Running head: PEER RESPONSES Administration of Corrections Organizations: 1 CCJ5700_0316_18111 Textbook: Carlson, P. M., & Garrett, J. S. (2008). Prison and jail administration: Practice and theory (2nd ed.). Burlington, MA: Jones and Bartlett Pub. (ATTACHED) DIRECTIONS: Must be min 200 words with 3 scholarly sources (APA) no cover letter necessary Emergency Planning Emergency preparedness plans require utilization of all available resources to ensure an effective and practical system of response that can also be implemented in concert with outside resources. 1. Have prisons and jails been affected by domestic and international terrorism? 2. What are the differences in emergency planning in today’s world compared to the planning done prior to September 11, 2001? 3. What role do Homeland Security and the National Response Plan play in local planning? Read the following articles, along with the chapters in this section: “Mock Prison Riot: The future of tactical corrections training” http://www.correctionsone.com/CERT/articles/2065962-Mock-Prison-Riot-Thefuture-of-tactical-corrections-training/ T U R N E R , T A M M Y 1 5 2 1 T S 28624_PT5_459_500.qxd 11/26/07 11:51 AM Page 469 © Jones & Bartlett Learning, LLC. NOT FOR RESALE OR DISTRIBUTION Emergency Management 43 T U R N E Describe the role a prison administrator plays R in emergency preparedness. , E.A. Stepp ■ ■ ■ Explain the stages of response: planning, active management, and aftermath. Differentiate between emergency responseTand emergency preparedness. A M M Prison and jail riots or disturbances continue toYbe the nightmare of institution administrators. While events necessitating full-scale emergency response are rare, they are ever-present in prison managers’ minds. Any number of small, isolated, 1 and seemingly unimportant events that occur frequently can mushroom into full5 blown emergencies. Emergencies can occur in isolated portions of a facility or, when not immediately contained, engulf the entire prison. 2 Disturbances range from passive demonstrations by inmates (i.e., food or 1 work strikes) to violent acts against property, staff, or other inmates. Whether T an event is planned by a few individuals or orchestrated by a large group, it can escalate quickly into a worst-case scenario, suchSas a riot, hostage situation, or escape. How then do prison administrators operate safe and secure institutions? How can staff move from routine daily operations to the highest level of emergency response? After the events of September 11, 2001, how can prison administrators prepare for traditional responses to prison emergencies and ensure that emergency plans incorporate new response standards established by the federal government? To answer these questions, one must take a look at the entire process of 469 28624_PT5_459_500.qxd 11/26/07 11:51 AM Page 470 © Jones & Bartlett Learning, LLC. NOT FOR RESALE OR DISTRIBUTION 470 | PRISON AND JAIL ADMINISTRATION: PRACTICE AND THEORY prison emergency preparedness and the new coordinated, all-hazards approach to emergency management. Planning The planning stage of emergency response includes development of established, specific emergency response plans, training, and assignment of resources. Before anything happens, management must ensure that staff are prepared to recognize and respond to a multitude of different emergencies. Each type of situation may require an individualized, specific response plan. If the first stage of emergency response is emphasized, a system of emergency preparedness can be established. There is a huge differenceTbetween the emergency preparedness (preparation, planning, training, and budgeting) and emergency response (active management, inU tervention, containment, and resolution). The goal of any administrator must R preparedness program to ensure that actual emerbe to establish an emergency gency response is effective. N The first step in preparing a response to emergency situations is to develop E site-specific plans for each type of emergency. An overall emergency plan for an R contingency plans for specific emergencies. These ininstitution contains several clude plans to resolve riots, , escapes, hostage situations, weather emergencies, food or work strikes, fires, and situations that could necessitate evacuation of inmates and staff from the institution. Planning for these and other types of emerT gencies will require establishing a contingency planning team consisting of different staff experts from various departments within the institution. A M Contingency Planning Internal Cooperative Planning for emergencyM response requires a “big picture” approach that examines all available resources. Y All contingency plans must define the responsibilities of staff from various departments. This is true when planning for even small situations. Plans must be developed through cooperative means, using the col1 from all departments within the institution. In cases lective experience of staff where emergency plans 5 are written by security staff, with little or no input from other departments, unrealistic or dangerous assumptions may be made. 2 All emergency plans should cover certain general elements clearly: ■ Communication of1the initial alarm. Once an emergency situation is identified, all staff must T know how to alert management and others of the situation. S ■ Securing the scene and initial containment of incident. Most emergencies begin small and spread quickly if initial containment actions are not effective. It is critical to the final resolution of any incident to contain the incident to the smallest area possible by locking the affected area or building. ■ Command structure. All plans should specify responsibilities for immediate emergency response command. Everyone must know who the initial on-scene commander is prior to senior management staff arrival. ■ Notification and call back procedures. Emergency situations must be communicated swiftly and clearly to the facility chief executive officer. A 28624_PT5_459_500.qxd 11/26/07 11:51 AM Page 471 © Jones & Bartlett Learning, LLC. NOT FOR RESALE OR DISTRIBUTION Emergency Management ■ ■ standard process of timely and urgent recall of staff to the institution should be in place. Command center location and operation. The location of the command center must be established clearly. Appropriate equipment and instructions for activating a command center must be in place in a secure location. Because predicting the location of an incident is impossible, the command center should be located in an area inaccessible to inmates. In most cases, this requires establishing a command center outside the secure portion of the institution. Emergency plans, communication equipment, and enough space for several staff to work are essential when planning for a command center. Preparation of emergency response teams. Before correctional administrators can begin to develop strategies to resolveT emergencies within their facilities, it is critical that decisions be made regarding resources that will be not U only needed, but dedicated to the emergency response. R N Different levels of response are required, contingent upon the type of emergency E faced. For each level of response, different teams with incident-specific training R levels of specialty expertise, are required. Regardless of team membership and common qualities apply to