A Glorious Failure: The State of Franklin and American Independence
Author(s): Jason Farr
Source: Tennessee Historical Quarterly , WINTER 2011, Vol. 70, No. 4 (WINTER 2011), pp.
276-287
Published by: Tennessee Historical Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/42628218
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The conditional process leading these com-
pendence left trans-Appala-
munities to believe it was in their best interest
The chian pendence realitychiancommunities
communities in a ofuniqueleft American trans-Appala- in a unique inde-
to be included, rather than excluded, from the
situation. They had the option of creating
new American union reveals a final chapter
jurisdictions within existing states, forming
in the traditional narrative of the American
new states within the union, or creating
independence. Securing and sustaining
their own sovereign republics. It was never
American independence demanded coopera-
assumed that these areas would join what
tion among the states and the creation of a
became the United States.1 From 1784 to
strong federal union. Incorporating western
1789, some people in what is now eastern
communities into this union was an early test
Tennessee exercised all of their options
of America's legitimacy.
A successful American Revolution was not
in the form of a self-declared jurisdiction
known as the State of Franklin. Franklin's
guaranteed by military victory in 1783. The
leadership petitioned for statehood after
coastal colonies separated from metropolitan
North Carolina ceded their land in 1784.
Britain in hopes of restoring the English con-
When their petition was denied, Franklin
stitutional liberties that Parliament and the
reached out to the state of Georgia and
king had seemed to usurp since 1763. The
considered an alliance with Spain.
Articles of Confederation proved an over-
«
Franklin's leaders were most interested
correction of the centralized authority that
in stability so they could secure land claims
so frightened provincial Americans.4 Under
and gain commercial access to the Mississippi
the Articles, states could not collectively
River.2 By 1789 the movement had collapsed,
enact effective diplomacy or commerce; nor
but they and many others in the chaotic west
could they avert what Douglas Bradburn has
calculated that securing political and com-
described as the "centrifugal tendency toward
mercial prosperity could be better achieved
disunion," which was particularly strong in
by aligning with the new federal experiment.3
the west.5 Faced with the problem of incor-
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From 1784-1789, people in now eastern Tennessee attempted to form the new State of Franklin.
After rejection from North Carolina, they considered the option of an alliance with Spain. (Detail
from "Map of Cumberland and Franklin," The Annals of Tennessee, 1 853)
porating western land, the new United States
century, but particularly since Parliament
had to confront the challenges of establishing
attempted to restrict settlement through the
a republican union.
Proclamation of 1763. 6 Still, restrictions on
Conflicts over jurisdictional sovereignty
colonial expansion and the perpetual threat
and land claims had plagued the south-
of regional Indians could not obstruct the
ern frontier throughout the eighteenth
lure of land ownership that enticed pro-
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vincial Americans to settle beyond the
these proved unavailable that evidence of west-
Appalachians. Settling land may only have
ern separatism becomes particularly notable.
required a willingness to endure the requi-
When the North Carolina Assembly ceded its
site challenges, but legitimizing those setde-
western lands to Congress in 1784, many liv-
ments was more complicated. Successful
ing in the region felt obligated to establish their
commerce was a critical factor in sustaining
own government. Aprecedentfor jurisdictional
settlement in areas that were geographically
independence had already been established by
isolated from major market centers. With
leading men from the Holston and Watauga
the mountains creating a natural obstacle
settlements when they drafted articles of inde-
to eastern markets, Mississippi River access
pendent association in 1772. The Wataugans
became essential for frontier participation in
thought they were in Virginia before realiz-
both domestic and Atlantic commerce.
