D’Amore-McKim School of Business
Global Marketing Strategy and
Modes of Entry into
International Markets
Professor Ravi Sarathy
Week 5 L1
D’Amore-McKim School of Business
Modes of Entry into New Markets
Mode of entry is a strategic long-term plan
Mode of entry can evolve from indirect to direct exporting to joint
ventures and wholly owned sales subsidiaries
Considerations in choosing Mode of Entry:
Control
Risk
Return on Investment (ROI)
Resources
Complexity
Time Pressure, Timing of Entry
Global Integration
Local Responsiveness
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D’Amore-McKim School of Business
Modes of Entry
Overcoming Unfamiliarity and Distance Costs
Meeting Strategic Objectives
Firm-Specific Factors, Home and Target Market Factors
Balancing Risk, Return, Control, and Time Constraints
FDI
M&A
Strategic Alliances and Joint Ventures
Exporting
Licensing
D’Amore-McKim School of Business
Modes of Entry: Risk and Control
Foreign Investment (including
manufacturing)
Risk
Wholly Owned Sales Subsidiaries
Licensing
Joint Ventures
OEMs
Alliances
Distributors
Control
Ravi Sarathy and Northeastern University ©2015
Web-Based Sales
D’Amore-McKim School of Business
Modes of Entry: Resource Needs, Time to
Implement, and Complexity
Web-Based Sales
Licensing
Distributors
OEMs
Alliances
Web-Based
Sales
Distributors
OEMs
Licensing
Joint
Ventures
Resources
Wholly Owned
Sales Subsidiaries
Wholly Owned
Sales
Subsidiaries
Joint
Ventures
Alliances
Complexity +
Ravi Sarathy and Northeastern University ©2015
Foreign Investment
(including
manufacturing)
Time
Foreign Investment
(including
manufacturing)
D’Amore-McKim School of Business
Modes of Entry: Global Integration and
Local Responsiveness
Foreign
Investment
(including
manufacturing)
Global
Wholly
Owned Sales
Subsidiaries
Integration
WebBased
Sales
Licensing
OEMs
Alliances and
Joint
Ventures
Local Responsiveness
Ravi Sarathy and Northeastern University ©2015
Distributors
D’Amore-McKim School of Business
Market Launch Economics
Market goals, time horizon—First mover and latecomer
advantages, disadvantages
Investment requirements, breakeven, opportunity cost
Risk—political, economic, legal; for example, political stability
Customer economics: focusing on the “right” customer
Product life cycle and phased introduction into multiple
international markets
D’Amore-McKim School of Business
Modes of Entry and Return on Investment (ROI)
ROI = Returns/Investment
Returns: Net profits
Sales effectiveness
Cost levels and cost control
Measurement and Allocation (M&A) issues (Joint costs, for example,
Research and Development (R&D)
Investments
Specific investments—specific to the product and/or market
Shared investments
Present values, discount factors—risk adjustment for riskier markets?
D’Amore-McKim School of Business
Modes of Entry May Be Differentiated as …
Export-based entry
Contract-based entry
Investment-based entry
D’Amore-McKim School of Business
Export-Based Entry
Indirect entry: Original Equipment Manufacturer-based (OEM) or
through domestic customers (for example, tire companies and auto
manufacturers)
Direct agent/distributor: find, select, negotiate, and monitor
performance
Direct company branch or sales subsidiary: takes longer, more
investment, risk, personnel needs
D’Amore-McKim School of Business
Contract-Based Entry
Licensing and/or franchising
Technology transfer agreements
Build-Operate-Own-Transfer (BOT and BOOT)-style turnkey
operations
Management and service contracts
Contract manufacturing
Countertrade and barter
D’Amore-McKim School of Business
Investment-Based Entry
Foreign Direct Investment
Green-field
Acquisition of existing operations
Joint Ventures
Extent of ownership and control
Strategic alliances
D’Amore-McKim School of Business
The Risk versus Control Tradeoff
Each mode of entry balances risk of entry with the degree of control
over entry operations.
In general, more risky modes of entry provide greater control.
Riskier modes of entry should also generate higher returns, albeit on
larger initial and total investments.