all. All teams must be ,composed of volunteers, receive Emergency Response Teams specialized training in specific skills and be highly trained in agency policy regarding use of force. All staff selected for membership on any team should be reT screening. quired to pass physical, academic, and psychological Traditional Disturbance Control Teams A The first level of response to disturbances is theM traditional disturbance control team (DCT). DCTs are trained in riot control formation and the use of defensive M agents. DCTs are trained to equipment such as batons, stun guns, and chemical control and contain both large and small groupsYof inmates involved in disturbances. Application of “less lethal” technologies usually falls to DCTs. Extensive training is necessary and should include minimum proficiency standards. A certification process must be included that requires1 a knowledge of agency policy 5 use of related equipment. and emergency plans as well as proficiency in the Armed DCTs 2 While traditional DCTs should be viewed as the 1 primary emergency response team for incidents requiring containment and control, a higher level of response T that has escalated to one that may be necessary to deal with a difficult scenario S requires the use of deadly force. This type of incident requires managers to respond with a specially trained team; the use of an armed DCT should be limited to situations where staff or inmate lives are in imminent danger. Training and certification standards increase as the manager of the incident follows an escalating use-of-force continuum. Use of armed DCTs implies that management has accepted that lethal force may be used. Tactical Response Teams Tactical response teams are the most highly trained and skilled emergency response staff. These teams, known as correctional emergency response teams, or | 471 28624_PT5_459_500.qxd 11/26/07 11:51 AM Page 472 © Jones & Bartlett Learning, LLC. NOT FOR RESALE OR DISTRIBUTION 472 | PRISON AND JAIL ADMINISTRATION: PRACTICE AND THEORY special operations response teams, are similar to traditional special weapons and tactics teams found in most police departments. Tactical teams required advanced levels of training in barricade breaching, hostage rescue tactics, and precision marksmanship with pistols, rifles, and assault weapons. External Cooperative Contingency Planning Most emergency situations in correctional institutions require assistance from outside law enforcement sources. Since September 11, 2001, there has been a renewed emphasis on cooperative contingency planning. This requires effective cooperation with entities outside of correctional agencies or departments. Historically, correctional facilities have developed emergency plans with an emphasis on self-directed and self-sustained response. Agreements with local, state, and federal agencies were oftenT ill-defined or nonexistent. Failure to establish relationships with outside law enforcement agencies will contribute to an already chaotic U situation and prolong incident resolution. R that institution emergency plans include mutually Managers must ensure agreed-upon cooperativeNcontingency plans with outside agencies. Plans may be as simple as assistance with site access and traffic control, or as complicated as E meshing institution tactical teams with outside tactical resources and hostage resRof the level of assistance, preexisting memoranda of cue attempts. Regardless understanding establishing , limits of assistance and command and control will reduce confusion and delay. Managers must be able to implement plans and take actions to resolve the situation and not debate questions of philosophy regarding expertise, resources,Tor how to accomplish a given goal. Cooperative contingency A plans should be signed by the outside agency representative and the institution warden. Once this is accomplished, role definition M is achieved. Institution managers must also realize that coordination with local M centers is important. Intelligence briefings regarding or state emergency action both domestic and international terrorism threats can be provided so long as muY tual assistance agreements exist. Outside groups such as terrorist organizations may believe it newsworthy to target government facilities, including prisons. 1 no longer take an “inside out” approach to emergency Prison administrators can planning. Planning must5also include an “outside in” review and plan. 2 Exercises Training and Mock 1 must include all key staff. Because not all staff will be A realistic training program available to respond during T an emergency, managers must ensure that cross training of staff occurs. Staff will be much more prepared and effective when they can S assume a variety of roles during an emergency. perform multiple tasks and For any emergency plan to succeed, all staff must be familiar with their responsibilities and management expectations. The only way to determine whether a plan is effective is to conduct regular tests and analyze results. Management must evaluate emergency plans, devise training scenarios, and analyze staff performance. Major exercises involving all staff and outside agencies should be conducted at least annually. This type of mock exercise requires planning, use of resources, and coordination with each cooperative contingency plan outside of the agency. In most cases, however, emergency plans can be tested with little or no disruption of normal institution operations. 28624_PT5_459_500.qxd 11/26/07 11:51 AM Page 473 © Jones & Bartlett Learning, LLC. NOT FOR RESALE OR DISTRIBUTION Emergency Management Small, internal training exercises that test specific parts of plans also should occur regularly. These tests include communication devices, staff recalls, command center set-up, and area containment. Having staff who are trained properly in their roles and in the requirements to implement emergency plans is the goal, as it limits the amount of time required to contain and ultimately resolve a crisis. The beginning of any emergency is the most critical time. There is often an early window of opportunity to resolve, or at a minimum, contain the incident. Managers should demand effective, well-rehearsed emergency plans to ensure that confusion and delay do not become the reality of the response. One of the most important aspects of emergency preparedness is knowing the capabilities and limitations of various emergency response teams. Practice scenarios where each team participates with other groups, including outside agenT managers. cies, will provide this critical information to crisis Testing emergencies plans should include the Ufollowing steps: 1. Identify those staff who are to respond R and those to be used as role players. N 2. Ensure that staff are cross-trained. E various roles. 3. Ensure that staff know how to assume their Rthe exercise. 4. Assign monitors to evaluate and criticize , should a real incident occur. 5. Provide a method of terminating the exercise 6. Establish a code word or signal to alert staff should an actual emergency occur. T 7. Conduct a debriefing with all staff participants. A The debriefing is a critical component. This evaluation of the exercise and M should provide useful feedback from participants. Gathering information from Mthe organization of emergency training participants allows management to assess teams, the adequacy of communication, and theYoverall use of resources. Based on this feedback, administration can revise plans to achieve better results in actual emergencies. 