Niccolo Machiavelli
Of Principalities
To the Magnificent Lorenzo de' Medici
[Nicolai Maclavelli
De principatibus
Ad magnificum Laurentium Medicem]
CONTENTS
Dedicatory Letter
5
How many kinds of principalities there are and
the ways they are acquired
7
Of hereditary principalities
7
III.
Of mixed principalities
8
IV.
Why the kingdom of Darius, occupied by Alexander,
did not rebel against his successors after the-death
of Alexander
16
How cities or principalities should be governed
that lived by their own laws before they were
occupied
19
Of new principalities acquired by one's own
troops and virtue
20
Of new principalities acquired with the arms of
others and by Fortune
23
Of those who have become princes through
wickedness
30
.Of the civil principality
34
How the strength of all principalities should be
measured
38
Of ecclesiastical principalities
40
Of the various kinds of troops and mercenary
soldiers
42
Of auxiliary, mixed, and citizen soldiers
47
A prince's duty concerning military matters
50
I.
II.
V.
,VI.
VII.
VIII.
IX.
X.
XI.
XII.
XIII.
XIV.
Contents
4
xv. Of those things for which men, and particularly
XVI.
XVII.
XVIII.
XIX.
princes, are praised or blamed
53
Of generosity and miserliness
54
Of cruelty and mercy, and whether it is better
to be loved than to be feared, or the contrary
How a prince should keep his word
57
60
Of avoiding being despised and hated
62
xx. Of whether fortresses and many things that princes
XXI.
employ every day are useful or harmful
72
How a prince should act to acquire esteem
76
Of the prince's private secretaries
XXIII.
Of how to avoid flatterers
79
80
XXIV.
Why Italian princes have lost their states
82
Of Fortune's power in human affairs and how
she can be resisted
84
An exhortation to seize Italy and to free her
from the barbarians
87
XXII.
XXV.
XXVI.
DEDICATORY LETTER
Niccolo Machiavelli to
the Magnificent Lorenzo de' Medici*
[Nicolaus Maclavellus magnifico Laurentiio Medici
iuniori salutem*]
IN most instances it is customary for those who desire to win the
favour of a prince to present themselves to him along with those
things which they value most or which they feel will most please
him.* Thus, we oftel)..see princes given horses, ar!Ds, and vestments of gold cloth, precious stpnes, and similar ornaments
suited to their greatness.* Wishing, therefore, to offer myself to
Your Magnificence with some evidence of my devotion to you, I
have not found among my belongings anything that I might value
more or prize so much as the knowledge of the deeds of great
men that I have learned from a long experience in modern affairs
and a continuous study of antiquity.* Having with great care and
for a long time thought about and examined these deeds, and
having now set them down in a little book, I am sending them to
Your Magnificence. And although I consider this work unworthy
of your station, nevertheless I am sure that your humanity will
move you to accept it, for there could not be a greater gift from
me than to give you the means to be able, in a very short time, to
u1:1derstand all that in so many years and with so many hardships
and dangers I have come to understand and to appreciate. I have
neither decorated nor filled this work with elaborate sentences,
with rich and magnificent words, or with any other form of rhetorical or unnecessary ornamentation that many writers normally
use in describing and enriching their subject-matter, for I wished
that nothing should set my work apart or make it pleasing except
the variety of its material and the gravity of its contents.* Neither
do I wish that it be thought presumptuous if a man of low and
inferior social condition dares to examine and lay down rules for
the governance of princes. For just as those who paint landscapes
6
The Prince
place themselves in a low position on the plain in order to consider the nature of the mountains and the heights, and place
themselves high on top of mountains in order to study the plains,
in like manner, to know the nature of the people well one must be
a prince, and to know the nature of princes well one must be of
the people.
Accept, therefore, Your Magnificence, this little gift in the
spirit that I send it. If you read and consider it carefully, you will
discover in it my most heartfelt desire that you may attain the
greatness that Fortune* and all your own qualities promise
you. And if Your Magnificence will at some time turn your eyes
from the summit of your high position toward these low places,
you will realize to what degree I unjustly suffer a great and
continuous malignity of Fortune.*
The Prince
7
I
How many kinds of principalities there are and the
ways they are acquired
[Quot sint genera principatuum et quihus modis acquirantur]
states and all dominions that have had and continue to have
power over men have been, and still are, either republics or principalities.* Principalities are either hereditary, in which instance the
family of the prince has ruled for generations, or they are new.*
The new ones are either completely new, as was Milan for
Francesco Sforza,* or they are like appendages added to the
hereditary state of the prince who acquires them, as is the Kingdom of Naples for the King of Spain.* Dominions taken in this
way are either accustomed to living under a prince or are used to
being free; and they are gained either by the arms of others or by
one's own, eit~er through Fortune or through virtue.*
ALL
II
Of hereditary principalities
[De principatihus hereditariis]
I SHALL set aside any discussion of republics, because I have
treated them at length elsewhere.* I shall consider solely the
principality, weaving together the threads mentioned above as I
go, and I· shall discuss how these principalities can be governed
and maintained.
I say, then, that in hereditary states accustomed to the rule of
their prince's family, there are far fewer difficulties in maintaining
them than in new states, for it is sufficient simply not to break
ancient customs, and then to suit one's actions to unexpected
events. In this way, if such a prince is of ordinary ability he
will always maintain his state, unless some extraordinary and
8
The Prince
inordinate force should deprive him of it, and although it may be
taken away from him, he will regain it at the slightest mistake of
the usurper.
As an example, we have in Italy the Duke of Ferrara,* who ,
withstood the assaults of the Venetians in 1484 and those of Pope
Julius in r 5IO for no other reason than his long-established rule
in that dominion. Because a prince by birth has fewer reasons and
less need to harm his subjects, it is natural that he should be more
loved; and if no unusual vices make him hated, it is reasonable
that he should be naturally well liked by them. And through the·
great length and continuity of his dominion the memories and
causes of innovations die out, because one change always leaves
indentations for the construction of another.*
III
Of mixed principalities
[De principatibus mixtis]
BuT it is in the new principality that difficulties arise. In the first
place, if it is not completely new but is like an added appendage
(so that the two parts together may be called mixed), its difficulties derive first from one natural problem inherent in all new
principalities: that men gladly change their ruler, thinking to better themselves. This belief causes them to take up arms against
their ruler, but they fool themselves in this, since they then see
through experience that matters have become worse. This stems
from another natural and ordinary necessity, which is that a new
prince must always harm his new subjects, both with his soldiers
as well as with countless other injuries involved in his new conquest. Thus, you have made enemies of all those you harmed in
occupying the principality, and you are unable to maintain as
friends those who helped you to rise to power, since you cannot
satisfy them in the way that they had supposed. Nor can you use
strong medicines* against them, for you are in their debt: this is
so because, although someone may have the most powerful of
The Prince
9
armies, he always needs the support of the inhabitants to seize a
region. For these reasons, Louis XII, King of France, quickly
occupied Milan and just as quickly lost it.* The first time, the
troops of Ludovico alone were needed to retake it from him,
because those citizens who had opened the gates of the city to the
King, finding themselves deceived in their beliefs and in that
future improvement they had anticipated, could not support the
vexations of the new prince.
It is indeed true that when lands that have rebelled once are
taken a second time it is more difficult to lose them; for the ruler,
taking advantage of the rebellion, is less reticent about punishing
offenders, ferreting out suspects, and shoring up weak positions.
And so, if only a Duke Ludovico* creating a border disturbance
sufficed for France to lose Milan the first time, the whole world*
had to oppose her and destroy her armies or chase them from
Italy to cause her to lose it the second time. This occurred for the
reasons mentioned above. Nevertheless, it was taken from her
both the first and the second time. The general explanations for
the first loss have been discussed. Now it remains to specify those
for the second, and to see what remedies the King of France had,
and those that someone in the same situation could have, so as to
be able to maintain a stronger grip on his conquest than France
did.
I say, therefore, that those dominions, upon being conquered
and added to the long-established state of the one who acquires
them, are either of the same region and language or they are not.
When they are it is easier to hold them, especially when they are
unaccustomed to freedom. To possess them securely it is sufficient only to have wiped out the family line of the prince who
ruled them, because so far as other things are concerned, men live
peacefully as long as their old way of life is maintained and there
is no change in customs. We have seen what happened in the case
of Burgundy, Brittany, Gascony, and Normandy,* which have
been part of France for such a long time; and although there are
some linguistic differences, nevertheless the customs are similar,
and they have been able to get along together easily. Anyone who
acquires these lands and wishes to hold on to them must keep two
IO
The Prince
things in mind: first, that the family line of the old prince must
be wiped out; second, that neither their laws nor their taxes be
altered. As a result, in a very short time they will become one
body with the old principality.
But when dominions are acquired in a region that is not similar
in language, customs, and institutions, it is here that difficulties
arise; and it is here that one needs much good luck and much
diligence to hold on to them. One of the best and most efficacious
remedies would be for the person who has taken possession of
them to go there to live. This would make that possession more
secure and durable; as happened with the Turk in Greece;* for
despite all the other methods he employed to retain that dominion, if he had not gone to live there it would have been impossible
for him to hold on to it. By being on the spot, troubles are seen at
their birth and can be quickly remedied; not being there, they are
heard about after they have grown up and there is no longer any
remedy. Moreover, the region would not be plundered by your
own officers; the subjects would be pleased to have direct
recourse to their prince; thus, those wishing to be good subjects
have more reason to love him, and those wanting to be otherwise,
more reason to fear him. Anyone who might wish to invade that
dominion from abroad would be more hesitant; so that living
right there, it is only with the greatest difficulty that the prince
can lose it.
