A Glorious Failure: The State of Franklin and American Independence Author(s): Jason Farr Source: Tennessee Historical Quarterly , WINTER 2011, Vol. 70, No. 4 (WINTER 2011), pp. 276-287 Published by: Tennessee Historical Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/42628218 REFERENCES Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article: http://www.jstor.com/stable/42628218?seq=1&cid=pdfreference#references_tab_contents You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms Tennessee Historical Society is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Tennessee Historical Quarterly This content downloaded from 141.225.112.53 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 04:34:28 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms The conditional process leading these com- pendence left trans-Appala- munities to believe it was in their best interest The chian pendence realitychiancommunities communities in a ofuniqueleft American trans-Appala- in a unique inde- to be included, rather than excluded, from the situation. They had the option of creating new American union reveals a final chapter jurisdictions within existing states, forming in the traditional narrative of the American new states within the union, or creating independence. Securing and sustaining their own sovereign republics. It was never American independence demanded coopera- assumed that these areas would join what tion among the states and the creation of a became the United States.1 From 1784 to strong federal union. Incorporating western 1789, some people in what is now eastern communities into this union was an early test Tennessee exercised all of their options of America's legitimacy. A successful American Revolution was not in the form of a self-declared jurisdiction known as the State of Franklin. Franklin's guaranteed by military victory in 1783. The leadership petitioned for statehood after coastal colonies separated from metropolitan North Carolina ceded their land in 1784. Britain in hopes of restoring the English con- When their petition was denied, Franklin stitutional liberties that Parliament and the reached out to the state of Georgia and king had seemed to usurp since 1763. The considered an alliance with Spain. Articles of Confederation proved an over- « Franklin's leaders were most interested correction of the centralized authority that in stability so they could secure land claims so frightened provincial Americans.4 Under and gain commercial access to the Mississippi the Articles, states could not collectively River.2 By 1789 the movement had collapsed, enact effective diplomacy or commerce; nor but they and many others in the chaotic west could they avert what Douglas Bradburn has calculated that securing political and com- described as the "centrifugal tendency toward mercial prosperity could be better achieved disunion," which was particularly strong in by aligning with the new federal experiment.3 the west.5 Faced with the problem of incor- This content downloaded from 141.225.112.53 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 04:34:28 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms From 1784-1789, people in now eastern Tennessee attempted to form the new State of Franklin. After rejection from North Carolina, they considered the option of an alliance with Spain. (Detail from "Map of Cumberland and Franklin," The Annals of Tennessee, 1 853) porating western land, the new United States century, but particularly since Parliament had to confront the challenges of establishing attempted to restrict settlement through the a republican union. Proclamation of 1763. 6 Still, restrictions on Conflicts over jurisdictional sovereignty colonial expansion and the perpetual threat and land claims had plagued the south- of regional Indians could not obstruct the ern frontier throughout the eighteenth lure of land ownership that enticed pro- This content downloaded from 141.225.112.53 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 04:34:28 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms vincial Americans to settle beyond the these proved unavailable that evidence of west- Appalachians. Settling land may only have ern separatism becomes particularly notable. required a willingness to endure the requi- When the North Carolina Assembly ceded its site challenges, but legitimizing those setde- western lands to Congress in 1784, many liv- ments was more complicated. Successful ing in the region felt obligated to establish their commerce was a critical factor in sustaining own government. Aprecedentfor jurisdictional settlement in areas that were geographically independence had already been established by isolated from major market centers. With leading men from the Holston and Watauga the mountains creating a natural obstacle settlements when they drafted articles of inde- to eastern markets, Mississippi River access pendent association in 1772. The Wataugans became essential for frontier participation in thought they were in Virginia