ing they were settled on land claimed under
As with all other southwestern settle-
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Lord Granville's North Carolina grant. Either
ments, Franklinites imagined Mississippi
way, they recognized the need to establish a
River access as a way to attract settlers and
legitimate governing body. With the help of
legitimize their jurisdictional claims.7 Franklin
Richard Henderson, the Wataugans negotiat-
benefited from the jurisdictional ambiguity of
ed a ten-year lease with Cherokees through the
the trans-Appalachian west, in which North
1775 Sycamore Shoals Treaty, which also gave
and South Carolina, Georgia, Indians, and
Henderson control of a vast amount of land in
Spain made overlapping claims. Spain never
Kentucky and Middle Tennessee where he set
embraced the provisions of the 1783 Treaty
up his Transylvania Colony.10
of Paris that set their boundary with the
Wataugans may have had legitimate
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United States at the banks of the Mississippi
claims for occupying their settlements, but
River and the 31st Parallel. Spanish officials in
the Sycamore Shoals Treaty did not solve the
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Louisiana recognized the possibility of allying
problem of issuing legitimate land grants or
o
their interests with those of western setders
tides. And for that matter, Henderson's efforts
(ļ
who wanted clear tides to their land. Before
were quickly repudiated by both Virginia and
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the creation of the Southwest Territory in
North Carolina. North Carolina's creation of
U1
1790, there were multiple land offices oper-
Washington County in 1777 offered a tem-
ating in the southwest, which often resulted
porary solution by establishing a land office
in conflicting and overlapping tides.8
in 1778 under the leadership of Colonel
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Western separatists, like those in the State
John Carter and his son Landon Carter."
of Franklin, were responding to the inability
Land offices were subsequently opened and
of states to provide legitimate legal and politi-
claims recorded in Greene and Sullivan coun-
hl
cal authority.9 Independence to procure and
ties, with grants given by North Carolina.
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secure property required the institutional sup-
Overlapping land grants made legitimizing
port of governing institutions. It was when
land claims difficult.
111
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278
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By 1780, some Watauga and Holston
the sectional division between the Overhill
settlers had moved west to the site of pres-
towns and eastern setdements, and carefully
ent day Nashville and established the
selected which Cherokee diplomats would
Cumberland Compact, a set of rules under
be invited, making sure to exclude the most
which the community would operate until
powerful chiefs such as Old Tassel, Dragging
a stronger jurisdictional control could be
Canoe, and Hanging Maw.14 These treaties
established by stronger authorities. In 1782,
were largely symbolic, considering the long
North Carolina established a "Military
presence of Anglo-Americans essentially tres-
Reservation" in the Cumberland River val-
passing in their setdement of western land.15
ley, where tracts of land were awarded to
The Dumplin Creek Treaty of 1785
Revolutionary War veterans. At the same
seemed to give Franklin a degree of legiti-
time, the North Carolina Assembly offered
macy in the eyes of some squatters and
"certificates of preemption," which served as
potential settlers, to whom they could now
legitimate ways for earlier settlers to obtain
offer legitimate land titles. But the North
land grants.12 Creating the military district at
Carolina Assembly and the Confederation
Cumberland resulted in North Carolina clos-
Congress never recognized the Dumplin
ing western land offices, although for a brief
Creek and Coyatee treaties, nor did they
period (from October 1783 to May 1784)
recognize the State of Franklin, with whom
the state did open their entire western terri-
the treaties were negotiated. Within a year,
tory to anyone capable of paying the admin-
United States diplomats negotiated a series
istrative costs and fee of ten pounds per 100
of three treaties with Cherokees (November
acres. Subsequendy known as the "great land
1785), Choctaws (January 3, 1786), and
grab," this action, as well as the preemption
Chickasaws (January 10, 1786). Collectively
certificates, angered many settlers remaining
known as the Hopewell Treaty, these nego-
in the Holston and Watauga region. They
tiations established the western bound-
felt as if their demands for legitimate land
ary of southern Indian lands, and reserved
grants were being undermined.
exclusive trade rights for the United States.16
It was in this confusing milieu that
The existence of two separate treaties, one
the State of Franklin was born. In addi-
with the State of Franklin, and one with the
tion to establishing a jurisdictional pres-
United States, made jurisdictional legitima-
ence for tax revenue and regional stability,
cy an even greater concern for the aspiring
Franklinites secured land claims through a
western elites within the State of Franklin.17
series of treaties negotiated with a small fac-
Securing political legitimacy and com-
tion of Overhill Cherokee. The so-called
mercial prosperity for communities west of
Dumplin Creek Treaty ceded land south of
the Appalachian Mountains required more
the Tennessee and French Broad rivers to the
than a few speculators consolidating their
inchoate state.13 The Franklinites understood
wealth in a fledgling "state." Ultimately, the
to
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Map 2.