The other and better solution is to send colonies into one or
two places, that will act as shackles* on that state; for it is necessary that the prince either do this or maintain a large number of
cavalry and infantry. Colonies do not cost much, and with little or
no expense a prince can send and maintain them. In so doing he
injures only those whose fields and houses have been taken away
and given to the new inhabitants, who are only a small part of that
dominion. Those he injures, finding themselves scattered and
poor, can never be a threat to him; and all the others remain
uninjured on the one hand, and because of this they should
remain peaceful, and on the other hand are afraid of making a
mistake, for fear that what happened to those who were dispossessed might happen to them. I conclude that these colonies are
The Prince
II
not expensive, they are more loyal, they are less injurious, and the
offended can do no harm since they are poor and scattered (as l
have said). Concerning this, it should be noted that men must be
either caressed or wiped out; because they will avenge minor
injuries, but cannot do so for grave ones. Any harm done to a man
must be of the kind that removes any fear of revenge. But by
garrisoning troops there instead of colonies, one spends much
more, being obliged to consume all the revenues of the state in
standing guard, so that the gain turns into a loss; and far greater
injury is committed, since the entire state is harmed by the army
- changing quarters from one place to another. Everybody resents
this inconvenience, and everyone becomes the ruler's enemy;
and these are enemies that can be harmful, sil}.ce, although
conquered, they remain in their own homes. And so, in every
respect, this form of protection is as useless as the other kind,
colonization, is useful.
Moreover, anyone who is in a region that is unlike his own in
the ways mentioned above should make himself the leader and
defender of his less powerful neighbours, and do all he can to
weaken those who are more powerful; and he should be careful
that, for whatever reason, no foreigner equal to himself in
strength should enter there. And it will always happen that the
outsider will be brought in by those who are dissatisfied, either
because of too much ambition or because of fear, as was once seen
when the Aetolians brought the Romans into Greece.* In every
other province that the Romans entered, the native inhabitants
brought them in. The order of things is such that, as soon as a
powerful foreigner enters a region, all who are less powerful cling
to him, moved by the envy they have against the ruler who has
ruled over them. And so, concerning these weaker powers, the
invader has no trouble whatsoever in winning them over, since all
of them will immediately and willingly become part of the state
he has acquired. He need only be careful that they do not seize
too much military power and authority. With his own military
power and their support, he can very easily put down those who
are powerful, and remain complete arbiter of that region. Anyone
who does not follow this procedure will quickly lose what he
12
The Prince
has taken, and while he holds it, he will find it full of infinite
Jiffa:ullie::s anJ Lruuble::s.
In the regions they conquered the Romans followed these rules
very carefully. They sent out colonies, had dealings with the less
powerful without increasing their strength, put down the powerful, and did not allow powerful foreigners to gain prestige there. I
shall cite only the region of Greece as an example: the Romans
kept the Achaeans and the Aetolians in check; they put down the
Kingdom of Macedon;* Antiochus was driven out.* Nor did they
ever permit the Achaeans or the Aetolians to expand their territory, despite their merits. Nor did the persuasion of Philip of
Macedon ever convince them to make him their friend without
first humbling him. Nor could the power of Antiochus force their
consent to his having any dominion whatsoever in that region.
For the Romans did in these instances what all wise princes must
do: they must be on their guard not only against existing
dangers but also against future disturbances, and try diligently to
prevent them. Once evils are recognized ahead of time, they may
be easily cured; but if you wait for them to come upon you, the
medicine will be too late, because the disease will have become
incurable. And what physicians say about consumptive illnesses*
is applicable here: that at the beginning, such an illness is easy to
cure but difficult to diagnose; but as time passes, not having been
recognized or treated at the outset, it becomes easy to diagnose
but difficult to cure. The same thing occurs in affairs of state;
by recognizing evils in advance (a gift granted only to the
prudent ruler), they can be cured quickly; but when they are not
recognized and are left to grow to such an extent that everyone
recognizes them, there is no longer any remedy.
Thus, recognizing dangers from afar, the Romans always found
remedies for them; and they never allowed them to develop in
order to avoid a war, because they knew that war cannot be
avoided, but can only be put off to the advantage of others.
Therefore, they wanted to go to war with Philip and Antiochus in
Greece in order not to have to face them in Italy; and at the time,
they could have avoided both the one and the other, but they did
not want to do so. Nor did they ever approve of what is always.on
The Prince
13
the lips of our wise men today-to reap the benefits of time.
Instead, they reaped the benefits of their virtue and prudence; for
time brings with it all things, and it can bring with it the good as
well as the evil, and the evil as well as the good.
·
But let us return to France, and observe whether she did any of
the things we have just mentioned. I shall speak of Louis and not
of Charles;* and therefore about the one whose progress has been
observed better, because he held territory in Italy for a longer
period. You will see that he did the contrary of those things that
must be done in order to hold one's dominion in a region with
heterogeneous customs, languages, and institutions. King Louis
was brought into Italy because of the ambition of the Venetians,*
who wanted by his coming to gain for themselves half of Lombardy. I have no wish to criticize the decision the King made.
Wishing to establish a first foothold in Italy, and not having any
friends in this region, and furthermore, having all the gates
closed to him because of the actions of King Charles,* he was
forced to strike up whatever alliances he could. This laudable
decision would have succeeded if he had not erred in his other
· moves. After having taken Lombardy, then, the King immediately
regained the reputation that Charles had lost him: Genoa
surrendered;* the Florentines became his allies;* the Marquis of
Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, the Bentivoglios, the Countess
of Forli, the rulers of Faenza, Rimini, Pesaro, Camerino, and
Piombino, as well as the people of Lucca, Pisa, and Siena, all
rushed to become his ally.* At this point the Venetians could
understand the recklessness of the decision they had taken. To
acquire two towns in Lombardy, they had made the King master
of two-thirds of Italy.*
Consider now, first, with what little difficulty the King might
have maintained his reputation in Italy if he had followed the
above-mentioned rules and kept secure and defended all those
allies of his who, being numerous but both weak and fearfulsome afraid of the Church, others afraid of the Venetians-were
always forced to remain his allies; and with their assistance, he
could have easily protected himself against the remaining greater
powers. But no sooner was he in Milan than he did the opposite,
14
The Prince
providing assistance to Pope Alexander so that he could occupy
the Romagna. Nor did he realize that with this decision he had
made himself weaker, abandoning his allies and those who had
thrown themselves into his lap, and he had made the Church
stronger by adding to it so much temporal power, in addition
to the spiritual power from which it derives so much authority.
Having committed this first error, he was obliged to continue,* so
that in order to put an end to the ambition of Alexander and
to keep him from becoming the ruler of Tuscany,* the King was
forced to invade Italy.
It was not enough for him to have made the Church powerful
and to have alienated his allies, for since he coveted the Kingdom
of Naples, he divided it with the King of Spain. And whereas
previously he had been the arbiter of Italy, he now brought in a
partner, so that the ambitious and the malcontented of that
region had someone else to whom they could turn for help. And
whereas he could have left a tributary king to rule that kingdom,
Louis replaced him,* establishing one there who could, in turn,
drive Louis out. The desire to gain possessions is truly a very
natural and normal thing, and when those men gain possessions
who are able to do so, they will always be praised and not criticized. But when they are not able to do so, and yet wish to do so at
any cost, therein lie the error and the blame. Therefore, if France
could have attacked Naples with her own troops, she should have
done so. If she could not, she should not have shared it. And
if the sharing of Lombardy with the Venetians deserves to be
excused, since it allowed Louis to gain a foothold in Italy, this
other sharing deserves to be criticized, since it cannot be excused
by necessity.
Thus, Louis committed these five errors: he wiped out the less
powerful rulers; he increased the power of an already powerful
ruler in Italy; he brought into that region an extremely powerful
foreigner; he did not go there to live; and he did not set up
colonies there. In spite of all this, these errors (had he lived)
might not have injured him if he had not made a sixth: that of
reducing the dominion of the Venetians.* For if he had not made
the Church stronger, nor brought Spain into Italy, it would have
The Prince.
15
been most reasonable and necessary to put the Venetians down;
but, having made those first decisions, he should never have
agreed to their ruin, for as long as the Venetians were powerful
they would have always kept the others from trying to seize
Lombardy, partly because the Venetians would not have allowed
this unless they themselves became the rulers of Lombardy, and
partly because the others would not have wanted to take it away
from France to give it to the Venetians; and they would not have
had the nerve to attack both France and Venice.
And if someone were to say that King Louis handed over the
Romagna to Alexander and the Kingdom of Naples to Spain in
order to avoid a war, I would reply with the arguments advanced
above: that one should never allow disorder to persist in order to
avoid going to war, because one does not avoid a war but, instead,
defers it to your disadvantage. And if some others were to bring
forward as evidence the promise that the King made the Pope, to
undertake that enterprise in return for the annulment of his
marriage and the cardinal's hat for the Archbishop of Rouen, *
I would reply with what I shall say later about the promises of
princes and how they should be observed.*
King Louis lost Lombardy, therefore, by not following any of
the precepts observed by others who seized territories and wished
to retain them. Nor is this in any sense a miracle, but very ordinary and to be expected. I spoke about this at Nantes* with the
Cardinal of Rouen, when Valentino (as Cesare Borgia, son of
Pope Alexander; was commonly called)* was capturing the
Romagna. When the Cardinal of Rouen told me that Italians
understood little about warfare, I replied to him that the French
understood little about statecraft, for if they had some understanding, they would not have permitted the Church to gain so
much power. Experience has shown that the power of both the
Church and of Spain in Italy has been caused by France, and that
her downfall has been brought about by the Church and by
Spain. From this one can derive a general rule which rarely, if
ever, fails: that anyone who is the cause of another becoming
powerful comes to ruin himself; because that power has been
brought about by him either through cunning or by force; and
The Prince
both of these two qualities are suspect to the one who has become
powerful.