before realiz- both domestic and Atlantic commerce. ing they were settled on land claimed under As with all other southwestern settle- ii cc ÜJ H G£ < D a j Lord Granville's North Carolina grant. Either ments, Franklinites imagined Mississippi way, they recognized the need to establish a River access as a way to attract settlers and legitimate governing body. With the help of legitimize their jurisdictional claims.7 Franklin Richard Henderson, the Wataugans negotiat- benefited from the jurisdictional ambiguity of ed a ten-year lease with Cherokees through the the trans-Appalachian west, in which North 1775 Sycamore Shoals Treaty, which also gave and South Carolina, Georgia, Indians, and Henderson control of a vast amount of land in Spain made overlapping claims. Spain never Kentucky and Middle Tennessee where he set embraced the provisions of the 1783 Treaty up his Transylvania Colony.10 of Paris that set their boundary with the Wataugans may have had legitimate < u United States at the banks of the Mississippi claims for occupying their settlements, but River and the 31st Parallel. Spanish officials in the Sycamore Shoals Treaty did not solve the E Louisiana recognized the possibility of allying problem of issuing legitimate land grants or o their interests with those of western setders tides. And for that matter, Henderson's efforts (ļ who wanted clear tides to their land. Before were quickly repudiated by both Virginia and X the creation of the Southwest Territory in North Carolina. North Carolina's creation of U1 1790, there were multiple land offices oper- Washington County in 1777 offered a tem- ating in the southwest, which often resulted porary solution by establishing a land office in conflicting and overlapping tides.8 in 1778 under the leadership of Colonel H U1 U) Ui z z Western separatists, like those in the State John Carter and his son Landon Carter." of Franklin, were responding to the inability Land offices were subsequently opened and of states to provide legitimate legal and politi- claims recorded in Greene and Sullivan coun- hl cal authority.9 Independence to procure and ties, with grants given by North Carolina. X H secure property required the institutional sup- Overlapping land grants made legitimizing port of governing institutions. It was when land claims difficult. 111 H 278 This content downloaded from 141.225.112.53 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 04:34:28 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms By 1780, some Watauga and Holston the sectional division between the Overhill settlers had moved west to the site of pres- towns and eastern setdements, and carefully ent day Nashville and established the selected which Cherokee diplomats would Cumberland Compact, a set of rules under be invited, making sure to exclude the most which the community would operate until powerful chiefs such as Old Tassel, Dragging a stronger jurisdictional control could be Canoe, and Hanging Maw.14 These treaties established by stronger authorities. In 1782, were largely symbolic, considering the long North Carolina established a "Military presence of Anglo-Americans essentially tres- Reservation" in the Cumberland River val- passing in their setdement of western land.15 ley, where tracts of land were awarded to The Dumplin Creek Treaty of 1785 Revolutionary War veterans. At the same seemed to give Franklin a degree of legiti- time, the North Carolina Assembly offered macy in the eyes of some squatters and "certificates of preemption," which served as potential settlers, to whom they could now legitimate ways for earlier settlers to obtain offer legitimate land titles. But the North land grants.12 Creating the military district at Carolina Assembly and the Confederation Cumberland resulted in North Carolina clos- Congress never recognized the Dumplin ing western land offices, although for a brief Creek and Coyatee treaties, nor did they period (from October 1783 to May 1784) recognize the State of Franklin, with whom the state did open their entire western terri- the treaties were negotiated. Within a year, tory to anyone capable of paying the admin- United States diplomats negotiated a series istrative costs and fee of ten pounds per 100 of three treaties with Cherokees (November acres. Subsequendy known as the "great land 1785), Choctaws (January 3, 1786), and grab," this action, as well as the preemption Chickasaws (January 10, 1786). Collectively certificates, angered many settlers remaining known as the Hopewell Treaty, these nego- in the Holston and Watauga region. They tiations established the western bound- felt as if their demands for legitimate land ary of southern Indian lands, and reserved grants were being undermined. exclusive trade rights for the United States.16 It was in this confusing milieu that The existence of two separate treaties, one the State of Franklin was born. In addi- with the State of Franklin, and one with the tion to establishing a jurisdictional pres- United States, made jurisdictional