D’Amore-McKim School of Business
Factors Affecting Modes of Entry
External environment of target country
Political environment
Economic environment
Market situation and prospects (primary and secondary data, field
research)
Production factors
Cultural differences, affecting consumer tastes, purchasing behavior
External environment of home country
Comparative advantage
Export controls
Internal company factors
Product specific
Corporate resources, experience with international business
Learning from past experience, mistakes, successes
Management capabilities
D’Amore-McKim School of Business
Global Marketing Strategy
1
6
D’Amore-McKim School of Business
Global Marketing Strategy
Goal setting
Balancing Global Integration and Local Responsiveness
Managing Shifts in Competitive Advantage
Assessing Performance
1
7
D’Amore-McKim School of Business
Key Aspects of Global Marketing Strategy
Which country markets to target? (Selecting, understanding, and prioritizing foreign markets)
Should the product or service be adapted to local market needs?
Picking modes of entry
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), diversification and risk reduction, Mergers and Acquisitions
(M&A)
Strategic alliances across borders
Licensing and cross-licensing
Exporting—direct and indirect
Where to manufacture? To integrate with global marketing decisions (Interfacing
with global supply chains
Organizational learning from foreign markets and competitors about customers,
technology, products, competitive positioning, forecasted changes in markets and
governments
Developing global strategy—global integration and local responsiveness
Developing and managing global R&D networks, integrating with product
development strategy
Emerging markets: Rates of growth, size of markets
Adapting to emerging markets; products, pricing, channels
1
8
D’Amore-McKim School of Business
Governments—Their Role and Influence on Global Marketing
National interests and the goals of the MNC—is there a degree of
convergence?
Regulators: tariffs, nontariff barriers, rules for entry and operation
Exchange rate regimes
Taxation and profit caps, capital flow controls;
Customers—access, consumer protection
Protectionism and Industrial Policy- subsidies for domestic
competitors, sunrise industries
Economic integration: governments joining together, increased
power—marketing strategy focused on regions rather than
individual country markets
1
9
D’Amore-McKim School of Business
Global Manufacturing and Links to Global Marketing
Manufacturing costs, productivity, impact on product costs, prices
Time to ramp-up; implications for scale manufacturing, meeting
demand
Supply chain and shipping infrastructure
Managing risk of interruption
Local factors: trade unions, language, government regulation,
affecting smooth production, product availability
Inflation, exchange rate changes; wage inflation; impact on product
costs, prices
Goal: integrated manufacturing and marketing strategy to meet
demand and deliver affordable prices
2
0
D’Amore-McKim School of Business
Ethics and Global Marketing
Serving the world’s poor, profitably
Microfinance as an example
Environmentalism and the Green Movement
Dealing with corruption and bribery
W16862
HISENSE-HITACHI JOINT VENTURE: EXPANDING IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA
Su Liu wrote this case under the supervision of Paul W. Beamish solely to provide material for class discussion. The authors do not
intend to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The authors may have disguised certain names
and other identifying information to protect confidentiality.
This publication may not be transmitted, photocopied, digitized or otherwise reproduced in any form or by any means without the
permission of the copyright holder. Reproduction of this material is not covered under authorization by any reproduction rights
organization. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, contact Ivey Publishing, Ivey Business School, Western
University, London, Ontario, Canada, N6G 0N1; (t) 519.661.3208; (e) cases@ivey.ca; www.iveycases.com.
Copyright © 2016, Richard Ivey School of Business Foundation
Version: 2017-01-23
On Saturday, April 28, 2015, the Hisense-Hitachi joint venture (JV) opened the first-ever Hisense
commercial central air-conditioner exhibition hall, where potential customers could experience Hisense’s
commercial air conditioner and learn about its manufacturing process and after-sales services. The
exhibition hall was located in Indonesia and was followed by a series of aggressive marketing campaigns
in Malaysia and Thailand. These three countries were the target markets selected by the JV after it was
once again allowed to sell its products in Southeast Asia starting in June 2014.
Before re-entering the Southeast Asian market, the Hisense-Hitachi joint venture had mainly used the
world-famous Hitachi brand to explore overseas markets. After the JV had accumulated enough capacity to
adopt a product differentiation strategy, it decided to treat the Hisense brand as the focal brand in Southeast
Asia and adopted a series of distribution strategies that differed from its approach when selling Hitachibranded products in other overseas markets. Why did the JV treat Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand as
target markets? Should the distribution mode be the same in the three neighbouring countries? Could the
previous international operating experience be replicated in Southeast Asia?
