Virtue Ethics Aristotle’s view, as found particularly in his Nichomachean Ethics, was for centuries a key text in ethics. It became less influential in the 18th and 19th centuries, in part because of the development of the other ethical theories we have looked at, utilitarianism and deon­ tology. There were other reasons that it seemed less satisfactory as a rigorous treatment of ethical ideas. Two particular problems have been identified as generating problems for virtue ethics. First, it is not clear that it is possible to identify a complete list of virtues, or that everyone would even agree on such a list if it were possible to provide one. Would we all agree on what precisely constituted a given virtue and its appropriate degree? Is, for instance, generosity always a virtue? One might suggest that it is, but how do we determine what its Golden Mean is? Will everyone agree on when one is too generous or too stingy? A soldier in war may sacrifice his life to save others; is that being appropriately courageous, and thus to be praised, or is it being foolhardy and leading to the loss of a valuable sol­ dier whose important contributions are now lost? Can we really be too honest? Is there a Golden Mean for being truthful, and thus a clearly identifiable setting where one should not tell the truth, or lie? Second, virtue ethics provides a catalog of virtues but offers little or no indication of how one should act. I may understand that I should be appropriately honest, courageous, tem­ perate, and so on, but does this really tell me what I should do in a specific situation? Does it give me a general set of principles to follow to qualify as a moral person? Many philosophers have suggested that this is a crippling weakness of Aristotle’s ethical view. In turn, those who have sought to revive virtue ethics in contemporary philosophy have addressed these kinds of objections, indicating that these criticisms either misrepresent virtue ethics or that those raising them don’t understand how it can be applied to actual situations. In general, virtue ethics focuses on the person—the moral agent—and evaluates the char­ acter of that person in terms of the specific virtues he or she exemplifies. Ideally, the most mos85880_01_c01.indd 25 10/28/13 1:07 PM Section 1.6  Classical Theories CHAPTER 1 virtuous person—sometimes called a person with a “noble soul”—will have all the vir­ tues in their appropriate amount, and they will all be in harmony with each other. As our example with Emma indicates, however, this seems to be at best a goal for most of us; a person who has all the virtues appropriately ordered seems to be a very rare kind of person. It might also be noted that virtue ethics could be seen as a complement to one of the other theories we have studied. That is, we may want to be a virtuous person, but we may find more guidance in becoming that kind of person by looking to utilitarianism or deontology as a way of solving ethical problems. If we are satisfied that, in general, we come to a satisfactory solution to those problems—in other words, we generally do the right thing—then we may well be the kind of person virtue ethics promotes. Some have argued that utilitarianism and deontology may give us more help in figuring out ethical challenges, whereas virtue ethics gives us a goal to aim for and a reason for figuring them out. In this way, virtue ethics might be part of a more general approach to ethics that can be paired with deontology or utilitarianism, rather than an alternative to utilitarianism or deontology. As noted, virtue ethics was neglected for many years (although a few philosophers endorsed it). It experienced a resurgence in the latter part of the 20th century and received a great deal of attention, through such influential works as Alasdair MacIntyre’s 1981 book After Virtue, which in many ways sought to update the basics of Aristotle’s account of virtue for the present era. It is interesting to ponder why, after so many years, virtue ethics has returned to a place of prominence in the field of ethical study. Virtue Ethics Versus Other Ethical Theories Virtue ethics helps highlight some important features about its relationship with the other two theories we have looked at, utilitarianism and deontology. First, all three theories may draw the same conclusion, or argue that a given act is the moral thing to do, although they may do so on the basis of distinct arguments. For instance, they may all regard act­ ing generously as the right thing to do, but they come to that conclusion from different directions. This won’t always be the case—and the conflicts among these three theories is where things get interesting—nevertheless, we shouldn’t be surprised when acts that are traditionally regarded in most, or all, cultures as good are also regarded by our three theories as good. Second, virtue ethics requires that one not just be virtuous but be virtuous in an appro­ priate way. As we saw, the idea of the Golden Mean indicates one can go to an extreme in either direction; one might, for instance, be too vain or too modest. Some critics have pointed out that saying one should achieve the appropriate degree of each virtue seems not to say very much. It may seem here that the virtue ethicist is saying that one must be appropriately virtuous to be moral. But “appropriate,” apparently, means being moral in the way one should be. And to tell someone that the way to be moral is to simply “be moral” doesn’t, again, offer much in the way of guidance. Application of the Three Classical Theories We saw that utilitarianism evaluates a moral act on the basis of whether it produces the greatest amount of good for the greatest number, given the available options. Deontology, on the other hand, employs rules—whether a