legitima- ence for tax revenue and regional stability, cy an even greater concern for the aspiring Franklinites secured land claims through a western elites within the State of Franklin.17 series of treaties negotiated with a small fac- Securing political legitimacy and com- tion of Overhill Cherokee. The so-called mercial prosperity for communities west of Dumplin Creek Treaty ceded land south of the Appalachian Mountains required more the Tennessee and French Broad rivers to the than a few speculators consolidating their inchoate state.13 The Franklinites understood wealth in a fledgling "state." Ultimately, the to H > H m O ■n ■n 7¡ > z * r z 279 This content downloaded from 141.225.112.53 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 04:34:28 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Map 2. A precedent for jurisdictional independence like Franklin had already been established in the ii K UJ future Tennessee by leading men from the Holston and Watauga settlements in 1772. (Tennessee Historical Society) H CC < D O J increasing number of settlers would have to and thus access to Atlantic trade networks, consent to some governing body, whether required western Americans to engage in < ü an existing state, a new state within the their own diplomatic initiatives, even if they Union, Spain, or even a new western repub- conflicted with federal policy. The aspiring E lic. In order for the speculating elites to pur- frontier elite believed that successfully nego- o sue various land schemes, and sustain their tiating access to the Mississippi River would (/) governing legitimacy, they had to convince secure their sovereign legitimacy by making X ordinary people that they were capable of them a commercial rival to eastern states.19 Lü securing their settlements and liberties. h UJ (A en UJ z z UJ IUJ X H Settlers would submit to any author- Post-French and Indian War peace set- tlements gave Spain control of Louisiana, ity that could offer the prospect of acquir- including navigable access of the Mississippl. ing land, removing Indians, and opening Controlling the river made Spain a major commerce.18 The Appalachian Mountains force in western diplomacy. For Spanish offi- limited extensive domestic commerce with cials, controlling the port of New Orleans and eastern markets, so people looked west to Mississippi navigation was the key to secur- Spanish Louisiana and the Mississippi Valley. ing their North American colonial posses- Acquiring Mississippi River navigation, sions. A 1779 letter from Louisiana governor 280 This content downloaded from 141.225.112.53 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 04:34:28 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Don Bernardo de Galvez described the banks tions to British Atlantic commerce believed of the Mississippi as "the bulwark of the vast that opening the trans-Appalachian west to empire of New Spain."20 Spanish King Carlos increased setdement presented a fundamental III recognized an opportunity to challenge threat to the union, especially if setders sought Britain's Adantic colonial presence following jurisdictional autonomy.24 Jay's focus was on the outbreak of the American Revolution. In sustaining trade within the British-Adantic, as 1778, Spain entered an alliance with France well as preserving a fragile union surrounded against the British. Louisiana Governor by more powerful European empires. Jay also Galvez ordered the evacuation of British recognized the fact that Spain and Britain traders, and seized any British boats on the were "the only two European powers which Mississippi River.21 After 1783, Spain in turn have continental possessions on our side of reassessed its control of the Mississippi River the water." Rumors that "Spain... wishes vis-à-vis the new American Republic. for league between them [and England] for In July of 1785 the Spanish monar- mutual security against us," convinced Jay that chy deployed Diego de Gardoqui as special Americans should "regard the present favor of ambassador to negotiate boundary lines and the British advances with less indifference."25 other issues with John Jay, the newly appoint- There was little concern for western ed American secretary for foreign affairs. political and economic interests during the Gardoqui was prohibited from granting navi- Confederation era, especially among the gable access to the Mississippi River. Jay was northeastern elite. Some even assumed that similarly ordered to accept nothing less than frontier communities would remain outside commercial access. Over the course of their the union. Writing in 1786, Rufus King negotiations, however, Jay conceded American believed that the "pursuits and interests claims to river navigation in exchange for on the two sides [of the mountains] will be more favorable trade relations with Spain.22 so different that an entire separation must Jay proposed deferring river access for twenty eventually ensue." He assumed those emi- five years, claiming, "Navigation . . . was not grating "to