CYB 6040 Wilmington University W3 Risk and Lethality via Delta Method Presentation

User Generated



CYB 6040

Wilmington University



Week 3 Resources


[B] Textbook: Read/ choose one chapter from Chapter 9-12 from Open Source Intelligence; pick one social network to research

Download, open in PPTX, and understand the RN Risk evaluation processes in One Attack /Defense Scenario - Armageddon.

Concentrate on slides 68-253. Be aware that there were two cases: one with a planned Nuclear strike on 3 Israel Cities with warning. It yielded a &% net Risk for the case. A second case was with a preemptive Nuclear strike against Israel without any warning, raising the Net Case Risk to 17%. This RA BTW Armageddon is one of the few scenarios with a legitimatize High Risk Threat at 75% + compared to normal Cyber which are 5% to 21% Threat Level.

Why? We killing human beings vs computers.

1) Armageddon A/D Scenario at: Link

Uses the approach that both Attack (Issue 1) and Defense (Issue 2) Risks are calculated / estimated. / The NET difference of Risks is what we look for because all the errors of estimation cancel out. The Net is also what we apply a $ figure to mitigate the residual risks.

In current $ for a Nuclear scenario it would be estimated at 100 Billion / risk point.

I have put together a Kaltura to expand on Week 3 Team Assignment:

Using Armageddon , Review / Study ( Use my Kaltura to help explain the process) the Issues, Risk Calculations and Net Risk Results for Issues 1 & 2 (Issue 1 = Attack side & Issue 2 = Defense Side). These are two separate calculations. Prepare a 20-25 slide PER ISSUE (40 -50 Slides total- minimum) Agreement or Challenge to the Risk calculations made by the PIF Teams. Support your positions using the Facts of the A/D scenario and your Experience plus the Delta Collaboration Method.

Download Armageddon PPTX at: Link

*Use the Delta Method. The Delta method is a collaboration process to combine and AVERAGE wisdom of several "experts." Each Team member gets a say and estimates their level risk for the indicated attacks and / or defenses. The Team them builds a matrix of answers (estimates)


40 slides minimum BUT up to 50+ would be be better to fully show understanding.

Teams may use a good portion of the Armageddon slides in their analysis and presentation as long as they give professional credit to the authors.

The Team Conclusions slide needs for points:

1. Calculation of the Initial Risk Assessment (IRA) in Risk %

use the full RN equation:

Risk = [Threats x Vulnerabilities x Impact] / Countermeasures (NORMAL CASE or Historical Case)

2. Calculate the Risk after the Boost to the Threat agents:

use the Reduced form of RN with Vulnerabilities & Impact dropped out as constants at state 0 with Countermeasures held Constant, so:

Risk ~ f( Threats / Countermeasures)

Issue 1 Risk = Risk at Boosted Threat - IRA = Net positive Threat Boost (WORST CASE)


Risk ~ f( Threats / Countermeasures)

Calculate the Risk after the Boost to the Countermeasures agents:

use the Reduced form of RN with Vulnerabilities & Impact dropped out as constants at state 0 with Threats held Constant, so:

Issue 2 Risk = ABS [IRA -Risk at Boosted Countermeasures ]= Net positive Countermeasures Boost (BEST CASE)

Issue 2 Risk % is always less that the Threat Boost ( Issue 1) because the Attacker ( Threat agent) always has all the advantages and the Defense (countermeasure agent) must cover much more of threat space.

Risk percentages can never be Negative.

4. Calculate the NET Case Risk = The Net Positive Risk Issue 1 - Net Positive Risk Issue 2 Each Risk % point is valued at $2MM