guideline like the Golden Rule or more mos85880_01_c01.indd 26 10/28/13 1:07 PM Section 1.7  Alternative Perspectives CHAPTER 1 complex directives about respecting others and being able to universalize the act in ques­ tion—to determine whether an act is moral or not. In contrast, virtue ethics focuses on the character of the person in evaluating morality. If we call that person the moral agent, then virtue ethics concerns itself with that agent and his character, rather than consequences or rules. We can use a simple example to see the difference in approach among the three theories we have in front of us. Imagine you see a mother and child sitting on the sidewalk with what appears to be all their possessions. Presumably, they are homeless and could use some help, and you decide to give them $10. The utili­ tarian observes that by giving $10, you make yourself a bit less well off, but make the mother and her child much better off; thus, giving the $10 produces the greatest good for the greatest number and is the right thing to do. The deontologist, on the other hand, adopts the rule that you Hemera Technologies/AbleStock.com/Thinkstock should, when possible, help those who are worse off than you. (Or, in What would motivate you to give money to a homeless terms of the Golden Rule, if you were person? Do you identify more with the utilitarian, the in the position of the mother, you deontologist, or the virtue ethicist? might well want someone to give you some help.) Thus, in accordance with this rule, the deontologist claims that giving the $10 is the right thing to do. The virtue ethicist, on the other hand, considers your char­ acter. You can spare, without too much sacrifice, $10, and the generous person should do so. Since generosity is a virtue, the virtuous person will regard giving the $10 as the right thing to do. Here we see that all three theories come to very similar conclusions (although for differ­ ent reasons). This won’t always be the case, of course; there are significant disagreements among utilitarians themselves as well as, naturally, among utilitarians, deontologists, and virtue ethicists. As we will now begin to see, there are significant responses to ethical questions that reject these theories as a whole, and offer a different way of thinking about ethics and about doing the right thing. 1.7  Alternative Perspectives B ecause of some of the problems we have seen that arise for classical theories in eth­ ics, other approaches to moral questions have been developed to try to solve them. Here we will look specifically at three of these different approaches: relativism, emo­ tivism, and ethical egoism. These views offer certain advantages, but, as we saw with tra­ ditional ethical theories, they also have certain drawbacks. It will be helpful to see which mos85880_01_c01.indd 27 10/28/13 1:07 PM Section 1.7  Alternative Perspectives CHAPTER 1 of the three theories you find most appealing, and how you think they can overcome the difficulties we will be looking at. Relativism The view of ethical relativism regards values as determined by one’s own ethical stan­ dards, often those provided by one’s own culture and background. Rather than insist­ ing that there are moral absolutes, moral claims must be interpreted in terms of how they reflect a person’s viewpoint; moral claims are then said to be “right in a given culture” or “wrong for a given society.” Definition of Relativism Have you ever ended an argument by simply agreeing to disagree? Relativism is the idea that one’s beliefs and values are understood in terms of one’s society, culture, or even one’s own individual values. You may dis­ Harry Hook/Stone/Getty Images agree with someone and believe your This Maasai elder has four wives, which is acceptable in his view is superior, relative to you as an culture. individual; more often, relativism is described in terms of the values of the community in which one lives. Perhaps my culture thinks soccer is the most enter­ taining sport to watch, and your culture thinks basketball is the most entertaining sport to watch. My view is true, relative to my culture, and your view is true, relative to yours; there isn’t some objective “fact” to point to that we would agree on, that would allow us to say one of us is correct (and thus that the other is incorrect). You probably have encoun­ tered examples of relativism in discussion with others about music, food, movies, and other issues that involve personal taste: These are said to be subjective and really can’t be treated as the kinds of issues that one can view objectively or as if there is a single, correct answer everyone should accept. The relativist in ethics extends this kind of approach to ethical values. Perhaps one person lives in a culture where having a sexual relationship outside of marriage is regarded as one of the worst things a person can do; in this culture a person engaging in extramarital sex may be punished or even forced to leave. But another culture might have a consider­ ably different view of what the first culture calls adultery, and sharing one’s spouses in a general way is not only thought not to be wrong but is actively encouraged. Which culture is right? The relativist insists that this question can’t really be answered without taking into consideration the values of the society: Adultery is wrong in one, right in the other, and there isn’t a lot more to say beyond that. Application of Relativism Traditional ethical views, as well as religious views, condemn a number of things as unethi­ cal, such as killing another person, rape, and theft. The relativist identifies a culture, or mos85880_01_c01.indd 28 10/28/13 1:07 PM Section 1.7  Alternative Perspectives CHAPTER 1 society, which we can call “Society 1.” So rather than