IV
Why the kingdom of Darius, occupied by
Alexander, did not rebel against his successors after
the death of Alexander
[Cur Darii regnum, quod Alexander occupaverat, a successoribus
suis post Alexandri mortem non deficit]
CONSIDERING the difficulties one has in maintaining a newly
acquired territory, one might wonder how it happened that when
Alexander the Great died, having become ruler of Asia in a few
years and having hardly occupied it, Alexander's successors*
nevertheless managed to hold on to it, although it would have
seemed reasonable for the whole region to revolt. And in keeping
it, they had no other difficulty than that which arose among
themselves from their own ambition. Let me reply that all principalities known to us are governed in two different ways: either
by a prince with all the others his servants, who as ministers
(through his favour and permission) assist in governing that
kingdom; or by a prince and by barons, who hold that rank not
because of any favour of their master but because of the antiquity
of their bloodline. Such barons as these have their own dominions
and subjects, who recognize them as masters and have natural
affection for them. In those states that are governed· by a prince
and his servants, the prince has greater authority, for in all his
territories there is no one else recognized as superior to him; and
if the people do obey any other persons, it is because they are his
ministers and officials; and they harbour a special affection for
him.
Contemporary examples of these two different kinds of governments are the Turk and the King of France. One ruler governs
the entire kingdom of the Turk; the others are his servants; and
The Prince
17
dividing his kingdom into sanjaks,* he sends various administrators there, and he moves them and changes them around as he
pleases. But the King of France is placed among a group of
hereditary nobles who are recognized in that state by their subjects and. who are loved by them; they have their hereditary
privileges, which the King cannot take away without endangering himself. Anyone, then, who considers the one and the other of
these two states will find that for the Turk the difficulty lies in
taking possession of the state, but once it has been conquered it is
very simple to hold on to it. And so (on the other hand), you will
find that in some respects it is easier to occupy the Kingdom of
France, but extremely difficult to hold on to it.
The reasons for the difficulty in being able to occupy the kingdom of the Turk are because it is not possible to be summoned
there by the princes of that kingdom, or to hope, through the
rebellion of those the ruler has around him, to make your enterprise easier. This is because of the reasons mentioned above: since
they are all his slaves and bound to him, it is more difficult to
corrupt them; and even if they could be corrupted, little profit
can be hoped for, since they will not be followed by the people for
the reasons already discussed. Therefore, anyone who attacks the
Turk must realize that he will find him completely united, and he
must rely more on his own forces than on the disunity of his
opponent. But once beaten and broken in battle so that he cannot
regroup his troops, there is nothing else to be feared than the
ruler's family. Once it has been wiped out, there remains no one
else to be feared, for the others have no credit with the people.
And just as, before the victory, tlie victor could place no hope in
them, so afterwards he should not fear them.
Th~ opposite occurs in kingdoms governed like that of France,
because you can invade them with ease once you have won to your
side some barons of the kingdom, since you can always find
malcontents and men who desire a change. These people, for the
reasons already given, can open the way to .that dominion and
facilitate your victory. However, when you wish to hold on to it
this is accompanied by endless problems, both with those who
have helped you and with those you have suppressed. Nor is it
18
The Prince
sufficient for you to wipe out the ruling family, since the nobles
who make themselves heads of new insurrections still remain.
And since you are neither able to make them happy nor to wipe
them out, you lose that dominion whenever the opportunity
arises.
Now, if you will consider the type of government Darius had,
you will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk; and therefore
Alexander had first to overwhelm it totally and defeat it in battle.
After this victory, Darius being dead, that state remained securely
in Alexander's hands for the reasons discussed above. And had
his successors been united they would have enjoyed it at their
leisure, for in that kingdom no disorders arose other than those
they stirred up themselves. But in states organized like that of
France, it is impossible to hold them with such tranquillity.
Because of this there arose the frequent rebellions in Spain,
France, and Greece against the Romans, all because of the
numerous principalities that existed in those regions. So long as
the memory of them lasted, Rome was always uncertain of those
possessions; but once this memory had been wiped out because of
their long and powerful rule, the Romans became sure possessors.
Afterwards, when the Romans fought among themselves, each
Roman leader was able to draw a following from those regions,
according to the authority he enjoyed there, and since the bloodlines of their former rulers had been wiped out, these regions
acknowledged only the Romans. Taking all these things into
account, therefore, no one should be at all surprised by the ease
with which Alexander held on to the region of Asia, or by the
problems others encountered in preserving the territory they
acquired, such as Pyrrhus and many others. This is not caused by
the greater or lesser virtue of the conqueror, but rather by the
different characteristics of the conquered territories.
The Prince
V
How cities or principalities should be governed that
lived by their own laws before they were occupied
[Qµodmodo administrande sunt civitates vel principatus qui ante
quam occuparentur suis legibus vivebant]
those states that are acquired, as I have said, are accustomed to living under their own laws and in freedom, there are
three methods of holding on to them: the first is to destroy them;
the second is to go ·there in person to live; the third is to allow
them to live with their own laws, forcing them to pay a tribute and
creating an oligarchy there that will keep the state friendly toward
you.* For since such a government, having been set up by that
prince, knows it cannot last without his friendship and power, it
must do everything possible to maintain them. A city accustomed
to living in freedom is more easily maintained through the
means of its own citizens than in any other way, if you decide to
preserve it.
As examples, there are the Spartans and the Romans. The
Spartans held Athens and Thebes by establishing oligarchies
there;* yet they lost them both. In order to hold Capua, Carthage,
and Numantia, the Romans destroyed them and did not lose
them.* They wished to hold Greece in almost the same manner
as the Spartans held it, making it free and leaving it under its
own laws, and they did not succeed. Thus, they were obliged to
destroy many of the cities in that region in order to retain it.* For
in fact, there is no secure means of holding on to cities except by
destroying them. Anyone who b.ecomes master of a city accustomed to living in liberty and does not destroy it may expect to be
destroyed by it, because such a city always has as a refuge in any
rebellion the name of liberty and its ancient institutions, neither
of which is ever forgotten either because of the passing of time or
because of the bestowal of benefits. And it matters very little what
one does or foresees, since if one does not separate or scatter the
WHEN
20
The Prince
inhabitants, they will not forget that name or those institutions.
Immediately, and in every instance, they will return to them, just
as Pisa did * after one hundred years of being held in servitude by
the Florentines. However, when cities or regions are accustomed
to living under a prince and his bloodline has been wiped out,
being on the one hand accustomed to obedience and, on the
other, not having their old prince and not being able to agree
upon choosing another one from amongst _themselves-yet not
knowing how to live as free men-they are, as a result, hesitant in
taking up arms, and a prince can win them over and assure himself of their support with greater ease. But in republics, greater
vitality, greater hatred, and greater desire for revenge exist. The
memory of ancient liberty does not and cannot allow them to rest,
so that the most secure course is either to wipe them out or to go
to live there.
VI
Of new principalities acquired by one's ·own
troops and virtue
[De principatibus novis qui armis propriis et virtute acquiruntur]
No one should wonder if, in speaking of principalities that are
completely new as to their ruler and form of government, I cite
the greatest examples. Since men almost always follow the paths
trod by others, and proceed in their affairs by imitation,*
although they are not fully able to stay on the path of others, nor
to equal the virtue of those they imitate, a wise man should always
enter those paths trodden by great men, and imitate those who
have been most excellent, so that if one's own virtue does not
match theirs, at least it will have the smell of it. He should do
as those prudent archers do* who, aware of the strength of their
bow when the target at which they are aiming seems too distant,
set their sights much higher than the designated target, not in
order to reach such a height with their arrow, but instead to be
able, by aiming so high, to strike their target.
The Prince
21
I say, therefore, that in completely new principalities, where
there is a new prince, greater or lesser difficulty in maintaining
them exists according to the greater or lesser virtue of the person
who acquires them. Because for a private citizen to. become a
prince presupposes virtue or Fortune, it appears that either the
one or the other of these two things should partially mitigate
many of the problems. Nevertheless, he who relies less upon
Fortune has maintained his position best. Matters are also facilitated when the prince, having no other dominions to govern, is
constrained to come to live there in person.
However, to come to those who have become princes by means
of their own virtue and not because of Fortune, I say that the
most outstanding are Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, and
others of their kind.* Although we should not discuss Moses,
since he was a mere executor of things he was ordered to do by
God, nevertheless he must be admired at least for the grace that
made him worthy of speaking with God. Let us then consider
Cyrus and the others who have acquired or founded kingdoms.
You will find them all admirable; and if their deeds and their
particular methods are considered, they will not appear different
from those of Moses, who had so great a teacher. In examining
their deeds and their lives, one can see that they received nothing
from Fortune except opportunity, which gave them the material
they could mould into whatever form they liked.* Without that
opportunity the strength of their spirit would have been
exhausted, and without that strength, their opportunity would
have come in vain.
It was therefore necessary for Moses to find the people oflsrael
slaves in Egypt and oppressed by the Egyptians, in order that
they might be disposed to follow him to escape this servitude. It
was necessary for Romulus not to stay in Alba, and that he be
exposed at birth, so that he might become king of Rome and
founder of that nation. It was necessary for Cyrus to find the
Persians unhappy about the rule of the Medes, and the Medes
rendered soft and effeminate after a lengthy peace. Theseus
could not have demonstrated his ability if he had not found the
Athenians dispersed. These opportunities, therefore, made these
22
The Prince
men successful, and their outstanding virtue enabled them to
recognize that opportunity,* whereby their nation was ennobled
and became extremely happy.
Those who, like these men, become princes through their
virtue acquire the principality with difficulty, bunhey hold on to
it easily. The difficulties they encounter in acquiring the principality grow, in part, out of the new institutions and methods*
they are forced to introduce in order to establish their state and
their security. One should bear in mind that there is nothing more
difficult to execute, nor more dubious of success, nor more dangerous to administer, than to introduce new political orders. For
the one who introduces them has as his enemies all those who
profit from the old order, and he has only lukewarm defenders in
all those who might profit from the new order. This lukewarmness partly arises from fear of the adversaries who have the law on
their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not
truly believe in new things unless they have actually had personal
experience of them. Therefore, it happens that whenever those
who are enemies have the chance to attack, they do so with partisan zeal, whereas those others defend hesitantly, so that they,
together with the prince, run the risk of grave danger.