that country from the Atlantic at this time very important, and would prob- states as forever lost to the Confederacy."26 ably not become so in less than twenty-five In southern states like Virginia and the or thirty years."23 Whereas Jay's deal was ben- Carolinas, frontier events were taken more eficial to northeastern merchants, people in seriously. The Virginia Assembly alleged the southwest were predictably angered by that Jay's dealings were "provoking the just ■n his apparent disregard for their political and resentment and reproaches of our western ■n commercial interests. brethren. . . and thereby. . . our Union itself," > Z Sectional tensions between eastern states and declared, "The common right of navi- and western territories threatened the fragile gating the Mississippi, was considered as a bonds of union. Some easterners with connec- bountiful gift of nature to the United States." U) -i > H m O * r z 281 This content downloaded from 141.225.112.53 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 04:34:28 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Emphasizing the importance of sustaining to establish and enforce jurisdictional bound- the Union, Jefferson expressed his concern aries, self-created states like Franklin had little that Kentucky might "separate not only from chance of surviving, let alone obtain any gov- Virginia. . . but also from the Confederacy."27 erning legitimacy.32 When westerners deter- The Virginians subsequendy ordered their mined that eastern state governments would congressional delegation to "oppose any not recognize their sovereignty, nor even offer attempt. . . to barter or surrender to any nation the protections to which they felt entitled, whatever, the right of the United States to the they looked elsewhere. A 1787 Spanish Royal free and common use of the Mississippl."28 Order authorized Louisiana officials to issue Spanish officials in Louisiana recog- land grants to Americans wishing to settle nized the strategic importance of controlling in West Florida. In order to apply for a land Mississippi River navigation, as well as the grant, one had to pledge loyalty to Spain and tenuous bonds uniting the American states. convert to Catholicism. After subsequendy In an effort to sustain their North American cultivating the land for four years, the grant presence, the Spanish granted special privi- became an official tide. Whereas these provi- leges to a select group of Americans. These sions may not seem so "simple" on the sur- privileges included religious toleration for face, especially the mandate that the mosdy Protestant settlers in Catholic Louisiana, but Protestant Americans convert to Catholicism, H more importantly, land grants and Mississippi enforcement was nearly impossible con- CC ii DC Ul < D River access.29 James Wilkinson negoti- sidering the lack of Spanish institutional ated an arrangement with Spanish officials oversight.33 And as previously noted, special O whereby he and "a few others," including the dispensation was not uncommon. Spain's J prominent early Tennessean James White, diplomatic offerings were based on a desire could freely trade through the port of New to facilitate western separatism in hopes of Orleans. Wilkinson drafted a letter outlin- strengthening their own colonial interests.34 < ü E 0 H Spanish officials particularly saw an ing the mutually beneficial nature of a com- mercial relationship between the "western opportunity as the Franklin movement was X people" and Spain.30 The letter claimed that collapsing. Following a meeting with Spanish UJ if Congress ceded Mississippi River access for ambassador Diego de Gardoqui in 1788, u tn twenty years, as proposed by Jay, the western James White approached William Blount tn people were prepared to leave the Union and and State of Franklin Governor John Sevier establish an alliance with Spain.31 with a proposal. The plan required pledging - u z z UJ H LÜ 1 H Rather than depending on the support support to the Spanish Crown in exchange of state governments or the Confederation for vast tracts of land in the southwest, and of Congress, western leaders began exercising course, Mississippi navigation. White's his- their own political and commercial sover- tory of interaction with the Spanish placed eignty. But without the institutional capacity him in a perfect position to mediate an alii- 282 This content downloaded from 141.225.112.53 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 04:34:28 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Gen. James Wilkerson was a leader in efforts to gain access to Mississippi River navigation. He negotiated an arrangement with Spanish officials for himself and "a few others" to freely trade with the port of New Orleans. (Inde- pendence National Historic Park Collection) ance. He used this role to perpetuate the "affection, fear, nor interest will not long assumption that western settlements would hold the trans-mountain people dependent ultimately constitute independent republics, on the