A precedent for jurisdictional independence like Franklin had already been established in the
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future Tennessee by leading men from the Holston and Watauga settlements in 1772. (Tennessee Historical Society)
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increasing number of settlers would have to
and thus access to Atlantic trade networks,
consent to some governing body, whether
required western Americans to engage in
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an existing state, a new state within the
their own diplomatic initiatives, even if they
Union, Spain, or even a new western repub-
conflicted with federal policy. The aspiring
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lic. In order for the speculating elites to pur-
frontier elite believed that successfully nego-
o
sue various land schemes, and sustain their
tiating access to the Mississippi River would
(/)
governing legitimacy, they had to convince
secure their sovereign legitimacy by making
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ordinary people that they were capable of
them a commercial rival to eastern states.19
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securing their settlements and liberties.
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Settlers would submit to any author-
Post-French and Indian War peace set-
tlements gave Spain control of Louisiana,
ity that could offer the prospect of acquir-
including navigable access of the Mississippl.
ing land, removing Indians, and opening
Controlling the river made Spain a major
commerce.18 The Appalachian Mountains
force in western diplomacy. For Spanish offi-
limited extensive domestic commerce with
cials, controlling the port of New Orleans and
eastern markets, so people looked west to
Mississippi navigation was the key to secur-
Spanish Louisiana and the Mississippi Valley.
ing their North American colonial posses-
Acquiring Mississippi River navigation,
sions. A 1779 letter from Louisiana governor
280
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Don Bernardo de Galvez described the banks
tions to British Atlantic commerce believed
of the Mississippi as "the bulwark of the vast
that opening the trans-Appalachian west to
empire of New Spain."20 Spanish King Carlos
increased setdement presented a fundamental
III recognized an opportunity to challenge
threat to the union, especially if setders sought
Britain's Adantic colonial presence following
jurisdictional autonomy.24 Jay's focus was on
the outbreak of the American Revolution. In
sustaining trade within the British-Adantic, as
1778, Spain entered an alliance with France
well as preserving a fragile union surrounded
against the British. Louisiana Governor
by more powerful European empires. Jay also
Galvez ordered the evacuation of British
recognized the fact that Spain and Britain
traders, and seized any British boats on the
were "the only two European powers which
Mississippi River.21 After 1783, Spain in turn
have continental possessions on our side of
reassessed its control of the Mississippi River
the water." Rumors that "Spain... wishes
vis-à-vis the new American Republic.
for league between them [and England] for
In July of 1785 the Spanish monar-
mutual security against us," convinced Jay that
chy deployed Diego de Gardoqui as special
Americans should "regard the present favor of
ambassador to negotiate boundary lines and
the British advances with less indifference."25
other issues with John Jay, the newly appoint-
There was little concern for western
ed American secretary for foreign affairs.
political and economic interests during the
Gardoqui was prohibited from granting navi-
Confederation era, especially among the
gable access to the Mississippi River. Jay was
northeastern elite. Some even assumed that
similarly ordered to accept nothing less than
frontier communities would remain outside
commercial access. Over the course of their
the union. Writing in 1786, Rufus King
negotiations, however, Jay conceded American
believed that the "pursuits and interests
claims to river navigation in exchange for
on the two sides [of the mountains] will be
more favorable trade relations with Spain.22
so different that an entire separation must
Jay proposed deferring river access for twenty
eventually ensue." He assumed those emi-
five years, claiming, "Navigation . . . was not
grating "to that country from the Atlantic
at this time very important, and would prob-
states as forever lost to the Confederacy."26
ably not become so in less than twenty-five
In southern states like Virginia and the
or thirty years."23 Whereas Jay's deal was ben-
Carolinas, frontier events were taken more
eficial to northeastern merchants, people in
seriously. The Virginia Assembly alleged
the southwest were predictably angered by
that Jay's dealings were "provoking the just
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his apparent disregard for their political and
resentment and reproaches of our western
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commercial interests.
brethren. . . and thereby. . . our Union itself,"
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Sectional tensions between eastern states
and declared, "The common right of navi-
and western territories threatened the fragile
gating the Mississippi, was considered as a
bonds of union. Some easterners with connec-
bountiful gift of nature to the United States."