saying, “Killing is wrong,” the relativ­ ist claims, “Killing is wrong in Society 1.” But, presumably, there might be another culture, called “Society 2,” and one might then claim, “Killing is not wrong in Society 2.” Since we can’t simply assert that Society 1’s values are right and Society 2’s values are wrong, we relativize the moral claim involved to the culture in question. Given the many cultures and societies around the world, the ethical relativist then concludes that all moral claims must be relativized in this way. Of course, we also know that many cultural values conflict with each other, over many different issues. The relativist’s solution to these conflicts seems to be a recommendation of tolerance and the suggestion that understanding the values of other cultures will help us better appreciate, and respect, those cultures. What we might object to is based on a view relative to our own culture; respect for another culture requires that we respect the moral evaluations of that culture, which are, of course, relative to that culture. Many people find relativism extremely attractive. After all, determining what is right and wrong is frequently very difficult. It may also be difficult to defend—rather than just assert—that a given culture’s (usually one’s own) values are the correct ones, and that those values that are different are somehow wrong. Relativism also seems to decrease the kinds of conflicts that arise over such issues. After all, many of us feel uncomfortable judg­ ing another society’s moral standards, particularly if that society, or culture, is one we aren’t familiar with. Indeed, the very term “judgmental” is used to indicate that one fails to understand the perspective of the other person, or the other culture, in making such claims. It is not unusual to hear someone criticized for being judgmental, or too judgmen­ tal, a criticism that really amounts to the suggestion that one doesn’t sufficiently appreci­ ate the perspective of the other person. Presumably, were we to understand other people’s cultural values, we wouldn’t be so quick to judge them; we would, that is, avoid being judgmental and thereby be more tolerant of others. Challenges to Relativism Relativism seems to offer a plausible, if not easy, way out of confronting ethical dilemmas. Many argue, however, that it may be an easy way out. It may, for instance, commit us to accepting prac­ tices that we might “deep down” regard not as wrong relative to a culture, but as simply wrong. One might consider some of the customs cultures have practiced, and may continue to practice, that one might object to: persecuting and killing eth­ nic minorities, genocide, mass executions of peo­ ple from a minority religion, infanticide, torture, slavery, systematic oppression of women (and, sadly, the list may go on). Although one may feel uncomfortable judging those in another society, others feel considerably more uncomfortable with an ethical view that seems unable to say that murdering hundreds of thousands, or millions, of people simply on the basis of their religious beliefs is wrong. In other words, stating, “Geno­ cide is wrong for my culture, but might be right mos85880_01_c01.indd 29 Robert Ginn/Photolibrary/Getty Images One of the problems with relativism is that some more objectionable attitudes and actions—like those of the Ku Klux Klan— might not be considered wrong because they are merely part of the group’s culture. 10/28/13 1:07 PM Section 1.7  Alternative Perspectives CHAPTER 1 for another culture” seems inadequate to express a sufficiently strong condemnation of genocide. We may be happy to embrace relativism when comparing one fast-food restau­ rant to another; we may be considerably less enthusiastic about regarding mass murder as only wrong relative to a given set of cultural values. Further difficulties arise for relativism, as well, when one considers that few people come from a single, specifiable “culture.” There may be general notions that guide one’s society, but one may also consider one’s self part of many different groups, each of which can inform one’s moral values. Relativism seems fairly clear, until we start trying to decide what provides our moral sense. You have a given country, language, gender, religion or lack of religion, race, ethnicity, class, and so on, but does only one of these determine your values? Or do they all contribute to what you consider your ethical viewpoint? Of course, things may get worse if one claims to be a relativist but subscribes to a view that regards relativism as wrong. Many religious viewpoints are like this: Does one who adopts a spe­ cific religious viewpoint really regard it as just a choice, relative to one’s culture, or don’t most religions put forth their doctrines as true, or right, in a way stronger than relativism can support? Be the Ethicist Discrimination or Fair Business Practice? Aaron Smith and his wife run a bakery, specializing in cakes for special occasions. They regard themselves as very devout Christians and believe that homosexuality is a sin. When two women ordered a wedding cake to celebrate their marriage (which took place in another state), the Smiths refused their order. Some regard this as discrimination, similar to businesses that refused to serve African Americans in large parts of the United States in the 20th century. Others regard this as completely within the rights of the Smiths, and to force them to provide such a wedding cake would be a violation of their religious freedom. Here are some ethical questions to consider regarding this example: 1. Is this discrimination or not? Are anyone’s rights potentially being violated here? Whose? 2. How might a utilitarian determine what the “greatest good for the greatest number” is in this case? What would a utilitarian suggest in this situation? 