Atlantic States."36 separate from the American states. Writing In 1789, Louisiana Governor Esteban (0 on the State of Franklin's behalf, White told Miro authorized James White "to make H the Spanish governor of New Orleans that known to the inhabitants [of the trans-Appa- H m these "western Americans. . . have cheerfully lachian west] . . . how much my most gracious consented" to an oath of allegiance and "a sovereign is inclined to favor and protect Tl connection with the [Spanish] King's gov- them." The governor's offer included land ■n ernment separate from any other."35 In a grants at Natchez or "any other place of both similar letter to North Carolina Governor Mississippi's shored," free trade rights within > Z Samuel Johnston, White alluded to the Louisiana, as well as "the same franchises and inevitability of western secession, claiming privileges as the other subjects of his most > 0 * r z 283 This content downloaded from 141.225.112.53 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 04:34:28 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms soon erupted between Franklinites and "Tiptonites." Although little more than a skirmish between supporters of rival lead- ers, the incident reveals how competing internal factions helped undermine the Franklin movement. Tipton's supporters in the North Carolina Assembly encouraged Sevier's arrest, and ultimately charged him with treason. Indian raids and a gen- eral instability increased in and around Franklin after Sevier's arrest, and many of the state's most loyal supporters sought reconciliation with North Carolina as the Franklin Governor John Sevier was ap- best way to secure their communities.38 North Carolina seized upon the opportu- proached with a proposal to pledge support to the Spanish Crown in exchange for land nity to regain the loyalty of Americans living 5 and navigation rights. When North Carolina in the trans-Appalachian frontier. In 1788, K offered to pardon western "separatists" in the North Carolina Assembly offered to par- bJ 1788, Sevier was for a time specifically ex- don western "separatists" provided they take cluded. (Tennessee Historical Society) an oath of allegiance to North Carolina. John H OC < D Sevier, however, was for a time specifically O excluded. Later that year, North Carolina J governor Samuel Johnston hoped to ease < u catholic Majesty, under the condition they westerner's anxiety about Indian attack when E shall at the same time take the due oath of he ordered an end to all hostilities between allegiance and bound themselves to take up "some persons on the western frontiers of arms in defense of this Province."37 this State and the neighboring tribes of 0 H (0 ī While Franklin's "leading men" envi- Indians," at least until the recendy appointed ÜJ sioned an independent political future in commissioners "establish a firm and lasting the west, events in the east kept demand- peace."39 Governor Johnston was attempt- ing their attention. In 1788, Sevier was ing to draw a wedge between supporters of accused of not paying taxes, and North Franklin and those loyal to North Carolina Carolina sheriff Jonathan Pugh had his and the American Confederation. His calcu- property (slaves and livestock) seized and lation was that by affirming peaceful relations subsequently placed under the control with Cherokees, Franklinites would be seen of his rival John Tipton. Sevier deployed as the real threat to Indian sovereignty. The Franklin's fledgling militia and a "battle" Confederation Congress reinforced this posi- ÜJ (0 0) ÜJ Z z Li] H ÜJ 1 H 284 This content downloaded from 141.225.112.53 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 04:34:28 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms tion several months later, warning anyone union was the American Revolution's real occupying lands granted to the Cherokee by triumph. Tennessee's tumultuous path to the Hopewell Treaty to vacate at once, or else statehood, including the failed State of forfeit United States protection.40 Franklin, offers one example of this dif- The State of Franklin had failed in ficult and contingent process. Only with the federal constitution and the assurances its pursuit of governing legitimacy. With Franklin's collapse, there was no way forof responsible government did the former Franklinites fully embrace the new United western settlers effectively to protest North Carolina's cession of their western lands toStates (and even then only grudgingly, Congress. As a result, there was little oppo-given the economic and military consequences of settler-Indian interaction as well sition to their subsequent incorporation as part of the Southwest Territory in 1790. as Spanish threats on the Mississippi dur- Thomas P. Abernethy's classic historying the 1790s). Considering the American Revolution as a process of incorporating of the Revolutionary-era southwest estabnew areas into a federal union shifts our lished the idea that the State of Franklin was focus from the political debates among constructed as