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Emphasizing the importance of sustaining
to establish and enforce jurisdictional bound-
the Union, Jefferson expressed his concern
aries, self-created states like Franklin had little
that Kentucky might "separate not only from
chance of surviving, let alone obtain any gov-
Virginia. . . but also from the Confederacy."27
erning legitimacy.32 When westerners deter-
The Virginians subsequendy ordered their
mined that eastern state governments would
congressional delegation to "oppose any
not recognize their sovereignty, nor even offer
attempt. . . to barter or surrender to any nation
the protections to which they felt entitled,
whatever, the right of the United States to the
they looked elsewhere. A 1787 Spanish Royal
free and common use of the Mississippl."28
Order authorized Louisiana officials to issue
Spanish officials in Louisiana recog-
land grants to Americans wishing to settle
nized the strategic importance of controlling
in West Florida. In order to apply for a land
Mississippi River navigation, as well as the
grant, one had to pledge loyalty to Spain and
tenuous bonds uniting the American states.
convert to Catholicism. After subsequendy
In an effort to sustain their North American
cultivating the land for four years, the grant
presence, the Spanish granted special privi-
became an official tide. Whereas these provi-
leges to a select group of Americans. These
sions may not seem so "simple" on the sur-
privileges included religious toleration for
face, especially the mandate that the mosdy
Protestant settlers in Catholic Louisiana, but
Protestant Americans convert to Catholicism,
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more importantly, land grants and Mississippi
enforcement was nearly impossible con-
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River access.29 James Wilkinson negoti-
sidering the lack of Spanish institutional
ated an arrangement with Spanish officials
oversight.33 And as previously noted, special
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whereby he and "a few others," including the
dispensation was not uncommon. Spain's
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prominent early Tennessean James White,
diplomatic offerings were based on a desire
could freely trade through the port of New
to facilitate western separatism in hopes of
Orleans. Wilkinson drafted a letter outlin-
strengthening their own colonial interests.34
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Spanish officials particularly saw an
ing the mutually beneficial nature of a com-
mercial relationship between the "western
opportunity as the Franklin movement was
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people" and Spain.30 The letter claimed that
collapsing. Following a meeting with Spanish
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if Congress ceded Mississippi River access for
ambassador Diego de Gardoqui in 1788,
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twenty years, as proposed by Jay, the western
James White approached William Blount
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people were prepared to leave the Union and
and State of Franklin Governor John Sevier
establish an alliance with Spain.31
with a proposal. The plan required pledging
-
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Rather than depending on the support
support to the Spanish Crown in exchange
of state governments or the Confederation
for vast tracts of land in the southwest, and of
Congress, western leaders began exercising
course, Mississippi navigation. White's his-
their own political and commercial sover-
tory of interaction with the Spanish placed
eignty. But without the institutional capacity
him in a perfect position to mediate an alii-
282
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Gen. James Wilkerson was
a leader in efforts to gain
access to Mississippi River
navigation. He negotiated an
arrangement with Spanish officials for himself and "a few
others" to freely trade with the
port of New Orleans. (Inde-
pendence National Historic
Park Collection)
ance. He used this role to perpetuate the
"affection, fear, nor interest will not long
assumption that western settlements would
hold the trans-mountain people dependent
ultimately constitute independent republics,
on the Atlantic States."36
separate from the American states. Writing
In 1789, Louisiana Governor Esteban
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on the State of Franklin's behalf, White told
Miro authorized James White "to make
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the Spanish governor of New Orleans that
known to the inhabitants [of the trans-Appa-
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these "western Americans. . . have cheerfully
lachian west] . . . how much my most gracious
consented" to an oath of allegiance and "a
sovereign is inclined to favor and protect
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connection with the [Spanish] King's gov-
them." The governor's offer included land
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ernment separate from any other."35 In a
grants at Natchez or "any other place of both
similar letter to North Carolina Governor
Mississippi's shored," free trade rights within
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Samuel Johnston, White alluded to the
Louisiana, as well as "the same franchises and
inevitability of western secession, claiming
privileges as the other subjects of his most
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soon erupted between Franklinites and
"Tiptonites." Although little more than a
skirmish between supporters of rival lead-
ers, the incident reveals how competing
internal factions helped undermine the
Franklin movement. Tipton's supporters