The Lethality Matrix is used to identify Qualitative Risk Range. See Link

Unformatted Attachment Preview

TEAM MEMBERS ➢ Marla Jones – Team Leader ➢ Chad Barshinger – Executive Officer, Team 1 ➢ Ross Hammer – Executive Officer, Team 2 ➢ Aaron Dunham – Executive Officer, Team 3 TEAM MEMBERS Team 1 ➢ Chad Barshinger – Executive Officer ➢ Hilda Chow ➢ Joshua Layaw ➢ Timothy Kiefer TEAM MEMBERS Team 2 ➢ Ross Hammer – Executive Officer ➢ Chris Jones ➢ Glen Roberts ➢ June Watt TEAM MEMBERS Team 3 ➢ Aaron Dunham – Executive Officer ➢ Bill Losier ➢ Jesse Rosen ➢ Joanee Jenkins Attack / Defense Scenario A/D Scenario Iran’s Nuclear Attack on Israel CRJ-662-Z1 For Approval: Professor Randall K. Nichols Agenda ▪ Facts ▪ Issues Issue 1 – Attack Boost Issue 2 – Defense Boost Issue 3 – Policies ▪ Rules and Regulations ▪ Conclusions ▪ References Facts Israel • Population – 7.59 million (2010) • Capital – Jerusalem • Geography – 7,850 sq. mi. ▪ Shares hostile borders Sources: Central Intelligence Agency. (2012). Middle East: Israel. Retrieved October 3, 2012, from U.S. Department of State. (2012). Background note: Israel. Retrieved October 3, 2012, from Facts ▪ Israeli prime minister Binyamin (Benjamin) Netanyahu • Elected March 2009 • Recently proposed a “red line” approach towards Iran ▪ Urged U.S. to set limits on Iran’s nuclear program before military strike is necessary • Estimates that Iran will be able to build nuclear weapon by March 2013 Sources: Central Intelligence Agency. (2012). Middle East: Israel. Retrieved October 3, 2012, from New York Times. (2012). Iran’s nuclear program (Nuclear Talks, 2012). Retrieved October 13, 2012, from Facts ▪ Reaction to Iranian nuclear program • Consists of economic sanctions against Iran ▪ Sanctions include “administrative and regulatory measures” ▪ Netanyahu stated “entire world is threatened by nuclearized Iran” Sources: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2011). Government of Israel approves sanctions against Iran. Retrieved October 3, 2012, from PBS Newshour. (2012). Israeli prime minister Netanyahu urges U.N. to halt Iran’s nuclear program. Retrieved October 3, 2012, from Facts ▪ Israel and Iran have not engaged in direct military conflict in the past ▪ There have been four Arab-Israeli wars • 1948 War of Independence • 1956 Sinai War • 1967 Six Day War • 1973 Yom Kippur War ▪ Israel successfully defended itself during each war ▪ Hamas recently fired 30 rockets towards Israeli southern border • Hezbollah sent drone into Israel as well Sources: Israel Science and Technology Directory. (2012). Arab-Israeli conflict: Basic facts. Retrieved October 3, 2012, from Associated Press. (2012). Israel strike, Hamas rockets, most serious Gaza flare-up in months. Retrieved October 13, 2012, from Facts ▪ Contemporary Israeli resentment in Iran • Iran views western culture as a threat to traditional ways of life • Western culture also threatens the ability of Iranian regime to keep power ▪ Iran views Israel as Middle Eastern agent of United States • United States represents western culture that Iranian leadership rejects Source: Ben-Israel, I. (2009). Why does Iran hate us? Retrieved October 3, 2012, from,7340,L-3738797,00.html Facts Israeli Military Overview ▪ Military Personnel • Active……………………………...187,000 • Reserves…………………………...565,000 ▪ Defense Budget………$16,000,000,000 (USD) ▪ Air Power • Aircraft……………………………….1,964 • Helicopters……………………………..689 • Airports………………………………….48 Facts ▪ Land Army • Tanks……………………………..3,230 • APCs / IFVs……………………...6,278 • Towed Artillery………………….....550 • SPGs…………………………….....706 • MLRSs……………………………..138 Facts ▪ Land Army • Mortars…………………………….750 • AT Weapons………………………..900 • AA Weapons……………………….200 • Logistical Vehicles……………….7,684 ▪ Naval Power • Navy Ships…………………………..64 • Submarines…………………………....3 • Patrol Craft…………………………..42 Facts Iran ▪ Located in Middle East • Capital – Tehran • Official religion – Shiite Islam • Ethnic majority – Persian • Official language – Persian (Farsi) Sources: U.S. Department of State, Background Notes, March 2008. Facts ▪ Population • Ethnic groups ▪ Persian 51%, ▪ Azeri 24%, ▪ Gilaki and Mazandarani 8%, Kurd 7%, Arab 3%, Lur 2%, Baloch 2%, Turkmen 2%, other 1% Sources: U.S. Department of State, Background Notes, March 2008. Facts ▪ Religions ▪ Muslim 98% • Shi’a 89% • Sunni 9% ▪ Others 2% (Zoroastrian, Jewish, Christian, Sufi, and Baha’i) Sources: U.S. Department of State, Background Notes, March 2008. Facts ▪ Languages • Persian and Persian dialects 58% • Turkic and Turkic dialects 26%, • Kurdish 9%, Luri 2%, Balochi 1%, Arabic 1%, Turkish 1%, other 2% Sources: U.S. Department of State, Background Notes, March 2008. Facts ▪ Shah Mohammed Rez Pahlavi (1950s-1970s) • Wanted Iranian nuclear power industry ▪ Capacity to produce 23,000 Megawatts of electricity ▪ Turn Iran into a powerful modern state ▪ Shah Mohammed Rez Palavi (1950s – 1970s) • Sought nuclear reactor purchase from US & Western Europe ▪ US presidents won’t approve sales without conditions • Require limitations to freedom of action to US supplied resources Facts Iranian Military Overview ▪ Military Personnel • Active……………………………..545,000 • Reserves…………………………..650,000 ▪ Defense Budget………$9,174,000,000 (USD) ▪ Air Power • Aircraft………………………..…….1,030 • Helicopters……………………..……..357 • Airports……………………….………319 Facts ▪ Land Army • Tanks…………………………….1,793 • APCs / IFVs……………………..1,560 • Towed Artillery………………….1,575 • SPGs…………………………….....865 • MLRSs……………………...