1 5 Meeting Legal Requirements 2ensuring all prearranged agreeA final step in the training portion of preparation is ments with other agencies have been reviewed by 1 the respective legal representatives. Short notice implementation of these agreements will be required. Prior T to implementation, everyone in the institution should know what staff from other agencies legitimately can and cannot do during S a crisis. Tactical Options Tactical planning and preparation for crisis resolution is an important element of overall emergency response training. Standard tactical plans will not be incident specific but will be based on certain known factors. These include agency philosophy and goals and tactical capabilities of teams. Flexibility of response is necessary. Standard, preexisting tactical plans based on agency management philosophy can then be tailored to specific situations as intelligence and information from the crisis develop. | 473 28624_PT5_459_500.qxd 11/26/07 11:51 AM Page 474 © Jones & Bartlett Learning, LLC. NOT FOR RESALE OR DISTRIBUTION 474 | PRISON AND JAIL ADMINISTRATION: PRACTICE AND THEORY A crisis manager can use any of the following three options to resolve major incidents in a correctional setting: 1. Negotiation—involves the least amount of force 2. DCTs—involves non-lethal technologies and options such as chemical agents and distraction devises 3. Use of deadly force—involves intervention by an armed team An effective emergency management structure relies on the use of all resolution options, since options only work properly when used together. Negotiations cannot succeed without tactical options. Tactical options cannot succeed without information and intelligence obtained by negotiators. All components of the emergency management structure must cooperate and train together to ensure success. Success for one is success for the entire emergency management structure. T It is nearly impossible to plan a specific response to all the different crisis U situations that could arise in a correctional setting. However, an effective emerR should include plans for accessing all areas of the gency preparation program institution during an emergency. Preplanned breach points and means of entry N provide the needed flexibility to develop an incident-specific tactical plan durE ing active management of the emergency situation. Preestablished breaching plans R should include the following: ■ Identification of a staging area. There should be primary and secondary stag, ing areas for teams that are not visible to inmates, media, or the public. ■ Plan of approach. Primary and secondary approaches should exist to areas T that provide concealment. ■ Preparation for entry. A Again, primary and secondary points of entry into all buildings should be established in advance of a crisis. M ■ Required physical hardware and equipment necessary to effect entry. Every Msecure perimeter of the institution should have bluebuilding inside the prints that identify Y doors, windows, hatches, tunnels, and all locking devices. The type of construction and strength of walls, doors, etc., must be known in advance. 1 method-of-entry options for opening or removing by ■ Identification of the force. Each entry point 5 must be planned in advance. All possible entry methods should be documented, including key rings, cutting tools, torches, 2 saws, and explosives. ■ Assignment of primary 1 entry teams. Tactical teams must work together and practice the techniques before attempting forced entry in an actual situaT tion. Incident-specific plans can then be developed based on known variS breach and forced entry plans. ables in the preexisting All staff members must understand the institution’s policy on use of force. Managers plan the resolution phase during active management of a crisis in accordance with a use of force continuum. A use of force (particularly deadly force) policy is based on the reasonable response from staff to actions by the inmate. A sequence of escalating steps lead to the top of a continuum. At each level the policy should define clearly what response from staff is acceptable in response to actions initiated by an inmate or group. Response by staff must meet the threat level presented. The response and the policy are governed by law. Active 28624_PT5_459_500.qxd 11/26/07 11:51 AM Page 475 © Jones & Bartlett Learning, LLC. NOT FOR RESALE OR DISTRIBUTION Emergency Management management of a crisis in a correctional setting does not include rules of engagement—a military term that permits a more flexible strategy of response. The response to each emergency is always governed by preexisting use of force policy that remains consistent, and legally and morally acceptable, regardless of the nature of the crisis or incident. Prediction Prediction is the phase of emergency preparedness that precedes the implementation of a well-planned emergency response. This phase will develop the methods to identify the possibility of an emergency, the probable type of incident, and the best response. The prediction phase requires T daily communication of risk factors identified within the prison population. Emergencies can often be preU dicted if disturbance factors can be identified and evaluated properly. Prison administrators should develop a riskRanalysis mechanism designed to predict the degree of possibility for an emergency. N This risk analysis should include intelligence information, an assessment of inmate grievances and comE plaints, and a review of any possible common ground issues (factors that affect the entire inmate population) discovered. TheseRissues may include: ■ Medical care , ■ Food service and preparation ■ Disciplinary programs T ■ Inmate work assignments ■ Safety A ■ Sanitation M ■ Grievance procedures Prevention M Y Prevention is the phase of emergency preparedness 1 that enables the prison administrator and the staff to maintain or restore 5 safe, humane, and professional conditions of confinement of the inmate population. This phase, like predic2 tion, requires constant monitoring and communication among staff. Prevention includes appropriate programs for inmates and 1 effective safety, security, and sanitation programs. The most important factorTin prevention is consistent enforcement of rules, policies, and directives. In almost every prison in the United S States, establishing a daily routine and communicating expectations must be a priority. Communication of any changes to the inmate routine reduces the risk factors and serves as a means of prevention. The bottom line is that prevention requires complete reporting of disturbance risk factors and responding with actions that mitigate these factors. New and Additional Emergency Preparedness Elements With the likelihood of intense scrutiny both during and after any prison disturbance, utilization of all available outside resources will be required. Additionally, | 475 28624_PT5_459_500.qxd 11/26/07 11:51 AM Page 476 © Jones & Bartlett Learning, LLC. NOT FOR RESALE OR DISTRIBUTION 476 | PRISON AND JAIL ADMINISTRATION: PRACTICE AND THEORY managing a disturbance or emergency within a prison requires planning and execution of strategies that are familiar to other law enforcement and