EMCH 550 University of Florida Nuclear Safeguard Self Assessment

User Generated

N1994

Engineering

EMCH 550

University of Florida

EMCH

Description

1Score your response submitted for this Assignment according to the Self-Assessment Key

provided here (next page).

a. With a red ink pen line through items in the Self-Assessment Key that are missing,

incomplete, or incorrectly stated.

b. Mark up and annotate with a red ink pen your printed submission for this Assignment

according to the assignment key.

c. Write your name on the Self-Assessment Key that you mark up.

2. Total the points for the assignment and write it on the Self-Assessment Key at the bottom and

sign.

3. Prepare a short narrative (less than a page, double spaced) summarizing your assessment of your

submitted Assignment. Describe the strengths and weaknesses and how you plan to improve

your response in future assignments and grow through this process.

Unformatted Attachment Preview

Assignment 4, Key for Self-Assessment IAEA Safeguards System: Goals/purpose: 1 Verify correct and complete declaration 1 Verify compliance with safeguards obligations 1 Timely detection of diversion 1 Material accountancy; material unaccounted for through material accountancy IAEA Safeguards System: Activities/functions of the system: 1 Collect/evaluate info from the state 1 Develop safeguards approaches 1 Plan, conduct, evaluate safeguards activities 1 Draw safeguard conclusions Types of Inspections: 1 Initial – verify construction in accordance with DIQ Ad hoc – verify initial report of nuclear material (quantity, composition, enrichment); 1 changes in initial report Routine inspections-regular basis established in agreement; verify report vs. records; 1 verify location, quantity, composition material under safeguards 1 Special inspections- outside ad hoc or routine inspections; check on rumors 1 Unannounced inspections-short notice, prevent non-compliance at known facilities Inspector activities: Before: Analyze evaluate state provided info such as material accountability reports, design 1 info facility 1 Check for inconsistencies Evaluate third party or open source info publications, literature, satellite data, new 1 reports During: 1 Audit operating and accounting records, 1 Verify inventories and changes to inventory, 1 Inspect surveillance and containment, 1 NDA, collect samples DA, environmental sampling After: 1 Evaluate all info collected; provide samples to laboratories for analysis 1 Final report; determine state compliance with agreements. General Assignment Directions 1 Submit 1 file via email as instructed 1 format: font correct, double spaced 1 format: name and page number 1 citation of references in the text, list of references 1 2 additional references according to instructions 27 TOTAL Graded Points Nuclear Safeguard 1 Introduction to Nuclear Safeguard – EMCH 550 IAEA Inspection Description of the IAEA Safeguard System The IAEA is an international agency that was established to prevent nuclear weapons from spreading. The agency ensures that there is early detection of any nuclear technology misuse (Morris & Elkhamri, 2008). The agency's purpose is to provide a reliable guarantee that Nuclear Safeguard 2 all states honor the set guidelines and that nuclear material or technology is utilized for peaceful agendas. Safeguards are the technical measures that are applied by the IAEA on all nuclear activities to determine the purposes in which nuclear materials or technology is used for. States agree on the measures set to verify the use of nuclear materials/technology through acceptance to the conclusion of safeguards agreements. According to Morris & Elkhamri (2008), the international security system depends on the IAEA safeguards to ensure that nuclear technology is not misused. There are global efforts to prevent further spread of nuclear weapons whose centerpiece the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty. The treaty requires each NonNuclear Weapon State to complete a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The IAEA safeguard system is used to build confidence among states that no country is making weapons contrary to the agreement; it’s an early warning alarm if any state goes against the agreed measures and also triggers immediate responses from the international community once a state breaches the agreed measures on the use of nuclear materials or technology (IAEA Department of Safeguards, 2007). The IAEA is mandated with the setting of nuclear verification measures to be used in assessing the compliance of states to the set measures as well as inspecting nuclear sites for policy compliance purposes. The evaluation of the completeness and correctness of states declared nuclear materials and activities form the basis of safeguards. The IAEA has to verify the completeness and truthfulness of the declared