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umbc

Question Description

Chapter 15 16

Discuss FULLY the issues raised by the call of the question

Question 1

  1. Facts of the case
    A police officer stopped a car that had a burned out license plate light and headlight. There were six men in the car, including Robert Clyde Bustamonte. Only one passenger had a drivers license, and he claimed that his brother owned the car. The officer asked this man if he could search the car. The man said, “Sure, go ahead.” Inside the car, the officer found stolen checks. Those checks were admitted into evidence at Bustamonte’s trial for possessing checks with the intent to defraud. A jury convicted Bustamonte, and the California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District affirmed. The court reasoned that consent to search the car was given voluntarily, so evidence obtained during the search was admissible. The California Supreme Court denied review. Bustamonte filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the district court denied. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that consent is not voluntary unless it is proven that the person who consented to the search knew he had the right to refuse consent.


    Question2
    (2) Did the court of appeals err when it held that the search of the car was invalid because the state failed to show consent given with knowledge that it could be withheld?

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Chapters 19 & 20 Quiz

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), was a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in which the Court ruled that the exclusionary rule, which prevents prosecutors from using evidence in court that was obtained by violating the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, applies not only to the U.S. federal government, but also to the U.S. states. The Supreme Court accomplished this by use of a principle known as selective incorporation; in Mapp this involved the incorporation of the provisions, as interpreted by the Court, of the Fourth Amendment which is applicable only to actions of the federal government into the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause which is applicable to actions of the states.

Read and Brief Mapp. Use the Issue, Rule, Application & Conclusion format to discuss all issues raised by this seminal case.

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Chapters 21-24 Assignment

Question 1


  1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)

    In the landmark supreme court case Miranda v. Arizona (1966), the Court held that if police do not inform people they arrest about certain constitutional rights, including their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, then their confessions may not be used as evidence at trial. The Court referenced Mapp v. Ohio (1961) as the basis for excluding the confessions. The ruling was also based on the assertions that the Fifth Amendment privilege is “fundamental to our system of constitutional rule” and that to inform the accused of their rights is “expedient [and] simple.”

    ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS USING MIRANDA:
    1. Why did the Supreme Court overturn Miranda’s conviction?
    2. According to the Court’s majority opinion,”…the prosecution may not use statements…stemming from … interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” What are the effects of this ruling for accused persons? For society?
    3. Justice Harlan, who wrote the Court’s dissenting opinion in the case, said, “The social costs of crime are too great to call the new rules anything but a hazardous experimentation…. One is entitled to feel astonished that the Constitution can be read to produce this result.” Do you agree? Why or why not?

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Chapters 25 - 28


How did Gideon v. Wainwright impact the criminal justice system?