…...5,000 • Mortars…………………………..5,000 • AT Weapons……………………..1,400 • AA Weapons……………………..1,701 • Logistical vehicles……………...12,000 Facts ▪ Naval Power • Ships………………………………...261 • Destroyers……………………………..3 • Submarines…………………………...19 • Frigates………………………………...5 • Patrol Craft………………………….198 • Mine Warfare Craft……………………7 • Amphibious Assault Craft……………26 Facts Bush Administration (2000 – 2008) ▪ Iran’s nuclear program controversy • Enrich uranium for civil reactors ▪ Permitted under Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) ▪ Reprocessing and enrichment critical component for nuclear weapon Facts ▪ 2004 – Stolen laptop from firm called Kimeya Madon • Contains design for a small-scale facility ▪ Uranium gas production ▪ Provide Iran secret stock enriched for fuel or for bombs Facts ▪ US Intelligence obtains same information • Drawings - Modifies Iran's ballistic missiles may accommodate a nuclear warhead • Iran received several advanced centrifuges • Iran capabilities to produce UF4, or “green salt” ▪ Conversion of uranium to a gas ▪ Large-scale enrichment plant • Material becomes usable for core of a bomb Facts ▪ Priority – end Iran’s enriched uranium production • Put forward inducements and disincentives • Commit to fully accountable civilian nuclear program • Diplomatic approach to altering Iran’s behavior Facts ▪ UN security council permanent members (P5 + 1) • US • UK • France • Russia • China • Germany Facts ▪ Proposes incentives to Iran ▪ Offer Iran trade relations ▪ Support for World Trade Organization (WTO) membership ▪ Prospect for opening diplomatic relations ▪ Support for civilian nuclear program Facts ▪ Sanctions • Impose asset freezes ▪ Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Iranian state – owned banks • Travel bans • Required international vigilance regarding arms sales Facts ▪ Launches a unique global campaign • Treasury Department – Administers sanctions program ▪ Identify parties who support or facilitate • Nuclear proliferation • Terrorism • Financing schemes ▪ Prohibits businesses and individuals from • Conducting business with identified parties • Deny access to U.S. financial and commercial systems Facts Bush Administration – Sanctions ▪ Economic sanctions and banking restrictions • Multinational companies cancel contracts with Iranian government • Multinational businesses and banks ▪ Servicing Iranian banks or supplying goods and services Facts Obama Administration (2008 – present) ▪ Policies inherited from previous administrations • Financial Sanctions • Weapons proliferation-related sanctions • Cooperative non-proliferation programs • Regional partnerships Facts ▪ Main Concerns • Nuclear Proliferation • Non-Proliferation Treaty violations • Will not guarantee nuclear program objectives ▪ Strictly for peaceful civilian purposes Facts ▪ Cooperative Defense Initiative ▪ Formed with • Saudi Arabia, Kuwait • United Arab Emirates • Bahrain, Qatar • Oman • Egypt • Jordan ▪ Security arrangements ▪ Develop military posture Facts ▪ Mechanism for cooperation on • Active or passive defense • Shared early warning systems • Consequence management • Medical countermeasures Facts ▪ Raise pressure on Iran to meet international nuclear obligations • August 2012 - expands sanctions target individuals or companies • Issue or purchase Iranian debt • Assist Iran development or transportation of Iranian oil or its petrochemicals • Foreign banks that help Iran sell its oil • Support to National Iranian Oil Company and Central Bank of Iran Facts ▪ The International Monetary Fund (IMF) • Predicts Iran's economy shrink by 0.9 percent in 2012 ▪ Iran battling to prop up their currency, the rial • International sanctions ▪ Targets Iranian oil revenues Facts ▪ Targets international banks and businesses supporters • China's Bank of Kunlun • Iraq's Elaf Islamic Bank ▪ Sanction Disadvantages • Spawns illegal enterprises, smuggling • Increases economic suffering to Iranian citizens ▪ Blame U.S. & Israel for economic woes ▪ Increase terrorist recruitment • Angry uneducated unemployed youth Facts ▪ Ekbar Etemad - Chairman of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization • U.S. attempts limits to nuclear access ▪ Criticizes U.S. efforts to limit their “freedom of action” • Control own reprocess, disposal or treatment of materials ▪ Rejects “second class citizen” treatment Facts ▪ Shah initials agreement with Carter Administration (never signed) • “Freedom of action” constraints ▪ Pay small price for nuclear reactors & good U.S. relations ▪ Continues interest working with U.S. nuclear industry Facts ▪ 1979 Islamic Revolution • Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini overthrows Shah ▪ Clerics oversee government ▪ Derails Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) • 1984 honors NPT ▪ Increases regime’s interest in nuclear deterrence Facts ▪ Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini overthrows Shah • Iran nationalism emphasizes “freedom of action” • rejects “second class citizen” status • U.S. & Western Europe apprehensive on nuclear proliferation Facts ▪ Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad • Elected in 2005, re-elected in 2009 • Abolished 2004 Paris Agreement to suspend uranium enrichment • 4-5% minority favors nuclear program ▪ Mullahs (ultraconservative clerics) ▪ Iranian War veterans ▪ Military personnel Facts ▪ Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmandinejad • Majority Iranian civilian population against nuclear program ▪ Suffering from poor economy • Heavy unemployment – 15.3% (2011) • Civil unrest - educated youths protesting Facts ▪ Mullahs • Ultraconservative clerics ▪ Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i & Ayatollah Khomeini • Nuclear weapons to annihilate “Great Satan” (U.S.) ▪ Do not tolerate evil western values • Threaten to wipe Israel off the map • Ahmadinejad + clerics = regime’s inner circle • No ethical, moral, or religious considerations ▪ 1994 – Mullahs attack Shiite’s holiest sites Facts Resurgence of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) ▪ Former commander – Mahmoud Ahmandinejad ▪ Qod Forces • Special unit within IRGC enhances terrorist activities ▪ Taken full control of Iran’s nuclear drive Facts IRGC ▪ Regime’s “Primary organ” • Sponsorship of terrorism • Execute special operations • Train terrorist organizations outside Iran Facts ▪ Cyberwarfare unit • Coordinated within Passive Defense Organization • Estimated 2,400 staff and $76M budget • Iranian Cyber Army ▪ Employs civilian hacker groups ▪ Links to the Revolutionary Guard ▪ Ashiyane hacker forum • Iranian Cyber Police Unit ▪ Police social media websites Facts ▪ Establish armed forces cybercommand • Defend against cyberattack and centralize operations • Defensive effort ▪ U.S. - Israeli Stuxnet virus attack at nuclear plant ▪ Primarily thwarting Western efforts to incite dissidence Facts ▪ Clout and Political Leverage: • Nuclear weapons allow Iranian regime to stay in power • IRGC and religious zealots (regime infrastructure) morale boost • Mullah’s new power ▪ Suppress & keep population in check ▪ Send out assassination squad to kill opponents Facts Iran’s nuclear facilities ▪ Esfahan Source: Institute for Science and International Security. (2005, January 26). Satellite Image of Esfahan. Retrieved October 3, 2012 from esfahan/Completed_Esfahan_26jan2005_GeoEye.jpg Facts ▪ Esfahan • Above ground facility • Uranium Conversion Facility ▪ Converts natural uranium to uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) • UF6 feeds centrifuge machines for enrichment at Natanz facilityHouses the Nuclear Technology and Research Center ▪ Employs close to 3000 scientists • Fortified with anti-aircraft missile systems Facts ▪ Natanz Source: Institute for Science and International Security (2008, February 6). Satellite image of Natanz. Retrieved October 3, 2012 from Facts ▪ Natanz • Underground complex ▪ Insulated with multiple concrete roofs ▪ 75’ underground • Houses primary Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) • Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) ▪ Uranium enrichment activities Facts ▪ Natanz • Centrifuge expansion ▪ Advanced centrifuge research and testing • Capacity to house approximately 50,000 centrifuges • Produces approximately 500 kilograms weapons grade uranium annually ▪ Produces approximately 20-30 nuclear weapons Facts ▪ Natanz • Growing low enriched uranium (LEU) inventory ▪ Convert into weapons grade uranium • Based critical air defense systems in proximity ▪ Russian supplied Tor-M1 missile defense system Facts ▪ Arak Source: Institute for Science and International Security. (2008, October 7). Satellite Image of Arak. Retrieved October 3, 2012 from Facts ▪ Arak • Above ground construction ▪ Completion projected – 2013 • Heavy water research reactor • Provides Pu-239 (plutonium) suitable for nuclear weapons Facts ▪ Arak • Produces about 9 kilograms of Pu-239 annually ▪ Enough to build one nuclear weapon every year • Ostensibly produces isotopes ▪ Civil use in medicine and agriculture • Protected by air defense system Facts ▪ Fordow Source: Institute for Science and International Security (2009, September). Satellite image of Fordow. Retrieved October 3, 2012 from Facts ▪ Fordow • Built inside mountain approximately 295’ deep • Fuel enrichment plant (FEP) • Built to house 3,000 IR-1 centrifuges • Manufacturing weapon grade uranium ▪ Enough for 1 bomb in 0.5 x 10 ISSUE 2 – Boost #3 Medical Defense Medicine Used Before Nuclear Attack ▪ Amifostine Drug • Protects tissue against radiation-induced injury ▪ Tempol Drug • Radiation protection against hair loss ▪ Radioprotectant drug • Protection against radiation • Must be taken before radiation exposure ISSUE 2 – Boost #3 Medical Defense Medicine Used for Injuries ▪ Empirical antimicrobial regimens • Manage fevers and neutropenic episodes • Antibiotic • Active against gram-positive bacteria ▪ Graniestron • High-dose radiological exposure ▪ Stops nausea and vomiting ▪ Ondansetron (Zofran) • High-dose radiological exposure ▪ Stops nausea and vomiting ISSUE 2 – Boost #3 Medical Defense Medicine Used for Injuries ▪ Steroid • Enhances survival after radiation exposure ▪ Antibiotic prophylaxis • High risk afebrile patients ▪ Albumin • Plasma protein ISSUE 2 – Boost #3 Medical Defense Medicine Used for Injuries ▪ Potassium iodine (KI) • Block radioactive iodine uptake by thyroid • Several hours before exposure • Shortly after exposure ▪ Ringer lactate • Used for fluid replacement ▪ Person in shock ▪ Server trauma ▪ Server burns ISSUE 2 – Boost #3 Medical Defense Medical Survival Handbook ▪ Wounds • Stop bleeding ▪ Apply dressing ▪ Apply pressure to wound ▪ Squirting blood • Apply dressing and windlass-type tourniquet • Apply pressure to wound • Loosen tourniquet pressure ▪ Every 15 minutes • Keeps flesh alive ISSUE 2 – Boost #3 Medical Defense Medical Survival Handbook ▪ Infected wounds • Don’t change dressing often ▪ White pus is good • Fights infection ▪ Glass in flesh • Don’t probe with tweezers or knife • Discharge of pus ▪ Glass comes out ISSUE 2 – Boost #3 Medical Defense Medical Survival Handbook ▪ Burns • Do not apply ▪ Grease ▪ Oil ▪ Medicine • Cover with clean dressing • Avoid changing dressing frequently ▪ Remove on 10th to 14th day • Use plenty of salted water • 1 teaspoon of salt per liter ▪ 1 to 3 liters daily ISSUE 2 – Boost #3 Medical Defense Medical Survival Handbook ▪ Shock • Keep warm ▪ Place blanket under the person ▪ Avoid using numerous blankets • Keeps sweating down • Keeps fluids in • Drink a lot of salted water ▪ Teaspoon of salt ▪ Liter of water ISSUE 2 – Boost #3 Medical Defense Medical Survival Handbook ▪ Simple Childbirth • Do not touch • Wait until birth happens • Do not tie or cut the cord ▪ Only if availability of disinfectant ▪ No disinfectant available • Wrap cord and placenta around infant ▪ Wait until dry • Mother pushes out after birth ▪ Avoid affection ISSUE 2 – Boost #3 Medical Defense Medical Survival Handbook ▪ Toothache ▪ Do not pull ▪ Decaying teeth will fall out ▪ Heat prostration • Adequate fluids • Drink some salt water ▪ Broken bones • Apply splint ▪ Keeps bone secure Risk Assessment Ryan-Nichols Reduced Risk Equation: Risk = function(Threats / Countermeasures) Risk: Potential for damage or loss of an asset Threat: Event with potential to cause loss/damage Countermeasures: Technologies put in place to mitigate threats and reduce risk Defense Risk Profile Threat ( T ) Countermeasure ( C ) Risk = f(T/C) Education 23% Iran WMD Family Action Plan 27% Iran WMD Medical Defense 25% Iran WMD Overall Risk: 25% - Low-Medium Risk Based Difference After Defense Boost Risk Assessment after Defense Boost Education 23% Family Action Plan 27% Medical Defense 25% ▪ Average Risk level of 25% - Low-Medium ▪ Net Risk = IRA – Defense RA (32 - 25 = 7) New overall risk level is 7% - Low ISSUE 2 – Option #4 Preemptive Strike What is a Preemptive Strike? ▪ A preemptive strike or (preemptive war), is an attack commenced in an attempt to repel or defeat a perceived offensive ISSUE 2 – Option #4 Preemptive Strike Israel forced to react in self-defense ▪ Goals of a Preemptive strike • Will only be initiated if Iran’s attack is imminent • “Reactive” defenses to a “Proactive” defense • To influence Iran from successfully landing a bomb • Self Defense, not an unnecessary attack ISSUE 2 – Option #4 Preemptive Strike ▪ Israel has already effectively strategized a preemptive strike • Minister Menachem Begin ordered an attack on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear program • It was code named “Operation Opera” • The destruction of Osirak has been cited as an example of a preemptive strike in contemporary scholarship on International Law ISSUE 2 – Option #4 Preemptive Strike U.S. and International effects of a Strike ▪ The United States • Possible consequences for the United States for a potential relationship with Iran • The strike might be before the November 2012 election ▪ To sway the decisions of a second term President ▪ Israeli officials don’t agree with Obama • The U.S will try and defend Israel if an attack would ensue ISSUE 2 – Option #4 Preemptive Strike U.S. and International effects of a Strike ▪ Internationally • Damage to Israel's growing political and economic relations with a) China b) Russia c) And potential acceleration of its international isolation • A successful strike would reduce significant costs of Countries spending towards Iran ▪ Increasing Israel's relationships ISSUE 2 – Option #4 Preemptive Strike Possible Preemptive strikes ▪ Nuclear weapons and Ballistic Missiles • Jericho project ▪ Israel’s Air Force • Aircraft mission capabilities ▪ Misc. Weapon attacks • The Guided Bomb Unit • Ground attacks ISSUE 2 – Option #4 Preemptive Strike Possible Preemptive strikes ▪ Jericho • A medium range ballistic missile with range capabilities of striking Iran • Can’t be used on above ground targets ▪ Examples: The facilities at Esfahan and Arak • Effectiveness is unclear because of deeper below ground facilities like Fordow • This attack would not be ideal ISSUE 2 – Option #4 Preemptive Strike Possible Preemptive strikes ▪ Misc. Weapons attack • The “Guided Bomb Unit” carries 550 lbs of high explosives • Can penetrate more than six feet of reinforced concrete • More effective against the underground targets • Can be used against the reinforced doors in Fordow • Still not a guarantee ISSUE 2 – Option #4 Preemptive Strike Possible Preemptive strikes ▪ Israel's Air force • Most likely effective form of attack • Their Air force can ▪ Detect, track, and engage via mobile ▪ Destroys Hard and deeply buried targets ▪ Operate long range, with surveillance gathering ▪ Carry out deep strike missions ▪ Israel’s Air force is considered superior to Iran's Air Force ISSUE 2 – Option #4 Preemptive Strike Attack targets ▪ Iranian Nuclear Targets • Main providers in Iran’s nuclear program: a) Estafahan - This is the nuclear research center b) Natanz - This is where Uranium is housed c) Arak - The future of their plutonium production ▪ These constructs are mainly composed of reinforced concrete and underground facilities up to 300 feet ▪ The areas range from 50,000 square feet to 700,000 square feet ISSUE 2 – Option #4 Preemptive Strike Israel’s Air Force attack Scenario ▪ Israel’s best chances are to use their Air Force • The three locations in Iran will be their targets ▪ The following will be needed in the mission • Either aircraft F-15E or F-16 • Air to air weapons/Air to ground weapons • Ballistic Missile Defenses BMD • Aircraft system capabilities (their radars) • Man power of at least 300 of their finest pilots • Enough fuel = 5,000 gallons • Weather must be clear and at night ISSUE 2 – Option #4 Preemptive Strike Israel’s Air Force attack Scenario ▪ Three F-15E planes will be used (one for each location) ▪ Departure is 2:00 am estimated arrival 3:15 am ▪ The Israeli planes will go under detection of Syrian detection ▪ Technology will play a huge role in not being detected ▪ Northern route of Syrian through Turkish boarders at an altitude of about 30,000 feet ISSUE 2 – Option #4 Preemptive Strike Israel’s Air Force attack Scenario ▪ Arrived at the Iranian boarder • Decrease flying altitude • Release weapons (do not fire until instructed) • Make sure targets are non responsive • Fire when ready ISSUE 2 – Option #4 Preemptive Strike Was it effective? ▪ Damage needs to present no recovery for up to 2 years • This financially shuts down the nuclear program • Deaths will be in the thousands • Radiation exposure would effect even more ▪ Planes were able to refuel and return to Israel ▪ Iran’s nuclear threat has been eliminated ISSUE 2 – Option #4 Preemptive Strike Israel Strike Repercussions ▪ Iran’s response • Iran will respond with an attack against Israel • There could be a Diplomatic response but highly unlikely • The military attacks would be on Israeli territories • Medium ranged missiles would reach Israel so this would be their weapon of choice ISSUE 2 – Option #4 Preemptive Strike Israel Strike Repercussions ▪ Regional responses • There would be escaladed tension • Iran would use these neighboring countries as a tool for retaliation • Hezbollah has about 50,000 Iranian Missiles • Iran has less control in negotiating allies with Palestine ▪ Increase threat of asymmetric attacks against American interests such as Qatar and Bahrain ISSUE 2 – Option #4 Preemptive Strike Israel Strike Repercussions ▪ The U.S. • America would be perceived as having assisted Israel • This would collapse the stability the U.S. had aimed at stabilizing in the Middle east • Arab states would have a reason to halt United State’s mission for weapons of mass destruction ISSUE 2 – Option #4 Preemptive Strike Israel’s preparations for a response ▪ Prepare for a military strike against their people ▪ Inform the public once the task has been completed ▪ Political negotiations should be given the highest priority ▪ Peace agreements would deprive Iran of any political context in which to counter attack Israel Preemptive Strike Risk Assessment Threat (T) Countermeasure (C) Risk Iran’s Nuclear Strike Preemptive Strike 15% - Low-Med Defense Strike Risk = 15% - Low-Medium Risk Assessment after Preemptive Strike Risk Assessment after Defender Response Preemptive Strike (15%) Risk level of 15% - Low-Medium Net Risk = IRA – Defender Response RA (32-15=17) New overall risk level is 17% - Low-Medium Defense Risk Profile Threat ( T ) Countermeasure ( C ) Risk = f(T/C) WMD Mitigation Plans 25% WMD Preemptive Strike 15% Overall Risk: 40% - Medium Risk Based Difference Defense Boost/Response Risk Assessment after Defense Boost Defender Response Mitigation Plans (25%) Pre-emptive Strike(15%) Total Average Risk level of 40% - Medium Net Risk = Defense RA – IRA (40-32 = 8) New overall risk level is 8% - Low ISSUE 3 – Policies What policies are indicated for Israel because of the Nuclear Bomb Threat from Iran? Israeli Policies ▪ Increase civilian infrastructure • Safe Rooms ▪ 30% of population have safe rooms in their home or apartment complex • Bomb Shelters ▪ 25% of population does not have access to shelters Israeli Policies ▪ Increase civilian infrastructure • Reinforce building structures to decrease deaths by falling structures ▪ Reinforced windows ▪ Reinforced stone • Designate additional public bomb shelters ▪ Tel Aviv - 60 underground parking garages designated Israeli Policies ▪ Hire additional emergency response forces • Haifa – 500 city workers trained and equipped for emergency response ▪ Hire, train, equip medical staff for mass casualty scenario • Triage • Transport Israeli Policies ▪ Early warning systems • IDF Warning System ▪ Sends SMS text to cell phones in target area • Four languages: English, Hebrew, Arabic, Russian ▪ Air Raid Sirens ▪ Development of anti-missile batteries • Iron Dome ▪ Useful against short range missiles and rockets ▪ 10 mobile batteries ▪ Determines flight path of incoming threats and deploys counter rocket Israeli Policies ▪ Development of anti-missile batteries • Arrow 2 Theater Ballistic Defense System ▪ Located outside Haifa and Tel Aviv ▪ Passive infrared for the tracking tactical ballistic missiles ▪ Active radar seeker used to home on air breathing targets at low altitudes U.S. Policies U.S. National Cybersecurity ▪ Responsible Federal Departments • Department of Homeland Security • Federal Bureau of Investigation • Department of Defense ▪ New US Cyber Command (National Security Agency - one of components) ▪Offensive operations • Cyber Command • Elements of the Central Intelligence Agency U.S. Policies U.S. National Cybersecurity ▪ Department of Homeland Security responsible for domestic defense • National Cyber Security Division work with public, private, and international entities to secure cyberspace and America’s cyber interest ▪ Programs to protect cyber infrastructure from attack U.S. Policies U.S. National Cybersecurity – Homeland Security • National Cyber Response Coordination Group ▪ Comprised of 13 federal agencies ▪ Nationally significant cyber incident • Coordinates federal response U.S. Policies U.S. National Cybersecurity ▪ Cyber Command Responsibilities • Increases resource coordination • Increases protection of their branch networks • Active defense – proactive hunting in and outside networks • Provide, operate, and defend [U.S.] networks through offensive operations U.S. Policies Law enforcement officials ▪ Iran could have capability to retaliate inside U.S. • Trigger - Israeli action against Iran ▪ Intelligence from Israeli sources, U.S. officials, and outside analysts • Steps up patrols ▪ Jewish sites in some major U.S. urban areas ▪ Israeli government sites (embassies and consulates) ▪ Jewish religious and cultural sites (synagogues, schools, community centers) U.N. Policies ▪ Resolution 1696 • July 31, 2006, the Security Council voted 14-1 • IAEA nuclear demands ▪ Iran has until August31, 2006 to fulfill • Requirement ▪ Iran suspend uranium enrichment U.N. Policies ▪ Resolution 1737 • December 23, 2006 • Impose sanctions against Iran ▪ Lack of compliance • Bans trade with Iran ▪ Items aiding uranium enrichment • Provides list of names ▪ Frozen assets for non-compliance U.N. Policies ▪ Resolution 1747 • March 24, 2007 • Bans Iranian importing and exporting of weapons • Freezes assets of 28 persons and entities ▪ Resolution 1835 ▪ September 27, 2008 ▪ Reaffirms previous resolution and their sanctions U.N. Policies ▪ Resolution 1803 • March 3, 2008 • Extends sanctions against Iran • Restricts Iranian importing ▪ dual use technology used for uranium enrichment ▪ Resolution 1929 • June 9, 2010 • Reinforces prior sanctions • Reduce and prevent transfer of weapons to Iran Rules & Regulations Bush Administration ▪ Executive Order 13224 signed September 23, 2001 • “Disrupt the financial support network for terrorists and terrorist organizations” • “Authorize US government to designate and block the assets ▪ Foreign individuals ▪ Businesses ▪ Organizations that commit, or pose a significant risk to commit, or support terrorist activities” Rules & Regulations ▪ 2007 – IRGC Qod Forces add • Material support of Hezbollah, Taliban in Afghanistan, and Shi’i militants ▪ Executive Order 13382 signed June28, 2005 • Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferators and Their Supporters ▪ Authorizes State and Treasury Depts. To identify parties (businesses and individuals) supporting WMD proliferation ▪ Treasury Dept. administers sanctions program Rules & Regulations : ▪ Iran Freedom Support Act signed September 30, 2006 • Penalizes persons or firms aiding Iran’s WMD and weapons program ▪ Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 2003 • Voluntary program • Inhibit global trafficking of WMD, delivery systems and related materials Rules & Regulations Obama Administration ▪ Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 2009 • Supports PSI activities • Builds PSI into a “durable international institution” • Relies on “Broken Tail-light scenario” ▪ Explore all potential options to interdict transporting of WMD and related items Rules & Regulations ▪ June 2010 – HR 2194 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA) • Strengthens existing U.S. sanctions against