information through on-site inspection, regular visits, and continued monitoring and evaluation. The IAEA safeguard system is mandated by carrying out two sets of measures according to the safeguard agreements that apply in a state. IAEA has to verify the state's reports of declared nuclear materials and activities. The measures which are authorized on the Non-Proliferation Treaty are majorly based on the Nuclear Safeguard 3 accountancy of nuclear materials which are further strengthened by containment and evaluation techniques. The other set of measures strengthens the inspection abilities of the IAEA. These measures are included in the Additional protocol. The measures not only enable the IAEA to verify the authenticity of declared nuclear materials or activities but further give assurances concerning the unavailability of undeclared nuclear activities or materials in a country. The agency is further mandated by carrying out various on-site inspections and visits. The on-site inspections ensure that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in a certain state. Again, the inspection ensures that all set guidelines have been followed effectively. Forms of Inspections within the IAEA Various forms of inspectiosn that IAEA undetakes under the safguards agreements. They include; i. Routine Inspections Being the commonly used inspection, it is undertaken based on a defined timetable, short-notice, or can be unannounced. IAEA’s rights carry out this form of inspection is limited to some areas. They include areas surrounded by a nuclear facility, or areas having the nuclear material that is predicted to flow. These areas are called strategic points. These inspections are useful in monitoring the occurrence and distribution of nuclear material with respect to time and space (International Atomic Energy Agency, n.d.). ii. Ad hoc Inspections This form of inspection aims to verify the initial report of the State about nuclear material or verifies report on the changes that might be present (International Atomic Energy Agency, n.d.). This inspection also confirms the nuclear material that plays a part in international Nuclear Safeguard 4 transfers. This form of inspection is appropriate when investigating and tracing nuclear material and its effects on the environment, which can help in controlling its spread through international transfers. iii. Special Inspections These inspections are undertaken in situations that are in line with well-defined protocols or rather procedure within a facility. A situation that can prompt the use of these inspections by IAEA is when IAEA finds and considers that available information for a state is deemed as insufficient for the agency to accomplish its roles or responsibilities as required by the safeguards agreement (International Atomic Energy Agency, n.d.). The information that the agency bases on to determining its insufficiency for these forms of inspections to be valid include report information acquired from routine inspections and State explanations. This form of inspection offers quick and sound decisions since it is carried out by IAEA experts. iv. Safeguards Visits These forms of inspections involve directly paying visits to nuclear facility sites in times deemed to necessary within a lifecycle. It is aimed at authenticating design information that is relevant in relation to nuclear safeguards. An example of a situation in which such inspection is carried out is when construction is ongoing. It can be done to investigate the wholeness of design information declared before the inspection is done. Safeguards visits can also be done where during regular operations and succeeding maintenance in a facility when decommissioning a facility, and verifying that particular equipment was judged to be inoperative. This form of inspection is more accurate than other types of inspection. Such special inspections rely on State and routine inspection reports because field expert can obtain firsthand information that can offer accurate results. Nuclear Safeguard 5 Inspector Activities Before Inspection Before inspectors inspect any field, they have to initially declare and develop facility agreement that is based on specific sites. These declaration and agreement development seek approval for routine inspections that are subsequently carried. Notifications are done for a period of at least 72hours. Meetings undertaken are tailored towards negotiations on the contents of the best approach to be used in the inspection process. NRC selection is made, and the NRC chosen communicates to a facility that it has been given the mandate to inspect IAEA’s approval. A Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) is made and completed by the operator of the selected facility. The DIQ details the physical account and the material flow to be used for the facility. Before an IAEA’s