However, if we desire to examine this argument thoroughly, it
is necessary to consider whether these innovators act on their
own or are dependent on others: that is, if they are forced to beg
for help or are able to employ force in conducting their affairs. In
the first case, they always come to a bad end and never accomplish
anything. But when they depend on their own resources and can
use force, then only seldom do they run the risk of grave danger.
From this comes the fact that all armed prophets were victorious
and the unarmed came to ruin. For, besides what has been said,
people are fickle by nature: it is easy to convince them of something, but difficult to hold them in that conviction. Therefore,
affairs should be managed in such a way that when they no longer
believe, they can be made to believe by force. Moses, Cyrus,
Theseus, and Romulus could not have made their institutions
respected for long if they had been unarmed; as in our times
happened to Brother Girolamo Savonarola,* who was ruined in
The Prince
23
his new institutions when the populace began to believe in them
no longer, since he had no way of holding steady those who had
believed, nor of making the unbelievers believe.
Therefore, such men encounter serious problems in conducting their affairs, and meet all their dangers as they proceed, and
must overcome them with their. virtue. However, once they have
overcome them and have begun to be venerated, having wiped
out all those who were envious of their accomplishments, they
-remain powerful, secure, honoured, and successful.
To such lofty examples I should like to add a lesser one; but
it will have some relation ~o the others, and I should like it to
suffice for all similar cases: and this is Hiero of Syracuse. From
a private citizen, this man became the ruler of Syracuse. He
received nothing from Fortune but the opportunity, for as the
citizens of Syracuse were oppressed, they elected him as their
captain, and from that rank he proved himself worthy of
becoming their prince. He had so much virtue while still a
private citizen that someone who wrote about him said: 'quod
nihil illi deerat ad regnandum praeter regnum' ['that he lacked
nothing to reign but a kingdom'].* He did away with the old
army and established a new one; he abandoned old alliances and
forged new ones; since he possessed allies and soldiers of his
own, he was able to construct whatever he desired on such a
foundation; so that it cost him great effort to acquire, but little
to maintain.
VII
Of new principalities acquired with the arms of
others and by Fortune
[De principatibus novis qui alienis armis etfortuna acquiruntur]
THOSE private citizens who become princes through Fortune
alone do so with little effort, but to maintain their position they
need a great deal. They encounter no obstacles along their way,
since they fly there, but all their problems arise once they have
The Prince
arrived. And these are the men who have been granted a state
either because they have money, or because they enjoy the favour
of him who grants it. This occurred to many in Greece, in the
cities of Ionia and the Hellespont, where Darius set up rulers in
order to hold these cities for his own security and glory. The same
thing happened to those emperors who came to power from being
private citizens by corrupting the soldiers.
Such men depend solely upon two very uncertain and \Instable
things: the will and the Fortune of him who granted them the
state. But they do not know how, and are unable, to maintain their
position. They do not know how to hold their state, since if men
are not of great intelligence and virtue, it is not reasonable that
they should know how to command, having always lived as
private citizens. They are unable to do so, since they do not have
forces that are faithful and loyal to them. Besides, states that arise
quickly, just like all the other natural things that are born and
grow rapidly, cannot have roots and branches and will be wiped
out by the first adverse weather. This occurs unless the men who
have suddenly become princes (as I have noted) possess such
virtue that they know how to prepare themselves rapidly to preserve what Fortune has dropped into their laps, and to construct
afterwards those foundations others have laid before becoming
princes.
Regarding the two methods just mentioned for becoming
a prince, by virtue or by Fortune, I should like to offer two
examples from recent memory: Francesco Sforza and Cesare
Borgia. Francesco became Duke of Milan from his station as a
private citizen through appropriate methods and a great deal of
virtue; and what he acquired with a thousand hardships he maintained with little effort. On the other hand, Cesare Borgia, called
by the people Duke Valentino, acquired the state through the
Fortune of his father, and when this was lost, he lost it; despite the
fact that he did everything and used every method that a prudent
and virtuous man ought to employ in order to root himself
securely in those states that the arms and Fortune of others had
granted him. For (as was stated above), anyone who does not lay
his foundations beforehand can do so later only with the greatest
The Prince
25
of virtue, although this is done with difficulty for the architect
and danger to the building. If, therefore, we consider all the
Duke's achievements, we shall see that he laid sturdy foundations
for his future power. And I do not think it useless to discuss them,
since I would not know of any better precepts to give to a new
prince than the example of his deeds. If he did not profit
from his methods it was not his fault, but this arose from an
extraordinary and extreme instance of contrary Fortune.
In his attempts to advance his son the Duke, Alexander VI
encountered many problems, both present and future. First, he
saw no means of making him master of any state that was not a
state of the Church. And when he decided to seize something
belonging to the Church, he knew that the Duke of Milan and the
Venetians would not permit this, because Faenza and Rimini were
already under the protection of the Venetians. Moreover, he saw
that the Italian military forces, particularly those he would have to
use, were controlled by those who had reason to fear the Pope's
greatness. Therefore, he could not count on them, since they all
belonged to the Orsini and Colonna famiiies or were their accomplices. It was, then, necessary to disturb the political balance of
Italy and throw the Italian states into turmoil so that he could
safely make himself the master of a part of them. This was easy
for him· to do, for he discovered that the Venetians, moved by
other motives, had turned to bringing the French back into Italy.
Not only did Alexander not oppose this, but he also rendered it
easier by annulling King Louis's previous marriage.
The King, therefore, entered Italy with the aid of the Venetians
and the consent of Alexander. No sooner was he in Milan than
the Pope obtained troops from him for the Romagna campaign,
and this was made possible for him because of the King's prestige. Then, having conquered the Romagna* and beaten down
the Colonna,* wishing to maintain the Romagna and to advance
further, the Duke was held back by two things: first, his troops,
who seemed disloyal to him; and second, the will of France. That
is to say, the troops of the Orsini family he had been using might
let him down, and not only keep him from acquiring more territory but even take away what he had already conquered. The
26
The Prince
King might well do the same thing. He had one experience like
this with the Orsini soldiers, when he attacked Bologna after the
seizure of Faenza and saw them go reluctantly into that battle. As
for the King, the Duke learned his intentions when the Duke
invaded Tuscany* after the capture of the Duchy of Urbino:* the
King forced him to abandon that campaign.
As a result, the Duke decided to depend no longer upon the
troops and Fortune of others. His first step was to weaken the
Orsini and Colonna factions in Rome. He won over all their followers who were noblemen, making them his own noblemen and
giving them huge subsidies; and he honoured them, according to
their rank, with military commands and civil appointments. As a
result, in a few months the affection for their factions was wiped
out from their hearts, and all of this affection turned towards the
Duke. After this, he waited for the opportunity to wipe out the
Orsini leaders, having already put to flight those of the Colonna
family. A good opportunity arose, and the use he put it to was
even better. For when the Orsini realized, only too late, that the
greatness of the Duke and of the Church spelled their ruin, they
called a meeting at Magione* in the territory of Perugia. From
this resulted the rebellion of Urbino, the insurrections in tl:w
Romagna, and countless dangers for the Duke,* all of which he
overcame with the assistance of the French. And when his reputation had been regained, placing no trust either in France or in
other forces not his own, in order not to have to test their
strength, he turned to treacherous deception. He knew how to
dissimulate his intentions so well that the Orsini themselves,
through Lord Paulo, reconciled themselves with him.* The
Duke did not fail to employ every kind of gracious act to reassure
Paulo, giving him money, garments, and horses, so that the stupidity of the Orsini brought them to Senigallia and into his
clutches.*
Having wiped out these leaders,* and having reduced their
partisans to his allies, the Duke had laid very good foundations
for his power, possessing all of the Romagna along with the
Duchy of Urbino. More important, it appeared that he had
befriended the Romagna and had won the support of all of its
The Prince
27
populace once the people began to taste the beneficial results of
his rule. Because this matter is worth noting and being imitated
by others, I do not want to pass over it. After the Duke had taken
the Romagna and had found it governed by powerless rulersmore anxious to plunder their subjects than to correct them, and
who had given them reason for disunity rather than unity, so that
the entire territory was full of thefts, quarrels, and every other
kind of insolence-he decided that if he wanted to make the
region peaceful and obedient to his regal power, it would be
necessary to give it good government. Therefore, he gave a cruel
and unscrupulous man, Messer Remirro de Oreo, the fullest
authority there. In no time at all Remirro reduced the territory to
a peaceful and united state, and in so doing, the Duke greatly
increased his prestige. Afterwards, the Duke judged that such
excessive authority was no longer required, since he feared that it
might become odious, and in the middle of the territory he set up
a civil tribunal with a very distinguished president,* in which
each city had its own advocate. Because he realized that the rigorous measures of the past had generated a certain amount of
hatred, in order to purge the minds of the people and to win them
completely over to his side he wanted to show that, if any form of
cruelty had occurred, it did not originate from him but from the
violent nature of his minister. Having found the occasion to do so,
one morning at Cesena he had Messer Remirro's body laid out in
two pieces on the piazza, with a block of wood and a bloody sword
beside it. The ferocity of such spectacle left that population
satisfied and stupefied at the same time.*
But let us return to the point we digressed from. I say that the
Duke, finding himself very powerful and partially secured from
present dangers, having armed himself in the way he desired, and
having in large measure destroyed those forces nearby that might
have harmed him, still had (if he wished to continue his conquests) to take into account the King of France; for he realized
that the King, who had become aware of his error only too late,
would not put up with any further conquest. Because of this, he
began to seek out new allies and to vacillate with France during
the campaign the French undertook in the Kingdom of Naples
a
28
The Prince
against the Spaniards besieging Gaeta.* His intent was to make
himself secure against the French, and he would have immediately succeeded in this if Alexander had lived. These were his
arrangements concerning present matters.