emergency response agencies. Continuity of Operations Plan A continuity of operations plan (COOP) is designed to ensure continuing facility operations of personnel and technical infrastructure. Terms of the plan should be tailored to meet the requirements of the National Incident Management System (discussed below). The COOP is a concept that requires evolution of traditional response into protection of electronic and communication, water, power, and sewer systems, along with designations of key personnel who would assume direction of various operations in worst-case scenarios. COOP plans are broken down into three T section may contain as many as 12 subsections of spemain topical sections. Each cific required activities and U coordination. These plans are designed to cover a wide range of potential incidents. R the Florida Division of Emergency Management inAn example taken from N cludes the following areas: 1. Contact information E (state, county, and agency and facility name)—All primary response personnel and alternates should be listed with primary R and secondary contact information. , 2. Policy and administration—Objectives, responsibilities, planning assumptions, plan execution, and post-incident review and remedial actions should beTdocumented. 3. Essential elements A criteria—This includes procedures; clearly defined mission; essential functions; delegations of authority; orders of succesM sion; alternate facilities; interoperable communications; vital records and data bases; logistics and administration; security, physical, and operaM tional coordination Y of personnel; and testing, training, and implementation of emergency plans.1 National Incident1Management System The National Incident Management System (NIMS) was established by the Secretary 5 of Homeland Security to standardize emergency responses from differing jurisdictions and disciplines.2 The theory behind NIMS is to enable responders to work 1 effectively when responding to natural disasters and together more quickly and other large scale emergencies. NIMS focuses on a unified approach to incident T management, command structures, and emphasizes mutual aid agreements among S agencies. While it may be difficult to view a local prison disturbance in the same light as a disturbance that occurs on a national scale, the concept of NIMS does translate to local jurisdictional mutual aid agreements as detailed earlier. The national plan incorporates best practices (lessons learned) from incident managers at the federal, state, and local levels as well as in the private sector. All emergency preparedness planning and training should incorporate the elements of the NIMS into local plans. Just as the prison administrator wants to eliminate common ground issues from the inmate population, law enforcement, through NIMS, attempts to lay a common ground framework for all potential emergency responders. 28624_PT5_459_500.qxd 11/26/07 11:51 AM Page 477 © Jones & Bartlett Learning, LLC. NOT FOR RESALE OR DISTRIBUTION Emergency Management National Response Plan The National Response Plan (NRP), developed by the Department of Homeland Security, is a comprehensive approach to emergency management that goes hand in hand with COOP and NIMS planning. It establishes protocols for state and local jurisdictions and the private sector to coordinate responses with the federal government. The goals of the National Response Plan are: 1. To save lives and protect the health and safety of the public, responders, and recovery workers 2. To ensure security of the homeland 3. To prevent an imminent incident, including acts of terrorism, from occurring T and key resources 4. To protect and restore critical infrastructure U to resolve the incident, ap5. To conduct law enforcement investigations prehend the perpetrators, and collect and R preserve evidence for prosecution and/or attribution N 6. To protect property and mitigate damages and impacts to individuals, E communities, and the environment R businesses, governments, 7. To facilitate recovery of individuals, families, 2 and the environment , The NRP establishes goals from an emergency response point of view and provides insight to prison administrators in preparing local plans. T A Dealing with the AftermathM M prison administrator’s toughAfter a crisis situation is contained and resolved, the est challenge may just be beginning. In all majorYcrises in a correctional setting, returning the institution to a normal, pre-event status is a unique challenge for administrators. Administrators must have a plan to deal with inmates and their needs. Just as important, they will need a plan to1deal with staff and their needs. Feelings of guilt, disbelief, and failure are common 5 among staff following a major prison incident. Support functions for both 2 staff and the inmate population will be critical in returning the facility to normal operations. Staff from both the 1 chaplain’s department and the psychology department should play an important role in dealing with and resolving deep-seated feelings among staff and inmates. T Support and counseling for everyone involved must be available and be a part of S the institution’s emergency preparedness planning and response. Conclusion Emergency preparedness plans require utilization of all available resources to ensure an effective and practical system of response that can also be implemented in concert with outside resources. The use of NIMS, COOP, and a review of the NRP will result in a better and more realistic emergency plan. However, planning for emergencies in a prison setting still requires the use of traditional first responders. | 477 28624_PT5_459_500.qxd 11/26/07 11:51 AM Page 478 © Jones & Bartlett Learning, LLC. NOT FOR RESALE OR DISTRIBUTION 478 DISCUSSION QUESTIONS Discussion Questions 1. Do you support use of deadly force for resolution of disturbances? 2. Does the cost of preparation and training affect active emergency management and crisis resolution? 3. Have prisons and jails been affected by domestic and international terrorism? 4. What are the differences in emergency planning in today’s world compared to the planning done prior to September 11, 2001? 5. What role do Homeland Security and the National Response Plan play in local planning? T U NOTES Notes R N 1. County Coordination Checklist—Continuity of Operations, Division E of Emergency Management, Department of Community Affairs, “County Coordination Checklist for Agency COOP Plans in accordance with R Chapter No. 2002-43: Relating to Disaster Preparedness—Amends , Division of Emergency Management (2004), available 252.365,” Florida at http://www.floridadisaster.org/documents/COOP/CountyCoordination Checklist.pdf, accessed September 23, 2007. T 2. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, available at A http://www.dhs.gov/xprepresp/committees/editorial_0566.shtm, accessed M September 23, 2007. M Y 1 5 2 1 T S 28624_PT5_459_500.qxd 11/26/07 11:51 AM Page 489 © Jones & Bartlett Learning, LLC. NOT FOR RESALE OR DISTRIBUTION Use of Force 45 T U R N E Describe circumstances in which an officerRmay use force in a correctional setting. , Marie L. Griffin and John R. Hepburn ■ ■ ■ Discuss critical elements of an agency’s use of force policy. Identify relevant constitutional amendments and how they have been applied to cases involving the use of force.T A M M Correctional institutions are extremely coercive organizations in which all acY tivities are carried out in an environment of uncertainty. In both jails and prisons, where staff are usually unarmed and always outnumbered by the population of resistant prisoners, the ability of staff to control1the prisoners is a matter of major importance. 