a means of instituting the political authority necessary for validatingestablished eastern states to the tangible the land claims of speculators.41 Around thework of nation-building happening in the same time, A.P. Whitaker poignantly sum- frontier. Sustaining American indepenmarized the Franklinite ethos in his account dence required securing the peripheries of settlement. Sadly, historians have too often of John Sevier's change of heart concerning his new "state." Whitaker described Sevier as neglected or dismissed this final chapter "deserted by Georgia, prosecuted by Northwhen explaining origins of the early republic. Carolina, losing his hold even in his own community, he was offered by Gardoqui's overtures both an escape from his troubles 1. For an innovative recent exploration of and aid for his long-cherished Muscle Shoals contingent American sovereignty, see Francois plan."42 But if the State of Franklin was little Furstenberg, "The Significance of the Trans- more than an apparatus for land consolida-Appalachian Frontier in Atlantic History," American Historical Review 1 13 #3 (June 2008). tion, why has it so dazzled our historical imaginations? So-called "separatist" move- 2. For more on this point see Kristofer Ray, "Leadership and Sovereignty in the Revolutionary ments like Franklin reveal the nuanced andEra Southwest: The State of Franklin as Case Study," in A. Glenn Crothers and Kevin Barksdale, contingent processes of state-formation and eds., Secessions: From the Revolution to the Civil War union consolidation that was essential to the success of the early republic. (Athens, Ohio, forthcoming). See also Kristofer Ray, Middle Tennessee, 1775-1825: Progress and American independence was never Popular Democracy on the Southwestern Frontier inevitable. Constructing and sustaining (Knoxville, a 2007). W H > H m O Tl "Tl > Z * r ž 285 This content downloaded from 141.225.112.53 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 04:34:28 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 3. For more on the "chaotic" state of the 1790," paper delivered at the 77th Annual Southern Revolutionary west, see Patrick Griffin, American Historical Association Conference, Baltimore, Md., Leviathan: Empire , Nation , Revolutionary October 201 1. Frontier (New York, 2007). 4. According to David Hendrickson, the 9. Peter Onuf argues, "The underdevelopment of political community and legitimate authority in Articles of Confederation represented an "idealized" the original states encouraged separatists to set up notion of empire that American revolutionaries had their own governments." Peter S. Onuf, The Origins felt should be established between the metropolis of the Federal Republic: Jurisdictional Controversies and periphery. See David Hendrickson, "The First in the United States , 1775-1787 , (Philadelphia, Union: Nationalism versus Internationalism in 1983), 39. For more on this point in Tennessee, see Kristofer Ray, Middle Tennessee , 1775-1825 ; Kevin the American Revolution," in Eliga H. Gould and Barksdale, The Lost State of Franklin: America s First Peter Onuf, eds., Empire and Nation: The American Revolution in the Atlantic World (Baltimore, 2005).Secession Movement (Lexington, 2008); and Cynthia 5. Douglas Bradburn, The CitizenshipCumfer, Separate Peoples , One Land: the Mind Revolution : Politics and the Creation of the American of Cherokees, Blacks , and Whites on the Tennessee Uniony 1774-1804 , (Charlottesville, 2009), 64-65. Frontier (Chapel Hill, 2007). 10. A lot of work remains to be done on the 6. For a peregrination on longer standing eigh- teenth century concerns, see Kristo fer Ray, "New Watauga Association. For more on Henderson's Directions in Early Tennessee History, 1540Transylvania Purchase, see Stephen Aron, How the i¡ DC Úl 1815," Tennessee Historical Quarterly Vol. LXIX#3 West was Lost: The Transformation of Kentucky From (Fall 2010): 204-223. Daniel Boone to Henry C/¿*j)/_(Baltimore, 1997); 7. For more on the importance of the John R. Finger, Tennessee Frontiers: Three Regions in H Mississippi River to western jurisdictions and idenTransition (Bloomington, 2002). See also Patrick OC tity formation, see Susan Gaunt Stearns, "Streams Griffin, American Leviathan: Empire , Nation , And < D O J < ü E o H (ß X ÜJ Ul (ß (ß Ul z z ül H L±J X H of Interest: The Mississippi River and the Political Revolutionary Frontier (New York, 2007); and Pat Economy of the Early Republic" (PhD Diss.,Alderman, The Overmountain Men , (Johnson City, University of Chicago, 201 1). 1970), 23-24. 