visit to the facility is made, announcements are made to the U.S Department of State. During Inspection During inspections, inspectors perform routine inspections. Inspections are carried out at declared facilities related to chemical weapons as well as those facilities used in the chemical industry. The contents of the initial declaration are verified to ensure activities coincide with CWC obligations. During inspections, inspectors also check chemicals used, their composition, any observations (visual). They are held responsible for accounting inventories declared in the initial declaration before inspections are done. By having a maximum of 9 inspectors, communication is maintained at a higher level, where notifications are made between 1 and 5 days in accordance with the type of facility used as well the management the facility. According to Bunn (2007), records are examined by IAEA. All the operator equipment and instructors’ operations have their performance checked (Heinonen, 2012). The servicing of equipment meant Nuclear Safeguard 6 for IAEA safeguards at the facility is carried out regularly. Inspectors perform an independent measurement to ensure they are at per with the IAEA’s set regulations. During the inspection, inspectors do a destructive evaluation through sampling. They take any other measures and activities that IAEA has recommended. The inspection team also audits the facility’s records of operations and accounting and compares the records alonside state’s report of accounting to those of the agency (International Atomic Energy Agency, n.d.). The team also takes environmentatl samples and apply meaures for control and suveillance and include applying seal and installing surveillance equipment. After Inspection After inspection, inspectors prepare a report of the results and an analysis of the findings for actions possible actions where possible (Spector, 2017). They also monitor the process to avoid breakout of nuclear material. Verification is done to ensure the IAEA standards are still met (Andrés, 2008). Reference Andrés, G. E. (2008). The International Atomic Energy Agency's Sfeguards System. Int. Law: Rev. Colomb. Derecho Int. Bogot, 11, 87-118. Bunn, G. (2007). Nuclear Safeguards: How Far Can Inspectors Go? IAEA. Heinonen, O. (2012). IAEA Inspections in Perspective. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Nuclear Safeguard 7 IAEA Department of Safeguards. (2007). IAEA Safeguards: Staying Ahead of the Game. Vienna: IAEA. International Atomic Energy Agency. (n.d.). IAEA Safeguards Overview _ IAEA. Retrieved June 28, 2020, from An Internationl Atomic Energy Agency Web site: https://www.iaea.org/publications/factsheets/iaea-safeguards-overview Morris, F. A., & Elkhamri, O. O. (2008). Integrating Domestic and International Safeguards in Emerging Nuclear Power States. Seattle, WA: Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. Spector, L. S. (2017). International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards: Challenge and Response. AIP Conference Proceedings . 1898, pp. 1-12. Washington, DC: AIP Publishing LLC. Put your name and page number on each and every sheet Use at least 1-inch margins all around. Type your paper double spaced using 12 pt font, Times Roman. Acceptable format is MSWord for short narrative, PDF for the scanned marked up of the assignment and key. 1. Score your response submitted for this Assignment according to the Self-Assessment Key provided here (next page). a. With a red ink pen line through items in the Self-Assessment Key that are missing, incomplete, or incorrectly stated. b. Mark up and annotate with a red ink pen your printed submission for this Assignment according to the assignment key. c. Write your name on the Self-Assessment Key that you mark up. 2. Total the points for the assignment and write it on the Self-Assessment Key at the bottom and sign. 3. Prepare a short narrative (less than a page, double spaced) summarizing your assessment of your submitted Assignment. Describe the strengths and weaknesses and how you plan to improve your response in future assignments and grow through this process. 4. Email the narrative (MSWord file) and scanned marked up assignment with the marked-up assignment key/scoring (one PDF file) as instructed above. The marked-up assignment key is page 1 of the PDF file. 5. I will review your scoring of the assignment to be sure that it is accurate and complete and make adjustments as needed. These adjustments will factor into the scoring of the Self-Assessment (i.e. a correctly scored assignment and one that properly recognizes the strengths and weaknesses will receive full credit for the Self-Assessment).
Purchase answer to see full attachment
User generated content is uploaded by users for the purposes of learning and should be used following Studypool's honor code & terms of service.