5 power; that is, prisoners acFor the most part, staff rely on their legitimate 2 instructions related to incept that staff have the authority to give reasonable mates’ daily activities.1 Of all the types of power, 1 legitimate power ensures compliance by the largest number of prisoners, over the widest scope of prisT and effort involved in those oner activities, and over the greatest amount of time S when it is always available activities. In contrast, coercive power is most effective but seldom used. In prisons and jails, coercive power is an ever-present resource that can be mobilized to provide the force necessary to support legitimate power. Lethal force is a rarely used type of coercive power that represents the extreme end of the continuum of force. Lethal weapons are issued routinely only to those who guard the perimeter of an institution. Few, if any, officers working within the population are armed with lethal weapons unless they are responding to an internal disturbance. Nonlethal force is used much more often than 489 28624_PT5_459_500.qxd 11/26/07 11:51 AM Page 490 © Jones & Bartlett Learning, LLC. NOT FOR RESALE OR DISTRIBUTION 490 | PRISON AND JAIL ADMINISTRATION: PRACTICE AND THEORY lethal force; officers routinely rely on direct physical contact with prisoners to maintain control and security. For the most part, this use of force involves only some form of hands-on contact with the prisoners. However, such nonlethal weapons as stun devices and chemical sprays are becoming more prevalent within jails and prisons.2 Incidence of the Use of Force It is generally agreed that deadly force is rarely used and that nonlethal force is frequently used, but there are few studies that provide data about how often the different types of force are used. Each institution keeps its own records of the use of force incidents that T occur, but totaling these incidents across institutions or making comparisons between institutions is difficult, if not impossible. Institution U policies have different definitions of force, different requirements about when incidents involving forceRshould be reported, and different specifications about the type and completeness N of such reports. In 1993, the American Correctional Association (ACA) conducted a naE tional survey of the use of force in 325 prison facilities, representing 49 state R the Federal Bureau of Prisons. This survey showed correctional systems and that in the 12 preceding,months, the number of incidents ranged from 0 (in 17 facilities) to more than 200 (in 8 facilities, with one facility with 652 incidents). Most facilities fell between these extremes, however, reporting between 7 and T reported a mean of 70 and median of 34 incidents.3 90 incidents. Overall, facilities In prisons, the incidence A of the use of force is greater within larger facilities and within maximum security facilities. In contrast, force may be used more frequently M in jails, especially in the intake units that receive arrestees who are intoxicated, angry, or frightened. A studyMof use of force incidents in the Maricopa County, Arizona jail system found 2995 reported use of force incidents (used or threatened) over a Y two-year period.4 Over half of these incidents (1808) occurred in the intake facility, while the remaining 1187 incidents occurred in the remaining six jail facilities. Lethal force is most1likely to be used against escaping inmates and to control group disturbances,5whereas nonlethal force is most likely to be used when officers become involved in inmate-on-inmate fights or when an inmate refuses 2 5 Most incidents of nonlethal force are spontaneous, to comply with lawful orders. use only hands-on force,1occur in housing units, and involve only one inmate. Although lethal force is T designed to have deadly consequences, nonlethal force rarely results in injuries to either officer or inmate. Most inmate injuries and nearly S all officer injuries from nonlethal force are minor abrasions or scrapes. Use and Effectiveness of Nonlethal Weapons Studies by the ACA and the Institute for Law and Justice reach similar findings with regard to the availability of nonlethal weapons in correctional facilities. These reports indicate that: 28624_PT5_459_500.qxd 11/26/07 11:51 AM Page 491 © Jones & Bartlett Learning, LLC. NOT FOR RESALE OR DISTRIBUTION Use of Force Nonlethal weapons are present in most facilities, although prisons are more likely than jails to have such weapons. ■ Chemical irritants and batons (or some type of impact weapon) were available for use in nearly all the prisons studied, but in only about half of the jails. ■ Less-than-lethal projectile guns were available in nearly half the prisons and less than 20 percent of the jails, and a stun device was available in approximately one third of both the prisons and the jails.6 Not all officers are routinely equipped with these weapons, however. Instead, these weapons are more likely to be stored in a central arsenal or distributed only to certain, perhaps supervisory, staff. As a result, many jails and prisons report that the weapons were not used during the preceding year. Even in those facilities in which these weapons had been used at Tleast once during the past year, only the chemical irritants were used an average of 10 or more times. U When surveyed about the effectiveness of nonlethal weapons, prison and jail administrators considered all the followingRnonlethal options to be effective, rated in order of effectiveness: less-than-lethal N projectile gun, chemical irritants (such as oleoresin capsicum—pepper spray), stun devices, batons, and E other nonlethal weapons.7 After overcoming initial resistance by jail personR integral tools for officers’ nel, stun devices and pepper spray quickly became responses to altercations with inmates. One study , noted that the mere display or threat of a nonlethal weapon often was enough to control inmates and terminate an altercation. As such, pepper spray use was found to be infrequent T was involved with more than and more likely to be used when only one officer one inmate, especially when controlling inmate-to-inmate altercations. Stun A devices and pepper spray were likely to totally incapacitate noncompliant inM mates, and their level of effectiveness was consistently high regardless of genM encountered.8 Research has der or size of inmate or the degree of resistance demonstrated that nonlethal weapons are effective Y in gaining control over noncompliant inmates except when used against inmates with a mental or substance impairment. ■ 1 5 Officer Attitudes Toward the2 Use of Force 1 correctional officers’ attitudes Unlike the policing literature, few studies examine officers with increased toward the use of force.9 Studies have found that detention T levels of punitive and custodial orientation, greater satisfaction with the quality S fear of victimization, and of supervision, or more concerns about role conflict, personal authority reported an increased readiness to use force.10 It is important to note, however, that readiness to use