3. What kind of response would a virtue ethicist provide here? Would it solve the problem? If so, how? 4. If both the Smiths and the women ordering the cake are relativists, would there be any way of resolving this dispute? Why or why not? Two fundamental objections to relativism persist. First, as noted above, relativism may seem to provide an easy solution to moral problems—one simply decides what one wishes to do, as an individual or, more broadly, as a culture—that may be too easy. For many, there seems to be something basic lacking in a response to particularly pressing moral dilemmas—abortion, euthanasia, the death penalty, distribution of wealth and power in society, and many other contemporary ethical concerns—that says a person or culture can simply decide the appropriate solution. For those who register this objection, this can be dismissive of the genuine harm that seems to be justified, or at least allowed, by relativ­ ism. While it is obvious that the relativist’s response would offer little in terms of actually mos85880_01_c01.indd 30 10/28/13 1:07 PM Section 1.7  Alternative Perspectives CHAPTER 1 trying to legislate policies that affect diverse communities, this objection leads to a second, salient, criticism. Are there no limits to what relativism is willing to allow an individual or culture to endorse? This objection may appeal, ultimately, as much to our intuitions as to more sophisticated arguments, but child abuse, infanticide, genocide, and other horrors that continue to occur seem to many people simply wrong. Is there something problematic about an ethical theory that seems powerless to provide a systematic and strong argument against child abuse or genocide? Relativism, as we have seen and will continue to see, has many attractive features, particu­ larly in its recommendation that we try to understand a different culture before criticizing it. Nevertheless, we have also seen (and will continue to see) that it may have substantial problems; for instance, relativism prevents us from registering our objections to practices that seem not just wrong relative to a society’s values, but simply wrong. It may be dif­ ficult to determine what, precisely, one’s culture actually is in the relevant ethical sense to make relativism work. And, finally, it may be difficult for a society to recognize that it might be doing something immoral, if the very idea of immoral policies cannot be raised within that society. Relativism may help us get some perspective on some issues, but it seems to fall short when we consider what some cultures and societies have done in the past—for example, the practice of slavery—and how they were able to reject such prac­ tices. Again, we see this view informing some of our understanding of ethical challenges, but perhaps not providing a way of solving them in a satisfactory way. Emotivism Emotivism offers a perspective on our ethical claims that eliminates much of the tradi­ tional kind of argument based on reason. Emotivism, instead, sees our moral evaluations as simply the expression of whether we respond to a given act by liking it or not liking it. Something is good, on this view, if it is something about which we feel good; something is wrong if it is something about which we feel bad. Definition of Emotivism Emotivism is a noncognitive theory of ethics because it denies, among other things, that moral claims can appeal to “facts.” Rather, emotivism, as the name indicates, simply says that moral claims express an emotional response, or an attitude, we may have toward a given kind of behavior. If I see someone stealing candy from a baby, I may have an emo­ tional response that indicates that I regard it as wrong. Of course, I may have a different response: I may not care, or I might think stealing candy from a baby is a good thing. In all these responses, however, there isn’t any fact or objective cognitive claim involved. I simply have the response I have, and my emotional response expresses whether I think it is a good or a bad thing or I am indifferent. Sometimes this theory is referred to as a “Boo Hurrah” theory of ethics: If I think some­ thing is wrong, about all I can do is say, “Boo,” indicating that I regard it as wrong. If, on the other hand, I approve of the act, I can say, “Hurrah,” to indicate that approval. One advantage of this theory is its simplicity: To evaluate an act as moral or immoral, I just give a thumbs-up or a thumbs-down. The simplicity is gained by seeing that there isn’t a whole lot more to say here, for the moral evaluation simply is my emotional response. mos85880_01_c01.indd 31 10/28/13 1:07 PM CHAPTER 1 Section 1.7  Alternative Perspectives Emotivists insist that there is a significant difference that we should recognize between moral claims and other kinds of claims. We can, it seems, appeal to “facts” in talking about the color of a table; there is, in this case, a public, objective kind of standard we can dis­ cuss. If we are talking about what appears to most of us as a brown table, and someone insists that it is, in fact, green, that person seems to us to be wrong. Of course, we can’t rule out the idea that we are wrong, and we can continue to discuss the claim among ourselves, doing measurements, comparing other things that we think are brown to see if this person calls them green, and so forth. We may discover she is color-blind or learned her color words in a unique way; we may also discover she is mistaken. But the emotivist thinks this kind of procedure would not work when considering moral claims because moral claims are fundamentally different. In more recent years, emotivism, and other noncognitivist approaches to ethics, have become considerably more sophisticated than