8. Spain wanted its North American claims to include land all the way to the Appalachian Mountainsin 1 1 . Gale W. Bamman, "Genealogical Research Tennessee," National Genealogical Society north of the 31st Parallel, and into the Mississippi Quarterly V ol. 81 No. 2 (1993), 99-125. River Valley. For more on the Spanish position in 12. Walter Clark, ed., State Records of North Carolina, , XXIV, 629-30. Hereafter SRNC the southwest, see Gene A. Smith and Sylvia Hilton, eds., Nexus of Empire: Negotiating Loyalty and Identity 13. A.P. Whitaker, "The Muscle Shoals in the Revolutionary Borderlands, 1760s-1820s Speculation, 1783-1789," in The Mississippi Valley (Gainesville, 2010); Andrew McMichael, AtlanticHistorical Review, Vol. 13, No. 3, (December 1926), 365- 386, 366. See also, William Stewart Lester, Loyalties: Americans in Spanish West Florida , 17851810 (Athens, Ga., 2008); Kevin Barksdale, "The The Transylvania Colony , (Spencer, Ind., 1935). New Orleans Fire of 1788 and the Transformation 14. SRNC , XXII, 649-650. See also, Samuel of Iberian-American Relations in the West," paper Cole Williams, History of the Lost State of Franklin, delivered at the 77th Annual Southern Historical(Johnson City, 1924, and 1933), 77-78. Kevin T. Association Conference, Baltimore, Md., October Barksdale, The Lost State of Franklin, 103. 201 1; and Kristofer Ray, "'The Whole Continent is 15. Finger, Tennessee Frontiers, 11 7. in Confusion': Land, Trade, and Spanish Concerns 16. Charles J. Kappler, ed., Indian Affairs: over American Settlement in the Southwest, 1783Laws and Treaties. Vol. //(Treaties), (Washington, 286 This content downloaded from 141.225.112.53 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 04:34:28 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 1904), 11-14. For the Congressional commis- The Papers of Thomas Jefferson , Vol. 9, (Princeton, sion issued to Benjamin Hawkins, Daniel Carroll, 1954), 218. 28. Ramsey, Annals of Tennessee , 525-26. William Perry, Andrew Pickens, and Joseph Martin "to make peace with the Cherokee and all other North Carolina congressional delegates joined southern Indian tribes within the limits of the Virginia in September, 1788, in a joint resolution United States," see; Draper Manuscript Collection claiming a "natural right" of "free navigation of the (State Historical Society of Wisconsin) Tennessee Mississippi River." Ramsey, 530. See also Stearns, and Kings Mountain Papers , [Reel 2 XX, 4]. "Streams of Interest." 29. Stagg, Borderlines in Borderlands , 30. 17. For more on these points, see Ray, "Leadership 30. Andro Linklater, An Artist in Treason: and Sovereignty in the Revolutionary American Southwest: The State of Franklin as Case Study." 18. See Ray, Middle Tennessee, 1775-1825, The Extraordinary Double Life of General James Wilkinson , (New York, 2009). 31. Ramsey, Annals of Tennessee, 529. chapters 1-2. 19. See Stearns, "Streams of Interest." See 32. Onuf, Origins of the Federal Republic , 56. 33. Andrew McMichael, Atlantic Loyalties , 17, also J.C.A. Stagg, Borderlines in Borderlands: James Madison and the Spanish American Frontier (New 19. 34. Samuel Cole Williams, The Lost State of Haven, 2009). 20. "Galvez to Navarro, Aug. 29, 1779" Lawrence Kinnaird, ed., Spain in the Mississippi Franklin , 235. 35. White (James) to Miro, April 18, 1789, Valley , 1765-1794 [Translations of Materials from in Lawrence Kinnaird, ed., Spain in the Mississippi the Spanish Archives in the Bancroft Library], 355- Valley, 1765-1794 , 267-268. 36. "James White to Governor Johnston," in 57. 21. Kathleen DuVal, The Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent Clark, ed., SRNC, XXI, 465. 37. Miro's Offer to Western Americans April 20, 1789, in Kinnaird, 269-271. (Philadelphia, 2006), 151. 22. "James Monroe to George Washington, 38. Barksdale, The Lost State of Franklin. Aug. 20, 1786," in Theodore Crackel, ed., The See also, Ray, "Leadership and Sovereignty in the Papers of George Washington Digital Edition. Revolutionary American Southwest;" and Williams, Monroe alleges that Jay had "been negotiating with History of the Lost State of Franklin, 231-34. Congress to repeal his instructions (or rather with particular members) so as to occlude the Mississippi, 39. "A Proclamation of N.C. Governor Samuel Johnston, Nov. 29, 1788," in SRNQ Vol. XXI, 507. 40. Draper Manuscript Collection: Calendar of and not with Spain to open it." 23. J.G.M. Ramsey, Annals of Tennessee to the End of the Eighteenth Century , (Charleston, SC: the Tennessee and King's Mountain Papers, (Madison, Wis., 1929), 41. 41 . Abernethy, From Frontier to Plantation , 89. 1853), 525. 24. Onuf, Origins of the Federal Republic, 159. This summation of Abernethy's argument cited in 25. "Jay to Robert R. Livingston, Paris, April Finger, Tennessee Frontiers, 131. 42. Whitaker, "Muscle Shoals Speculation," 22, 1783," Papers of John Jay, 42-43. U) H > H m O "Tl 26. "Rufus King to E. Gerry, June 4, 1786," in 378. He further argues that the Muscle Shoals Charles R. King, ed., The Life and Correspondence of Project ultimately "became part of the expansionist 71 Rufus King, Vol. 1 , 1755-1794 , (New York, 1894), program of the new state," 370. > Z 176. Tl * 27. "Thomas Jefferson to Archibald Stuart, Jan. 26, 1786," in, Julian P. Boyd, et al., eds., r z 287 This content downloaded from 141.225.112.53 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 04:34:28 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Purchase answer to see full attachment