Iran ▪ Refined petroleum sales ▪ Serious human rights abuses ▪ Iran’s access to the international financial system Rules & Regulations ▪April 2011 – Executive Order 13572 Blocking Property of Certain Persons With Respect to Human Rights Abuses in Syria • The IRGC-Qods Force added to list ▪ Supporting the Syrian regime ▪ Human rights abuses ▪ Suppression of anti-government protests Rules & Regulations ▪ November 20, 2011 - Executive Order 13590 Authorizing the Imposition of Certain Sanctions with Respect to the Provision of Goods, Services, Technology, or Support for Iran’s Energy and Petrochemical Sectors • Hinders Iran’s Oil and Gas Sector • Add difficulty for Iran to operate, maintain, and modernize its oil and gas sector • First time targeting Iran’s petrochemical sector • Expanding energy sanctions Rules & Regulations ▪ December 2011 - FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) ▪ Contains new sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran • Undermine Iran’s ability to sell its oil internationally Rules & Regulations ▪ February 5, 2012 - Executive Order 13599 Blocking Property of the Government of Iran and Iranian Financial Institutions • Block Iran’s Access to the International Financial Market ▪ Limit Iran’s access to international financial institutions for nuclear weapons program ▪ Block within US jurisdiction • All Iranian government assets • All Iranian financial institutions Rules & Regulations ▪ April 22, 2012 - Executive Order 13606 Blocking the Property and Suspending Entry Into the United States of Certain Persons With Respect to Grave Human Rights Abuses by the Governments of Iran and Syria via Information Technology • Combats Human Rights Abuses Using 21st Century Tools • Target human rights abuse by Iranian and Syrian regimes Rules & Regulations Obama Administration – EO 13606 ▪ Authorized sanctions and visa bans against those who commit or facilitate grave human rights abuses via information technology ▪ Targets companies provide technology for oppression ▪ “Digital guns for hire” creating or operating systems • Monitor, track, target citizens for killing, torture, or other grave abuses Rules & Regulations Obama Administration ▪ May 1, 2012 - Executive Order 13608 Prohibiting Certain Transactions With and Suspending Entry Into the United States of Foreign Sanctions Evaders With Respect to Iran and Syria • Punish Sanctions Evasion ▪ Ensure sanctions to continue tangible impact on Iran ▪ Sanctions against those engage in activities to evade U.S. sanctions Rules & Regulations ▪ July 30, 2012 - Executive Order16622 Authorizing Additional Sanctions With Respect to Iran • Expands upon sanctions of section 1245 of the FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) ▪ Knowingly conducting or facilitating significant transactions for the purchase or acquisition of Iranian oil ▪ Deter Iran or any other country from establishing payment mechanisms for purchase of Iranian oil to circumvent the NDAA sanctions Conclusions Risk Assessment after the attack Net Risk I1=(I1 Boost) – (IRA) 85-32= 53 Net Risk = 53% - Medium Risk Assessment after defense boost Net Risk I2= (I2 Boost/response) – (IRA) 40-32= 8 Net Risk = 8% - Low Risk to Israel for the Iran threat I1 (net) = ABS (53%-8%) Net= 45% - Medium A minimum of $45,000,000 would need to be added to the defense budget to reduce the threat further References ▪ Abrams, H. L. (1984, August 3). Medical Resource After Nuclear War. Retrieved October 4, 2012, from ▪ (2012). Iron Dome Air Defense Missile System, Israel. Retrieved from ▪ (2012). Iron Dome Air Defense Missile System, Israel. Retrieved from ▪ Associated Press. (March 1, 2012). Israel unveils sophisticated bomb shelters in Tel Aviv. Retrieved from http:// ▪ Ben Zion, I. (August 20, 2012). Haifa drafts plans for national emergency. Retrieved from ▪ Berger, R. (March 1, 2012). Tel Aviv readies bomb shelter amid Iran tensions. Retrieved from ▪ Blomfield, A. (September 19, 2012). Israel stages largest snap exercise in years. Retrieved from References ▪ Clark, L. (August 14, 2012). Israel tests geo-targeted SMS missile warning system. Retrieved from ▪ Central Office of Information . (1976). Protect and Survive. UDO Litho Ltd. ▪ Congressional Research Service. Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities. March 28, 20120. CRS Report for Congress. ▪ Congressional Research Service 7-5700, Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities. September 28, 2012. Retrieved September 30, 2012 from ▪ Connor, S. (2011, May 19). WHAT TO DO IF A NUCLEAR DISASTER IS IMMINENT! Retrieved October 4, 2012, from KI4U: ▪ Cordsman, A.H. & Wilner, A. (July 16, 2012). Iran and the gulf military balance – II. Retrieved from ▪ Cronin, P.M. (August 12, 2012). Can U.S. Help Gulf Shield Itself Against Iran? Retrieved from ▪ Couch, D. (2003). The United States Armed Forces Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Survival Manual. New York, NY: Basic Books . References ▪ Dick Couch, C. U. (n.a). Nuclear Agents and Their Effect. In The United States Armed Forces Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Survival Manual (pp. 124-141). n.a: A Member of The Perseus Books Group. ▪ Emanuelson, J. (2009). Getting Prepared for an Electromagnetic Pulse Attack or Severe Solar Storm. Retrieved October 3, 2012, from Futurescience: ▪ Eshel, D. (2009). Iran Nearly Completes Construction of Nuclear Reactor at Arak. Retrieved October 2, 2012 from ▪ Fact Sheet: Sanctions Related to Iran. (2012). The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. Retrieved October 12, 2012 from ▪ Federal Emergency Management Agency. (1985, June ). Protection in the Nuclear Age . Washington DC: US Government Printing Office. ▪ Fleet Cyber Command. (2010, January 29). Navy Stands Up Fleet Cyber Command, Reestablishes U.S. 10th Fleet. America’s Navy. Retrieved October 14, 2012 from References ▪ Fordow Uranium Enrichment Faciilty (n.d.). The Institute for Science and International Security. Retrieved October 2, 2012 from ▪ GlobalFirePower. (2011, June). Retrieved from ▪ GlobalFirePower. (2011, June). Retrieved from ▪ Harel, A. (August 5, 2012). Israel