in the North Carolina Assembly encouraged Sevier's arrest, and ultimately charged
him with treason. Indian raids and a gen-
eral instability increased in and around
Franklin after Sevier's arrest, and many
of the state's most loyal supporters sought
reconciliation with North Carolina as the
Franklin Governor John Sevier was ap-
best way to secure their communities.38
North Carolina seized upon the opportu-
proached with a proposal to pledge support
to the Spanish Crown in exchange for land
nity to regain the loyalty of Americans living
5
and navigation rights. When North Carolina
in the trans-Appalachian frontier. In 1788,
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offered to pardon western "separatists" in
the North Carolina Assembly offered to par-
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1788, Sevier was for a time specifically ex-
don western "separatists" provided they take
cluded. (Tennessee Historical Society)
an oath of allegiance to North Carolina. John
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Sevier, however, was for a time specifically
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excluded. Later that year, North Carolina
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governor Samuel Johnston hoped to ease
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catholic Majesty, under the condition they
westerner's anxiety about Indian attack when
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shall at the same time take the due oath of
he ordered an end to all hostilities between
allegiance and bound themselves to take up
"some persons on the western frontiers of
arms in defense of this Province."37
this State and the neighboring tribes of
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While Franklin's "leading men" envi-
Indians," at least until the recendy appointed
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sioned an independent political future in
commissioners "establish a firm and lasting
the west, events in the east kept demand-
peace."39 Governor Johnston was attempt-
ing their attention. In 1788, Sevier was
ing to draw a wedge between supporters of
accused of not paying taxes, and North
Franklin and those loyal to North Carolina
Carolina sheriff Jonathan Pugh had his
and the American Confederation. His calcu-
property (slaves and livestock) seized and
lation was that by affirming peaceful relations
subsequently placed under the control
with Cherokees, Franklinites would be seen
of his rival John Tipton. Sevier deployed
as the real threat to Indian sovereignty. The
Franklin's fledgling militia and a "battle"
Confederation Congress reinforced this posi-
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tion several months later, warning anyone
union was the American Revolution's real
occupying lands granted to the Cherokee by
triumph. Tennessee's tumultuous path to
the Hopewell Treaty to vacate at once, or else
statehood, including the failed State of
forfeit United States protection.40
Franklin, offers one example of this dif-
The State of Franklin had failed in
ficult and contingent process. Only with
the federal constitution and the assurances
its pursuit of governing legitimacy. With
Franklin's collapse, there was no way forof responsible government did the former
Franklinites fully embrace the new United
western settlers effectively to protest North
Carolina's cession of their western lands toStates (and even then only grudgingly,
Congress. As a result, there was little oppo-given the economic and military consequences of settler-Indian interaction as well
sition to their subsequent incorporation as
part of the Southwest Territory in 1790.
as Spanish threats on the Mississippi dur-
Thomas P. Abernethy's classic historying the 1790s). Considering the American
Revolution as a process of incorporating
of the Revolutionary-era southwest estabnew areas into a federal union shifts our
lished the idea that the State of Franklin was
focus from the political debates among
constructed as a means of instituting the
political authority necessary for validatingestablished eastern states to the tangible
the land claims of speculators.41 Around thework of nation-building happening in the
same time, A.P. Whitaker poignantly sum- frontier. Sustaining American indepenmarized the Franklinite ethos in his account
dence required securing the peripheries of
settlement. Sadly, historians have too often
of John Sevier's change of heart concerning
his new "state." Whitaker described Sevier as
neglected or dismissed this final chapter
"deserted by Georgia, prosecuted by Northwhen explaining origins of the early republic.
Carolina, losing his hold even in his own
community, he was offered by Gardoqui's
overtures both an escape from his troubles
1. For an innovative recent exploration of
and aid for his long-cherished Muscle Shoals
contingent American sovereignty, see Francois
plan."42 But if the State of Franklin was little
Furstenberg, "The Significance of the Trans-
more than an apparatus for land consolida-Appalachian Frontier in Atlantic History," American
Historical Review 1 13 #3 (June 2008).
tion, why has it so dazzled our historical
imaginations? So-called "separatist" move-
2. For more on this point see Kristofer Ray,
"Leadership and Sovereignty in the Revolutionary
ments like Franklin reveal the nuanced andEra Southwest: The State of Franklin as Case
Study," in A. Glenn Crothers and Kevin Barksdale,
contingent processes of state-formation and
eds., Secessions: From the Revolution to the Civil War
union consolidation that was essential to the
success of the early republic.
(Athens, Ohio, forthcoming). See also Kristofer
Ray, Middle Tennessee, 1775-1825: Progress and
American independence was never
Popular Democracy on the Southwestern Frontier
inevitable. Constructing and sustaining (Knoxville,
a
2007).