a simple response such as “Boo” or “Hur­ rah!” These developments include complex discussions of what properties are ascribed to an agent’s state of mind, as well as what is actually being expressed emotionally, psycho­ logically, or otherwise, in a ethical response that expresses approval or disapproval. There have also been suggestions that any claims that a noncognitivist makes that are truthevaluable—can be seen as either true or false—are in fact secondary or parasitic upon a fundamental moral response, and the relationship between these levels has led to further complications in defending the emotivist, or more generally the noncognitivist, position. Various noncognitivist approaches to ethics continue to be developed, defended, and criticized. Application of Emotivism iStockphoto/Thinkstock David Hume claimed that it is a mistake in reasoning to move from an “is” statement to an “ought” statement. mos85880_01_c01.indd 32 David Hume (1711–1776), in a very famous argu­ ment, claimed that it was a basic mistake in reason­ ing to go from an “is” statement—a claim about some property something has—to an “ought” statement—a claim about some moral conception of right or wrong. Actually, most of us make this distinction on a pretty regular basis. Imagine you live in a country where women are not allowed to work outside the home or have salaried jobs. This way of life is very old, and many people regard it as “natural.” So one might offer, as an “is” statement, “Women not working outside the home is natural.” The corresponding argument, though, concludes (on the assumption that “natu­ ral” means “correct”) with an “ought” statement, that women ought not, or should not, work out­ side the home. But just because something is the case, and has been for a long time, doesn’t mean it ought to be the case. So Hume and others have argued that one can never go from an “is” state­ ment to an “ought” statement, making a bit more 10/28/13 1:07 PM Section 1.7  Alternative Perspectives CHAPTER 1 explicit the idea that just because something can be described in a certain way doesn’t mean that certain moral obligations follow from that description. We can see why the emotivist finds Hume’s argument attractive. We are happy to talk about properties that objects have. We can examine such claims as “The table is brown,” “The rectangle has four sides,” and “People who live in Hawaii have suntans” (all “is” statements), and we can determine, or at least meaningfully argue about, whether they are true or false. The emotivist argues that emotional reactions cannot be examined or argued about in the same way; they involve “ought” statements (such as “one ought not cheat”); by those reactions, we register our moral evaluation of them. Imagine a friend who cried when he saw a movie that he found very moving. Would we say he was “wrong” to have that reaction? It seems to be the case that we would regard the friend’s reaction as his emo­ tional response to the movie. The emotivist argues that we could no more say that one’s moral evaluation of something is “wrong” (or “right”) than we could judge our friend’s reaction to the movie. One might imagine a couple of friends debating whether it is ever right to lie. One person might point to the consequences of lying, in terms of the damage lies can do in general or in specific cases, or might point to why, in some circumstances, a lie might be appropriate. The other person might point to the deontological claim that if lying is permitted in some cases, the fundamental commitment to truth-telling is lost; if we don’t assume people tell the truth, then this undercuts the background that makes a lie effective in the first place. The noncognitivist—in this case, a relatively unsophisticated emotivist—responds to both of these views that there aren’t any moral “facts”—the sentence “Lying is wrong” isn’t a proposition that can be true or false. Rather, it expresses the speaker’s disapproval of lying (in this case). A more complex treatment might offer, “Lying to adults when something important is at stake is wrong,” or “Lying to children about Santa Claus is right” pro­ vides a bit more context. But in both cases, these responses simply offer a noncognitivist response that shows that this speaker does not approve of lying in some circumstances, and does approve of it other circumstances. Challenges to Emotivism Just as the theory of emotivism is pretty clear, the objections to it are also not very difficult to figure out. For instance, if emotivism really reduces our moral evaluations to simple, almost involuntary emotional responses, does it eliminate our ability to disagree about ethical evaluations? To return to an earlier example, are we satisfied by simply giving a “thumbs-down” to genocide and recognizing that we don’t have any way of refuting someone who gives it a “thumbs-up”? Does this conflict with our moral intuitions? Do we want to be able to say something more or something stronger? As you can probably tell, some of the objections to emotivism are similar to those of rela­ tivism. Note, however, that the two theories are distinct. The relativist seems to be saying that it is true (or false) that a given act is wrong, but that truth is relative to the person making the moral evaluation. I may think it is a good thing to lie, and you may think it a bad thing. A relativist will say the claim “Lying is good” is true, but just true for me (or my culture); she will also say that it is false, but just false for you (or your culture). mos85880_01_c01.indd 33 10/28/13 1:07 PM Section 1.7  Alternative Perspectives CHAPTER 1 The emotivist disagrees, insisting that “true” and “false” don’t really have any role to play here; the emotional response, in other ...
Purchase answer to see full attachment