But as for future events, he had first to fear that a new successor in control of the Church might not be his ally, and might try
to take away what Alexander had given him. Against this possibility, he thought to secure himself in four ways: first, by wiping
out all the bloodlines of those rulers he had despoiled in order to
deprive the Pope of that opportunity; second, by gaining the
friendship of all the noblemen of Rome (as mentioned already),
in order to hold the Pope in check by this means; third, by
making the College of Cardinals as much his own as he could;
fourth, by acquiring such a large territory before the Pope died
that he would be able to resist an initial attack on his own. Of
these four things, he had realized three by the time of Alexander's death. The fourth he had almost realized, for he killed as
many of the despoiled noblemen as he could capture, and very
few saved themselves;* he had won over the Roman noblemen;
he had a large faction in the College of Cardinals;* and as for the
acquisition of new territory, he had plans to become ruler of
Tuscany and was already in possession of Perugia and Piombino*
and had taken Pisa under his protection.* As soon as he no
longer needed to respect the wishes of France (for he no longer
had to, since the French had already been deprived of the Kingdom of Naples by the Spaniards, forcing both of them to purchase his friendship), he would attack Pisa .. After this, Lucca and
Siena would have immediately surrendered, partly to spite the
Florentines and partly out of fear, and the Florentines would
have had no means of preventing it. If he had carried out these
designs (and he would have brought them to fruition during the
same year that Alexander died), he would have gathered together
so many military forces and such reputation that he would have
been able to stand alone and would no longer have had to rely
upon the Fortune and military forces of others, but instead .on his
own power and virtue.
But Alexander died* five years after Cesare Borgia had drawn
The Prince
29
his sword, Alexander left his son gravely ill, with only the state of
the Romagna secured and with all the others up in the air,* situated between two very powerful enemy armies.* But the Duke
possessed so much ferocity and so much virtue, and so well did he
understand how men can be won over or lost, and so sound were
the foundations that he had laid in such a short time, that if he
had not had those armies on his back or if he had been healthy, he
would have surmounted every difficulty.
That h1s foundations were sound is witnessed by the fact that
the Romagna waited more than a month for him;* in Rome,
although only half alive, he was safe;* and although the Baglioni,
Vitelli, and Orsini families came to Rome, they found none
of their allies opposed to him. If he could not set up a pope
he wanted, at least he could act to ensure that it would not be
someone he did not want. If he had been healthy.at the time of
Alexander's demise, everything would have been simple. On the
day when Julius II was made pope, he himself said to me* that he
had thought about what might happen on his father's death, and
had found a remedy for everything, except that he had never
dreamed that at the time of his father's death he, too, would be at
death's door.
Therefore, having summarized all the Duke's actions, I would
not know how to reproach him. On the contrary, I believe I am
correct in proposing that he be imitated by all those who have
risen to power through the Fortune and with the troops of others.
Possessing great courage and high goals, he could not have conducted himself in any other manner, and his plans were frustrated
solely by the brevity of Alexander's life and by his .own illness.
Anyone, therefore, who considers it necessary in his newly
acquired principality to protect himself from his enemies, to win
allies, to conquer either by force or by deceit, to make himself
loved and feared by the people, to be followed and revered by his
soldiers, to wipe out those who can or may do you harm, to
renovate ancient institutions with new ones, to be both severe and
kind, magnanimous and generous, to wipe out disloyal troops and
create new ones, to maintain alliances with kings and princes in
such a way that they must either gladly help you or injure you
The Prince
30
with caution-that person cannot find more recent examples than
this man's deeds.
One can only reproach him for creating Julius pope, for in this
he made a bad choice. For (as I said before), not being able to
create a pope to suit him, he should have prevented the papacy
from going to someone he did not like.* He should never have
agreed to raise to the papacy any cardinal he might have injured
or who, upon becoming pope, might have. cause to fear him. For
men do harm either out of fear or out of hatred. Those he had
injured were, among others, the Cardinal of St Peter's in Chains,
Cardinal Colonna, the Cardinal of San Giorgio, and Cardinal
Ascanio.* Upon becoming pope, any of the others would have to
fear him, except for the Cardinal of Rauen and the Spaniardsthe latter because they were related to him and were in his debt,
the former because of his power, since he was connected to the
Kingdom of France. Therefore, above all else, the Duke should
have created a Spanish pope. Failing that, he should have agreed
to the election of the Cardinal of Rauen and not to that of the
Cardinal of St Peter's in Chains. Anyone who believes that new
benefits make men of high station forget old injuries deceives
himsel( The Duke, then, erred in this election, and it was the
cause of his ultimate ruin.*
VIII
Of those who have become princes
through wickedness
[De his qui per scelera ad principatum pervenere]
there still remain two additional methods for an ordinary citizen to become a prince that cannot be attributed completely to either Fortune or virtue, I believe they should not be
omitted, although one of them will be discussed at greater length
in a treatise on republics.* These two methods are when one
becomes prince through some wicked and nefarious means; or
when a private citizen becomes prince of his native city* through
BECAUSE
The Prince
31
the favour of his fellow citizens. In discussing the first way, I shall
cite two examples, one from ancient times and the other from
modern times, without otherwise entering into the merits of this
method, since I consider them sufficient for anyone who finds it
necessary to imitate them.
Agathocles the Sicilian, who became King of Syracuse, was not
only an ordinary citizen but also of the lowest and most abject
condition. A potter's son, this man lived a wicked life at every
stage of his career. Yet he joined to his wickedness such strength
of mind and body, that when he entered upon a military career, he
rose through the ranks to become praetor of Syracuse. Once
placed in such a position, having decided to become prince and to
hold with violence and without any obligations to others what
had been conferred upon him by universal consent, and having
informed Hamilcar the Carthaginian (who was waging war with
his armies in. Sicily), one morning he called together the people
and the senate of Syracuse as if he were going to discuss some ·
matters concerning the republic. At a prearranged signal he had
his troops kill all the senators and the richest citizens; and when
they were dead he seized and held the rule of the city without any
opposition from the citizenry. Although he was twice defeated by
the Carthaginians and finally besieged, not only was he able to
defend his city, but, leaving part of his troops for the defence of ·
the siege, with his other forces he attacked Africa, and in a short
time he freed Syracuse from the siege and forced the Carthaginians into dire straits. They were obliged to make peace with him
and to be content with dominion over Africa, leaving Sicily to
Agathocles. *
Anyone, therefore, who examines the deeds and the life of this
man will observe nothing (or very little) that can be attributed to
Fortune. Not with the assistance of others (as was mentioned
before), but by rising through the ranks, which involved a thousand hardships and dangers, did he come to rule the principality
that he then maintained by many brave and dangerous actions.
Still, it cannot be called virtue to kill one's fellow citizens, to
betray allies, to be without faith, without pity, without religion;
' by these means one can acquire power, but not glory.* If one were
32
The Prince
to consider Agathocles' virtue in getting into and out of dangers,
and his greatness of spirit in bearing up under and overcoming
adversities, one can see no reason why he should be judged
inferior to any most excellent commander. Nevertheless, his
vicious cruelty and inhumanity, along with numerous wicked
deeds, do not permit us to honour him among the most excellent
of men. One cannot, therefore, attribute either to Fortune or to
virtue what he accomplished without either the one or the other.
In our own days (during the reign of Alexander VI), Oliverotto
of Fermo, who many years before had been left as a little child
without a father, was brought up by his maternal uncle named
Giovanni Fogliani. In the early days of his youth he was sent to
serve as a soldier under Paulo Vitelli, so that, once he was versed
in that discipline, he might attain some outstanding _military rank.
Then, after Paulo died,* he soldiered under Paulo's brother Vitellozzo. In a very short time, because of his skill and his boldness of
body and mind, he became the first man of Vitellozzo's troops.
However, since he felt it was demeaning to serve under others, he
decided, with Vitellozzo's help and with the assistance of some of
its citizens (those who preferred servitude to the liberty of their
native city), to take over Fermo. He wrote to Giovanni Fogliani
that, since he had been away from home for so long, he wanted
both to come to see him and his city and to check his inheritance.
Since he had exerted himself for no other reason than_ to acquire
honour, he wanted to arrive in honourable fashion, accompanied
by an escort of a hundred horsemen from among his friends and
servants, so that his fellow citizens might see that he had not
spent his time in vain. In addition, he begged his uncle to arrange
for an honourable reception from the people of Fermo, one that
might bring honour not only to Giovanni but also to himself as
his pupil.
Therefore, Giovanni in no way failed in his duty toward his
nephew: he had him received in honourable fashion by the people
of Fermo, and he gave him rooms in his own dwellings. After a
few days had passed and he had secretly made the preparations
necessary for his forthcoming wickedness, Oliverotto gave a
magnificent solemn banquet,* to which he invited Giovanni
The Prince
33
Fogliani·and all of the first citizens of Fermo. When the meal and
all the other entertainments customary at such banquets were
completed, Oliverotto artfully began to discuss serious matters,
speaking of the greatness of Pope Alexander and his son Cesare,
and of their undertakings. After Giovanni and the others had
replied to his arguments, he suddenly arose, declaring that these
were matters to be discussed in a more secluded place, and withdrew into another room. Giovanni and all the other citizens
followed him. No sooner were they seated than, from secret places
in the room, soldiers emerged who killed Giovanni and all the
others.* After this murder Oliverotto mounted his horse, paraded through the town, and besieged the chief officials in the
government palace. They were forced to obey him out offear, and
to constitute a government of which he made himself prince.