force on the part of correctional officers is neither necessarily punitive nor indicative of the potential for misuse of force. A competent corrections officer is required to maintain a certain level of readiness to use force. Both correctional training and policy emphasize that officers should be prepared to use legitimate force to gain the compliance of or maintain control over inmates. | 491 28624_PT5_459_500.qxd 11/26/07 11:51 AM Page 492 © Jones & Bartlett Learning, LLC. NOT FOR RESALE OR DISTRIBUTION 492 | PRISON AND JAIL ADMINISTRATION: PRACTICE AND THEORY Civil Liability of Lethal Force Different standards are used to judge the civil liability of the use of lethal force by police and correctional officers. For police, the appropriate use of lethal force is judged in terms of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibitions against unreasonable seizure. The standard is defined by the Supreme Court’s decision in Tennessee v. Garner (1985), which specifies that deadly force is only appropriate to seize a fleeing suspect when, under the totality of the circumstances, “the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.”11 In contrast, civil liability for correctional officers is defined in terms of the Eighth Amendment, which provides that “Excessive bail shall not be required, T nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” Although nor excessive fines imposed U the cruel and unusual punishment clause is an explicit “intention to limit the power of those entrustedRwith the criminal law function of government,” it protects against only those actions that are “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.”12 N officers have more latitude than police officers in As a result, correctional the use of force. First, the Ecourts begin with the (often false) assumption that all escaping prisoners are dangerous, so evidence of a threat is not required to jusR tify the use of lethal force. Second, warning shots and shooting to maim cannot , be justified by current standards that govern police, but can be justified, and may even be preferred by the courts, in correctional settings. Warning shots may be more safely usedTwhen prisons are separated from the neighboring populace by open fields. If the situation permits less-than-deadly force, then deadly A force should not be used—disabling force is always preferred to deadly force.13 Finally, the courts have M established that only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment as forbidden by M the Eighth Amendment.14 In Whitley v. Albers, a case involving an officer who Y shot an inmate during a disturbance, the Supreme Court concluded that “whether the particular measure undertaken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering ultimately turns on whether force was applied in a good faith effort to 1 maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very pur5 pose of causing harm.”15 2 Civil Liability of Nonlethal Force 1 Correctional officers may T use force lawfully within a correctional institution in defense of self or others or to enforce prisoner rules and regulations, prevent a S prevent escape. In all cases, the degree of force used crime from occurring, or must be shown to have been reasonable under the totality of the circumstances known at that time. A successful claim of excessive force must demonstrate that, either intentionally or through gross negligence or recklessness, officers used excessive force that inflicted bodily harm under circumstances when officers knew (or should have known) that it was an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.16 Force applied in a good faith effort to maintain discipline is not excessive; a successful plaintiff must prove that the force was applied maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. 28624_PT5_459_500.qxd 11/26/07 11:51 AM Page 493 © Jones & Bartlett Learning, LLC. NOT FOR RESALE OR DISTRIBUTION Use of Force Litigation typically occurs under one of four conditions:17 1. Those cases that assert that an officer reacted improperly to an inmate, either by overreacting to a resistant inmate or by using or threatening to use force against a nonresistant inmate; the use, or continued use, of a nonlethal weapon is examined in terms of the officer’s reasonable belief that such force was necessary. 2. Negligent use of nonlethal weapons contrary to the manufacturer’s recommendations; this implies carelessness, not wanton harm, and is judged against the standards of use expected of any trained officer. 3. Failure to provide timely medical aid to an inmate who has been injured. In Estelle v. Gamble, the Court ruled that there must be a deliberate indifference to the inmate’s medical needsTand not simply an inadvertent failure to provide medical care.18 Indifference implies culpability whenU that medical aid was needed. ever a reasonable person would have known Further, the deliberate indifference must R result in substantial harm to the inmate.19 N 4. Legal liability for any misuse of a nonlethal weapon may extend to suE pervisors or administrators. Supervisors may be liable whenever it can R at the scene to prevent an be established that they (1) failed to intervene officer’s excessive use of force, (2) assigned , an officer to a duty or issued to the officer a weapon that he or she was not trained to use, or (3) failed to investigate or discipline an officer who was known to have misused nonlethal weapons. Administrators whoTfail to provide training or to establish clear policies regarding the proper A and appropriate uses of lethal and nonlethal weapons also may be liable.20 Policies and Training M M Y Both the National Sheriffs Association and the National Association of Chiefs of Police have recommended a few basic actions that 1 agencies can take to reduce their legal liability for excessive force claims. Miller 5 offers a similar, but more detailed, set of recommendations.21 Further, model policies have been drafted 2 of Law Enforcement Agencies. by the ACA and the Commission on Accreditation At a minimum, each agency should have a written 1 use of force policy, use of force training, and systematic institutional review of all incidents in which force T is used. S Use of Force Policy One recommendation is to create, and then to periodically review, written policies regarding the appropriate application of force. The use of force policy should clarify the levels of force that are appropriate for various situations that arise, always calling for the use of the minimum force needed. In many cases, the levels of force are portrayed as a continuum, with higher levels of force being used in response to a higher threat or level of resistance from inmates. These policies also should include reporting requirements, review procedures, and a statement of | 493 28624_PT5_459_500.qxd 11/26/07 11:51 AM Page 494 © Jones & Bartlett Learning, LLC. NOT FOR RESALE OR DISTRIBUTION 494 | PRISON AND JAIL ADMINISTRATION: PRACTICE AND THEORY disciplinary actions that may result from the excessive use of force. Finally, the policy must include a clear statement pertaining to medical aid and medical review following the use of force. If nonlethal weapons are available, the policy should indicate which weapons are authorized for use, which officers are authorized to carry or use such weapons, and when and how officers will be trained