Explanation & Answer

Attached.

Nuclear Safeguard

1

Introduction to Nuclear Safeguard – EMCH 550

IAEA Inspection
Description of the IAEA Safeguard System
The IAEA is an international agency that was established to prevent nuclear weapons
from spreading. The agency ensures that there is early detection of any nuclear technology
misuse (Morris & Elkhamri, 2008). The agency's purpose is to provide a reliable guarantee that

Nuclear Safeguard

2

all states honor the set guidelines and that nuclear material or technology is utilized for peaceful
agendas. Safeguards are the technical measures that are applied by the IAEA on all nuclear
activities to determine the purposes in which nuclear materials or technology is used for. States
agree on the measures set to verify the use of nuclear materials/technology through acceptance to
the conclusion of safeguards agreements. According to Morris & Elkhamri (2008), the
international security system depends on the IAEA safeguards to ensure that nuclear technology
is not misused. There are global efforts to prevent further spread of nuclear weapons whose
centerpiece the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty. The treaty requires each NonNuclear Weapon State to complete a safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
The IAEA safeguard system is used to build confidence among states that no country is
making weapons contrary to the agreement; it’s an early warning alarm if any state goes against
the agreed measures and also triggers immediate responses from the international community
once a state breaches the agreed measures on the use of nuclear materials or technology (IAEA
Department of Safeguards, 2007). The IAEA is mandated with the setting of nuclear verification
measures to be used in assessing the compliance of states to the set measures as well as
inspecting nuclear sites for policy compliance purposes. The evaluation of the completeness and
correctness of states declared nuclear materials and activities form the basis of safeguards. The
IAEA has to verify the completeness and truthfulness of the declared information through on-site
inspection, regular visits, and continued monitoring and evaluation. The IAEA safeguard system
is mandated by carrying out two sets of measures according to the safeguard agreements that
apply in a state.
IAEA has to verify the state's reports of declared nuclear materials and activities. The
measures which are authorized on the Non-Proliferation Treaty are majorly based on the

Nuclear Safeguard

3

accountancy of nuclear materials which are further strengthened by containment and evaluation
techniques. The other set of measures strengthens the inspection abilities of the IAEA. These
measures are included in the Additional protocol. The measures not only enable the IAEA to
verify the authenticity of declared nuclear materials or activities but further give assurances
concerning the unavailability of undeclared nuclear activities or materials in a country. The
agency is further mandated by carrying out various on-site inspections and visits. The on-site
inspections ensure that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in a certain state.
Again, the inspection ensures that all set guidelines have been followed effectively.
Forms of Inspections within the IAEA
Various forms of inspectiosn that IAEA undetakes under the safguards agreements. They
include;
i.

Routine Inspections
Being the commonly used inspection, it is undertaken based on a defined timetable,

short-notice, or can be unannounced. IAEA’s rights carry out this form of inspection is limited to
some areas. They include areas surrounded by a nuclear facility, or areas having the nuclear
material that is predicted to flow. These areas are called strategic points. These inspections are
useful in monitoring the occurrence and distribution of nuclear material with respect to time and
space (International Atomic Energy Agency, n.d.).
ii.

Ad hoc Inspections
This form of inspection aims to verify the initial report of the State about nuclear

material or verifies report on the changes that might be present (International Atomic Energy
Agency, n.d.). This inspection also confirms the nuclear material that plays a part in international

Nuclear Safeguard

4

transfers. This form of inspection is appropriate when investigating and tracing nuclear material
and its effects on the environment, which can help in controlling its spread through international
transfers.
iii.

Special Inspections
These inspections are undertaken in situations that are in line with well-defined protocols

or rather procedure within a facility. A situation that can prompt the use of these inspections by
IAEA is when IAEA finds and considers that available information for a state is deemed as
insufficient for the agency to accomplish its roles or responsibilities as required by the
safeguards agreement (International Atomic Energy Agency, n.d.). The informa...


Anonymous
I was having a hard time with this subject, and this was a great help.

Studypool
4.7
Trustpilot
4.5
Sitejabber
4.4

Related Tags