After he killed all those who might have harmed him because they
were unhappy with the situation, he strengthened his power by
instituting new civil and military institutions. As a result, in the
space of the year that he held the principality, not only was he
secure in the city of Fermo, but he had become feared by all its
neighbours. His expulsion would have been as difficult as that of
Agathocles, if he had not let himself be tricked by Cesare Borgia
(as was noted above), when the Duke captured the Orsini and the
Vitelli at Senigallia. There Oliverotto too was captured, a year
after he committed his parricide,* and together with Vittellozzo,
who had been his teacher in his virtues and wickedness, he was
strangled.
One might well wonder how, after so many betrayals and cruelties, Agathocles and others like him could live for such a long
time secure in their native cities and defend themselves from
foreign enemies without being plotted against by their own citizens. Many others, employing cruel means, were unable to hold
on to their state even in peaceful times, not to speak of the
uncertain times of war. I believe that this depends on whether
cruelty be badly or well used.* Those cruelties are well used (ifit
is permitted to speak well of evil) that are carried out in a single
stroke, done out of necessity to protect oneself, and then are not
continued, but are instead converted into the greatest possible
34
The Prince
benefits for the subjects. Those cruelties are badly used that,
although few at the outset, increase with the passing of time
instead of disappearing. Those who follow the first method
can remedy their standing, both with God and with men, as
Agathocles did; the others cannot possibly maintain their
positions.
Hence it should be noted that, in conquering a state, its conqueror should weigh all the injurious things he must do and
commit them all at once, so as not to have to repeat them every
day. By not repeating them, he will be able to make men feel
secure and win them over with the benefits he bestows upon
them. Anyone who does otherwise, either out of timidity or
because of bad advice, is always obliged to keep his knife in his
hand. Nor can he ever count upon his subjects, who, because of
their recent and continuous injuries, cannot feel secure with him.
Therefore, injuries should be inflicted all at once, for the less they
are tasted, the less harm they do. However, benefits should be
distributed a little at a time, so that they may be fully savoured.
Above all, a prince should live with his subjects in such a way that
no unforeseen event, either bad or good, may cause him to alter
his course; for when difficulties arise in adverse conditions, you
do not have time to resort to cruelty, and the good that you do will
help you very little, since it will be judged a forced measure, and
you will earn from it no gratitude whatsoever.
IX
Of the civil principality
[De principatu civili]
BuT let us come to the second instance, when a private citizen
becomes prince of his native city not through wickedness or
any other intolerable violence, but with the favour of his fellow
citizens. This can be called a civil principality, the acquisition
of which neither depends completely upon virtue nor upon
Fortune, but instead upon a fortunate astuteness. I maintain that
The Prince
35
one reaches this princedom either with the favour of the common
people or with that of the nobility, since these two different
humours* are found in every body politic. They arise from the
fact that the people do not wish to be commanded or oppressed
by the nobles, while the nobles do desire to command and to
oppress the people. From these two opposed appetites, there
arises in cities one of three effects: a principality, liberty, or
licence. A principality is brought about either by the common
people or by the nobility, depending on which of the two parties
has the opportunity. When the nobles see that they cannot resist
the populace, they begin to support someone from among themselves, and make him prince in order to be able to satisfy their
appetites under his protection. The common people as well, seeing that they cannot resist the nobility, give their support to one
man so as to be defended by his authority. He who attains the
principality with the help of the nobility maintains it with more
difficulty than he who becomes prince with the help of the
common people, for he finds himself a prince amidst many who
feel themselves to be his equals, and because of this he can
neither govern nor manage them as he wishes. But he who
attains the principality through popular favour finds himself
alone, and has around him either no one or very few who are not
ready to obey him. Besides this, one cannot honestly satisfy the
nobles without harming others, but the common people can certainly be satisfied. Their desire is more just than that of the
nobles-the former want not to be oppressed, while the latter
want to oppress. In addition, a prince can never make himself
secure when the people are his enemy, because there are so many
of them; he can make himself secure against the nobles, because
they are so few. The worst that a prince can expect from a
hostile people is to be abandoned by them; but with a hostile
nobility, not only does he have to fear being abandoned, but also
that they will oppose him. Since the nobles are more perceptive
and cunning, they always have time to save themselves, seeking
the favours of the side they believe will prevail. Furthermore, a
prince must always live with the same common people, but he
can easily do without the same nobles, having the power every
The Prince
day to make and unmake them, or to take away and restore their
power as he sees fit.
In order better to clarify this point, let me say that the nobles
should be considered chiefly in two ways: either they conduct
themselves in such a way that they commit themselves completely to your cause, or they do not. Those who commit themselves and are not rapacious should be honoured and loved.
Those who do not commit themselves can be evaluated in two
ways. If they act in this manner out of pusillanimity ?,nd a natural
lack of courage, you should make use of them, especially those
who are wise advisers, since in prosperous times they will gain
you honour, and in adverse times you need not fear them. But
when, cunningly and influenced by ambition, they refrain from
committing themselves to you, this is a sign that they think more
of themselves than of you. The prince should be on guard
against them and fear them as if they were declared enemies,
because they will always help to bring about his downfall in
adverse times.
Therefore, one who becomes prince with the support of the
common people must keep them well disposed. This is easy for
him, since the only thing they ask of him is not to be oppressed.
But one who becomes prince with the help of the nobility against
the will·of the common people must, before all else, seek to win
the people's support, which should be easy ifhe takes them under
his protection. Because men who are well treated by those from
whom they expected harm are more obliged to their benefactor,
the common people quickly become better disposed toward him
than if he had become prince with their support. A prince can
gain their favour in various ways, but because these, vary according to the situation, no fixed rules can be given for them, and
therefore I shall not discuss them. I shall conclude by saying only
that a prince must have the friendship of the common people.
Otherwise, he will have no support in times of adversity. Nabis,
Prince of the Spartans, withstood a siege by all of Greece and by
one of Rome's most victorious armies, and he defended his native
city and his own state against them. When danger suddenly
approached, he needed only to protect himself from a few of his
The Prince
37
subjects, but ifhe had had the common people hostile, this would
not have been sufficient.
Let no one contradict my opinion by citing that trite proverb,
claiming he.who builds upon the people builds upon mud; for that
is true when a private citizen makes them his foundation, and
allows himself to believe that the common people will free him if
he is oppressed by enemies or by the public officials. In such a
case, a man might often find himself deceived, as were the Gracchi
in Rome or as Messer Giorgio Scali was in Florence. When the
prince who builds his foundations on the people is a man able to
command and of spirit, is not bewildered by adversities, does not
fail to make other preparations, and is a leader who keeps up the
spirits of the populace through his courage and his jnstitutions,
he will never find himself deceived by the common people, and he
will discover that he has laid his foundations well.
Principalities of this type are usually endangered when they are
about to change from a civil government into an absolute form of
government. For these princes rule either by themselves or by
means of public magistrates. In the latter case, their status is
weaker and more dangerous, since they depend entirely upon the
will of those citizens who are appointed as magistrates·. These
men can very easily (especially in adverse times) seize the state,
either by abandoning him or by opposing him. And in such
periods of danger the prince has no time for seizing absolute
authority, since the citizens and subjects* who are used to receiving their orders from the magistrates are not willing to obey his
orders in these crises. And in doubtful times he will always find a
scarcity of men in whom he can trust. Such a prince cannot rely
upon what he sees during periods of calm when the citizens need
his rule, because then everyone comes running, everyone makes
promises, and each person is willing to die for him, since death is
remote. But in times of adversity, when the state needs its citizens, then few are to be found. Arid this experiment is all the
more dangerous since it can be tried but once. Therefore, a wise
prince must think of a method by which his citizens will need the
state and himself at all times and in every circumstance. Then
they will always be loyal to him.
The Prince
X
How the strength of all principalities should
be measured
[Quomodo omnium principatuum viresperpendi debeant]
IN examining the qualities of these principalities, another
consideration arises: that is, whether the prince has so much
power that he can (if necessary) stand up on his own, or whether
he always needs the protection of others. In order to clarify this
matter, let me say that I judge those princes self-sufficient who,
either through abundance of troops or of money, are capable of
gathering together a suitable army and of fighting a battle against
whoever might attack them. I consider men who always need the
protection of others to be those who cannot meet their enemy in
the field, but must seek refuge behind their city walls and defend
them. The first case has already been treated,* and later on I shall
say whatever else is necessary on the subject. Nothing more can
be added to the second case than to encourage such princes
to fortify and provision their own cities, and not to concern
themselves with the surrounding countryside. Anyone who has
fortified his city well, and has managed his affairs well with his
subjects in the manner I discussed above and discuss below, will
be attacked only with great hesitation, for men are always
enemies of undertakings in which they foresee difficulties, and it
cannot seem easy to attack someone whose city is well fortified
and who is not hated by his people.
The cities of Germany are completely independent, they control little surrounding territory, they obey the emperor when they
please, and they fear neither him nor any other nearby power. For
they are fortified in such a manner that everyone considers their
capture to be a tedious and difficult affair. They all have
appropriate moats and walls; they have enough artillery; they
always store in their public warehouses enough drink, food, and
fuel for a year. Besides all this, in order to be able to keep the
The Prince
39
lower classes fed without loss of public funds, they always keep in
reserve a year's supply of raw materials sufficient to give these
people work at those trades that are the nerves and lifeblood of
that city and of the industries from which the people earn their
living. Moreover, they hold the military arts in high regard, and
they have many regulations for maintaining them.