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Inventory Searches Chapter 15 Automobile Inventories • Routine inventory searches of lawfully impounded vehicles are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment without warrant or probable cause • If criminal evidence is discovered during a valid inventory search, authorities may seize it. • Remember the Plain View Doctrine? Recognition from Supreme Court • South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) • First case that dealt with the “automobile inventory” search warrant and probable cause exception recognized by the S.C. • O’s car was impounded after being parked in a tow-zone illegally and ticketed. Police removed items visible from outside of the car for safekeeping, and found marijuana in the glove compartment after unlocking the car. The owner of the car was charged with possession of contraband. • The search was upheld by the Court (5-4) • Inventory is an administrative act – part of the police’s community caretaking function. Probable cause is a standard used in criminal investigations • The Court noted that there is no need for a warrant if there is no reason for determining probable cause • Three distinct needs which make automobile inventories reasonable: • To protect police/public from anything hazardous that may be in the car • To protect police from claims of either lost or stolen property • To protect the owner’s property while it is in custody of the police • Critic’s Claims: • Cars rarely have dangerous instrumentalities hidden within them – an impounded, unsearched car poses no greater threat to the community than an unsearched car that is not impounded • Inventories may not discourage false claims of missing/stolen property • There are possibly less intrusive ways to protect property than the inventory process Administrative Non-Pretextual Nature of the search • When evidence is found during inventory, it may be admissible in a criminal trial. • Problems regarding admissibility arise if the search is actually a pretextual inventory searche. • These searches are not routine administrative police activities by definition, but bad-faith subterfuges when it comes to criminal investigation • It can be difficult for a defendant to argue that an inventory search is instead investigation, since inventory searches are required by regulation Routine Nature of the Inventory • The inventory must be a normal requirement of the department administering it • An officer should not be granted significant discretion by the regulations • The S.C. has upheld some inventories that allow police discretion Automobile Owner’s Wishes • The owner of a vehicle does not have to be unavailable to consent for the police to have the right to inventory Scope of Inventory • Containers • “Police officer may be allowed sufficient latitude to determine whether a particular container should or should not be opened in light of the nature of the search and characteristics of the container itself” –Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990) • Locked Portions of an Automobile • Whether the glove compartment or trunk is locked does not seem to hold any significance • Inspection of Papers • Although it has not been decided if police may read documents/papers during inventory, five Justices in Opperman believed that routinely, it should not be permitted Arrest Inventories • The S.C. held that police are permitted to search an arrested person, their personal effects (as well as containers) incident to booking/jailing • Arrest inventories are parallel to automobile inventories • Arrest inventory prevents theft of property, protects police from claims, and keeps contraband and dangerous objects from entering the jail Consent Searches Chapter 16 Pragmatism, Police, and the Supreme Court • The consent search exception is likely the most significant exception to the warrant “requirement” • Because obtaining a warrant causes delay, officers officers attempt to get a person’s consent instead – as a police officer said: There are a lot of warrants that are not sought because of the hassle. You just figure it’s not worth the hassle. . . . I don’t think k you can forego a case because of the hassle of a search warrant, but you can. . . .work some other method. If I can get consent, I’m gonna do it • Consent falls under the dominant category for lawful searches conducted without a warrant • Remember the 4th only protects you from unreasonable searches “Voluntary” consent • When a person consents for the police to search, what use is it for the police to first seek a warrant to protect the rights of that person under the Constitution? • Courts have characterized consent searches as “voluntary”, though studies have shown people sometimes feel they have little freedom to refuse • Warrantless consent searches can be difficult to legitimize when police bargain for a person’s consent because they fear - or know they are unable to get a warrant General Rule • Valid consent: • Granted voluntarily • Obtained by someone who has the authority to give it • Scope must not exceed the consent granted Rationale • Waiver? • When consenting to searches, that person waives their right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures • “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege” • “Third party” consent is valid, though one person cannot waive another’s rights • Consent = No Search? • When a person consents, they no longer have a reasonable expectation of privacy • Technically…. No expectation of privacy, no search • Reasonableness • The Court’s explanation is that consent is not really an “exception” because it is a reasonable search Voluntary Consent • In General • Burden of proof is on the prosecutor to demonstrate • Factors that may demonstrate coerced consent: • • • • Show of force by police The presence of a large number of officers Repetitive requests after refusal Evidence suggesting a person’s will was overcome • The issue lies in whether or not the officer’s method of containing consent is ethical when it comes to the goals of law enforcement • Claim of Authority by Police • Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) • Consent invalid when it “has been given only after the official conducting the search has asserted that he possesses a warrant” • Bright-line rule: Consent granted to an officer after he claims to have a warrant, regardless of the warrant’s validity, is invalid • Bumper has not been discredited, but the fact that this case may have