to use such weapons. The policy also should: ■ Include a statement that locates the weapons on the continuum of force (e.g., is a chemical spray less severe than, more severe than, or the same severity as the use of hands-on contact with an inmate?) ■ Give specific directions or limitations for their use (e.g., stun devices may not be applied to the head or the genitals and batons are not to be applied to the head or theTneck) ■ Define any situations in which, or persons (e.g., pregnant women, older U persons, or persons who are mentally ill) against whom, nonlethal weapons are not to be usedR The use of lethal weapons N also must be included in any use of force policy. These policies are likely to be tailored to the individual needs of each correctional E facility. The Federal Bureau of Prisons, for instance, stipulates that deadly force R may be used to prevent escapes from secure facilities or to stop an inmate whose actions present imminent danger to others. Moreover, firearms generally are not , to be used in a minimum security institution; they may be used to prevent an escape from a minimum security institution only when specifically authorized by T a warden.22 In addition, deadly force A policies should clarify expectations with regard to such related matters as the use of warning shots and shooting to maim, as both Msome jurisdictions and prohibited by others. Indeed, practices are preferred by M other states have policies that explicitly state that Nebraska, Texas, and some disciplinary actions mayYbe taken against officers who fail to use deadly force to prevent an escape. Use of Force Training 1 Agencies should provide5 all officers with entry-level and in-service training in the use of force. Training should include a review of all institutional policies per2 as well as some general guidelines about the officer’s taining to the use of force 1 force. Training should include technical information civil liability when using and physical training regarding the proper use for each authorized force techT nique or weapon, whether handholds, physical restraints, or such nonlethal S and chemical irritants. Trainees also should receive weapons as stun devices basic information about rendering temporary medical assistance to those who may be harmed by the use of force, especially by chemical irritants. Finally, the training should acquaint officers with a large number and variety of situations through role-playing activities that require them to exercise discretion along the entire use of force continuum. It is important to train for deescalation of force and to emphasize that verbal communication skills are the preferred means of inmate control.23 28624_PT5_459_500.qxd 11/26/07 11:51 AM Page 495 © Jones & Bartlett Learning, LLC. NOT FOR RESALE OR DISTRIBUTION Use of Force Systematic Institutional Review Agencies should develop and maintain a process by which all instances of the use of force are systematically recorded and reviewed.24 All incidents of any physical contact with an inmate, regardless of whether they result in an injury, should be recorded and reviewed, as should all incidents in which an inmate is threatened with a lethal or nonlethal weapon. Systematic and formal review will help to identify problem areas and problem inmates within the institution and officers who may need further training or formal sanction. Unacceptable behaviors by officers or supervisors must be addressed and, if appropriate, sanctioned according to a set of written disciplinary guidelines. T U Use of force policies, practices, and training vary Rwidely across correctional institutions.25 There is no single standard or model that fits all institutions. For that N matter, there is no consensus about what is defined as use of force or what is an E data on use of force inciappropriate response to a given situation. Systematic dents are almost nonexistent. The state of current R knowledge about the use of force in corrections is best illustrated by the fact that these simple questions re, main unanswered: Utility and Costs 1. How often, and in what contexts, is lethal (or nonlethal) force used T annually? 2. What types of inmates and officers areA involved, and what situational factors are present, in use of force incidents? M 3. How many inmates and staff are injured annually as a result of lethal and M nonlethal force incidents, and what is the extent of their injuries? Despite the fact that the use of force is a common Y and expected occurrence in correctional settings, little is known about its utility and its costs. The question of utility revolves around the1issue of what type or level of force is most useful in maintaining safety and control. Today, the focus is on the 5 utility of nonlethal weapons in corrections. The Science and Technology Division of the National Institute of Justice supports many efforts to examine the useful2 ness of chemical irritants, electronic stun devices, 1 intense pulsating lights, sticky foam, capture nets, projectile launchers, stun grenades, and other less-thanlethal weapons in prisons and jails. The limited T data available suggest that nonlethal weapons can be used effectively in corrections, S but more research is needed to discern which weapons are effective and which weapons are ineffective (or worse, counterproductive) for specific situations or settings.26 The following questions still need to be addressed: 1. Should such nonlethal weapons as chemical irritants and handheld stun devices be issued to all officers? 2. Will the presence or threat of a nonlethal weapon calm or exacerbate the situation? | 495 28624_PT5_459_500.qxd 11/26/07 11:51 AM Page 496 © Jones & Bartlett Learning, LLC. NOT FOR RESALE OR DISTRIBUTION 496 | PRISON AND JAIL ADMINISTRATION: PRACTICE AND THEORY 3. Will the use of a nonlethal weapon be more effective than conventional hands-on force in gaining control over the inmate and in reducing injuries to the inmate and officer involved in the incident? The use of force involves many potential costs. One is the direct financial cost associated with injuries that occur to inmates or officers in the application of force. For inmates, these direct costs comprise the medical treatment received; for officers, these costs include medical treatment, workers’ compensation claims, and lost work days. Indirect financial costs to the institution accrue in the form of the time and dollars spent to process inmate grievances, to respond to civil lawsuits alleging excessive force, and to address governmental (e.g., U.S. Department of Justice) and nongovernmental (e.g., Amnesty International) investigations into the misuse of force. The use of force alsoThas emotional costs for those who use force, especially deadly force. Law enforcement agencies routinely require some level of counselU ing following shooting incidents. How (if at all) does the use of force, especially R officers lead to feelings of guilt, remorse, or despair deadly force, by correctional N of work and interpersonal relationships with famthat affect an officer’s quality ily and friends? Unfortunately, these questions remain largely unanswered. E R Conclusion , Available data on the incidence of the use of lethal and nonlethal force in corT a wide disparity within and among federal, state, rectional institutions suggest and local jurisdictions. A It is generally agreed, however, that