Therefore, a prince who has a city organized in this fashion
and who does not make himself hated cannot be attacked. Even if
he were to be attacked, the enemy would have to retreat in shame,
for the affairs of this world are so changeable that it is almost
impossible for anyone to sustain a siege for a year with his troops
idle. And if it is objected that when the people have their possessions outside the city, and see them destroyed, they will lose
patience, and that the long siege and self-interest wi~l cause them
to forget their love for their prince, let rile reply that a prudent
and spirited prince will always overcome all such difficulties,
inspiring his subjects now with hope that the evil will not last
long, now with fear of the enemy's cruelty, now by protecting
himself with clever manoeuvres against those who seem too outspoken. Besides this, the enemy will in all likelihood burn and lay
waste to the surrounding country upon their arrival, just when
the spirits of the defenders are stiHardent and determined on the
city's defence. And thus the prince has so much the less to fear,
because after a few days, when their spirits have cooled down
somewhat, the damage has already been inflicted and the evils
suffered, and there is no longer any remedy for them. Now the
people will rally around their prince even more, for it would
appear that he is bound to them by obligations, since their homes
were burned and their possessions destroyed in his defence. The
nature of men is such that they find themselves obligated as much
for the benefits they confer as for those they receive .. Thus, if
everything is taken into consideration, it will not be difficult for a
prudent prince to keep the spirits of his citizens firm during the
siege before and after this destruction, so long as he does not lack
sufficient food and weapons for his defence.
40
The Prince
XI
Of ecclesiastical principalities
[De principatibus ecclesiasticis]
ecclesiastical principalities now remain to be discussed.
Concerning these, all the problems occur before they are
acquired, since they are acquired. either through virtue or
through Fortune, and are maintained without one or the other.
They are sustained by the ancient institutions of religion, which
are so powerful and of such a quality that they keep their princes
in power no matter how they act and live their lives. These
princes alone have states and do not defend them; have subjects
and do not govern them; and their states, though undefended,
are never taken away from them; and their subjects, being
ungoverned, show no concern, and do not think about severing
their ties with them, nor are they able to. These principalities,
then, are the only secure and successful ones. However, since they
are protected by higher causes, that the human mind is unable to
fathom, I shall not discuss them: being exalted and maintained by
God, it would be the act of a presumptuous and foolhardy man to
do so.* Nevertheless, someone might ask me why it is that the
Church, in temporal matters, has arrived at such power when,
until the time of Alexander, the Italian powers-not just those
who were the established rulers, but every baron and lord, no
matter how weak-considered her temporal power as insignificant, and now a King of France trembles before it, and it has been
able to throw him out of Italy and to ruin the Venetians. Although
this situation may already be known, it does not seem superfluous
to me to recall it in some detail.
Before Charles, King of France, invaded Italy, this province
was under the power of the Pope, the Venetians, the King of
Naples, the Duke of Milan, and the Florentines. These rulers had
two major concerns: first, .that a foreigner might enter Italy
with his armies; second, that no one of them should seize more
ONLY
The Prince
41
territory.* Those whom they needed to watch most closely were
the Pope and the Venetians. To restrain the Venetians, the alliance
of all the rest was necessary, as was the case in the defence of
Ferrara.* To keep the Pope in check, they made use of the Roman
barons, who-divided into two factions (the Orsini and the
Colonna)-always had a reason for squabbling amongst themselves. They kept the papacy weak and unstable, standing with
their weapons in hand right under the eyes of the Pope. And
although from time to time there arose a courageous pope like
Pope Sixtus,* neither Fortune nor his wisdom could ever free
him from these difficulties. The brevity of the reigns of the popes
was the cause. In ten years (their average life expectancy), a p~pe
might put down one of the factions with difficulty. If, for
example, one pope almost wiped out the Colonna, a new pope
who was the enemy of the Orsini would emerge, enabling the
Colonna to grow powerful again, and yet he would not have sufficient time to destroy the Orsini. As a consequence, the temporal
powers of the Pope were little respected in Italy.
Then Alexander VI came to power, and he, more than any of
the popes who ever reigned, demonstrated how well a pope could
succeed with money and his own troops. With Duke Valentino as
his instrument and the French invasion as his opportunity, he
achieved all those things that I discussed earlier in describing the
actions of the Duke. And although his intention was to make the
Duke and not the Church great, nevertheless, what he did
resulted in the increase of the power of the Church, which after
his death, and once the Duke was ruined, became the heir to his
labours.
Then came Pope Julius, and he found the Church powerful,
possessing all of the Romagna, having destroyed the Roman
barons, and having annihilated their factions by Alexander's
blows. He also found the way open for the accumulation of wealth
by a method never before used by Alexander or his predecessors.*
These· practices Julius not only continued but also increased,
and he planned to capture Bologna, to wipe out the Venetians,
and to drive the French out of Italy.· He succeeded in all these
undertakings, and he is worthy of even more praise, since he did
42
The Prince
everything in order to increase the power of the Church, and not
for any private individual. He also managed to keep the Orsini
and the Colonna factions in the same condition in which he found
them. Although there were some leaders among them who
wanted to make changes, there were two things which held them
back: first, the power of the Church, which frightened them; and
second, not having any of their own family as cardinals, for these
men were the source of the conflicts among them. These factions
will never be at peace as long as they have cardinals, since such
men foster factions (both in Rome and outside the city), and those
barons are compelled to defend them. And thus, from the ambitions of the priests are born the disorders and the quarrels among
the barons.
Therefore, His Holiness Pope Leo* has found the papacy
extremely powerful. It is to be hoped that, if his predecessors
made it great by feats of arms, he will make it extremely great and
venerable through his natural goodness and his countless
virtues.*
XII
Of the various kinds of troops and mercenary soldiers
[Quot sunt genera militiae et de mercenaries militibus]
HAVING treated in detail all the characteristics of those principalities that I proposed to discuss at the beginning, and having
considered, to some extent, the reasons for their success or
failure, and having demonstrated the methods by which many
have tried to acquire them and to maintain them, it remains for
me now to speak in general terms of the kinds of offence and
defence that can be adopted by each of the previously mentioned
principalities.
We have said above that a prince must have laid fii:m foundations; otherwise he will necessarily come to ruin. And the principal foundations of all states, the new as well as the old or the
mixed, are good laws and good armies. Since good laws cannot
The Prince
43
exist where there are no good armies, and where good armies
exist there must be good laws, I shall leave aside the arguments
about laws and shall discuss the armed forces.
I say, then, that the armies with which a prince defends his
state are made up of his own troops, or mercenaries, or auxiliaries,
or of mixed troops. Mercenaries and auxiliaries _are useless and
dangerous. If a prince holds on to his state by means of mercenary armies, he will never be stable or secure. Mercenaries are
disunited, ambitious, undisciplined,.and disloyal. They are brave
with their friends; with their enemies, . they are cowards. They
have no fear of God, and they keep no faith with men. Their ruin
is deferred only so long as an attack is deferred. In peacetime you
are plundered by them, in war by your enemies. The reason for
this is that they have no other love nor other motive to keep them
in the field than a meagre salary, which is not enough to make
them want to die for you. They love being your soldiers when you
are not waging war, but when war comes, they either flee or
desert. This would require little effort to demonstrate, since the
present ruin of Italy is caused by nothing other than its having
relied on mercenary troops for a period of many years. These
forces did, on occasion, help some to get ahead, and they
appeared courageous in combat with other mercenaries. But
when the invasion of the foreigner came,* they showed themselves for what they were, and thus Charles, King of France, was
permitted to take Italy with a piece of chalk.* The man who said
that our sins were the cause of this disaster spoke the truth;* but
they were not at all those sins he had in mind, but rather these
I have recounted; and because they were the sins of princes, the
princes in turn have suffered the punishment for them.
I wish to demonstrate more fully the failure of such armies.
Mercenary captains are either excellent men or they are not. If
they .are, you cannot trust them, since they will always aspire
to their own greatness, either by oppressing you, who are their
masters, or by oppressing others against your intent; but if the
captain is without ability, he usually ruins you. If someone were
to reply that anyone who bears arms will act in this manner,
mercenary or not, I would answer that armies have to be
The Prince
44
command.ed either by a prince or by a republic. The prince must
go in person and perform the office of captain himself. A republic must send its own citizens, and when it sends one who does
not .turn out to be an able man, it must replace him. If he is
capable, the republic must restrain him with laws so that he does
not exceed his authority. We see from experience that only
princes and republics armed with their own troops make very
great progress, and that mercenaries cause nothing but damage.
A republic armed with _its own citizens is less likely to come
under the rule of one of its citizens than a city armed with
foreign soldiers.
Rome and Sparta for many centuries stood armed and free.
The Swiss are extremely well armed and are very free. An
example from antiquity of the use of mercenary troops is the
Carthaginians. They were almost overcome by their own mercenary soldiers after the first war with the Romans, even though
the Carthaginians had their own citizens as officers. Philip of
Macedon was made captain of their army by the Thebans after
the death of Epaminondas, and after the victory he took their
liberty away from them. After the death of Duke Filippo, the
Milanese employed Francesco Sforza to wage .war against the
Venetians; having defeated the enemy at Caravaggio,* he joined
with them to oppress the Milanese, his employers. Sforza, his
father,* being in the employ of Queen Giovanna of Naples, all at
once left her without defences. Because of this, so as not to lose
her kingdom, she was forced to throw herself into the lap of the
King of Aragon. And if the Venetians and the Florentines have in
the past increased their dominion with such soldiers, and their
captains have not yet made themselves princes but have, instead,
defended them, I answer that the Florentines have been favoured
in this matter by luck. Among their able captains whom they
could have had reason to fear, some did not win, others met with
opposition, and others turned their ambition elsewhere. The one
who did not win was John Hawkwood, whose loyalty will never be
known since he did not win. But anyone will admit that, had he
succeeded, the Florentines would have been at his mercy. Sforza
always had Braccio's soldiers as enemies, so that each checked the
The Prince
45
other. Francesco turned his ambition to T,ombardy, Braccio
against the Church and the Kingdom of Naples.