upgrades anti-ballistic defense system, amid recent Iran and Syria drills. Retrieved from http:// /diplomacy-defense/israel-upgrades-anti-ballistic-defense-system-amid-recentiran-and-syria-drills-1.456073Institute for Science and International Security. (2005, January 26). Satellite image of Esfahan. October 3, 2012 from 005_GeoEye.jpg ▪ Institute for Science and International Security (2008, February 6). Satellite image of Natanz. Retrieved October 3, 2012 from References ▪ Institute for Science and International Security. (2008, October 7). Satellite image of Arak. Retrieved October 3, 2012 from ed_copy.jpg ▪ Institute for Science and International Security (2009, September). Satellite image of Fordow. Retrieved October 3, 2012 from ▪ Iran: Country Profile (2012) Nuclear Threat Institiute. Retrieved October 2, 2012 from ▪ Institute for Science and International Security. (2008, October 7). Satellite image of Arak. Retrieved October 3, 2012 from ed_copy.jpg ▪ Institute for Science and International Security (2009, September). Satellite image of Fordow. Retrieved October 3, 2012 from References ▪ Iran: Country Profile (2012) Nuclear Threat Institiute. Retrieved October 2, 2012 from ▪ Institute for Science and International Security. (2005, January 26). Satellite image of Esfahan. October 3, 2012 from 05_GeoEye.jpg ▪ Institute for Science and International Security (2008, February 6). Satellite image of Natanz. Retrieved October 3, 2012 ▪ Iran Demographics Profile 2012, (2012) Index Mundi . Retrieved September 30, 2012 from ▪ Israel Aerospace Industries. (2002). EL/M-2080 “Green Pine” Radar System. Retrived from http:// ▪ Israel Map: ▪ Israel's water system. (n.d.). Retrieved from ▪ Jafarzadeh, A. (n.d.). The Iran Threat, President Ahamdinejad and the Coming Nuclear Crisis. Palgrave, Macmillan. References ▪ Jewish virtual library. (2012, January). Retrieved from ▪ Kagan, F.W. & Zarif, M. (2012) America’s Iranian Self-Deception. American Enterprise Institute. Retrieved October 1, 2012 from ▪ Katz, Y. (September 12, 2011). Security and Defense: Preparing for nuclear terror. Retrieved from ▪ Kearny, C. (1999). Nuclear War Survial Skills. Retrieved October 7, 2012, from KI4U: ▪ Qods (Jerusalem) Force/Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC - Pasdaran-e Inqilab). (1998 Federation of American Scientists; Intelligence Resource Program. Retrieved September 30, 2012 from, J.A. & Timlin, K. (2011). Cybersecuirty and Cyberwarfare 2011. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. Retrieved October 14, 2012 from ▪ Linzer, D. (2006, February 8). Strong Leads and Dead Ends in Nuclear Case Against Iran. The Washington Post. Retrieved October 12, 2012 References ▪ Lopez, C.T. (2010, June 2). Cyber command to unite network defense efforts .Washington Army News Service. Retrieved October 14, 2012 from ▪ McMichael, W.H. (2010, May, 21). DoD Cyber Command is officially online. Air Force Times. Retrieved October 14, 2012 from ▪ Medical Response to a Radiologic/Nuclear Event: Integrated Plan From the Office of the Assistant Secretart for Preparedness and Response, Department of Health and Human Services. (2009). Retrieved October 4, 2012, from Center for Biosecurity of UPMC: ▪ Mitnick, J. (March 13, 2012). Missile Defenses Offering Israel Calm in ConFlict. Retrieved from .html References ▪ National Emergency Management Authority. (2012). About the National Emergency Management Authority. Retrieved from ▪ NIH Strategic Plan and Research Agenda for Medical Countermeasures Against Radiological and Nuclear Threats. (2005). Retrieved October 5, 2012, from National Institution of Health: ▪ Nuclear Detonation Response Communications Working Group. (2010, September 1). Nuclear Detonation Preparedness: Communicating in the Aftermath. Retrieved from National Library of Medicine: ▪ Nuclear Fallout Maps: ▪ Nuclear Threat Initiative. (2011). “Country Profiles – Iran”. Retrieved from References ▪ Operation Opera. Retrieved (2012) from ▪ Obama Announces New Iran sanctions. (2012). Aljazeera. Retrieved October 12, 2012 from ▪ Obama Signs Order Implementing New Iran Sanctions. (2012). Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. Retrieved October 12, 2012 from ▪ Penketh, A. (2005, October 27). Iran. Retrieved from ▪ Phillips, A. , The Effects of a Nuclear Bomb on a American City. Retrieved from ml ▪ Reuel, Marc. (2012, Jul 26) Should Israel Bomb Iran? Better Safe than sorry. The weekly Standard. Foundation for defense of Democracies. ▪ Rozdilsky, J.L. (2012). Emergency Management in Israel: Context and Characteristics. Retrieved from References ▪ Sacred Destinations. (2012, October 8). Retrieved from ▪ Staff Writers. (September 25, 2012). Israel postpones vital Arrow-3 flight test. Retrieved from /Israel_postpones_vital_Arrow-3_flight_test_999.html ▪ Sublette, Carrie (1997). Effects of Nuclear Explosions Retrieved from ▪ Teibel, A. (August 5, 2012). Israel Arrow Missile Defense System Upgraded. Retrieved from ▪ The George W. Bush Administration. (n.d.) United States Institute of Peace. Retrieved October 12, 2012 from Wilson ▪ The Unemployment Rate – Iran (2012). The World Fact Book (Publication) Central Intelligence Agency Retrieved October 1, 2012 from ▪ Triposo. (2012, October 8). Retrieved from References ▪ US Department of Health and Human Services. (2011, December 28). Nuclear Detonation: Weapons, Improvised Nuclear Devices. Retrieved from National Library of Medicine: ▪ Wellerstein, A. (2012). Nukemap. Retrieved from ▪ Wilson, J.R. ( 2012, January 5). MARFORCYBER: Marines Fight in a ...
Purchase answer to see full attachment
User generated content is uploaded by users for the purposes of learning and should be used following Studypool's honor code & terms of service.

Explanation & Answer


Department Of Homeland Security
Office Of Infrastructure Protection
Chemical Sector


• Threat: Flooding.
• Most chemical plants are located near the coastal cities of United States.
• Coastal cities are mostly hit by flood in the US.

• Estimated level of threat: 25% Low-Medium.

Vulnerability: Destruction of Chemic...

This is great! Exactly what I wanted.


Related Tags