THE JV’S AUTONOMY TO EXPLORE MARKETS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
As early as 2011, Hisense had begun to track and investigate the commercial central air-conditioner market
in Southeast Asia. In 2013, Hisense sent staff to Southeast Asia and spent considerable time making
preparations because the consumer acceptance of the Hisense brand was low, and sales of its other
products were far below Hisense’s expectations for the Southeast Asian market.
The Hisense brand and many other Chinese brands had been unpopular in Southeast Asia for a long time.
In the 1990s, cheap and inferior Chinese products, ranging from motorcycles to shoes, had flooded into
Southeast Asia. Due to product defects and a lack of after-sales services, complaints from local customers
accumulated, and these inferior Chinese products eventually left a deep negative impression. Between
2005 and 2015, it was difficult to change local customers’ initial impressions despite Hisense and many
other Chinese manufacturers having made great efforts to enhance their brand reputation in this market.
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Although Japanese and South Korean manufacturers charged higher prices, they offered higher-quality
products and were considered to be more trustworthy.
From 2012 to 2014, the Hisense International Marketing Company (HIMC) assumed responsibility for the
JV’s global sales of commercial central air conditioners; however, sales did not reach Hisense’s
expectations. In response, in June 2014, the JV assumed responsibility to explore the Southeast Asian
market. Three main considerations led to this decision. First, compared with the HIMC, the JV was more
familiar with its products and was able to provide a more complete product cycle service system, a critical
factor in consumers’ purchasing decisions. Second, the HIMC, Hisense’s global sales platform, would
never focus on selling only the JV’s commercial central air conditioners, so there were questions about
whether it would adopt an effective marketing strategy for the JV’s products. Third, China and the
Southeast Asian countries belonged to the same cultural region, where residents’ consumption tastes and
preferences were similar. Therefore, there was a desire to determine whether the JV could replicate its
successful marketing strategy in the Chinese market and apply it to this new territory.
THE JV’S PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION STRATEGY
In the commercial central air-conditioner market, manufacturers were generally divided into two strategic
groups, both competing in the domestic and overseas markets at the same time. In the first group, there
were mainly Japanese, South Korean, European, and American manufacturers, famous for their superior
products and high prices, such as Daikin, Hitachi, Samsung, Mitsubishi, Toshiba, LG, York, and
Electrolux. They held more than 70 per cent of the market. The second group was composed of Chinese
manufacturers, such as Midea, Gree, Haier, and Zhigao. They mainly produced high-quality products at
medium prices, which helped them win an increasing number of orders. Their market share had been
growing quickly in recent years.
If the JV had only the Hitachi brand, it would be restricted to competing with the first group and would
lose the opportunity to compete with the second group. After having experienced a successful marketing
strategy with the Hitachi brand, the JV began considering producing Hisense-branded products for the
purpose of competing with high-quality products made by other Chinese manufacturers. The Hisensebranded and Hitachi-branded products focused on different market segments and were able to develop a
complementary relationship.
The double-brand strategy needed to go through several developmental phases. Initially the JV changed
only the logo, the packaging, and some of the product parameters in an attempt to make a simple
distinction between the Hisense and Hitachi brands. By 2013, the JV was capable of differentiating
between the two branded products in performance and parts 1 (e.g., overall framework designs,
compressors, surface materials, and motors). These products represented an advanced phase of product
differentiation and the JV’s differentiated products could better cater to customers’ needs.
TARGET BRAND AND MARKET SELECTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
“Hisense” as the Target Brand in Southeast Asia
Before exploring the Southeast Asian market, the JV sold most of its products in overseas markets under
the well-known Hitachi brand. However, the regions to which the JV was permitted to export the Hitachi
1
Hisense, accessed November 24, 2016, www.hisense.com/sycp/syzykt.
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brand were originally quite limited. If the JV used the Hisense brand, it could enter more regions. After
independently developing a new product line with the Hisense brand, the JV treated these products as its
focus in the subsequent overseas expansion.