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3. For more on the "chaotic" state of the
1790," paper delivered at the 77th Annual Southern
Revolutionary west, see Patrick Griffin, American Historical Association Conference, Baltimore, Md.,
Leviathan: Empire , Nation , Revolutionary
October 201 1.
Frontier (New York, 2007).
4. According to David Hendrickson, the
9. Peter Onuf argues, "The underdevelopment
of political community and legitimate authority in
Articles of Confederation represented an "idealized"
the original states encouraged separatists to set up
notion of empire that American revolutionaries had
their own governments." Peter S. Onuf, The Origins
felt should be established between the metropolis of the Federal Republic: Jurisdictional Controversies
and periphery. See David Hendrickson, "The First
in the United States , 1775-1787 , (Philadelphia,
Union: Nationalism versus Internationalism in
1983), 39. For more on this point in Tennessee, see
Kristofer Ray, Middle Tennessee , 1775-1825 ; Kevin
the American Revolution," in Eliga H. Gould and
Barksdale, The Lost State of Franklin: America s First
Peter Onuf, eds., Empire and Nation: The American
Revolution in the Atlantic World (Baltimore, 2005).Secession Movement (Lexington, 2008); and Cynthia
5. Douglas Bradburn, The CitizenshipCumfer, Separate Peoples , One Land: the Mind
Revolution : Politics and the Creation of the American
of Cherokees, Blacks , and Whites on the Tennessee
Uniony 1774-1804 , (Charlottesville, 2009), 64-65.
Frontier (Chapel Hill, 2007).
10. A lot of work remains to be done on the
6. For a peregrination on longer standing eigh-
teenth century concerns, see Kristo fer Ray, "New
Watauga Association. For more on Henderson's
Directions in Early Tennessee History, 1540Transylvania Purchase, see Stephen Aron, How the
i¡
DC
Úl
1815," Tennessee Historical Quarterly Vol. LXIX#3
West was Lost: The Transformation of Kentucky From
(Fall 2010): 204-223.
Daniel Boone to Henry C/¿*j)/_(Baltimore, 1997);
7. For more on the importance of the
John
R. Finger, Tennessee Frontiers: Three Regions in
H
Mississippi River to western jurisdictions and idenTransition (Bloomington, 2002). See also Patrick
OC
tity formation, see Susan Gaunt Stearns, "Streams
Griffin, American Leviathan: Empire , Nation , And
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of Interest: The Mississippi River and the Political
Revolutionary Frontier (New York, 2007); and Pat
Economy of the Early Republic" (PhD Diss.,Alderman, The Overmountain Men , (Johnson City,
University of Chicago, 201 1).
1970), 23-24.
8. Spain wanted its North American claims to
include land all the way to the Appalachian Mountainsin
1 1 . Gale W. Bamman, "Genealogical Research
Tennessee," National Genealogical Society
north of the 31st Parallel, and into the Mississippi
Quarterly V ol. 81 No. 2 (1993), 99-125.
River Valley. For more on the Spanish position in
12. Walter Clark, ed., State Records of North
Carolina, , XXIV, 629-30. Hereafter SRNC
the southwest, see Gene A. Smith and Sylvia Hilton,
eds., Nexus of Empire: Negotiating Loyalty and Identity
13. A.P. Whitaker, "The Muscle Shoals
in the Revolutionary Borderlands, 1760s-1820s
Speculation, 1783-1789," in The Mississippi Valley
(Gainesville, 2010); Andrew McMichael, AtlanticHistorical Review, Vol. 13, No. 3, (December 1926),
365- 386, 366. See also, William Stewart Lester,
Loyalties: Americans in Spanish West Florida , 17851810 (Athens, Ga., 2008); Kevin Barksdale, "The The Transylvania Colony , (Spencer, Ind., 1935).
New Orleans Fire of 1788 and the Transformation
14. SRNC , XXII, 649-650. See also, Samuel
of Iberian-American Relations in the West," paper
Cole Williams, History of the Lost State of Franklin,
delivered at the 77th Annual Southern Historical(Johnson City, 1924, and 1933), 77-78. Kevin T.
Association Conference, Baltimore, Md., October
Barksdale, The Lost State of Franklin, 103.