been about civil rights (given the year it was decided), deserves attention • Police Deception • Officers may use deception to obtain consent – usually relating to the person’s identity Police Deception Continued… • United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1971) – The search in this case was invalidated after police told the person who consented that they were searching for narcotics when in fact, they were searching for documents in which they intended to examine • Police “may not obtain consent to search on the representation that they intend to look only for certain specified items and subsequently use the consent as a license to conduct a general exploratory search” • Search would have been invalid in any case as they exceeded the scope – drugs could not be discovered by opening/examining documents Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) • Awareness of Fourth Amendment Rights • The defendant declared the search in this case was invalid after the government failed to approve the consenting party knew they had the right to refuse • The court rejected that lacking proof of knowledge of a right to refuse a search deems it as involuntary • A person’s awareness of his right to refuse is merely one factor among many that determine voluntariness • Critics believe the issue was misconstrued, and that the issue was actually whether or not the person who consented waived his right to be free from unreasonable searches Scope of Search • Search is invalid if an officer exceeds the scope of the consent • although it is frequently unclear how extensive a search may be based on the permission given • Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991) – The Trial Court suppressed the evidence of this case after the defendant gave the officer permission to search his car, but not the container within, where cocaine was found Florida v. Jimeno • Reversed by U.S.S.C., Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that “it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search the car included consent to search containers within that car which might bear drugs.” • However, this case does not stand for the idea that police may open every container during a consensual search of a car or home Third Party Consent • Personal or real property can have more than one person with interest in containers (anyone who uses it) and the home itself home (anyone who inhabits it) • At trial, if a person consents to a search that invades the privacy of a third party, consent issues will not generally arise if the evidence is only introduced against the consenting party • United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) – M was arrested outside of his home. He shared a room in the home with another person, and that person gave police consent to search the room while M’s was not granted, but could have been sought after • The Court declared the law as clear – a co-inhabitant has the right to give consent to search a premises, and the other inhabitant(s) take that risk • Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006) – In short, police were called to a husband and wife’s dwelling on a domestic dispute and were informed by the wife that her husband used cocaine. She gave the police consent to search the home, while her husband refused. A straw with powdery residue was discovered during the search. • Supreme Court held “a warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence over the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident cannot be justified as reasonable as to him on the basis of consent given to the police by another resident.” • The assumption-of-risk doctrine set in Matlock was exchanged by a socialexpectation standard in examination by the Court • Souter: “. . . .there is no common understanding that one co-tenant generally has a right or authority to prevail over the express wishes of another, whether the issue is the color of the curtains or invitation to outsiders.” • Chief Justice Roberts criticized the majority’s assumptions about societal expectations… “such shifting expectations are not a promising foundation on which to ground a constitutional rule” • The Chief Justice returned to the assumption-of-risk doctrine of Matlock… “If an individual shares information, papers, or places with another, he assumes the risk that the other person will in turn share access to that information or those paper or places with the government” • “The Fourth Amendment does not insist upon bright-line rules. Rather is recognizes that no single set of rules can capture the ever changing complexity of human life.” –Justice Breyer (concurred in majority opinion) Apparent Authority • Does apparent authority constitute effective consent? • Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) – A woman let police inside of an apartment with a key that the owner was unaware she had (she referred to owning the apartment with R), after reporting that she had been beaten by R. The woman had actually moved out weeks earlier, and police found drug paraphernalia in the dwelling for which R was charged for possessing. • The defendant made a motion to exclude the evidence and it was granted by the Trial Court. The Supreme Court reversed. • The mistake made by the police was “reasonable” Fourth Amendment: Standing Chapter 19 The Role of “Standing” in Fourth Amendment Law • “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searched and seizures.” • Enforced by exclusionary rule • Constitutional right can be raised by someone who has standing to assert it • Fourth Amendment rights are personal • Is “Standing” a Separate Concept? • If one wishes evidence to be suppressed at trial, they have to prove they have standing to challenge the search/seizure • Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-139 (1978) – the S.C. does not wish for the lower courts to resolve the issue of standing, but whether or not the person’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated • Some lower courts, along with Professor LaFave and Justice Blakmun, believe it is not inappropriate for a court to differentiate between the analysis of standing and Fourth Amendment rights in what has occurred • Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998) taught standing lessons: • 1. Standing must be present to challenge the Fourth Amendment • 2. Were the person’s (movant’s) rights violated? • 3. Standing can result in incomplete/incorrect analysis Rationale of the Standing Requirement • “Atomistic” Perspective – The Fourth Amendment “safeguards my person and your house and her papers and his effects against unreasonable search and seizure” • Standing based on the person being victimized by unreasonable police activity • The exclusionary rule acts in opposition (atomistic limits the amount of people who can bring unethical behavior by police to the court’s attention, while the exclusionary rule is meant to protect society as a whole) • United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) – case in which the atomistic standing requirement frustrated the effort of the exclusionary rule • “Regulatory” Perspective –The Fourth Amendment is designed to protect “we the people” from government overreaching The Law of Standing: Pre-Rakas v. Illinois • Summary for pre-Rakas law: • Fourth Amendment claims had standing when the person • • • • • 1. Owned or had interest in the establishment searched 2. On the premises at the time 3. Owned property seized 4 Had lawful possession of what was seized (such as being delivered in bailment) *To some courts, someone could claim standing if they were a co-defendant or conspirator or the person who had the standing (this doctrine was rejected previous to Rakas) Automatic Standing • Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) – Narcotics were seized by agents belonging to J in another person’s apartment. The automatic standing rule permitted J to challenge the validity of the search, without proving that he owned the narcotics • Automatic Standing was approved by the Court • Automatic Standing was disregarded by the Court after United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980) – Simmons v. Unites States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) removed the self-incrimination problem in Jones. • “the testimony of a defendant in support of a Fourth Amendment motion to suppress evidence may not be used against her at trial, over her objection, on the issue of guilt” Standing to Contest a Search: Rakas v. Illinois • Rakas v, Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) • Leading case in modern standing rules of law • Car was stopped after the car fit the description described to officers as a getaway car after a robbery. All occupants were ordered to step outside of the vehicle, and police conducted a search in which rifle shells were found in the glove compartment and a rifle was found beneath the passenger seat • R (passenger) moved to suppress the evidence asserting that police lacked cause to search his vehicle, with the standing claim that he was “legitimately on the premises” when the search was conducted • The trial court denied his motion and the S.C. agreed • The Court considered “whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place” • R failed to prove his legitimate expectation of privacy Rakas Continued… • The dissent asserted that the holding would weaken the exclusionary rule • Dissent found fault in the majority rejecting Jones’s legitimately-on-thepremises rule and allowing the “legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place” to replace it • They also blamed the Court of going back to pre-Katz property rights differences, which it denied • Rakas did not hint that the rule in which a person has standing to contest a search conducted in a place they have possessory interest (even if searched while they are not present) was altered • The Search of Another Person’s Residence • When the Owner or Lessor is Absent • A non-resident cannot challenge a search of a place they have no interest in simply because they were there at the time of the search • The non-resident could have standing if they were there with permission of the owner and have important connections to the premises (e.g. had a key to the residence, had clothing there, etc., as in Jones) • When the Owner or Lessor is Present • Even when a resident is present, a non-resident can challenge the search of the residence • In Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990), O spent the night at his girlfriend’s house, and the Court allowed O to dispute the police entry into her home • • • • He was never alone in the house He did not have a key He lacked dominion/control over house The holding “merely recognizes the everyday expectations of privacy that we all share” –Justice White • In Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998), two guests’ (in a lessee’s apartment) Fourth Amendment rights were not infringed upon when a police officer watched them bag cocaine with the lessee through a blind gap in a window • “one who is merely present with the consent of the householder may not” (claim the protections of the Fourth Amendment) • Carter Continued… • The case was put on the no-right-to-challenge side of the line based on three factors: • 1. The commercial nature of the transaction • 2. The short period of time the guests were on the premises • 3. The lack of previous connection between the guests and lessee • It seemed that Justice Kennedy (swing vote) may have ruled for the defendants if at least one of the following three factors were met: • Were in the apartment for non-commercial reasons • Had spoken confidentially to the lessee about their activities • Had previous/more substantial and current connections to the apartment • Search of One’s Own Automobile When Absent • The lower courts are split on whether the owner of a vehicle has a legitimate expectation of privacy when they are absent during the search of the vehicle • Most courts have ruled that if the vehicle is lent and searched, then the owner does have that reasonable expectation • Some courts have held that the key is possession, not ownership • Search of Another Person’s Automobile • The general rule after Rakas is that it is possible for an occupant of a vehicle to have standing in restricted situations • Absent Owner: • The person challenging the search has possessory interest • The person may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in only some areas of the car • Present Owner: • Speaking in terms of the search of the vehicle and not the occupant’s person • A person should have standing, say, when they have a key to the car with the understanding that they may place their possessions in a portion of it whenever they like, in light of Olson • Contesting a Search Resulting in the Seizure of One’s Own Property • When the property seized belongs to the defendant (adding another element to the earlier questi ...
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