Treating Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand as Target Markets
Southeast Asia comprised 11 countries, and the JV needed to select its target markets because of limited
resources. It first considered Hitachi’s overseas market-entry restrictions, and excluded the Philippines and
Singapore. It then investigated the other Southeast Asian countries and concluded that several countries
were unsuitable for the JV’s entry—for example, Vietnam, Cambodia, Burma, and Brunei, due to market
capacity, language, political environment, population, and culture. Ultimately, the JV decided to focus on
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand.
The JV chose Malaysia because of its language. In Malaysia, 60.4 per cent of the whole population was
Buddhist, and people mainly spoke Bahasa Malaysia, English, and Chinese (Chinese immigration made up
25 per cent of the whole population) 2 (see Exhibit 1). If the JV entered this market, the JV’s expatriates
would face a lower language barrier and could effectively communicate with their customers in Chinese or
English. Also, Hisense already had an HIMC branch in Malaysia; however, the sales performance of
Hisense’s products was unsatisfactory due to local consumers’ deep-rooted impressions of Chinese-made
products. Despite Malaysia having disadvantages, the JV still attempted to tap this market.
Indonesia had a population of 255 million and a large market capacity, and thus was the most promising
market according to the JV. Nevertheless, it could be the most difficult market to enter due to political
tensions between Indonesia and China. Furthermore, the JV faced the challenges of a huge language barrier
(Indonesian only), a high cultural distance (about 88 per cent of its population was Muslim), and
geographic diversity. 3 Although these obstacles were great, Indonesia’s market potential ultimately
motivated the JV to enter this market.
Thailand was the largest commercial central air-conditioner manufacturing base in Southeast Asia. The
country was made up of five groups of provinces, and 96.4 per cent of the country’s population was
Buddhist. Therefore, compared with Indonesia and Malaysia, Thailand was much less ethnically diverse.
Despite being a latecomer and facing fierce market competition, the JV thought that Thailand still offered
market opportunities for expansion due to the country’s steady economic growth. In addition, it was much
easier to recruit local sales representatives or technical engineers with professional experience from the
commercial central air-conditioner industry. Therefore, the JV treated Thailand as another regional target
market.
EXPANDING TO MARKETS IN MALAYSIA, INDONESIA, AND THAILAND
Firms could distribute their products through either exclusive agents or non-exclusive agents. An exclusive
agent was the only agent who could sell all of a manufacturer’s products in one region. Alternatively, a
manufacturer could allow multiple agents to sell its products in one region.
2
The data are from the Business Data Center of Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, accessed
November 24, 2016, www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/tongjiziliao.
3
Ibid.
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Malaysia
The JV initially planned to use non-exclusive agents in Malaysia. However, many local small agents did
not prefer this mode. In their opinion, if the manufacturers had no branch or factory in their local market,
these small agents worried that the manufacturers would not provide after-sales services. Local exclusive
agents, who were responsible for selling the manufacturers’ entire product range and providing after-sales
services, had engaged in this industry for more than 30 years, and had very good credit records. Although
the exclusive agents’ prices for distribution were higher than the prices offered by the manufacturers, small
agents nonetheless preferred to take products from exclusive agents. Tony Liu, the director in charge of the
JV’s Southeast Asian market, said:
The first time we visited our customer, a large agent, he asked me which kind of visa I had applied
for. I told him it was a one-year work permit. He said, “This implies that after one year I may not see
you anymore.” Why did he ask this question? Because he was very skeptical of the foreign
manufacturers’ expatriates.
The commercial central air-conditioning industry required a relatively long sales cycle. For example,
from tracking the project to winning the order usually took six to 12 months and the installation
required another several months. If the expatriate salesman could not stay long enough, what he had
promised the customer after finishing the project might not be fulfilled. One customer said: “Today
you come here, but when your work permit expires, you will go back and may no longer be
responsible for this business. Thus, it is too unsafe to do business with you.” For this reason, we did
not think that choosing the non-exclusive agent mode was a wise idea in this market.
Apart from local concerns about the JV’s expatriates, the business climates in Malaysia and China were
distinct. For example, in the Chinese market, if the JV wanted to sell a product to customers in Shanghai, it
needed only a truck. However, if it wanted to sell products to Malaysian customers, they would qualify as
exports, making the process more complicated in three specific ways.