But let us come to what has occurred just recently. The Florentines made Paulo Vitelli their captain, a very able man and one
who rose from being a private citizen to achieve great prestige. If
he had captured Pisa, no one would deny that the Florentines
would have had to become his ally. Ifhe had become employed by
their enemies, they would have had no defence, and if they had
kept him on, they would have been obliged to obey him. As for
the Venetians, if we examine the course they followed, we see that
they operated securely and gloriously as long as they fought with
their own troops (this was before they began to fight on the
mainland); with their nobles and their common people armed,
they fought courageously [at sea]. But when they began to fight
on land, they abandoned this successful strategy and followed the
usuai practices of waging war in Italy. As they first began to
expand their territory on the mainland, since they did not have
much to control there and enjoyed great prestige, they had little
to fear from their captains. When their territory increased, which
happened under Carmagnola, the Venetians had a taste of this
mistake. Having found him very able (since under his command
they had defeated the Duke of Milan), and knowing, on the other
hand, that he had cooled off in waging war, they judged that they
could no longer conquer under him, for he had no wish to do so.
Yet they could not dismiss him, for fear of losing what they had
acquired. So, in order to secure themselves against him, they
were forced to execute him. Then they had as their captains
Bar.tolomeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, the Count of
Pitigliano, and the like. With men such as these they had to fear
their losses, not their acquisitions, as occurred later at Vaila, *
where, in a single day,* they lost what had cost them eight hundred years of exhausting effort to acquire.* From these kinds of
soldiers, therefore, come only slow, tardy, and weak conquests but
sudden and astonishing losses.
And since with these examples I have begun to treat of Italy,
which for many years has been ruled by mercenary soldiers, I
should like to discuss them in greater depth, so that once their
The Prince
origins and developments are uncovered they can be more easily
corrected. You must, then, understand how in recent times, when
the Empire began to be driven out ofltaly and the Pope began to
win more prestige in temporal affairs, Italy was divided into many
states. Many of the large cities took up arms against their nobles,
who (at first backed by the Emperor) had kept them under their
control. The Church supported these cities to increase its temporal power; in many other cities, citizens became princes. Hence,
after Italy came almost entirely into the hands of the Church and
of several republics, those priests and other citizens who were not
accustomed to bearing arms began to hire foreigners. The first to
give prestige to such troops was Alberigo of Conio from the
Romagna. From this man's training emerged, among .others,
Braccio and Sforza, who in their day were the arbiters of Italy.
After them came all the others who have commanded these soldiers until the present day. The result of their skills has been that
Italy has been overrun by Charles, plundered by Louis, violated
by Ferdinand, and insulted by the Swiss.
Their method was, first, to increase the prestige of their own
soldiers by taking away the prestige of the infantry. They did so
because they were men without a state of their own, who lived by
their profession; a small number of foot-soldiers could not give
them prestige, and they could not afford to hire a large number of
them. So they relied completely upon cavalry, since for possessing
only a reasonable number of horsemen they were provided for and
honoured. They reduced matters to such a state that in an army of
twenty thousand troops, one could hardly find two __thousand footsoldiers. Besides this, they had used every means to spare themselves and their soldiers fear and hardship, not killing each other
in their scuffies, but instead taking each other prisoner without
demanding ransom. They would not attack cities at night. Those
in the cities would not attack the tents of the besiegers. They built
neither stockades nor trenches around their camps. They did not
campaign in the winter. And all these things were permitted by
their military institutions and gave them a means of escaping
hardships and dangers, as was mentioned. As a result, these
condottieri have conducted Italy into slavery and disgrace.*
The Prince
47
XIII
Of auxiliary, mixed, and citizen soldiers
[De militibus auxiliariis, mixtis et propriis]
THE other kind of worthless army, auxiliary troops, are those that
arrive when you call a powerful prince to bring his forces to your
aid and defence, as was done in recent times by Pope Julius, who,
having witnessed the sad showing of his mercenary soldiers in the
· campaign of Ferrara, turned to auxiliary soldiers and made an
agreement with Ferdinand, King of Spain, that he should assist
him with his soldiers and his armies.* These soldiers can be
useful and good in themselves, but for the man who summons
them they are almost always harmful. If they lose, you are destroyed; if they win, you end up their prisoner. And although
ancient histories are full of such examples, nevertheless I do not
wish to leave unexamined this recent example of Pope Julius,
whose policy could not have been more poorly considered; for he
threw himself completely into the hands of a foreigner in his
desire to take Ferrara. But his good luck caused a third development, so that he did not reap the fruits of his ill-advised decision.
After his auxiliaries were routed at Ravenna,* the Swiss rose up
and chased out the victors, to the surprise of Pope Julius as well
as everyone else. Thus, he was neither taken prisoner by his
enemies, who had fled, nor by his auxiliaries, since he triumphed
with troops other than theirs. Completely unarmed, the Florentines engaged ten thousand French soldiers to take Pisa:*
such a plan endangered them more than any of their previous
predicaments. In order to oppose his neighbours, the Emperor of
Constantinople* brought ten thousand Turkish troops into
Greece: when the war was over they did not want to leave, and
this was the beginning of Greek servitude under the infidel.
Anyone, therefore, who wishes to be unable to win should
make use of these soldiers, for they are much more dangerous
than mercenary troops. With them ruin is assured, for they are
The Prince
completely united and completely under the command of
others. Whereas, after they have been victorious mercenaries
require more time and a better opportunity if they are to injure
you, for they are not a single body of men and they have been
brought together and paid by you. Any third party whom you
might make their commander cannot immediately seize enough
authority to harm you. In short, with mercenaries the greatest
danger is their reluctance to fight; with auxiliaries, their military
virtue. A wise prince has always avoided these soldiers and has
turned to his own troops. He has preferred to lose with his own
troops rather than to win with those of others, judging that to
be no true victory which has been gained by means of foreign
troops.
I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. This
Duke entered the Romagna with auxiliary troops, leading an
army composed entirely of Frenchmen; and with them he captured Imola and Forli. * But not considering such troops reliable,
he turned to mercenary forces, judging them to be less dangerous,
and he hired the Orsini and the Vitelli. When he found, in managing them, that they were unreliable, disloyal, and dangerous, he
got rid of them and turned to his own men. And it is easy to see
the difference between these two sorts of troops, if we consider
the difference between the Duke's reputation when he had only
French troops or when he had the Orsini and the Vitelli, as
opposed to when he was left with his own troops and depending
on himself. We find that his prestige always grew. Never was
he esteemed more highly than when everyone saw that he was
completely in command of his own troops.
I did not wish to depart from citing recent Italian examples, yet
I do not want to omit Hiero of Syracuse, one of those I mentioned
above. This man, as I said, having been named by the Syracusans
commander of their armies, immediately realized that mercenary
forces were useless, since their condottieri were men like our
Italian condottieri. It seemed to him that he could neither keep
them on nor dismiss them, so he had them all cut to pieces.
Afterwards he waged war with his own troops, and not with those
belonging to others.
The Prince
49
I should also like to call to mind a figure from the Old
Testament* that suits this topic. David offered himself to Saul to
fight Goliath, the Philistine challenger. In order to give him courage, Saul armed him with his own armour, which David cast off
after putting it on, declaring that with it he could not test his true
worth. He therefore wished to meet the enemy with his own sling
and his own knife. In short, the weapons of others slide off your
back, weigh you down, or tie you up.
Having freed France from the English* by means of his
Fortune and his virtue, Charles VII, father of King Louis XI,
recognized the necessity of arming himself with his own men,
and he set up an ordinance to procure cavalry and infantry in his
kingdom.* Later, his son King Louis abolished the ordinance of
the infantry and began to hire Swiss troops.* This error, followed
by others, as we can now observe from events, is the cause of the
threats to that kingdom. By giving prestige to the Swiss, he discredited his own troops, for he did away entirely with his footsoldiers and obliged his cavalry to depend upon the abilities of
others. Being accustomed to fighting with the aid of the Swiss,
the French cavalry felt they could not win without them. From
this, it came about that the French were not strong enough to
match the Swiss, and without the Swiss they did not test their
chances. The armies of France, therefore, have been mixed,
partly mercenaries and partly her own troops. Armies combined
together in such a fashion are much better than a purely auxiliary
force or a purely mercenary army, but are greatly inferior to one's
own troops. And the example just cited should suffice, for the
Kingdom of France would be invincible if Charles's military
institutions had been developed or preserved. But the poor
judgement of men will begin something that seems good at the
outset without noticing the poison concealed underneath, as I
said earlier in connection with consumptive fevers. And thus
anyone who does not diagnose the ills when they arise in a principality is not really wise, and this talent is given to few men. If one
looks for the first signs of the downfall of the Roman Empire
it will be found to have begun with the hiring of the Goths as
mercenaries.* From that beginning the armed forces of the
50
The Prince
Roman Empire began to be weakened, and all the virtue taken
away from it was given over to the Goths.
I conclude, therefore, that without having one's own soldiers,
no principality is safe. On the contrary, it is completely subject to
Fortune, not having the virtue that defends it faithfully in adverse
times. It was always the opinion and conviction of wise men,
'quod nihil sit tam infirmum aut instabile quam fama potentie
non sua vi nixa'* ['that nothing is so unhealthy or unstable as the
reputation for power that is not based upon one's .own forces'].
One's own soldiers are those composed either of subjects or of
citizens or your own dependants; ali others are either mercenaries
or auxiliaries. The means of ordering one's own arms are easily
discovered, if the methods followed by those four men* I have
cited above are examined, and if one observes how Philip, father
of Alexander the Great,* and many republics and princes have
armed and organized themselves. I take my stand entirely on such
methods.
XIV
A prince's duty concerning military matters
[Quod principem deeeat circa militiam]
A PRINCE, therefore, must not have any other object nor any
other thought, nor must he adopt anything as his art but war,
its institutions, and its discipline; because that is the only art*
befitting one who commands. This discipline is of such efficacy
that not only does it ma...
Purchase answer to see full
attachment