lethal force is restricted to use against escaping inmates and in response to group disturbances, M while nonlethal force generally is applied to individual inmates as a means of M most commonly used in prisons and jails are chemcontrol. Nonlethal weapons ical irritants and batons.YLess-than-lethal projectile guns and stun devices are available in about one third of all correctional institutions and, together with chemical irritants, are generally considered to be most effective in controlling 1 inmate behavior. Issues of civil liability5revolve around both lethal and nonlethal force. Although given more latitude than2the police in resorting to lethal force, correctional officers are held to the cruel and unusual punishment prohibition contained in the 1 U.S. Constitution as interpreted by several federal Eighth Amendment to the courts. Appropriate nonlethal T force must generally meet the tests of reasonableness, non-negligence, timely medical aid for injuries resulting from the use of S force, provisions for adequate training, and the existence of clear policies regarding the use of force. To avoid liability for claims of excessive force, agencies should have a written policy on the use of lethal and nonlethal force. Such a policy should establish a continuum of force available to correctional officers and associate the levels of force with the levels of inmate resistance or threat. Training in the use of handson techniques for control of inmates, as well as lethal and nonlethal weapons, should be mandatory and updated regularly. A process of supervisory review is also helpful. 28624_PT5_459_500.qxd 11/26/07 11:51 AM Page 497 © Jones & Bartlett Learning, LLC. NOT FOR RESALE OR DISTRIBUTION Use of Force Issues surrounding the utility and costs of the use of force by correctional officers remain largely unresolved. The level of force and type of weapon best suited to a particular incident remain the subject of continuing debate. Injuries to both inmates and correctional officers and the economic impact of medical treatment, processing inmate grievances, and civil lawsuits should be seen as real costs likely to be incurred when even reasonable, nonexcessive force is used. T U R N E R , T A M M Y 1 5 2 1 T S | 497 28624_PT5_459_500.qxd 11/26/07 11:52 AM Page 498 © Jones & Bartlett Learning, LLC. NOT FOR RESALE OR DISTRIBUTION 498 DISCUSSION QUESTIONS Discussion Questions 1. What costs are associated with the misuse of force by correctional officers? 2. How does the court assess allegations of misuse of force by a correctional officer? 3. What are the relative advantages and disadvantages of alternative, nonlethal weapons in a correctional setting? 4. In what instances may correctional officers use force lawfully within a correctional institution? 5. How might officer attitudes toward the work environment influence their readiness to use force against an inmate? T U ADDITIONAL RESOURCES Additional Resources R N R. Johnson, Hard Time: Understanding and Reforming the Prison, 3rd ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2002). E J. Marquart, “Prison Guards and the Use of Physical Coercion as a Mechanism of R Prisoner Control,” Criminology 24 (1986), pp. 174–188. P. Zimbardo, The Stanford, Prison Experiment: A Simulation Study of the Psychology of Imprisonment Conducted at Stanford University, available at http://www .prisonexp.org T A M NOTES Notes M 1. J. Hepburn, “The Exercise of Power in Coercive Organizations: A Study Y Criminology 23, no. 1 (1985), pp. 145–164. of Prison Guards,” 2. C. Hemmens, J. Maahs, and T. Pratt, “Use of Force in American Jails: A Survey of Current 1 Policies.” American Jails, January/February (2000), pp. 47–52; P. Henry, J. Senese, and G. Ingley, “Use of Force in America’s 5 Prisons: An Overview of Current Research,” Corrections Today 56 (1994), pp. 108–114. 2 3. P. Henry, J. Sense, 1 and G. Ingley, “Use of Force in America’s Prisons: An Overview of Current T Research,” Corrections Today 56, no. 4 (1994), pp. 108–114. S 4. J. Hepburn, M. Griffin, and M. Petrocelli, Safety and Control in a County Jail: Nonlethal Weapons and the Use of Force. A report submitted to Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, National Sheriffs’ Association, and the National Institute of Justice (September 1997). 5. J. Senese, Summary Report: Institutional Use of Force Reports. A paper presented at the American Correctional Association Open Symposium on Use of Force (Orlando, FL, 1994), pp. 6–7. 28624_PT5_459_500.qxd 11/26/07 11:52 AM Page 499 © Jones & Bartlett Learning, LLC. NOT FOR RESALE OR DISTRIBUTION 499 6. Institute for Law and Justice, Less Than Lethal Force Technologies in Law Enforcement and Correctional Agencies (National Institute of Justice, Alexandria, VA: National Institute of Justice,1993), pp. 3–12. 7. J. Onnen, Oleoresin Capsicum: Executive Brief (Alexandria, VA: International Association of Police Chiefs, 1993). 8. Hepburn et al., Safety and Control in a County Jail: Nonlethal Weapons and the Use of Force. 9. M. Griffin, The Use of Force by Detention Officers (New York: LFB Scholarly Publishing, 2001). 10. M. Griffin, “The Influence of Organizational Climate on Detention Officers’ Readiness to Use Force in a County Jail,” Criminal Justice Review 24, no. 1 (1999), pp. 1–26; M. Griffin, “The T Influence of Professional Orientation on Detention Officers’ Attitudes Toward the Use of Force,” U Criminal Justice and Behavior 29, no. 3 (2002), pp. 250–277. R 11. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). N 12. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 98 (1976). 13. J. Walker, “Police and Correctional Use of E Force: Legal and Policy Standards and Implications,” Crime and Delinquency R 42 (1996), pp. 144–156. 14. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991). , 15. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986). 16. McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780, 9th Cir. (1986). T 17. Institute for Law and Justice, Less Than Lethal Force Technologies in Law Enforcement and Correctional Agencies. A M 18. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 98 (1976). M 19. May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164 (CA9 1980). 20. D. Daane and J. Hendricks, “Liability for Y Failure To Adequately Train,” Police Chief 58, no. 11 (1991), pp. 26–29. 21. N. Miller, “Less-Than-Lethal Force Weaponry: Law Enforcement and 1 Correctional Agency Civil Law Liability for the Use of Excessive Force,” Creighton Law Review 28, no. 3 (1995),5pp. 733–794. 22. Federal Bureau of Prisons, Program Statement 2 558.12 Firearms and Badges, (Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Prisons, 1996), p. 6. 1 23. J. Nicoletti, “Training for De-Escalation of Force,” Police Chief 57, no. 7 T (1990), pp. 37–39. S 24. D. Lyons, “Preventive Measures Cut Physical Force Suits,” Corrections Today 52 (1990), pp. 216–224. 25. Hemmens et al., “Use of Force in American Jails: A Survey of Current Policies.” 26. Institute for Law and Justice, Less Than Lethal Force Technologies in Law Enforcement and Correctional Agencies; Hepburn et al., Safety and Control in a County Jail: Nonlethal Weapons and the Use of Force. 28624_PT5_459_500.qxd 11/26/07 11:52 AM Page 500 © Jones & Bartlett Learning, LLC. NOT FOR RESALE OR DISTRIBUTION T U R N E R , T A M M Y 1 5 2 1 T S
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