First, the agents needed to have the ability to import and exchange currencies. Second, they needed to deal
with the process of customs declaration and clearance as well as other procedures the Malaysian
government required. Third, they needed to have product warehousing. Most agents considered it a hassle
to deal with exporting procedures or warehousing. They wanted to pay only in their own currency, receive
the required products in return, and leave the complicated procedures to exclusive agents or manufacturers
to complete. As a new market entrant, the JV was inexperienced. It worried that even though it dedicated
resources to these tasks, the effect would not be satisfactory.
Although the expatriate manager considered many exclusive agents, it was not easy for him to make a
decision. Ultimately, he selected an exclusive agent who had been influential in the commercial central airconditioner industry for more than 30 years and had a very good credit record. Because the agent was a
Chinese immigrant, he was familiar with both the Chinese and Malaysian cultures, and was able to
communicate with the JV expatriates in Chinese. Before the agent began to co-operate with the JV, he had
distributed other brands’ products for many years. To avoid conflicts, the JV required the agent to form a
new company that would focus on selling only Hisense-branded products. Moreover, the JV required him
to open a Hisense exhibition hall, and hold a press conference for more than 500 participants, including
local agents, consultants, and commercial central air-conditioner experts. The press conference was
successfully and it had proved useful. The JV received its first order in less than two months.
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Commercial central air conditioners required highly skilled and professional maintenance crews. However,
it was difficult for the exclusive agent to recruit maintenance employees from the local market. To solve
this problem, the JV provided an expatriate team composed of a sales representative, a technical support
engineer, and an installation engineer. The three expatriates had worked in the JV for more than three years
and were familiar with the business operation process. The sales representative, in particular, had been in
charge of the JV’s overseas marketing before leaving for Malaysia, and had worked in a job rotation
through every department of the JV. Due to this previous working experience, the sales representative
served an important role in facilitating communication between the JV and the exclusive agent. These
expatriates applied for a two-year work permit, and the exclusive agent felt very satisfied with their work.
The JV’s exclusive agent mode in Malaysia was similar to the approach it had adopted in Russia; however,
the two operations had significant practical differences. In Russia, the JV offered no expatriate team, but in
Malaysia the JV did. These expatriates worked together and ate lunch together with the exclusive agent’s
staff, as if they were ordinary colleagues. In reality, they belonged to two companies. Having an expatriate
team in the exclusive agent’s company could help the JV track the local product sales closely. For
example, when the exclusive agent or the local market implemented changes, the JV could quickly adjust
its strategy.
Indonesia
When entering the Indonesian market, the JV offered potential local customers who were unfamiliar with
the Hisense brand an opportunity to visit its factory in Qingdao, China. After detailed analysis, the JV
divided these local customers into three groups. In the first group were customers who eagerly wanted to
visit the factory. They already intended to co-operate, and the JV did not have to worry about their
sincerity. In the second group were customers who had not decided whether they would visit the factory.
They were key customers, and the JV needed to make great efforts to create or seize opportunities for cooperation with them. In the third group were potential customers who had no interest in visiting the factory.
If the JV invited them, they were often unwilling to go and had no intention of co-operating. If the JV
failed to create other ways of attracting these customers, it would be nearly impossible to do business with
them in the future.
As more customers visited the factory, the JV gradually found that these visits were running at high costs,
and visitors had to spend at least four or five days on such trips. To enhance the Hisense brand reputation
and develop more customers, especially in the second and third groups, the JV decided to open a
comprehensive exhibition hall, which was a synthesis of exhibition, experience, design, and maintenance
elements. In the exhibition hall, customers could experience Hisense’s commercial central air conditioner
for themselves and learn more about the manufacturing process and after-sales services. On Saturday,
April 28, 2015, the JV opened its first Hisense commercial central air-conditioner exhibition hall in
Indonesia.
In the Indonesian market, the JV was challenged by a high cultural distance and a huge language barrier. In
this situation, the JV selected an exclusive agent, who was a Chinese immigrant and proficient in both
Indonesian and Chinese. He was a former shareholder of a commercial central air-conditioner agency
company. To avoid competition in the same industry, he withdrew his shares and set up a new company for
selling only Hisense-branded products.
Besides undertaking the agency business, this exclusive agent also managed a small household airconditioner manufacturing factory. Therefore, he was competent at providing after-sales services; but it
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was difficult for him to recruit local staff to fill jobs in technical support and marketing. To address these
urgent needs, the JV provided a two-person team of expatriates: a sales manager and a technical support
engineer.