201 1; and Kristofer Ray, "'The Whole Continent is
15. Finger, Tennessee Frontiers, 11 7.
in Confusion': Land, Trade, and Spanish Concerns
16. Charles J. Kappler, ed., Indian Affairs:
over American Settlement in the Southwest, 1783Laws and Treaties. Vol. //(Treaties), (Washington,
286
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All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
1904), 11-14. For the Congressional commis-
The Papers of Thomas Jefferson , Vol. 9, (Princeton,
sion issued to Benjamin Hawkins, Daniel Carroll,
1954), 218.
28. Ramsey, Annals of Tennessee , 525-26.
William Perry, Andrew Pickens, and Joseph Martin
"to make peace with the Cherokee and all other
North Carolina congressional delegates joined
southern Indian tribes within the limits of the
Virginia in September, 1788, in a joint resolution
United States," see; Draper Manuscript Collection
claiming a "natural right" of "free navigation of the
(State Historical Society of Wisconsin) Tennessee
Mississippi River." Ramsey, 530. See also Stearns,
and Kings Mountain Papers , [Reel 2 XX, 4].
"Streams of Interest."
29. Stagg, Borderlines in Borderlands , 30.
17. For more on these points, see Ray, "Leadership
30. Andro Linklater, An Artist in Treason:
and Sovereignty in the Revolutionary American
Southwest: The State of Franklin as Case Study."
18. See Ray, Middle Tennessee, 1775-1825,
The Extraordinary Double Life of General James
Wilkinson , (New York, 2009).
31. Ramsey, Annals of Tennessee, 529.
chapters 1-2.
19. See Stearns, "Streams of Interest." See
32. Onuf, Origins of the Federal Republic , 56.
33. Andrew McMichael, Atlantic Loyalties , 17,
also J.C.A. Stagg, Borderlines in Borderlands: James
Madison and the Spanish American Frontier (New
19.
34. Samuel Cole Williams, The Lost State of
Haven, 2009).
20. "Galvez to Navarro, Aug. 29, 1779"
Lawrence Kinnaird, ed., Spain in the Mississippi
Franklin , 235.
35. White (James) to Miro, April 18, 1789,
Valley , 1765-1794 [Translations of Materials from
in Lawrence Kinnaird, ed., Spain in the Mississippi
the Spanish Archives in the Bancroft Library], 355-
Valley, 1765-1794 , 267-268.
36. "James White to Governor Johnston," in
57.
21. Kathleen DuVal, The Native Ground:
Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent
Clark, ed., SRNC, XXI, 465.
37. Miro's Offer to Western Americans April
20, 1789, in Kinnaird, 269-271.
(Philadelphia, 2006), 151.
22. "James Monroe to George Washington,
38. Barksdale, The Lost State of Franklin.
Aug. 20, 1786," in Theodore Crackel, ed., The
See also, Ray, "Leadership and Sovereignty in the
Papers of George Washington Digital Edition.
Revolutionary American Southwest;" and Williams,
Monroe alleges that Jay had "been negotiating with
History of the Lost State of Franklin, 231-34.
Congress to repeal his instructions (or rather with
particular members) so as to occlude the Mississippi,
39. "A Proclamation of N.C. Governor Samuel
Johnston, Nov. 29, 1788," in SRNQ Vol. XXI, 507.
40. Draper Manuscript Collection: Calendar of
and not with Spain to open it."
23. J.G.M. Ramsey, Annals of Tennessee to the
End of the Eighteenth Century , (Charleston, SC:
the Tennessee and King's Mountain Papers, (Madison,
Wis., 1929), 41.
41 . Abernethy, From Frontier to Plantation , 89.
1853), 525.
24. Onuf, Origins of the Federal Republic, 159.
This summation of Abernethy's argument cited in
25. "Jay to Robert R. Livingston, Paris, April
Finger, Tennessee Frontiers, 131.
42. Whitaker, "Muscle Shoals Speculation,"
22, 1783," Papers of John Jay, 42-43.
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26. "Rufus King to E. Gerry, June 4, 1786," in
378. He further argues that the Muscle Shoals
Charles R. King, ed., The Life and Correspondence of
Project ultimately "became part of the expansionist
71
Rufus King, Vol. 1 , 1755-1794 , (New York, 1894),
program of the new state," 370.
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176.
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27. "Thomas Jefferson to Archibald Stuart,
Jan. 26, 1786," in, Julian P. Boyd, et al., eds.,
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287
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