In Indonesia, most people spoke only Indonesian; few could speak Chinese or English. Although the JV’s
expatriates could communicate with the exclusive agent in Chinese, they faced a language barrier when
contacting their customers. The JV’s expatriates could not speak Indonesian, while most of the local
customers could not speak Chinese. Because of this language barrier, the JV recruited an Indonesian
Chinese sales representative who had just graduated with a master’s degree. He was proficient in
Indonesian and Chinese and could assist the JV’s sales manager in recruiting more agents beyond the
exclusive agent’s distribution channel.
When exclusive agents sold the JV’s products, they had no emotional involvement because they were
familiar with neither the JV’s history nor its culture. Therefore, if a JV’s sales representative provided the
exclusive agents with only a printed brochure, they would be less likely to distribute the JV’s products. To
solve this dilemma, the JV required newly recruited sales representatives to take a three-month intensive
job-training session in its factory before contacting customers. During training, the sales representatives ate
dinner, lived, and communicated with their colleagues in the dorm provided by the JV. These colleagues
helped them to better understand the JV’s culture and to quickly improve their professional skills. When
the sales representatives visited their customers, they could introduce their customers to what they had
experienced in the JV. Only by having a deeper understanding of the JV’s culture and products would
customers want to do business with its sales representatives in the future.
Thailand
Thailand was the largest commercial central air-conditioner manufacturing base for the whole Southeast
Asian market. Many manufacturers—such as Daikin, Mitsubishi, LG, and Panasonic—had factories there,
and competition was fierce. According to Hitachi, though its products were of high quality, it had neither a
price advantage nor a local manufacturing advantage. Having reached the conclusion that it had no
competitive advantage, Hitachi had exited this market.
The JV, however, did not agree with Hitachi’s conclusion. After investigating the Thai market, it decided
the Thai market was worthwhile to enter. The JV first registered a branch and then adopted a non-exclusive
agent mode to explore the market. In this regard, there were two main considerations. On the one hand,
because Thailand had so many manufacturers, the JV could recruit professional employees more easily
than in other Southeast Asian countries. On the other hand, an exclusive agent could not cover such a big
market, and the agents were used to taking products directly from the manufacturers.
The JV’s Thai branch, which was located in a five-star office building, recruited some expatriates to be
responsible for technical support, service, and training. To overcome the language barrier, the JV recruited
a local Chinese translator who had lived in Thailand for more than 10 years and was proficient in Chinese,
Thai, and English.
After the personnel were ready, the Thai branch director provided his agents with weekly training and
discussions about progress. The director not only helped solve problems they encountered but also
obtained new market information from these agents.
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Daikin held more than a 50 per cent of the market share in Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, and exerted
much bargaining power over its agents. Besides Daikin, the three other main manufacturers were
Mitsubishi, Panasonic, and Toshiba. Each held approximately 10 per cent of the Thai market.
Facing this market structure, the JV developed its own strategy. First, the JV focused on those distributors
that Daikin had offended and those that held negative opinions of Daikin. This strategy echoed a Chinese
idiom: “Your enemy’s enemy is your friend.” Second, the JV explored those relatively small agents who
had weak co-operative ties with Daikin or other large manufacturers. Third, it focused on identifying new
emerging opportunities to work with other manufacturers’ main agents.
Although Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand were neighbouring countries and were in some ways
culturally similar, each country’s market expansion logic differed substantially. The JV chose to develop
distribution strategies on a country-by-country basis. Was this approach the right decision?
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EXHIBIT 1: FACTORS THE HISENSE-HITACHI JOINT VENTURE CONSIDERED BEFORE ENTERING
THE MARKETS
Factors
Population (in millions)
Chinese immigrant percentage (%)
Main language(s)
Ethnic diversity
Geographic diversity
GDP growth rate (%)
Industry maturity
Political risk
Malaysia
30
25
Bahasa Malaysia,
English, Chinese
High
High
4.5
Not mature
Low
Indonesia
255
2
Indonesian
Thailand
67
14
Thai, English
High
High
4.5
Relatively mature
High
Low
Medium
3.5
Mature
Low
Note: GDP = gross domestic product
Source: Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, accessed November 24, 2016, www.mofcom.gov.cn.
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